Military Review

Pyrrhic victory of the American troops

37
Pyrrhic victory of the American troopsMore than 10 years have passed since 1 May 2003, US President George W. Bush announced “the unprecedented victory of the US Armed Forces (SC) over Saddam’s Iraq” and “bringing the ideals of democracy” to this country. Since then, many copies have been crossed by Western and domestic experts around analyzing the "victorious" actions of the Americans in the operation to "destroy the war machine" of Iraq and the conclusions from this experience regarding the formulation of recommendations for reforming the US military (and not only!) wars. The farther apart are the events of the past years, the clearer are the pros and cons of this action of Americans and its compliance with the principles of the current revolution in military affairs, and therefore, the general trends of the development of the armed forces as a whole.


HAVE YOU RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A STORM IN THE DESERT?

Practically all American military construction specialists believe that the Freedom to Iraq US military operation in the spring of 2003 was directly related to the military actions of the US military and its all-varied allies, or, as it is now accepted to say, “coalition willing”, during the operation Desert Storm in winter 1991.

The essence of the question is how successful the President-father Bush Bush finally accomplished with the incompleteness of the defeat of the dictator in 1991, and finally, did the Americans learn from the first operation and how they were brought to life.

No doubt, the Americans and their allies defeated 1991, as it was then thought, the most powerful regional-scale military machine that had recent 8-year war experience with the equally powerful armed forces of the traditional enemy of Iraq - Iran. Trying to get to the root causes of this success, critically-minded supporters of the “military reforms” in the United States recognize that the victory of the Americans and their allies in 1991 was achieved at the very beginning of the campaign by winning air supremacy. At the same time, they are unanimous in their conclusion that this happened solely due to the work of those lobbyists in the national military-industrial complex (MIC) who managed to “break through” the use of “really best” aircraft for that period of time (F -15, F-16, F-18, A-10), and not those that were imposed in 70 – 80-s of the last century by the so-called representatives of the military-industrial complex and "lured" officials from the Pentagon.

Suffice to say that of the 36s shot down by the Americans and their allies, the Iraqi 34 aircraft were hit by the F-15 fighter jets, the other two by the US Navy F-18 fighter jets. As recognized by Iraqi prisoners, the most shocking impression on the Iraqi military personnel “in the field” was not so much the massive bombardment of “timeless” B-52, as the exhausting attack aircraft of А-10 aircraft, which allegedly also testified to the correctness of the American “reformers” sticking to them (as “Independent” and from the authorities) to the leadership of the US Armed Forces of deliveries to the troops and the use in combat of serious preliminary tests of weapons and military equipment (IWT).

Success in aerial combat american aviation very substantially leveled by the inaction of the Iraqi air defense system, in fact, on the first day (from the 38-day air campaign) crushed by the Americans, or completely excluded (with the goal of "maintaining integrity"?) by the willful decision of the Iraqi leadership from participating in hostilities. Therefore, the unprecedentedly small losses of Americans and their allies in airplanes (0,0006% of 65 thousand sorties) can only indicate the minimum benefit for the flight personnel of participating in military operations in the winter of 1991, practically in "range conditions". Indeed, the complete demoralization of Iraqi military personnel even before the ground phase of the operation, on the one hand, unequivocally indicated the incompetence of the leadership of the Iraqi armed forces, who were considered a “formidable adversary,” and on the other, showed the inadequacy of US intelligence regarding the morale of the Iraqi armed forces and thereby turned out to be bad service to the command of the American-led coalition, not allowing him to show his best qualities in full.

But let us be fair, yet it is impossible not to pay tribute to the developers of the operation at the Pentagon, for the first time in the latest stories focusing on the unprecedented duration of the preparatory part (the air operation), which ultimately decided the fate of the entire campaign in the 1991 year. This, of course, could not but be taken into account when developing scenarios for fighting in 2003 and misleading the Iraqis, this time around the “shortened” air operation and the “conventional” ground campaign phase.

An example of a learned lesson can serve as the recommendations of the "reformers", and among them dismissed for obstinacy from the US Armed Forces, Major Donald Wandergriff, who put forward the idea, precisely from the experience of ground forces fighting in 1991, about reorganizing the system of interrelationships within ground formation units (SV and marines), ensuring their coherence and commitment to achieving the goal set by management.

Adopted by the recommendations of Vandergriff, set out in his well-known analytical work “The Way to Victory: the American Army and the Revolution in the Humanitarian Sphere”, were widely spread among the troops thanks to a personal petition on this subject by the US Army Secretary Thomas White and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Army Jack Keane. In particular, these recommendations were used, inter alia, in the main “penetrating power” in the 2003 operation — the 3 Infantry Division, where the so-called new division management system was introduced, which allegedly contributed to establishing the authority of lower-level commanders and generally uniting combat teams.

