Military Review

Theories of War

40
Theories of War



War is a complex social phenomenon, which is a continuation of the political struggle of states, nations, classes by means of armed violence. The main content of the war is organized armed struggle. At the same time, other forms of struggle are widely used in it (political, economic, ideological), which in the war conditions acquire the most drastic nature and specific features (rupture of diplomatic relations, blockade, sabotage, special methods of decomposition of the army and the rear of the enemy, etc.).

All история Humanity is basically a story of war and armed conflict. Scientists estimate that in the last 5,5 thousand years there have been about 14,5 thousand large and small wars. At the same time, wars were different, and accordingly theories of wars were also different.

HISTORICAL FLASHBACK

The war itself appeared with the emergence of the slave formation. Armed clashes were fought with the aim of seizing other people's riches, territories, slaves. One of the first theories of war is associated with the name of the ancient Chinese commander and military theorist Sun Tzu, the author of the famous treatise on the art of war, in which he examined the relationship between war and politics, victory factors, strategy and tactics.

According to Sun Tzu, the highest transubstantiation of war is to destroy the plans of the enemy; then destroy his alliances; then break his army; the most recent is to attack its fortified cities. However, to fight a hundred times and win a hundred times is not the best of the best.

The best of the best - to conquer someone else's army, not fighting. And the one who has succeeded in military affairs, subjugates other people's armies, without engaging in battle, captures other cities, not besieging them, and destroys other countries without a long battle.

In the Middle Ages, in Western Europe, during the period of feudal anarchy and the complete domination of the Church, science, including military science, was driven into monastic cells. Scholasticism and dogmatism that prevailed in medieval philosophy ruled out the possibility of a theoretical study of combat practice. Among the military theorists of medieval Western Europe can only be called the Italian political figure Niccolò Machiavelli, who outlined in the treatise On Military Art the main provisions of the organization, training and arming of the army, as well as the requirements for the commander.

Machiavelli's strategic views were inconsistent. He put forward as the main means of achieving victory that decisive battle, now the starvation of the enemy. Many of the provisions of Machiavelli borrowed from Vegetia, often mechanically transferring the experience of the army of ancient Rome to a completely different era. The immediate goal of the armed struggle, he defined as: "Anyone who wants to wage war sets one goal for himself - to be able to confront any enemy in the field and defeat him in a decisive battle."

As for the military art of the Arabs, Ottoman Turks and Mongol conquerors, it was distinguished by cunning and cunning. Wars were fought by large masses of cavalry, and strategic actions were characterized by a desire to evade general battles. The policy was aimed primarily at aggravating the internal contradictions of the enemy, disuniting the people and the government, disintegrating their troops and suppressing the opponent's will to resist.

The most important content of the strategy was the disorganization of the defense of the enemy by internal subversive activity and terror; evading the struggle against large organized forces of the enemy, bypassing them and taking a deep blow at the vital centers of the country; destruction of the government and high command of the enemy forces. In the modern world, the English military theorist and historian Liddell Harth justified such a policy as a strategy of indirect action.

NEW TIME

The development of science and technology was a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of new methods of warfare and battle. The use of gunpowder for military purposes in Europe and the invention of firearms in the 16th century weapons led to the peculiarities of the new wars, which now involved mass armies. Increased spatial scope, bitterness and duration of the battles.

At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, the wars of Napoleon I Bonaparte had a significant influence on the development of military art. The main features of his military art are an organic combination of political and military-strategic decisions, deep creativity, decisive actions with maximum concentration of troops and artillery for the main attack. Leading the war, Napoleon set his goal to decide its outcome in a general battle. From the battle, Napoleon said, "the fate of the army, the state or the possession of the throne depends." Having destroyed the enemy's army in one or several general battles, he seized his capital and dictated its own conditions to it.

In contrast to Napoleon, the Prussian military theorist Heinrich Bülow believed that a war could be won by actions on communications, while dodging a general battle. In order to counteract the enemy’s maneuvering strategy, the defending side erected powerful fortresses with important garrisons and large inventories on important communications hubs. All available forces of the defending army were located along the borders with a thin barrier (cordon), having the task of covering the most probable directions of actions of the enemy troops. The advancing army did not dare to penetrate the line of enemy fortresses, fearing to leave their communications at risk. Such a passive way of waging war was called the “cordon strategy”.

The military theorist and historian, Infantry General Heinrich Jomini, in his Discourses on the Great Military Acts ... and Essays on the Art of War, advanced the theory of the strategic crushing of the enemy by means of a decisive offensive. However, he template Napoleonic methods of strategic actions and did not take into account the new conditions for waging war that were already emerging.

The great Russian commander, Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, who defeated Napoleon’s army, raised the art of war to a new, higher level of development. Strategic goals were achieved by him by concentrating forces on the decisive direction and routing the enemy in a system of successive battles and battles instead of one general battle.

The German military theorist, Major General Karl Clausewitz, in his main work, On War, defined the strategy for organizing a general battle, for which he recommended concentrating all forces and means: “To win, you must meet the main forces of the enemy ... Fight is the only effective way of doing war; his goal is the destruction of enemy forces as a means of ending the conflict. ”

Prussian and German military leader and theorist, Field Marshal Moltke the Elder led ideas of the inevitability of war, a sudden attack and a lightning-quick defeat of the enemy by encirclement. French military leader and military theorist Marshal Ferdinand Foch considered battle an indispensable condition for waging war: "Modern war to achieve its ultimate goal ... recognizes only one means, namely, the destruction of the organized forces of the enemy."

