Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905's. State of the Russian fleet. Bad luck and missed opportunities

15 May 2013 157

The Russo-Japanese War is one of the blackest pages in stories Russian fleet. Perhaps that is why it still attracts the attention of military historians and just people interested in the military history of Russia. Yes, it was not only victories and the almost complete defeat of the Russian Pacific and Baltic fleets by the Japanese imperial fleet to this is a clear confirmation. This topic is interesting in that never before has the Russian Imperial Navy been so modern, huge, strong and powerful. On paper. After the events of that war, the Russian fleet revived such oceanic power only once - in the 70-80s of the XX century. So why did it happen? Why did the very modest Japanese fleet manage to defeat its superior Russian one without significant losses. Although "on paper" should have been exactly the opposite? These issues will be considered in this article. The reader will find many bare figures and facts. Without any fairy tales about “outdated and weak armadillos”, “small firing range”, “large area for booking Japanese ships” and other, other, other beautiful tales. That supposedly did not allow such "geniuses of naval thought" as Z. P. Rozhestvensky and V. K. Witgeft to defeat the Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral Togo. Who was to blame for this - the technique or the people who were entrusted with this technique? The military in their failures always first of all blame the useless, in their opinion, military equipment. People who created this technique, on the contrary, point to the lack of professionalism and unsuitability of the military. So it has always been, so it will continue. We will analyze all this with dispassionate mathematical precision.

Fleet compositions

Before proceeding to the enumeration of the combat equipment that was at the disposal of the Russian and Japanese admirals, I consider it necessary to explain to the reader the general quality level of the fleets and classes of warships of that period. In the era when the god of war was artillery, all types of naval weapons systems could be counted on fingers:

- Classic artillery guns different calibers and destination. At that time, they had already reached a fully mature level of development and differed little from modern artillery systems, although they were less powerful.

- Torpedoes. At that time, this type of weapon was just beginning to develop. Torpedoes of that period were much inferior to modern ones in terms of launch range and striking action.

- Mines. At that time, this type of marine weapons It was already a fully developed and effective means of dealing with the enemy ships.

- Aviation. Was in that period in its infancy. Actually, and aviation, it can be called a big stretch, because she was only aerostats, which were used only for reconnaissance and adjustment of artillery fire at long distances.

In accordance with this, the classes of warships were distributed:

1. The main striking force of the fleet of that period were battleships. In the course of their evolution, battleships had many different subclasses: battery battleship, barbetan battleship, tower battleship, I-class battleship, II-class battleship, coastal defense battleship, squadron battleship (also dodrednought), dreadnought, superdreadnought, and finally battleship. All of them were the most armed and protected ships of their time. In the period described, armed squadrons, II-class battleships and coastal defense battleships were in service. These ships had a displacement from 4000 to 16000, carried heavy armor and powerful universal artillery and mine-torpedo armament. In doing so, they could reach speeds of 14-18 nodes. The more modern ships of this class were in the fleet, the more formidable was the fleet.

2. Same to the main striking force of the fleet can be attributed armored cruisers. Ships with a displacement of about 8000-10000, also having good protection, though not as powerful as the battleships. Artillery weapons were also weaker, but such ships could reach speeds in the 18-22 node. The presence of armored cruisers in the squadron expanded its operational capabilities. It was on the battleships and armored cruisers that the main task of fighting the enemy warships and supporting the troops in coastal operations with fire was laid.

3. Auxiliary tasks for reconnaissance, patrol, interception, and the fight against small enemy ships and its amphibious transport fleet fell on armored cruisers of the first and second rank. These ships with a displacement of 4000-6000, had easy booking and artillery armament from medium and small caliber guns. But they could reach speeds in 20-25 nodes and had a long range. Example - the famous cruiser of the first rank Aurora gives a good idea of this type of warships.

4. For night torpedo attacks, the final finishing off of damaged enemy ships and the feasible performance of part of the functions of armored cruisers, the fleets had destroyersFurther destroyersbasic destroyers (destroyers), further torpedo boats и submarines. Destroyers of destroyers are small ships that did not carry the shadow of the reservation. They were armed with one or two torpedo tubes and several small cannons. Reached speed in 25-30 nodes and could operate together with squadrons in the near sea zone. Torpedo boats and submarines of that period, because of their imperfections, were weapons of the near coastal zone.

Cruiser I-rank "Aurora" was directly involved in the Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905 years. The ship with a length of 123 meter is still in good technical condition, though not on the move.

5. Also in the fleets of that time could be aerostatons, [/ i]minelayers и transport ships. The aero-carriers, the forerunners of aircraft carriers, were intended for basing reconnaissance balloons on them and were equipped with hangars for their storage. Minelayers were used for setting mines. The artillery armament of these ships consisted of several small cannons. Transport ships were used to transport troops, weapons or other goods. Could have several small guns or not have any weapons. Their sizes could vary widely.

After a brief excursion into the characteristics of warships during the Russo-Japanese War, let us turn to a comparison of the forces of both sides.

Russian Imperial Navy (RIF). Despite all the vacillation and bureaucracy, by the beginning of the war with Japan was a formidable force. Since there is no possibility to list the entire combat train with all auxiliary ships and support ships in the format of this article, we’ll dwell in detail only on the main striking force of the fleet:

Table 1

1.	Alexander-II	Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet.
2.	Nikolay-I	Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet.
3.	Navarin	Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet.
4.	Sisoy the Great	Squadron battleship. New. Baltic Fleet.
5.	Sevastopol	Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet.
6.	Poltava	Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet.
7.	Petropavlovsk	Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet.
8.	Admiral Ushakov	Battleship coastal defense. New. Baltic Fleet.
9.	Admiral Sevyanin	Battleship coastal defense. New. Baltic Fleet.
10.	Admiral apraksin	Battleship coastal defense. New. Baltic Fleet.
11.	Table 1Oslyabya	Squadron battleship. New. Baltic Fleet.
12.	Relight	Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet.
13.	Victory	Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet.
14.	Retvizan	Squadron battleship. The newest. Pacific Fleet.
15.	Tsarevich	Squadron battleship. The newest. Pacific Fleet.
16.	Prince Suvorov	Squadron battleship. The newest. Baltic Fleet.
17.	Alexander-III	Squadron battleship. The newest. Baltic Fleet.
18.	Borodino	Squadron battleship. The newest. Baltic Fleet.
19.	Eagle	Squadron battleship. The newest. Baltic Fleet.
20.	Russ	Aerostatonosets. The newest. Baltic Fleet.
21.	Catherine-II	Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet.
22.	Sinop	Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet.
23.	Chesma	Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet.
24.	George the Victorious	Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet.
25.	Twelve Apostles	Battleship II-class. Old. Black Sea Fleet.
26.	Three Saints	Squadron battleship. New. Black Sea Fleet.
27.	Rostislav	Battleship II-class. New. Black Sea Fleet.
28.	Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky	Squadron battleship. The newest. Black Sea Fleet.
29.	Panteleimon	Squadron battleship. The newest. Black Sea Fleet.
30.	Admiral Nakhimov	Armored cruiser. Old. Baltic Fleet.
31.	Rurik	Armored cruiser. Old. Pacific Fleet.
32.	Memory of Azov	Armored cruiser. Old. Black Sea Fleet.
33.	Russia	Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet.
34.	Thunderbolt	Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet.
35.	Accordion	Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet.
36.	Pallas	Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet.
37.	Admiral Makarov	Armored cruiser. New. Black Sea Fleet.
38.	Peter the Great	Training artillery ship. Old battleship I class. Baltic Fleet.

The main striking power of the Russian fleet was precisely in these 38 ships. In sum, they had 88 caliber 305mm guns, 26 254mm caliber guns, 8-229mm and 28 203mm caliber guns. Even smaller-caliber guns already belonged to medium-caliber artillery, although they retained an important combat significance at that stage of development of science and technology. In addition to these ships, the fleet included a large number of powerful cruisers of the first and second ranks, both new and ancient, many destroyers, minelayers, gunboats, transports, four multi-purpose submarines "Dolphin", "Trout", "Sturgeon" and "Som" and other ships. Subsequently, submarines (SP) became one of the main classes of warships of the fleet.

The squadron battleship “Tsesarevich” is one of the most powerful battleships of its time. His power is felt literally in his appearance - even today he looks quite modern. The ship was built according to the latest technology and had all the features of a modern battleship of World War II: a high board of an optimal, seaworthy form, well-developed tower-like superstructures for placing observation posts and elements of the OMS at the maximum possible height. Modern artillery in paired tower gun mounts was located high, was fully mechanized and had large pointing angles. Very complex, multi-row differentiated booking was very powerful. The ship was far seen on the horizon and could act effectively and conduct aimed fire in any weather. Displacement of this floating tank: 13105 tons. The enemy was awaited by 68 guns of various calibers, 4 torpedo tubes, 20 min barriers and 4 7,62mm Maxim machine guns. All the weapons that were then in the Russian Navy - everything was installed on it. The SLA of this ship was also first-class.

The total total number of warships of all classes and ages in service with the Russian fleet at the time of the outbreak of war with Japan is difficult to estimate, but according to rough estimates it was about ~ 300 ships of various classes. In order to destroy such numerous armored power, even today it would be necessary to attract very serious sea-launched missile-carrying and aviation forces. Any of those battleships is not Sheffield cardboard plastic and it will not burn and sink after being hit by one single Exocset anti-ship missiles. It will also not be a strong exaggeration to say that the fleet was more powerful than, say, the USSR Domestic Navy on the eve of World War II10. For a predominantly agrarian country, such as Tsarist Russia, to create such a large ocean fleet was a real achievement. The flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet was the newest battleship Tsesarevich. The striking core of the Baltic Fleet was battleships of the Borodino type in the amount of four units. Already during the war, the fleet was replenished with the fifth battleship of this type of "Glory".

The Eagle is one of the ships in the Borodino series. He was an improved model of the "Cesarevich." The outlines of its hull somewhat resemble the hulls of today's URO frigates built using Stealth technology. It differed from the prototype with a new 121 meter-long hull, improved armor, improved design of a number of components and assemblies, and a slightly modified composition of auxiliary weapons. Displacement: 13516 tons. Like the prototype at the time of construction was considered one of the most powerful and sophisticated warships of its time.

Japanese Imperial Navy (IJN). After the defeat of the Chinese fleet in the battle of Yalu, the Japanese fleet began to rapidly increase its combat potential. In the construction of its fleet, Japan relied on British aid. The resources of the Japanese economy were enough to create a group of six squadron battleships close in characteristics and six armored cruisers. In addition, they had two more old battleships of the first class: "Chin-Yen" and "Fuso" of which "Chin-Yen" was captured from the Chinese. Since the number of strike warships was small, part of the large-caliber guns were placed on light-weight Matsushima and Takasago-type light armored cruisers that were poorly suited for this purpose. The list of warships of the Japanese fleet, which carried on board more or less large caliber, is as follows:

Table 2

1.	Mikasa	Squadron battleship. The newest. Japanese fleet.
2.	Sikisima	Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet.
3.	Asahi	Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet.
4.	Hatcuse	Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet.
5.	Fuji	Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet.
6.	Yashima	Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet.
7.	Chin-yen	Battleship I-th class. Old. Japanese fleet.
8.	Fuso	Casemate battleship. Old. Japanese fleet.
9.	Asama	Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.
10.	That's right	Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.
11.	Azuma	Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.
12.	Yakumo	Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.
13.	Izumo	Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.
14.	Iwate	Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.
15.	Macusima	Cruiser I-rank. Old. Japanese fleet.
16.	Itsukushima	Cruiser I-rank. Old. Japanese fleet.
17.	Hasidate	Cruiser I-rank. Old. Japanese fleet.
18.	Takasago	Cruiser I-rank. New. Japanese fleet.
19.	Titose	Cruiser I-rank. New. Japanese fleet.
20.	Kasagi	Cruiser I-rank. New. Japanese fleet.

Thus, the power of the Russian fleet, the Japanese fleet, along with the absolutely unsuitable for confrontation of the battleships, light cruisers, could oppose: 3 guns of caliber 320mm, 28 caliber 305mm, 4 - 240mm guns and 30 - 203mm guns. A simple mathematical calculation shows that the potential of the Japanese fleet was less than three times lower than that of the Russian Navy. Of the 20 ships, no more than 12, that is, 60%, could be considered modern and truly suitable for a general battle. The characteristics of the rest did not leave them any decent chance of survival under the fire even of the old Russian squadron battleships. Of the 38 Russian strike ships, to one degree or another suitable for a general battle could be 35, that is, 92%. The flagship of the Japanese Imperial fleet was the squadron battleship "Mikasa".

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905's. State of the Russian fleet. Bad luck and missed opportunities

Squadron battleship "Mikasa". Its design was traditional for ships of this class of that period. Constructively, he repeated the British designs: low board, low superstructures, mostly citadel armor, tower artillery installations of the main caliber only. Relatively low-power medium-caliber guns were located in onboard casemate installations low above water. The ship was more optimized to fight on level water, and not to move. At the same time, the large dimensions of its body made all its characteristics very decent. The displacement of its 15352 tons. The closest analogue to this ship in the Russian fleet is the squadron battleship Retvizan.

The entire Japanese fleet consisted of order 100 warships of various classes, but unlike the Russian fleet, all these 100 ships like a fist were focused on the same theater of operations. From ~ 300 warships of the Russian fleet, they took direct part in the war with Japan around 100, that is, of the order of 30%. Already during the war, the Japanese fleet was replenished with two armored cruisers of Italian construction: the Nissin and the Kassuga.

Results: Without going deep at this stage in all nuances, manning ships, their maintenance and repair, combat training of personnel, the choice of commanders and assessing their professional suitability, but simply concisely noting that "at some stage something went wrong one can say that all this giant armored power of the Russian fleet was lost in the most mediocre manner. Moreover, without any serious damage to the enemy. The Japanese fleet loss data is given in the 3 table. They only cause a bitter grin.

Table 3

Losses of the Japanese fleet in the 1904-1905 Russian-Japanese war.

Battleships (EDB)
1. Ijn Hatcuse - sank near Port Arthur as a result of an explosion on the mines put up by the Russian mine-layer Amur. 2 May 1904.
2. Ijn Yashima - Cupid exploded on mines exposed by the Russian minelayer and sank in 5 miles from Etkaunter-rock Island. Yellow Sea. 2 May 1904.

Light cruisers I-ranga (CRL)
1. Ijn Takasago - was blown up by a mine exposed by the Russian destroyer Angry during patrols and sank in the Yellow Sea between Port Arthur and Chief. December 12 1904 of the year.
2. Ijn Yoshino - sank off Cape Xantum 2 May 1904, after colliding with the armored cruiser Kassuga. Yellow Sea.

Light cruisers II-ranga (CRL)
1. Ijn Cyan en - hit a Russian mine and sank under Port Arthur on November 30 1904 of the year.
2. Ijn Myoko - hit a Russian mine and sank 14 May 1904, in the Bay of Kerr.
3. Ijn Kaymon - The mine of the Russian mine-layer Yenisei was blown up in the bay of Talenenvan and sank on July 5 of the year. Dasanshan Island Yellow Sea.

Gunboats (CL)
1. Ijn Oshima - sank as a result of a collision with a cannon boat Akagi near Port Arthur 3 May 1904. Yellow Sea.
2. Ijn Atago - I hit a cliff in the fog and sank near Port Arthur on October 24 1904.
3. Ijn Otagara maru - exploded on a Russian mine and sank on August 8 1904 near Port Arthur.
4. Ijn Hey-yen - hit a Russian mine and sank 18 September 1904, 1,5 miles from Iron Island.

Destroyer destroyers (EM)
1. Ijn Akatsuki - hit a Russian mine and sank in 8 miles from the m. Laoteshan. 4 May 1904.
2. Ijn Hayatori - it was blown up on a mine by the Russian destroyer Skory and sank 2 miles from Cape Lun-Wan-Tan near Port Arthur. 21 October 1904 of the year.

Military transports (TR)
1. Ijn Hitazi maru - sunk by artillery and torpedoes of the Russian armored cruiser Thunderboy south of Okinoshima island 2 July 1904. Japanese Sea.
2. Ijn Izumo Maru - 152mm sunk by shells of the Russian armored cruiser Thunderbolt 2 July 1904 in the Sea of Japan.
3. Ijn Kinsu Maru - sunk by Russian armored cruisers 13 on April 1904, in the Sea of Japan.

Torpedo boats (TK)
1. Ijn № 48 - hit a Russian mine and sank in the bay of Kerr. 12 May 1904.
2. Ijn № 51 - hit a reef and sank in the bay of Kerr. 28 June 1904 of the year.
3. Ijn № 53 - hit a mine and sank while trying to attack the Russian ship of the line Sevastopol. Port Arthur. December 14 1904 of the year.
4. Ijn № 42 - shot by a Russian battleship Sevastopol 15 December 1904. Port Arthur.
5. Ijn № 34 - Admiral Nakhimov of the Russian armored cruiser in the night battle of 203 on May 15 sank after the 1905mm hit the shell of the Russian armored cruiser. Japanese Sea.
6. Ijn № 35 - Vladimir Monomakh was sunk by artillery fire of the Russian I-rank cruiser in the night battle of 15 in May of 1905. Japanese Sea.
7. Ijn № 69 - sank after a collision with the destroyer Akatsuki 27 May 1905 of the year.
8. Ijn Unidentified - Admiral Sevyanin sank after hitting a 254mm projectile from a Russian coastal defense battleship on the night of May 15 of the year.

Total 24 combat and auxiliary ships... Of these, 13 ships (54%) were sunk by mines, 6 ships (25%) by artillery, 0 ships by torpedoes (0%), by the joint action of artillery and torpedoes, 1 ship (<1%) and losses from navigation accidents amounted to 4 ships (17 %). 0 ships sunk and abandoned by crews as a result of damage received (0%). Also surrendered 0 ships (0%). The fact that more than half of all ships of the fleet irretrievably lost by Japan were destroyed by mines - weapons of a passive - defensive type by their nature, speaks of the extreme passivity and inaction of the strike of the Russian fleet during the period of DB at sea. All combat operations at sea boiled down to two major battles, several decent battles and local clashes of individual large ships and light forces. It seems that even in battle, our ships fought as if from under the stick, reluctantly, without initiative and in every possible way trying to evade the battle. In the future, this will be given more than one confirmation, as will be considered all the cases of individual "flashes" of clarification of consciousness and fighting spirit. Such tactics of our senior admirals led to losses, which can be found in Table 4.

Table 4

The loss of the Russian fleet in the Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905.

Battleships (EDB)

RIF Retvizan - sat on the ground in the harbor of Port Arthur as a result of damage from the artillery fire of the Japanese ground artillery 23 November 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Petropavlovsk - exploded and sank under Port Arthur 13 on April 1904, as a result of a blast on a Japanese mine.
RIF Poltava - sat on the ground in the harbor of Port Arthur as a result of damage from the artillery fire of the Japanese ground artillery 22 November 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Sevastopol - Torpedoed by Japanese destroyers and flooded by the crew near Port Arthur 20 December 1904.
RIF Peresvet - flooded by the crew in the port harbor of Port Arthur as a result of damage from artillery fire of the Japanese ground artillery 24 on November 1904 of the year. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Victory - flooded by the crew in the port harbor of Port Arthur as a result of damage from artillery fire of the Japanese ground artillery 24 on November 1904 of the year. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Oslyabya - drowned by artillery fire of Japanese warships during the battle near Tsushima Island 14 May 1905.
RIF Prince Suvorov - sunk by artillery fire and torpedoes of Japanese warships during the Battle of Tsushima Island 14 May 1905.
RIF Imperator Alexander III- sank as a result of damage from artillery fire of Japanese warships 14 May 1905, during the battle of Tsushima Island.
RIF Borodino - sunk by artillery fire of Japanese warships during the Battle of Tsushima Island 14 May 1905.
RIF Eagle - surrendered to the Japanese in the Sea of Japan 15 May 1905, after the battle of Tsushima Island.
RIF Sisoy the Great - During the battle near Tsushima island, it was heavily damaged by artillery fire and torpedoes of Japanese warships, after which it was scuttled by a crew three miles from Cape Kirsaki 15 in May 1905.
RIF Navarin - sunk by torpedoes of Japanese destroyers 15 May 1905 of the year in the Sea of Japan.
RIF Emperor Nikolai I- surrendered to the Japanese in the Sea of Japan 15 May 1905, after the battle of Tsushima Island.

Battleships of coastal defense (BRBO)

RIF Admiral Ushakov - sunk by artillery fire of Japanese armored cruisers 15 in May 1905, west of Oka Island.
RIF Admiral Senyavin - surrendered to the Japanese in the Sea of Japan 15 May 1905, after the battle of Tsushima Island.
RIF Admiral Apraksin - surrendered to the Japanese in the Sea of Japan 15 May 1905, after the battle of Tsushima Island.

Armored cruisers (CRB)

RIF Rurik - sunk by artillery fire of Japanese armored cruisers14 August 1904 of the year during the battle in the Sea of Japan.
RIF Bayan - sunk by Japanese ground artillery artillery fire in the Port Arthur harbor 26 on November 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Admiral Nakhimov - damaged by artillery fire of Japanese warships during the battle of Tsushima Island, later torpedoed by Japanese destroyers and scuttled by 15 crew on May 1905 of the year.
RIF Dmitry Donskoy - flooded by the crew off the island of Dzhelet 16 in May 1905 of the year as a result of damage received during the battle with the Japanese light cruisers.
RIF Vladimir Monomakh - Torpedoed by a Japanese destroyer, and then flooded by the crew off the island of Tsushima 15 May 1905.

Armored cruisers I-th rank (CRL)

RIF Varyag - scuttled by the crew on the Chemulpo raid as a result of damage received from the artillery fire of Japanese warships during the battle at Chemulpo on January 27, 1904. After it was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Pallas - sat on the ground in the harbor of Port Arthur as a result of damage from the artillery fire of the Japanese ground artillery 24 November 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Boyarin - was left by the crew after the blast on the 29 January January 1904 mine and sank under the Port Arthur January 31 1904.
RIF Bully - drowned by artillery fire of Japanese land artillery in the harbor of Port Arthur 12 October 1904.
RIF Svetlana - sunk by fire of Japanese light cruisers 15 May 1905, in the Sea of Japan.

Cruisers II-ranga (CRL)

RIF Emerald - I hit the rocks and was blown up by the 19 crew in May of 1905, in the Vladimir Bay.
RIF Rider - sunk by Japanese ground artillery artillery fire at the Port Arthur Harbor 2 December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Gaydamak - flooded by the crew on the eve of the surrender of the Port Arthur fortress 20 December 1904 of the year.
RIF Ural - thrown by the crew, fired upon by Japanese battleships, after which it was torpedoed by one of them and sunk by 14 in May of 1905.
RIF Novik - flooded by the crew as a result of damage received in battle with Japanese light cruisers in the port of Korsakovsk on Sakhalin Island on August 20 of 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Jigit - flooded the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress 20 December 1904 year.
RIF Bully - drowned by artillery fire of Japanese land artillery in the harbor of Port Arthur 12 October 1904.

Gunboats (CL)

RIF Korean - blown up and scuttled by the crew on Chemulpo's roadstead after the battle with the Japanese 27 warships on January 1904.
RIF Beaver - sank in the Port Arthur roadstead after 283mm hit the Japanese ground artillery 13 December 1904.
RIF Sivuch - blown up and flooded by the crew on the Liaohe River 20 July 1904 of the year.
Rif rattling - sank near Port Arthur 5 on August 1904 of the year as a result of a mine blast.
RIF Brave - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the surrender of the fortress 20 December 1904 of the year.
RIF Gilyak - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.

Minelayers (MoH)

RIF Yenisei - blown up by a mine and sank off the island of Nord-Sanshan-Tau 29 January 1904.
RIF Amur - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.

Destroyer destroyers (EM)

RIF Loud - sunk by artillery fire of Japanese destroyers in the Sea of Japan 15 May 1905.
RIF Flawless - sank as a result of damage to Japanese warships 15 of May 1905 received by artillery fire.
RIF Fast - blown up by the crew north of Chikulen-van 15 May 1905 of the year.
RIF Brilliant - received an 203mm projectile from a Japanese armored cruiser and sank the next day 15 in May 1905 of the year in the Sea of Japan.
RIF Exuberant - sunk by artillery fire of the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" because of a malfunction in 15 vehicles in May 1905.
RIF Bedovy - surrendered to the Japanese in the Sea of Japan after the Battle of Tsushima Island 15 May 1905.
RIF Impressive - thrown by the crew in the bay Jingzhou 13 February 1904 of the year. After he was shot by a Japanese cruiser.
RIF Watchman - sank as a result of damage to Japanese 26 destroyers February 1904 of the year received from artillery fire near Port Arthur.
RIF Scary - sunk by artillery fire of Japanese warships in the night battle of 13 on April 1904.
RIF Attentive - hit the 14 stones in May, 1904, in the area Jingzhou, after which it was torpedoed by the destroyer "Enduring".
RIF Lt. Burakov - torpedoed by a Japanese torpedo boat in Tahe Bay on July 23 1904, as a result of which it was badly damaged, stranded and blown up by the crew of July 29 1904.
RIF Stormy - I ran into stones and was blown up by the 29 crew on July 1904, after the Battle of Shantung.
RIF Hardy - hit a mine and sank 11 August 1904, near Port Arthur.
RIF Slim - exploded a mine and sank on October 31 1904 on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur.
RIF Rapid - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Chief 3 on November 1904.
RIF Strong - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Silent - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Fighting - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Striking - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
RIF Storzhevoy - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.

Military transports (BT) and auxiliary ships.

RIF Kamchatka (floating platform) - at the final stage of the main phase of the battle near the island of Tsushima, was at the flagship of the battleship Prince Suvorov. After its final neutralization, it was also sunk by Japanese destroyers. May 14, 1905. Japanese Sea.

Torpedo boats (TK)

RIF number XXUMX - it was blown up on the mine exposed by the Japanese armored cruisers near Vladivostok.

The total losses of the Russian Imperial Navy surpassed the losses of the US Navy in the four years of war in the Pacific 1941-1945. Sad list of Xnumx lost ship distributed as follows: 20 ships (31%) were sunk by artillery fire. The Japanese alone failed to sink a single Russian ship 0 (0%), the joint action of artillery and torpedoes destroyed the 3 ship (5%), on the mines 6 were killed ships (9%). Thrown / flooded / blown up by their crews as a result of damage from artillery fire / torpedoes / min / just hopelessness and not knowing what to do: 27 ships (42%!), Surrendered to the enemy 5 ships (8%), as a result of navigation damage lost 3 ship (5%). The most direct and most important responsibility for these gigantic losses, in addition to the tsarist regime itself, is borne by very specific people. These are the admirals: Z. P. Rozhestvensky, V. K. Vitgeft, O. V. Stark. It was in their hands that all power was concentrated and the right to make all the fateful decisions that were taken by them, or not taken. As for Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, he can be reproached with a lack of courage / will / spirit, but one cannot be blamed for lack of professionalism or not knowing his business. Admiral S.O. Makarov proved himself to be a competent and active leader, who knew his job well and was confident in his weapon. Admiral OA Enquist may have been a good specialist in his field, but for some reason he could not express himself. We will consider the contribution to the increase of the fleet combat capability of some of these people below.

Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov - one of the outstanding Russian admirals. Born in 1848 year. He died in 1904 on board the battleship Petropavlovsk (was the flagship of the 1 Pacific Squadron during the renovation of the Tsarevich). The cause of death from a single mine was a fatal accident and shortcomings in the defense of Petropavlovsk. It was booked mainly citadel by type of the British and Japanese DAD. When a mine exploded in the bow of the ship, a sequential detonation of torpedo ammunition, then stored in the fore part of the mine obstacle, and finally, the entire ammunition load of the 1 artillery of the main caliber occurred. The 56-year-old admiral had little chance of escape in such a situation (his place was not far from the epicenter of the last explosion). Under the command of this man, the Russian fleet had every chance of successfully defeating the enemy. The fatal confluence of circumstances put an end to this scenario.

However, many modern post-Soviet researchers of that war very often turn the situation upside down. His "holiness", "Adjutant General" ZP Rozhdestvensky simply can not be something to blame. The outdated and useless, in their opinion, equipment, as well as the illiterate and unaware of the crews of these “floating galoshes” are to blame for everything. To justify such a position, many myths were invented, designed to “translate the arrow” of blame for the disgraceful defeat to civilian specialists, factories, ITC, anyone, but not officers. We will try to consider these myths below. So:

Half-myth №1: Overload of Russian battleships. Because of this, they, they say, died "so quickly." Here it is necessary to understand the difference. They create military equipment and carry out its current / medium / major repairs by civilian specialists, and they exploit it, fight on it and carry out various military maintenance. It is necessary to distinguish the construction and operational overload of ships. Construction overload - civil wines. Operational overload - military fault. With regards to construction overload. At that time, this phenomenon was massive and from that it could even be called "normal." Indeed, armadillos of the Borodino type were calculated for a displacement of 13516 tons, but in reality iron turned out to be 14150 tons. Construction overload amounted to 634 tons. But the level of engineering calculations of that period simply did not allow counting all the loads absolutely exactly. The construction overload of the Japanese battleship "Mikasa" was even greater - 785 tons and at the same time none of the Japanese military as it did not complain about the deterioration of stability or other TTX "Mikasy". Operational overload - excess capacity of the ship. In the campaign 2 th Pacific Squadron, all the battleships were so full of coal, water, provisions and other reserves that the displacement of the battleships of the Borodino type, according to engineer V.P. Kostenko, reached 17000 tons! What are the fighting qualities with such a "weight"! No measures were taken to remedy the situation even before the battle, as a result of which, the displacement of attack ships of the Borodino type before the Tsushima battle was unacceptably large - 15275 tons. The proposal of the Orla officers to carry out the preparation of the ships for battle before the general battle, together with their radical unloading, was rejected with idiotic reasons: “The Orla officers love to play war too much.” The blame in this military, namely ZP Rozhestvensky.

Myth № 2: Slow speed Russian ships. This myth is explained simply. Speed is needed for action. Those who do not take any active actions do not need speed. The Japanese used the speed of their ships, which is called "to the fullest." The Russians used it only when their ships for one reason or another (usually damage) were deprived of the “guardianship” of the commander (and it was already too late) and would just run away and not catch up. In addition, the maximum speed of the ship depends not only on its passport data, but also on the specific technical condition, and on the combat damage it received. The limiting squadron of the Japanese squadron was 15uz, the most XNUMHuz and was limited by the speed of its slowest ship - EBRD¹ "Fuji" (for technical reasons could not develop more XNUMHuz). The squadron 15,5 th Pacific squadron was 1-14,5use. The “Sevastopol” EBR didn’t give out more than XNUMH because of the bent blade of the screw. The squadron move of the 15 Pacific Squadron was not tested in practice, but theoretically could be of the order of 15-2 in the squadron there was no ship slower than 15, 15,5uz (“Nikolai-I” - 15uz, “Navarin” - 5uz, “Sisoy the Great” - 15,5uz, BRBO² such as "Ushakov" all issued on XNUMHuz). In the course of the night attempt to break away from the enemy, the old battleship Nikolai-I under the flag of N.I. Nebogatov, heavily damaged the Eagle, BRBO Sevyanin and Apraksin, as well as the cruiser of the II-rank Emerald easily supported 16-13 speed. Conclusion: The squadron of the Russian attack ships, if it was below the Japanese, then very little. The fact that ZP Rozhdestvensky trudged in with the speed of XNUMHuz (14km / h in total - slower than a river pleasure boat rolls), dragging transports with him — not its low speed capabilities of its warships.

Myth number XXUMX. Russian ships were inferior in terms of Japanese. Came across numbers about the firing range of the Japanese on the 82 cable and even on the 100 (!) Cable cable. The myth is explained in the same way as speed. The Japanese fought actively and used the capabilities of their artillery for all 100%. Of course, there could be no question of some kind of aimed shooting at such gigantic distances for that time. But over long distances, the Japanese did sometimes shoot. Domestic ships fired almost always only in response and ceased fire as soon as their enemy stopped. All without initiative and sluggish (more detailed descriptions of this will be given below). In order to shoot a long distance you need to fulfill three conditions:

1. Artillery must have the technical ability to fire at such distances, in other words, be long-range enough. This is the responsibility of civilians.
2. The fire control system of warships must provide a sufficiently high probability of hitting a target at long distances. This is also the responsibility of civilians.
3. Artillerymen of all levels must have proper training and practice in organizing and conducting firing at such distances. It is good to own the military equipment entrusted to them and be able to handle it correctly. The military is responsible for this.

Unfortunately, the military was the “weak link” here. With regards to technical issues. On 100kbt could shoot a single Japanese ship - an armored cruiser "Kassuga" Italian construction. And only from a single 254mm gun. His 203mm cannon, like his twin brother Nissin, was fired at 87kbt. As for the new Japanese battleships, their main-caliber artillery was of two types. The 305mm / L42,5 guns of the EBR Fuji and Yashima, with a maximum angle of + 13,5 °, could shoot extremely at 77kbt. Slightly more powerful 305mm / L42,5 guns “Mikasy”, “Asahi”, “Hattsuse” and “Sikishima” had a lower limiting angle of elevation - + 12,5 ° and extremely fired at 74kbt. Maximum range 203mm guns of the main caliber of Japanese armored cruisers such as "Asama", "Yakumo", etc. was only 60-65kbt, which was approximately at the level of modern 152mm artillery installations of medium caliber Russian ships. The question of ensuring at least the technical capability of firing for the greatest possible distance Russian specialists paid, perhaps, the greatest attention after the German fleet. The elevation angle of the guns of the main caliber of the Russian battleships was + 15 °, + 25 ° and even + 35 °. The squadron battleship Victory was considered the most long-range in the entire Russian fleet. It installed a more modern 254mm / L45 guns, which from the previous "10-inch" differed in increased weight, strength and rigidity of the barrel. As a result, its 225-kilograms main-caliber projectiles flew 777kbts at elevated speeds up to 113 / s. The 254mm guns of the other two ships of this series, the Oslyab and Peresvet, as well as the Admiral Apraksin BRBO, were shot at 91kbt. All “12-inch” battleships with 305mm / L40 guns were fired at 80kbt at an angle of + 15 °. BRBO "Ushakov" and "Sevyanin" shot at 63kbt. The range of fire of the old squadron battleships was less: the “Navarin” had 54kbts, the Nikolay-I had 51kbts for 229mm / L35 and 49кбт for 305mm / L30 guns.

As for the OMS, its 4-x multiple optics and rangefinders with the 1200 mm base even then allowed to conduct a more or less effective fire at a distance of ~ 60кбт (10-12km). Russian battleships of new and newest types have received the latest fire control system “mod.1899”. Its device can be judged by the description of the squadron battleship "Eagle":

Supero mod.1899. The instrument kit was first presented at an exhibition in Paris in 1899 and was installed on many RIF battleships. It was the prototype of the modern systems of central focusing. The system was based on two target posts (VP) - one per board.

Pancratic, optical, monocular devices of these posts - center-level viziers (VTSN) had a variable magnification - 3x-4x. The search for the target and the targeting of weapons to it were made by the VP operator When aiming at the VTsN target, the scale determined the elevation of the target relative to the ship’s diametrical plane, and the associated tracking system automatically set this angle with an arrow in the receiving instruments of the main 8 tower AU batteries and 75 batteries of the ship's guns. After that, the gunners-operators (commanders) carried out a horizontal pickup of their installations before aligning the angle of rotation of the AU with the angle of the target's position (the so-called “combining arrows” principle) and the target came into the field of view of optical riflescopes. Optical, pankraticheskie, monocular sights of the Perepelkin system had a variable magnification ratio - 3x-4x and the angle of the field of view 6 - 8, changing in accordance with it. To illuminate the target in the dark, six combat searchlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm were used. The next step was to determine the distance to the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower there were two distance measuring stations - one each aboard. They were installed horizontal base rangefinders "Barr and Studd" with the base 1200 mm.

The range finder measured the distance and, using the distance-measuring key, the data was automatically entered into the receiving instruments of the conning tower, the central post, the 8 main tower AU and 75 batteries of mm guns. To control the correctness of the data transfer, there was a feedback system with a control ranging dial, the readings of which were compared with those entered into the receiving instruments. The sight posts and rangefinder stations were located inside the conning tower on the right and left side (one pair for each side), due to which the Orel conning tower had an oval shape in the transverse direction from the center plane of the ship. A set of instruments and a magnetic compass in the conning tower showed the senior artillery officer his own course and speed, direction and strength of the wind. The course and speed of the goal, he determined approximately "by eye". Having information about own speed and course, wind direction and strength, deviation, type of target, angle of target location and distance to it, estimating the approximate speed and course of the target — the senior artillery officer, using firing tables, manually (on paper) made the necessary calculations and I calculated the necessary corrections of preventions for HV and GN. I also chose the type of AU and the kind of projectiles needed to hit this target. After that, the senior artillery officer transferred the data for guidance to the AU, from which he intended to hit the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower and the central post, there was a set of indicator pointing devices that transmitted data through 47 cable wires to the receiving devices in AU and 75 mm batteries. The whole system operated at the voltage Up = 23В through the transformer 105 / 23В. In the case of centralized fire control, they were used to transfer data on the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance, the type of projectiles used. After obtaining the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected AUs installed the guns at the specified angles (corrected the initial installation at the VTsN) and loaded them with the selected type of ammunition. After performing this operation, the senior artillery officer in the conning tower, at the moment when the inclinometer showed “0”, set the grip of the device-indicator of firing into the sector corresponding to the selected fire mode “Fraction”, “Attack” or “Short alarm” in accordance with which AU opened fire. This mode of centralized fire control was the most effective. In the event of failure of a senior artillery officer or the inability for any other reason to produce centralized fire control, all 305 mm, 152mm AU and 75 battery of mm guns switched to group (plutong) fire or a single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data on their course, their speed, wind direction and strength, the angle of the target site, the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the AU or battery. This mode of fire was less effective. In the event of complete defeat of the fire control devices, the personnel of the conning tower and the data transmission circuits, all AUs switched to independent fire. In this case, the choice of the target, and the guidance on it was made by calculating a specific AU using only a gun optical sight, which sharply limited its effectiveness and range. Targeting torpedo tubes was performed using ring sights with the same tracking system as the VP for onboard 381mm TA or turning the entire hull of the vessel for the bow and stern 381mm TA. This fire control system ensured high efficiency in the use of naval artillery and torpedoes against various targets and allowed us to simultaneously “lead” two targets — one from each side. However, it should be noted that the officers and commanders of the Russian squadron battleships of the 2-th Pacific Squadron had poorly mastered this system. For external communication, the ship had a radio station "Slaby-Arko".

Stayed third point. Exercises and combat training. In this aspect, the Russian fleet is certainly behind the Japanese. The Japanese regularly conducted exercises and trained in shooting. Since the new fire control devices were then too difficult for them to understand (and even more so their combining into the system) by ordinary sailors, they were developed, if not the most ideal, but the most effective in terms of those specific conditions, fire control and management techniques firing. One of them - the so-called. “The art of massive fire”. Its essence is that, without any use of the SLA (having measured the distance only once), they begin to actively shoot with medium and small caliber artillery. After that, waiting for the cover of the goal. The whole adjustment of the fire is not done by changing the input data and adjusting the fire of the guns themselves, but by directly changing the position of the group of ships (closer to the target). Despite the gigantic consumption of medium-caliber shells, such tactics bore fruit at that time. Moreover, the Japanese goals (that is, our ships) contributed to its success. At the same time, this method of "massive fire" has never been used by anyone. Perhaps due to the fact that the enemies were no longer so stupid. As for our gunners, they worked according to the instructions. And they tried to master the work of the JMA. It turned out not at all. If the lower ranks of artillery somehow could still master their subject, then on the part of the higher ranks almost no effort was made to this. As for the firing range, the command of the 1 Pacific squadron, albeit belatedly, realized the role of new, powerful and long-range guns, as well as modern MSA. And the beginning seems to be developing activities adequate to the current situation. But time was already hopelessly missed. The command of the 2 Pacific Squadron was still in happy ignorance regarding the combat capabilities of enemy and own ships. All those criminally rare shooting exercises were conducted at a distance not further 20kbt. Thus, the gunners of the 2 Pacific squadron engaged the Japanese, not having any practice at long range. The exception is - 3-I Pacific squadron of admiral N. I. Nebogatov (joined the 2-th Pacific squadron). Admiral Nebogatov proved himself to be a good specialist in artillery. He trained his artillerymen to fire well from the most extreme possible distances. As luck would have it, Rear Admiral NI Nebogatov’s squadron consisted only of outdated or small ships. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the battleship Nikolai-I was in fact the oldest and weakest battleship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, its fire turned out to be almost the most effective! The old ship, still shooting with black powder, achieved hits at distances up to 50 cable ie. at the maximum possible range for their artillery! In all likelihood, it was his 305mm and 229mm shells that inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese armored cruiser Asama, which had to withdraw from the battlefield. Thus, the cruiser Varyag was to some extent avenged.

Semi Myth # 4. Bad shells on Russian ships. They, they say, badly pierced the armor and almost did not explode. Russian "12-inch" battleships used 305mm armor-piercing and fragmentation shells of the 1887 model with a mass of 331,7kg. "10-inch" ships had 254mm armor-piercing shells of the model 1892, the mass of 225,2kg. Japanese battleships fired 305mm armor-piercing and high-explosive shells of mass 386kg. Let's start with armor-piercing. Their comparative characteristics are shown in the table 5.

Table 5

As can be seen from Table 5, all the shells are well worth each other. What is surprising is that the 254mm shells of Russian ships with almost half the kinetic energy compared to 305mm shells, nevertheless, almost did not yield to them in armor penetration. As for the armor penetration itself, Table 5 shows that the characteristics of both the Russians and the Japanese armor-piercing shells made them ineffective against the powerful armor of battleships at long distances. Their effective use against heavily armored targets was limited to a distance of <20-30 cables. At long distances, there was practically no chance of penetrating the protection of the HHC of any battleship. These data have been confirmed by real practice. Despite all the efforts of the Russian and Japanese gunners during the battles, it was never possible to penetrate the Krupp armor plate thicker than 152mm. It is also worth noting that for the 305mm / L35 Navarina guns there were also heavier 305mm shells weighing 455kg. But for some reason they were not included in the ammunition load of this ship. The use of such "suitcases" in modern gun mounts with 305mm / L40 guns in new ships is a question that requires further research, since it is not known for certain whether the MZ trays were adapted⁹ the newest "Borodintsev" and "Tsesarevich" to receive such longer projectiles. Therefore, at distances over 30 cable it made sense to switch to fragmentation and high-explosive shells. Their comparative characteristics are shown in the table 6.

Table 6

*Art system*	*Shell*	*Weight*	*Explosive charge*	*starting speed*
*Russian 305mm / L40*	*Fragment*	*331,7kg*	*15,6kg pyroxylin*	*792m / s*
*Russian 305mm / L40*	*High explosive*	*331,7kg*	*25kg pyroxylin*	*792m / s*
*Japanese 305mm / L42,5*	*High explosive*	*385,6kg*	*48,5kg picric acid*	*762m / s*

At first glance, it seems that the Japanese high-explosive shells utterly surpass the Russians3. In part, it is. Especially if you add to our shells increased pyroxylin humidity from 10% to 30%. But not everything is so great. First, the fuses on the Japanese high-explosive shells were set up for instant action from the slightest touch. This led to a series of explosions of these shells directly in the barrels of Japanese guns, which naturally led to the failure of these guns. Secondly, it is an explosion inside its armored hull that is terrible for any armored vehicle. Even a powerful high-explosive explosion from the outside is not capable of causing serious damage, but only spoils the "cosmetics". Therefore, to combat armored objects, first of all, armor-piercing and semi-light-launching shells with time-delay fuses are good. The Japanese non-projectiles were very effective against light cruisers, but it turned out to be extremely difficult to destroy the booked from head to foot, even if the overloaded “Borodino”. The Japanese themselves understood this perfectly well, which, along with land mines, also actively used armor-piercing shells against Russian battleships. Conclusion - the myth of the bad shells of Russian ships, of course, is not a myth in the full sense of the word - partly a fact. And the blame for this lies with civilian specialists, but it is not worth exaggerating its value beyond measure either. Opponents were not perfect either.

Myth № 5. Small booking area of Russian ships. At that time, there were two main heavy ship booking schemes in the world: the English one, also known as the “all or nothing” scheme and the French one — a common one. According to the first - ZHVCH ship are covered with the most thick armor, and all other parts of it either have weak protection, or are completely deprived of it. It was under this scheme that the Japanese and many of our battleships were booked. However, in the design of the newest ships Tsesarevich and the Borodino series, domestic designers, based on the best of both schemes, brought the booking of these ships to perfection. The protection of the “Tsarevich” and the “Borodino” series turned out so powerful, so modern that in principle it corresponded to battleships and large heavy cruisers of the Second World War. It provided reliable protection of these ships even from dreadnought-out "suitcases". The battle of "Glory" with the powerful German dreadnoughts "Koenig" and "Kronprinz-Wilhelm" in 1917, was clearly demonstrated. In spite of the seven 305mm projectiles received (each weighing 405,5kg), three of which fell below the belt into the underwater part of the hull, the battleship Slava did not receive serious damage. And if it were not for the waterproof door that was unclosed due to someone's disorder (and if not for the revolution), then it would have been possible to continue fighting. The booking scheme for the Eagle battleship is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1⁸

The most heavily protected zone in the center of the ship at the waterline is approximately 60m length and about 0,8m height and is protected: 194mm / 0 ° + 40mm / 30 ° + 40mm / 0 ° = 314mm equivalent of Krupp armor 4. This was more than enough to counter any armor-piercing projectiles of the time. However, all ZhVCH, artillery, torpedo tubes, as well as areas near the surface of the water were also protected by quite powerful armor. And the total thickness of armor of all armored decks ranged within 72mm, 91mm, 99mm, 127mm, 142mm, 145mm - the indicators are quite good for the huge battleships of the Second World War. The protection of the Japanese ships was much simpler and approximately corresponded to our battleships of the Poltava, Retvisan, Sisoy the Great projects, etc. In addition, all Japanese battleships with the exception of "Mikasa" were chained to Harveyev armor. The counterhard resistance of the Harvey armor is related to Krupp’s as 0,8 to 1, that is, the Harveyev’s armor was inferior to the counter-projectile firmness of Krupp (on new Russian ships) by 20%. Really powerful was the booking only from the flagship Japanese battleship Mikasa. In addition, we should not forget that half of the Japanese attack ships were armored cruisers, the level of protection of which was even lower compared to the squadron battleships.

Half-myth №6: Large sizes of reticle and embrasures in Russian ships. The width of the sighting slits in the battleship Tsesarevich and the Borodino series was huge 380mm. It was a necessary measure. the designers placed in the conning tower all the elements of the JMA of these ships including. DS, VP and ring sights onboard torpedo tubes. To ensure the normal visibility of all these optics, we had to make slots of that width. The desire of designers to place the entire SLA under the armor of the conning tower can be explained. Firstly, the SLA has not yet developed so strongly and the weight and size characteristics of its elements still allowed them to be assembled in the BR - the most protected place in the upper part of the ship.

Secondly, typical combat distances of that time: 30-60кбт meant that in addition to the rare single hits of large-caliber shells, the ship was also under a hail of small and medium-caliber shells: 75mm, 76mm, 152mm. Obviously, bulky and poorly protected control towers, guided sight posts and other elements of the SLA, if they were openly located, would be destroyed by these seemingly innocent shells in the first minutes of the battle. However, in terms of protection against shells, the combat logging of domestic ships was designed well.

They had a mushroom-shaped roof protruding beyond the side armor felling and splinter shields. As a result, the penetration of shells inside the conning tower was practically excluded, which was confirmed in actual combat practice. Despite the huge number of hits, which fell on the share of Russian battleships, the cases of penetration of projectiles inside the BR were practically not recorded. However, the commanding staff, however, was badly damaged by shrapnel, while being inside the conning tower. But this is primarily due to the huge number of hits and high characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation projectiles. But, as you know, everything is relative. The well-known Soviet writer A.S. Novikov wrote in his novel “Tsushima”: “Inspection gaps in Japanese ships were made so that even a small fragment could not penetrate into the conning tower ...” With all due respect to Alexey Silich, you need to understand that he was not a specialist in the field of shipbuilding and could only appreciate the perfection of the design of the logging of Japanese ships purely visually. Photo to assess the size of the reticule slots of the Japanese battleships. In addition, the Japanese would not have been Japanese if they had not decided on a very original from the point of view of straightforward European logic, a step - Vice-Admiral of Togo and Rear-Admiral Kamimura, who commanded the Japanese attack ships, would not have to “climb” into the military logging of their ships! Admiral Togo spent the entire battle, substituting his chest hung with epaulets and medals to all winds (and shells) on the upper bridge of the Mikasy. That is, quite openly ... By an evil coincidence, a Russian 305mm splintering right above the bridge, a fragmentation shell killed and wounded everyone who was on it. Besides…. BESIDES…. Of course, Vice Admiral Kheyhatiro Togo. Admiral Kamimura also spent the whole battle on the battle mars of the mainmast and remained alive. The fact that both Japanese admirals remained alive and did not even get seriously wounded indicates only extraordinary good luck accompanying and evil fate pursuing Russian ships throughout this war. In addition, very low characteristics of domestic fragmentation and high-explosive shells affected.

Battle house of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. View from the stern of the ship. It can be seen that the size of the sighting slots is also very decent, although it is smaller than that of our ships. In addition, this cabin has no “eyebrows” in the form of an overhanging mushroom-shaped roof, so in principle it is possible to penetrate inside its shells falling at an angle. Admiral Togo all battle stood two floors above ...

As for the sizes of embrasures ... The sizes of embrasures in the towers of Japanese artillery installations of the Civil Code were smaller than those of Russians, but the angle of pumping of their guns vertically was also smaller, we should not forget about it. In addition, the AU GC towers of the Russian battleships were streamlined and defended with Krupp armor 254mm thick, which made them invulnerable from any projectiles of that time at typical combat distances. The rotating parts of the Japanese AU GD, “Fuji” and “Yashima” were reserved much more modest - all 152mm and were potentially vulnerable to BB-shells of Russian ships. The Japanese battleship Fuji, to which ours really struck 152mm 12 armor of an artillery installation (thus confirming my logical conclusions) almost exploded. after that, a fire started and the charges in the tower and the supply pipe were already ignited. The fire miraculously “extinguished itself” with water from a torn pipeline, which we again attribute to the “conscience” of evil rock. But all this concerns only artillery of a large (main) caliber. The level of any type of protection 152mm turret gun mounts of the newest Russian battleships exceeded by two orders of magnitude the security of medium-caliber guns and their calculations on Japanese ships. This photo in essence and in the comments does not need, but still:

Battery deck of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. You do not need to have wild imagination to imagine what will happen to the calculations of all these guns, at least one more or less decent shell will explode here ... Just meat. This design is no different from the technical solutions used in wooden battleships of the sailing era. The size of their "embrasures" as well hints ... Good gate. On Russian battleships of the Borodino type 75mm, the mine weapons were located in separate casemates with 76mm armor of their walls in a circle. There are many historians who are happy to criticize the 152mm twin tower turrets of the latest Russian armadillos. They somehow forgot that the entire medium-caliber artillery of the battleship Oslyabya, which was located in the same casemate installations as the Mikas, was completely destroyed after some 20 minutes after the start of the battle.

Obviously, the conclusion is that the Japanese ships simply had good high-explosive fragmentation shells (for all their shortcomings), and not beyond invulnerable logging, ultra small embrasures or something else. And most importantly - the Japanese samurai fought, and not sluggishly fought back like ours. There is a good phrase from the H / F "Antikiller". In this case, of course, exaggerated, but the essence reflects quite accurately: “Because they are at war, and we are at work ...” The comparative characteristics of the most basic types of strike ships of the Russian and Japanese fleets are listed in the 7 table.

