Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905's. State of the Russian fleet. Bad luck and missed opportunities



The Russo-Japanese War is one of the blackest pages in stories Russian fleet. Probably because it still attracts the attention of military historians and just people interested in Russia's military history. Yes, there were not only victories in it and the almost complete defeat of the Russian Pacific and Baltic fleets by the Japanese Imperial Navy is a clear confirmation of this. This topic is interesting because never before has the Russian Imperial Navy been so modern, huge, strong and powerful. On paper. After the events of that war, the Russian navy revived such ocean power only once - in the 70-80-s of the XX century. So why did this happen? Why did the rather modest Japanese fleet succeed without significant losses to crush its superior Russian fleet? Although "on paper" should have been exactly the opposite? These questions will be considered in this article. Readers are waiting for a lot of bare numbers and facts. Without any tales about "outdated and weak battleships", "short range shooting", "large booking area of ​​Japanese ships" and other, other, other beautiful tales. That they allegedly did not allow such “geniuses of naval thought” as ZP Rozhestvensky and VK Whitgeft to defeat the Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral Togo. Who was to blame for this - the equipment or the people who were entrusted with this technique? The military always blamed for their failures in the first place unfit, in their opinion, military equipment. People who created this technique on the contrary point to the lack of professionalism and unsuitability of the military. So it always was, so it will be further. We will analyze all this with passionless mathematical accuracy.


Fleet compositions

Before proceeding to the enumeration of the combat equipment that was at the disposal of the Russian and Japanese admirals, I consider it necessary to explain to the reader the general quality level of the fleets and classes of warships of that period. In the era when the god of war was artillery, all types of naval weapons systems could be counted on fingers:

- Classic artillery guns different calibers and destination. At that time, they had already reached a fully mature level of development and differed little from modern artillery systems, although they were less powerful.

- Torpedoes. At that time, this type of weapon was just beginning to develop. Torpedoes of that period were much inferior to modern ones in terms of launch range and striking action.

- Mines. At that time, this type of marine weapons It was already a fully developed and effective means of dealing with the enemy ships.

- Aviation. Was in that period in its infancy. Actually, and aviation, it can be called a big stretch, because she was only aerostats, which were used only for reconnaissance and adjustment of artillery fire at long distances.

In accordance with this, the classes of warships were distributed:

1. The main striking force of the fleet of that period were battleships. In the course of their evolution, battleships had many different subclasses: battery battleship, barbetan battleship, tower battleship, I-class battleship, II-class battleship, coastal defense battleship, squadron battleship (also dodrednought), dreadnought, superdreadnought, and finally battleship. All of them were the most armed and protected ships of their time. In the period described, armed squadrons, II-class battleships and coastal defense battleships were in service. These ships had a displacement from 4000 to 16000, carried heavy armor and powerful universal artillery and mine-torpedo armament. In doing so, they could reach speeds of 14-18 nodes. The more modern ships of this class were in the fleet, the more formidable was the fleet.

2. Also to the main striking force of the fleet can be attributed armored cruisers. Ships with a displacement of about 8000-10000, also having good protection, though not as powerful as the battleships. Artillery weapons were also weaker, but such ships could reach speeds in the 18-22 node. The presence of armored cruisers in the squadron expanded its operational capabilities. It was on the battleships and armored cruisers that the main task of fighting the enemy warships and supporting the troops in coastal operations with fire was laid.

3. Auxiliary tasks of reconnaissance, patrol, interception, combat with small ships of the enemy and its transport-assault fleet fell on armored cruisers of the first and second rank. These ships with a displacement of 4000-6000, had easy booking and artillery armament from medium and small caliber guns. But they could reach speeds in 20-25 nodes and had a long range. Example - the famous cruiser of the first rank Aurora gives a good idea of ​​this type of warships.

4. For the night torpedo attacks, the final finishing of the damaged enemy ships and the feasible execution of some of the functions of armored cruisers, the fleets had destroyersFurther destroyersbasic destroyers (destroyers), further torpedo boats и submarines. Destroyers of destroyers are small ships that did not carry the shadow of the reservation. They were armed with one or two torpedo tubes and several small cannons. Reached speed in 25-30 nodes and could operate together with squadrons in the near sea zone. Torpedo boats and submarines of that period, because of their imperfections, were weapons of the near coastal zone.

Cruiser I-rank "Aurora" was directly involved in the Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905 years. The ship with a length of 123 meter is still in good technical condition, though not on the move.



5. Also in the fleets of the time could aerostatons, [/ i]minelayers и transport ships. The aero-carriers, the forerunners of aircraft carriers, were intended for basing reconnaissance balloons on them and were equipped with hangars for their storage. Minelayers were used for setting mines. The artillery armament of these ships consisted of several small cannons. Transport ships were used to transport troops, weapons or other goods. Could have several small guns or not have any weapons. Their sizes could vary widely.

After a brief excursion into the characteristics of warships during the Russo-Japanese War, let us turn to a comparison of the forces of both sides.


Russian Imperial Navy (RIF). Despite all the vacillation and bureaucracy, by the beginning of the war with Japan was a formidable force. Since there is no possibility to list the entire combat train with all auxiliary ships and support ships in the format of this article, we’ll dwell in detail only on the main striking force of the fleet:

Table 1

1.

Alexander-II

Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet.

2.

Nikolay-I

Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet.

3.

Navarin

Squadron battleship. Old. Baltic Fleet.

4.

Sisoy the Great

Squadron battleship. New. Baltic Fleet.

5.

Sevastopol

Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet.

6.

Poltava

Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet.

7.

Petropavlovsk

Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet.

8.

Admiral Ushakov

Battleship coastal defense. New. Baltic Fleet.

9.

Admiral Sevyanin

Battleship coastal defense. New. Baltic Fleet.

10

Admiral apraksin

Battleship coastal defense. New. Baltic Fleet.

11

Table 1Oslyabya

Squadron battleship. New. Baltic Fleet.

12

Relight

Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet.

13

Victory

Squadron battleship. New. Pacific Fleet.

14

Retvizan

Squadron battleship. The newest. Pacific Fleet.

15

Tsarevich

Squadron battleship. The newest. Pacific Fleet.

16

Prince Suvorov

Squadron battleship. The newest. Baltic Fleet.

17

Alexander-III

Squadron battleship. The newest. Baltic Fleet.

18

Borodino

Squadron battleship. The newest. Baltic Fleet.

19

Eagle

Squadron battleship. The newest. Baltic Fleet.

20

Russ

Aerostatonosets. The newest. Baltic Fleet.

21

Catherine-II

Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet.

22

Sinop

Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet.

23

Chesma

Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet.

24

George the Victorious

Squadron battleship. Old. Black Sea Fleet.

25

Twelve Apostles

Battleship II-class. Old. Black Sea Fleet.

26

Three Saints

Squadron battleship. New. Black Sea Fleet.

27

Rostislav

Battleship II-class. New. Black Sea Fleet.

28

Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky

Squadron battleship. The newest. Black Sea Fleet.

29

Panteleimon

Squadron battleship. The newest. Black Sea Fleet.

30

Admiral Nakhimov

Armored cruiser. Old. Baltic Fleet.