At the end of the XNUMXth century, the American naval theorist, Rear Admiral Alfred Mahan, together with the English naval theorist, Vice Admiral Philip Colomb, created the so-called theory of naval power, according to which naval forces play a decisive role in armed struggle, and conquest dominance at sea - the main condition for victory in the war. In turn, the Italian military theorist, General Giulio Douai at the beginning of the twentieth century, created a theory about the leading role aviationwhich is capable of deciding the outcome of the war ("Douai doctrine"). According to Douai, aviation, having gained dominance in the air, can strike at state and economic centers of the enemy alone to achieve victory in the war. Army and the fleet an auxiliary role was assigned. The First and Second World Wars proved the complete failure of both of these theories.

Lightning war, or "blitzkrieg" - the theory of waging short-lived war, was created at the beginning of the 20th century by German General Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen. Schlieffen’s views (which received the official status of the Schlieffen Doctrine) are most fully covered in the Modern War article published by him in 1909. The doctrine is based on a plan of lightning defeat of the enemy in one big battle (operation) with the crushing blow of a powerful strike fist on one of the flanks of the strategic front. The Second World War denied this claim.

The concept of total war, developed by German military theorists at the beginning of the 20th century, was based on the point of view of modern war as a war of nations, not armies. Therefore, in order to win, it is necessary, on the one hand, to mobilize all the resources of “its” nation, and on the other, to have a full impact on the hostile nation in order to break its spirit and ensure that it demands from its government that the resistance be stopped. The experience of two world wars showed the failure of this theory.

ROCKET-NUCLEAR EPOCHA

The creation of fundamentally new types of weapons in the last century led to a radical change in the previous ideas about war and the modification of the forms, methods and methods of military operations. This was facilitated by the massive use of armored forces, aircraft and submarine forces of the fleet, the appearance in the middle of the twentieth century of nuclear missile weapons and the rapid development of information and communication technologies from the end of the twentieth century.

Back in the 20 of the last century, the outstanding Russian military theorist Major General Alexander Svechin opposed the absolutization of the theory of total war and advocated the necessity of combining various forms of war - the war of crushing and war of attrition (exhaustion), including in the latter not only defensive actions in broad military-political understanding, but also elements of “indirect action”. At the beginning of the 1930s, he wrote that only a war of attrition, with limited goals, was expedient for the USSR, and the time of the proletarian war had not yet come to crush. Then these judgments of Professor Svechin were rejected with harsh criticism of him, but the year 1941 confirmed his warnings.

In 1920, the English military theorist and historian Liddel Garth began publishing his strategy of indirect action in the popular press, which requires you to avoid a decisive clash with the enemy. According to Liddell Garth, during the war, it would be more expedient to disarm the enemy rather than destroy him in a difficult struggle. “The most reasonable strategy in any campaign,” he pointed out, “is to delay the battle, and the most rational tactic is to delay the beginning of the offensive until the enemy’s morale is undermined and favorable conditions are created delivering a decisive blow.

Immediately after the Second World War, the doctrine of nuclear war was adopted in the United States, subsequently being reflected in all official strategic concepts of the United States and NATO. The military doctrine of the USSR also envisaged the decisive role of nuclear missiles in the war. At the first stage, the possibility was considered only of a general nuclear war, characterized by the unrestricted, massive and time-concentrated use of all types of nuclear weapons for military and civilian purposes.


American naval theorist, Rear Admiral Alfred Mahan.


However, there was a possibility that the outbreak of such a war would have led to the death of human civilization, therefore in the second half of the 1950-s in the USA the concept of limited nuclear war was put forward. Later, such a conflict was considered to be an armed struggle against the use of various types of weapons, including tactical and operational-tactical nuclear weapons, the use of which is limited in scope, areas of use and types of nuclear weapons. In this case, nuclear weapons are used to destroy the most important military and military-economic targets of the enemy.

In 1961, due to an increase in the USSR’s nuclear potential and a roughly equal balance of forces, the US leadership switched to a flexible response strategy - the admissibility of using nuclear weapons not only in total, but also in limited military conflict. And in 1971, the United States proclaimed a strategy of realistic deterrence (realistic deterrence), which retained the fundamental principles of the previous strategy, but gave it greater activity and flexibility in building up and using the military power of the United States and its allies.

INFORMATION WAR

After the end of the Cold War, the danger of a world nuclear war diminished. In modern war, the thesis of the prevalence of the moral and psychological factor over the physical destruction of the enemy is becoming more common. The war, even in its traditional form, is seen by military experts not only and not so much by military clashes on the battlefield, as by complex information-technological, cognitive-psychological, virtual-real phenomenon.

According to the views of the Russian military theorist Major-General Vladimir Slipchenko: “In an armed struggle of the future, victory can be achieved mainly only by destroying the economic potential of the enemy. Moreover, if the defending enemy was not ready for the wars of the future, and he made the whole stake, as in the past, on his ground forces, then, as already paid attention, there is no need to smash such his armed forces. They, with the exception of the means of retaliation, do not pose any threat to the attacker, and in the conditions of a ruined economy are doomed, first, to lose their combat capability, and then to complete collapse. In such circumstances, the political system will inevitably collapse. ”

An analysis of the characteristics of war under modern conditions by Major General Alexander Vladimirov allowed him to draw the following conclusions: “Modern war can be viewed as a struggle of ideologies for domination in world governance, aggressively waged by nations (state) through geopolitical technologies supported by information, economic and military superiority periodic use of the actual military (armed) means of war ".

