There is money - it's up to arms
In early February, a round table was held in the State Duma on the theme “Can the Russian military industrial complex be able to provide the army with modern weapons? The forum was chaired by State Duma Deputy, member of the State Duma Committee on Defense Vyacheslav Tetekin. The discussion of the problem was attended by leading experts in the field of the defense industry and military leaders. A very difficult situation in the domestic "defense industry" has become the object of a detailed analysis of specialists. The speakers drew attention to the growing personnel problem, deficiencies in the control system of the military-industrial complex, problems with the rhythm of financing and other pressing issues, without which it is impossible to provide the army and navy with modern weapons in the necessary quantities. The participants of the "round table" shared their vision of a way out of this situation.
There is no one to work
Aviation the industry has always felt the need for qualified designers, engineers, technologists, technicians and, of course, workers. But now the lack of qualified specialists is especially acute. Indeed, in Russia over the past decades there has been a real "deengineering." Today we feel the consequences of a serious violation of the principle of continuity of generations, which provided both design bureaus and serial factories with the necessary personnel.
The situation began to worsen with the second half of the 80-s of the last century. Proclaimed in February of the 1986, at the XXVI CPSU Congress, the policy of accelerating, reconstructing scientific and technological progress, increasing the role of mechanical engineering and its further development did not actually produce results. Moreover, young specialists who were trained by aviation institutes and technical schools, due to low wages, began to look for jobs not in their specialty.
This process is even more accelerated with the collapse of the USSR. Now affects almost 20-year break in the influx of young personnel. It is not only about engineers. Even more difficult was the situation with skilled workers, whose preparation today is forced to deal with the production plants themselves.
Especially difficult situation was in the design offices involved in civil aviation. There was a period when a serial factory, which had qualified specialists, did not receive orders, did not have money. Today you can observe another situation. There are orders, there is money, but there is no one to work. Significantly decreased the number of designers. Perhaps, there remains the last chance to change the current situation, while experienced specialists continue to work, who are able, under the right conditions to be created, to pass on their experience to the young shift.
Under the proper conditions means the organization of wages. Previously, everything was simple and natural. The size of the salary corresponded to the qualifications and was acceptable to the young specialist. In the design bureau, the lead designer, who had to use the work of young employees, was simply obliged to monitor their work, constantly explaining how to most efficiently solve the technical problem that ended with the release of working documentation going into production. This method of work ensured rapid growth of qualifications and, accordingly, wage increases. All this happened quickly enough.
The solution to the issue of training today is the main for the revival of the domestic aircraft. The loss and non-completion of personnel means the loss of invaluable practical experience gained over decades, since it is not stored on paper, not on tracing paper, not in books and dissertations, not on a computer’s hard disk, but in human memory.
Of course, computerization of design and production, the presence of many programs provide solutions to complex problems in the field of aerodynamics, strength, and aircraft frame creation, but understanding how to best use all this when creating a new aircraft comes with experience that accumulates much faster when working with those who already has it.
It will take serious efforts to grow the recruitment of specialists, make up the technological gap, rebuild the destroyed. And this should be dealt with immediately, without sparing means.
Heinrich Novozhilov,
aircraft designer, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Troops need industry feedback
Of course, the state and capabilities of the country's military-industrial complex (DIC) directly depend on the level of the Armed Forces, their combat capability and, as a result, the defense capability of the country as a whole.
But this statement is valid only if close, continuous, interdependent feedback and interaction on the development of tactical and technical tasks (TTZ) for the development of weapons and military hardware will be established between the military-industrial complex and the consumer of weapons and military equipment, that is, the troops. equipment (IWT) and technical solutions in their implementation. At the same time, the results of military tests when adopting a model for service should be prioritized.
Excessive independence of the defense industry, neglect of the demands of the troops led and always will lead to unnecessary and sometimes harmful for the troops technical solutions in the development of weapons and military equipment that do not improve their performance, but lead to a banal appreciation of products. In our time, this is especially true.
I will refer to an example. It is known that in the Ground Forces one of the main models of military equipment is a tank. So, starting with the T-64 (sixties) and to this day everything Tanks equipped with a tank gun loader. Many participants in the development of this mechanism became laureates of the State Prize. The main advantage of this mechanism was formally recognized as the possibility of increasing the rate of fire of the tank gun by more than two times and reducing one crew member of the (loading) tank, which ultimately reduced the total number of tank troops.
And this is actually the case. But let's see what benefits the troops received from this innovation, from the point of view of the commanders who used this technique in battle.
So, when manually loading a tank gun, the maximum technical rate of fire can be four to five shots per minute, while using an automatic loader - up to 10. But in practice, when performing exercises, firing on the move, not all trained crews are able to make three shots in two minutes, which are allotted to a target, for appearing and moving targets. And it is natural. In real shooting, the crew needs to detect the target, determine the distance, adjust for the wind and the movement of the target, enter the initial data in the scope, aim and shoot. After the shot, evaluate the results of the shooting, if necessary, re-amend, aim and re-shoot. Thus, in a combat situation, the crew, using the loading mechanism, is able to produce no more than two aimed shots per minute.
With this in mind, the expediency of an automatic loader in a tank is extremely doubtful. After all, this complex technical device requires constant qualified service, prone to difficult failures, a large part of the tank’s internal volume is occupied by its installation, which worsens the already insufficient crew ergonomics and disunites it inside the tank. In addition, being in a tank became dangerous for the crew because of the large number of elements of the mechanism moving in the open space of the combat compartment.
For these and other reasons, it is not by chance that the enterprises leading in the tank construction of the country are not in a hurry with the introduction of this technical device.
Regarding the reduction of the crew from four to three people, this decision led to the intractable damage to the survivability of tank units. As you know, a combat vehicle requires constant maintenance, engineering equipment and a position taken in combat and constant protection. Only for guarding a car in a combat position, the crew members alternate with each other every two hours, without having a place to rest, being inside the machine in a cramped position, lose all working capacity in three or four days, not to mention the ability to conduct combat operations. It was not by chance that during the war the T-34 tank had a crew of five people, including a gunner-radio operator.
The given example illustrates how sometimes the good intentions of the defense industry complex do not correlate with the practice of the troops and how, on the contrary, it is difficult for the insistent requests of the troops to be resolved. For all that, it is necessary to take into account some regularity manifested by the DIC when accepting orders. Industry is eager to take orders for the production of weapons of destruction. They are easier to manufacture, they are metal-intensive and, therefore, more expensive to manufacture. Can not be said about the automated control systems of troops and weapons, especially in the tactical level of control, communications, troop reconnaissance, satellite navigation and ground equipment of consumers to it, EW. Great efforts are required for the industry to undertake the production of these kinds of products. As a result, we observe an imbalance in the structure of weapons in general. With an overabundance of weapons, there is a lack of devices to ensure their use, negating the combat capabilities.
A long-standing and still existing state of affairs can only be straightened by that official and only by the governing body, which will be entrusted with full and sole responsibility for the condition of the troops, for construction and development, for preparation and, preferably, for their application. Only in this case can the full interested cycle be realized from obtaining a sample of a weapon to its use for its intended purpose. Until recently, such command bodies were the Commanders-General of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with commanders-in-chief, endowed with corresponding functions and structures.
For all history The ground forces have only once been organized since their organizational design in 1946 - in the period from 1955 to 1964, they for the first and probably the last time were close to relative independence in matters of technical policy during their construction and development. During this period, all groups of troops, military districts, separate armies and higher educational institutions of the Ground Forces, as well as the main developers and customers of weapons and military equipment according to the nomenclature of the Ground Forces were subordinated to the commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces as the First Deputy of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
During this period, the commander-in-chief was given the right, in addition to other tasks, to develop and approve annual plans for experimental design and research work on the subject of strategic weapons, as well as to place orders for the weapons and military equipment and ammunition industry for the USSR Armed Forces.
