Cannot be refused?
On the issue of Russia's compliance with international agreements on arms control and military activities
As soon as Moscow decisively declared its national interests in the post-Soviet space, Russia's relations with the West deteriorated. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation continues to fulfill its serious obligations under a number of treaties (agreements) that allow it to monitor the state and daily activities of our Armed Forces, both conventional and strategic nuclear ones. At the same time, the introduction of a moratorium on their execution by Russia could greatly influence the position of Western leaders.
The return of Crimea to the Russian Federation was perceived in the West as a direct challenge, an encroachment on hegemony, primarily of the United States. Unilaterally, the United States, the EU, and NATO cease cooperation with Russia in a number of areas, there are calls to punish Moscow, and new sanctions are being phased in step by step. NATO announced the suspension of the entire complex of military and civilian cooperation with Russia. The groups of troops of the bloc in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States are intensifying, the warships of the US Navy are moving into the Black Sea.
Russian leaders of high rank are defamatory in humiliating form, some gatekeepers block their entry to the institutions of international organizations. Private firms join on to official blockade actions undertaken by the governments of Western countries on their own initiative.
The likely opponent in the person of the so-called Western partners of Russia openly outlined his plans, the absence of a tough reaction from the Russian side encourages his actions. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of 22 June 1941, when the Germans were already bombing Kiev and Minsk, and trains with bread and oil continued to go to Germany from the USSR.
Blood interest
The Medium and Shorter Range (INF) Treaty of 1987 of the Year, the 1992 Open Skies Treaty of the Year, the START-3 Treaty of the 2010 of the Year and the Vienna Document of the 2011 of the Year are critically interested in complying with all these treaties (agreements).
Under the Open Skies Treaty, in order to control military activities, inspectors of approximately 35 countries - from Canada to the Baltic states - can fly over Russian territory, carrying out surveillance using onboard optical and other control equipment. Russian observers, of course, also have the right to make similar overflights of other countries, but the inequality here is obvious, given the non-offensive nature of the Russian Military doctrine. Spraying control over dozens of countries is inefficient, so the value of the information obtained in this way for Russian defense is relative.
The INF Treaty was concluded in conditions when no one questioned the status of the USSR as a great power, and for that time its signing might have made sense. Today, according to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, it is likely that regional conflicts will arise on the borders of Russia, in which the use of missiles with a range of 500 – 5500 kilometers could have a decisive influence on the outcome of the hostilities. The question of withdrawing from the INF Treaty and restoring the dismantled production lines of such missiles has been repeatedly raised by domestic experts.
As for the START-3 Treaty, there are two main circumstances to bear in mind.
First, with the natural decline of Russian strategic offensive weapons, Americans would surely go to a proportional reduction of their nuclear warheads. Carefully counting the money, the American Congress, as a rule, refuses to allocate funds to maintain surplus weapons, in this case strategic nuclear weapons. Especially since back in the 90s, American experts considered it sufficient for the US to have just such a number of nuclear warheads as provided for by the START-3 Treaty. Therefore, it is completely counterproductive to assert that this treaty was a great victory for Russian diplomacy, since it allegedly forced the United States to reduce their nuclear arsenal. This is self-deception.
Secondly, the most important circumstance is that compliance with the START-3 Treaty allows the Americans to exercise careful continuous monitoring of the state of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, their combat readiness and control system. This is especially valuable for the United States in an environment where the Russian Defense Ministry set a course for the transfer of a significant part of domestic strategic nuclear weapons to mobile (wheel ground and railway) status.
From this point of view, the signing of the START-3 Treaty, its observance in the setting of the actually revived Cold War seem to be a strategic mistake made as a result of a shallow analysis of global development trends.
However, the most incomprehensible motives are those for which Russia signed the Vienna Document 2011 on confidence- and security-building measures developed under the auspices of the OSCE. This document actually replaced the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the implementation of which lost its meaning after the collapse of the USSR and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.