There were other “useful innovations” both in the areas of tactics, operational art, the organization of the redeployment of significant groups of troops, the testing of experimental models of weapons and military equipment in all types of armed forces with the rejection of “unsuccessful” and some others. But there were also obvious blunders of the political and military leadership of the United States, which for objective, and more often for subjective reasons, were trivially ignored, were not taken into account during the planning and conduct of hostilities in the same region ten years later and are still subject to discussion by specialists. First of all, it concerns the evaluation of the enemy.

PARADOXAL “LEARNINGS”

After many years from the end of the combat phase of the operation in 2003, we can confidently state: the Iraqis did not make any constructive conclusions from their defeat in the 1991 year, and if they did, it was only to their detriment.

As on the eve of the first operation, the specialists were impressed by the mass of the Iraqi armed forces: 350 thousand people, plus another 100 thousand called up from the reserve on the eve of the start of hostilities in 2003. Of the main types of weapons and military equipment, Iraqis had from 2,2 to 2,6 thousand. tanks, 3,7 thousand armored personnel carriers and 2,4 thousand artillery pieces of all calibers. At the same time, only about 700 T-72 tanks could be distinguished from more or less modern weapons and military equipment, the rest were obviously outdated models of the 50-60s of the last century, mainly Soviet-made. The Iraqi Air Force and Air Defense, as in the previous campaign, were again “excluded” from the hostilities. Moreover, American intelligence learned that most of the Iraqi Air Force aircraft (300 aircraft) were dismantled (wings removed) and stored in special shelters, supposedly for safety, on the eve of the campaign. The participation of several Iraqi aircraft in subsequent battles, as the analysis showed, was intended to demonstrate to its ground forces only "the availability of national air power to raise morale", and nothing more. The "miserable" naval forces of Iraq, as in the 1991 operation, apparently did not even take Baghdad into account when preparing for military operations.

When the inevitability of a new clash with the Americans became apparent, the Iraqis immediately inexplicably immediately attacked the same rake. The Iraqi command, perplexed by the enemy, again deployed in the desert, virtually open, almost unsuitable for conventional defense, formations and part of their ground forces, making them a convenient target for aviation and high-precision means of destruction, quantitatively increased over the past decade in the arsenal of Americans. Some experts tend to explain this strange decision of the Iraqi generals to the fact that Baghdad simply intended to sacrifice a less valuable component of his troops — infantry to contain the enemy’s overwhelming firepower in order to later engage him in fighting in populated areas (fighting in the city) with units supposedly prepared for this elite Republican Guard. Moreover, as American expert Winslow Wheeler emphasizes, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who did not trust the “infantry mass”, mainly consisting of “unreliable” Shiite recruits and, accordingly, poorly trained and equipped, had little concern for the fate of “cannon fodder”, which he considered only as "the first step of protection of the mode".

The American army knew how to win the battle, but not the war.

The so-called tactics of actions used by the Iraqis, as if "taken from Soviet textbooks of the Second World War epoch," were also surprising. In their opinion, the Iraqi generals threw their infantry into a frontal attack under the destroyer of powerful weapons of American destruction in their opinion of the favorable conditions that had been formed. Yes, and the interaction on the battlefield of the Iraqi units and units can not speak. As indicated in one of the studies devoted to this operation, the Iraqi commanders were so "fixated on their personal responsibility for what is happening on the battlefield that they completely constrained the initiative of their subordinates, preventing them from taking a step without proper instructions." Isolated instances of the initiative and even the manifestation of “courage and heroism” on the part of Iraqis, emphasize the American participants in the fighting, looked like “complete insanity and self-destructive fanaticism”, which do not bring any benefit in battle.

As stated above, Saddam Hussein and his entourage cared little for the needs of the armed forces. All his efforts to "strengthen the country's defense" were actually aimed at preserving his unlimited power. Otherwise, how to explain the fact that instead of reorganizing the ground forces that were “shabby” in 1991 year, the traditional basis of the Iraqi Armed Forces, he recreated a special republican guard ranging from 15 to 20 thousand with personally selected officer corps, who received money allowances superior to the salaries of army officers. The command of the guard, of course, was entrusted to one of Saddam’s sons, Qusay, who, as a commander, was very mediocre.

In addition to this, various irregular formations were created by the dictator. In particular, in 1995, the corps of the “Saddam Fedains (in translation - partisans)” was formed, also numbering up to 20 thousand people, led by another dictator's son - Uday. Following the pattern of the Hitlerites in Iraq, the militant youth organization Lions Saddam, numerous armed groups of members of the ruling Al Baath party, and a powerful Special Security Service, were spent on maintaining the combat readiness of which, in total, surpassed the military budget. At the same time, the main task of these fighters was not at all a struggle with an external enemy, but with an internal enemy.