“Modern wars are fought at the level of consciousness and ideas, and only there and thus are the most complete victories achieved. The war is fought with new operational tools that have the appearance of modern geopolitical technologies that are informational. The product (the fruit of victory) of information technology is a given state of human (national) consciousness, ”says Major General Vladimirov.

In turn, the President of the Academy of Military Sciences, Army General Makhmut Gareyev regarding future wars, makes the following assumptions: “First of all, we see that global nuclear war and large-scale war in general are becoming less and less likely. And not only because of the disastrous consequences of such a war, or because someone arbitrarily canceled such wars. Other insidious and fairly effective forms of international confrontation are simply found, when it becomes possible by unleashing local wars, conflicts, the application of economic, financial sanctions, political-diplomatic and information-psychological pressure, various kinds of subversive actions, as was the case in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Georgia , consistently subordinate and lead to a general world order recalcitrant countries, without resorting to a big war. "

According to Western experts, modern war is an information war, and it is won by one whose information systems are more perfect. The term “information war” appeared in the middle of the 80-ies in connection with the new tasks of the US Armed Forces after the end of the Cold War and was formalized by the Directive of the US Department of Defense on December 21 of the 1992 of the year. And in October, 1998 of the United States Armed Forces launched the Unified Information Operations Doctrine, which is a concentrated presentation of the views of the US military leadership on the nature and organization of the impact on the enemy’s information resources and the protection of their own information resources from similar influences. As stated in the preface of the doctrine, the ability of the US armed forces to "pre-empt or prevent crises and conflicts in peacetime, as well as to win in wartime, depends crucially on the effectiveness of information operations at all levels of war and across the entire spectrum of armed hostilities."

Defining the features of the information war, US government security expert Richard Clark introduces the concept of "cyber war." According to his definition, “cyberwar is the actions of one national state from penetrating computers or networks of another national state to achieve the goal of damage or destruction.” According to one American cyber security analyst, in order to prepare a cyber attack that would disable computers and paralyze the United States, it would take two years or less 600 people, and it would cost less than $ 50 million per year.

Understanding the importance of informational confrontation, as early as June, 2009 in the United States created cyber command, which was responsible for the security of computer networks of the US Defense Department, conducting computer intelligence, preventing cyber attacks on the United States, and launching preemptive strikes against opponents preparing such actions. At present, the 24 th cybernetic army of the Air Force and the 10 th Navy cyber fleet have been formed. About 10, thousands of cybersecurity experts work at the Center for Strategic and International Studies as part of the US Cyber ​​Challenge program. In addition to the United States, about 100 countries of the world also have units in the armed forces for conducting operations in cyberspace.

Another concept of future warfare, based on the use of information technology, was the concept of network-centric warfare, developed by US military theorists, Vice Admiral Arthur Sebrowski, Pentagon Researcher John Garstka and Admiral Jay Johnson at the end of 90.

At its core is an increase in the total combat power of military formations by connecting them into a single network, which is characterized by two main characteristics: speed of control and self-synchronization. The speed of management is achieved through information superiority through the introduction of new control systems, tracking, reconnaissance, control, computer modeling. As a result, the enemy is deprived of the opportunity to conduct effective operations, since all his actions will be delayed. Self-synchronization refers to the ability of the organizational structure of military formations, the forms and methods of their combat missions to be modified at their discretion, but in accordance with the needs of the higher command. As a result, hostilities take the form of continuous high-speed actions (operations, actions) with decisive goals.

The network allows geographically dispersed forces belonging to different types and types of troops to combine operations into a single plan and use information superiority to use them more efficiently by ensuring the unity of views of the commanders (commanders) of diverse forces (forces) on operations, as well as by self-synchronization of their actions in the interests of achieving the overall goal of the operation.

Criticism of the theory of network-centric warfare concerns, first of all, a bias towards technology, and the authors of the critics quite rightly noted that a person remains at the center of the war, his will and the war are not "network-centric." She is either “human-centered,” or she has no center at all. ”

An analysis of the fighting that the United States conducted during the past 15 years shows that the concept of network-centric warfare is good in low and medium intensity military conflicts against a deliberately weak adversary. And it remains to be seen how the concept of a network-centric war will behave when powerful armies clash with rich historical experience of major wars with space reconnaissance systems, electronic warfare, high-precision weapons, including long-range weapons, as well as various combat platforms of different generations.

SUN-CHA ON THE NEW LAD

Does the appearance of the latest theories of war in modern times mean that we should abandon the classical theories developed by Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and other military theorists? Certainly not. Michael Handel - one of the modern followers of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz - believes that, although the classical theories of war require adaptation to the changed environment of the information age, they remain fundamentally fair. The logic of war and strategic thinking is as universal and infinite as human nature itself.