This concentration of independence, supported organizationally, allowed the scientific and technical revolution in the Ground Forces to take place during this period, a sharp qualitative leap in providing the troops with the latest types of weapons and military equipment, which significantly changed the characteristics of general arms and led to the improvement of forms and methods of combat operations and operations. .
Designed and adopted weapons of military equipment of that period are still basic models and are only slightly modernized.
In 1964, the CB Main Office was re-disbanded. During the subsequent formations, the previous tasks were only declared, but their solution was not supported by organization. The last formation of the Main Command Committee of the Army, with just over a hundred people, is formally responsible for the construction and development of the Ground Forces, but is really devoid of any levers of influence on the technical policy in them. And the troops themselves are not subordinate to him. For the first time, the Air Force and Air Defense, as well as the Navy, found themselves in the same position.
As of today, there are no competent command and control bodies endowed with the functions mentioned above in the structure of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Thus, without a revision of the place and role of the consumer in the system of development and orders, the forecast for the quick and high-quality rearmament of troops is questionable.
Yuri Bukreev,
Chief of the Main Directorate of the Ground Forces (1998 – 2001), Colonel-General
It takes years to grow a specialist
Back in the 60s of the last century, the experience gained in the development of anti-aircraft guided missiles, their operation and use in combat conditions, made it possible to formulate requirements and begin to solve the problems of creating anti-aircraft missiles and systems that provide real anti-aircraft cover for our country geopolitical situation and world politics.
Thus, the now well-known C-300 systems with the 5B55 rocket, designed to destroy planes and cruise missiles at all ranges and their combat use, appeared. In this rocket, many properties were designated by the word "for the first time", and for that time even "for the first time in the world."
I would like to mention the guaranteed reliability system introduced for the first time during the creation of these missiles, which allowed this technically complex weapon to last unchecked troop operation up to 30 years with constant readiness for launch.
The experience of creating rocket technology showed that the required reliability of rockets and their onboard equipment is provided not so much by duplication of the most important components and their careful selection, but by the harsh conditions of their laboratory tests. Flight tests should be carried out only in cases where the required parameters and loads can not be reproduced in laboratory conditions.
By assigning an important role to ground testing, we take into account that in the process of ground testing, the measurement of various parameters is greatly simplified, and visual and instrumental evaluation of the operation of blocks and assemblies becomes possible.
A significant increase in the cost of rocket technology and a reduction in the cost of its manufacture and testing constantly have an impact on developers, reducing the number of test samples, and for carrying out ground tests only individual specimens are required.
What problems today hinder progress? Now we have the main problem - funding, which directly affects the updating of laboratory and bench equipment, the introduction of new technologies and software, increasing information management systems and attracting personnel. The creation of a new technology at a developing enterprise begins with an experimental design development. The first stage, related to pre-project work and research experiments, is usually performed in the course of research work and research and experimental work, is absent. In accordance with federal law 94, only the sample design stage itself is put up for competition. It is believed that the enterprise should produce the pre-project preparation stage at its own expense.
In our country, the developer of armaments has the state defense order as the main source of income, which includes OCD, and he cannot, and more than that, he has no right to allocate funds from OCR for R & D, equipment and stands. This is stopped by the customer as inappropriate use of funds.
Also, everyone knows that each development enterprise has a design service, high-class specialists. It includes a fairly multidisciplinary theoretical group of specialists solving the problems of substantiating the concept and appearance of future models of equipment. The maintenance of these specialists in the absence of constantly carried out R & D and R & D is possible only from overhead costs. This is the main difference between conventional serial enterprises and developers of new technology; this can not but affect the final price of products.
The source of development of the head enterprises of the industry could be the attraction of budget funds in the development and maintenance of the national technological base and the modernization of production. Targeted financing in this situation could be planned in the development of a target program for the creation of the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation.
Today, the company has laboratory and test bases that allow 19 types of unique tests to be carried out in ground conditions. Created a creative team capable of creating modern rocket technology. In fact, this is the national treasure of Russia. To support everything, and even more to bring it in line with today's requirements, is an expensive matter and is not always within our reach, especially in terms of finance.
Before 90, interesting work, its prestige, the prestige of the enterprise in the world allowed young specialists from the best universities to be received. Today, they are the backbone of firms. But now those who want to work in the defense industry have become much smaller and simply are not enough. It is necessary to take unusual measures and we should not forget that it takes years to grow a specialist.
Vladimir Svetlov,
General Director of IBC "Torch" (1991 – 2006)
We lose energy security
Since 1994, industrial output in Russia did not exceed 15 – 17 per cent of the production in the Russian Federation during the period of the Soviet Union. I exclude oil, gas, wood, fertilizer, and so on.
Since 2000, product prices have multiplied. In 2000, the tank was worth 17,5 million, now it's more than 140. Metal has risen in price, electricity has risen in price, we are in a constrained position on many issues.
If we talk about the basis of defense, it should be based on the self-sufficiency and autonomy of the country in ensuring its activities and national security. What I mean? First of all, food, the ability to meet the needs of the country in all major types of technical and industrial products, the provision of all types of goods, including textiles.
One of the most painful problems was that the collapse of the industry and the transition from the branch to the functional principle completely violated cooperation. And if earlier at the head of the corner was a factory or an enterprise, the leading manufacturer, now there is a management company, a service center or some other organization that is not responsible for anything.
Due to the fact that the sectoral structure and regulatory framework have been eliminated, the standards used by the old memory have been destroyed, but no one develops them, no one is responsible for them. The relevant ministries were enterprises of science, economics, technology, training, management, materials.
There is a process of de-structuring of scientific organizations, and in all areas: aviation, radio electronics. On the threshold is another sale of enterprises, which does not promise anything good.
We are losing energy security as such. All over the world, the main and main criterion of safety is the state’s ability to produce energy products: internal combustion engines, gas turbine engines, and electric motors. We do not make cars, the need of the engine to the car is lost. We do not produce civil aircraft, we have no need to produce aircraft engines. We do not produce element base. Look, enter any house - not a single domestic receiver, not a single domestic phone. The element base is the quintessence of the information space.
Providing information, energy, material, mobile - we are able to create everything ourselves.
In the Ministry of Defense, the problem is not that there are few technical means. It is important that the entire combat readiness system is destroyed, the system for maintaining technical readiness, the system of personnel training and the regulatory framework are destroyed.
A technological fence is being built between us and the developed countries.
We will try to keep at the level of the Papuans.
We need to develop science. Science must go ahead, above all industry science. Combat readiness depends largely on the state of the industry. And our man, he knows how to fight and will fight, we must give him what.
Anatoly Sitnov,
Chief of Armaments of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (1994 – 2000), Colonel-General
Need munitions ministry
I firmly believe that if the money allocated for the development of the military-industrial complex does not fall under public control, half of this money will be stolen. We need to think about how to create this control, what needs to be done for this.
At one time, we ourselves compiled a technical industrial plan and in December it was approved. At the same time, they were confident that during the whole financial year not a single natural monopolist would increase the price for us. Now there is no such certainty.
We need a law that would prohibit a natural monopolist from manipulating the prices of his services during the financial year.
We now have 50 on 50 in high school: 50 is the state budget, and 50 is a commercial education.
The money spent by the state must be worked out within three years. Let's make those who study, get our education at the expense of the state, then go to the factories - go to work out the education we received.
Peter Romanov,
State Duma deputy, Hero of Socialist Labor
Transportation on foreign aircraft
In my speech I will briefly dwell on two issues: the state of civil aviation technology and the state of aviation industry science, in what position it is today.
Unfortunately, today 85 – 90 percent of traffic in Russia is performed on foreign aircraft. That is, practically civil aviation equipment does not participate in transportation in the industry. This is a huge problem. Although in fact we have beautiful planes: IL-96, Tu-204, Tu-214, Tu-334. They are quite competitive with their foreign counterparts. Everyone knows that. Nevertheless, there is no mass production. Where is she, serial equipment? She is not there either, and no one is going to do it. What, we will continue to fly on the western technology? You understand perfectly well that if civil aviation technology ends, and this applies to personnel, science, and everything, then the production of military equipment will also end in a certain amount of time. It is all interconnected.