Saddam Hussein introduced the practice of rivalry among not only the generals of the armed forces, but also the leaders of the irregular formations allegedly betrayed to him personally for “the possibility of close access to the dictator’s body” and receiving privileges and benefits at the expense of it. But this practice only led to the creation of an extremely unhealthy atmosphere in the officer-general's environment, and produced various “conspirators” and “informers” with a corresponding response from the security services. Hence the extremely low morale and state of discipline in the troops. Since the beginning of the fighting, numerous cases of desertion have been noted, often in the structure of subunits and even from seemingly "tame" republican guards. The media cited numerous examples of trivial betrayal by a large group of Iraqi generals, allegedly bribed by American agents on the eve of the campaign and who left (simply escaped) their posts during the most critical period of battles.

From all this it was impossible not to draw an unequivocal conclusion about the unpreparedness of the Iraqi armed forces for war. Charles Heyman, editor-in-chief of the authoritative Janes World Army, makes the following conclusion: “It is obvious that the Iraqi armed forces on the eve of the invasion were perhaps the most incompetent army in the world.” The American expert Winslow, Wheeler, mentioned in his assessment goes even further, asking: “Is there any reason for us to say that the US Armed Forces are supposedly“ the strongest and the best ”if they had experience of fighting only with such a weak opponent?”

HOPE FOR TECHNICAL EXCELLENCE

Disregarding generalizations and looking at the problems that the US armed forces encountered during the campaign, as they say, from the inside, the following picture emerges: weapons"In Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

Let's start with the tactical level. As for the hope of the American generals for the unconditional technical (technological) superiority of the US Armed Forces over any virtual and real adversary demonstrated during and, most importantly, deciding the outcome of the combat phase of the operation, many analysts, including the US, have doubts about the truth of this thesis. .

For example, Winslow Wheeler, the military authority mentioned above, based on his own analysis of reports from the combat zone, concludes that information about the absolute success of American high-tech systems is generally an exaggeration or even a distortion of the truth. He questions the approval of those lobbyists introduced (and partially introduced during the campaign) into the military forces of a system of sensors, computers and communication equipment, which in the complex allegedly "finally lifted the veil of uncertainty and ambiguity from the battlefield." The lawyers of this system, even on the eve of the operation, categorically stated that from now on, using these information devices that track the location and movement of the enemy, it is possible to control the fire from higher-level staffs in such a way that, for example, the enemy’s anti-tank weapons will be amazed even before they reach the firing range for defeat armored vehicles. The reality has refuted the promised triumph of new technologies.

The commander of one of the battalions of the 3 Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Markoun, recalls that, thanks to the new system, he was almost deprived of information about the composition of the forces and intentions of the enemy. And at night, on the eve of the battle, he was “deceived” in general: he was informed from higher authorities that there was an Iraqi brigade in front of the front of his battalion, while just before the start of the clash it became clear that there were three brigades, that is, in fact, a division . I had to urgently "break" all the planning of the battle.

A similar assessment of the new system was given by the commanders of the US Marine Corps. Moreover, some of them argued that against the background of the methods of obtaining information through traditional means of communication that had been worked out over the years, the new system was inactive, only creating additional difficulties with “avalanche-like information flows” that could not be processed on time. It got to the point that the commanders simply ignored this system. This “phenomenon of mistrust,” indicates Wheeler, as if justifying the leadership of the American units, was fairly common in previous conflicts. And not only in the US Army, when the commanders of the lower level were wary of instructions from above, because they were confident that they knew better the situation in their area of ​​responsibility than they did in the higher headquarters, located at a considerable distance from the front line. However, the main negative, according to another authoritative American expert, William Lind, referring to the experience of a rigid hierarchy and “selected” information under the centralized management of high-tech fire, which took place during the campaign in Iraq in 2003, is that these schemes carry heavy burden ... dogmatic concepts that, demanding unquestioning obedience and restricting initiative, act like a drug.

An analysis of the results of the combat phase of the American operation in Iraq in 2003 exposes another myth about the unconditional contribution of the technical superiority of the US military to ensuring victory in the campaign as a whole. We are talking about the allegedly successful use of precision weapons. In fact, Wheeler points out, this was a very rare occurrence. It is estimated that, for example, to destroy one bridge, on average, up to 10 tons of ammunition was consumed, which does not fit in with the essence of the proclaimed concept of “one bomb - one goal”. With the defeat of Iraqi armored vehicles was about the same story. As it turned out, only a small percentage of tanks were hit with high-precision weapons, most of them were undermined by the Iraqis themselves, or even thrown on the battlefield before contact with the Americans.

Did a transformation take place?