Table 7

*TTX*	*Eagle*	*Poltava*	*Oslyabya*	*Mikasa*	*Fuji*	*Asama*
*A type*	*Dbc*	*Dbc*	*Dbc*	*Dbc*	*Dbc*	*KRB23*
*Displacement t.*	*13516*	*11500*	*12674*	*15352*	*12320*	*914.2% 0*
*Engine power hp*	*15800*	*11255*	*15051*	*16000*	*14000*	*18200*
*Travel speed knots / km / h*	*17,8 / 33*	*16,3 / 30,2*	*18,6 / 34,4*	*18,5 / 34,3*	*18,3 / 33,9*	*22,1 / 40,9*
*Large caliber artillery*	*Obuhov* *2-2х305mm* L40	*Obuhov* *2-2х305mm* L40	*Obuhov* *2-2x254***mm L45	*Amstrong* *2-2x305mm*** L42,5¹	*Amstrong* *2-2х305mm* L42,5	*Amstrong* *2-2х203mm* L47,52
*Muzzle energy mj*	*106,1*	*106,1*	55	*112,1*	*105,1*	*34,9*
*Drives* *Loading*	A3 А	А А	А А	А А	А А	А *PM4*
*Firing range kbt / km*	*80/14,8*	*80/14,8*	*91/16,8*	*74/13,7*	*77/14,3*	*60/11,18*
*The thickness of the pierced armor with 50kbt normal mm*	*129 / 0 °* *"K" 9*	*129 / 0 °* *"TO"*	*109 / 0 °* *"TO"*	*140 / 0 °* *"TO"*	ND	*56 / 0 °* *"TO"*
*Fire temp* *volley per second:*	*14.2%*	*14.2%*	*14.2%*	75	*150*	*3011*
*Medium caliber artillery*	*Cane* *6-2х152mm* L45	*Cane* *4-2х152mm* *4-152mm* *L45*	*Cane* *11-152mm* L45	*Amstrong* *14-152mm* L42,5	*Amstrong* *10-152mm* L42,5	*Amstrong* *14-152mm* L42,5
*Muzzle energy mj*	*13,3*	*13,3*	*13,3*	*10,4*	*10,4*	*10,4*
*Drives* *Loading*	А PM	*M-PA5* *R-PM*	M6 R7	М Р	М Р	М Р
*Firing range kbt / km*	*61/11,3*	*61/11,3*	*61/11,3*	*49/9,1*	*49 / 9,1 55 / 10,210*	*49 / 9,1 55 / 10,2*
*The thickness of the pierced armor with 30kbt normal mm*	*43 / 0 °* *"TO"*	*43 / 0 °* *"TO"*	*43 / 0 °* *"TO"*	*35 / 0 °* *"TO"*	*35 / 0 °* *"TO"*	*35 / 0 °* *"TO"*
*Fire temp* *volley per second:*	12	*10-12*	10	10	10	10
*Torpedo armament*	*4-381mm*	*4-381mm* *2-457mm*	*5-381mm*	*4-457mm*	*5-457mm*	*5-457mm*
*Torpedo launch range km*	*0,9*	*0,9* 3	*0,9*	3	3	3
*Distance meter stations DS* *type / number*	*F2A / 2Pieces* Inside the BR**	*F2A / 2Pieces* Inside the BR**	*F2A / 2Pieces* Inside the BR**	*F2A / 2Pieces* Open**	*F2A / 2Pieces* Open**	*F2A / 2Pieces* Open**
*Viziry central guidance VTSN*	*2pcs at the posts of posts ВП1⁴inside the BR*	no	no	no	no	no
*Bearing guidance*	*Semi-center - central to the tracking system ВЦН15*	*Local*	*Local*	*Local*	*Local*	*Local*
*Range guidance*	*Local Instrument*	*Local Instrument*	*Local Instrument*	*Local Instrument*	*Local*	*Local*
*The calculation of the lead angles of HV and GN*	*Manual* *Devices and* *Ballist* *shooting tables*	*Manual* *Devices and* *Ballist* *shooting tables*	*Manual* *Devices and* *Ballist* *shooting tables*	*Manual* *Devices and* *Ballist* *shooting tables*	*Manual* *Devices and* *Ballist* *shooting tables*	*Manual* *Devices and* *Ballist* *shooting tables*
*Data transmission of the HV and GN prediction angles to the AU*	*On receiving and transmitting devices*	*On receiving and transmitting devices*	*On receiving and transmitting devices*	*The voice*	*The voice*	*The voice*
*Data transfer DS and bearing in the AU*	*Machine. on tracking system VTsN and auth. input far in the LMS from DS16*	*Machine. input far In the LMS from DS*	*Machine. input far In the LMS from DS*	*The voice* *For receiving-transmitting devices SUO12*	*The voice*	*The voice*
*Protection of the citadel and ЖЖЧ mm*	*194 / 0 ° + 40 / 30 °* *+ 40 / 0 ° = 31413* *"TO"*	*368 / 0 ° = 368* *"TO"*	*229 / 0 ° + 51 / 30 °* *= 331* *"G" + "*NI»	*229 / 0 ° + 76 / 45 °* *= 336* *"K" + "G"*	*457 / 0 ° = 457* *"Mr.*NI»	*178 / 0 ° + 51 / 30 °* *= 280* *"G"*
*Mm tip protection*	*145 / 0 ° + 40 / 30 °* *= 225* *"TO"*	*76 / 45 ° = 107* «NI»17	*83 / 30 ° = 166* «NI»	*102 / 0 ° + 51 / 45 °* *= 174* *"K" + "G"*	no	*14.2% / 0 ° = 14.2%* *"G"*
*Deck protection mm* *(in different places)*	*51+40=91* *24 + 32 + 40 = 99* *51 + 32 + 40 = 123* *51 + 51 + 40 = 142* *"TO"*	51 76 «NI»	51 64 «NI»	51 76 *51+51=102* *"G"*	64 «NI»	51 «NI»
*PTZ mm*	*40 / 0 °* *"TO"* *False bottom*	*False bottom*	*False bottom*	*False bottom*	*False bottom*	*False bottom*
*Protection AU24 GK mm*	*254 tower* *229 barbet* *"TO"*	*254 tower* *254 barbet* *"G" 18*	*229 tower* *203 barbet* *"TO"*	*254 tower* *203-35620* *barbet* *"TO"*	*152* *tower* *229-35621* *barbet* *"Mr.*NI»22	*152 tower* *152 barbet* *"G"*
*Protection AU SK mm*	*152 tower* *152 barbet* *"TO"*	*127 tower* *127 barbet* *"G"*	-	-	-	-
*Protection of the board and casemate AU mm*	*51-76* *"TO"*	75 *“X” 19*	*102-127* *"G"*	*152* *"TO"*	*102-152* *"Mr.*NI»	*127-152* *"G"*
*Note:* The documents are designated as 40-caliber, but the Japanese, according to the British model, measured the barrel length only by its rifled part, whereas in the Russian and German fleets the charging chamber was also included in the barrel length. In order to bring the values of barrel lengths to a common denominator, the length of Japanese guns was recalculated according to the Russian standard of measurements. *Often in documents are designated as 40-caliber, but in fact were 45-caliber (according to Japanese standard) and therefore* L47,5 on the Russian standard of measurement. *A - automatic ones at all stages of the loading process, they do not require the direct use of human muscular strength or mechanisms that transform it, but only pressing buttons.* *PM - semi-mechanical ie at some stages, mechanisms that transform the human muscular strength work, and at some stages, operations are performed completely manually.* *PA - semi-automatic ie in a series of operations is performed automatically, and some mechanisms that transform the human muscular strength.* *M - mechanical with the help of mechanisms that transform the human muscular strength.* *P - manual ones requiring direct physical work.* The data are given for standard projectiles with mass 95,3kg. Also in the ammunition of the ship included 203mm projectiles mass 113,4kg. The firing range of heavy projectiles reached 65kbt or 12km, but the feed pipes and chutes of the MH of the gun mounts of the Asama armored cruisers were not designed for these shells and therefore they could only be used by placing the ammunition in the stern of the turret. Naturally, without such "trifles" as the expelling panels and fire wall. *K - Krupp armor. The most powerful armor at that time period. Therefore, it is taken as a base with an 1,0 resistance coefficient.* *For deck 152mm art installations.* The data are given for standard 203mm projectiles of mass 95,3kg. In the case of the use of heavy projectiles with 113,4kg mass from the ammunition in the turret's aft niche (20 projectiles intervened), this rate of fire was maintained only until these 20 projectiles were exhausted (10 volleys). Then the rate of fire fell sharply. A set of transceiver devices on the Mikas was available, but they either did not work, or the Japanese did not know how to use them, and therefore the data was transmitted like on other Japanese ships - just with a voice or messenger-sailor messenger. *The data are given for the ships "Eagle", "Glory", "Prince Suvorov". The battleships Borodino and AlexanderIII»Was: 203mm / 0 ° + 40mm / 30 ° + 40mm / 0 ° = 323mm of Krupp armor in total normal.* *VP - sight post. The ships of the Borodino series were located inside the conning tower on the left and right sides (one per board).* *VTSN - center-view sight. Located on the sight post.* *DS - distance measuring station.* NI - Nickel armor. The coefficient of resilience in relation to the base (Krupp armor) - 0,7. *G - Harvey armor. 0,8 resistance coefficient.* *W - iron armor. 0,4 resistance coefficient.* *For the outer (above the upper deck) part of the barbet.* *For the outer (above the upper deck) part of the barbet.* *"Mr.NI"- Harvey steel-nickel armor. Resistance coefficient 0,14.2%. KRB - armored cruiser.* *AU - art installation.*

After analyzing all the listed myths and facts, it gradually comes to the conclusion that the most shameful defeat in the entire history of the Russian Navy does not lie in the quality of military equipment or the incompetence of civilian specialists. Of course, there were sins behind them too. The main one is a frail OFS⁵ and weak torpedo weapons. Powerful, long-range 457mm torpedoes were carried on board only battleships of the Poltava type.

The rest were more modest, caliber 381mm. And the difference is - whether to approach the “wounded game” on 2-3km, or on 900 meters. However, torpedoes are generally the strong point of the Japanese. They frightened Americans a lot with their huge "Long Lans" and (in other things, the Japanese did not help). But torpedoes are not the main thing! So why did this happen? And who is to blame? The main responsibility for such a rout lies with:

1. Admirals Z.P. Rozhestvensky, V.K. Vitgeft, O.V. Stark.
2. Evil fate, pursuing our fleet throughout this war.

Let us examine these two main reasons for the defeat. Point one. Were these three men clinical idiots who had themselves strangled all the basics of combat training, operation and maintenance of the ships and ships entrusted to them? They really strangled all the basics, but yet they were not idiots. These were people of a kind of abilities that were in demand in the then royal navy. In the fleet, whose leadership seriously believed that only a demonstration of the newest weapon to the enemy could be defeated, warriors were not needed. And needed business executives. Whatever the ships clearly kept operation, did not "delay", always glittered with new paint, the curbs on the shore were also painted and all the leaves on the ground were turned upside down to the visit of "His Majesty". All three could not be better suited to the implementation of such activities. Well, it is necessary to recognize that they could also solve the problem of logistics (moving over long distances). Logistics, to some extent, was one of the reasons for the defeat of the 2 th Pacific Squadron. The Japanese fleet went into battle, fresh, rested and prepared. The Russian squadron, after six months of the hardest swimming, immediately went into battle. And the fact that the combat potential of the fleet is reduced by N% per each 1000km distance from the home base has been known for quite some time.

As for the second point, we come to one of the most interesting questions of that war — and what could we have done then? The author of these lines had to read quite a few “alternative” variants of the Tsushima battle. They all started with the same thing: “But if - (commanded by Makarov / armadillos were not overloaded / shells exploded well / your version), then OOO ………” Then they followed, perhaps quite logical, but completely delusional with historical point of view reasoning. Historical processes have enormous inertia and the change of just one fact of history to fundamentally change the entire subsequent chain of events is simply unrealistic. To do this, it is necessary to change all previous events and momentous decisions in a historical retrospective for many years to a significant date in order to change the logical chain itself preceding it. This simply does not make any sense that it is clear to any student. The most "tasty" alternative is obvious - Admiral Makarov did not die, but continued to command the 1 Pacific Squadron. But to calculate what would be in this case reliably practically unrealistic. Therefore, without going into details regarding the 1 Pacific Pacific squadron, which is inactive and operating in conjunction with the ground forces, we’ll dwell in detail on the 2 squadron of ZP Rozhestvensky. What could she expect to do, exhaustedly drawing into the Tsushima Strait in the evening of 13 in May of 1905, when the ship’s radio stations had already detected the presence of an enemy fleet over the horizon? So let's try to figure out what the 2-I Pacific Squadron could do if ... No, no - do not be intimidated. If she was just lucky in battle this time. And two. Rozhdestvensky, no - he did not change to another, equally gifted figure, but he would just seriously fall ill and spend the whole battle in the ship’s first-aid post without disturbing anyone to fight. Calculations show that in this case it would not have been possible to win anyway. The maximum that 2 Pacific squadron could count on in this case was to keep the game in a draw.

So. Virtual reality. Morning 14 May. Admiral Felkersam died. Admiral Rozhestvensky in the cabin in serious condition. Admirals Nebogatov and Enkvist do not know about it and therefore almost do not survive. The squadron is commanded by someone on the battleship "Prince Suvorov". And so:

“At the beginning of the sixth, our signalmen and midshipman Shcherbachev, armed with binoculars and telescopes, noticed on the right a steamship rapidly approaching with us. Approaching the cable at forty, he lay down on a course parallel to us. But he walked this way for only a few minutes and, turning to the right, disappeared into the morning mist. He had at least sixteen knots. The flag could not identify him, but by his behavior he immediately suggested suspicion - undoubtedly it was a Japanese intelligence officer. We should have immediately sent him after two high-speed cruisers. Would they drown it or not, but at least find out an extremely important question: are we open to the enemy or are we still in the dark? And in accordance with this, the line of conduct of the squadron should have been determined. But Admiral Rozhestvensky did not take any measures against the mysterious ship. [17 - It was, as it turned out after the battle, the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru, who was in night reconnaissance.⁶»

To intercept the Shinano Maru, the cruiser Svetlana and two destroyers were sent in time, and they quickly sent it to the bottom. An auxiliary cruiser, the Shinano Maru, was added to the 24 warships listed in the 3 table. Further:

“About seven o'clock on the right side, fuming with two pipes, one more ship appeared which was moving along a converging course. When the distance to him was reduced to fifty cables, then they identified the light enemy cruiser Izumi. For an hour he walked with us in one course, as if teasing us. Of course, it was not in vain that he stayed in front of us. This affected our radio station, which nervously perceived the cipher that was incomprehensible to us, then reports to Admiral Togo, informing him of which ships our squadron was made of, where we were, how fast and what course we were going, how our squadron was built. The Admiral of Rozhdestvensky ordered the ships of the right column to hoist the right-hand cannon and stern towers to Izumi with a signal. But they only limited themselves to taking him on sight. And our high-speed cruisers did nothing this time. ”

The squadron fired a concentrated salvo at Izumi and one projectile hit the target. In addition, several projectiles exploded next to the board, filling the Izumi superstructure with a hail of fragments and flooding with water. As a result of such an execution, the small Japanese cruiser abruptly poplohelo. Further, the most high-speed cruisers "Oleg" (23,5), "Emerald" (24,5) accompanied by a pair of destroyers (26,5) were sent to intercept. Izumi quickly set fire to artillery (the original 50kbt distance was quite accessible to the guns of the Oleg cruiser) and after the torpedoes finished off the cruisers. Izumi added to 152 a place on the list of dead Japanese ships. Report on "Mikasu" full information, he did not have time. Further:

“At ten o'clock on the left, in front of the beam, at a distance of about six cables, four enemy ships seemed already. One of them was two-pipe, and the rest - one-pipe. From our front bridge, we looked at them for a long time before we identified their names: “Hasidate”, “Matsushima”, “Itsukushima” and “Chin-Yen” (two-pipe). These were second class armadillos⁷, old, slow speed, with a displacement of four to seven thousand tons. On our ships struck alarm. The guns of the left side and twelve-inch bow towers were sent to the enemy detachment. Many of us assumed that our high-speed battleships of the first detachment and Oslyabya from the second detachment, as well as the most powerful cruisers Oleg and Aurora, would immediately rush to the Japanese. As long as their main forces arrived, these four ships would have been smashed. But Admiral Rozhestvensky again refrained from decisive action. ”

To intercept a detachment of Japanese ships sent the cruisers "Oleg", "Aurora", "Svetlana", accompanied by a cruiser II-rank "Emerald" and five destroyers. From a safe distance, they quickly knocked out the old Chinese with a hail of 152mm shells (the range of 305mm guns "Chin-Yen" did not exceed 20 cable), then giving it to the tears of "Emerald" and destroyers, themselves switched to the three remaining cruisers. Those with their hopelessly low rate of fire of a single 320mm gun had practically no chance against our modern large cruisers. As a result, Matsushima and Itsukushima are sunk. The damaged Hassidate managed to escape. Some injuries received cruiser "Aurora". The cruisers Matsushima, Itsukushima and the battleship Chin-Yen were added to the list. Hassidate is disabled. Further:

“Now, four light and high-speed cruisers appeared on the same left side to replace them. They identified: "Chitose", "Kassagi", "Niytaka" and "Otava". Now there was no doubt that the fateful hour was approaching. The enemy forces were being pulled up to us. Four cruisers, like the previous ships, went with us on the same course, gradually moving closer to the squadron. They also had the duty to inform their commander about the movement of our fleet. And our command, as before, did not think to prevent this.

On the auxiliary cruiser “Ural” there was an improved apparatus of a wireless telegraph capable of receiving and sending telegrams at a distance of seven hundred miles. With the help of such a device it was possible to kill the reports of Japanese cruisers. Why don't we take advantage of this? With the "Ural" on the semaphore requested permission from Rozhestvensky. But he answered:

- Do not interfere with the Japanese wire.

On the "Ural" were forced to abandon their very reasonable intentions. "

The cruiser "Ural" hammered the air with noises, as a result of which the Japanese cruisers were not able to transmit to the "Mikasu" data on the composition and disposition of our squadron. At the same time with the Japanese squad of cruisers, the cruisers Oleg, Aurora, Svetlana, Izumrud and five destroyers immediately fought. The Dmitry Dmitriy Donskoy and Vladimir Monomakh cruisers were sent to their reinforcements, but by the time they reached the point, the battle was already over. Enemy cruisers, having received damage, retreated at top speed. Received a series of damage and Russian ships. The Emerald and destroyers returned to their squadron. "Oleg", "Aurora" and "Svetlana" overtook and finished off the damaged cruiser Ottawa with torpedoes. 30 ranked. Well - already not bad. In the meantime, the main forces of the Japanese fleet emerged from the fog and a general battle began.

It proceeded in approximately the same way, with one BUT:

“On the 50 minute of the Tsushima battle, a Russian projectile pierced the aft armor of the 305-mm Fuji battleship tower and exploded inside, igniting the prepared powder charges. The fire ran down the elevators, a little more, and “Fuji” would have blown up the air, but ... an occasional splinter broke through the pipe of the hydraulic line and struck a stream of water to extinguish the flame. Once again, happiness was on the side of the Japanese. "

Not turned out. Fuji battleship exploded and sank. The Japanese squadron has already lost two strike ships: the battleship Fuji and the armored cruiser Assam, which left the battlefield and suffered heavy damage. “Honorable” 31-place in the list. But let's not return for a long time again to the cruisers:

“From the very first Russian shots, the Izumi cruiser began to suffer defeat. Hits fell on its front end. He began to bury his nose. Fifteen minutes later the enemy cruiser turned to the right and, increasing the course, began to move away. For a short time he disappeared into the mist. But soon they saw him again. He walked towards the "Monomakh" in forty cables. On it again opened heavy fire. This time the Izumi feed was enveloped in smoke, and this forced him to leave the battlefield and head left. [40 - The English newspaper The Japan Daily Mail, published in Yokohama, dated 31 on May 1905, was published: “The cruiser Izumi (formerly Esmeralda, 2950 tons) was heavily damaged and had to leave the battlefield.” ]

"Vladimir Monomakh" remained intact. The enemy shells made undershoots or flights, and only one of them hit him. Commander Popov exulted. When the senior gunner Nozikov approached him, he, trying to shout over the hubbub of still not settled chickens, solemnly spoke:
“But we cleverly chopped it!” As set strekacha! In full swing rushed from us. "

In place of the already sunk Izumi cruiser, there was another similar cruiser. After he turned to the right and began to move away, he was already trimming and serious damage, the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" squeezing all the 16-17 units from his old worn-out cars caught up with the damaged Japanese cruiser and finally finished it off. The forces are simply not equal, the Japanese had no chance and stupidly to watch how he flees was not for anything. 32-place. Lucky and destroyers:

“About eleven o'clock ahead, a second destroyer appeared on the right, who intended to cross the course of“ Loud ”. Kern ordered to develop the most complete course. The rear destroyer began to lag behind, and the one on the right approached and opened fire. There was a battle with unequal forces. It was necessary to decide on something audacious to get out of a difficult situation. And the commander Kern went for it. The specialty of the miner suggested to the commander the idea that the moment had come to discharge the two surviving mine apparatuses at the enemy. They were located on the upper deck. At his disposal, both mines were prepared for shooting. "Loud" made a sharp turn and rushed to the enemy, who was walking behind. As they learned later, it was the Shiranui fighter. Kern decided to blow it up, and then conduct an artillery duel with another destroyer. The distance between Siranui and Loud was quickly reduced. The team was aware that a decisive moment had arrived. Komendory increased fire. But at that moment the main role was assigned to the minerals, who stood at the ready of their vehicles. Suddenly, near them, flashing a short lightning, smoke curled up like a whirlwind on the dusty road. From the fire and smoke, something heavy separated and flew overboard. Senior officer Paskin pushed the air to the casing at the back of the chimney. Recovering, he rushed to the site of the explosion. The apparatus had dead miners Abramov and Telegin, and all that was left of the mine-conductor of the Bezdenezhnykh was a peaked cap that was thrown off to the stand of the onboard tracker. Lieutenant Paskin delivered Tsepelev, Bogorytsev and Ryazdievsky to the staff of the miners. The enemy was approaching the traverse. The distance to it did not exceed two cables. From the bridge, the commander commanded to release a mine from the apparatus number 1. But she barely moved forward and, hitting her tail overboard, fell into the water like a log.

- Drowned, mean! - screamed on the bridge vigilant signalman Skorodumov and swore firmly. The commander, who was closely following the actions of the miners, clenched his fists and not in response to him, not to clarify to himself what had happened, he said through clenched teeth: “The gunpowder ignited badly — it was damp. The second mine, released after the enemy, went right to the goal. Already they were waiting for an explosion, but when it reached the surface of the sea almost to the stern, it suddenly turned to the side, thrown away by raging streams from screws. In this attack, all the advantages were on the side of "Loud". "
The "loud" was lucky and the torpedo was working. The Japanese destroyer Shiranui quickly set off for Yasukuni Shrine.

"The enemy, obviously, shot his mines last night, and his vehicles were fixed in a traveling manner."

The destroyer "Loud" launched the second torpedo on the second Japanese destroyer, but he managed to dodge and began an artillery duel. Excellent training crew Kern did not leave him a chance. The Japanese destroyer received fatal injuries, lost speed and sank after a while. The destroyer "Loud" showed the highest class, destroying two Japanese destroyers in a duel and safely reached Vladivostok. 32-e and 33-e place occupied by Japanese destroyers. The day before the duel of the armored giants continued. Already lost "Oslyabya", "Suvorov" and "Alexander III" (the last two are still afloat and still fired). Later, the crew of the destroyer "Violent" arranged lynching, throwing overboard Vice Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky with the words "Missing". The commander of the destroyer NNKolomeytsev did not support the idea, but he treated the situation with understanding. Admiral Kheykhatiro Togo stood on the upper bridge with all his staff. Russian 305mm fragmentation shell hit the foremast at the level of people's heads and exploded. From all those who were on the upper bridge including and Admiral Kheyhatiro Togo, only shapeless stumps remained. So in one second the Japanese squadron was completely beheaded. And although the command quickly passed into the hands of Rear Admiral Kamimura, the actions of the Japanese began to give a slight hysteria, which usually happened to them, as soon as something started to go not according to their plan.

The effectiveness of the fire of the Japanese squadron immediately fell so much that the Borodino battleship had enough power and vitality to “drag” the battle before dusk. Admiral Kamimura gave the order to stop the persecution. After the onset of silence, the battleship Borodino, managed only by sailors and having machines in full repair, increased the course to the maximum possible 17-18uz (there was no sense from him in battle anyway) without unnecessary complexes, keeping the course N / O-23 ° Behind him, he tried to catch the same number of “Eagle”, but because of the armor plate on the nose at the waterline turned upside down, the speed did not rise above 16,5. The rest of the ships with the flagship "Nikolai-I" followed along with a speed of about 14. The cruiser "Emerald" went with them in complete darkness without spotlights. News of the death of Admiral Togo, with all its headquarters, had a depressing effect on the Japanese sailors. The activity of the Japanese fleet dropped sharply while it was decided in Tokyo what actions to take next. This hitch was enough for the battleship Borodino, Orel, Nikolai-I and BRBO Apraksin and Sevyanin to reach Vladivostok, where they were taken under the protection of the powerful armored cruisers Russia and Thunderbolt ". As a result, with the most favorable set of circumstances and maximum luck, the Russian 2-I Pacific Squadron could additionally destroy the Japanese battleships Fuji, Chin-Yen, six different cruisers and two destroyers. At the same time, partly break through to Vladivostok, retaining such ships as Borodino, Oryol, Nikolai-I, Apraksin, Sevyanin, Izumrud and Loud. Purely by the number of ships sunk and destroyed - of course, it’s still a loss, but not so disgraceful that the world promised on more favorable terms while preserving the Kuril Islands behind Russia. Both admirals, Russian and Japanese in this virtual reality die. Only a person who does not understand the essence of those deep-seated crisis processes, which at that time already covered all of tsarist Russia, can count on something more, for example, on the complete defeat of the Japanese fleet at Tsushima. So maybe lucky - once in 1000 years. The absurd death of Sergei Makarov showed that the war "did not work out" from the very beginning.

Lessons of war

Lesson №1. To defeat the enemy with only one presence, even the most modern weapons is impossible. It is necessary to be able to use the entrusted military equipment and to be proficient in all the techniques of its use. How are things today with combat training in our fleet? I would like to think that it is better than in the 1904 year. Probably better.

Lesson №2. A combat vehicle is a very complicated mechanism, even one broken screw of which can deprive or in any case limit its functionality. In the 1904-1905 Russian-Japanese War, such “broken cogs” were over-moistened pyroxylin in projectiles, the low power of the CFC and the overload of the ships above the norm with any nonsense. And in what condition are the ships and submarines of the modern Russian fleet? And how many “broken screws” they have, despite the fact that they are immeasurably more complicated than even the most modern ships of the type “Borodino” and “screws” in them are significantly larger.

Lesson №3. Ships of that period (meaning battleships), unlike modern ones, had phenomenal strength and vitality with relatively compact dimensions and forgave admirals and commanders for such mistakes that no modern ship would ever forgive. In other words, with the same “style of command” today, the defeat of the fleet will be an order of magnitude more terrible and transient than it was in the Tsushima battle. In order not to be unfounded, you can see photos that explain everything.

Battleship "Eagle" (13516t, 121,2м) after the Tsushima battle. According to V.P. Kostenko, during the battle he received at least 300 hits. However, during the inspection of the ship in the Japanese dock, it turned out that the Eagle received 76 hits. Of these, 5 - 305mm shells (386kg), 2 - 254mm shells (226,5kg), 9 - 203mm shells (113,4kg), 39 - 152mm shells (45,4kg) and 21 - caliber 76mm (~ 6kg). The total mass of steel that got into the ship is non-sickly 5,3 tons. From her explosives from halftones to tons. The ship survived and retained the order of 10-15% of the original combat potential.

The British destroyer Sheffield (4350t, 125m) after a single hit with the anti-ship missile command AM-39 "Exocet" with a mass of 655kg. The rocket did not explode. However, this cardboard-plastic boat completely burned and sank. If the reader thinks that our Ave. 956 is much stronger, then he is deeply mistaken.