In principle, we have our industry today. UAC is developing two aircraft - one of them "Superjet" about a hundred people. And the second machine is being created - MC-21, which should appear and make the first flight in 2016. They used to say: in 2014, in 2015, now this is all moving away to 2016, serial production - to 2017 a year. And by this time Western machines will appear again, A-320-NEO, Boeing-737, which again will not allow us to enter a good international market with our new products, because we will not be the first.
In the car MC-21 laid good new things, especially composite materials. But we are not ready in today's state for the production of the wing of them.
We have no opportunities for this. The fact that TsAGI is now experiencing two Tison, made the Austrian company "Fisher". But this is a good thing. We are gaining knowledge, getting something, but this has very little to do with the real industry. In Kazan and Ulyanovsk, they want to build two new factories or workshops based on old factories to produce these materials.
Europe and America have spent 20 years to master this technology and a lot of money, which we simply do not have. Therefore, it is hard to believe that we in 2015 or 2014 can make a so-called black wing from composite materials. And what will this lead to? If this is not done, then the MC-21 project will go even further. This is what concerns the state of civil aviation technology. Practically, our domestic aviation technology is excluded from the process of transportation of civil aviation. Of course, there is a real tragedy.
And all the time we did new things and worked on the groundwork for five, for ten years, that is, we brought the existing equipment and made the groundwork for the future, but today it is not. And here come the young specialists from the MAI, the level of training both in the MAI and in the Physical and Technical Institute, well, in general in high school, he is now very, unfortunately, lowered. It's clear. Why? Because what can you learn personnel? Frames can be learned from the real business when real planes are built, and they are practically not built. Certain modifications are being made at Sukhoi, at Ilyushin, but there are no new machines.
Vladimir Dmitriev,
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Deputy Chairman of the Military Industrial Complex under the Government of the Russian Federation (2006 – 2008)
Military equipment with imported equipment
There is a branch of science and technology, which is also decisive in achieving the highest indicators - optics. It is present everywhere: in industry (in all sectors), in agriculture. Russia did not have its own optics, German was used. And, surprisingly, the leader of our revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, a technically illiterate person, thought about it. One of the first government decrees in 1918 was a decree establishing the State Optical Institute in St. Petersburg, Leningrad. Who told him I do not know.
One more. All the old scientists, academics, practical optics - no one emigrated abroad. And since there was no Academy of Sciences, science was created within this institute.
It so happened that in our Academy of Sciences of this unit as such was not. We had two academicians - Prokhorov and Basov, the Nobel Prize laureates - for lasers received it. Everything else was concentrated in the walls of the State Optical Institute.
But in order to destroy the defense industry, you just have to pull one link. This happened: the institution was liquidated, it no longer exists. Since there is no institution, there is no science.
The current remnants of nothing new, fundamental can not create. The only one who has kept all the Soviet achievements is the Lukashenko dad. Belomo operates in Belarus - the largest, second largest enterprise of the optical industry.
I will just give one example: why are we now putting imported equipment in our military equipment?
Here we say: why the "Mace" does not fly? Because they made two major mistakes: they liquidated the institute of military representatives - a unique control body and removed the specialists in the Ministry of Defense, who were equal to our designers. By eliminating this, we lost everything.
If there is no science, what to talk about?
It should be repeated - we liquidated specialists, we liquidated the main designers. Here sits the last outstanding designer, we no longer have. At the head of all put the manager. But money only helps development, they do not create science. At the head of the institute can not stand the manager.
We have no workers. And no matter how much money is allocated, if there are no workers, nothing can be done. We also had a system of vocational schools. There were recruited less affluent people, but there were growing personnel. There is nothing now. Well, how do you imagine how much time is needed to restore this system?
See how any project was previously developed within the walls of institutions. Projects were discussed on technical councils, on board of the ministry. When Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov, the cleverest man who went through all this school, became the Minister of Defense, the main projects were considered at the board of the Ministry.
We had specialized all divisions. Well, how could you have thought of giving our MIT a naval missile "Bulava"? We have a great company "Makeev", Makeevskaya "Sineva" flies, and our "Bulava" will not fly.
In addition, there is still not our electronics. Specialists made mobile complexes. The first rocket was the most secret, called Temp-2С. We have 10 pieces done. Then they were declassified. After “Temp-2C” went “Pioneer”, “Topol” is all “Temp-2С”. Previously, if 11 did not launch positive, the rocket was not put into service.
God forbid that the Bulava was pulled out ... This is a big specificity: a sea rocket and a land rocket.
In addition, there is a problem with specialists - there simply are no young people.
Igor Kornitsky,
President of the Association "Optoelectronic Instrument Engineering"
Fleet out of production
We all know well the achievements of both the Russian shipbuilding industry and the Soviet Ministry of Shipbuilding, as well as the shortcomings. I would like to cite some figures in order to understand what we have left and what we lost.
There was a large shipbuilding program before the Great Patriotic War. Battleships and heavy battle cruisers, not to mention other ships, are mortgaged. Only during the war did we get 211 submarines, but we didn’t have them left from royal times. And 211 received.
But for these twenty two and a half years, we got only three boats.
For 1941 – 1945, the fleet received two light cruisers, 20 destroyers, 40 minesweepers, 59 patrol ships, 15 big hunters, 54 submarines, 900 combat boats.
In 1957, our fleet has already received the first nuclear submarine. Can you imagine what a jump it is! There was also a shock segment - 1966 – 1978 years. 122 nuclear submarines took the Navy for 12 years. The 35 nuclear boat was built in 251 years, and in a year and a half 22 three.
I'm not talking about surface ships, as part of fleet both missile cruisers and heavy nuclear missile cruisers were located, and went on to nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Now we would have at least two or three nuclear aircraft carriers in the North and Pacific Fleets.
Sailors mastered them, all ships carried combat service from three months to one year. But these 22 have passed a year and a half, and the ships are all walking, swimming, performing the task, and these are all our ships. No new in the ocean has not yet appeared. Why?
We all remember: in the Soviet Union there was a plan, there were personal responsibilities. There was a customer - the Navy and the contractor - the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. Who is the customer now? I do not know...
You can buy the Crimean factories in Kerch and Feodosia, they built ships of a different kind. Well, create, of course, necessary.
And we need a strict plan and personal responsibility, someone must be responsible for the result. Be sure to control the finances. The navy should be associated with the production of ships. At all times it was, only now is not. Fleet out of production.
Valentin Selivanov,
Chief of General Staff - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (1992 – 1996), Admiral
Aging machine park
I think that I will not tell you anything new if I say that the defense of our country and the implementation of its armament program in many respects can be carried out only in the case of modernization, first of all, of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex. Because today, without modern technologies, the products of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex certainly cannot meet the requirements that are imposed on it.
If we talk about the structure and condition of the metalworking equipment park, today the park of metalworking machines in the industrial complex of the country, including the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, is calculated on the order of 1,2 – 1,3 million units of machines and presses together. Since 1991, it has shrunk dramatically, in 1991 and 1992, totaled about 3,7 million units. But the saddest thing is that this park is not only quantitatively seriously damaged, it is qualitatively at a very unsatisfactory level today, since more than 80 – 85 percent has been in operation for more than 20 years. These figures suggest that the current equipment is morally and physically outdated and requires a radical update. Moreover, 90 percent, including enterprises of the military-industrial complex, I want to emphasize this particularly - equipment that was produced in its time in the Soviet Union and partly in Russia.
Today, less than 4,5 percent of the total amount of equipment used in the country's industry, has a life of less than five years. Only this equipment can to some extent be called modern and progressive. The skating rink, which rolled in all areas, rolled through the machine tool industry. Over the entire reform period, from 1992 – 1993 to the present, 43 enterprises have died in the industry.