31

Rurik

Armored cruiser. Old. Pacific Fleet.

32

Memory of Azov

Armored cruiser. Old. Black Sea Fleet.

33

Russia

Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet.

34

Thunderbolt

Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet.

35

Accordion

Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet.

36

Pallas

Armored cruiser. New. Pacific Fleet.

37

Admiral Makarov

Armored cruiser. New. Black Sea Fleet.

38

Peter the Great

Training artillery ship. Old battleship I class. Baltic Fleet.



The main striking power of the Russian fleet was precisely in these 38 ships. In sum, they had 88 caliber 305mm guns, 26 254mm caliber guns, 8-229mm and 28 203mm caliber guns. Even smaller-caliber guns already belonged to medium-caliber artillery, although they retained an important combat significance at that stage of development of science and technology. In addition to these ships, the fleet included a large number of powerful cruisers of the first and second ranks, both new and ancient, many destroyers, minelayers, gunboats, transports, four multi-purpose submarines "Dolphin", "Trout", "Sturgeon" and "Som" and other ships. Subsequently, submarines (SP) became one of the main classes of warships of the fleet.

The squadron battleship Tsesarevich is one of the most powerful battleships of its time. His power is felt literally in his appearance - even today it looks quite modern. The ship was built using the latest technology and had all the hallmarks of the modern battleship of the 2 World War II: a high board of optimal, seaworthy form, developed tower-like superstructures to accommodate observation posts and elements of the FC at the maximum possible height. Modern artillery in high-mounted turret guns was high, fully mechanized, and had large pointing angles. Very complex, multi-row differential booking was very powerful. The ship was far on the horizon and could effectively operate and conduct aimed fire in any weather. Displacement of this floating tank: 13105 tons. The enemy was awaited by 68 guns of various sizes, 4 torpedo tubes, 20 mines barrage and 4 7,62mm Maxim machine guns. All the weapons that were then in the Russian fleet were all installed on it. The ship's control system was also first-class.


The total total number of warships of all classes and ages in service with the Russian fleet at the time of the outbreak of war with Japan is difficult to estimate, but according to rough estimates it was about ~ 300 ships of various classes. In order to destroy such numerous armored power, even today it would be necessary to attract very serious sea-launched missile-carrying and aviation forces. Any of those battleships is not Sheffield cardboard plastic and it will not burn and sink after being hit by one single Exocset anti-ship missiles. It will also not be a strong exaggeration to say that the fleet was more powerful than, say, the USSR Domestic Navy on the eve of World War II10. For a predominantly agrarian country, such as Tsarist Russia, to create such a large ocean fleet was a real achievement. The flagship of the Russian Pacific Fleet was the newest battleship Tsesarevich. The striking core of the Baltic Fleet was battleships of the Borodino type in the amount of four units. Already during the war, the fleet was replenished with the fifth battleship of this type of "Glory".

The Eagle is one of the ships in the Borodino series. He was an improved model of the "Cesarevich." The outlines of its hull somewhat resemble the hulls of today's URO frigates built using Stealth technology. It differed from the prototype with a new 121 meter-long hull, improved armor, improved design of a number of components and assemblies, and a slightly modified composition of auxiliary weapons. Displacement: 13516 tons. Like the prototype at the time of construction was considered one of the most powerful and sophisticated warships of its time.


Japanese Imperial Navy (IJN). After the defeat of the Chinese fleet in the battle of Yalu, the Japanese fleet began to rapidly increase its combat potential. In the construction of its fleet, Japan relied on British aid. The resources of the Japanese economy were enough to create a group of six squadron battleships close in characteristics and six armored cruisers. In addition, they had two more old battleships of the first class: "Chin-Yen" and "Fuso" of which "Chin-Yen" was captured from the Chinese. Since the number of strike warships was small, part of the large-caliber guns were placed on light-weight Matsushima and Takasago-type light armored cruisers that were poorly suited for this purpose. The list of warships of the Japanese fleet, which carried on board more or less large caliber, is as follows:

Table 2


1.

Mikasa

Squadron battleship. The newest. Japanese fleet.

2.

Sikisima

Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet.

3.

Asahi

Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet.

4.

Hatcuse

Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet.

5.

Fuji

Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet.

6.

Yashima

Squadron battleship. New. Japanese fleet.

7.

Chin-yen

Battleship I-th class. Old. Japanese fleet.

8.

Fuso

Casemate battleship. Old. Japanese fleet.

9.

Asama

Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.

10

That's right

Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.

11

Azuma

Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.

12

Yakumo

Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.

13

Izumo

Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.

14

Iwate

Armored cruiser. New. Japanese fleet.

15

Macusima

Cruiser I-rank. Old. Japanese fleet.

16

Itsukushima

Cruiser I-rank. Old. Japanese fleet.

17

Hasidate

Cruiser I-rank. Old. Japanese fleet.

18

Takasago

Cruiser I-rank. New. Japanese fleet.

19

Titose

Cruiser I-rank. New. Japanese fleet.

20

Kasagi

Cruiser I-rank. New. Japanese fleet.



Thus, the power of the Russian fleet, the Japanese fleet, along with the absolutely unsuitable for confrontation of the battleships, light cruisers, could oppose: 3 guns of caliber 320mm, 28 caliber 305mm, 4 - 240mm guns and 30 - 203mm guns. A simple mathematical calculation shows that the potential of the Japanese fleet was less than three times lower than that of the Russian Navy. Of the 20 ships, no more than 12, that is, 60%, could be considered modern and truly suitable for a general battle. The characteristics of the rest did not leave them any decent chance of survival under the fire even of the old Russian squadron battleships. Of the 38 Russian strike ships, to one degree or another suitable for a general battle could be 35, that is, 92%. The flagship of the Japanese Imperial fleet was the squadron battleship "Mikasa".

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905's. State of the Russian fleet. Bad luck and missed opportunities
Squadron battleship "Mikasa". Its design was traditional for ships of this class of that period. Constructively, he repeated the British designs: low board, low superstructures, mostly citadel armor, tower artillery installations of the main caliber only. Relatively low-power medium-caliber guns were located in onboard casemate installations low above water. The ship was more optimized to fight on level water, and not to move. At the same time, the large dimensions of its body made all its characteristics very decent. The displacement of its 15352 tons. The closest analogue to this ship in the Russian fleet is the squadron battleship Retvizan.


The entire Japanese fleet consisted of order 100 warships of various classes, but unlike the Russian fleet, all these 100 ships like a fist were focused on the same theater of operations. From ~ 300 warships of the Russian fleet, they took direct part in the war with Japan around 100, that is, of the order of 30%. Already during the war, the Japanese fleet was replenished with two armored cruisers of Italian construction: the Nissin and the Kassuga.

Results: Without going deep at this stage in all nuances, manning ships, their maintenance and repair, combat training of personnel, the choice of commanders and assessing their professional suitability, but simply concisely noting that "at some stage something went wrong one can say that all this giant armored power of the Russian fleet was lost in the most mediocre manner. Moreover, without any serious damage to the enemy. The Japanese fleet loss data is given in the 3 table. They only cause a bitter grin.