The fact that among the Western military establishment there is a strong belief that technologies, especially information, will allow their party to more effectively solve the problem of reducing or completely eliminating the “fog of war”, speaks of the immaturity of Western military theory, especially in the United States. The intellectual challenge faced by military theory, military theorists and professionals at the beginning of the XXI century is not to “send Clausewitz to the dustbin of history. Rather, the challenge is to learn how to effectively deal with the entire spectrum of the conflict. ”

Nevertheless, the American military leadership is actively introducing the proposition that future wars will, as a rule, be network-centric and non-contact, using mainly high-precision weapons. The goal of such a policy is to instil in the world the thoughts of the rejection and senselessness of military competition with the United States. Therefore, Western theories of war can not be regarded as the only true and correct. Otherwise, we will prepare for a war in which we simply have no chance of winning (the so-called programmed defeat).

It should be borne in mind that “the tasks of the US Armed Forces and our army do not radically coincide. For decades, the United States and its NATO allies have led offensive military operations outside their territory, always have the initiative to start a war, and are at war with a weak adversary. Therefore, their experience is atypical for us. We first need to ensure the protection of our territory, so at the beginning of the war we will have to conduct defensive actions against a stronger, fundamentally different on each theater of the enemy. "

It is necessary to develop and promote our own theories, forms and methods of using groups of troops (forces) - in particular, the theory of interaction of troops, developed by the author from the 90-s of the last century.

The theory of interaction of troops is an emerging theory of war, as it defines:

- new sources of military power associated with synergistic, multiplicative and cumulative use of the entire spectrum of capabilities of the troops (forces) at all levels;

- how to integrate the use of forces and means of various types of the Armed Forces and the armed forces with respect to the opposing side;

- How to destroy the coalition of the opposing side, thwart its plans and neutralize its potential allies;

- how the robust interaction of troops increases the stability and speed of command;

- how cooperation ensures the flexibility of command and control of troops (forces);

- how joint awareness of troops reduces decision-making time, providing decisive effects in the operation (battle, battle);

- how to ensure the ability of units, units and formations to operate almost autonomously, but in the interests of accomplishing common combat missions;

- how to adapt to the dynamics of hostilities;

- How to achieve the required density of combat forces and assets at the right time and in the right place;

- how by dispersed forces to gain an advantage over the massed forces of the enemy;

- How to complicate the enemy task of setting goals.

In fact, the theory of the interaction of troops adapts the classical theories of war to the modern conditions of the conduct of hostilities. Its main provisions were set forth in the author’s work The Theory of Interaction of Forces, published in 2002 and reprinted in 2006. However, despite the positive feedback and the received acts of implementation from the implementation of individual research results, the theory of interaction of the troops has not yet found understanding in the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation.

Until now, many military leaders have considered the interaction of troops as one of the basic principles of the art of war, but not as a theory. However, in modern conditions it is necessary to form a new strategic, operational and tactical thinking for military personnel. "You can not stay with the old templates, - said Alexander Svechin. - If our concepts do not change according to the progress of military affairs, if we stop at the freezing point, then, adhering to the immutable laws, we will gradually lose sight of the whole essence of the phenomena. Deep ideas will turn into harmful prejudices: our characters will lose their inner content; there will be an external empty shell, a lifeless idol. ”
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  1. Baikal
    Baikal 25 May 2014 06: 32
    +1
    All these theorists should not forget that if Russian patience bursts, it is very serious.
    With sappers, they will reach their flies ... nskov, despite the information and technological delights. As it was already.
    God forgive me for openly and confidently throwing up my hat.
    1. rkkasa xnumx
      rkkasa xnumx 25 May 2014 07: 37
      16
      Quote: Baikal
      With sappers they will reach their flies ... nskov,


      When it came with sappers "to their muhosr ... nskov" ?!
      If they did, it was not with bare hands, and not because patience was bursting.
      If we hadn’t had tanks and planes with us during the Great Patriotic War, we wouldn’t have reached anywhere. And hats would not help.

      So "information and technological sophistication" is very important.
      1. Baikal
        Baikal 25 May 2014 07: 57
        27
        I will answer the story that I found out here, in.
        Just one of the immortal examples.

        The uprising in the fortress of Badaber.
        On April 26 on 1985 in 21.00 during the evening prayer, a group of Soviet prisoners of war in Badaber prison (in Pakistan - S.T.) removed six sentries from artillery depots and, breaking the locks in the arsenal, armed herself, pulled ammunition for the paired anti-aircraft gun and the machine gun DSh mounted on the roof. Mortar and RPG grenade launchers were put on alert. Soviet soldiers occupied the key points of the fortress: several corner towers and the building of the arsenal.
        The entire base personnel was raised on alarm - about 3000 people, led by instructors from the USA, Pakistan and Egypt. They tried to storm control over the fortress, but were met by heavy fire and, after suffering heavy losses, were forced to retreat. In 23.00, the leader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan Burkhanuddin Rabbani raised the regiment of Mujahideen Khalid-ibn-Walida, surrounded the fortress and ordered the rebels to surrender, but received a response demanding to call representatives of the embassies of the USSR, DRA, Red Cross and the UN. The second assault began, which was also repulsed by rebellious Soviet soldiers. The battlefield at that time was blocked by a triple ring of encirclement, composed of Pakistani army dushmans and military personnel, armored vehicles and artillery of the 11 army of the Pakistan Armed Forces. The air force of the Pakistan Air Force fought in the air.
        The fierce clash lasted all night. The assault followed the assault, the forces of the rebels melted away, but the enemy also suffered tangible losses. On April 27, Rabbani again demanded surrender and was again refused. He ordered to bring heavy artillery to direct fire and storm the fortress. The artillery preparation and then the assault began, in which artillery, heavy equipment and the link of the Pakistani Air Force helicopters took part.
        When the troops broke into the fortress, the remaining wounded Soviet prisoners of war blew up the arsenal, they themselves died and destroyed significant enemy forces. ”
        In the uprising participated and died, according to various estimates, from 12 to 15 of Soviet troops.
        Mujahideen of Rabbani and Pakistan’s 11 Army Corps acted against them, the losses of which amounted to:
        - about 100 Mujahideen,
        - 90 Pakistani regular troops, including 28 officers,
        - 13 representatives of the Pakistani authorities,
        - 6 American instructors,
        - 3 installation "Grad"
        - 40 units of heavy military equipment.