Science has suffered very seriously. Of the 22 branch institutes in the industry, there are six that are practically not engaged in applied, research science, they survive. This is the reality of the present day.
Speaking about the volume of production in the industry, I can demonstrate the graphics. We always show them to our top management if it succeeds. Here is a diagram on the chart: 1991 – 1992 years, when we made 70 thousands of units of machines and presses together per year, by 1997 – 1998-m reached the level of nine thousand, you can see what the decline in production. Balanced at the level of eight to nine thousand to 2008 of the year, in 2008-m production once again fell after the crisis, and now we balance at the level of five to six thousand units per year.
It must be said that we managed to break through a number of government decrees and orders, which to some extent changed the attitude towards the industry as a whole. I think that it’s very important that the industry’s problems began to be discussed at the highest political level, and that today, as we say, the words “machine tool industry” began to be mentioned both by the President and the Prime Minister - also in some degree our victory. I speak a little with irony, but you understand that you probably cannot do without it.
So, we managed last year under the auspices of the Prime Minister to hold a targeted meeting on the machine tool industry. In 2011, a government decree was issued, according to which, for the first time in the last 20 and more, the machine tool industry development subprogramme for the period 2011 – 2016 was approved. Its first stage was implemented during 2011 – 2013. For the first time in more than 20 years, we received five billion budget resources for 2011 – 2013 years, and the industry has begun to manufacture a modern product.
Last year, modern measuring equipment and metalworking equipment were made on the 101 theme, new modern technologies were created for which the equipment was created.
We succeeded in issuing Government Decree No. 2011 in 56, at the end of last year, due to the repeal of FZ-94, it received a new name - 1224 Decree, which was signed on December 24. It is called "On the introduction, on the introduction of prohibitions and restrictions on the supply of products for enterprises working for the needs of the defense and security of the country in the presence of the Russian equivalent." Within the framework of this decree, at the cost of incredible efforts, we were able to establish the priority of domestic products, although the representatives of the military-industrial complex and enterprises of the military-industrial complex are very offended at us. But if there is no domestic consumption market for the machine tool industry, primarily in the defense industry, we will not get the proper development.
I head a working group that prepares the presence or absence of analogs, and I will say that over the past few years, 20 has developed a clear supply system for the enterprises of the military-industrial complex for importing equipment.
We talk a lot about this topic, we argue a lot with enterprises, with heads of enterprises. Yes, we are also not sinless, during this time we have lost to a certain extent the technical level of many developments and the quality of workmanship, but there are no miracles when everything, unfortunately, has subsided.
But nevertheless, as a result of these actions, we managed to persuade many. At the end of 2011, at the request of enterprises of the military-industrial complex, we gave permission to receive 93 per cent of the volume of the product they ordered for import. Today we have already reached the level of the fact that 33 – 35 percent of all applications sent by the defense industry enterprises have a Russian equivalent. So, of course, there is a certain impulse for the development of the domestic market, in order to create a modern product to the requirements of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex. And it is very important, I believe that as a result of the implementation of this decree, we have become a little bit closer with the enterprises of the military-industrial complex.
We offer them all the time: “Attract us at the stage of creating technical assignments for the products you are going to produce, so that we develop the equipment for which you will manufacture them for these developed and in the future manufactured products”.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to find a common language for a long time, but now there are already certain advances in this direction, and this is a positive thing.
What do the enterprises of the military-industrial complex need from the point of view of modern technologies?
I assure you, nowhere, in one sphere you will not find complex information, except for us, and only thanks to this 56-th resolution. Because over the past two or three years we have been processing about three thousand applications, we have the opportunity, having accumulated all the needs of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, to form modern trends in metalworking technology, taking into account which we must develop. This is also very important. Therefore, speaking of the state of the industry, I will say that the situation is very difficult, it is critical.
No matter how hard it is, but 20 trillions of rubles have been allocated to re-equip the Russian army, three trillion of this money is intended to re-equip defense enterprises. I think that, probably, it would be expedient to raise the question of allocating at least 10 – 15 percent of these resources to the creation and re-equipment, re-equipping of machine tool enterprises.
I have complete statistics showing how we are limited in the supply of a modern product, we are prohibited from supplying modern equipment to Russia for defense enterprises that work in the field of dual technologies.
If they receive this equipment, it is done in different roundabout ways, through third-fourth countries, but this is not the case. And we have a lot of examples when they stop and shut off foreign equipment, especially American-made. We can recall specific facts, for example, in 2010, and in 2011, and in 2012, when equipment was disconnected at a number of enterprises when it was moved a meter or two from the moment of initial installation.
I consider that it is necessary to use any opportunity, any tribune to convey our concern to the top leaders. For example, we, the machine tool builders, succeeded in approaching Putin several times at various events — and only after that the solution of the issue began and five or six years ago we were able to start forming a subprogram.
Georgy Samodurov,
Head of the Association of Machine Tool Manufacturers
No equivalent to the Defense Council
I would like to highlight two fundamental issues: responsibility and manageability. These are two cardinal problems, and if we do not solve them in the coming years, the defense industry will remain in the same grave condition.
You all remember very well that we had a Defense Council, headed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee. The main defense problems in the country were brought to the Defense Council and general designers and directors of leading production plants were invited there directly. The Defense Council was the highest authority. Now its counterpart is needed, because the country's defense capability is the main task.
I will cite one historical example. In Tula 400 years ago, the first weapons factory was established. Started with private entrepreneurs. One did the trigger, the other trunks, the third ... in general, a dozen companies. Peter the Great was convinced that Russia's private capacity could not be strengthened in private enterprise, and immediately issued a decree on state-owned state-owned factories. That's what saved Russia in later times. Both the successors of Peter — Catherine, and Pavel, and other heads of state — strengthened their defense capability through centralization. And what do we get? We have the opposite, only private enterprise. Do we solve such major issues with private entrepreneurs? Never decide.
Farther. A few years ago I spoke with the article on the MIC - "MIC in the twilight." He remains in the twilight. Four years ago, I said that the Military-Industrial Commission, if it is in fact a commission, should deal with financing issues. With our old Soviet military industrial complex there was a special fund for the development of new products of all kinds: aviation, shipbuilding, electronics, in general, in all areas of the Nine. Now this is not. The military-industrial commission is not able to finance the latest problems. Our military-industrial complex is purely formal, and not an active body.
Further, in terms of manageability. Before this meeting, I spoke with many factory directors and once again made sure that if the state defense order was not formed in the old days at the beginning of the year, then the position on financing slightly shifted. Some plants have approved or signed contracts for several years. Financing is supported at the expense of these contracts, that is, first of all, the issuance of wages, but now it’s bad with defense orders.
Until now, the price - the main problem is that we have delayed contracts on defense orders.
For example, in February, we have not yet created so-called contests. After all, two or three enterprises create contests, and then they only give out, let's say, where they do it cheaper. In our Soviet time, who was the main person in charge? Military representative at the enterprise. The military representative essentially said, this is the price, the director confirms - and there were no competitions, everything was fine, the Ministry of Defense agreed on this price. That's how it was agreed, without any competitions. And now the competition ... It's February already, and there are no competitions yet. After this competition will meet. February will end when we will execute contracts, the state defense order?
In Soviet times, we received a draft plan for this company in December for each enterprise. Coordinated the draft plan in terms of volume, in number, in all parameters. We knew what to do next year and what will be given to us.
Now there is nothing like this. After all, why should the program be in the company? At the expense of this program, the director should think about the number, about all matters related to the arrangement, communications, etc.
And now there is no program. I do not know what I will do not only this year, I do not know what I will do tomorrow. A clear program to 2020, to 2030 of the year, but there is nothing like this among enterprises. In the first place, there should be at least five years for each enterprise to receive a certain amount. But not this.
And the third. Now the enterprises of the military-industrial complex are divided into so-called concerns, associations, and so on and so forth. They then appear, then again they are not. Ultimately, everyone is talking about what? What is needed is a single Ministry of Defense Industry, which should be responsible for everything - both for the control of funding, and for timely contracts.