It is known that the defense minister Donald Rumsfeld was an ardent champion of the technical superiority of the US Armed Forces, who put this thesis at the basis of the transformation of the country's military machine under his leadership and tried to prove his eligibility in a real combat situation in Afghanistan and Iraq. The minister and his supporters among the American generals believed that high-tech weapons and military equipment alone could quickly achieve the goal, destroying the enemy and achieving breaking his intentions to continue resistance. Using advanced technology, precision long-range weapons, modern means of reconnaissance and communications, it seemed to American generals that they were able to defeat the enemy quickly and with little blood.

However, having achieved success on the battlefield relatively quickly, they suddenly discovered that the easy part of the operation had ended, but the goal of the war had not been achieved. As the course of this campaign in Iraq in 2003 showed, the aforementioned expert, Wheeler, who is technologically superior to the enemy, emphasizes the American army knew how to win the battle, but not the war. He is echoed by the famous British strategist, Colin Gray, who noted that practicing in the US Armed Forces “dependence entirely on firepower, although highly desirable by itself, ultimately becomes useless at a time when other methods of behavior in the military are more acceptable” .

In fact, General Tommy Frank, the commander of the United Central Command of the U.S. Armed Forces of the US troops in Iraq in 2003, was clearly in captivity of these outdated notions and was not at all concerned about the consequences of the blitzkrieg and the capture of Baghdad, and what to do next.

And then came the sobering, especially after the publication of the fact of a sharp increase (after the "victory") of losses among the US military and engaging them in protracted battles with the rebels, including from among the civilian population, which, in theory, was to be grateful to the Yankees for exemption from dictatorial regime. But at first, the Americans did not even think about conducting a phase of peacekeeping and operations to stabilize the situation in the country. Immediately, the claims to the Minister Rumsfeld on this score were sharply rejected by him: “It’s not up to the military to help, let alone participate in civil engineering.” To the question of whose business it was, the head of the military department did not know what to answer.

And what seemed especially unacceptable for experts, including such authority in the field of military reforms as Lawrence Korb, is that instead of recognizing the fallacy of their actions and swiftly shifting the emphasis of work in a ravaged country to building on the instructions of the American leadership, a systematic withdrawal of troops began from Iraq, and at once 50 thousand people and another 50 thousand after a short period of time.

A civil war, which began in destabilization, in essence only multiplied the disgruntled and, accordingly, victims among the “liberators” who had lost the initiative and were forced to carry out endless “sweeps”, which in turn increased the discontent of the population. In other words, a vicious circle of problems was formed. Yes, and Minister Rumsfeld, as they say, “enlightened,” admitted: “We have no criteria for understanding whether we win the war on terror (meaning the situation in Iraq) ... or lose.” Therefore, Korb concludes, the traditional military victory in modern military conflicts is only a prelude to a stabilization operation, the success or failure of which determines the overall outcome of the campaign. On the whole, the use of force as a means of appeasing the population is fraught with "the withdrawal of military methods from the political goals that they are intended to provide." What happened in Iraq!

WINNING POINTS

Completing a brief critical analysis of the US military’s involvement in the war against Iraq in 2003, it seems appropriate to provide an assessment of the position of the US military-political leadership given by renowned military practitioner and theorist, retired colonel Douglas MacGregor. A veteran of Operation Storm in the Desert, in which he became famous as the “most successful armored commander in the US Army” and became widely known as the author of the sensational study “Overcoming Phalanx: A New Structure for Ground Power of the 21st Century”, MacGregor as a result of Operation “ Freedom for Iraq ”published an essay in 2006 under the very eloquent title“ Down with the generals! ”.

Summing up the results of his analysis, the author of the essay, in particular, notes: first, the command of the American grouping of troops in the region did not understand the essence of the “new generation conflicts”, did not have the appropriate doctrine and experts in its headquarters, who knew the counterinsurgency nuances fight Secondly, the American commanders were trained and prepared “for the global confrontation with the military might of the Soviets,” but were at a loss in the face of the tactics of the Iraqi “fedains” (partisans). Thirdly, in spite of the fact that the American commanders of ground formations perceived the concept of “unity” (that is, close interspecific interaction) as a mantra, in reality they simply neglected it in battle. Fourthly, during the 12 years since the end of the “Storm in the Desert”, the American military command did nothing to comprehend the peculiarities of the local mentality and nuances of the Arab world as a whole, which only contributed to the growth of anti-American sentiment in Iraqi society and, accordingly, the emergence of a broad partisan movement in this country.