        List of the heroes of the Badaber uprising known today:
        Lieutenant Saburov S.I., 1960 born, Republic of Khakassia;
        ml Lieutenant Kiryushkin G.V., 1964 born, Moscow Region .;
        Sergeant Vasiliev P.P., 1960 born, Chuvashia;
        Private Varvaryan M.A., 1960 born, Armenian;
        ml Lieutenant Kashlakov G.A., 1958 b., Rostov region;
        ml Sergeant Ryazantsev S.E., 1963 b. Russian;
        ml Sergeant Samin N.G., 1964 b., Kazakhstan;
        Corporal Dudkin N.I., 1961 b., Altai Territory;
        Private Rakhimkulov R.R., 1961 born, Tatar, Bashkiria;
        Private Vaskov I.N., 1963, b. Kostroma region;
        Private Pavlyutenkov, 1962 b., Stavropol Territory;
        Private Zverkovich A.N., 1964 b., Belarus;
        Private Korshenko S.V., 1964 D.O.B., Ukraine;
        an employee of the Soviet army N. Shevchenko;
        Private Levchishin S.N., 1964 b., Samara region.
        1. skifd
          skifd 25 May 2014 08: 32
          20
          Quote: Baikal
          Lieutenant Saburov S.I., 1960 born, Republic of Khakassia;
          ml Lieutenant Kiryushkin G.V., 1964 born, Moscow Region .;
          Sergeant Vasiliev P.P., 1960 born, Chuvashia;
          Private Varvaryan M.A., 1960 born, Armenian;
          ml Lieutenant Kashlakov G.A., 1958 b., Rostov region;
          ml Sergeant Ryazantsev S.E., 1963 b. Russian;
          ml Sergeant Samin N.G., 1964 b., Kazakhstan;
          Corporal Dudkin N.I., 1961 b., Altai Territory;
          Private Rakhimkulov R.R., 1961 born, Tatar, Bashkiria;
          Private Vaskov I.N., 1963, b. Kostroma region;
          Private Pavlyutenkov, 1962 b., Stavropol Territory;
          Private Zverkovich A.N., 1964 b., Belarus;
          Private Korshenko S.V., 1964 D.O.B., Ukraine;
          an employee of the Soviet army N. Shevchenko;
          Private Levchishin S.N., 1964 b., Samara region.


          Memory to the guys, unforgettable ...

          International, your mother ... What other rubbish will write something against the USSR ????
          1. yushch
            yushch 25 May 2014 10: 28
            +4
            If he does, it won't "jump" for a long time;)
          2. sabakina
            sabakina 25 May 2014 14: 20
            +2
            Private Vaskov I.N., 1963, b. Kostroma region;
            Well, nifiga, my zem was there .... 4 years older than me. The kingdom of heaven to him and the earth rest in peace ...
            damn, but I did not know this story ...
          3. biznaw
            biznaw 25 May 2014 23: 51
            0
            Which international is that? The success of the resistance is explained by the fact that the majority of Russians and only one was Ukrainian and one Armenian, but those are also brave warriors, there would be more ukrov who would still be held captive.
        2. rkkasa xnumx
          rkkasa xnumx 25 May 2014 08: 46
          +2
          There is an expression:
          - "Do not take the name of the Lord in vain" - one of the meanings of this expression, it is - "You do not need to swear to God unnecessarily (swears).
          Here is your example, he is approximately from the same "opera".

          And the example just speaks against yours:

          Quote: Baikal
          With sappers they will reach their flies ... nskov


          There was a feat, but then the guys didn’t get anywhere ...
          Therefore, I repeat - "information and technological sophistication" it is very important.
          1. Baikal
            Baikal 25 May 2014 08: 53
            -6
            Wow, how would we live without you - thanks for opening our eyes, Cap.
            I was talking about something completely different. And, considering your silly remarks, there is simply nothing to discuss.
            However, pretend to be, you go inverts laughing
            1. rkkasa xnumx
              rkkasa xnumx 25 May 2014 09: 27
              +3
              Quote: Baikal
              Wow, how would we live without you - thanks for opening our eyes, Cap.
              I was talking about something completely different.


              Excuses began ...
              How to breed flood about sappers, so shit, and when they stuck their noses, then just let * twist the opa - they say, I spoke about something completely different.
          2. skifd
            skifd 25 May 2014 08: 59
            +6
            Quote: rkkasa 81
            There was a feat, but then the guys didn’t get anywhere ...