In short, we now have: some enterprises have gone to nowhere, they have been liquidated. The first task is a personnel problem. How can we provide 25 millions of jobs in the future?
Nikolay Shakhov,
formerly deputy head of the boron industry department of the Central Committee of the CPSU
There is no one to work
Aviation the industry has always felt the need for qualified designers, engineers, technologists, technicians and, of course, workers. But now the lack of qualified specialists is especially acute. Indeed, in Russia over the past decades there has been a real "deengineering." Today we feel the consequences of a serious violation of the principle of continuity of generations, which provided both design bureaus and serial factories with the necessary personnel.
The situation began to worsen with the second half of the 80-s of the last century. Proclaimed in February of the 1986, at the XXVI CPSU Congress, the policy of accelerating, reconstructing scientific and technological progress, increasing the role of mechanical engineering and its further development did not actually produce results. Moreover, young specialists who were trained by aviation institutes and technical schools, due to low wages, began to look for jobs not in their specialty.
This process is even more accelerated with the collapse of the USSR. Now affects almost 20-year break in the influx of young personnel. It is not only about engineers. Even more difficult was the situation with skilled workers, whose preparation today is forced to deal with the production plants themselves.
Especially difficult situation was in the design offices involved in civil aviation. There was a period when a serial factory, which had qualified specialists, did not receive orders, did not have money. Today you can observe another situation. There are orders, there is money, but there is no one to work. Significantly decreased the number of designers. Perhaps, there remains the last chance to change the current situation, while experienced specialists continue to work, who are able, under the right conditions to be created, to pass on their experience to the young shift.
Under the proper conditions means the organization of wages. Previously, everything was simple and natural. The size of the salary corresponded to the qualifications and was acceptable to the young specialist. In the design bureau, the lead designer, who had to use the work of young employees, was simply obliged to monitor their work, constantly explaining how to most efficiently solve the technical problem that ended with the release of working documentation going into production. This method of work ensured rapid growth of qualifications and, accordingly, wage increases. All this happened quickly enough.
The solution to the issue of training today is the main for the revival of the domestic aircraft. The loss and non-completion of personnel means the loss of invaluable practical experience gained over decades, since it is not stored on paper, not on tracing paper, not in books and dissertations, not on a computer’s hard disk, but in human memory.
Of course, computerization of design and production, the presence of many programs provide solutions to complex problems in the field of aerodynamics, strength, and aircraft frame creation, but understanding how to best use all this when creating a new aircraft comes with experience that accumulates much faster when working with those who already has it.
It will take serious efforts to grow the recruitment of specialists, make up the technological gap, rebuild the destroyed. And this should be dealt with immediately, without sparing means.
Heinrich Novozhilov,
aircraft designer, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Troops need industry feedback
Of course, the state and capabilities of the country's military-industrial complex (DIC) directly depend on the level of the Armed Forces, their combat capability and, as a result, the defense capability of the country as a whole.
But this statement is valid only if close, continuous, interdependent feedback and interaction on the development of tactical and technical tasks (TTZ) for the development of weapons and military hardware will be established between the military-industrial complex and the consumer of weapons and military equipment, that is, the troops. equipment (IWT) and technical solutions in their implementation. At the same time, the results of military tests when adopting a model for service should be prioritized.
Excessive independence of the defense industry, neglect of the demands of the troops led and always will lead to unnecessary and sometimes harmful for the troops technical solutions in the development of weapons and military equipment that do not improve their performance, but lead to a banal appreciation of products. In our time, this is especially true.
I will refer to an example. It is known that in the Ground Forces one of the main models of military equipment is a tank. So, starting with the T-64 (sixties) and to this day everything Tanks equipped with a tank gun loader. Many participants in the development of this mechanism became laureates of the State Prize. The main advantage of this mechanism was formally recognized as the possibility of increasing the rate of fire of the tank gun by more than two times and reducing one crew member of the (loading) tank, which ultimately reduced the total number of tank troops.
And this is actually the case. But let's see what benefits the troops received from this innovation, from the point of view of the commanders who used this technique in battle.
So, when manually loading a tank gun, the maximum technical rate of fire can be four to five shots per minute, while using an automatic loader - up to 10. But in practice, when performing exercises, firing on the move, not all trained crews are able to make three shots in two minutes, which are allotted to a target, for appearing and moving targets. And it is natural. In real shooting, the crew needs to detect the target, determine the distance, adjust for the wind and the movement of the target, enter the initial data in the scope, aim and shoot. After the shot, evaluate the results of the shooting, if necessary, re-amend, aim and re-shoot. Thus, in a combat situation, the crew, using the loading mechanism, is able to produce no more than two aimed shots per minute.
With this in mind, the expediency of an automatic loader in a tank is extremely doubtful. After all, this complex technical device requires constant qualified service, prone to difficult failures, a large part of the tank’s internal volume is occupied by its installation, which worsens the already insufficient crew ergonomics and disunites it inside the tank. In addition, being in a tank became dangerous for the crew because of the large number of elements of the mechanism moving in the open space of the combat compartment.
For these and other reasons, it is not by chance that the enterprises leading in the tank construction of the country are not in a hurry with the introduction of this technical device.
Regarding the reduction of the crew from four to three people, this decision led to the intractable damage to the survivability of tank units. As you know, a combat vehicle requires constant maintenance, engineering equipment and a position taken in combat and constant protection. Only for guarding a car in a combat position, the crew members alternate with each other every two hours, without having a place to rest, being inside the machine in a cramped position, lose all working capacity in three or four days, not to mention the ability to conduct combat operations. It was not by chance that during the war the T-34 tank had a crew of five people, including a gunner-radio operator.
The given example illustrates how sometimes the good intentions of the defense industry complex do not correlate with the practice of the troops and how, on the contrary, it is difficult for the insistent requests of the troops to be resolved. For all that, it is necessary to take into account some regularity manifested by the DIC when accepting orders. Industry is eager to take orders for the production of weapons of destruction. They are easier to manufacture, they are metal-intensive and, therefore, more expensive to manufacture. Can not be said about the automated control systems of troops and weapons, especially in the tactical level of control, communications, troop reconnaissance, satellite navigation and ground equipment of consumers to it, EW. Great efforts are required for the industry to undertake the production of these kinds of products. As a result, we observe an imbalance in the structure of weapons in general. With an overabundance of weapons, there is a lack of devices to ensure their use, negating the combat capabilities.
A long-standing and still existing state of affairs can only be straightened by that official and only by the governing body, which will be entrusted with full and sole responsibility for the condition of the troops, for construction and development, for preparation and, preferably, for their application. Only in this case can the full interested cycle be realized from obtaining a sample of a weapon to its use for its intended purpose. Until recently, such command bodies were the Commanders-General of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with commanders-in-chief, endowed with corresponding functions and structures.
For all history The ground forces have only once been organized since their organizational design in 1946 - in the period from 1955 to 1964, they for the first and probably the last time were close to relative independence in matters of technical policy during their construction and development. During this period, all groups of troops, military districts, separate armies and higher educational institutions of the Ground Forces, as well as the main developers and customers of weapons and military equipment according to the nomenclature of the Ground Forces were subordinated to the commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces as the First Deputy of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
During this period, the commander-in-chief was given the right, in addition to other tasks, to develop and approve annual plans for experimental design and research work on the subject of strategic weapons, as well as to place orders for the weapons and military equipment and ammunition industry for the USSR Armed Forces.
This concentration of independence, supported organizationally, allowed the scientific and technical revolution in the Ground Forces to take place during this period, a sharp qualitative leap in providing the troops with the latest types of weapons and military equipment, which significantly changed the characteristics of general arms and led to the improvement of forms and methods of combat operations and operations. .
Designed and adopted weapons of military equipment of that period are still basic models and are only slightly modernized.