How can one explain the construction of such ships that do not carry the shadow of the reservation is difficult to say. They even have aluminum and magnesium steel, which burns very well. Maybe speed? But speed in modern naval war is no longer the determining factor.

The battleship "Eagle" in a creatively reworked version, with armor closed dynamic protection "Relic", with six AK-130 settings instead of 152mm, with added anti-ship missiles launched through 305mm gun barrels of GK, with AK-630 instead of 47mm guns, with radars with TVP, with a gas turbine power plant (speed from 25 to 35), with operational-tactical missiles RK-55 "Granat" with YABCh in new TA, with universal air defense missile systems and means of PLO would be a terrible and universal weapon. Moreover, this very compact and powerful ship is not the giant battleship Yamato. Building such "Eagles" can be massively and a lot. In this case, the hit of 2-5 missiles of the П-700 complex can be sustained by such a sea tank, after which it will be restored at the factory. Expensive? And how many Sheffields need to be built so that they can withstand 76 hits? No less than 77. Armor, of course, will not save from modern powerful anti-ship munitions, but it gives the hull strength of the tank and does not allow it to fall apart after hitting just one missile. These are perhaps the main lessons for civilian shipbuilders and sailors from that long-lasting war.

Notes:
1. EBR - squadron battleship.
2. BRBO - coastal defense battleship. It had the same architecture as the "big brothers", but less than them in terms of displacement by 3-4 times.
3. The given performance characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells of a new generation, which were first used in the Tsushima battle. High-explosive fragmentation shells of the previous types, which were used by the Japanese in battles with the 1st Pacific squadron and the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, had a very mediocre power, at the level of Russian fragmentation shells. This became clear after an ineffective artillery strike by Japanese armored cruisers on Vladivostok on March 6, 1904. 200 shells were fired. Result: one killed and three wounded on our side.
4. Data are given for Suvorov, Orel and Slava. "Borodino" and "Alexander-III" had 203mm/0° + 40mm/30° + 40mm/0° = equivalent to 323mm normal Krupp armor.
5. OFS - high-explosive fragmentation projectile.
6. The novel "Tsushima" by A.S. Novikov-Priboy. Memoirs of Russian sailors about the Battle of Tsushima.
7. Only one old Chinese Chin-Yen was an armadillo among them. The remaining three were light armored cruisers of the Matsushima type. Each of them carried one heavy and low rate of fire 320mm cannon. Of course, these ships could not even withstand the Russian cruisers of the XNUMXst rank, not to mention the battleships. However, on the battleship lack of fish of the Japanese fleet, these were quite “lobsters” for themselves, and therefore the Japanese were in no hurry to send them for scrapping. During the Battle of Tsushima, they were ordered to shoot at the shock Russian battleships from behind the backs of the Japanese armored detachments, which they did, but they never hit anyone.
8. The diagram shows only the physical dimensions of the Orel armor without taking into account the angles of inclination of the armor plates.
9. MZ - loading mechanisms.
10. Taking into account the “semi-heavy” cruisers of project 26 and 26-bis from heavy artillery, the USSR Navy on June 22, 1941 had only 36 305mm caliber guns (on the modernized royal battleships of the Marat type) and 40 B-1-P 180mm caliber guns (on cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and modernized " Red Caucasus). At the same time, the inclusion in the list of formally light cruisers of project 26 and 26 bis is an obvious stretch “for the number”, as is the case with the list of the Japanese fleet. No matter how embarrassing it was. As of June 22, 1941, the USSR Navy did not have aircraft carriers.

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rainer

+2

15 May 2013 09: 30

The article is good, but there are a few inaccuracies and two lines in the ear:

1. Comparing the armored cruisers of the Russians and the Japanese is somewhat incorrect since these formally similar ships were built for different purposes (compare the data on the power reserve).

2. Where did the author forget the "Nissin" and "Kassugi" (Garibaldi type) bought from Italians.

3. I can’t say that the picric was a good solution in the equipment of ammunition, taking into account the nice properties of the salts of picric acid formed in contact with the metal.

4. With what a crossover did Americans lose fewer ships than Russians when, according to official figures, only surface ships of the main classes, they lost 86 units during the entire Second World War, not counting minor trifles and submarines?

5. Why is the list of sources indicated only artistic officialdom of Novikov-Priboy?

6. Do you know that the real battle reports of the Japanese for the REV were declassified only 8 years ago and are still not published in Russian?
1. sergius60
  
  +8
  
  15 May 2013 13: 46
  
  The table below shows the combat strength of the Russian Navy - stupor and fucking.
  On the Black Sea Fleet in the same list "Kn.Potemkin" and "Panteleimon" - separately! As if it's not the same ship, renamed after the uprising. At that time, by the way, only CONSTRUCTION!
  The old trough "Rus" CONVERTED into an aerostat carrier is ranked among the newest!
  At the Pacific Fleet "drew" BKR "Adm. Makarov" and "Pallalda" built AFTER the war. It would be nice to watch Stepan Osipovich raise the flag on the cruiser HIS name.
  The Russian MGSh reports were published in 1907 with a secrecy period of 10 years. In 1917, everyone was just interested in reading them. I managed to read somehow "xeroxed". WELL VERY BIG QUESTIONS about the combat use of JAPANESE submarines received from Holland 12.12.1904g. (!!!)
  To teach the author, teach and once again teach the materiel.
  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    
    +7
    
    15 May 2013 13: 54
    
    Well, damn it, and when I saw Potemkin on the list of ships ready TO REVEAL, I blew so hard that I missed Panteleimon :)))) The armadillo is bifurcated ...
  2. Pavel_4
    
    0
    
    4 May 2021 16: 07
    
    I support! When I saw this vinaigrette, I went nuts. Didn't know whether to cry or laugh ..... Here the author has one more gem - "Memory of Azov" in the Black Sea Fleet! The author is not aware that this old armored cruiser served in the Pacific squadrons. There is a photo of "In Memory of Azov" on the raid of Chief
2. I think so
  
  +1
  
  16 May 2013 00: 23
  
  For Rainger.
  "3. I can't say that the picrink was a good decision ..."
  
  You are VERY wrong here. Picric acid is an EXPLOSIVE substance, and pyroxylin, the filling of Russian shells, is GUNPOWDER. And by the way, this circumstance is the main reason for the defeat of the Russian fleet. And the "instability and explosiveness" of this explosive was eliminated by a special technology for the manufacture of shells, which, by the way, was not possessed in Russia at that time ...
  
  The author of the article apparently does not understand AT ALL in explosives, if he believes that 25 kg of GUNPOWDER, and 48 kg of EXPLOSIVES are "not all that bad." In terms of their destructive power, these shells differed by about 100 times ... Gunpowder does not belong to EXPLOSIVE substances at all, but to THROWING. And the author DOES NOT SEE this MAIN cause of the death of the Russian fleet. The statistics of casualties say that the Russians were drowning with MINES, and the Japanese with SHELLS, moreover, FUGASES and WITHOUT piercing the ARMOR. We should pay tribute to the Russian artillerymen, they made almost TWO times more hits on Japanese ships than the Japanese on Russian ones, but the POWER of the shells outweighed all this. By the way, the absence of shells stuffed with EXPLOSIVES in the then Russian army was the MAIN reason for the defeat ON LAND ... This is the reason for the defeat in the war in the LACK of the then Russian equipment, and not in the ability to shoot, as the author of the article wants to convince us ... Article UNIQUE minus ...
  1. anomalocaris
    
    +2
    
    19 May 2013 20: 49
    
    Great tip - do not abuse the caps.
    Pyroxylin is still an explosive. Pyroxylin powder, it is made on the basis of pyroxylin, but differs very significantly from it. What would be clear, pyroxylin has been known since the 30s of the XIX century, but the less sane gunpowder, which did not detonate when firing from a rifled barrel, was developed by Viel only in 1885. By the way, pyroxylin was used to equip shells not only in Russia.
    Picric acid, melinite, chimose, liddit, trinitrophenol are a rather capricious thing. I’m very interested here - what is the percentage of loss of guns in the Japanese fleet from the burst of these shells. And the power of the Japanese shells is greatly exaggerated by you, since 10-15 ...
avt

+3

15 May 2013 09: 58

I don’t know, a myth, a half-myth. The author was too clever about something. Here is the mentioned Kostenko - a member of Tsushima, somehow more interesting and lively he described everything in his book "On the Orel" in Tsushima "I would advise those interested in the topic to start with him, well, then there are also very worthy descriptions those events, for example, the magazine "Gangut" covered the topic well.
1. Sakhalininsk
  
  +3
  
  15 May 2013 12: 51
  
  To be honest, the article is, to put it mildly, more like a stream of consciousness, starting from comparing fleets and ending with alt extravaganza in the Doinikov style.
  I don’t know who and how, but in my opinion flies (reality) should be separated from cutlets (alternative), or at such a pace and historical delights ... we get to the point that Samizdat will become scientific literature.
  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    
    +1
    
    15 May 2013 13: 07
    
    Quote: Sakhalininets
    To be honest, the article is, to put it mildly, more like a stream of consciousness
    
    Probably because she is. "If something looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and swims like a duck, then this is a duck" :)
    1. Iraclius
      
      +2
      
      15 May 2013 14: 45
      
      The word "old" smiled in the table with the list of Russian ships. To the author for information - the most effective ship of the 2nd / 3rd Pacific squadron was not the newest high-board battleship of the Borodino class, but the old man Nicholas I, who planted Fuji from his 12-inch on the armor of the EBR GC turret so that he broke it, which miraculously did not lead to its explosion. He also knocked out the armored cruiser Asama with a successful shot, knocking out the steering - again with the penetration of the armor.
      1. Crang
        
        +1
        
        15 May 2013 17: 56
        
        So the article says so.
        
        Iraclius
        
        +3
        
        15 May 2013 18: 50
        
        I mean, ironically (is it fate?) This old man with only two 12 "guns turned out to be the most effective battleship of the battle.
        
        Crang
        
        +5
        
        15 May 2013 20: 00
        
        Not ironically, but for the simple reason that Nikolai-I was originally part of the 3rd squadron under the command of Nebogatov and, unlike Borodintsy, he had everything in order with his combat training. All this is described in the article.
        
        Iraclius
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 20: 17
        
        The hit in the stern tower of Fuji, as described in sources known to me, was the result of the unsuccessful maneuvering of the Japanese. For the first time I hear about the outstanding combat training of artillerymen of Nicholas I.
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 20: 25
        
        Take an interest. Nebogatov was a good admiral and all the ships of the 3rd squadron had good training. Not to say that it's better than Japanese, but not bad.
        
        Iraclius
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 20: 33
        
        I noticed that he was a good admiral. Very good he surrendered his squadron. And Eagle at the same time. Particularly competent is the decision to break into Vladivostok after the afternoon phase of the battle.
Pilat2009

0

15 May 2013 09: 58

Unfortunately, in the 90s it was as if worse than in 1905
You can also remember the saying: "Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side"
The first fuel cell was supposed to die at sea and not at joke
Regarding the battleship with modern filling, I agree, the analogue of the US battleships
In general, after 1910 it seemed to come to the conclusion that it would be better spent on the land army than on battleships and that’s right
1. Vladimirets
  
  +1
  
  15 May 2013 10: 17
  
  Quote: Pilat2009
  In general, after 1910 it seemed to come to the conclusion that it would be better spent on the land army than on battleships and that’s right
  
  You tell the Americans about this, otherwise they riveted so many AUGs. After the WWII, and especially WWII, they came to the conclusion that large artillery ships did not have serious tasks at the maritime theater.
  1. rainer
    
    +3
    
    15 May 2013 10: 38
    
    It’s just that at sea the Americans didn’t have any more serious opponents at sea ...
Pilat2009

+2

15 May 2013 10: 09

Quote: Rainger
Japanese battle reports for the REV were declassified only 8 years ago and are still not published in Russian

and what is new there besides the well-known from the "Official Japanese history at sea?"
the ship is not a soldier, you cannot hide the loss
1. rainer
  
  +4
  
  15 May 2013 10: 19
  
  Well, the fact of the sinking of the ship can not be hidden? And the data on the hits of the Russians can be completely hidden, plus the Description of the hostilities in the Meiji era is a naked officialdom like Di Deutsche Voihshenau ...
  And in general, then what is the point of keeping secret if everything was in chocolate?
Fuzeler

+4

15 May 2013 10: 14

Strange article. The author, in my opinion, uses mutually exclusive paragraphs. I could be wrong, I do not deny it.
Pilat2009

+1

15 May 2013 10: 24

Quote: Rainger
this is naked officialdom

Novikov-Priboy certainly wrote more colorfully, especially regarding the bachelor's advice to admirals
1. rainer
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 10: 32
  
  Well, Novikov-Priboy is a professional writer, but for me it is interesting to read it only as a well-presented chronology, and I have a slightly different claim to it ...
  
  It turned out quite well for I. Bunich: essays on the history of Russian battleships (drawn by rock, Martyr Tsushima, Port Arthur trap).
2. Iraclius
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 14: 47
  
  Admiral, who grew up as a Marsofleet and does not understand a damn thing in modern technology? Why not learn from the bachelor.
3. vyatom
  
  0
  
  17 May 2013 13: 27
  
  There is only one conclusion: we need to fight not by numbers, but by reduction.
  Read "Overhaul" by Leonid Sobolev, and everything will become clear.
omsbon

+6

15 May 2013 10: 24

After the Russo-Japanese War, 108 years have passed, and it’s a shame to this day. Stupidity and mediocrity is always expensive.
1. Papakiko
  
  +1
  
  15 May 2013 12: 34
  
  Quote: omsbon
  still ashamed
  
  It should be a shame for the fact that after the "Crimean" lesson they did not draw ALL-OVERALL conclusions and could not make friends with Japan. Which became a weapon in the hands of the Saxons and the "mattress". It did not allow to gain a foothold in the Pacific Ocean and made it impossible to return Alaska and Hawaii.
  And then they were still drawn into 1 MV.
  
  Sadness-Sadness-Sadness.
Papakiko

+3

15 May 2013 10: 27

The Tsushima battle for a long time and more than once disassembled on the bones on the site of the same name and others.
There are several reasons and luck is not lucky here, this is not the theory of "Relativity".
-All countries with "overseas possessions" of colonies worked against Russia and made incredible efforts to prevent the strengthening of Russia's influence in the Asia-Pacific region9 even expert advisers were present on the Japanese courts).
- The ships of the squadron were painted like clowns in the arena. Excellent targets in any light and stretched almost in one line (column).
-Transports had to be sent from Shanghai (the place of the last anchorage of the squadron, to replenish supplies) back or bypassing the Japanese islands (with the exception of the "Ural" ship EW).
- The increased moisture content of pyroxylin played a negative role (not all shells exploded). In turn, the filling of the Japanese shells proved to be highly effective. A shower of fragments has completely deprived the control of the Squadron (radio, light or flags), I will attach one photo with the damage to the Bonen carrier "Eagle", everything else can be found on your own if you wish.
- The most important thing: there was a catastrophic lack of coordinated and learned actions by all ships and crews regarding artillery training.

I am sincerely sorry that the sons of the fatherland could not defeat the Japanese in the battle of Tsushima. History would go a different way.

Regarding the last lines in the article: Well, it’s very controversial, relatively and somewhat deletansky (I apologize right away).
1. rainer
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 10: 35
  
  Picrinka caused the death of Mikasa in the parking lot in Sasebo ...
  A waterlogged pyroxylin was outfitted for fear of self-ignition of shells during transition in the southern latitudes.
  1. Papakiko
    
    +2
    
    15 May 2013 11: 20
    
    Quote: Rainger
    Picrinka caused the death of Mikasa in the parking lot in Sasebo
    
    And the cause of the sinking of almost the entire 2-Squadron.
    Quote: Rainger
    A waterlogged pyroxylin was outfitted for fear of self-ignition of shells during transition in the southern latitudes.
    
    How many ships exploded on the 1st Squadron?
    But the 2-Squadron in full force dived into the abyss of water because of the inability to inflict damage on the enemy.
    
    Cool, really !?
    1. rainer
      
      +2
      
      15 May 2013 11: 31
      
      On the 1st squadron of the BC, they delivered by rail, do not compare two different things ...
      And again, the penetration rate of Russian artillerymen is unknown, and by the way I did not know about wet pyroxylin ... You have no shit to condemn neither the Russian leadership nor sailors because you are not in the place of the Sovereign Emperor and not on the bridge of "Prince Suvorov" .. ...
      1. sergius60
        
        +3
        
        15 May 2013 14: 07
        
        Good people helped with waterlogging of pyroxylin.
        "Mikasa" exploded because of cordite (Aglitsky gunpowder), not explosives.
        With shimoza "Yapi" risked terribly. The sensitivity to detonation increases if the picrink is LOW-phlegmatized. Which they did. But if there was at least one internal explosion, the polar fox runs to any BNE, breaking its legs! Therefore, Togo KNEW about the "specificity" of the shells of the 2nd TOE! He's not a suicide.
        
        Iraclius
        
        +2
        
        15 May 2013 14: 51
        
        Brink created fuses and never renounced that Russian artillery is better than Japanese in all respects. Armor-piercing shells, by the way, were designed by S.O. Makarov.
        According to some reports, the person who recommended increasing the humidity of the tubes before the round-the-world was never found.
2. Iraclius
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 14: 49
  
  The argument with painting always smiles. 1 I squadron was painted in a protective color. So what?
  About shimozy. Already sore mouth. The Japanese themselves suffered from it.
Pilat2009

0

15 May 2013 10: 39

Quote: Papakiko
from shanghai

The squadron was not there
1. Papakiko
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 11: 08
  
  Quote: Pilat2009
  The squadron was not there
  
  eva on how!
tlauicol

+5

15 May 2013 10: 45

They shot badly. While they were being repaired in Madagascar, they were firing - they did not make a single hole in the shield with the entire squadron! And sailed on to the slaughter. Ignorant admirals, ignorant sailors. Well, and materiel ..
Plus, the Japanese skillfully took advantage of the main principle of warfare - the principle of unequal separation of forces along the front. Taking advantage of the fact that the squadron was 9-nodal move, concentrated 5-6-fold forces against the head ships and smashed them in turn.
the author could still dream about the Japanese attack at the time of the turn - a pretty dump would be!
1. Iraclius
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 14: 54
  
  When, after the delivery of the Eagle, they boarded Asahi, our sailors were in shock. From all the fire of our squadron, the coamings of the hatch were torn apart at the armadillo and the stairway step was knocked down.
  This is a direct consequence of the "high quality" combat training of our gunners.
Standard Oil

+12

15 May 2013 10: 45

The whole Russo-Japanese war is one continuous file, the rotten tsarist regime and personally bloody nicholas, but the insidious communists had to return everything that they had lost after that war and I must say that they, unlike the tsarist army, the Soviet one, took a month or even less , in my opinion this is a fact and you can not argue with him.
1. Iraclius
  
  +3
  
  15 May 2013 15: 04
  
  I expressed my opinion many times. I repeat again. The disgusting organization of combat training and supply of the army and navy is to blame. Happer sentiment in society. The technique is not to blame.
2. yurta2013
  
  -5
  
  15 May 2013 17: 59
  
  No need to compare disparate things. In 1945, we actually finished off the Japanese armed forces that were thoroughly defeated by the Americans. In addition, Japan capitulated to our allies the very next day after the start of our offensive.
3. Bogatyrev
  
  0
  
  21 October 2019 22: 38
  
  I must agree with you. The inertia of leaders at all levels did not allow motivating people to use equipment correctly. Obsession with less useful drill routines, ostentatious order, when everything shines, but low initiative and technical literacy did not allow people to use all the great potential inherent in the technique. And he was big - bigger than the Japanese.
  When they learned from this, and finally reformed the fleet, competent sailors revolted and overthrew the monarchy.
Pilat2009

+1

15 May 2013 11: 01

Quote: Tlauicol
about the Japanese attack at the time of the turn - a pretty dump would be!

Retvisan already tried to run forward in the Yellow Sea - got a lot
The turn took 15 minutes during which time it was unrealistic to do anything
A turn is certainly adventurism but designed for our psychology and opportunities
1. rainer
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 11: 35
  
  That's right 10-12 volleys taking into account the shooting maximum ...
2. tlauicol
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 19: 00
  
  in 15 minutes with a 15-node move you can go 7 km - this is a boarding, even 10 with a 38-node approach point-blank. XNUMXkb in total was. this is a chance
  1. Iraclius
    
    +1
    
    15 May 2013 19: 18
    
    Yeah. You still remember the ram, as in the battle of Liss.
    1. tlauicol
      
      0
      
      15 May 2013 19: 39
      
      I mean that there was plenty of time for decisive action. but they were not followed
      1. Iraclius
        
        +1
        
        15 May 2013 20: 21
        
        There was no time there. There was no speed advantage to apply Wilhelm von Tegethoff's tactics. All that could be done was to correctly classify the ships by type, separating the battleships of the Borodino type into a separate detachment and timely get rid of the shackling maneuver of the convoy. But even in this case, the results of the battle would be extremely vague.
  2. Crang
    
    +1
    
    15 May 2013 19: 48
    
    It wasn’t worth coming close. Given the powerful and long-range Japanese torpedoes, this venture could end very badly.
Andrei from Chelyabinsk

+7

15 May 2013 11: 02

Hmmm ...
Chesslovo, the depth of the author’s errors is truly amazing.
1. The main striking force of the fleet of that period was battleships.

The term "battleship" during the RYAV (Russian-Japanese war) was not in circulation. The main striking force of the fleet was squadron battleships.
battleships had many different subclasses: a battery battleship, a barbet battleship, a tower battleship, a class I battleship, a class II battleship, a coastal battleship, a squadron battleship (aka pre-dreadnought), dreadnought, super dreadnought, and finally a battleship.

The author is completely unfamiliar with the classification of warships. The main fleets in 1904 were squadron battleships. Depending on the location of the artillery, squadron battleships could be barbet or tower (battery battleships had long lost all combat significance) Squadron battleships were considered 1 class battleships, second-class battleships had other tasks than fighting in line (although they could also fight in it ) The coastal defense battleships are purely auxiliary ships not related to the main force of the fleet (except for very small states that could not afford more) Dreadnought (and the ship and the term) appeared only about in 1906 year. Superdreadnoughts - even later.
In general, the author does not know the terminology. Therefore, you are no longer surprised to find torpedo boats in the loss lists (!!!)
And you are not surprised at the completely illiterate fleet composition analysis ... Why compare ALL fleets of the Russian Empire (RI) with the Japanese fleet? The author seriously suggests that the Russian empire could send all its squadrons to the Far East? !! Generally speaking, if the author wanted to do some analytical work, then she would have to ask ANOTHER question - which ships could PHYSICALLY be concentrated in the Far East by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War? True, then almost nothing will remain of the entire gigantic list. Well, okay, just look at what the author writes.
[
1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
  
  +6
  
  15 May 2013 11: 02
  
  Despite all the vacillations and bureaucracy, by the beginning of the war with Japan it was a formidable force
  
  TO THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. And completely shamelessly enters into the list of RI ships "Suvorov", "Alexander III", "Borodino", "Eagle", "Potemkin-Tavrichesky", while none of these EBR (squadron battleships) was ready to build at the beginning of the war
  Further it gets worse. The author managed to add three armored cruisers to the list of RI ships - "Bayan", "Pallada" and "Admiral Makarov". Everything would be fine, but these cruisers are not that they were not completed - they were FOUNDED AFTER the Russian-Japanese war
  In fact, it was so. In total, 4 Bayan-class cruisers were built in Russia. At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the very first cruiser "Bayan" was in the Russian fleet. He distinguished himself in Port Arthur and established himself as a good cruiser, but was lost along with the other ships of the Arthur squadron. After the war, the fleet had to be urgently strengthened - so Russia urgently laid down three armored cruisers according to the same project ("Bayana") - one was named "Bayan", in honor of the namesake who distinguished himself in the Russian-Japanese war. Well, at the beginning of the war, of course, these cruisers were not and could not be, there was only the very first "Bayan"
  
  So I have a question for the author - maybe, before giving out articles of terrifying magnitude to the mountain, is it worth at least a little to study the history of the Russian-Japanese war? At least at the level of knowledge of the naval composition of warring fleets?
  The author diligently adjusts the ships' trains to fit his theory. Having attributed 7 extra ships (not built - not included in service at the beginning of the war), he apparently decided that it would not be enough - so that the main forces of the Russian fleet got "Rus" (as an aircraft carrier) "The newest balloon carrier" in fact, also not was ready to build by the beginning of the war (entered the fleet in November 1904) and was nothing more than a support ship. What could a steamer with several tethered balloons do when it met a Japanese warship? Show language from the skies? Forgive me, but even peeing on the deck of an enemy ship would not have been possible - the balloons were tethered and hovered strictly above the deck of the "Rus".
  In general, wherever you stick it - everywhere horror. The author takes the myths born by Kostenko "Russian battleships were super-super-loaded with coal aaaaa !!!!!" and begins to mold even greater myths on their basis. By the way, be it said, if any battleships were overloaded at Tsushima - it was Japanese, not Russian. The Russians had everything more or less. But how did this mythical overload affect the combat capability of the Russian battleships? Suvorov - smashed by artillery fire, sunk by torpedoes. Borodino - sank after the explosion of the artillery cellar. Only Alexander III turned over and sank, and only his death can be recorded as a mythical overload.
  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    
    +4
    
    15 May 2013 11: 03
    
    Myth No. 2: The low speed of Russian ships.
    