Table 3


Losses of the Japanese fleet in the 1904-1905 Russian-Japanese war.

Battleships (EDB)
1. Ijn Hatcuse - sank near Port Arthur as a result of an explosion on the mines put up by the Russian mine-layer Amur. 2 May 1904.
2. Ijn Yashima - Cupid exploded on mines exposed by the Russian minelayer and sank in 5 miles from Etkaunter-rock Island. Yellow Sea. 2 May 1904.

Light cruisers I-ranga (CRL)
1. Ijn Takasago - was blown up by a mine exposed by the Russian destroyer Angry during patrols and sank in the Yellow Sea between Port Arthur and Chief. December 12 1904 of the year.
2. Ijn Yoshino - sank off Cape Xantum 2 May 1904, after colliding with the armored cruiser Kassuga. Yellow Sea.

Light cruisers II-ranga (CRL)
1. Ijn Cyan en - hit a Russian mine and sank under Port Arthur on November 30 1904 of the year.
2. Ijn Myoko - hit a Russian mine and sank 14 May 1904, in the Bay of Kerr.
3. Ijn Kaymon - The mine of the Russian mine-layer Yenisei was blown up in the bay of Talenenvan and sank on July 5 of the year. Dasanshan Island Yellow Sea.

Gunboats (CL)
1. Ijn Oshima - sank as a result of a collision with a cannon boat Akagi near Port Arthur 3 May 1904. Yellow Sea.
2. Ijn Atago - I hit a cliff in the fog and sank near Port Arthur on October 24 1904.
3. Ijn Otagara maru - exploded on a Russian mine and sank on August 8 1904 near Port Arthur.
4. Ijn Hey-yen - hit a Russian mine and sank 18 September 1904, 1,5 miles from Iron Island.

Destroyer destroyers (EM)
1. Ijn Akatsuki - hit a Russian mine and sank in 8 miles from the m. Laoteshan. 4 May 1904.
2. Ijn Hayatori - it was blown up on a mine by the Russian destroyer Skory and sank 2 miles from Cape Lun-Wan-Tan near Port Arthur. 21 October 1904 of the year.

Military transports (TR)
1. Ijn Hitazi maru - sunk by artillery and torpedoes of the Russian armored cruiser Thunderboy south of Okinoshima island 2 July 1904. Japanese Sea.
2. Ijn Izumo Maru - 152mm sunk by shells of the Russian armored cruiser Thunderbolt 2 July 1904 in the Sea of ​​Japan.
3. Ijn Kinsu Maru - sunk by Russian armored cruisers 13 on April 1904, in the Sea of ​​Japan.

Torpedo boats (TK)
1. Ijn № 48 - hit a Russian mine and sank in the bay of Kerr. 12 May 1904.
2. Ijn № 51 - hit a reef and sank in the bay of Kerr. 28 June 1904 of the year.
3. Ijn № 53 - hit a mine and sank while trying to attack the Russian ship of the line Sevastopol. Port Arthur. December 14 1904 of the year.
4. Ijn № 42 - shot by a Russian battleship Sevastopol 15 December 1904. Port Arthur.
5. Ijn № 34 - Admiral Nakhimov of the Russian armored cruiser in the night battle of 203 on May 15 sank after the 1905mm hit the shell of the Russian armored cruiser. Japanese Sea.
6. Ijn № 35 - Vladimir Monomakh was sunk by artillery fire of the Russian I-rank cruiser in the night battle of 15 in May of 1905. Japanese Sea.
7. Ijn № 69 - sank after a collision with the destroyer Akatsuki 27 May 1905 of the year.
8. Ijn Unidentified - Admiral Sevyanin sank after hitting a 254mm projectile from a Russian coastal defense battleship on the night of May 15 of the year.



Total 24 combat and auxiliary ships. Of these, mines were sunk by 13 ships (54%), 6 ships artillery (25%), 0 ships torpedoes (0%), the combined effect of artillery and XNUM torpedoes (<1%) and losses from navigation accidents of XNX of XNX %). Flooded and abandoned by crews as a result of damage to 1 ships (4%). 17 ships were also captured (0%). The fact that more than half of all the ships of the fleet irretrievably lost by Japan was destroyed by mines - weapons in nature passively - defensively of type, speaks of the extreme passivity and inaction of the Russian fleet of attack during the database at sea. All the fighting at sea was reduced to two major battles, several decent battles and local clashes of individual large ships and light forces. It seems that even in battle, our ships fought as if from a stick, reluctantly, without initiative and in every way trying to evade battle. In the future, this will be given more than one confirmation, as all the cases of individual “flashes” of clarification of consciousness and morale will be considered. Such tactics of our higher admirals led to losses, which can be found in the 0 table.

Table 4



The loss of the Russian fleet in the Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905.

Battleships (EDB)

  1. RIF Retvizan - sat on the ground in the harbor of Port Arthur as a result of damage from the artillery fire of the Japanese ground artillery 23 November 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  2. RIF Petropavlovsk - exploded and sank under Port Arthur 13 on April 1904, as a result of a blast on a Japanese mine.
  3. RIF Poltava - sat on the ground in the harbor of Port Arthur as a result of damage from the artillery fire of the Japanese ground artillery 22 November 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  4. RIF Sevastopol - Torpedoed by Japanese destroyers and flooded by the crew near Port Arthur 20 December 1904.
  5. RIF Peresvet - flooded by the crew in the port harbor of Port Arthur as a result of damage from artillery fire of the Japanese ground artillery 24 on November 1904 of the year. After was captured by the Japanese.
  6. RIF Victory - flooded by the crew in the port harbor of Port Arthur as a result of damage from artillery fire of the Japanese ground artillery 24 on November 1904 of the year. After was captured by the Japanese.
  7. RIF Oslyabya - drowned by artillery fire of Japanese warships during the battle near Tsushima Island 14 May 1905.
  8. RIF Prince Suvorov - sunk by artillery fire and torpedoes of Japanese warships during the Battle of Tsushima Island 14 May 1905.
  9. RIF Imperator Alexander III- sank as a result of damage from artillery fire of Japanese warships 14 May 1905, during the battle of Tsushima Island.
  10. RIF Borodino - sunk by artillery fire of Japanese warships during the Battle of Tsushima Island 14 May 1905.
  11. RIF Eagle - surrendered to the Japanese in the Sea of ​​Japan 15 May 1905, after the battle of Tsushima Island.
  12. RIF Sisoy the Great - During the battle near Tsushima island, it was heavily damaged by artillery fire and torpedoes of Japanese warships, after which it was scuttled by a crew three miles from Cape Kirsaki 15 in May 1905.
  13. RIF Navarin - sunk by torpedoes of Japanese destroyers 15 May 1905 of the year in the Sea of ​​Japan.
  14. RIF Emperor Nikolai I- surrendered to the Japanese in the Sea of ​​Japan 15 May 1905, after the battle of Tsushima Island.