In 1964, the CB Main Office was re-disbanded. During the subsequent formations, the previous tasks were only declared, but their solution was not supported by organization. The last formation of the Main Command Committee of the Army, with just over a hundred people, is formally responsible for the construction and development of the Ground Forces, but is really devoid of any levers of influence on the technical policy in them. And the troops themselves are not subordinate to him. For the first time, the Air Force and Air Defense, as well as the Navy, found themselves in the same position.
As of today, there are no competent command and control bodies endowed with the functions mentioned above in the structure of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Thus, without a revision of the place and role of the consumer in the system of development and orders, the forecast for the quick and high-quality rearmament of troops is questionable.
Yuri Bukreev,
Chief of the Main Directorate of the Ground Forces (1998 – 2001), Colonel-General
It takes years to grow a specialist
Back in the 60s of the last century, the experience gained in the development of anti-aircraft guided missiles, their operation and use in combat conditions, made it possible to formulate requirements and begin to solve the problems of creating anti-aircraft missiles and systems that provide real anti-aircraft cover for our country geopolitical situation and world politics.
Thus, the now well-known C-300 systems with the 5B55 rocket, designed to destroy planes and cruise missiles at all ranges and their combat use, appeared. In this rocket, many properties were designated by the word "for the first time", and for that time even "for the first time in the world."
I would like to mention the guaranteed reliability system introduced for the first time during the creation of these missiles, which allowed this technically complex weapon to last unchecked troop operation up to 30 years with constant readiness for launch.
The experience of creating rocket technology showed that the required reliability of rockets and their onboard equipment is provided not so much by duplication of the most important components and their careful selection, but by the harsh conditions of their laboratory tests. Flight tests should be carried out only in cases where the required parameters and loads can not be reproduced in laboratory conditions.
By assigning an important role to ground testing, we take into account that in the process of ground testing, the measurement of various parameters is greatly simplified, and visual and instrumental evaluation of the operation of blocks and assemblies becomes possible.
A significant increase in the cost of rocket technology and a reduction in the cost of its manufacture and testing constantly have an impact on developers, reducing the number of test samples, and for carrying out ground tests only individual specimens are required.
What problems today hinder progress? Now we have the main problem - funding, which directly affects the updating of laboratory and bench equipment, the introduction of new technologies and software, increasing information management systems and attracting personnel. The creation of a new technology at a developing enterprise begins with an experimental design development. The first stage, related to pre-project work and research experiments, is usually performed in the course of research work and research and experimental work, is absent. In accordance with federal law 94, only the sample design stage itself is put up for competition. It is believed that the enterprise should produce the pre-project preparation stage at its own expense.
In our country, the developer of armaments has the state defense order as the main source of income, which includes OCD, and he cannot, and more than that, he has no right to allocate funds from OCR for R & D, equipment and stands. This is stopped by the customer as inappropriate use of funds.
Also, everyone knows that each development enterprise has a design service, high-class specialists. It includes a fairly multidisciplinary theoretical group of specialists solving the problems of substantiating the concept and appearance of future models of equipment. The maintenance of these specialists in the absence of constantly carried out R & D and R & D is possible only from overhead costs. This is the main difference between conventional serial enterprises and developers of new technology; this can not but affect the final price of products.
The source of development of the head enterprises of the industry could be the attraction of budget funds in the development and maintenance of the national technological base and the modernization of production. Targeted financing in this situation could be planned in the development of a target program for the creation of the aerospace defense of the Russian Federation.
Today, the company has laboratory and test bases that allow 19 types of unique tests to be carried out in ground conditions. Created a creative team capable of creating modern rocket technology. In fact, this is the national treasure of Russia. To support everything, and even more to bring it in line with today's requirements, is an expensive matter and is not always within our reach, especially in terms of finance.
Before 90, interesting work, its prestige, the prestige of the enterprise in the world allowed young specialists from the best universities to be received. Today, they are the backbone of firms. But now those who want to work in the defense industry have become much smaller and simply are not enough. It is necessary to take unusual measures and we should not forget that it takes years to grow a specialist.
Vladimir Svetlov,
General Director of IBC "Torch" (1991 – 2006)
We lose energy security
Since 1994, industrial output in Russia did not exceed 15 – 17 per cent of the production in the Russian Federation during the period of the Soviet Union. I exclude oil, gas, wood, fertilizer, and so on.
Since 2000, product prices have multiplied. In 2000, the tank was worth 17,5 million, now it's more than 140. Metal has risen in price, electricity has risen in price, we are in a constrained position on many issues.
If we talk about the basis of defense, it should be based on the self-sufficiency and autonomy of the country in ensuring its activities and national security. What I mean? First of all, food, the ability to meet the needs of the country in all major types of technical and industrial products, the provision of all types of goods, including textiles.
One of the most painful problems was that the collapse of the industry and the transition from the branch to the functional principle completely violated cooperation. And if earlier at the head of the corner was a factory or an enterprise, the leading manufacturer, now there is a management company, a service center or some other organization that is not responsible for anything.
Due to the fact that the sectoral structure and regulatory framework have been eliminated, the standards used by the old memory have been destroyed, but no one develops them, no one is responsible for them. The relevant ministries were enterprises of science, economics, technology, training, management, materials.
There is a process of de-structuring of scientific organizations, and in all areas: aviation, radio electronics. On the threshold is another sale of enterprises, which does not promise anything good.
We are losing energy security as such. All over the world, the main and main criterion of safety is the state’s ability to produce energy products: internal combustion engines, gas turbine engines, and electric motors. We do not make cars, the need of the engine to the car is lost. We do not produce civil aircraft, we have no need to produce aircraft engines. We do not produce element base. Look, enter any house - not a single domestic receiver, not a single domestic phone. The element base is the quintessence of the information space.
Providing information, energy, material, mobile - we are able to create everything ourselves.
In the Ministry of Defense, the problem is not that there are few technical means. It is important that the entire combat readiness system is destroyed, the system for maintaining technical readiness, the system of personnel training and the regulatory framework are destroyed.
A technological fence is being built between us and the developed countries.
We will try to keep at the level of the Papuans.
We need to develop science. Science must go ahead, above all industry science. Combat readiness depends largely on the state of the industry. And our man, he knows how to fight and will fight, we must give him what.
Anatoly Sitnov,
Chief of Armaments of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (1994 – 2000), Colonel-General
Need munitions ministry
I firmly believe that if the money allocated for the development of the military-industrial complex does not fall under public control, half of this money will be stolen. We need to think about how to create this control, what needs to be done for this.
At one time, we ourselves compiled a technical industrial plan and in December it was approved. At the same time, they were confident that during the whole financial year not a single natural monopolist would increase the price for us. Now there is no such certainty.
We need a law that would prohibit a natural monopolist from manipulating the prices of his services during the financial year.
We now have 50 on 50 in high school: 50 is the state budget, and 50 is a commercial education.
The money spent by the state must be worked out within three years. Let's make those who study, get our education at the expense of the state, then go to the factories - go to work out the education we received.
Peter Romanov,
State Duma deputy, Hero of Socialist Labor
Transportation on foreign aircraft
In my speech I will briefly dwell on two issues: the state of civil aviation technology and the state of aviation industry science, in what position it is today.
Unfortunately, today 85 – 90 percent of traffic in Russia is performed on foreign aircraft. That is, practically civil aviation equipment does not participate in transportation in the industry. This is a huge problem. Although in fact we have beautiful planes: IL-96, Tu-204, Tu-214, Tu-334. They are quite competitive with their foreign counterparts. Everyone knows that. Nevertheless, there is no mass production. Where is she, serial equipment? She is not there either, and no one is going to do it. What, we will continue to fly on the western technology? You understand perfectly well that if civil aviation technology ends, and this applies to personnel, science, and everything, then the production of military equipment will also end in a certain amount of time. It is all interconnected.