            What do you mean "NOT RECEIVED" ????? Yes, I would change my life from the "sofa" to this one! There are no just words, damn it ... It enrages everything ...
            1. rkkasa xnumx
              rkkasa xnumx 25 May 2014 09: 47
              +2
              Quote: skifd
              There are no words, damn it ... Enrages everything ...


              And since childhood I have been enraged by bastard-provocateurs, who first provoke a conflict, and then hide behind the backs of elders.
              So this Baikal - At first he wrote nonsense, and then he hides behind those guys who accomplished a feat.
              1. skifd
                skifd 25 May 2014 10: 33
                +4
                Quote: rkkasa 81
                And since childhood I have been enraged by bastard provocateurs,


                You know, the bastards-provocateurs are now brought up according to "amerovsky" textbooks. It's hard to fight. But I'm trying . The sons grew up, they know something. Now I am raising my grandson. I try to understand. I try to love my homeland. But this is the USSR.
                1. rkkasa xnumx
                  rkkasa xnumx 25 May 2014 10: 59
                  +3
                  Quote: skifd

                  You know, the bastards-provocateurs are now brought up according to "amerovsky" textbooks. It's hard to fight. But I'm trying . The sons grew up, they know something. Now I am raising my grandson. I try to understand. I try to love their homeland. But this is the USSR.


                  For me, the homeland is still the USSR and Russia (whatever this new homeland would be).
                  I only argued with Baikal not about the homeland. And not about the exploits.
                  You see, there is an article, and I want to read a normal, sensible commentary (to be honest, I am "floating" on this issue).
                  And flooders clog the forum with their nonsense, and sometimes even hands do not reach normal comments.
                  1. Boa kaa
                    Boa kaa 25 May 2014 16: 47
                    +3
                    Quote: rkkasa 81
                    flooders clog the forum with their nonsense, and sometimes even hands do not reach normal comments.

                    Alexey, you need to be more tolerant.
                    Some have education that is not enough to discuss theoretical issues, others are not in the subject, but want to talk, and therefore rushing emotionally stupid crap, or "Cracking". But this is also a way to respond to what you read.
                    By the way, despite the position of Baikal, I really liked his story. I had heard about this uprising at one time, but somehow all my hands did not reach. Yes, essentially the Baikal dispute is wrong, but after reading his comment, I personally enriched myself with knowledge and pride in our children. For which he personally thanks me very much and a huge plus, although in essence of the dispute I put him the same huge minus.
                    PS Learn to read diagonally, sifting through the flood, then there will be time for the grains of the mind.
                    1. rkkasa xnumx
                      rkkasa xnumx 25 May 2014 18: 42
                      0
                      Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

                      Alexey, you need to be more tolerant.

                      Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
                      PS Learn to read diagonally, sifting through the flood, then there will be time for the grains of the mind.


                      Yes, I agree on the one hand.
                      On the other hand, sometimes the evil takes on my word of honor while you wade through these "thickets". And not everyone succeeds in getting through. Compare at least the number of ratings in ours with Baikal dispute and their number per comment at the bottom of the page. But there were just useful (IMHO) reviews.

                      Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
                      I really liked his story.


                      The story itself is correct, but as the ANSWER to my comment - no.
                      And in general, it’s not beautiful to justify your "Grunting" such examples. One should treat the feat more respectfully, scrupulously, or something.
                      It’s about as if Mikhalkov was asked why he had spoken about thousands of shovel cuttings, and in response he would begin to talk about the defense of the Brest Fortress.
                  2. Polevik
                    Polevik 25 May 2014 21: 01
                    +1
                    Quote: rkkasa 81
                    You see, there is an article, and I want to read a normal, efficient comment

                    This article is difficult to comment on. Especially - sensibly. Too messy.
                    To push fundamental works into ONE paragraph is simple ... Well, I don’t even know.
                    For example, I learned about Sun-Tzu as a child, from the ... Water polo Coach. Starting with "We will grab - with the right fight. We will win - with a maneuver" and so on. I liked it - I got carried away. Decades have already passed, but I would not undertake "one paragraph".
                    In the army, they "introduced" Clausewitz - the same story.

                    Quote: rkkasa 81
                    (to be honest, I am "floating" in this matter).

                    EVERYTHING is floating on this issue. And who says that he is strong - or stupid, or lying.
                    PS IMHO, of course.
                    PPS ... la, hurt me all the same. Military thought was described flatly and faded. There is reliable infa that Sun Tzu is hard to study in Japanese business schools. What is it for? Yes, I know that he is Chinese. But I have information specifically for Japan.
      2. Penzyac
        Penzyac 25 May 2014 14: 29
        +2
        Quote: rkkasa 81
        Quote: Baikal
        With sappers they will reach their flies ... nskov,


        When it came with sappers "to their muhosr ... nskov" ?!
        If they did, it was not with bare hands, and not because patience was bursting.
        If we hadn’t had tanks and planes with us during the Great Patriotic War, we wouldn’t have reached anywhere. And hats would not help.

        So "information and technological sophistication" is very important.

        That's right, but we also had talented military commanders who could develop and put into practice military theory, without it tanks and planes were the same hats, only very expensive. And there were also great designers and production organizers, and other dedicated home front workers producing all these tanks and planes.
    2. ATATA
      ATATA 25 May 2014 13: 33
      +2
      Quote: Baikal
      God forgive me for openly and confidently throwing up my hat.