Based on this, there is reason to question the assertion that the US Armed Forces successfully dealt with the trials in Iraq, although they formally achieved a military victory in the spring of 2003. To say that this campaign is a “visible embodiment of the revolution in military affairs” is clearly unfounded.
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  1. makarov
    makarov 9 November 2013 09: 05
    +6
    And in Iraq, and in Afghanistan, and in Libya, the American "victory" has the same fate, the TOTAL DISRUPTION of independent states. Hence the conclusion that the main world enemy for the United States is INDEPENDENCE from their thoughts, ideology, and capital ..
    1. Polovec
      Polovec 10 November 2013 00: 10
      +5
      I agree with you.
      The author avoids a simple answer to the direct question: "What were the tasks?"
      The answer is obvious and the US Army coped with its task. A prosperous country was bombed into the Stone Age.
      All other reasoning is from the evil one.
      The country is in chaos. The oil industry is controlled and protected. The natives continue to die out and cut each other out.
      The script is tested and replicated.
      There is also a variant of the "color revolution".
      There is a hiring option for a war of bandits and scum from around the world.
      Recipes for every taste!
      Guys are creative nonstop. It is foolish to think that they do not draw conclusions.
      Conclusions must be done to us! And faster ...
  2. Stinger
    Stinger 9 November 2013 09: 49
    10
    “The visible embodiment of the revolution in military affairs” is the preliminary bribery of the ruling elite in Iraq, primarily the army. Hence all the oddities of behavior and Iraqi air defense, and the subsequent actions of the Iraqi command.
    1. Botanologist
      Botanologist 9 November 2013 11: 19
      +8
      Quote: Stinger
      “The visible embodiment of the revolution in military affairs” is the preliminary bribery of the ruling elite in Iraq,


      The most destructive weapon is a gold-bearing war donkey.
    2. Mikhail3
      Mikhail3 9 November 2013 15: 27
      10
      Absolutely right. Saddam made the only true conclusion from his first defeat - the main danger for him was the traitors. He strengthened in the first place what, in his opinion, could save him from the traitors bought by the Americans.
      It didn't work. How could it have come out? The man wanted personal power. He handed out pieces of this power to whom he could "trust" even as much and let them fatten on what was handed out. Old script, very old ... The only question here is - what about the people? Why on earth would the people in such conditions be for their country? So that oily pimples continue to shit on his head, the people? Fight for this, or what? The army is not generals.
      In the sense of the generals, too, but only such as Margelov or Rokhlin. The army is the people. You can flood her with money and allow various "privileges" ... to no avail. An army is combat-ready only to the extent that the people are combat-ready, and this is exactly the size to which the people are ready to die for their country and its leadership. You cannot order a person to win. Maximum - you can put him in conditions when he will inevitably die. So to say "fell for the Fatherland." Like pitiful kamikaze who uselessly died near American ships ... The winner snatches victory, straining all his fortitude, otherwise there is no way.
      Iraqis did not die for Hussein and his fat asses. That’s the whole reason ... (we, of course, will stand up for Dvorkovich’s capitals, huh ...) But when the Americans showed who they were ... Anglo-Saxons, as you know, are mean scum. Bandits and filthy thieves, enjoying the torment of the defenseless. That's how they tasted this dish in Iraq, and so they began to show how the Iraqi people really are able to fight. Prisons as branches of hell, wild robbery by entire ships, shooting at defenseless on an indescribable scale, cowardly vile villainy ... I had to answer for everything.
      Well, and "high-precision cyberrevolution". Right now ... Since the Middle Ages, the Anglo-Saxons have all tried to replace man with weapons. Build up armor shields, thicker shield, welded glove, helmet with a huge bucket ... weapons will do everything, yeah. Well, if they still killed the knight, we will put on practically a whole weapon on another. And here we are again a knight. Well, great! Until from the other side of the field a Russian forged army flew into position. Kuyak, baydana, conical helmet with a ponosie, chain mail glove ... A bucket with hands on the Russian boyar simply did not hit. Because the boyar used weapons, followed the new products (he was still watching! Only ... he thought a lot. The Russians had such a peculiarity - to think over everything), but the main weapon was, first of all, he himself. Boyarin himself studied all his life and taught his slaves tirelessly.
      First of all, the warrior improved, and then the weapon. All this computerization simply takes amers further and further into the swamp. You need to work "from the person". From a warrior you need to start! Everything, absolutely everything that has been done to "cyberize" the army is suicidal rubbish. Because all these cartoons have many goals. And make money. And the desire to "be in line with progress." And (let no one admit it) a strong desire to hide their stupidity and illiteracy, unfit for the post in intelligence behind the convulsive "introduction of the latest novelties." But I somehow forgot to work with the soldier. Understand - what does he need to improve his fighting skills? Eh ...
      1. maxvet
        maxvet 10 November 2013 10: 13
        -4
        Quote: Mikhail3
        A bucket with hands on the Russian boyar simply did not fall. Because the boyar used weapons, he followed the news (even as he did!