Viennese waltz
The Vienna Document, which was not considered within the walls of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, meanwhile involves regular exchange with the OSCE countries of information about the armed forces, armaments, the daily activities of troops, military exercises, plans for the development of armed forces, military expenditures, etc. Here, for example, Russia is obliged to provide information on each formation and combat unit of ground forces up to a brigade / regiment or equivalent level, inclusive:
- name and subordination;
- is it regular (oops) or irregular (oops);
- place the usual location of peacetime of his (her) headquarters, indicating the exact geographical names and coordinates to the nearest 10 seconds;
-the number of personnel in peacetime states;
-Main standard weapons and equipment systems with an indication of the amount of each type (combat tanks, helicopters, armored combat vehicles, anti-tank guided missile launchers, permanently mounted / integral parts of armored vehicles, self-propelled and towed artillery guns, mortars and multiple launch rocket systems of a caliber of 100 millimeters and above, tank bridge spacers).
The same data is required from us on the Air Force, aviation Air defense and naval aviation.
Confirming data should be sent to the OSCE governing bodies also on the tactical and technical characteristics and distinctive features of the main domestic systems. weapons and military equipment - battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles, anti-tank guided missile launchers, self-propelled and towed artillery, mortars and volley fire systems, combat aircraft and helicopters.
Obligations to provide information on the content of military doctrines, plans for the deployment of the main weapon systems and equipment, moving and changing the deployment of troops, plans and scale of military exercises, as well as procedures for conducting inspections and visits to air bases are particularly detailed in the Vienna Document.
It is known for what purpose in 1940, the German mountain shooters from the Edelweiss division massively in the guise of tourists and climbers visited the Soviet North Caucasus.
On the whole, the content of this document obliges Russia to widely declare virtually secret information about the state of its Armed Forces, their numerical and combat strength, deployment and combat deployment plans. It is clear that Western countries exchange such information: there are no serious contradictions between them, most of them belong to the same military and economic blocs, and they are all ready to oppose Russia on a consolidated basis.
The position and actions of the United States and united Europe, taken by them in response to the annexation of Crimea to Russia, convince us that the above-mentioned international agreements on arms limitation and control over military activities turned into an anachronism that must be disposed of. Russia alone, virtually without allies, should not voluntarily weaken its defense potential, providing the likely adversary with the most valuable strategic information. Historically, the intelligence community has always been engaged in obtaining such information.
Today, there is every reason to correct mistakes, to refuse to perform contracts concluded to the detriment of their own security in the post-Soviet period, based on the development of equal partnership with Western countries.
As soon as Moscow decisively declared its national interests in the post-Soviet space, Russia's relations with the West deteriorated. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation continues to fulfill its serious obligations under a number of treaties (agreements) that allow it to monitor the state and daily activities of our Armed Forces, both conventional and strategic nuclear ones. At the same time, the introduction of a moratorium on their execution by Russia could greatly influence the position of Western leaders.
The return of Crimea to the Russian Federation was perceived in the West as a direct challenge, an encroachment on hegemony, primarily of the United States. Unilaterally, the United States, the EU, and NATO cease cooperation with Russia in a number of areas, there are calls to punish Moscow, and new sanctions are being phased in step by step. NATO announced the suspension of the entire complex of military and civilian cooperation with Russia. The groups of troops of the bloc in Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States are intensifying, the warships of the US Navy are moving into the Black Sea.
Russian leaders of high rank are defamatory in humiliating form, some gatekeepers block their entry to the institutions of international organizations. Private firms join on to official blockade actions undertaken by the governments of Western countries on their own initiative.
The likely opponent in the person of the so-called Western partners of Russia openly outlined his plans, the absence of a tough reaction from the Russian side encourages his actions. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of 22 June 1941, when the Germans were already bombing Kiev and Minsk, and trains with bread and oil continued to go to Germany from the USSR.
Blood interest
The Medium and Shorter Range (INF) Treaty of 1987 of the Year, the 1992 Open Skies Treaty of the Year, the START-3 Treaty of the 2010 of the Year and the Vienna Document of the 2011 of the Year are critically interested in complying with all these treaties (agreements).
Under the Open Skies Treaty, in order to control military activities, inspectors of approximately 35 countries - from Canada to the Baltic states - can fly over Russian territory, carrying out surveillance using onboard optical and other control equipment. Russian observers, of course, also have the right to make similar overflights of other countries, but the inequality here is obvious, given the non-offensive nature of the Russian Military doctrine. Spraying control over dozens of countries is inefficient, so the value of the information obtained in this way for Russian defense is relative.