      And what does God have to do with it?
    3. philip
      philip 26 May 2014 07: 38
      0
      if the patience of the Russian burst - it is very serious
  2. demotivator
    demotivator 25 May 2014 06: 56
    +6
    You can’t stay with old patterns, ...
    You can’t argue. However, remain. This is Churchill noticed that "Generals are always preparing for the last war". He had in mind a practically objective fact: in preparing for possible military conflicts, military leaders usually proceed from their past experience and, in a sense, really prepare for a “past” war, since there is no experience of a future, possible war.
    The meaning of the expression: in military construction, one should take into account all the latest victory factors (science, technology, politics, psychology, etc.), which conservative generals often tend to neglect.
  3. diff
    diff 25 May 2014 06: 56
    +2
    The modern world is like an organism, somewhere behind it, and the abscess will be in another place where you do not expect it.
    NATO's world domination confirms this. Therefore, it is necessary today to monitor the health of the state so that there are no oncological tumors (fifth columns).
  4. taseka
    taseka 25 May 2014 07: 23
    0
    The practice of our neighbors is as follows!
  5. mamont5
    mamont5 25 May 2014 07: 26
    +4
    "The war as such appeared with the emergence of the slave formation."

    Oh well, war is as old as peace. There were wars before the slave society.
    1. andj61
      andj61 25 May 2014 09: 17
      +4
      Quote: mamont5
      "The war as such appeared with the emergence of the slave formation."

      Oh well, war is as old as peace. There were wars before the slave society.

      Theorists need to somehow justify everything for purely economic reasons!
      And before the slave system of wars, they say, there weren’t, only clashes!
      It’s even more interesting how A. Makedonsky (slave. System) fought with the Scythians (clan relations, no slavery). He is at war, but they, it turns out, no?
      Also the war against the Indians in the United States.
  6. kot28.ru
    kot28.ru 25 May 2014 07: 58
    +1
    Nevertheless, the actions of Russians during the conduct of hostilities destroy all the ideas of Western theorists about war, and with enviable consistency! lol
    1. northern
      northern 25 May 2014 09: 15
      +3
      Soldier ingenuity is a great thing, how many stories go about it, and for good reason.
  7. 11111mail.ru
    11111mail.ru 25 May 2014 09: 27
    +3
    Quote: north
    Soldier savvy is a great thing

    Well, yes, this ingenuity has more experience, but the armament is appropriate ...
    1. northern
      northern 25 May 2014 10: 00
      +2
      And experience and skill are a must. All according to Suvorov.
  8. silberwolf88
    silberwolf88 25 May 2014 10: 05
    +3
    Military action ... this is a special professional field and it requires a good theoretical base ...
    The theory of warfare must be constantly developed and improved ... the theory must correspond to the modern World ... take into account the nature of the weapons used ... methods and methods of warfare ... and most importantly, take into account what qualities soldiers and officers need ... a higher military leadership.
  9. Barakuda
    Barakuda 25 May 2014 11: 09
    +5
    “We, Cyberberkut, completely destroyed the network and computer infrastructure of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine in protest against the legitimization of the crimes of the Kiev junta.
    We have at our disposal a closed postal correspondence of the members of the CEC of Ukraine:
    http://filefactory.com/file/2hhlueo8k067/emails1.7z
    http://filefactory.com/file/8fcalizvvl9/emails2.7z

    http://www.mediafire.com/download/nv3tm7j7bu3fvzw/emails1.7z
    http://www.mediafire.com/download/33scil16ax7x2a0/emails2.7z

    Technical documentation of CEC system administrators and district election commissions:
    http://filefactory.com/file/k9vx1qmgoo5/tech.7z
    http://www.mediafire.com/download/exka9sfyy9yd3jg/tech.7z

    Hack Report:
    http://www.filefactory.com/file/2e3s7kestivr/razb_vzlom.docx

    We, CyberBerkut! We will not forget! We will not forgive! "

    Who does not know, there are such guys, hackers ..

    "Last night, one of the admins of my personal site avakov.com hacked mail, gained access to the site and posted there a couple of fake statements on my behalf about the elections. These statements do not exist in nature - these are fakes," Avakov wrote on Sunday on your Facebook page.
  10. Giant thought
    Giant thought 25 May 2014 11: 10
    +1
    Over time, the armament of armies is changing, approaches to conducting military operations, and tactics are changing. The capabilities of the aircraft are changing in the direction of their increase. Therefore, the tactics of warfare will always change more rapidly than strategy.
  11. gridasov
    gridasov 25 May 2014 13: 12
    0
    In a sense, it is worth sympathizing with Ukrainian politicians that they, being themselves illiterate, in the literal sense of the word, got involved in a confrontation with the GIANT. Whether we like V.I. Lenin or not, he carried knowledge to everyone who was going to manage communities of people. Social sciences are knowledge, and those who do not study do not know how to manage the people. The result is the confrontation that they themselves created, and now do not understand where the problem comes from. Well, from the theory of war, the main rule is that if the enemy is weaker than you, then destroy him ...
    1. Penzyac
      Penzyac 25 May 2014 15: 13
      +1
      Quote: gridasov
      ... Whether we like V.I. Lenin or not, he carried knowledge to everyone who was going to manage communities of people. Social sciences are knowledge, and those who do not study do not know how to manage the people. The result is the confrontation that they themselves created, and now do not understand where the problem comes from ...