    Wow !:)))
    The squadron course of the 2 Pacific Squadron was not tested in practice, but could theoretically be of the order of 15-15,5
    
    If the author had bothered to read at least something on this issue, he would have known that on the same battleship Borodino, already at a speed of 14 knots, "eccentrics were unacceptably warming up" (quote from acceptance tests). the battleship could develop 14 bonds only at the risk of incapacitating its steam engines. This defect was not corrected (they did not have time) and in what condition his chassis was after a hike beyond the distant lands - one can only guess. "Admiral Nakhimov", which showed 16,33 knots in Tsushima during the acceptance tests, could hardly accelerate to 14 (except for a very short time and with the risk of vehicle breakdown) And so on ...
    Myth No.3. Russian ships were inferior in range to the Japanese.
    
    the author writes and ... rushes to fight in windmills, talking about the maximum range of fire of the main caliber guns.
    In fact, Russian ships were really inferior in range to the Japanese ones - while Japanese artillery could fire at distances of 50-65 cables without problems, in the French six-inch Kane, with which our ships were equipped, lifting mechanisms (arcs) failed And a six-inch, if anything, then it was considered almost the main tool of the fleet (it was a mistake, but it was).
    In general, you can write an article ABOUT EACH thesis of the author of the article :))) For example, to the question of shooting control - the author clearly does not know what he is writing about. The author simply DOESN'T KNOW that centralized shooting in the Russian fleet was practiced at distances of up to 15 kbt, and the Russian fleet REFUSED from it shortly before RYAV. In fact, the whole "centralization" boiled down to the fact that the plutongs were given the initial data for shooting. And about the "rangefinder stations INSIDE the EBR" - this is generally for all times.
    Conclusion - the author to learn the materiel and not to disgrace
    1. Iraclius
      
      0
      
      15 May 2013 14: 58
      
      In fact, Russian ships were really inferior in range to the Japanese
      
      Yeah. I also want to recall the story with vertical guidance mechanisms on the cruisers of the Vladivostok brigade, where gears failed during the battle with Kamimura’s squadron, since the mechanism was not designed to fire with large elevation angles of gun barrels.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        15 May 2013 15: 06
        
        That's for sure, thanks.
    2. Egen
      
      +1
      
      15 May 2013 15: 09
      
      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
      In general, you can write an article ABOUT EVERYTHING of the author of the article :)))
      
      Well, Andrey broke up :) And here I go
      - "The battleship Tsesarevich is one of the most powerful battleships of its time. .... The ship was built using the latest technology and had all the features of a modern battleship of World War II ..."
      - this did not go :)) ...
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        15 May 2013 15: 35
        
        Yeah :)))) Well, if you do not say a word to the author, then a masterpiece
    3. Crang
      
      0
      
      15 May 2013 19: 32
      
      It seems that Andrei from Chelyabinsk thinks that he knows everything well. But it is obvious that the materiel must be taught precisely to him, and not to the author of the article.
      1. Iraclius
        
        +1
        
        15 May 2013 19: 39
        
        The author of the article actually has little knowledge of the terminology and classification of warships. The use of the term battleship as applied to EDB is at least an incorrect anachronism.
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 19: 53
        
        Why? On what basis is this anachronism? Maybe, following your logic, he should have called torpedoes "mines" then?
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +3
        
        15 May 2013 20: 35
        
        Quote: Krang
        Why? On what basis is this an anachronism?
        
        Anachronism, because the squadron battleships DIDN'T CALL it that way. This was the name of the sailing ships intended for battle in the line. The term "battleship" was revived after the appearance of the dreadnoughts, and then the old battleships were awarded the same rank.
        If you are about to write an article, then WORK to do it correctly.
        And I look at the Pepsi generation to spit - you think, the battleship there, or the battleship, Kalash or Schmeisser. Monoenergetic.
        
        Crang
        
        +1
        
        15 May 2013 20: 46
        
        The article is written in language understandable modern man. There are no fundamental mistakes in it. The term "battleship" is simply an abbreviation for "battleship". On what grounds cannot a battleship be considered a battleship? These are actually synonyms. Or do you need to add "ъ" at the end of each word? Sorry, this is not a sign of a bright head.
        
        Iraclius
        
        +2
        
        15 May 2013 20: 55
        
        Modern man finds it difficult to answer even about the chronology and main events of the Russo-Japanese War. The work will be read by people with very different backgrounds and, in my opinion, one should not mislead readers. Agree that the EBR Emperor Nicholas I and the battleship Emperor Nicholas I are still two big differences. And not every reader will go to the reference book to put things in order in the terminology, which the respected author so boldly "modernized".
        
        Crang
        
        -1
        
        15 May 2013 20: 58
        
        Only clinical can not understand what is at stake. As well okay. The use of terminology 100 years ago will further complicate the understanding of the subject.
        
        Iraclius
        
        +2
        
        15 May 2013 21: 09
        
        To make your publications even more modern, I recommend printing them in English. As you correctly noted there, the word "battleship" means absolutely everything - armored battleships, and wooden battleships, and EBR, and battleships. Personally, I am glad that I speak Russian, which is also my native language. And with proper use of it, I can only correctly determine what type of ship we are talking about by just one name. And the Anglo-Saxon will have to ask specific questions. I think that such a "modernization" is not required for the Russian language.
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +6
        
        16 May 2013 07: 47
        
        Quote: Iraclius
        I think only clinical will not be able to understand what is at stake
        
        Of course. After you indicated in the list of Russian ships TWO Potemkin, the ARMORED cruiser "Pallada" and the "man and the ship" "Admiral Makarov", after the discovery that Tsesarievich, it turns out, has all the features of a modern battleship of the 2nd World War after torpedo boats in the nuclear explosives, etc. etc. - I completely agree with you, the case is really clinical
        
        Pilat2009
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 19: 54
        
        However, in the work of, for example, Wilson, "Battleships in battle", former battleships are called "old battleships" or "battleships of the 2nd class"
        
        Crang
        
        +1
        
        15 May 2013 20: 03
        
        And do not care what was in Wilson's work. The year is 1904. At this point, our battleships were the "newest battleships". Such nagging about the classification is generally difficult to explain, given that the author did not make any fundamental mistakes.
        
        Pilat2009
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 20: 16
        
        So I claim no claim to be deadlocks
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 20: 27
        
        In the British navy, they were all called the same: Batleship and that was it.
        
        Iraclius
        
        +1
        
        15 May 2013 20: 27
        
        A battleship is not only a tactic of use, but, according to the classification, an armored ship, built according to the concept of "only big guns". In addition to displacement, another fundamental point was the centralized fire control from a single general ship post. The first ship is the British Dreadnought. A little bit, and this could be the Japanese EBR Satsuma, which eventually became one of the last powerful battleships.
        The term "battleship" can still be forgiven in relation to the first armored battleships, but this does not apply to the classic EBR.
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 20: 51
        
        The "big guns only" concept refers to the dreadnought - the same subclass of the battleship. And the battleship itself is a general concept characterizing the principal class of a warship. The ships of the Borodino series were centrally controlled from a single general ship post - there is a description. By the way, regarding "only big guns" - battleship "Yamato" 9-460mm + 12-155mm and "Tirpitz" 8-380mm + 12-150mm what's this? Battleships or dreadnoughts? You understand that this whole classification is rather far-fetched and therefore it would be most correct to simply call battleships battleships.
        
        Iraclius
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 21: 04
        
        Certainly there were some rudiments. In Russian naval terminology, the term "ship of the line" refers to either a sailing ship designed to conduct artillery combat in a wake column or the type of ship I wrote about above - an armored ship of the Dreadnought type. You will continue to argue that the Dreadnought, Yamato, Sevastopol, King George, etc. are the same type of Borodino?
        I understand that it’s unpleasant to admit my mistake, but when multi-page criticism comes to my articles from the magazine’s editorial staff, I take this with gratitude. Because it makes it possible to develop in the right direction. You have some kind of nervous and strange reaction. Excuse me.
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 21: 07
        
        "Yamato" has no more to do with "Dreadnought" than "Borodino". The same goes for the rest. They were all different types. But they were all battleships and were created to solve the same problems. Where is the mistake?
        
        pacific
        
        0
        
        1 March 2018 05: 26
        
        SW Kreng, you are defending the author in vain.
        He made more than enough fundamental mistakes. In almost every paragraph.
        By the way, to call the squadron battleship the term "battleship" is also a fundamental mistake.
        If you write about any historical period, you should use the terms of the time accepted in the historical community.
        During the REV, the term "ship of the line." In the RIF (Russian Imperial Fleet) exclusively squadron battleships were considered as such, and in the Japanese fleet both squadron battleships and armored cruisers were classified as line ships. Also, by the way, the latest.
        According to the logic of the author and yours - and Mikas, and Asam, and Kassug, and Fuso, and Nissin, and Chen Yen, etc. - these are all battleships. I hope you enjoyed my mix of EDB and BrKR? Now, submit an article about the battle of the wok with the squadron of battleships Kamimura.
        And the Varangian (armored cruiser) in Chemulpo also fought with the battleship (!) Asama.
        
        Well, such pearls as "battle at o. Tsushima" against the background of the presence of 2 Panteleymon and Prince Potemkin-Takrichesky EDBs and everything else, it’s like catching fleas on a dead dog. Andrei from Chelyabinsk is right - for each paragraph you need to write a separate article with an analysis of the "flight of the author’s creative thoughts."
        PS Japanese destroyers were based on the Tsushima Islands, therefore both Rozhestvensky and Nebogatov set the course as far as possible from these islands. The general battle at sea in the REV and in historiography is generally called the "battle / battle / in the Tsushima Strait".
        
        Egen
        
        +2
        
        16 May 2013 08: 10
        
        Quote: Pilat2009
        in Wilson's work "Battleships in battle", for example, former battleships are called "old battleships"
        
        Yes, it’s not Wilson’s work, but his translation into Russian :) Oh, Pilate, it’s better not to mention this work, right now Andrei will also remember so much about him !! :)))
        Guys, seriously, I'm sorry, but your argument IMHO is not worth wasting time ... As it is written below, really probably the current young generation perceives battleships as battleships, for them one is not far from the other, both are already history, like the times of the Horde: ) Now there are computers, other hobbies, etc., this is in Soviet times, when there was nothing like that, we simply had nothing to do :)) how not just to re-read Novikov-Priboy and Pikul, but also comparing all sorts of nuances of descriptions, delving into them and other very rare sources. This was later the "Marine Collection" - oh, just a treasure! And now - I opened it and no, I asked the word "battleship" in the search engine, received a page about "Tsarevich" in response, and there is no need to think further :))
        Unfortunately, this is the tendency for the development of society to be like this - everything is on top :(, and in some ways I understand this, because if you go into details, you will not have time to cover more and you will lag behind life :(
        As for translated texts, I still learned 20 years ago when I learned better English, I realized how poor it is in the definition of military terms, everything there is somehow described in general terms. Many times I thought about how to translate some kind of detail into Russian, and what is it about :), and then he spat, tired of racking my brains :)
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +4
        
        16 May 2013 08: 27
        
        Quote: Egen
        Oh, Pilate, it’s better not to mention this work, right now Andrei will also remember so much about him !! :)))
        
        I will not, today I am kind :))))))
        You are right that the confusion in terminology is not too important in itself, as long as it demonstrates a decent knowledge of the hardware. Well, the person called the wrong word ... If it is clear that the author is guided in the question, then ignorance of the terminology is a reason to hint as politely "Dear Author! Just do not be upset, but the description given by you:" pimpochki, bounce, pretend to be a rag and do not shine, because at this time it’s yak tudyt, yak yak yaksel moxel ruff your copper! And you run around the corner for half a liter. Because it's gone! "Is called" Windows 98 Installation Instructions "- and that's it :)))
        But when a person with the basics of materiel is unfriendly, and even confused the whole terminology - the reaction is completely different.
        
        Egen
        
        0
        
        16 May 2013 09: 28
        
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        : "You fuck with a booze on a crusher
        
        Sorry to litter, could not resist - +++ !! :)))
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        16 May 2013 10: 20
        
        Thank you, otherwise the author can essentially object to the issues raised, I was upset and actively minus me :))))
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        16 May 2013 13: 43
        
        Ask me these questions. You didn’t ask. Ask specifically - what is wrong?
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        15 May 2013 20: 40
        
        Yes Yes Yes. I understand that the author is offended and uncomfortable. But you'd better be silent, right :)
        On the merits of the questions I have raised, there will be objections, oh "expert" materiel? :)))))
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 20: 54
        
        And you have not raised any questions, except for a heap of dubious information, which in your opinion characterizes you as a professional in the field of the Navy. Naturally distorting and distorting everything that is possible. Rangefinders in casemts for the Japanese ... The lack of rangefinders and optics for ours ... Nonsense .. All these data are well known for a long time and your "new word" in the field of domestic naval technology causes only a smile.
  2. Kars
    
    +2
    
    15 May 2013 11: 24
    
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    alshe is worse. The author managed to add three armored cruisers to the list of RI ships - "Bayan", "Pallada" and "Admiral Makarov". Everything would be fine, but these cruisers are not that they were not completed - they were FOUNDED AFTER the Russian-Japanese war
    
    Of course, I also have a pretension to the author.
    But what about the Palada
    Doesn't this fit?
    http://tsushima.su/RU/shipsru/shipsrussiaru/shipsrussiabronru/shipsrussiabronbpk
    
    rru / bronbpkrpallada /
    And he is indicated in losses
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      
      +2
      
      15 May 2013 11: 31
      
      The author writes
      Pallas Armored Cruiser. New. Pacific fleet
      
      While at the Pacific Fleet we had the Pallada Armored Deck This is a completely different type of ship, which the author does not take into account at all in the table of the Russian fleet.
      If you enter that "Pallada" that fought in Port Arthur, then you need to write there "Diana" (of the same type) and "Varyag" and "Askold" and "Bogatyr" (these were also stronger) - and many many others armored cruisers. Well, 15 Japanese armored decks (I don't remember exactly how many, to count too lazy) to add to the table to the Japanese.
    2. Crang
      
      0
      
      15 May 2013 19: 53
      
      Some inaccuracies can and forgive Kars.
  3. Alex
    
    +3
    
    25 August 2013 20: 46
    
    Only Alexander III rolled over and sank
    
    As far as I remember, "Oslyabya" too.
2. Crang
  
  +1
  
  15 May 2013 19: 51
  
  What exactly did the author mess up? Squadron battleship is not a battleship? Moreover, all the battleships in 1905 were officially reclassified to battleships. The author quite logically described the linear ships and their subclasses. What's wrong? Once again I am convinced that with the match, not even - with elementary logic and flexibility of thinking you have serious problems.
  1. pacific
    
    0
    
    1 March 2018 05: 50
    
    You are right - with "flexibility of thinking"really problems. In any case, with the one that you propose and which the author demonstrates.
    Here is just one problem - the "flexibility of thinking" does not compensate for the large number of factual errors and lack of knowledge of the material the author writes about.
    It just strikes Khlestakov’s “ease of unusual thought”.
    But seriously - I am struck by a sort of amateurish self-confident impudence of the author. This site is read by many really knowledgeable people. Moreover, they know more, deeper and more accurately the author. But none of them dares more than a comment. Some, like Andrei from Chelyabinsk, write interesting and most importantly, technically competent articles.
    And what the author presented is graphomania.
    It’s even a shame - after all, with such free manipulation of facts and terms, he shows complete disrespect to his readers, i.e. to us.
Pilat2009

0

15 May 2013 11: 16

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
Further it gets worse. The author has managed to add three armored cruisers to the list of RI ships - "Bayan", "Pallada" and "Admiral Makarov"
Contradict yourself in the part of "Bayan" and "Pallas" seems to have been
1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
  
  +3
  
  15 May 2013 11: 20
  
  Try to read what I wrote again. especially this phrase
  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
  Well, at the beginning of the war, of course, these cruisers were not and could not be, there was only the very first "Bayan"
  
  Quote: Pilat2009
  and "Pallada" seemed to be already
  
  (heavy sigh) And where do you experts come from so much?
  "Pallas" was. Only it was never an armored cruiser, but an armored cruiser, such as "Diana". The author does not take into account armored cruisers in the table about the Russian fleet.
  1. Papakiko
    
    0
    
    15 May 2013 11: 28
    
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    (heavy sigh) And where do you experts come from so much?
    
    Respect categorically, for "rolling out".
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      
      +1
      
      15 May 2013 11: 32
      
      Yes, it would be for that, dear Papakiko :))))
Pilat2009

0

15 May 2013 11: 24

Quote: Papakiko
Quote: Pilat2009
The squadron was not there

eva on how!

The picture is certainly interesting, but there is no information and memories about the parking in Shanghai or at the raid))))
1. Papakiko
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 12: 52
  
  Quote: Pilat2009
  The picture is certainly interesting, but there is no information and memories about the parking in Shanghai or at the raid
  
  And in all the sources, take a closer look and find out where the Squadron replenished supplies.
Pilat2009

+1

15 May 2013 11: 42

Quote: Rainger
It turned out quite well for I. Bunich

Bunich there is generally mysticism about the Japanese gods, allegedly helping to accurately shoot
Where were ours? Sailors prayed otherwise
1. Papakiko
  
  +1
  
  15 May 2013 12: 50
  
  Quote: Pilat2009
  Where were ours? Sailors prayed otherwise
  
  And where did you get the idea that the "Greek" religion for the Slavs, planted with fire and sword !?
  Shakhnazarov in "White Tiger" not in vain raised the topic of the tank god.
  1. saturn.mmm
    
    +1
    
    15 May 2013 21: 14
    
    Quote: Papakiko
    And where did you get the idea that the "Greek" religion for the Slavs, planted with fire and sword !?
    
    I would clarify the Jewish religion planted by Greek priests, it seems to be more accurate.
Kars

+3

15 May 2013 11: 48

_______________________
Pilat2009

+1

15 May 2013 11: 51

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
And about the "rangefinder stations INSIDE the EBR" - this is generally for all times.
Conclusion - the author to learn materiel

Actually I agree that the author somewhere is not enough, somewhere he collected all versions
But the fact that there was a rangefinder in the conning tower and even Novikov-Priboy mentions firing control devices
1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
  
  +2
  
  15 May 2013 13: 03
  
  I apologize. I put it incorrectly.
  The thing is that we had the Barra rangefinders and the jet on a few ships, and on all the others there were Lyuzhol-Myakishev micrometers, which didn’t even lie close to the barre-strode (they could measure the distance to 30 kbt provided that the ship’s mast height was accurately known ) At the same time, ALL armadillos and cruisers of the Japanese fleet were equipped with rangefinders of barra and jet.
  And according to the table of the author, it turns out that we are all so cool and we have rangefinders, and even are protected, unlike the open-standing Japanese :))
  1. Iraclius
    
    +1
    
    15 May 2013 15: 00
    
    To this I add that rangefinders practically did not know how to work with Barra-Stroda rangefinders. In addition, different matelots differently determined the distance. From here, sighting became even more problematic.
    1. Iraclius
      
      0
      
      15 May 2013 18: 25
      
      On Mikaz (Sikishima and of the same type), rangefinders even stood on casemate 6 inches. I won’t speak for armored and armored deck cruisers, I don’t know.
      Given that the squadron of Rozhestvensky fired over THOUSAND large-caliber shells at the enemy - TWICE more than the Japanese, the result is simply shocking.
      This cannot be explained by anything other than the disgusting work of the MSA and the terribly low combat training of our sailors. Even the famous hit by a 12 "shell with the penetration of the armor of the main turret in Fuji cannot be explained by anything other than an accident. However, in fairness, the Japanese maneuvers were sometimes tactically illiterate.
      1. Iraclius
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 20: 13
        
        I made a reservation. I quote from the Marine Collection for 1900
        All six of the above-described battleships on 305 mm (elevation angle up to 13,5 °), 152 and 76 mm guns were equipped with optical sights supplied by Barra and Struda, range finders with a 1,2 m base, electrical synchronous systems transmission of commands (distance, type of shells, command) from the conning tower to the towers and batteries.
        
        Our battleships with optical sights were in trouble. Or will you argue with that too?
  2. Crang
    
    0
    
    15 May 2013 18: 06
    
    So they really are. What is the problem then?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      
      +1
      
      15 May 2013 18: 12
      
      Who are they? Be more specific, please
      1. Crang
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 19: 34
        
        On the Russian ships described in the table were rangefinder stations with rangefinders F2A Barra and Studda with a base of 1200mm. About the fact that the Japanese rangefinders were even in casemates - this is generally some kind of nonsense. Novikov guy re-read something ....
    2. Iraclius
      
      0
      
      15 May 2013 20: 29
      
      I just added the post of Andrew. See above.
2. Crang
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 20: 06
  
  Great description of "Eagle":
  http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%CE%F0%B8%EB_(%E1%F0%EE%ED%E5%ED%EE%F1%E5%F6)
  Everything was in the upper class.
  1. Iraclius
    
    -1
    
    15 May 2013 20: 30
    
    Have I even hinted somewhere that our ships are worse? On the contrary, I am in the position that there was no significant technical backlog.
    1. Crang
      
      -1
      
      15 May 2013 20: 56
      
      There was significant technical superiority in the field of OMS.
      1. Iraclius
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 21: 10
        
        Who? At our fleet?
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        15 May 2013 21: 15
        
        Yes - in our fleet. Once again, look at the table of comparative performance characteristics and a detailed description of the Eagle FCS. Everything is in the article.
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +2
        
        16 May 2013 07: 24
        
        Quote: Krang
        Look again at the table of comparative performance characteristics and a detailed description of the Eagle's FCS. Everything is in the article.
        
        M-dya. It’s not a shame to not know something. I am ashamed to persist in my ignorance.
        Firstly - NO SLAs were used on ships from the time of the REV. Neither Japanese nor Russian. Moreover, they CANNOT be used, and this is understandable to anyone who is even a little familiar with the basics of artillery naval affairs of those times.
        In order to illustrate the situation about the use of SLAs in the Russian fleet I use scans from Rimsky-Korsakov’s monograph “Control of artillery fire” of 1925, (see scans below)
        so if it’s short, then all of these thought-out SLAs were originally intended FOR NON-SHOT SHOT artillery for short-range combat (10 kbt).
        So, the control of our firing in the Russo-Japanese war looked like this - an officer on the OMS determines the distance / speed / course of the enemy ship and transmits this data to the commandants (in the form of these data or in the form of aiming angles). The gunners aim guns and open fire. From the moment of the opening of the fire, its adjustment is assigned to the COMMANDERS, and not to the OMS officer.
        And here is how things were in the Japanese Navy
        The fire control system was essentially quite primitive. On each of the battleships, starting with the Sikishima, there were two FA2 rangefinders of the Scottish company Barr and Strood; in 1901, they were equipped with Fuji and Yashima. After the start of the war with Russia, in February 1904, a party of new, more advanced rangefinders ONCE arrived in Japan - they were installed on the Mikas and, probably, on the other battleships. With the same base (1,37 m), the new devices had twice the accuracy - the error in determining the distance did not exceed 3%. Calculations for the installation of the sight and rear sight were carried out by an artillery officer manually, according to the tables, and then the data was transmitted to the gunners through the interphone pipes. The exchange of information between the bow and stern bridges was carried out by a messenger sailor or voice using a horn. The master and dial electromechanical dials of the same Barr & Strood company, although they were installed on all Japanese battleships, were practically not used in practice, according to the British military advisers. In general, the fire control system was not technically superior to the one that existed in the Russian Navy, but Japanese sailors, thanks to intensive training, learned how to use it to conduct effective centralized fire with a very high rate of fire.
        http://wunderwaffe.narod.ru/Magazine/MK/2004_08/06.htm
        
        The comment was deleted.
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        16 May 2013 07: 29
        
        The first scan of Korsakov
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        16 May 2013 07: 31
        
        Second scan
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +2
        
        16 May 2013 07: 35
        
        So the moral is very simple. The Eagle's FCS was NOT BETTER than on the Japanese battleships. She was DIFFICULT, and they are not the same thing. But even better trained Japanese did not use their LMS. Therefore, SUO "Borodintsev" did not give us ANY advantage.
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        16 May 2013 07: 54
        
        MSO "Eagle" was better... But the fact that they did not know how to use it - well, they themselves are to blame. Maybe it was still really difficult. The Geisler's control system on the first dreadnoughts was made easier.
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +2
        
        16 May 2013 08: 18
        
        Quote: Krang
        But the fact that they did not know how to use it - well, it’s their own fault.
        
        Yes, on the ships almost from the slipway of those who went on a hike there were so many opportunities to master complex SLAs that you are simply amazed :))))
        The Japanese, who had 150 rangefinders of barre and jet (against 13 in the Russian fleet) at the beginning of the NRW and whose armadillos (and most of the BKR) had a similar SLA (but simpler) did not master it. And on Borodintsy going on a hike - just spit ...
        in fact, this SLA, even if it had been mastered, would not give us any advantages. The MAIN thing was missing, which makes it possible to use the benefits of the OMS - volley fire. And it was possible only when organizing firing with one caliber guns of equal rate of fire
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        16 May 2013 08: 34
        
        Who told you that? The "Eagle" control system just allowed the senior artillery officer to conduct fire of all calibers at will. Both calibers operate independently and the bursts from 12 "and 6" shells are easily distinguishable. Of course, when one target is shot at all all, it is absolutely impossible to distinguish the fall of one's own shells from those of others. But absolutely everyone is powerless in this matter. Even though we, even the Japanese, even though "Peter the Great", even though "Yamato".
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        16 May 2013 10: 14
        
        Quote: Krang
        Who told you that? The Eagle's fire control system just allowed the senior artillery officer to conduct fire of all calibers at will
        
        This is called "it was smooth on paper". Because in theory, yes, it was. Well, in practice ...
        Just put yourself in the shoes of an artillery officer. How did you write
        Having data on their own speed and course, direction and strength of the wind, deviation, type of target, angle of elevation of the target and distance to it, having estimated the approximate speed and course of the target, the senior artillery officer, using the shooting tables, manually (on paper) made the necessary calculations and calculated the necessary corrections of the lead on the HV and GN. Also I chose the type of AC and the kind of shells necessary to hit this target. After that, the senior artillery officer transmitted data for guidance to the AU, from which he intended to hit the target.
        
        Well, now try to imagine how much time this process took from the artillery officer managing the shooting (let's call it the glavart) and correlate it with the rate of 6-dm artillery. Add to this the fact that CACA did not exist at that time, i.e. even after shooting at an enemy ship, each subsequent volley could not be adjusted automatically - for EVERY volley (even after the volley gives cover), FULL calculation was required.
        Add to this the fact that the glavart is simply obliged to observe the fall of its own volleys. And then - multiply all this work by 2. Because the glavart must do all the calculations SEPARATELY for the 305-mm and 152-mm guns and SEPARATELY observe the fall of their volleys.
        Remember that the rate of fire of our tower installations then left much to be desired - the equipment then did not have the necessary reliability and, due to the constant hitches / jamming, the rate of fire of the tower 6-dm was lower than the passport. Suliga writes that on an EDB like Petropavlovsk, the average rate of fire did not exceed 1 rounds / min. And realize that when salvo firing, you have to wait for the readiness of the LAST gun participating in the salvo, and only then produce the salvo. Note that the glavart still has to get information about the readiness of the guns for shooting and give an order to open fire.
        And when you take all this into account, you will probably understand why the attempt to fire multiple salvos and corrected by the glavart even with the help of well-trained Japanese commandants only succeeded in giving rare salvos SIMULTANEOUSLY from the 6-dm and 12-dm guns. Those. the advantage of the high rate of fire of the 6-dm, which was then considered almost the main weapon of the ship, was completely depreciated. And faster - did not work.
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +2
        
        16 May 2013 10: 14
        
        That is why I wrote about the impossibility of volley fire.
        But now think for yourself - will a rare-rare volley fire under the control of a fire control system be more effective than an individual sighting according to the initial data from the glavart?
        It will not.
        The Japanese also understood this, and that is why they "hammered" on the OMS-management. They used the LMS only until the target was covered, after which they switched to rapid fire at the discretion of the gunners.
        The advantages of the LMS were realized to a certain extent with the advent of dreadnoughts - when it became possible to fire four-five-gun salvoes every 30-40 seconds and when the chief art officer no longer needed to calculate data for two calibers. But the MSA "started playing" seriously only after the DACs appeared, which AUTOMATICALLY calculated the data for firing when entering the initial parameters, thereby freeing the head artist to assess the MOST IMPORTANT question for firing accuracy - how much the data about the enemy correspond to reality.
        PS By the way, I completely forgot - in those cases when the Russian EDB fired at a long range, the shooting was carried out according to the LMS from ONE sighting tower or even a gun.
        