Battleships of coastal defense (BRBO)

  1. RIF Admiral Ushakov - sunk by artillery fire of Japanese armored cruisers 15 in May 1905, west of Oka Island.
  2. RIF Admiral Senyavin - surrendered to the Japanese in the Sea of ​​Japan 15 May 1905, after the battle of Tsushima Island.
  3. RIF Admiral Apraksin - surrendered to the Japanese in the Sea of ​​Japan 15 May 1905, after the battle of Tsushima Island.

Armored cruisers (CRB)

  1. RIF Rurik - sunk by artillery fire of Japanese armored cruisers14 August 1904 of the year during the battle in the Sea of ​​Japan.
  2. RIF Bayan - sunk by Japanese ground artillery artillery fire in the Port Arthur harbor 26 on November 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  3. RIF Admiral Nakhimov - damaged by artillery fire of Japanese warships during the battle of Tsushima Island, later torpedoed by Japanese destroyers and scuttled by 15 crew on May 1905 of the year.
  4. RIF Dmitry Donskoy - flooded by the crew off the island of Dzhelet 16 in May 1905 of the year as a result of damage received during the battle with the Japanese light cruisers.
  5. RIF Vladimir Monomakh - Torpedoed by a Japanese destroyer, and then flooded by the crew off the island of Tsushima 15 May 1905.

Armored cruisers I-th rank (CRL)

  1. RIF Varyag - flooded by the crew on Chemulpo roadstead as a result of damage to Japanese warships received from artillery fire during the battle of Chemulpo 27 on January 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  2. RIF Pallas - sat on the ground in the harbor of Port Arthur as a result of damage from the artillery fire of the Japanese ground artillery 24 November 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  3. RIF Boyarin - was left by the crew after the blast on the 29 January January 1904 mine and sank under the Port Arthur January 31 1904.
  4. RIF Bully - drowned by artillery fire of Japanese land artillery in the harbor of Port Arthur 12 October 1904.
  5. RIF Svetlana - sunk by fire of Japanese light cruisers 15 May 1905, in the Sea of ​​Japan.

Cruisers II-ranga (CRL)

  1. RIF Emerald - I hit the rocks and was blown up by the 19 crew in May of 1905, in the Vladimir Bay.
  2. RIF Rider - sunk by Japanese ground artillery artillery fire at the Port Arthur Harbor 2 December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  3. RIF Gaydamak - flooded by the crew on the eve of the surrender of the Port Arthur fortress 20 December 1904 of the year.
  4. RIF Ural - thrown by the crew, fired upon by Japanese battleships, after which it was torpedoed by one of them and sunk by 14 in May of 1905.
  5. RIF Novik - flooded by the crew as a result of damage received in battle with Japanese light cruisers in the port of Korsakovsk on Sakhalin Island on August 20 of 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  6. RIF Jigit - flooded the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress 20 December 1904 year.
  7. RIF Bully - drowned by artillery fire of Japanese land artillery in the harbor of Port Arthur 12 October 1904.

Gunboats (CL)

  1. RIF Korean - blown up and scuttled by the crew on Chemulpo's roadstead after the battle with the Japanese 27 warships on January 1904.
  2. RIF Beaver - sank in the Port Arthur roadstead after 283mm hit the Japanese ground artillery 13 December 1904.
  3. RIF Sivuch - blown up and flooded by the crew on the Liaohe River 20 July 1904 of the year.
  4. Rif rattling - sank near Port Arthur 5 on August 1904 of the year as a result of a mine blast.
  5. RIF Brave - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the surrender of the fortress 20 December 1904 of the year.
  6. RIF Gilyak - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.

Minelayers (MoH)

  1. RIF Yenisei - blown up by a mine and sank off the island of Nord-Sanshan-Tau 29 January 1904.
  2. RIF Amur - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.

Destroyer destroyers (EM)

  1. RIF Loud - sunk by artillery fire of Japanese destroyers in the Sea of ​​Japan 15 May 1905.
  2. RIF Flawless - sank as a result of damage to Japanese warships 15 of May 1905 received by artillery fire.
  3. RIF Fast - blown up by the crew north of Chikulen-van 15 May 1905 of the year.
  4. RIF Brilliant - received an 203mm projectile from a Japanese armored cruiser and sank the next day 15 in May 1905 of the year in the Sea of ​​Japan.
  5. RIF Exuberant - sunk by artillery fire of the cruiser "Dmitry Donskoy" because of a malfunction in 15 vehicles in May 1905.
  6. RIF Bedovy - surrendered to the Japanese in the Sea of ​​Japan after the Battle of Tsushima Island 15 May 1905.
  7. RIF Impressive - thrown by the crew in the bay Jingzhou 13 February 1904 of the year. After he was shot by a Japanese cruiser.
  8. RIF Watchman - sank as a result of damage to Japanese 26 destroyers February 1904 of the year received from artillery fire near Port Arthur.
  9. RIF Scary - sunk by artillery fire of Japanese warships in the night battle of 13 on April 1904.
  10. RIF Attentive - hit the 14 stones in May, 1904, in the area Jingzhou, after which he was torpedoed by the destroyer "Vigorous".
  11. RIF Lt. Burakov - torpedoed by a Japanese torpedo boat in Tahe Bay on July 23 1904, as a result of which it was badly damaged, stranded and blown up by the crew of July 29 1904.
  12. RIF Stormy - I ran into stones and was blown up by the 29 crew on July 1904, after the Battle of Shantung.
  13. RIF Hardy - hit a mine and sank 11 August 1904, near Port Arthur.
  14. RIF Slim - exploded a mine and sank on October 31 1904 on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur.
  15. RIF Rapid - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Chief 3 on November 1904.
  16. RIF Strong - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  17. RIF Silent - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  18. RIF Fighting - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  19. RIF Striking - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.
  20. RIF Storzhevoy - flooded by the crew in the harbor of Port Arthur before the delivery of the fortress in December 1904. After was captured by the Japanese.

Military transports (BT) and auxiliary ships.

  1. RIF Kamchatka (floating platform) - at the final stage of the main phase of the battle near the island of Tsushima, was located at the flagship battleship Prince Suvorov. After its final neutralization, it was also sunk by Japanese destroyers. 14 May 1905. Japanese Sea.

Torpedo boats (TK)

  1. RIF number XXUMX - it was blown up on the mine exposed by the Japanese armored cruisers near Vladivostok.


The total losses of the Russian Imperial Navy surpassed the losses of the US Navy in the four years of war in the Pacific 1941-1945. Sad list of Xnumx lost ship distributed as follows: 20 ships (31%) were sunk by artillery fire. The Japanese alone failed to sink a single Russian ship 0 (0%), the joint action of artillery and torpedoes destroyed the 3 ship (5%), on the mines 6 were killed ships (9%). Thrown / flooded / blown up by their crews as a result of damage from artillery fire / torpedoes / min / just hopelessness and not knowing what to do: 27 ships (42%!), Surrendered to the enemy 5 ships (8%), as a result of navigation damage lost 3 ship (5%). The most direct and most important responsibility for these gigantic losses, in addition to the tsarist regime itself, is borne by very specific people. These are the admirals: Z. P. Rozhestvensky, V. K. Vitgeft, O. V. Stark. It was in their hands that all power was concentrated and the right to make all the fateful decisions that were taken by them, or not taken. As for Admiral N.I. Nebogatov, he can be reproached with a lack of courage / will / spirit, but one cannot be blamed for lack of professionalism or not knowing his business. Admiral S.O. Makarov proved himself to be a competent and active leader, who knew his job well and was confident in his weapon. Admiral OA Enquist may have been a good specialist in his field, but for some reason he could not express himself. We will consider the contribution to the increase of the fleet combat capability of some of these people below.

Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov - one of the outstanding Russian admirals. Born in 1848 year. He died in 1904 on board the battleship Petropavlovsk (was the flagship of the 1 Pacific Squadron during the renovation of the Tsarevich). The cause of death from a single mine was a fatal accident and shortcomings in the defense of Petropavlovsk. It was booked mainly citadel by type of the British and Japanese DAD. When a mine exploded in the bow of the ship, a sequential detonation of torpedo ammunition, then stored in the fore part of the mine obstacle, and finally, the entire ammunition load of the 1 artillery of the main caliber occurred. The 56-year-old admiral had little chance of escape in such a situation (his place was not far from the epicenter of the last explosion). Under the command of this man, the Russian fleet had every chance of successfully defeating the enemy. The fatal confluence of circumstances put an end to this scenario.


However, many modern post-Soviet researchers of that war very often turn the situation upside down. His "holiness", "Adjutant General" ZP Rozhdestvensky simply can not be something to blame. The outdated and useless, in their opinion, equipment, as well as the illiterate and unaware of the crews of these “floating galoshes” are to blame for everything. To justify such a position, many myths were invented, designed to “translate the arrow” of blame for the disgraceful defeat to civilian specialists, factories, ITC, anyone, but not officers. We will try to consider these myths below. So:

Half-myth №1: Overload of Russian battleships. Because of this, they, they say, died "so quickly." Here it is necessary to understand the difference. They create military equipment and carry out its current / medium / major repairs by civilian specialists, and they exploit it, fight on it and carry out various military maintenance. It is necessary to distinguish the construction and operational overload of ships. Construction overload - civil wines. Operational overload - military fault. With regards to construction overload. At that time, this phenomenon was massive and from that it could even be called "normal." Indeed, armadillos of the Borodino type were calculated for a displacement of 13516 tons, but in reality iron turned out to be 14150 tons. Construction overload amounted to 634 tons. But the level of engineering calculations of that period simply did not allow counting all the loads absolutely exactly. The construction overload of the Japanese battleship "Mikasa" was even greater - 785 tons and at the same time none of the Japanese military as it did not complain about the deterioration of stability or other TTX "Mikasy". Operational overload - excess capacity of the ship. In the campaign 2 th Pacific Squadron, all the battleships were so full of coal, water, provisions and other reserves that the displacement of the battleships of the Borodino type, according to engineer V.P. Kostenko, reached 17000 tons! What are the fighting qualities with such a "weight"! No measures were taken to remedy the situation even before the battle, as a result of which, the displacement of attack ships of the Borodino type before the Tsushima battle was unacceptably large - 15275 tons. The proposal of the Orla officers to carry out the preparation of the ships for battle before the general battle, together with their radical unloading, was rejected with idiotic reasons: “The Orla officers love to play war too much.” The blame in this military, namely ZP Rozhestvensky.

Myth № 2: Slow speed Russian ships. This myth is explained simply. Speed ​​is needed for action. Those who do not take any active actions do not need speed. The Japanese used the speed of their ships, which is called "to the fullest." The Russians used it only when their ships for one reason or another (usually damage) were deprived of the “guardianship” of the commander (and it was already too late) and would just run away and not catch up. In addition, the maximum speed of the ship depends not only on its passport data, but also on the specific technical condition, and on the combat damage it received. The limiting squadron of the Japanese squadron was 15uz, the most XNUMHuz and was limited by the speed of its slowest ship - EBRD1 "Fuji" (for technical reasons could not develop more XNUMHuz). The squadron 15,5 th Pacific squadron was 1-14,5use. The “Sevastopol” EBR didn’t give out more than XNUMH because of the bent blade of the screw. The squadron move of the 15 Pacific Squadron was not tested in practice, but theoretically could be of the order of 15-2 in the squadron there was no ship slower than 15, 15,5uz (“Nikolai-I” - 15uz, “Navarin” - 5uz, “Sisoy the Great” - 15,5uz, BRBO2 such as "Ushakov" all issued on XNUMHuz). In the course of the night attempt to break away from the enemy, the old battleship Nikolai-I under the flag of N.I. Nebogatov, heavily damaged the Eagle, BRBO Sevyanin and Apraksin, as well as the cruiser of the II-rank Emerald easily supported 16-13 speed. Conclusion: The squadron of the Russian attack ships, if it was below the Japanese, then very little. The fact that ZP Rozhdestvensky trudged in with the speed of XNUMHuz (14km / h in total - slower than a river pleasure boat rolls), dragging transports with him — not its low speed capabilities of its warships.

Myth number XXUMX. Russian ships were inferior in terms of Japanese. Came across numbers about the firing range of the Japanese on the 82 cable and even on the 100 (!) Cable cable. The myth is explained in the same way as speed. The Japanese fought actively and used the capabilities of their artillery for all 100%. Of course, there could be no question of some kind of aimed shooting at such gigantic distances for that time. But over long distances, the Japanese did sometimes shoot. Domestic ships fired almost always only in response and ceased fire as soon as their enemy stopped. All without initiative and sluggish (more detailed descriptions of this will be given below). In order to shoot a long distance you need to fulfill three conditions:

1. Artillery must have the technical capability to fire at such distances, in other words, to be sufficiently long-range. Civilian specialists are responsible for this.
2. The fire control system of warships should provide a sufficiently high probability of hitting the target at long distances. Civilian specialists are also responsible for this.
3. Artillerymen of all levels should have proper training and practice in organizing and conducting firing at such distances. Well own the military equipment entrusted to them and be able to handle it correctly. Already the military is responsible for this.

Unfortunately, the military was the “weak link” here. With regards to technical issues. On 100kbt could shoot a single Japanese ship - an armored cruiser "Kassuga" Italian construction. And only from a single 254mm gun. His 203mm cannon, like his twin brother Nissin, was fired at 87kbt. As for the new Japanese battleships, their main-caliber artillery was of two types. The 305mm / L42,5 guns of the EBR Fuji and Yashima, with a maximum angle of + 13,5 °, could shoot extremely at 77kbt. Slightly more powerful 305mm / L42,5 guns “Mikasy”, “Asahi”, “Hattsuse” and “Sikishima” had a lower limiting angle of elevation - + 12,5 ° and extremely fired at 74kbt. Maximum range 203mm guns of the main caliber of Japanese armored cruisers such as "Asama", "Yakumo", etc. was only 60-65kbt, which was approximately at the level of modern 152mm artillery installations of medium caliber Russian ships. The question of ensuring at least the technical capability of firing for the greatest possible distance Russian specialists paid, perhaps, the greatest attention after the German fleet. The elevation angle of the guns of the main caliber of the Russian battleships was + 15 °, + 25 ° and even + 35 °. The squadron battleship Victory was considered the most long-range in the entire Russian fleet. It installed a more modern 254mm / L45 guns, which from the previous "10-inch" differed in increased weight, strength and rigidity of the barrel. As a result, its 225-kilograms main-caliber projectiles flew 777kbts at elevated speeds up to 113 / s. The 254mm guns of the other two ships of this series, the Oslyab and Peresvet, as well as the Admiral Apraksin BRBO, were shot at 91kbt. All “12-inch” battleships with 305mm / L40 guns were fired at 80kbt at an angle of + 15 °. BRBO "Ushakov" and "Sevyanin" shot at 63kbt. The range of fire of the old squadron battleships was less: the “Navarin” had 54kbts, the Nikolay-I had 51kbts for 229mm / L35 and 49кбт for 305mm / L30 guns.