      Unfortunately, Lenin did not leave behind a scientific school or worthy followers. Those who came to his place turned his theory from scientific-practical into religious-dogmatic, and himself into a emasculated icon. The result, as they say, on the face.
  12. Dimy4
    Dimy4 25 May 2014 13: 16
    0
    According to the views of the Russian military theorist, Major General Vladimir Slipchenko ....

    You might think that the states make full and complete use of the works of our military theorists in their common affairs.
  13. tehnoluks
    tehnoluks 25 May 2014 13: 37
    +2
    War is such a way to resolve the conflict, in which the enemy’s survival is not considered as a necessary boundary condition.
    Liddel-garth
    1. tokens2
      tokens2 25 May 2014 18: 44
      +1
      Controversial.
      Recall even the destroyer of the US Navy "Donald Cook" where no one was hurt - an invincible faith in the power of the United States and suffered.
      And 1 world? When whole fronts were not destroyed but simply ...
      disappeared under the influence of propaganda.
      Although generally agree.
  14. Penzyac
    Penzyac 25 May 2014 14: 18
    +2
    “We cannot stay with the old patterns,” pointed out Alexander Svechin. “If our concepts do not change according to the progress of military affairs, if we stop at the freezing point, then, worshiping immutable laws, we will gradually lose sight of the whole essence of phenomena. Deep ideas will turn into harmful prejudices: our symbols will lose their inner content; an empty outer shell, a lifeless idol will remain "
    This applies not only to military theory. It is precisely the above-cited, but with respect to communist theory, that ruined the CPSU and the USSR and its allies, it also ruins the Communist Party, not allowing it to become a truly people's party, capable of not only gaining power, but also, in the future, guaranteed to retain and use it for the good of the people.
    Having turned Communism into a ossified and formalized quasi-religion, almost an almost sectarian one, the Bolsheviks themselves defeated their implacable enemies — liberalism, Islamism, etc. etc.
  15. Boa kaa
    Boa kaa 25 May 2014 18: 20
    +3
    Military science has a graduation level. Strategy, operational art (the West denies it), tactics. Above strategies are politics and geopolitics. New means and methods of maintaining a database affect the nature of war. But now there are new means of communication, collection and processing of information, materials and types of energy. When introduced into the armed forces, they change the methods of warfare. All this normally fits into the theory of database management, the dialectic of war.
    What did the Americans do. They threw a global information network onto the battlefield and gave birth to a network-centric war. Having technical capabilities, they provided real-time information on the battlefield. In order not to fall under the enemy’s strike, the troops were dispersed to the ranges of their weapons of destruction, moving to a contactless war, keeping the troops from direct combat clashes. And everything seems to be O * kay. But they forgot about information and fire resistance, camouflage and countermeasures against RT intelligence. With an adversary of the second, third level of danger for the US Armed Forces, this works. But what should you do if there is a breakdown in communication in this system (electronic warfare, physical suppression), if camouflage and IEP direct forces to the other side? When all SRSs are eliminated, and the EMP of a high-altitude nuclear weapon ceases communication with troops from 4 to 24 hours. What will the commanders do after losing their usual gadgets? Passion for the technical side of the issue is harmful to the health of troops on the battlefield. To exclude the decision on the battlefield, the Americans increased the level of command and control, raising it to the headquarters of the compound. Orders are given to the soldier as a result of the commander’s decision. Americans don’t believe in their soldiers, knowing what they are. We are the other way around. Example - Pristina.
    So it turns out that in all cases, man remains the main instrument of war. The quality of human material, along with the technical equipment and training of troops is a decisive condition for victory in any war. Relying only on a technical advantage is futile.
  16. Signaller
    Signaller 25 May 2014 19: 22
    0
    As in his time, after the failure of the Americans in Somalia in Operation Restore Hope, General Van Riper said about the thesis (information war) "If you see the battlefield, you won the war." He said; "I can also say that if I see a chessboard, I won the game. However, this is not so until the master smashes me to smithereens again." (P. 142 I. Popov America against all)
  17. tol100v
    tol100v 25 May 2014 20: 36
    0
    Quote: rkkasa 81
    So "information and technological sophistication" is very important.

    You just need not to forget the main thing - the economic WAR. The same Poroshenko, even though he is a billionaire, will deflate like a soap bubble if you cut off his "green" wings, and if you cut the wings of all the other MANDANUTS, they will not smoke white light for long.
  18. shalomnet
    shalomnet 26 May 2014 00: 43
    +1
    The author forgot to mention - Asymmetric warfare.
  19. radar1967
    radar1967 26 May 2014 02: 29
    0
    There is one invariable rule - generals prepare for past wars. The article did not mention the presence of new types of weapons in the main countries. Despite the fact that these weapons are already being actively tested on the world stage. These are weapons of special services. THIS IS A COMPLETELY NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS AND METHODS OF WARFARE - CLIMATE (drought in Moscow), GENETIC (bird flu), SEISMIC (Japan), BIOLOGICAL (artificial AIDS mowed Africa), ORANGE, REVIEW based on psi and electro-wave radiation.

    Generals who do not know about these types of confrontation will never become marshals.
  20. philip
    philip 26 May 2014 07: 08
    0
    It’s not so, it may be that Moltke is there, Clausewiec is, and even Bismarck is, but there is no Gudarian and Tukhachevsky and his student.