        Crang
        
        +1
        
        16 May 2013 13: 51
        
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Well, now try to imagine how much time this process took from the artillery officer managing the shooting (let's call it the glavart) and correlate it with the rate of 6-dm artillery.
        
        A little if the chief artist would normally have mastered his specialty. What was the whole calculation? He did not consider any complex logarithms and integrals. And he simply took in his hands a ballistic firing table and used it to find out the required HV angles for certain weapons, depending on the range to the target (by this time it had already been entered into the FCS and he saw it on the device). He estimated the speed of the target and the wind roughly by eye. By this time, all the gun mounts involved were already looking where VCN was looking. For the entire "calculation" no more than 2-3 minutes. This is maximum. Further, fire was opened as written in the description. Volleys, half-volleys - whatever. Usually 6 "first, and if the target was covered, 12" artillery came into play. There was nothing very abstruse in such an MSA, and during the 6 months that the newest "Borodintsy" were sailing it was quite possible to master it. There would be a desire. But our officers did not want to waste precious time on "playing the war" - it is better to go out and sit in the wardroom. Or walk along the bridge. And miracles do not happen. Without people, even Yamato is just a piece of iron.
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        17 May 2013 07: 36
        
        Quote: Krang
        There was nothing much abstruse in such a SLA
        
        If I understand correctly, you propose using the SLA almost like the Japanese fleet (i.e., only for the initial aiming) only carry out the sighting from 6-dm. With this use, it does not surpass the Japanese.
        What is incomprehensible to me - because after all, ours fought like that. What is the claim? That fell a little?
        So in order to fall a lot, we needed shooting scientists. MSA is not such a thing that it can be studied theoretically - only practice.
        In any case, there are such nuances that you won’t understand until you try. For example, the same rangefinders of the barra jet correctly gave distance only when the range finder had absolutely equal vision with both eyes. And until you shoot a certain number of shells, you won’t understand the nuances. But shooting at 2TOE was bad, but I would not blame the glavartam
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        17 May 2013 09: 33
        
        Why only for initial guidance? Our LMS gave an advantage in the speed of transferring the AU to another target - once. Could "lead" from the command post at the same time two targets (one from each side) - two. And the third adjustment of fire is also much easier. You still haven't bothered to carefully read the description of the Eagle's control system and grasp its essence? Data on atmospheric conditions are displayed on Glavart's instruments. The range to the target after it is measured is automatically entered into the LMS and everyone can see it: the head art and the commanders of the AU. The same is with the bearing. In this case, it was much easier and sped up fire control. And compare with what the Japanese had. They did not "fight like this" They had it like this: They measure the range to the target - the range finder reports it with a voice. Then a frisky young sailor, like a twisted ram, rushes around the ship and yells at all this range. The same goes for indicating the goal. They did not have a centralized control of the ship's fire as such, although there were some devices for this purpose. And who made the calculations is not clear at all. Maybe the chief artist, or maybe the commanders of the AU and batteries. For the Japs it was easier at that moment but it does not mean What was it correctly. You so admire the stupid art of massive fire? Tell me the facts - Where and When was this method of shooting at enemy warships still used? Where and when?
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        17 May 2013 13: 18
        
        Quote: Krang
        Our LMS gave an advantage in the speed of transferring the AU to another target - once.
        
        Suppose, but this is not an advantage that could allow us to win. In essence - it would not play any role
        Quote: Krang
        Could "lead" from the command post two targets at the same time (one from each side) - two.
        
        And how would this help us in Tsushima?
        Quote: Krang
        In this case, fire control was much simplified and accelerated.
        
        In the BEST case, what we could count on, having perfectly studied the FCS "Borodino" - for a slightly better zeroing speed. Interestingly, she was not very good anyway. But the best speed of zeroing does not give victory at all - in a naval battle it is not so much how quickly you aim, but how long you will be able to "keep" the enemy ship out of the covers. And here the "Borodinets" control system is useless - because when the enemy ship is covered, the chief art officer simply does not have time to count each salvo (those same "2-3 minutes")
        I will try to explain again. How did the LMS of the Second World War work? Having determined the bearing and distance (and even a bunch of different parameters) from a rangefinder post / sights and so on, these data were entered into the CAC - in fact, an analog computer that automatically calculated data for aiming guns. As a result, the glavart didn’t need to count anything at all, the glavart’s task was to ensure that, observing the fall of volleys, to determine what the OMS was wrong and what initial data were incorrect. And after covering the target, the CAC accompanied the target automatically (until the course / speed of the target or arrow ship changed)
        Thus, after the goal was achieved, NO participation of the glavart in determining the guidance parameters of the guns was required at all.
        Therefore, the shooting looked like this - at first there was a gunfire, and when the enemy was covered, the artillery switched to a quick fire - in order to release maximum metal for the time until the enemy maneuvers and does not hit the tip.
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        17 May 2013 13: 18
        
        So your question
        Quote: Krang
        You so admire the stupid art of massive fire? Tell me the facts - Where and When was this method of shooting at enemy warships still used? Where and when?
        
        The answer will be - "Everywhere and always" :)))
        The fundamental difference between the MSA of the Second World War and the Japanese way of firing is the one and only - where the modern MSA after the cover uses the CAC to determine the parameters of the gun refueling, the Japanese used gunner gunners. The gunners themselves, individually and by eye, determined the correction after covering.
        But the SAME would have been on the Russian battleships. Because despite all the advantages of the FCS "Borodino" CACs they did not have, which means that after the cover, a person would still have to carry out the additional flooding. Moreover, an attempt to impose this honorable duty on the head art is doomed to failure - he considers too long. If we are going to fire one volley every three minutes after covering, it is easier to flood ourselves. The gunner-gunner, adjusting the sight, was no longer guided by the numbers of the distance-bearing, but by seeing where his projectile falls (in the optics and at short distances, you can track the hit of your own projectile in a salvo - at a distance of 10 kbt this can be done without optics, well and for 30 kbt and further optics to help)
        Therefore, in the REV after the enemy ship is covered, it is simply impossible for the OMS to control the fire, a person must do this. And in the training of people, the Japanese excelled us.
        Therefore, I say that having mastered the SLA, we would not have gained anything - there wasn’t any ability to adjust the fire after cover, and there is no SLA here
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        17 May 2013 16: 02
        
        Alas - you do not understand the essence. The very principle of the LMS. That's why we lost. Because even the gunner's "keen eye" will not be able to determine the fall of "his" shell from dozens of others from other ships. the principle of "massive fire" is dull as an oak. It is in the article. Here again:
        Its essence is that without any use of the MSA (only once having measured the distance) they begin to shoot extremely actively with medium and small caliber artillery. After that, they are waiting for the target to be covered. All adjustment of fire is carried out not by changing the input data and adjusting the fire of the guns themselves, but by directly changing the position of the group of ships (closer to the target). Despite the huge consumption of medium-caliber shells, such tactics at that time bore fruit.
        That's all. Purely the fact that the Japanese did not have on their ships normal SLAs and did not know use them.
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        17 May 2013 15: 57
        
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Suppose, but this is not an advantage that could allow us to win. In essence - it would not play any role
        
        Didn't play, why? What are you arguing with me about? Should have played, but "why" did not play? Why? The article says that due to the human factor - in other words, untrained NUDs. Not this way?
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And how would this help us in Tsushima?
        
        Nothing! Again, what do you want to prove? It should have technically helped, but it did not help. Why? The article says that due to lack of education. Not this way?
        
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In the BEST case, what we could count on, having perfectly studied the FCS "Borodino" - for a slightly better zeroing speed. Interestingly, she was not very good anyway. But the best speed of zeroing does not give victory at all - in a naval battle it is not so much how quickly you aim, but how long you will be able to "keep" the enemy ship out of the covers. And here the "Borodinets" control system is useless - because when the enemy ship is covered, the chief art officer simply does not have time to count each salvo (those same "2-3 minutes")
        
        Apparently you, again, have not fully studied the Borodintsev FCS. The DS measured the distance every 3-5 seconds and the measured range was immediately entered into the OMS automatically. Based on this, timely settlement. Voice transmission means that the data will arrive late and their value will already be in question.
        
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I will try to explain again. How did the LMS of the Second World War work? Having determined the bearing and distance (and even a bunch of different parameters) from a rangefinder post / sights and so on, these data were entered into the CAC - in fact, an analog computer that automatically calculated data for aiming guns. As a result, the glavart didn’t need to count anything at all, the glavart’s task was to ensure that, observing the fall of volleys, to determine what the OMS was wrong and what initial data were incorrect. And after the target was set, the CAC accompanied the target automatically (until the course / speed of the target or the gunship changed) Thus, after the target was covered, NO participation of the glavart in determining the parameters of the gun guidance was required at all.
        
        Do you know what your trouble is? You don't know how think... You are stupidly like a parrot memorized all this data from the books of Shirokorad / Melnikov / Suliga, etc. Moreover, any deviation from these "rails" is unacceptable for you. Well, if I called the battleship a battleship, and the "self-propelled mine" a torpedo, and at the same time had the audacity not to add "b" at the end and this immediately put you into a stupor, then what to talk about? The Orel's FCS was actually the forerunner of the ship's FCS with central aiming during WW2 with the only difference that there was no CAS in it and the chief chief had to keep in his hands a firing table all the time where the angle was given relative to each number of meters of distance. And after that, to enter the angle into the transmitting devices of the OMS - is that SO difficult? Andrey - if you are a modern person cannot understand the principle of work in general, then a simple control system "Borodintsev", then I understand why we lost the battle!
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        17 May 2013 21: 11
        
        To start, I will answer the last
        Quote: Krang
        Do you know what your trouble is? You do not know how to think. You stupidly like a parrot memorized all this data
        
        I could, of course, answer with a pair of affectionate ones, but I won’t. How will I differ from you in this case? (well, except for knowledge, of course :)))
        I will answer essentially
        Quote: Krang
        The Orel's FCS was actually the forerunner of the ship's FCS with central aiming during WW2 with the only difference that there was no CAS in it and the chief chief had to keep in his hands a firing table all the time where the angle was given relative to each number of meters of distance.
        
        In order to understand how much you miss in your judgment, you need a little To think, but at the same time we recall the course of geometry for the 6-oh approximately class.
        Let's start from the moment the distance meter measures the distance. Measured. Say - 30 kbt. What's next? The distance - is, the bearing - is, the firing table (i.e. the indication of the vertical angle depending on the distance) is. Urya? Can I shoot? I see, you think so ...
        Quote: Krang
        And after that, introducing an angle into the MSA transmitting devices - is that SO complicated?
        
        Yes, Gregory, this is SO complicated. If it was SO SIMPLE, and for aiming the gun, all that was needed was to look at the data of the rangefinder and, having checked the table, set the scope - so then it would not make sense to prepare gunners AT ALL - a six-year-old child would cope with such a task. No one would be tormented and create automatic machines for generating the current (smoothed) distance and, subsequently, CACs. Why, if you just look at the table? :)
        If the ships stood, nailed to the sea with screws, maybe it would be so. But the thing is that the enemy ship is moving, and usually not on the same course as ours, and the speeds usually do not coincide. In other words, the ships are CONSTANTLY SHIFTING relative to each other. Let's estimate the minimum time from the moment of measuring the distance to the moment of the shot and the fall of the shells from the "Borodino"
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        17 May 2013 21: 13
        
        1) the range finder will measure the distance (this is 5 seconds, about measurements every 3-5 seconds, he probably confuses the flowers, usually measurements were taken every 30-40 seconds. But for the calculation I take 5 seconds, I'm good today :))) Let the range data fall before the eyes of the glavart, 5 seconds after the measurement. Total + 5 from the moment of measurement.
        2) Glavart sees the distance data, looks at the shooting tables. Data on the angle of the vertical aiming — yes, corrections for the longitudinal and transverse winds — also, whether the correction for atm was taken. pressure and air temperature in those years, I don’t know, we will consider that not. Glavart quickly calculates the HV angle and enters it into the MSA transmitting devices. 30 seconds for everything about everything we give him? Total + 35 seconds from the moment of measurement.
        3) On the guns are super-trained super-fighters. As soon as the data about the sight arrived, they immediately set the required sight and report to the glavart about the readiness of the gun - in just 15 seconds. Total - + 50 seconds from the moment of distance measurement
        4) Glavart, in full accordance with your Wikipedia quotes
        After performing this operation, the senior artillery officer in the conning tower, at the moment when the inclinometer showed “0”, set the grip of the device-indicator of firing into the sector corresponding to the selected fire mode “Fraction”, “Attack” or “Short alarm” in accordance with which AU opened fire.
        
        - give for this operation another 5 seconds total + 55 seconds.
        5) And a shot struck! But the projectile at 30 KBT flies for about 5 seconds. And everything comes out from the moment the distance to the projectile begins to be measured - MINUTE.
        This, I repeat, I am generous. According to your description, the commandos were loading the gun AFTER they received the sight of the sight from the head, but not before. And in general, to deal with such a chain of actions in a minute UNREAL. But today I am kind.
        So, the skills acquired in the second class would allow you to calculate that in a specified time the enemy ship following on 14 nodes will LEAVE from the point at which it was at a distance of 14 knots * 1852 m / 60 min = 432 meters.
        In other words, from the moment of measuring the range and until the fall of our shell, the enemy ship will be HALF a meter away from the point at which we were aiming.
        That's why the glavart cannot shoot where the enemy ship is located according to observation. Glavart should shoot where this ship WILL be, provided the course and speed are unchanged. AT THE MOMENT of projectile fall, after a time between distance measurement and projectile fall.
        And in order to calculate the FORWARD, no tables will be enough. Because you need:
        a) Get data (distance and bearing)
        b) Based on point (a), knowledge of the enemy’s own speed and course, and the ADVISED course and speed of the enemy, calculate his position in space relative to the ship at the time of the salvo (i.e. calculate the FUTURE distance and bearing at the moment when our ship can shoot)
        c) Add an amendment to the projectile flight time
        d) Take, finally, the table, and determine from them the pickup angles AU.
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        17 May 2013 21: 13
        
        Glavart knows his course and speed for sure. But the course and speed of an enemy ship can be estimated only by eye.
        In order to calculate all this, the glavart must solve a generally simple, but quite a geometric problem similar to the calculation of the torpedo triangle of a submarine. Displacement angle, sines, cosines ...
        At the same time, the glavart cannot, without straightening his head, hold onto the slide rule. He needs to see the FALLING of his shells, because ONLY THEY can tell him how much and what he was wrong in, estimating the course and speed of the enemy ship.
        In other words, in addition to solving geometric problems, the chief artist had to estimate the distance of the volleys falling to the target and make (on a piece of paper) correction calculations for the problem he was solving. "If I calculated that there would be a cover and the volley went down 300 m in the bow and 150 m short, then ..." it is necessary to recalculate the value of the ERROR and reverse count to correct for the enemy's course / speed parameters ...
        And all this is at the same time. And all this is for two calibers.
        That is why the Glavart, without having a CAC, could not use the advantages of a centralized LMS.
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        17 May 2013 21: 34
        
        Andrey will answer at once to three of your posts. The "Borodintsy" in 1905 did not have TsAS and to accuse them of this is simply idiocy! They had what they had - a description of their LMS is in the article. She was much better than the Japanese one, since all the data for the preparation of firing was displayed on devices and some of them were automatic. What else does? It was so cool at the time! And here you started some kind of controversy - the Borodintsev control system was no better than in WW2, but it was more effective than other ships of that time. Satisfied? And the fact that they did not know how to use it was that it was necessary to teach, and not to rest.
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        19 May 2013 10: 24
        
        Quote: Krang
        In 1905 "Borodintsy" did not have TsAS and to blame them for this is simply idiocy!
        
        I do not blame "Borodintsev" for the absence of CAC. I accuse you of a superficial approach to business.
        There was no "wunderwaffe" in the form of an MSA on the "Borodintsy". Yes, it was better in a number of parameters than that of the Japanese, but mastering it could not change the result of Tsushima in any way - simply because, although our MSA was better, it didn’t provide effective fire, reducing the role of gunners with guns to setting the sight. could.
        Therefore, the reason for the small number of hits in Japanese ships is the preparation of gunners
        1) They were trained to fire extremely short distances
        2) The preparation was overly "economical" - it was necessary to shoot more often.
        Moreover, one follows from the other - in order to effectively hit the target at 10-15 KBt, the shell consumption required by the rules was more or less sufficient. It was harder to shoot at long distances, it was better to cook.
        In principle, the same applies to artillery officers.
        As for the possibilities to prepare artillerymen on the campaign, the blame for this lies entirely on Rozhdestvensky. He had information about battles with the Japanese fleet and could very well have driven the commandants.
        The main argument - the lack of shells at 2TOE - can still not be accepted as a mitigating circumstance. Yes, 2TOE could count only on what lay in its cellars, but there were not so few.
        But this was decided by the admiral, not the glavart
        And there is another point of view that can strongly refute the usual opinion that the 2TOE commandos were complete stupid. Now a group of enthusiasts are digging Japanese archives, studying the reports of Japanese commanders and shipyards ... and according to their preliminary data, 2TOE fired BETTER than 1TOE. What, why and how - I’m not ready to answer, they have not yet posted their research.
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        19 May 2013 17: 50
        
        Exactly! AND exactly and written in this article. What are you arguing with? About what? Where did the author make a mistake? Or do you just want to show that you are so smart? Insufficient combat training yes - in the article a lot of attention is paid to this.
        
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        
        +1
        
        20 May 2013 10: 07
        
        The Japanese regularly conducted exercises and trained in shooting. Since the new fire control devices were then too complicated for ordinary sailors to understand their action (and even more so integrate them into a system), even the most ideal, but the most effective fire control and firing methods from the point of view of those specific conditions were developed. firing. One of them is the so-called. "The art of massive fire." Its essence is that without any use of the MSA (only once having measured the distance) they begin to shoot extremely actively with medium and small caliber artillery. After that, they are waiting for the target to be covered. All adjustment of fire is carried out not by changing the input data and adjusting the fire of the guns themselves, but by directly changing the position of the group of ships (closer to the target). Despite the huge consumption of medium-caliber shells, such tactics at that time bore fruit. Moreover, the Japanese goals (that is, our ships) contributed to its success as well as possible. At the same time, this method of "massive fire" was never used by anyone again. Perhaps due to the fact that the enemies were not so stupid. As for our gunners, they worked according to the instructions. And they tried to master the work of the OMS. It turned out far from everyone. While the lower ranks of artillery still managed to master their subject, from the higher ranks almost no effort was made. As for the firing range, the command of the 1-th Pacific Squadron, although belatedly, realized the role of new, powerful and long-range guns, as well as modern SLAs. And the beginning seemed to develop measures appropriate to the current situation. But time was already hopelessly lost. The command of the 2 Pacific Squadron was still happily unaware of the combat capabilities of enemy and own ships. All those criminally rare training shootings were conducted at a distance no further than 20kbt. Thus, the gunners of the 2 Pacific Squadron entered the battle with the Japanese, having no long-range shooting practice at all. An exception is the 3-th Pacific Squadron of Admiral N.I. Nebogatov (joined the 2-th Pacific Squadron). Admiral Nebogatov proved himself to be a good specialist in artillery. He trained his gunners well at firing from the most extreme distances possible.
        
        With the exception of
        The Japanese regularly conducted exercises and trained in shooting.
        
        Not a single true statement.
        Quote: Krang
        Exactly! And that's exactly what is written in this article. What are you arguing with? About what?
        
        You see, if you simply wrote: "The personnel of 2TOE was poorly prepared and this is one of the main reasons for the loss of the Tsushima battle" - then I would not argue with you. But you don't write like that. You are trying to ANALYZE - what was the poor preparation of the Russians and the good - of the Japanese. And, forgive a thousand times, but you get this analysis out of hand. More precisely, it doesn't work at all. Because you do not care about the little things, because you DO NOT WISH to delve into the subject that you are analyzing. As a result, your explanations are absolutely fantastic and have nothing to do with reality.
        Why are you even giving them?
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        20 May 2013 12: 55
        
        Probably because my analysis in general terms corresponds to the real state of affairs. And what do you think is "to delve into the subject." Multi-page dessert on this issue does not apply to the format of this article. So it's okay.
        
        Crang
        
        0
        
        16 May 2013 07: 53
        
        I know how the fire control at Borodino looked technically. And I know his LMS. But on the Japanese, everything looked as you said - really.
Makarov

+1

15 May 2013 12: 31

can be briefly and a quote from the movie: "Tsushima fucked up?" ....
Pablo_K

+1

15 May 2013 13: 11

Well, there is nothing new in the article.
But questions on that war still remain.
1) Why didn’t the armadillos of the 1 squadron sink?
2) It was possible to buy Kasugu and Nanshin, if only so that the enemy would not buy them, why didn’t they?
3) Why did 2 squadrons melt in Madagascar for 2 months, probably to give the Japanese time to repair and modernize their fleet?
1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
  
  +1
  
  15 May 2013 13: 31
  
  Quote: Pablo_K
  1) Why didn’t the armadillos of the 1 squadron sink?
  
  Because they did not receive the number of hits that raked the EDB of the second squadron.
  In the battle with the Shantung, Peresvet received the maximum hits - 35. The rest got from 4 to 27 hits. Well, in Tsushima one Eagle grabbed at least 55-76 hits, and how many were on “Suvorov” “Alexander” and “Borodino” can only be guessed at, but obviously more. "Oslyaba" was simply not lucky.
  Quote: Pablo_K
  There was an opportunity to buy Kasugu and Nanshin, if only so that the enemy would not buy them, why didn’t they?
  
  The fact is that in Russia they could not know whether the war would begin or not? And to acquire these ships would make sense only if we knew for sure that the war would begin just about
  In fact, the question came down to the usual “guessing game”: will the war begin soon or not? The Naval Ministry nevertheless hoped that once again it would be enough to demonstrate the power of Russia in the Far East, and the fighting itself could be avoided. In this case, when buying two Garibaldi, the Russian fleet acquired two very alien combat units and a bunch of problems. GMSH and MTK were very sensitive to such characteristics of combat ships as their compliance with naval doctrine and the presence of Russian artillery on them. The Italian "Argentines" did not satisfy either one or the other requirement. Although they had twice the weight of the airborne salvo in comparison with the Bayan, which was considered the most successful armored cruiser, they were clearly inferior to it in terms of seaworthiness, autonomy and range - the main parameters that Russian cruisers should have had. With their inclusion in the composition of the active forces, the domestic fleet would be “enriched” at once with three new types of guns, besides the production of Britain, that is, a potential enemy. The “novices” would not have looked as part of the linear forces, since Russia did not foresee the development of second-class armadillos. So, if the war hadn’t flared up immediately, we would have had to deal with costly re-equipment and re-equipment of not quite modern and tactically unsuitable ships.
  http://wunderwaffe.narod.ru/Magazine/MK/1995_03/03.htm
  Then, when it became clear that the Japanese were buying the cruiser (which no one expected from Japan) they tried their best to prevent it - but you couldn’t argue against the ally of Japan - Great Britain ...
  Quote: Pablo_K
  Why did the 2 squadron of the 2 month melt in Madagascar, probably in order to give the Japanese time to repair and modernize their fleet?
  
  Apparently Rozhestvensky was trying to return the 2TOE back. If I have not confused anything, then the fact is that in Madagascar Rozhestvensky learns about the death of ITOE and the fall of Arthur. now he can rely only on himself ... It seems that his famous radiogram "with the available forces I can not hope to take possession of the sea" was sent from Madagascar.
Crang

0

15 May 2013 13: 33

The article is excellent. But she published ... Whoever needs it - I will send the original.
shurup

+1

15 May 2013 13: 45

Funny fiction. I will print it and I will read it before going to bed.
And a lot of numbers - well put to sleep. It was necessary to add steam pressure and the weakness of Japanese stokers.
Pilat2009

+1

15 May 2013 14: 15

Quote: Makarov
can be briefly and a quote from the movie: "Tsushima fucked up?" ....

No, for it was impossible to win
Arct

+1

15 May 2013 14: 24

The article is crazy. Plus, the author can only be awarded for diligence. Attempts to create an "alternative" history after projecting and submitting the article as scientific and statistical, well, this does not go into any gate at all. The main bloopers were painted by Andrey. From myself I will add:
What are destroyers and destroyers for a specified period of time? Maybe it's better to use historical classification?
Armored cruisers were also 3rd rank.
Well, attempts to manipulate bare statistics, not taking into account real operating conditions, do not stand up to criticism at all.
P.S. To draw conclusions about the current state of technology of the armed forces, comparing it with the history of a century ago, is how to compare the wars of Macedon and Suvorov. It seems to be something in common, that's just incomparable.
1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
  
  +2
  
  15 May 2013 14: 47
  
  Quote: Arkt
  The main mistakes were painted by Andrew.
  