        that he could get the Russian boyar from the west and get it out, there was no armor for metallurgy in Russia was not so developed, and the specifics of the battles are different hi
        1. Mikhail3
          Mikhail3 10 November 2013 10: 38
          +2
          No, it was not so developed. Before the arrival of the filthy vulture, named Peter 1, Russia supplied an average of 200 cannon barrels per year to Europeans. In Europeans, they didn’t try to pour such things, there were no such brains or hands. For great happiness there they believed to get Damascus steel - a cowardly undercooking. True damask blade in the cold pricked into the spray even without a blow, just drop it awkwardly and. And the damask blade did not pierce at all. what could the knight dogs tell us in color (though all the knights are dogs ... so any ...), which were fully armed at our borders ... and they stayed there. As for our metallurgy, the best metallurgists of those times (never once Europeans like that) - the Turks, received exhaustive information at Molody. There they all carefully about the guns and about sabers and about armor. Well and so on.
          Even the Russian boyar was armed with weapons that made the "gallant" knights wrinkle their noses. Ai ay ay, these russ boyars are all armed with bows! Of course. The battle bow was worth then as a large European village with all the inhabitants, lands and dog shit. Vile gopota - Western chivalry, such means did not even have a trace! To make a combat compound bow, first of all, you need a master, and this was completely unrealistic in europads. Real masters there simply did not live up to mastery.
          What kind of a Robin Bad fired from a yew stick, and this is somewhere from a quarter to a third of the parameters of the Russian compound bow. And materials ... and work ... and endurance up to three years (so that at this time the European city is not captured a couple of times ?! Do not burn? Masters did not sell for painted debts?).
          In general, about the Europen perk culture and indescribable skill, you can narrate endlessly ....
          1. Shur
            Shur 10 November 2013 14: 29
            0
            Not quite so, treasury swords, for example, were also valued.
          2. Shur
            Shur 10 November 2013 14: 46
            +3
            And so I agree. And the ships did and drove and much more. And how to understand the absence and underdevelopment of metallurgy? Nonsense, some kind of forge in Russia has always been held in high esteem. Flea shod tea not mi hans what .. People do not know at all. Archaeological findings suggest otherwise. And then, to credit the Germanized Peter with bringing someone else to Russia, and not creating our own production and other things, is not to understand that now we are on the same "rake". Where is our Russian production of capital goods? They will buy someone else's, they will somehow put it on and go ringing. By God, idiots. For 12 years of the reign of GDP shifts, something is invisible. It's all some kind of technology transfer. And for a simple purchase of foreign equipment. This is a dead end. Big impasse. Its oil pipelines are a shame and a feeding trough for the elite, since the revenues are again being used for new wells and, for the most part, offshore. And then they say RosNeft is our property, they pay taxes and so on. Let it be, what is it all? As Papuans buy gold for mirrors, so we exchange oil for Chinese slippers. It's a shame. This is more important than any innovation, your own machine tool industry is the key to survival! And these are chewing about some kind of energy doctrine. The country is inundated with imports and that's it. All this says. For this dependence alone, I curse these rulers.
            1. Mikhail3
              Mikhail3 10 November 2013 17: 15
              -1
              Yes, with the first pets, mrazoty, it all started. Before him, Russia was the LEADER on the continent. He inflicted such terrible blows on the country that not only a single country, but also a civilization would not have endured. All his "reforms" led to a hurricane of destruction of advanced technologies, the extinction and panicky flight of masters, and simply to the extinction of the Russian people, who before this terrible rule did not know any real hunger or senseless arbitrariness of the authorities.
              Two facts, only two. The soldier of the "new system" regiment knew as many as ... three combat techniques! THREE!! And against the foot and against the horse and in ambush and in the attack and in retreat ... nothing more than the soldiers of the Preobrazhensky regiment did not know !! Second. Russia reduced its population, died out and fled, but did not give up in any way. Then this scum chose a place in a rotten swamp and poured into it the NATIONAL INCOME OF THE COUNTRY FOR A YEAR. For the sake of a city in which people began to die en masse from tuberculosis, which was practically uncommon in Russia before, because Russians did not live in poisonous garbage dumps before. It was supposed to finish off the hated Russia with a triple guarantee. And we survived all the same. But.
              From that moment on, weakened, thrice-broken legs set off after Europe. Although until recently, they had never been able to catch up with us ...
  3. de bouillon
    de bouillon 9 November 2013 10: 09
    +3
    The United States wanted to transform Iraq. They did it. Leaving behind a federal state. Shiites and Sunnis each pulls a blanket over themselves. Kurds have long been living in the north in their state.