As for the OMS, its 4-x multiple optics and rangefinders with the 1200 mm base even then allowed to conduct a more or less effective fire at a distance of ~ 60кбт (10-12km). Russian battleships of new and newest types have received the latest fire control system “mod.1899”. Its device can be judged by the description of the squadron battleship "Eagle":

Supero mod.1899. The instrument kit was first presented at an exhibition in Paris in 1899 and was installed on many RIF battleships. It was the prototype of the modern systems of central focusing. The system was based on two target posts (VP) - one per board.

Pancratic, optical, monocular devices of these posts - center-level viziers (VTSN) had a variable magnification - 3x-4x. The search for the target and the targeting of weapons to it were made by the VP operator When aiming at the VTsN target, the scale determined the elevation of the target relative to the ship’s diametrical plane, and the associated tracking system automatically set this angle with an arrow in the receiving instruments of the main 8 tower AU batteries and 75 batteries of the ship's guns. After that, the gunners-operators (commanders) carried out a horizontal pickup of their installations before aligning the angle of rotation of the AU with the angle of the target's position (the so-called “combining arrows” principle) and the target came into the field of view of optical riflescopes. Optical, pankraticheskie, monocular sights of the Perepelkin system had a variable magnification ratio - 3x-4x and the angle of the field of view 6 - 8, changing in accordance with it. To illuminate the target in the dark, six combat searchlights with a mirror diameter of 750 mm were used. The next step was to determine the distance to the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower there were two distance measuring stations - one each aboard. They were installed horizontal base rangefinders "Barr and Studd" with the base 1200 mm.

The range finder measured the distance and, using the distance-measuring key, the data was automatically entered into the receiving instruments of the conning tower, the central post, the 8 main tower AU and 75 batteries of mm guns. To control the correctness of the data transfer, there was a feedback system with a control ranging dial, the readings of which were compared with those entered into the receiving instruments. The sight posts and rangefinder stations were located inside the conning tower on the right and left side (one pair for each side), due to which the Orel conning tower had an oval shape in the transverse direction from the center plane of the ship. A set of instruments and a magnetic compass in the conning tower showed the senior artillery officer his own course and speed, direction and strength of the wind. The course and speed of the goal, he determined approximately "by eye". Having information about own speed and course, wind direction and strength, deviation, type of target, angle of target location and distance to it, estimating the approximate speed and course of the target — the senior artillery officer, using firing tables, manually (on paper) made the necessary calculations and I calculated the necessary corrections of preventions for HV and GN. I also chose the type of AU and the kind of projectiles needed to hit this target. After that, the senior artillery officer transferred the data for guidance to the AU, from which he intended to hit the target. For this purpose, in the conning tower and the central post, there was a set of indicator pointing devices that transmitted data through 47 cable wires to the receiving devices in AU and 75 mm batteries. The whole system operated at the voltage Up = 23В through the transformer 105 / 23В. In the case of centralized fire control, they were used to transfer data on the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance, the type of projectiles used. After obtaining the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected AUs installed the guns at the specified angles (corrected the initial installation at the VTsN) and loaded them with the selected type of ammunition. After performing this operation, the senior artillery officer in the conning tower, at the moment when the inclinometer showed “0”, set the grip of the device-indicator of firing into the sector corresponding to the selected fire mode “Fraction”, “Attack” or “Short alarm” in accordance with which AU opened fire. This mode of centralized fire control was the most effective. In the event of failure of a senior artillery officer or the inability for any other reason to produce centralized fire control, all 305 mm, 152mm AU and 75 battery of mm guns switched to group (plutong) fire or a single fire. In this case, the instruments transmitted data on their course, their speed, wind direction and strength, the angle of the target site, the distance to it, but all calculations were made by the commander of the AU or battery. This mode of fire was less effective. In the event of complete defeat of the fire control devices, the personnel of the conning tower and the data transmission circuits, all AUs switched to independent fire. In this case, the choice of the target, and the guidance on it was made by calculating a specific AU using only a gun optical sight, which sharply limited its effectiveness and range. Targeting torpedo tubes was performed using ring sights with the same tracking system as the VP for onboard 381mm TA or turning the entire hull of the vessel for the bow and stern 381mm TA. This fire control system ensured high efficiency in the use of naval artillery and torpedoes against various targets and allowed us to simultaneously “lead” two targets — one from each side. However, it should be noted that the officers and commanders of the Russian squadron battleships of the 2-th Pacific Squadron had poorly mastered this system. For external communication, the ship had a radio station "Slaby-Arko". It was located in the radio room on the first tier of the nasal superstructure and provided communication at a distance of 180-200km.


Stayed third point. Exercises and combat training. In this aspect, the Russian fleet is certainly behind the Japanese. The Japanese regularly conducted exercises and trained in shooting. Since the new fire control devices were then too difficult for them to understand (and even more so their combining into the system) by ordinary sailors, they were developed, if not the most ideal, but the most effective in terms of those specific conditions, fire control and management techniques firing. One of them - the so-called. “The art of massive fire”. Its essence is that, without any use of the SLA (having measured the distance only once), they begin to actively shoot with medium and small caliber artillery. After that, waiting for the cover of the goal. The whole adjustment of the fire is not done by changing the input data and adjusting the fire of the guns themselves, but by directly changing the position of the group of ships (closer to the target). Despite the gigantic consumption of medium-caliber shells, such tactics bore fruit at that time. Moreover, the Japanese goals (that is, our ships) contributed to its success. At the same time, this method of "massive fire" has never been used by anyone. Perhaps due to the fact that the enemies were no longer so stupid. As for our gunners, they worked according to the instructions. And they tried to master the work of the JMA. It turned out not at all. If the lower ranks of artillery somehow could still master their subject, then on the part of the higher ranks almost no effort was made to this. As for the firing range, the command of the 1 Pacific squadron, albeit belatedly, realized the role of new, powerful and long-range guns, as well as modern MSA. And the beginning seems to be developing activities adequate to the current situation. But time was already hopelessly missed. The command of the 2 Pacific Squadron was still in happy ignorance regarding the combat capabilities of enemy and own ships. All those criminally rare shooting exercises were conducted at a distance not further 20kbt. Thus, the gunners of the 2 Pacific squadron engaged the Japanese, not having any practice at long range. The exception is - 3-I Pacific squadron of admiral N. I. Nebogatov (joined the 2-th Pacific squadron). Admiral Nebogatov proved himself to be a good specialist in artillery. He trained his artillerymen to fire well from the most extreme possible distances. As luck would have it, Rear Admiral NI Nebogatov’s squadron consisted only of outdated or small ships. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the battleship Nikolai-I was in fact the oldest and weakest battleship of the Russian Pacific Fleet, its fire turned out to be almost the most effective! The old ship, still shooting with black powder, achieved hits at distances up to 50 cable ie. at the maximum possible range for their artillery! In all likelihood, it was his 305mm and 229mm shells that inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese armored cruiser Asama, which had to withdraw from the battlefield. Thus, the cruiser Varyag was to some extent avenged. Unfortunately, this combat training didn’t touch the crews of the newest strike ships otherwise even with such a “brilliant” commander as Z. Rozhdestvensky, the Japanese could probably be crushed by the power of the Borodino team.