  Yes, in general, I have not even started yet :))))))
avt

0

15 May 2013 14: 55

Quote: Pilat2009
Contradict yourself in the part of "Bayan" and "Pallas" seems to have been

Inattentively read the comment. Three armored deck goddesses of domestic production took part in the war - Aurora, Pallas, Diana. Aurora and Diana remained in the ranks, and then, according to the project of Boyan, they pondered another new Pallas.
Pilat2009

0

15 May 2013 15: 04

Quote: Iraclius
at the armadillo, the coamings of the hatch were torn apart and the ladder step was shot down

And the roofing felts from Novikov, the roofing felts at Pikul, the Japanese hammered holes with pieces of wood and covered them with paint
1. Iraclius
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 15: 07
  
  Not the point. They could not disguise destroyed artillery or downed armor plates. We conclude.
  If the same Mikaza was barely alive after the battle in the Yellow Sea, then there is nothing to say about Tsushima - there was no combat training.
  1. Pilat2009
    
    0
    
    16 May 2013 22: 32
    
    http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=7620
    Here is an interesting photo of Nissin
2. avt
  
  +1
  
  15 May 2013 15: 16
  
  Quote: Pilat2009
  And the roofing felts from Novikov, the roofing felts at Pikul, the Japanese hammered holes with pieces of wood and covered them with paint
  
  At Pikul's, but it's better to read more serious literature. He was never interested in details, let alone historical facts. Itself with pleasure I read both "Cruisers" and "Moonzund", but this is a fantasy on the theme of historical events.
  1. Alex
    
    +2
    
    25 August 2013 21: 51
    
    Pikul himself said, not without irony: "People like my novels so much, because they don't know history well." Although the strength of the syllable and the imagery of the narrative cannot be denied. Tallant, however ...
bbss

+1

15 May 2013 15: 12

I read indignantly. The article is similar to a lecture from a pet teacher. It was possible to compile the material on the basis of a HUGE number of scientific monographs, but why delirious conclusions ...
Drosselmeyer

+1

15 May 2013 15: 43

There was obviously an adventurous idea of a long-distance transition by the national squadron from the Baltic and the Black Sea to Vladivostok. Moreover, the first Pacific squadron, frankly, lost a penny, although only its strength would be enough to compete at sea with the Japanese.
Regrettably, the army of the Russian Empire began to decay even before the Crimean War. And this rottenness, mainly in the high command, stretched to World War I, where the army disintegrated ingloriously.
It seemed that Sevastopol was lost and the Black Sea Fleet was flooded without any battle. Fifty years have passed and no one has learned any lessons. Again the heroic defense of Port Arthur, the death of the only sane commander Kondratenko, and the inglorious surrender of the fortress with the same meaningless death of the First Squadron.
1. yurta2013
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 18: 35
  
  It is impossible to compare the results of the actions of our fleet in the Crimean War and in the Russo-Japanese. In the first of these, the fleet was perfectly prepared, which was proved by the Sinop battle. The ships were sunk due to the absolute superiority of the enemy at sea and to save Sevastopol. The reason for the poor preparation of our fleet in the Russo-Japanese War, in my opinion, is the general technical lag of Russia from the advanced powers in this regard (England, Germany). As a result, there were not enough specialists in the Navy who could master the latest technical (and not only technical) achievements in the naval affairs of that time. The Japanese, in everything, tried to imitate the British at sea, and the Germans on land. The second main reason is the lack of combat experience in the entire personnel of our fleet (and the Russian steam fleet did not have it at all). By that time, the Japanese had already received it, even against the weak Chinese fleet.
  1. Iraclius
    
    -1
    
    15 May 2013 18: 41
    
    Everything was turned upside down. The Crimean War, the first battle of which was Sinop, was lost just because of the dense backlog in armament and no less dense logistics.
    Russian-Japanese because of the low connectivity of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the illiteracy of the top military leadership and poor combat training of the army and navy.
    If there was any serious technical lag, then such a deplorable result for Togo in the Yellow Sea would not exist.
    1. yurta2013
      
      0
      
      16 May 2013 11: 54
      
      Quote: Iraclius
      The Crimean War, the first battle of which was Sinop, was lost just because of the dense backlog in armament and no less dense logistics. Russian-Japanese due to the low connectivity of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the illiteracy of senior management and the poor preparation of the army and navy
      
      Did I mention anything about weapons? I spoke specifically about military training. In the Crimean War, it fully corresponded to the weapons that we had then. Sailors and officers knew their job well, as Sinop showed, and then the defense of Sevastopol. On the other hand, it was the insufficient training of both sailors and officers (including the oldest) in mastering the latest equipment and weapons that the Russian fleet had in the Russo-Japanese war, became one of the main reasons for its defeat.
  2. Drosselmeyer
    
    0
    
    15 May 2013 19: 02
    
    Yes, with equipment just in Russian-Japanese everything was in order. The ships were excellent, otherwise they could not make such a phenomenal (at that time) transition from the Baltic to the Pacific Fleet in duration.
    1. yurta2013
      
      0
      
      16 May 2013 11: 42
      
      I am not talking about the technology of the Russian army and navy, but about the level of technical development of the country. This level certainly lagged far behind the advanced in this respect, England and Germany. Hence the lack of a sufficient number of qualified specialists. This problem is actually chronic for our country throughout almost its entire history.
Alexan

+1

15 May 2013 16: 59

After Ushakov's glorious victories for the Russian fleet, luck smiled only at the submariners ("Crab" laid mines for "Goeben", Lunev, Marinesko, etc.) How sad it is to hear, but this is a fact. Talented naval commanders have always suffered from the rulers and the incompetent general staff (Makarov, Kuznetsov, Gorshkov)
1. Drosselmeyer
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 18: 05
  
  Uh, it’s you, my friend, that somehow you forgot the Sinop battle and Pavel Stepanovich Nakhimov.
  1. Alexan
    
    +1
    
    15 May 2013 19: 11
    
    I do not argue - the battle with the Turks was glorious. but Nakhimov after flooded the fleet. I know everything and I understand hopelessness, causes and effects. I am talking only about naval battles.
    1. Alex
      
      +2
      
      25 August 2013 22: 05
      
      but Nakhimov after flooded the fleet
      
      Sounds like the verdict of the Special Meeting. Or do you think that Nakhimov just had to withdraw the fleet into the sea and die heroically? Yes, they would send some ships to the bottom, but they themselves would certainly perish. And so their powerful artillery became the basis of the defense of Sevastopol (I won’t say anything about the underwater screen, its effectiveness remained outside the brackets).
      But the most interesting thing is that the fate of the wooden handsome sailboats was a foregone conclusion: it was time for armor and steam. Or put warships for firewood more heroically?
Pilat2009

0

15 May 2013 19: 25

Quote: Tlauicol
in 15 minutes with a 15-node move you can go 7km - this is a boarding,

This is if Togo will indifferently smoke bamboo, and given the good rebuilding of the Japanese fleet, this is concentrated fire on five of our ships from all over
Although, in principle, this happened after the perestroika, so our all the time they tried to collapse. Yes, any midshipman knows
By the way, Wittgeft was better in this regard, although also without initiative
1. tlauicol
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 20: 15
  
  concentrated fire from a pivot point? will not work out. In the 1st squad, the Japanese had 4br and 2br.kr. - at the moment of turning 1-3 ships against 5 of ours would fire. The 2nd Japanese detachment was on the right.
  what remained of Togo if R had decided on such an attack? just smoke bamboo. Once again, turn left to collide with the cruisers. to the right - I would get closer to the Russians even faster. To stop and turn on the police turn or abruptly turn back - it’s unlikely that the armadillo would finish the maneuver. If you give the most complete, the first three fastest the battleship could break through, but Asahi with the cruisers would fall into binding. the order between 1m and 2m our units
  1. Pilat2009
    
    0
    
    15 May 2013 20: 39
    
    Well let's debate
    Togo originally walked. Crossing our course from right to left, the distance was great for firing, he did not calculate. if he continued to move, he would have slipped either at the counter-courses for a short time and again to catch up. Is this clear?
    Further, we also walked in two columns with 12 sort of nodes and just started pushing the latest battleships — and then they walked in the column and Oslyabya stopped at all. Until you figure it out, raise the signal, figure it out again what the commander wants to do and start to execute ... time that’s coming. Yes, and the admirals were taught to fight in the wake ... And at that time Mikasa would already start shooting and pass the data to the next ships ... And the second detachment could well continue moving as in the second phase of the battle and wet it from the side. This is my view of the amateur -Let our gurus explain if
    1. Pilat2009
      
      0
      
      15 May 2013 22: 08
      
      Well, if you try, it might be an option to turn left-on the counter course and wet one by one by passing by, but alas, we will not know
      1. Egen
        
        +1
        
        16 May 2013 08: 42
        
        Quote: Pilat2009
        option to turn left-on the counter-course and wet one by one
        
        How alternately, "stick over T" it was already then a classic in mind :)
        A couple of the first links that showed that you could do without wasting time writing and discussing this article: :))
        http://tsushima.su/RU/libru/i/Page_7/page_18/page_19/Page_32/chistyakov-tsushima
        /
        http://keu-ocr.narod.ru/Legenda/index.html
        For our IMHO, it was any losing position, the only option could be "all of a sudden" at 32 rumba with the subsequent divergence of the columns, Togo if it line up in pursuit of the wake, and then if we are lucky we will have time to insert a "stick" anyway it's all fantastic ...
        
        tlauicol
        
        0
        
        16 May 2013 10: 16
        
        32 rumba full circle
        
        Egen
        
        0
        
        16 May 2013 10: 32
        
        Quote: Tlauicol
        32 rumba full circle
        
        thanks I know :)
        
        tlauicol
        
        0
        
        16 May 2013 11: 26
        
        those. Do you actually offer the entire squadron to stop under enemy fire, practically not responding to it? and then start over
        
        Egen
        
        0
        
        16 May 2013 13: 16
        
        Quote: Tlauicol
        the entire squadron to stop under enemy fire, practically not responding to it? and then start over
        
        why stop, on the contrary, t. retreat to more advantageous positions :) Seriously, if, you see, in any case, answer - do not answer the point at a given position, no, the only way out is to change the balance of forces in battle (that is, the proportion of the number of weapons used by the sides), but how to do it? Any layouts that I studied rest against either the narrowness of the strait or the speed. The position is initially unfavorable, but how to transform it into a profitable one ... well, I have not yet seen absolute solutions. It is clear that the complicated maneuver "all of a sudden" at 32 was simply not feasible for the squadron, but due to the surprise for the enemy, there might be chances to interrupt its course ... Although with Togo's maneuvers on the spot it was not clear for a long time how then it was too late, it is now easy for us to argue "looking from above", but there they probably thought their formations were correct in place because of the "fog of war" ... well, why, I'm not a naval commander, but an amateur, this is, I say so fantastic ...
        
        Alex
        
        +2
        
        25 August 2013 22: 12
        
        Any layouts that I studied rest against the narrowness of the strait
        
        Strange, but Togo, this very narrow strait did not interfere with maneuvering over a large area.
        
        Pilat2009
        
        0
        
        16 May 2013 18: 23
        
        The first link is quite interesting, it presents Rozhdestvensky as a brilliant tactician. And indeed it was not in vain that he carried out all these evolutions, delusional from the point of view of bailers
        Precisely because he considered the position with the turn as favorable as possible, he did not hit the adventure with a jerk forward
Containers

0

15 May 2013 21: 57

It is much more useful to read instead of this article "Tsushima" by A.S. Novikov-Priboi, right-word. There, albeit on the fingers, artistically and with embellishment, everything about overloading, and shells, and combat training, including on "the latest battleships of the Borodino type" "(about which is still in the stage of project approval it was said that they have low stability at the slightest overload, as a result of which they are prone to overturning, which was sadly confirmed by "Borodino" and "Emperor Alexander III"). And as for "Glory" - there were a lot of modernizations between 1905 and 1917, including a solution to the stability problem. And as for the "unframed waterproof door" - this is the first time I hear it. In all the sources that I watched - everywhere the fault is hit with a break, trims as a result of flooding (sometimes forced), loss of progress. In general, some kind of nonsense.
By the way, in vain they began to try to improve the "Tsarevich" ... Nothing good, as we see, came of it. But this is already history.
1. Crang
  
  0
  
  15 May 2013 22: 10
  
  Why in vain? Just compare how many shells it took the Japanese to disable our battleships of previous projects. "Navarina", "Sisoya the Great", "Oslyabyu". They all received fewer shells in total than one Eagle. Have you noticed this? About "Glory". There is a wonderful book by Sergei Evgenievich Vinogradov: "Battleship Slava. The undefeated hero of Moonzund." There, a battle with German dreadnoughts and the case of an unclosed waterproof door is described in detail.
unknown

0

16 May 2013 20: 44

Disputes on the topic: who is to blame - technology or people began immediately after Tsushima
The most simple answer was given by Soviet historians: the equipment is outdated, and people (of course, the royal encirclement, Moscow State School of Arts, Rozhestvensky) are fools.
Of course, Makarov doesn’t count. The fact that he himself died along with the flagship battleship due to stupidity doesn’t count.

In the last quarter of a century, the situation began to change. Toward a greater objectivity. Although many people are still hindered by the reign of thought, past achievements, monographs, academic degrees, positions associated with this privilege, position.
But changing

1. Shimoza - the horror of our historiography. She’s liddit, she’s also melinite. In the sense, it is an explosive based on picric acid. Shimoza-Japan, lidit-Great Britain, melinite-France.
What about Germany? Pyroxylin, as in Russia. The explosiveness is 1,45 times higher than that of a shimoza. The shimoza has a higher detonation speed. Plus instability. Hence the damage to the guns during the battle. The mass of explosives in Japanese shells is greater, but redundant. After the RPE, the Englishmen switched to black powder as explosives. The explosiveness is 14 times less. Something after the Battle of Jutlan, nobody cried that the British used bad shells and the Germans used light ones. Since both sides considered their shells sufficient to defeat the enemy.
The accepted moisture content of pyroxylin is another matter. Moreover, it is usually not indicated that a significant part of medium-caliber shells came in 2 squadrons from Germany.

About ships tomorrow
1. sergius60
  
  0
  
  17 May 2013 12: 22
  
  1. + K-88 - this is in Germany. But the same crap that the Russian Navy has experienced since the beginning of the 90s is understandable - 19th century. They just didn’t want to explode on their own BC. Dumb, huh?
  And YOU absolutely definitely emphasized that the Britons generally switched to POWDER!
  And if the fuses do not fire, then absolutely ... er, as you have with everything else. Even though the laser rangefinders, even the cannons are gyro-stabilized, even in the "summer" potential "Nelsons" wander along the deck in schools.
Crang

0

16 May 2013 21: 57

Here we must not forget about another VERY important factor - the fire hazard of picric acid. Remember how many British battlecruisers at Jutland went into orbit as a result of detonation of ammunition? Some. And the German ones? Except for Pommern, who caught a powerful torpedo, none. Although they also had a fire in the ammunition load. But that's just the point - only a fire, not an explosion. Well, the much more perfect design of German ships cannot be discounted either.
1. Kars
  
  +1
  
  16 May 2013 22: 06
  
  Quote: Krang
  fire hazard of picric acid. Remember how many British battlecruisers under Jutland went into orbit as a result of detonation of the ammunition? Some
  
  There was no picric acid or picrates in the British. In Jutland.
Crang

0

16 May 2013 23: 01

Quote: Kars
There was no picric acid or picrates in the British. In Jutland.

On BC, they were still explosive.
1. Kars
  
  +3
  
  16 May 2013 23: 25
  
  Quote: Krang
  On BC, they were still explosive.
  
  It would be cool, but if it is not explosive, then the shells will inflict weak damage to the enemy if they fly out of the barrel.
  
  the British with their cordit and reloading compartments no side to the Japanese shells with shimoza. It makes more sense to recall the French, and the explosion of the battleship in the harbor. (Although I can be wrong, laziness will be checked)
  1. Crang
    
    0
    
    17 May 2013 09: 35
    
    The Germans somehow managed to combine both advantages.
    1. Kars
      
      +1
      
      17 May 2013 09: 40
      
      Quote: Krang
      The Germans somehow managed to combine both advantages.
      
      The Germans also did not have trinitrophenol in service. Therefore, I repeat that
      Quote: Kars
      the British with their cordite and reloading compartments no sideways to the Japanese shells with shimoza.
      
      Quote: Krang
      There is no need to forget about another VERY important factor - the fire hazard of picric acid. Remember how many British battlecruisers under Jutland went into orbit as a result of detonation of the ammunition?
      1. Prohor
        
        -1
        
        17 May 2013 14: 47
        
        Oh, and amused!
        I do not know what kind of nonsense they write on the Internet about the ammunition of that war, but to us at the Moscow Art Theater. At the lectures on industrial explosives, Mendeleev said that Russian shells stuffed with picric acid stupidly exploded from a strike on the side of Japanese ships, because the picknick is close in sensitivity to the initiating explosives, while Japanese shells with TROTIL exploded, already breaking through the armor. That's tryndets Russian fleet! And personally, I trust the deceased already (alas) associate professor V.G. Khotin, a scientist who devoted his whole life to explosives, rather than all the Internet tales of sofa historians ...
        
        Kars
        
        +1
        
        17 May 2013 16: 41
        
        Quote: Prokhor
        picric acid Russian shells stupidly exploded from a strike on the side of Japanese ships,
        
        Maybe Japanese shells, aboard Russian ships? Because RI VV had wet pyroxylin, and the Japanese just refused phlegmatizers, and either did not use them at all, or a very small percentage.
        Quote: Prokhor
        while the Japanese shells with TNT exploded, already breaking through the armor.
        
        TNT in 1904?
        The German armed forces took it as a filling for artillery shells in 1902. TNT-filled armor-piercing shells would explode after they penetrated the armor of British warships, while British lyddite shells would usually explode after they hit the armor, thus spending most of their energy outside the ship. [15] The British began replacing lyddite with TNT in 1907.
        
        Pilat2009
        
        0
        
        17 May 2013 16: 50
        
        Prohor
        Russian shells filled with picric acid stupidly exploded from an impact on the side of Japanese ships, for the picrinca is close in sensitivity to the initiating explosives, while Japanese shells with TNT exploded, already breaking through the armor.
        
        The opposite is true: you have Russian shells with pyroxylin and Japanese shells with shimoza. If you read carefully before the posts, you would be in the know. You did not listen well to lectures.
        
        Alex
        
        +2
        
        25 August 2013 22: 26
        
        Quote: Prokhor
        japanese shells with trotyl
        
        This is in what dream did you see TNT shells in the REV? There wasn’t a lot of them in the WWII either.
        
        Quote: Prokhor
        And personally, I trust the deceased already (alas) associate professor Khotin V.G.
        
        If you personally didn’t mix anything up (which is possible and in no way shameful), then, apparently, the respected professor was mistaken.
2. Alex
  
  +2
  
  25 August 2013 22: 20
  
  Compared to German battlecruisers, the British battlecruisers were more explosive, not so much because of the type of explosives, but because of the storage conditions of the ammunition: the British had cartridges and the Germans had brass cylinders. Somehow I looked at Discovery English film, there they lead such an aversion.
tlauicol

0

17 May 2013 09: 54

The dispute dragged on and turned into a "Who Googled More" contest. I urge everyone to simply and concisely answer what is your reason (s) for defeat: there are not so many options:
1. low technical equipment, shortcomings of weapons and equipment
2. Unskilled crews, incompetence of command
3. both
Crang

+1

17 May 2013 11: 48

Option 2 is indisputable, which in turn "dragged" along with itself and option 1. Without claims to factories and civilian specialists, as well as the quality of the technology they created.
1. tlauicol
  
  0
  
  17 May 2013 18: 23
  
  I agree. what was this episode worth alone
  “Then, in order not to waste time, we decided to sink the destroyer with shells.
  
  The commander and his assistants moved to Donskoy. The commandors loaded a six-inch gun. Both ships stood motionless, one and a half cable from each other. The first shot rang out. By! The cannon barked a second and third time. "Raging" continued to be safe and sound.
  
  There was a rumble among the team
  
  - Oh, woe to the commandors!
  
  - After all, a spit can abundance of the guns do not fall!
  
  “Yes, as if someone had cast a spell on a destroyer.”
  
  - Eyes or something, slanting at the commandants!
  
  Commander Lebedev, who was watching the shooting from the bridge, felt awkward, nervous and: finally, when they missed the fourth and fifth time, he exclaimed angrily:
  
  - Disgrace! A shame! A curse hangs over our fleet! All this is the result of the fact that we were not doing what we needed.
  
  Senior Officer Blokhin explained:
  
  - I repeatedly argued with our experts, I proved to them that they are training their team incorrectly ...
  
  The commander interrupted him:
  
  - It's not about individual specialists. We must look deeper. The entire service organization in our fleet is no good.
  
  The sixth and seventh shots hit the destroyer and only the eighth hit thoroughly in its bow. "
sergius60

+1

17 May 2013 12: 34

Guys, what hysteria. Fuses DO NOT WORK !!! The rest do not care. All fuss loses its meaning by definition. Although you are a super-duper karateka, but you couldn’t embed, what difference does everything else.
By the way, I like the real offense of all the participants, for the events of 110 years ago. And a clearly visible desire to return the favor. Maybe the yapam shouldn't remind us of some islands? When there is a fountain of desire recall Tsushima The same island.
Crang

0

17 May 2013 12: 41

Now the strength may not be enough. If only together with the Chinas unite.
unknown

0

17 May 2013 21: 38

About ships

1. Shipbuilding

Funded insufficiently and with a lag. Therefore, they failed.
As the basic design of the battleship, they chose an unnecessarily complex, contrary to domestic traditions. And also a metric one. For example, the conversion of a metric "Bogatyr" into an inch "Oleg" added 600 tons to the latter.
Yes, and they decided to improve. Speed, they say, will not get enough. Mockery of fate. In battle dragged along with the speed of an artillery shield.
Melnikov was right. "Retvizan" on our traditions, inch. More familiar. Simpler. They would build faster.

We didn't build armored ones for battle. No finance, no capacity, no project. And so "Slava" was not completed. And if they also contacted the armored cruisers, who else would be unfinished? Yes, and they are weaker, unless, of course, six against one

And 6000 tons turned out to be great. Sea-going, powerful, high-speed. In the years of WWI, the displacement of the cruisers grew from series to series. The British came to the conclusion that the minimum for an ocean-going cruiser is 6000 tons. The Japanese, too, laid down exactly this for the reconnaissance program of 1910. Yes and the Port Arthur squadron liked "Boyar" more than "Novik". Seaworthiness, however.
Of course, with the completion of the shipbuilding program, we did not have time.
The paradox is that the forces gathered by Rozhdestvensky were enough. Do not win. Do not lose devastatingly. About it tomorrow.
1. Pilat2009
  
  0
  
  17 May 2013 23: 48
  
  We have already come to the conclusion that in order not to lose, it was imperative to:
  Train teams
  Build new ships
  Have good ammunition
  Have a little luck
  The first three points needed to be addressed before the war.
unknown

-1

19 May 2013 13: 56

2. The balance of power in Tsushima (Russian)
As a rule, historians say that both Russians and Japanese had 12 ships of the main classes
But the Russian ships were either obsolete or unsuccessful, and the Japanese ships were the latest, best in their classes. In addition, Russian ships simply had a catastrophic overload.
In terms of the number of guns of the main caliber, the Russians had an advantage, in terms of the average caliber, the Japanese, and the overwhelming one.
Not only was there pyroclisin in the Russian shells (which, in fact, is more powerful), but in the Japanese there was fantastic shimosa, and even the mass of Russian shells was less (in fact, insignificantly). They very quickly lost their speed and were useless at long distances ("Panteleimon" against "Goebenne" did not hurt)
The Japanese had an advantage in the rate of fire of guns and, most importantly, in speed. This allowed them to cover the head of the Russian column to knock out the latest Russian ships, thereby deciding the outcome of the battle in their favor.
Some doom. Just a terrible tale. Moreover, not all horror stories are listed.
The main strength of Rozhestvensky was made by the battleships of the Borodino type
It is based on the French project “Tsesarevich”, which was creatively redesigned to achieve the mystical speed of 18 knots. Some of the shortcomings have been fixed. Mounting the anti-torpedo bulkhead improved. The pre-cut neck after the trials of “Alexander” was closed up. But the swath, agility, large upper weight (due to the towers of medium caliber) remained.
A significant obstruction of the sides has also been preserved. The area of the upper deck was less than the area of the waterline, which significantly reduced the recovery moment. The rate of fire of overly mechanized medium-caliber guns was less.
But, in general, these ships were not a mass of flaws. Full belt on the waterline. The armor is the newest, according to the Krupp method. All artillery is protected by armor.
Overload was. But, the construction is about 670 tons. The rest is operational. Excessive coal, water for boilers. It was easy to get rid of the operational one.
Oddly enough, from the construction part - too. According to Kostenko’s work, it was composed of protective shields, linoleum, metlakh tiles - that is, from materials intended to facilitate the life of the crew in tropical conditions. There was enough time to get rid of some of these materials. The ships carried the craft, which were destroyed in battle.
And this is 50-70 tons, which could be removed before the battle.
The battleship "Oslyabya", as well as generally "overexposure" is usually called an unsuccessful project.
Why unsuccessful? The armament is slightly weaker, but the shell is still heavy and sufficient to defeat armadillos. Garveyev’s armor, many have not yet switched to Krupov’s, thickness
no less than the Japanese counterparts. The belt is not full, but someone can call the battleship dead due to the destruction of its extremities by medium-caliber artillery fire.
“Relight” and “Victory” survived the battle in the Yellow Sea, and “Oslyaba” was simply unlucky.
He received fatal injuries at the very beginning of the battle. Without running, with the main belt buried due to operational overload.
Sisoy - with modern artillery, a powerful but incomplete belt, at a speed of 15 knots
"Navarin" - with a somewhat outdated, but sufficient main caliber, an incomplete belt,
at a speed of 15 knots
"Nikolai" - with outdated, but still sufficient, especially for armored cruisers
armament, speed 14 knots
"Nakhimov" - with outdated, but qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient for confrontation with armored cruisers weapons. Full belt. Speed 15-16 knots
The coastal defense battleships are small, with an incomplete belt, 14 nodal, without medium artillery, but armed with 10 inch guns.
unknown

0

19 May 2013 14: 12

3. The balance of power (Japan)
"Mikasa" - in terms of armament is equal to the type of "Borodino". An extra six-inch in the side salvo is not a decisive advantage. The belt is full, Krupovskaya armor. Construction overload of about 1000 tons.
“Asahi”, “Shikishima” are similar in armament. Garveyev's armor.
"Fuji" - the main caliber barbers with low loading speed, most of the medium artillery is covered only by shields. The belt is incomplete. Actual speed is 16 knots.
This means that the real speed of the entire first Japanese detachment is 16 knots.
The Russians have at least five ships have a speed higher. Type Borodino 17,5-17,8 knots
Oslyabya - 18 knots guaranteed.
Yes, and the Japanese battleships I ended. The rest are armored cruisers.
The best in the world, as they say. Harbingers of battlecruisers. Role Models.
The reservation is powerful. At the last - Krupp. The armament is strong, for cruisers
But the shell is 118 kg, while Oslyaby has 225 kg. The test speed is 20-22 knots.
But there are no miracles.
The mechanisms are lightweight. Actual speed is 16-18 knots. No more than new armadillos.
But the "Azuma" for a long time could not keep such a speed, it is closer to 14 knots.
The Japanese could not catch up with the Russian cruisers after the damage to the Rurik (15,5 knots)
The speed of “Russia” is 19 knots, “Thunderbolt” is 20 knots.
In the battle in the Yellow Sea, the six-thousander armored deck marching for a breakthrough could not be stopped, in succession, by two armored cruisers. They did not have enough fire performance.
The real rate of Russian guns was higher. Not for nothing that the Japanese after PMV switched to a caliber of 140mm. Six inches turned out to be difficult for them.

The perfect armored cruiser for battle did not work out.
Neither speed nor weapons
Japanese "Italians" had the same characteristics. And more than 18 knots did not go, and even then with difficulty.
In the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese armored cruisers were just lucky. They were engaged in killing an enemy damaged by armadillos. When they managed to get under fire
Equal adversary - received serious damage. "Asama" from "Nikolai"
Many experts note that the construction of three full-fledged armadillos instead of under-cruisers-under-armadillos would give the Japanese an absolute advantage at the beginning of the war.
The Japanese understood this.
As a result, the next type of armored cruiser immediately switched to 305mm.