    http://forum.skyscraperpage.com/showthread.php?t=191360
  4. pavlo
    pavlo 9 November 2013 10: 16
    +2
    They must have taken a copy of all actions from General Pavlov.
  5. crasever
    crasever 9 November 2013 11: 03
    +1
    Ordinary American guys were sent to Iraq to punish this terrible Saddam, who hid a couple of hundred chemical munitions for a "rainy" day, and, of course, to continue the victorious march across the planet of the ideals of freedom (oil had absolutely nothing to do with it !!!) Completed the task - having defeated and hanged the nightmare Saddam, searched and did not find weapons of mass destruction on the territory of Iraq and ensured the holding of elections in the occupied territory (the oil is now divided there - the Dutch-British Royal Dutch Shell, the French Total and the American ExxonMobil). It's strange that after leaving
    (remember how the Russian Army was going home from Paris taken with a bayonet after the victory over Napoleon), peace and harmony in not only Iraq, but also in neighboring countries, were literally blown up ... Here is another example of Anglo-Saxon political verbiage, and ordinary American guys from Iraq, were forced to run away quickly, ordinary Iraqi men, who saw how very naturally "true democracy" (especially in Abu Ghraib prison) treats them and their relatives and friends. Get, gentlemen, invaders, sniper Juba in all its glory !!!
    1. Polovec
      Polovec 10 November 2013 00: 21
      +1
      I have a very positive attitude to ordinary American guys. Especially to those on Arlington ... Everyone would have to resettle them there ...
  6. Zymran
    Zymran 9 November 2013 11: 38
    +1
    That's just the oil that the Americans almost did not get. Google on this topic, you will learn quite a lot of interesting things.
  7. ka5280
    ka5280 9 November 2013 11: 42
    +2
    I wonder how much money the American Foreign Intelligence Service spent on bribing Iraqi generals. The obvious conclusion from the article suggests that the command of the air defense and the air force of Iraq was bought by the Americans with a loss.
  8. castle
    castle 9 November 2013 13: 44
    -7
    After the Iran-Iraq conflict, 1980-1988 (almost 8 years! Soviet advisers and specialists were on both sides of the front. They studied and studied. Did they learn?), The Iraqi army was very combat-ready. But! The Gulf War was a practical exercise in which the western (Japan is also the west?) School of warfare measured off with the Soviet school. Who trained the Iraqi army? Soviet universities and Soviet advisers (and local experts!). What technique did the Iraqi army have? Soviet. Do not blame all the losses on betrayal and bribery! Only weaklings do it! It is necessary to learn and draw conclusions, and not to bark in vain!
    1. Realist58
      Realist58 10 November 2013 02: 23
      +1
      The only (in history) clash between Soviet and American military schools was in August 2008.
      Let me remind you that two reinforced battalions of the 58th army (800 people) took flight of the 12 thousandth group of the American army of Georgia.
      So, you’re not even able to bark.
      1. Prometey
        Prometey 11 November 2013 11: 56
        0
        Quote: Realist58
        Let me remind you that two reinforced battalions of the 58th army (800 people) took flight of the 12 thousandth group of the American army of Georgia.

        You can throw off the link to this event? It would be interesting to read.
        1. Realist58
          Realist58 11 November 2013 15: 12
          0
          Enter the five-day war, the war with Georgia or 080808. there are a lot of materials. There are even almost minute circuits.

          Threat. Somewhere in the bookmarks was, if I find send in PM.
    2. Polovec
      Polovec 10 November 2013 11: 34
      +2
      Learning and applying the knowledge gained are two different things. Among the leaders of the gangs (in the same Afghanistan) used to be full of graduates of the USSR Higher Education. They created problems immeasurably. So they taught them pretty well. And military equipment would be bad, so it would not be sold all over the world.
      And the fact that the technique is in the hands of the savage a piece of metal is the truth as old as the world.
      In 2004, at a joint US-Indian exercise, Americans were amazed at what the Indians did on the MIG-21.
      Hussein prepared the army for internal use and surrounded himself with loyal people. So they betrayed him. It was necessary to surround smart ...
    3. Shur
      Shur 10 November 2013 14: 56
      0
      In Vietnam, everything was fine, in Korea, too. You just are not confused in time? In 2003, did you remember something about the Soviet legacy in the Iraqi army? It’s ridiculous.
      1. Realist58
        Realist58 22 November 2013 13: 58
        0
        Military experts howled in Viet Nam and Korea, helping local people adapt to modern military operations on the basis of the Soviet military school.
        And this is actually not the same thing.
        And in 2008, the army was still Soviet-style (charters, etc.), so it is absolutely accurate and I was not confused.
  9. vahatak
    vahatak 9 November 2013 17: 37
    +4
    The Americans got what they wanted. Someone thought that they bring freedom? Freedom cannot be received as a gift, it can only be won.
    And the fact that Saddam did not learn from the first defeat is simply not true. He extracted everything. But Iraq is not a state that can be reformed.
  10. saramb
    saramb 9 November 2013 17: 38
    +4
    Saddam withdrew his air defense from the defense in 1991 due to the betrayal of our government. Before the "Desert Storm" and after the collapse of the Union, our smart guys who went under the ov put programs in the United States to jam against Soviet-made MANPADS. Therefore, in 2003, their air defense was powerless.
  11. max702
    max702 9 November 2013 19: 03
    +4
    Iraq had no chance at first, they could not fight the whole world, look at all the major local post-war conflicts, at least 2 superpowers from different sides took part in them, and in the case of Iraq this was not, there was Iraq and NATO, with the approval of the USSR and the rest of the world , compare with Afghanistan. Vietnam, Iraq would have supported the USSR and nothing would have come of the United States, but again, the United States achieved military goals and very successfully by bribing them with treason or by any other method is not important, and then politicians and other businessmen couldn’t share it a completely different conversation, perhaps the goal of a general mess in the region was set, so it was successfully completed. If they really wanted to capture Iraq, they would organize concentration camps and other ways to get rid of the extra population .. but it wasn’t tolerant, they decided to take a different path a mess of war with everyone, they planted the country on alcohol and drugs and the country itself will destroy itself in 10-20 years. and there the United States will again catch up to kill the remaining thugs, and the rest will kiss their feet for getting rid of the mess and lawlessness.
  12. samoletil18
    samoletil18 9 November 2013 20: 44
    +3
    Oh how! This is not to admit that in 1991 Gorbachev handed over Iraq to them with all the giblets, the Americans put some major at his desk, and brought their actions under the scientific basis then? And no one will remember a loan of $ 1 billion from occupied Kuwait? Hussein would have known that it would be so, he would not have taken air defense systems in the USSR. In 1991, I freaked out from the fact that the Iraqis bombed the S-75 Tornado. But then one clever uncle suggested to me: the Americans received all the information from us about more modern weapons, but they didn't bother about the S-75 - so they got it.
    It’s interesting, but are money laid in the budget for US military spending to bribe the leadership of the alleged victims of future aggressions and their allies?
    1. Russ69
      Russ69 9 November 2013 21: 25
      +1
      Quote: samoletil18
      It’s interesting, but are money laid in the budget for US military spending to bribe the leadership of the alleged victims of future aggressions and their allies?