Semi Myth # 4. Bad shells on Russian ships. They, they say, badly pierced the armor and almost did not explode. Russian "12-inch" battleships used 305mm armor-piercing and fragmentation shells of the 1887 model with a mass of 331,7kg. "10-inch" ships had 254mm armor-piercing shells of the model 1892, the mass of 225,2kg. Japanese battleships fired 305mm armor-piercing and high-explosive shells of mass 386kg. Let's start with armor-piercing. Their comparative characteristics are shown in the table 5.

Table 5


Art system

Shell

Weight

Explosive charge

starting speed

The thickness of the pierced armor in the support Kruppovskaya

Thickness of pierced armor with 60kbt Kruppovskaya

Russian 305mm / L40

Armor piercing

331,7kg

5,3kg pyroxylin

792m / s

381mm / 0°

99mm / 0°

Japanese 305mm / L42,5

Armor piercing

385,6kg

11,9kg picric acid

762m / s

368mm / 0°

104mm / 0°

Russian 254mm / L45

Armor piercing

225,2kg

8,3kg pyroxylin

693m / s

343mm / 0°

84mm / 0°



As can be seen from the table 5, all the shells are completely worth each other. What is surprising is that the 254mm projectiles of Russian ships with almost two times less kinetic energy compared to the 305mm projectiles, however, were almost as good as armor penetration. As for the armor penetration itself, it can be seen from the 5 table that the characteristics of the Russians that the Japanese armor-piercing shells made them ineffective against the powerful armor of battleships at long distances. Their effective use for heavily armored targets was limited by the distance <20-30 cable. Over long distances, there was practically no chance of penetrating the defense of the female gunner. This data was confirmed by real practice. Despite all the efforts of the Russian and Japanese artillerymen during the battles, they never once managed to penetrate the Krupp armor plate thicker than the 152mm. It is also worth noting that for 305mm / L35 guns "Navarin" there were more heavy 305mm projectiles with a mass 455kg. But for some reason they were not included in the ammunition of this ship. The use of such "suitcases" in modern gun mounts with 305mm / L40 guns in new ships is a question that requires further research, since it is not known for certain whether the MOH trays were fitted9 the newest "Borodintsev" and "Tsesarevich" to receive such longer projectiles. Therefore, at distances over 30 cable it made sense to switch to fragmentation and high-explosive shells. Their comparative characteristics are shown in the table 6.

Table 6


Art system

Shell

Weight

Explosive charge

starting speed

Russian 305mm / L40

Fragment

331,7kg

15,6kg pyroxylin

792m / s

Russian 305mm / L40

High explosive

331,7kg

25kg pyroxylin

792m / s

Japanese 305mm / L42,5

High explosive

385,6kg

48,5kg picric acid

762m / s



At first glance, it seems that the Japanese high-explosive shells utterly surpass the Russians3. In part, it is. Especially if you add to our shells increased pyroxylin humidity from 10% to 30%. But not everything is so great. First, the fuses on the Japanese high-explosive shells were set up for instant action from the slightest touch. This led to a series of explosions of these shells directly in the barrels of Japanese guns, which naturally led to the failure of these guns. Secondly, it is an explosion inside its armored hull that is terrible for any armored vehicle. Even a powerful high-explosive explosion from the outside is not capable of causing serious damage, but only spoils the "cosmetics". Therefore, to combat armored objects, first of all, armor-piercing and semi-light-launching shells with time-delay fuses are good. The Japanese non-projectiles were very effective against light cruisers, but it turned out to be extremely difficult to destroy the booked from head to foot, even if the overloaded “Borodino”. The Japanese themselves understood this perfectly well, which, along with land mines, also actively used armor-piercing shells against Russian battleships. Conclusion - the myth of the bad shells of Russian ships, of course, is not a myth in the full sense of the word - partly a fact. And the blame for this lies with civilian specialists, but it is not worth exaggerating its value beyond measure either. Opponents were not perfect either.

Myth № 5. Small booking area of ​​Russian ships. At that time, there were two main heavy ship booking schemes in the world: the English one, also known as the “all or nothing” scheme and the French one — a common one. According to the first - ZHVCH ship are covered with the most thick armor, and all other parts of it either have weak protection, or are completely deprived of it. It was under this scheme that the Japanese and many of our battleships were booked. However, in the design of the newest ships Tsesarevich and the Borodino series, domestic designers, based on the best of both schemes, brought the booking of these ships to perfection. The protection of the “Tsarevich” and the “Borodino” series turned out so powerful, so modern that in principle it corresponded to battleships and large heavy cruisers of the Second World War. It provided reliable protection of these ships even from dreadnought-out "suitcases". The battle of "Glory" with the powerful German dreadnoughts "Koenig" and "Kronprinz-Wilhelm" in 1917, was clearly demonstrated. In spite of the seven 305mm projectiles received (each weighing 405,5kg), three of which fell below the belt into the underwater part of the hull, the battleship Slava did not receive serious damage. And if it were not for the waterproof door that was unclosed due to someone's disorder (and if not for the revolution), then it would have been possible to continue fighting. The booking scheme for the Eagle battleship is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 18




The most heavily protected zone in the center of the ship at the waterline is approximately 60m length and about 0,8m height and is protected: 194mm / 0 ° + 40mm / 30 ° + 40mm / 0 ° = 314mm equivalent of Krupp armor 4. This was more than enough to counter any armor-piercing projectiles of the time. However, all ZhVCH, artillery, torpedo tubes, as well as areas near the surface of the water were also protected by quite powerful armor. And the total thickness of armor of all armored decks ranged within 72mm, 91mm, 99mm, 127mm, 142mm, 145mm - the indicators are quite good for the huge battleships of the Second World War. The protection of the Japanese ships was much simpler and approximately corresponded to our battleships of the Poltava, Retvisan, Sisoy the Great projects, etc. In addition, all Japanese battleships with the exception of "Mikasa" were chained to Harveyev armor. The counterhard resistance of the Harvey armor is related to Krupp’s as 0,8 to 1, that is, the Harveyev’s armor was inferior to the counter-projectile firmness of Krupp (on new Russian ships) by 20%. Really powerful was the booking only from the flagship Japanese battleship Mikasa. In addition, we should not forget that half of the Japanese attack ships were armored cruisers, the level of protection of which was even lower compared to the squadron battleships.