In principle, we have our industry today. UAC is developing two aircraft - one of them "Superjet" about a hundred people. And the second machine is being created - MC-21, which should appear and make the first flight in 2016. They used to say: in 2014, in 2015, now this is all moving away to 2016, serial production - to 2017 a year. And by this time Western machines will appear again, A-320-NEO, Boeing-737, which again will not allow us to enter a good international market with our new products, because we will not be the first.
In the car MC-21 laid good new things, especially composite materials. But we are not ready in today's state for the production of the wing of them.
We have no opportunities for this. The fact that TsAGI is now experiencing two Tison, made the Austrian company "Fisher". But this is a good thing. We are gaining knowledge, getting something, but this has very little to do with the real industry. In Kazan and Ulyanovsk, they want to build two new factories or workshops based on old factories to produce these materials.
Europe and America have spent 20 years to master this technology and a lot of money, which we simply do not have. Therefore, it is hard to believe that we in 2015 or 2014 can make a so-called black wing from composite materials. And what will this lead to? If this is not done, then the MC-21 project will go even further. This is what concerns the state of civil aviation technology. Practically, our domestic aviation technology is excluded from the process of transportation of civil aviation. Of course, there is a real tragedy.
And all the time we did new things and worked on the groundwork for five, for ten years, that is, we brought the existing equipment and made the groundwork for the future, but today it is not. And here come the young specialists from the MAI, the level of training both in the MAI and in the Physical and Technical Institute, well, in general in high school, he is now very, unfortunately, lowered. It's clear. Why? Because what can you learn personnel? Frames can be learned from the real business when real planes are built, and they are practically not built. Certain modifications are being made at Sukhoi, at Ilyushin, but there are no new machines.
Vladimir Dmitriev,
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Deputy Chairman of the Military Industrial Complex under the Government of the Russian Federation (2006 – 2008)
Military equipment with imported equipment
There is a branch of science and technology, which is also decisive in achieving the highest indicators - optics. It is present everywhere: in industry (in all sectors), in agriculture. Russia did not have its own optics, German was used. And, surprisingly, the leader of our revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, a technically illiterate person, thought about it. One of the first government decrees in 1918 was a decree establishing the State Optical Institute in St. Petersburg, Leningrad. Who told him I do not know.
One more. All the old scientists, academics, practical optics - no one emigrated abroad. And since there was no Academy of Sciences, science was created within this institute.
It so happened that in our Academy of Sciences of this unit as such was not. We had two academicians - Prokhorov and Basov, the Nobel Prize laureates - for lasers received it. Everything else was concentrated in the walls of the State Optical Institute.
But in order to destroy the defense industry, you just have to pull one link. This happened: the institution was liquidated, it no longer exists. Since there is no institution, there is no science.
The current remnants of nothing new, fundamental can not create. The only one who has kept all the Soviet achievements is the Lukashenko dad. Belomo operates in Belarus - the largest, second largest enterprise of the optical industry.
I will just give one example: why are we now putting imported equipment in our military equipment?
Here we say: why the "Mace" does not fly? Because they made two major mistakes: they liquidated the institute of military representatives - a unique control body and removed the specialists in the Ministry of Defense, who were equal to our designers. By eliminating this, we lost everything.
If there is no science, what to talk about?
It should be repeated - we liquidated specialists, we liquidated the main designers. Here sits the last outstanding designer, we no longer have. At the head of all put the manager. But money only helps development, they do not create science. At the head of the institute can not stand the manager.
We have no workers. And no matter how much money is allocated, if there are no workers, nothing can be done. We also had a system of vocational schools. There were recruited less affluent people, but there were growing personnel. There is nothing now. Well, how do you imagine how much time is needed to restore this system?
See how any project was previously developed within the walls of institutions. Projects were discussed on technical councils, on board of the ministry. When Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov, the cleverest man who went through all this school, became the Minister of Defense, the main projects were considered at the board of the Ministry.
We had specialized all divisions. Well, how could you have thought of giving our MIT a naval missile "Bulava"? We have a great company "Makeev", Makeevskaya "Sineva" flies, and our "Bulava" will not fly.
In addition, there is still not our electronics. Specialists made mobile complexes. The first rocket was the most secret, called Temp-2С. We have 10 pieces done. Then they were declassified. After “Temp-2C” went “Pioneer”, “Topol” is all “Temp-2С”. Previously, if 11 did not launch positive, the rocket was not put into service.
God forbid that the Bulava was pulled out ... This is a big specificity: a sea rocket and a land rocket.
In addition, there is a problem with specialists - there simply are no young people.
Igor Kornitsky,
President of the Association "Optoelectronic Instrument Engineering"
Fleet out of production
We all know well the achievements of both the Russian shipbuilding industry and the Soviet Ministry of Shipbuilding, as well as the shortcomings. I would like to cite some figures in order to understand what we have left and what we lost.
There was a large shipbuilding program before the Great Patriotic War. Battleships and heavy battle cruisers, not to mention other ships, are mortgaged. Only during the war did we get 211 submarines, but we didn’t have them left from royal times. And 211 received.
But for these twenty two and a half years, we got only three boats.
For 1941 – 1945, the fleet received two light cruisers, 20 destroyers, 40 minesweepers, 59 patrol ships, 15 big hunters, 54 submarines, 900 combat boats.
In 1957, our fleet has already received the first nuclear submarine. Can you imagine what a jump it is! There was also a shock segment - 1966 – 1978 years. 122 nuclear submarines took the Navy for 12 years. The 35 nuclear boat was built in 251 years, and in a year and a half 22 three.
I'm not talking about surface ships, as part of fleet both missile cruisers and heavy nuclear missile cruisers were located, and went on to nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. Now we would have at least two or three nuclear aircraft carriers in the North and Pacific Fleets.
Sailors mastered them, all ships carried combat service from three months to one year. But these 22 have passed a year and a half, and the ships are all walking, swimming, performing the task, and these are all our ships. No new in the ocean has not yet appeared. Why?
We all remember: in the Soviet Union there was a plan, there were personal responsibilities. There was a customer - the Navy and the contractor - the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry. Who is the customer now? I do not know...
You can buy the Crimean factories in Kerch and Feodosia, they built ships of a different kind. Well, create, of course, necessary.
And we need a strict plan and personal responsibility, someone must be responsible for the result. Be sure to control the finances. The navy should be associated with the production of ships. At all times it was, only now is not. Fleet out of production.
Valentin Selivanov,
Chief of General Staff - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (1992 – 1996), Admiral
Aging machine park
I think that I will not tell you anything new if I say that the defense of our country and the implementation of its armament program in many respects can be carried out only in the case of modernization, first of all, of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex. Because today, without modern technologies, the products of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex certainly cannot meet the requirements that are imposed on it.
If we talk about the structure and condition of the metalworking equipment park, today the park of metalworking machines in the industrial complex of the country, including the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, is calculated on the order of 1,2 – 1,3 million units of machines and presses together. Since 1991, it has shrunk dramatically, in 1991 and 1992, totaled about 3,7 million units. But the saddest thing is that this park is not only quantitatively seriously damaged, it is qualitatively at a very unsatisfactory level today, since more than 80 – 85 percent has been in operation for more than 20 years. These figures suggest that the current equipment is morally and physically outdated and requires a radical update. Moreover, 90 percent, including enterprises of the military-industrial complex, I want to emphasize this particularly - equipment that was produced in its time in the Soviet Union and partly in Russia.
Today, less than 4,5 percent of the total amount of equipment used in the country's industry, has a life of less than five years. Only this equipment can to some extent be called modern and progressive. The skating rink, which rolled in all areas, rolled through the machine tool industry. Over the entire reform period, from 1992 – 1993 to the present, 43 enterprises have died in the industry.
Science has suffered very seriously. Of the 22 branch institutes in the industry, there are six that are practically not engaged in applied, research science, they survive. This is the reality of the present day.