      For these articles, there are budgets constantly ...
    2. Russ69
      Russ69 10 November 2013 01: 03
      +1
      Quote: samoletil18
      Oh how! This is not to admit that in 1991 Iraq surrendered to them Gorbachev with all his giblets,

      And whom did Gorbachev not surrender?
      1. Shur
        Shur 10 November 2013 14: 59
        0
        He would fix a spot on the skull with a soldering iron ...
      2. alone
        alone 10 November 2013 22: 08
        0
        Quote: Russ69
        And whom did Gorbachev not surrender?


        I didn’t hand over my bank accounts and, of course, my beloved wife. For the rest I handed over everything that could be handed over, and even sometimes handed over something that was fundamentally impossible to hand over. (One Warsaw block was worth what)
  13. catapractic
    catapractic 9 November 2013 21: 28
    +2
    the fact of the matter is that there is not even a Pyrrhic victory.
  14. voliador
    voliador 10 November 2013 02: 46
    0
    HAVE YOU RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A STORM IN THE DESERT?

    Weird question. Scramers have increased their influence in the Middle East. And this is oil and gas, plus control of the shipping lanes, that is - control over cargo transportation by sea. Not bad pluses.
  15. Zomanus
    Zomanus 10 November 2013 08: 19
    +2
    Damn, saslepu on the top photo saw a piece of a member. Then looking closely I saw a face.)) In general, the Americans are not fighting for victories, as such. They steal people, equipment, technology. That then there would be no overlays, if that. And we only experience in conditions of approximate ...
  16. Kolyan 2
    Kolyan 2 10 November 2013 09: 18
    0
    The article is a minus, because the word dictator is sick of it, and he was popularly elected. And the article is not unambiguous in meaning. hi
  17. Ivanovich47
    Ivanovich47 10 November 2013 15: 16
    +1
    The "victories" of the Americans in the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, etc. can be compared to the victory of a recidivist armed to the teeth in a dark alley, over a bystander armed with a stick. Generally telling America that she won these wars is shame ...
    1. Prometey
      Prometey 11 November 2013 12: 03
      0
      Quote: Ivanovich47
      Generally telling America that she won these wars is shame ...

      And then what can we say about the war with Georgia?
  18. Prometey
    Prometey 11 November 2013 12: 02
    0
    I still do not understand why the "Pyrrhic" victory? The armed enemy forces have been defeated, a pleasing regime has been established in the country, and its resources are under control.
  19. Proud.
    Proud. 12 November 2013 15: 53
    0
    The so-called tactics of action used by Iraqis were also surprising, as if "taken from Soviet textbooks of the Second World War era." Iraqi generals, in the case of, in their opinion, favorable conditions formed, threw their infantry into a frontal attack under the powerful fire of American weapons destroying all living things.
    In the Red Army, not all commanders did this, not everywhere and not always. And it is not clear what textbooks they are talking about. And why, at all, insert this quote. Article "-".