The INF Treaty was concluded in conditions when no one questioned the status of the USSR as a great power, and for that time its signing might have made sense. Today, according to the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, it is likely that regional conflicts will arise on the borders of Russia, in which the use of missiles with a range of 500 – 5500 kilometers could have a decisive influence on the outcome of the hostilities. The question of withdrawing from the INF Treaty and restoring the dismantled production lines of such missiles has been repeatedly raised by domestic experts.
As for the START-3 Treaty, there are two main circumstances to bear in mind.
First, with the natural decline of Russian strategic offensive weapons, Americans would surely go to a proportional reduction of their nuclear warheads. Carefully counting the money, the American Congress, as a rule, refuses to allocate funds to maintain surplus weapons, in this case strategic nuclear weapons. Especially since back in the 90s, American experts considered it sufficient for the US to have just such a number of nuclear warheads as provided for by the START-3 Treaty. Therefore, it is completely counterproductive to assert that this treaty was a great victory for Russian diplomacy, since it allegedly forced the United States to reduce their nuclear arsenal. This is self-deception.
Secondly, the most important circumstance is that compliance with the START-3 Treaty allows the Americans to exercise careful continuous monitoring of the state of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, their combat readiness and control system. This is especially valuable for the United States in an environment where the Russian Defense Ministry set a course for the transfer of a significant part of domestic strategic nuclear weapons to mobile (wheel ground and railway) status.
From this point of view, the signing of the START-3 Treaty, its observance in the setting of the actually revived Cold War seem to be a strategic mistake made as a result of a shallow analysis of global development trends.
However, the most incomprehensible motives are those for which Russia signed the Vienna Document 2011 on confidence- and security-building measures developed under the auspices of the OSCE. This document actually replaced the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the implementation of which lost its meaning after the collapse of the USSR and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.
Viennese waltz
The Vienna Document, which was not considered within the walls of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, meanwhile involves regular exchange with the OSCE countries of information about the armed forces, armaments, the daily activities of troops, military exercises, plans for the development of armed forces, military expenditures, etc. Here, for example, Russia is obliged to provide information on each formation and combat unit of ground forces up to a brigade / regiment or equivalent level, inclusive:
- name and subordination;
- is it regular (oops) or irregular (oops);
- place the usual location of peacetime of his (her) headquarters, indicating the exact geographical names and coordinates to the nearest 10 seconds;
-the number of personnel in peacetime states;
-Main standard weapons and equipment systems with an indication of the amount of each type (combat tanks, helicopters, armored combat vehicles, anti-tank guided missile launchers, permanently mounted / integral parts of armored vehicles, self-propelled and towed artillery guns, mortars and multiple launch rocket systems of a caliber of 100 millimeters and above, tank bridge spacers).
The same data is required from us on the Air Force, aviation Air defense and naval aviation.
Confirming data should be sent to the OSCE governing bodies also on the tactical and technical characteristics and distinctive features of the main domestic systems. weapons and military equipment - battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles, anti-tank guided missile launchers, self-propelled and towed artillery, mortars and volley fire systems, combat aircraft and helicopters.
Obligations to provide information on the content of military doctrines, plans for the deployment of the main weapon systems and equipment, moving and changing the deployment of troops, plans and scale of military exercises, as well as procedures for conducting inspections and visits to air bases are particularly detailed in the Vienna Document.
It is known for what purpose in 1940, the German mountain shooters from the Edelweiss division massively in the guise of tourists and climbers visited the Soviet North Caucasus.
On the whole, the content of this document obliges Russia to widely declare virtually secret information about the state of its Armed Forces, their numerical and combat strength, deployment and combat deployment plans. It is clear that Western countries exchange such information: there are no serious contradictions between them, most of them belong to the same military and economic blocs, and they are all ready to oppose Russia on a consolidated basis.
The position and actions of the United States and united Europe, taken by them in response to the annexation of Crimea to Russia, convince us that the above-mentioned international agreements on arms limitation and control over military activities turned into an anachronism that must be disposed of. Russia alone, virtually without allies, should not voluntarily weaken its defense potential, providing the likely adversary with the most valuable strategic information. Historically, the intelligence community has always been engaged in obtaining such information.
Today, there is every reason to correct mistakes, to refuse to perform contracts concluded to the detriment of their own security in the post-Soviet period, based on the development of equal partnership with Western countries.
Information