Rozhdestvensky did not use all the capabilities of his squadron
To list for a long time what he could do, but he didn’t. Or he didn’t want to.

Stupidly lost battle. Stupidly lost war. War in the giveaway.

Sound familiar?
Pilat2009

0

19 May 2013 15: 22

The eternal Russian habit of saving. Or lack of money
Well, "Until the thunder breaks out, the man does not cross himself"
Askold

0

19 August 2013 18: 50

Quote: sergius60
Guys, what hysteria. Fuses DO NOT WORK !!! The rest do not care.

And tell me - how many percent of the shells did not work fuses?
Askold

0

24 August 2013 13: 10

Quote: Iraclius
Brink created fuses and never renounced that Russian artillery is better than Japanese in all respects.

Please write how many percent of Russian shells did not explode and how many were Japanese explosions
Askold

0

24 August 2013 13: 54

Quote: Tlauicol
I agree. what was this episode worth alone
“Then, in order not to waste time, we decided to sink the destroyer with shells.

The commander and his assistants moved to Donskoy. The commandors loaded a six-inch gun. Both ships stood motionless, one and a half cable from each other. The first shot rang out. By! The cannon barked a second and third time. "Raging" continued to be safe and sound.

There was a rumble among the team

- Oh, woe to the commandors!

- After all, a spit can abundance of the guns do not fall!

“Yes, as if someone had cast a spell on a destroyer.”

- Eyes or something, slanting at the commandants!

Commander Lebedev, who was watching the shooting from the bridge, felt awkward, nervous and: finally, when they missed the fourth and fifth time, he exclaimed angrily:

- Disgrace! A shame! A curse hangs over our fleet! All this is the result of the fact that we were not doing what we needed.

The sixth and seventh shots hit the destroyer and only the eighth hit thoroughly in its bow. "

Don't you think that all of you are deeply mistaken?
That is, the picture of the sinking of this destroyer was completely different. The thickness of its side skin is only about 6 millimeters, and a 152-mm caliber projectile easily pierces it through - like steel a thin sheet of paper. In this case, none of the eight shells did not explode. That is, after breaking through the torpedo boat these shells left only small holes with a diameter of 15 centimeters in its sides - several times smaller than the open porthole with a diameter of 45 centimeters. And if you consider that these small holes from the shells were located above the waterline and the water almost did not flow in them, if only the crest of the wave covered them for several seconds. Therefore, the destroyer was not going to sink. And only because there were eight such holes, and one was still in the nose near the waterline, the water level rose and closed some of these holes and the water poured into them.
Conclusions: none of the history buffs and even the participants of the Tsushima battle themselves: This means that the Russian gunners may have shot very accurately and hit the Japanese ships very well, but the Russian shells did not explode, leaving only small absolutely harmless holes that the Japanese quickly and easily plugged with pre-prepared wooden plugs.
1. Alex
  
  +4
  
  25 August 2013 23: 07
  
  Firstly, they themselves answered their own question. If such a picture of fuses is indicative (of which I personally doubt very much), then the percentage of neuronism 7 of 8 (87,5%).
  
  Secondly, the passage clearly states that they missed five times, hit twice, but not fatally (“hooked”), and only the eighth hit was effective. If this was the case in battle, then I'm sorry ...
  
  Thirdly, about pre-prepared plugs. This is one of the Japanese gods informed the Japanese in advance about
  1 - unexploded Russian shells
  2 - their high penetration
  3 - Gauges of rigorous geometric shape
  4 - at least an approximate number of holes (and it’s not enough, it’s forbidden, Japanese god. Or carry extra ones?)
  5 - in which parts of the body will be damaged to quickly plug a hole.
  
  In general, enough banter. Such categorical judgments combined with a statement of long-known facts (this is that Russian shells penetrated the armor for departure. Not all, of course, but such cases were recorded and are not a secret.) Are usually evidence of a low level of knowledge of the material.
Alex

+2

25 August 2013 23: 15

So many years have passed since then, and the bitterness of defeat does not diminish. This is probably correct. And here's what I paid attention to. Three times Russia experienced the death of the fleet: in the Crimean War, the Russian-Japanese and the First World War + Civil. And each time it was at a turning point in the military strategy: the battleships changed sailing ships (the first time), the battleships lost to the dreadnoughts (the second time), and the superdreadnoughts became the crown of the artillery ships (the third time). And the second time we failed not only to level the situation, but even to "get on the last carriage." Just some kind of rock. Or is it not rock?
Askold

0

26 August 2013 12: 37

Quote: Alex
Firstly, they themselves answered their own question. If such a picture of fuses is indicative (of which I personally doubt very much), then the percentage of neuronism 7 of 8 (87,5%).

How did you get the idea that the percentage of non-explosion of 87,5% calculated by you personally is at least the right answer to the question? I’m assuming that the eighth missile that hit the destroyer didn’t explode either, it just got in the nose close to the waterline, and it became more flooded from this hole. And if you talk like that, then all 100% of the shells that hit the destroyer did not explode. This is real. So, asking my question, I would like to receive an answer official numbers. That is, I would like to see the number of explosions that the command of the Russian fleet determined by experimental firing.
Askold

0

13 September 2013 13: 24

For many days now, my question has been asked whether anyone knows about test firing for testing shells of the imperial Russian fleet after the last Russian-Japanese war in order to check how many percent they did not explode? But so far no one has answered this. As the saying goes: if the question is posed correctly, then it will stand for a long time. This either means that none of the Russian naval history buffs is completely interested in the quality of the shells that the Russian fleet fired during the Russian-Japanese war, or that there is completely no official information about the quality of the Russian shells - that is, about their percentage of explosions.

And finally, some kind of but the only answer came from Mr. Alex. And although in fact this answer speaks of complete ignorance, but I still bring it.
So, asking my question, I would like to receive official figures in response. That is, I would like to see the number of explosions that the command of the Russian fleet determined by experimental firing.
But with this information, I would love to read it. But for some reason it seems to me that it either does not exist, or in such state guards that you won’t get to the bottom of it. And if you will, that's why.

The deafening results of the Russo-Japanese war (both on land and at sea) became the cause of the first Russian revolution, which (according to official theory) became the prologue of the Great October Revolution. Thus, inconvenient information (including, for example, the quality of shells and fuses) could well be either destroyed or hidden in the far corner of the repository.

Please understand me correctly. I am not a supporter of conspiracy theories and do not suffer from delusions of conspiracy. Just if until now such figures have not been published, it is logical to assume that they do not exist. But they could put an end to many disputes about the technical equipment of the Russian fleet.
So, to the question about the percentage of non-explosions of Russian shells, only one answer was received, and the rest did not say anything at all. But even from this answer it is not clear what connoisseurs of history think about this problem: Either experiments of firing Tsushima shells were carried out, but the results were so amazing that all documents about these experiments were immediately classified and destroyed, so much so that even a hundred years after the Russian -Japanese war in general, no one knows anything about it. But is there really absolutely no information that Russian shells did not explode? No, many readers, having carefully rummaged in their memory, could easily recall a well-known fact: when, after the Russian-Japanese war in 1906, an uprising took place in the Sveaborg fortress, and it was suppressed by the fire of artillery guns of the battleship "Slava", which fired Tsushima shells, it turned out that these shells did not explode, but remained lying on the ground. That is, it is reliably known, and is not subject to any doubt. However, what was the reaction of the state authorities and officials responsible for the technical condition of the Russian fleet? After all, if the shells with which they fired at Sveaborg did not explode, then the shells with which the Russian ships fired at Tsushima did not explode in the same way! And was it not this circumstance that was the main reason for the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese war? Suppose, for some reason, Russian sailors had no time to deal with their shells during naval battles, but the war ended, peacetime came, and it was possible to calmly investigate how the Russian shells actually acted against Japanese ships. Moreover - a stunning case - the shelling of Sveaborg, and here they are unexploded shells, there is complete proof that in Tsushima and in other battles and battles Russian shells did not explode.
Askold

0

13 September 2013 13: 26

Of modern people, probably not everyone knows how the bureaucratic machine works. It is enough for modern people to read about a fact in the literature, and it already seems to them that everything is clear to everyone and the problem is solved. But in fact, in the Russian Empire, mainly events related to state interests took place in the following order. So, officers and sailors of the battleship "Slava" who landed with a landing on surrendered Sveaborg saw unexploded shells lying here and there in the streets. the officers immediately reported to the commander of their ship about this blatant fact and he sent an official report to his command, they say so and so - the shells fired from our battleship did not explode. Deal with this and punish who is to blame. Having received this report, the command sends it to the instance, a commission is appointed for investigation, which organizes test firing with such projectiles, as a result of which they determine how many percent of the projectiles did not explode (maybe a complete non-explosion) and compare with the number that did not explode during the shelling of Sveaborg. The commission immediately appoints experienced engineers who meticulously investigate the cause of non-explosions, and assign technical measures to correct this situation. Thus, as a result of the work of this bureaucratic machine, a rather large pile of papers should be formed - various reports, requirements for obtaining funds for the production of experiments, requirements for shells for experiments, technical reports on the results of test firing and much more. and then all this heap of papers should settle in the naval archives of the Russian empire. And modern Russian and Soviet historians, in theory, reading these papers should have published them - an outrageous fact - that it turns out that Russian shells in Tsushima did not explode! And maybe this fact was the main reason for the defeat of the Russian fleet.
However, a paradoxical phenomenon, every competent lover of naval history knows that the shells in Sveaborg did not explode, but no more words were published on this topic! That is, any event in modern history should not only qualitatively describe it, but also have a quantitative assessment! That is, the fact that the shells did not explode is not so important, how important is it to know - how many percent of the shells were defective - all one hundred percent or maybe partially? So what have our modern historians written about this to us? Yes, absolutely nothing - not a single word! Not how many percent of the shells in Sveaborg did not explode, nor about whether test firing was scheduled, when and where they were fired (of course at the firing range ..). What results were obtained and who is to blame for the fact that the Russian shells in Tsushima and in Sveaborg did not explode? But why did not one of the modern Russian historians write about this research? None of you were interested in this? And is it really true that Alex assumes that these documents are stored in such state guards that no historians have access there? Or how does one of my acquaintances believe that all historians are fools and idlers, that these documents are in the public domain, but in such far corners of the repository, as Alex wrote, that historians or archive workers are just too lazy to get to this far corner? So who has any opinion on this?
fan1945

0

24 July 2014 10: 15

The author quite sanely described his idea of the state of the reef in the RVV. And if
exclude the alternative, then in general I am ready to support most of his thoughts ...
The debate about the terms must apparently be separated from the essence of the dispute. EDB, Dreadnought, Superdreadnought
-All the essence of battleship. Readers well understand what is often referred to even by name. I think not to simplify, nor to complicate. It’s like with tanks - it’s clear
when they say, the medium tank of WWII.
But the debate about fire control systems for amateurs is very interesting.
onshore batteries how management was organized? And what is the idea of installing on
coastal mortar batteries. Is this a hinged fire?
online

0

17 July 2015 22: 51

battery battleship, barbette battleship, turret battleship, I-class battleship, II-class battleship, coastal defense battleship, squadron battleship (aka pre-dreadnought), dreadnought, super-dreadnought and finally, battleship
Everything was mixed up, horses, people. Here it is not even clear on what principle the author intended to classify the ship. Looks like he wrote everything he knew.
Armored cruisers can also be considered the main striking force of the fleet.
Where? The most important question is “where”? If in Latin America, then there were such countries. If in a more or less rich country, then no.
The presence of armored cruisers in the squadron expanded its operational capabilities
Nonsense. As part of a normal squadron there was a mobile wing consisting of class 2 EDB. In poorer countries, such as Japan, its functions were performed by the DBK. But it was wrong, because of poverty.
armored cruisers had the main task of fighting enemy warships and supporting troops with fire in coastal operations
Again nonsense. DBKs were divided into armored trade fighter cruisers (raiders). And DBK are trade defenders. Those. these were the antipodes. The DBK had nothing to do with the squadron operations. Again, in normal countries. In poor countries it could be anything.
Auxiliary tasks of reconnaissance, patrol, interception, and combat against small enemy ships and its transport and landing fleet fell on armored cruisers of the XNUMXst and XNUMXnd ranks.
When did this happen and why was the activity of the cruisers auxiliary? Who said that?
Then the author again mixed trade fighters, reconnaissance fighters and stationary fighters into a pile. Apparently he doesn't understand the difference between them.
An example - the famous XNUMXst rank cruiser Aurora gives a good idea of this type of warship.
Aurora gives a good idea of what not to do. According to their final performance characteristics, the Pallada-class cruisers turned out to be stationary cruisers. Usually, all sorts of old men like Donskoy and Monomakh served as hospital residents. For some reason, Russia built 4 new hospitals (don’t forget Svetlana). Why, I cannot find the answer to this question to this day. After all, in peacetime, stationary ships are colonial cruisers. But Russia did not have overseas colonies. Why did she need 4 new inpatients? Maybe she was planning to chop something off somewhere? And what kind of sea convoys did she plan to conduct in wartime? And where? Unanswered questions.
online

0

17 July 2015 23: 46

And Sisoy, Petropavlovsk, and Sevastopol, where are they new? New type of guns? Are the guns the whole ship? Is it okay that they all have old armor? And DBK level protection? In normal countries, such “EDBs” are honestly called 1st class BrBOs. At the same time, Sisoy pulled only on its lower segment.
The same goes for Russians regular BrBO. Only Apraksin had cemented armor. But because of the advantage, it is refined. The guns were good for their level. The range of opponents of these ships is not entirely clear. It is unclear who they were supposed to fight with and why they were built at all. During the REV, they actually fell into auxiliary battleships. Those. They weren’t even old class 2 BrBOs, they were even weaker.
Poltava. Honest old 1st class EDB. Lower segment.
Oslyabya and Peresvet. It didn't work out. They built one thing, they built another. They built class 2 EDBs, they built “battleships for the poor.” They were not suitable for linear combat of real EBRs; there was no proper protection and power of the main battery guns. Since “battleships for the poor” were not used in normal fleets, approximately based on their total power they could be classified as ships of the lower level of the 1st class BrBO. The only one from this series who was built as a class 2 EDB is Victory. Both guns and protection are complete. The speed was just not enough; at least another 0,5 knots were needed. But in fact, from birth it is an old class 2 EDB. But EBR, without quotes.
Navarin at one time it was very good. But by the time the REV was no more than an old 1st class BrBO.
Nicholas I and Alexander II by the time of the REV, they reached a maximum of the lower segment of class 2 BrBO. The ships were extremely weak. In everything.
Retvizan was an EDB of an excellent project. RIF had a “raider” configuration, not an “EDB”. Despite this, RIF was the most powerful EDB. Corresponded to the lower segment of the level of modern 1st class EDB.
Tsarevich was a 2nd class EDB project ship, converted into a 1st class EDB. This had a lot of disadvantages. But in general, it was possible to reach the level of the upper segment of the old 1st class EDB.
4 Borodino residents There is no point in special mention. Ships of a monstrously clumsy design. With the correct “landing”, the GP along the overhead line had a full coal reserve of 600 tons for 1550 nautical miles with an economical speed of 10 knots. And at 310 nm it was in full swing. In addition, the GP in some places had protection at the level of DBK, and not EDB. In fact, they were very good 1st class BrBOs, not EDBs. So good that with some caution they could butt heads with class 2 EDB. But not a 1st class EDB.
Rurik to the beginning of the REV, this is a floating semi-armored floating battery. It could also be an auxiliary cruiser. Perhaps the best ship that has ever been built in Russia. At the time of commissioning it was very good.
Russia at the time of commissioning it was rather weak, but in general, nothing. By the beginning, RYAV could have been a “junior comrade” with a normal raider. And there was one in RIF, this is Retvizan. Based on its performance characteristics, it couldn’t be anyone else. Or "on the run."
Thunderbolt, a nightmare. No words other than abusive and obscene words can be said about this project. The goals and motives for its construction are completely unclear. Could ONLY be used for errands.
online

0

17 July 2015 23: 46

Accordion. Victim of saving. A wonderful (magnificent) idea was killed, first by the “economy” of the MTK, and then by the cross-armed French. The saving was that the cars on Bayan were exactly the same as on the Tsarevich. And because of this they were noticeably cheaper (already a series). The trouble was that these cars were unimportant for a cruiser. And if the Tsarevich had enough speed, then Bayan clearly lacked 4000 strength. In addition, the French built a crooked hull. Due to this, Bayan ate fuel like a child. And because of this it had a ridiculous range of action. As a result, instead of an excellent high-speed armored long-range reconnaissance cruiser, we got a slow-moving armored short-range reconnaissance cruiser. For his money it was possible to build 2 high-speed armored short-range reconnaissance cruisers.
Nakhimov, this is a floating armored floating battery.
online

0

18 July 2015 00: 24

The main striking power of the Russian fleet lay precisely in these 38 ships. In total, they had 88 guns of 305mm caliber, 26 guns of 254mm caliber, 8 - 229mm and 28 guns of 203mm caliber.
Another accountant. I’ve already written more than once, you need to look at ballistics, not caliber:
The 2x2x305mm main battery guns of Alexander II and Nicholas I had the ballistics of field howitzers. And in fact, they weren’t even guns. EBRs were not suitable for linear combat.
The Navarin 4x305mm main guns had the ballistics of field guns. Those. EBRs were also not suitable for linear combat.
The Russian BrBO 11x254mm main battery guns were specially lightweight and were not intended for linear EBR combat.
The Peresvet 4x254mm main guns did not work out. Therefore, they fired with incomplete charges. EBRs were not suitable for linear combat.
The Oslyabi 4x254mm main guns were lightened to the level of the Peresvet guns. Therefore, they also fired with incomplete charges. EDBs were also not suitable for linear combat.
203mm guns were not suitable for linear EBR combat. Any.
I am not considering the guns of the Black Sea Fleet ships, because... it's empty.
In addition, the ship was often unable to participate in a linear EBR battle due to the weak protection of the platform. Those. Main battery guns were suitable for linear combat of the EBR, but the platforms were not. Such ships also need to be crossed out, otherwise it will be Tsushima after Tsushima. Let me remind you that platforms All The Russian ships participating in that battle were not suitable for a linear battle at the EDB level. The absolutely logical result did not take long to arrive.
What do we get in the bottom line?
The bottom line is we have 3x4=12x305mm guns (Retvizan, Tsesarevich and Poltava) and 4x254mm guns (Victory). This is all. Slightly less than stated by the author 88x305mm и 26x254mm guns.
The Japanese have it easier. There's 6x4=24x305mm guns on 6 EBR platforms that are quite normal for linear battle. And even after the “mine jar” there were 4x4 left =16x305mm guns on 4 platforms. True, there were no platforms at the level of the new Japanese ones in the RIF at all. Even Retvizan was noticeably not up to them. The Japanese did not have 254mm EBR-level guns.
As we see, accounting in technical matters is often inappropriate.
1. online
  
  0
  
  23 July 2015 09: 25
  
  Yes, that's another thing, I forgot.
  At the very end of the 19th century. Russia has switched to a modern system for measuring trunks. And the RYAV guns, when they were put into service, were measured according to the old system. Therefore, it is appropriate to show what the RIF and YaIF guns were like in the same “coordinate system”. Better in the British one, Russia later switched to it. Japanese guns remain unchanged as a result.
  Russian 305/40 guns were actually 300/38,3.
  Russian 254/45 guns were actually 250/43,3 (in British reference books they are listed as 9,8").
  Up to a range of ~40 kbt, Russian 300/38,3 guns in terms of armor penetration corresponded to the level of EBR 1st class GK guns. Further, only class 2 EDB.
  Japanese 305/40 guns at all ranges corresponded to the level of EBR class 1 main guns.
  The 250/43,3 guns of the EBR Pobeda main battery corresponded in armor penetration to the level of class 2 EBR main guns at all ranges.
pacific

+1

2 February 2018 01: 30

I have no words!
Well, you can’t treat history so shamelessly! Especially with such a still painful topic as the REV of 1904-05.
You should still respect your potential readers,
According to classification: battleships, especially squadron ships, were ships of the battle line. That is, battleships. Dreadnought is a type of battleship design, named after the first ship built on the principle all big gun. Superdreadnought is the same all big guns, only with an increased main caliber. A battleship is a class of warship. What you call a “battleship”, according to your classification, should be called a “super-duper dreadnought,” because the name “super-super dreadnoughts” should belong to the South Dakotas, Iron Dukes and Tirpitz. Previously there were corvettes - frigates - battleships, now: destroyers - cruisers - battleships - aircraft carriers.
Casemate and barbette battleships or cruisers are a type of artillery arrangement. I won’t decipher it - Google will help.
EDB Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky is the same Panteleimon, after it was renamed in 1905 as punishment for the rebellion.
KR Pallada is an armored(!) cruiser of the same type as Diana and Aurora
Torpedo boats (TB) did not exist in nature in 1905! For two reasons: firstly, there were no torpedoes - there were self-propelled Whitehead mines. That is why there was a class of destroyer ships with subclasses: mine cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats and torpedo boats. Secondly, the British developed the concept of the TC only during WWI. The first use of the Tornikoft TC was in Ostend in 1917 and in Kronstadt in 1919.
Where is the numerous class of gunboats? Where is the Korean? Where are Manchzhur, Khivinets and others like them? But each has 2 203 mm guns, which you classify as the main calibers. Yes, and the Japanese had gunboats.
I was also pleased with the presence of “modern control systems.” I would like more details. Or is the only Barra-Struda optical rangefinder for the entire ship and a couple of micrometers at the start, and repeating dials in the towers - this is the OMS? Let me remind you that there weren’t even optical sights on the guns on Russian ships at that time. What then can we say about the Japanese, who had 2 rangefinders on the ship?
The squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" -..... even today it looks quite modern.
Well, perhaps only in comparison with Zumvolt. Dear, well, play WoWS in the training room on “Kutuzov” against “Mikasa”. Get at least a vague impression of the “modernity” of the EDB of the REV era.
In general, the advice is: study, study and study again. I even feel sorry for you - you still did so much work. But this, my friend, is still graphomania. Readers need to be respected! And if you decide to regal people with fairy tales, then you need to choose a specialized site. Knowledgeable people gather here, and the mixture of Novikov-Priboi and Doinikov “doesn’t matter” here. Read at least “Reckoning” by Semenov, Kostenko, Melnikov. At least occasionally check what you write with reference books. Well, at least with Wikipedia.
Good luck in your work. And separate historical facts and their analysis from AI fantasy. You haven't been able to get a second "Encore Option" yet. You are not Anisimov, alas. And not on this site.
Respect us - don't waste our time with such pseudo-analyses.
pacific

0

1 March 2018 06: 53

He determined the course and speed of the target approximately “by eye.” Having data on your own speed and course, direction and strength of wind, deviation, type of target, elevation angle of the target and distance to it, estimating the approximate speed and course of the target.....

"By eye" is how this article is written.
In the navy, at least since the 2th century, there has been a method for determining the position of a ship by cruising bearing. The essence is simple - at a constant course, 3-XNUMX bearings at different times are measured for one object. Knowing our own course and speed, we obtain the distance traveled and adjust the bearings to the last time.
Determining the course and speed of a target is even easier; at regular intervals we take measurements of the bearing and distance to the target (a rangefinder and compass are available) and put the corresponding points on the sheet. After 2 measurements we get an approximate line, and after 3 - 4 measurements we get a fairly accurate line of relative target motion (RLM). Those. line of change in the target's position relative to ours moving ship. Usually they take a time period that is a multiple of 60 - 2 / 3 / 6 minutes..
On the LOD we plot the vector of the relative (apparent) speed of the target ship. Our course and speed are known. So, all that remains is to solve the simplest vector triangle (velocity triangle) and we get the true course and true speed of the target ship. An experienced navigator solves it on any sheet of paper in a matter of seconds. The longest time required is to take distance bearings.
But for shooting, knowledge of the target’s LOD is quite sufficient.
So that the senior gunner KNEW the course and speed of the enemy ship.
This method is still used in the navy to calculate target movement parameters. True, now everything is already integrated into the radar and calculated automatically.
1. goga13
  
  0
  
  April 6 2019 11: 35
  
  Comrades, how did you miss the start date of the YARV (and not as you write the YARV here, have a conscience) And there is no one to refute this libel. Where is the latest data? Remove this article as discrediting the honor of the Russian fleet.
  Anyway. Well, the British have long written down that a difference of 1 knot in a naval battle is the greatest advantage.....
  First things first. Under the name “someone”, financed by the Anglo-Saxons, I will personify the entire corrupt elite of that time........
  “someone” chose Port Arthur and not Mozampo for the Pacific Fleet, built the port “Dalniy”, the only port that could receive siege weapons (the killer of Port Arthur), he also put the Pacific Fleet in reserve, instead of active actions he forced the TOE-1 to be saved, he he stopped TOE-2 for THREE months and allowed the nuclear force to rearm, he also surrendered Port Arthur, which could hold out for another THREE months........................ .......
  The author is spinning the pro-Western version. Yes, Rozhdestvensky should have been given a Hero of Russia (it’s a pity there was no such award at that time). And if he had rushed from Nosi-be with a high-speed link, then in January (when Mikasa changed weapons) he would have already been in Vladivostok.
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Alexey Petrovichev

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12 December 2019 01: 49

Another nonsense from another alternativeist
sevtrash

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6 September 2020 17: 11

The best thing about Tsushima on the site. Although I only read it now, maybe I still missed something. Thanks to the author
Pavel_4

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4 May 2021 16: 45

Gregory, thanks for the good article! You have worked hard and for the glory. This glory spoils everything, because you are careless about details, and there is no story without details. I spoke below about the tables of ship personnel in response to like-minded people. I would like to point you directly to Table No. 5. Japanese armor-piercing shells filled with picric acid? Where did you find this game? Well, use the logic: 1) an armor-piercing projectile must be durable, because the thick walls and charge are much less than in a land mine. 2) the fuse must be tight so that it fires AFTER penetrating sufficiently thick armor. 3) the explosive must be durable so that it does not detonate upon impact with the armor. Liddite, melinite and Shimose melinite are picroalloys. They detonate from any nearby sneeze :-))))) and form unstable compounds with metal. Japanese armor-piercing shells were filled only with black smokeless powder! Sources: Balakin S.A. "Triumphants of Tsushima. Battleships of the Japanese Fleet" M., 2017. Suliga S.V. "Ships of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. Japanese Fleet" M., 1993. Balakin S.A. "Naval Battles of the Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905" M., "Sea Collection" No. 2/2004
Murmillo

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April 7 2024 14: 47

What a disgusting libel the author wrote.... For starters, at least I should have learned some hardware. This unique one has the same ship, the EBR Prince Potemkin, which was later renamed Panteleimon, is listed as two different battleships in the list of RIF ships, in the same list are the armored cruisers Pallada and Admiral Makarov, which were built after the war, after Karl!! Enchanting!!!