Speaking about the volume of production in the industry, I can demonstrate the graphics. We always show them to our top management if it succeeds. Here is a diagram on the chart: 1991 – 1992 years, when we made 70 thousands of units of machines and presses together per year, by 1997 – 1998-m reached the level of nine thousand, you can see what the decline in production. Balanced at the level of eight to nine thousand to 2008 of the year, in 2008-m production once again fell after the crisis, and now we balance at the level of five to six thousand units per year.
It must be said that we managed to break through a number of government decrees and orders, which to some extent changed the attitude towards the industry as a whole. I think that it’s very important that the industry’s problems began to be discussed at the highest political level, and that today, as we say, the words “machine tool industry” began to be mentioned both by the President and the Prime Minister - also in some degree our victory. I speak a little with irony, but you understand that you probably cannot do without it.
So, we managed last year under the auspices of the Prime Minister to hold a targeted meeting on the machine tool industry. In 2011, a government decree was issued, according to which, for the first time in the last 20 and more, the machine tool industry development subprogramme for the period 2011 – 2016 was approved. Its first stage was implemented during 2011 – 2013. For the first time in more than 20 years, we received five billion budget resources for 2011 – 2013 years, and the industry has begun to manufacture a modern product.
Last year, modern measuring equipment and metalworking equipment were made on the 101 theme, new modern technologies were created for which the equipment was created.
We succeeded in issuing Government Decree No. 2011 in 56, at the end of last year, due to the repeal of FZ-94, it received a new name - 1224 Decree, which was signed on December 24. It is called "On the introduction, on the introduction of prohibitions and restrictions on the supply of products for enterprises working for the needs of the defense and security of the country in the presence of the Russian equivalent." Within the framework of this decree, at the cost of incredible efforts, we were able to establish the priority of domestic products, although the representatives of the military-industrial complex and enterprises of the military-industrial complex are very offended at us. But if there is no domestic consumption market for the machine tool industry, primarily in the defense industry, we will not get the proper development.
I head a working group that prepares the presence or absence of analogs, and I will say that over the past few years, 20 has developed a clear supply system for the enterprises of the military-industrial complex for importing equipment.
We talk a lot about this topic, we argue a lot with enterprises, with heads of enterprises. Yes, we are also not sinless, during this time we have lost to a certain extent the technical level of many developments and the quality of workmanship, but there are no miracles when everything, unfortunately, has subsided.
But nevertheless, as a result of these actions, we managed to persuade many. At the end of 2011, at the request of enterprises of the military-industrial complex, we gave permission to receive 93 per cent of the volume of the product they ordered for import. Today we have already reached the level of the fact that 33 – 35 percent of all applications sent by the defense industry enterprises have a Russian equivalent. So, of course, there is a certain impulse for the development of the domestic market, in order to create a modern product to the requirements of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex. And it is very important, I believe that as a result of the implementation of this decree, we have become a little bit closer with the enterprises of the military-industrial complex.
We offer them all the time: “Attract us at the stage of creating technical assignments for the products you are going to produce, so that we develop the equipment for which you will manufacture them for these developed and in the future manufactured products”.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to find a common language for a long time, but now there are already certain advances in this direction, and this is a positive thing.
What do the enterprises of the military-industrial complex need from the point of view of modern technologies?
I assure you, nowhere, in one sphere you will not find complex information, except for us, and only thanks to this 56-th resolution. Because over the past two or three years we have been processing about three thousand applications, we have the opportunity, having accumulated all the needs of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, to form modern trends in metalworking technology, taking into account which we must develop. This is also very important. Therefore, speaking of the state of the industry, I will say that the situation is very difficult, it is critical.
No matter how hard it is, but 20 trillions of rubles have been allocated to re-equip the Russian army, three trillion of this money is intended to re-equip defense enterprises. I think that, probably, it would be expedient to raise the question of allocating at least 10 – 15 percent of these resources to the creation and re-equipment, re-equipping of machine tool enterprises.
I have complete statistics showing how we are limited in the supply of a modern product, we are prohibited from supplying modern equipment to Russia for defense enterprises that work in the field of dual technologies.
If they receive this equipment, it is done in different roundabout ways, through third-fourth countries, but this is not the case. And we have a lot of examples when they stop and shut off foreign equipment, especially American-made. We can recall specific facts, for example, in 2010, and in 2011, and in 2012, when equipment was disconnected at a number of enterprises when it was moved a meter or two from the moment of initial installation.
I consider that it is necessary to use any opportunity, any tribune to convey our concern to the top leaders. For example, we, the machine tool builders, succeeded in approaching Putin several times at various events — and only after that the solution of the issue began and five or six years ago we were able to start forming a subprogram.
Georgy Samodurov,
Head of the Association of Machine Tool Manufacturers
No equivalent to the Defense Council
I would like to highlight two fundamental issues: responsibility and manageability. These are two cardinal problems, and if we do not solve them in the coming years, the defense industry will remain in the same grave condition.
You all remember very well that we had a Defense Council, headed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee. The main defense problems in the country were brought to the Defense Council and general designers and directors of leading production plants were invited there directly. The Defense Council was the highest authority. Now its counterpart is needed, because the country's defense capability is the main task.
I will cite one historical example. In Tula 400 years ago, the first weapons factory was established. Started with private entrepreneurs. One did the trigger, the other trunks, the third ... in general, a dozen companies. Peter the Great was convinced that Russia's private capacity could not be strengthened in private enterprise, and immediately issued a decree on state-owned state-owned factories. That's what saved Russia in later times. Both the successors of Peter — Catherine, and Pavel, and other heads of state — strengthened their defense capability through centralization. And what do we get? We have the opposite, only private enterprise. Do we solve such major issues with private entrepreneurs? Never decide.
Farther. A few years ago I spoke with the article on the MIC - "MIC in the twilight." He remains in the twilight. Four years ago, I said that the Military-Industrial Commission, if it is in fact a commission, should deal with financing issues. With our old Soviet military industrial complex there was a special fund for the development of new products of all kinds: aviation, shipbuilding, electronics, in general, in all areas of the Nine. Now this is not. The military-industrial commission is not able to finance the latest problems. Our military-industrial complex is purely formal, and not an active body.
Further, in terms of manageability. Before this meeting, I spoke with many factory directors and once again made sure that if the state defense order was not formed in the old days at the beginning of the year, then the position on financing slightly shifted. Some plants have approved or signed contracts for several years. Financing is supported at the expense of these contracts, that is, first of all, the issuance of wages, but now it’s bad with defense orders.
Until now, the price - the main problem is that we have delayed contracts on defense orders.
For example, in February, we have not yet created so-called contests. After all, two or three enterprises create contests, and then they only give out, let's say, where they do it cheaper. In our Soviet time, who was the main person in charge? Military representative at the enterprise. The military representative essentially said, this is the price, the director confirms - and there were no competitions, everything was fine, the Ministry of Defense agreed on this price. That's how it was agreed, without any competitions. And now the competition ... It's February already, and there are no competitions yet. After this competition will meet. February will end when we will execute contracts, the state defense order?
In Soviet times, we received a draft plan for this company in December for each enterprise. Coordinated the draft plan in terms of volume, in number, in all parameters. We knew what to do next year and what will be given to us.
Now there is nothing like this. After all, why should the program be in the company? At the expense of this program, the director should think about the number, about all matters related to the arrangement, communications, etc.
And now there is no program. I do not know what I will do not only this year, I do not know what I will do tomorrow. A clear program to 2020, to 2030 of the year, but there is nothing like this among enterprises. In the first place, there should be at least five years for each enterprise to receive a certain amount. But not this.
And the third. Now the enterprises of the military-industrial complex are divided into so-called concerns, associations, and so on and so forth. They then appear, then again they are not. Ultimately, everyone is talking about what? What is needed is a single Ministry of Defense Industry, which should be responsible for everything - both for the control of funding, and for timely contracts.
In short, we now have: some enterprises have gone to nowhere, they have been liquidated. The first task is a personnel problem. How can we provide 25 millions of jobs in the future?
Nikolay Shakhov,
formerly deputy head of the boron industry department of the Central Committee of the CPSU
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