Half-myth №6: Large sizes of reticle and embrasures in Russian ships. The width of the sighting slits in the battleship Tsesarevich and the Borodino series was huge 380mm. It was a necessary measure. the designers placed in the conning tower all the elements of the JMA of these ships including. DS, VP and ring sights onboard torpedo tubes. To ensure the normal visibility of all these optics, we had to make slots of that width. The desire of designers to place the entire SLA under the armor of the conning tower can be explained. Firstly, the SLA has not yet developed so strongly and the weight and size characteristics of its elements still allowed them to be assembled in the BR - the most protected place in the upper part of the ship.

Secondly, typical combat distances of that time: 30-60кбт meant that in addition to the rare single hits of large-caliber shells, the ship was also under a hail of small and medium-caliber shells: 75mm, 76mm, 152mm. Obviously, bulky and poorly protected control towers, guided sight posts and other elements of the SLA, if they were openly located, would be destroyed by these seemingly innocent shells in the first minutes of the battle. However, in terms of protection against shells, the combat logging of domestic ships was designed well.

They had a mushroom-shaped roof protruding beyond the side armor felling and splinter shields. As a result, the penetration of shells inside the conning tower was practically excluded, which was confirmed in actual combat practice. Despite the huge number of hits, which fell on the share of Russian battleships, the cases of penetration of projectiles inside the BR were practically not recorded. However, the commanding staff, however, was badly damaged by shrapnel, while being inside the conning tower. But this is primarily due to the huge number of hits and high characteristics of Japanese high-explosive fragmentation projectiles. But, as you know, everything is relative. The well-known Soviet writer A.S. Novikov wrote in his novel “Tsushima”: “Inspection gaps in Japanese ships were made so that even a small fragment could not penetrate into the conning tower ...” With all due respect to Alexey Silich, you need to understand that he was not a specialist in the field of shipbuilding and could only appreciate the perfection of the design of the logging of Japanese ships purely visually. Photo to assess the size of the reticule slots of the Japanese battleships. In addition, the Japanese would not have been Japanese if they had not decided on a very original from the point of view of straightforward European logic, a step - Vice-Admiral of Togo and Rear-Admiral Kamimura, who commanded the Japanese attack ships, would not have to “climb” into the military logging of their ships! Admiral Togo spent the entire battle, substituting his chest hung with epaulets and medals to all winds (and shells) on the upper bridge of the Mikasy. That is, quite openly ... By an evil coincidence, a Russian 305mm splintering right above the bridge, a fragmentation shell killed and wounded everyone who was on it. Besides…. BESIDES…. Of course, Vice Admiral Kheyhatiro Togo. Admiral Kamimura also spent the whole battle on the battle mars of the mainmast and remained alive. The fact that both Japanese admirals remained alive and did not even get seriously wounded indicates only extraordinary good luck accompanying and evil fate pursuing Russian ships throughout this war. In addition, very low characteristics of domestic fragmentation and high-explosive shells affected.

Battle house of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. View from the stern of the ship. It can be seen that the size of the sighting slots is also very decent, although it is smaller than that of our ships. In addition, this cabin has no “eyebrows” in the form of an overhanging mushroom-shaped roof, so in principle it is possible to penetrate inside its shells falling at an angle. Admiral Togo all battle stood two floors above ...


As for the sizes of embrasures ... The sizes of embrasures in the towers of Japanese artillery installations of the Civil Code were smaller than those of Russians, but the angle of pumping of their guns vertically was also smaller, we should not forget about it. In addition, the AU GC towers of the Russian battleships were streamlined and defended with Krupp armor 254mm thick, which made them invulnerable from any projectiles of that time at typical combat distances. The rotating parts of the Japanese AU GD, “Fuji” and “Yashima” were reserved much more modest - all 152mm and were potentially vulnerable to BB-shells of Russian ships. The Japanese battleship Fuji, to which ours really struck 152mm 12 armor of an artillery installation (thus confirming my logical conclusions) almost exploded. after that, a fire started and the charges in the tower and the supply pipe were already ignited. The fire miraculously “extinguished itself” with water from a torn pipeline, which we again attribute to the “conscience” of evil rock. But all this concerns only artillery of a large (main) caliber. The level of any type of protection 152mm turret gun mounts of the newest Russian battleships exceeded by two orders of magnitude the security of medium-caliber guns and their calculations on Japanese ships. This photo in essence and in the comments does not need, but still:

Battery deck of the Japanese battleship Mikasa. You do not need to have wild imagination to imagine what will happen to the calculations of all these guns, at least one more or less decent shell will explode here ... Just meat. This design is no different from the technical solutions used in wooden battleships of the sailing era. The size of their "embrasures" as well hints ... Good gate. On Russian battleships of the Borodino type 75mm, the mine weapons were located in separate casemates with 76mm armor of their walls in a circle. There are many historians who are happy to criticize the 152mm twin tower turrets of the latest Russian armadillos. They somehow forgot that the entire medium-caliber artillery of the battleship Oslyabya, which was located in the same casemate installations as the Mikas, was completely destroyed after some 20 minutes after the start of the battle.


Obviously, the conclusion is that the Japanese ships simply had good high-explosive fragmentation shells (for all their shortcomings), and not beyond invulnerable logging, ultra small embrasures or something else. And most importantly - the Japanese samurai fought, and not sluggishly fought back like ours. There is a good phrase from the H / F "Antikiller". In this case, of course, exaggerated, but the essence reflects quite accurately: “Because they are at war, and we are at work ...” The comparative characteristics of the most basic types of strike ships of the Russian and Japanese fleets are listed in the 7 table.

Table 7


TTX

Eagle

Poltava

Oslyabya

Mikasa

Fuji

Asama

A type

Dbc

Dbc

Dbc

Dbc

Dbc

KRB23

Displacement t.

13516

11500

12674

15352

12320

9900

Engine power hp

15800

11255

15051

16000

14000

18200

Travel speed knots / km / h

17,8 / 33

16,3 / 30,2

18,6 / 34,4

18,5 / 34,3

18,3 / 33,9

22,1 / 40,9

Large caliber artillery

Obuhov
2-2х305mm L40

Obuhov
2-2х305mm L40

Obuhov
2-2x254mm L45

Amstrong
FI2x305mm L42,5¹

Amstrong
2-2х305mm L42,5

Amstrong
2-2х203mm L47,52

Muzzle energy mj

106,1

106,1

55

112,1

105,1

34,9

Drives
Loading

A3
А

А
А

А
А

А
А

А
А

А
PM4

Shooting range kbt / km

80

80

91

74

77

60

The thickness of the pierced armor with 50kbt normal mm

129 / 0 °
"K" 9

129 / 0 °
"TO"

109 / 0 °
"TO"

140 / 0 °
"TO"

ND

56 / 0 °
"TO"

Fire temp
volley per second:

90

90

90

75

150

3011

Medium caliber artillery

Cane

6-2х152mm
L45

Cane
4-2х152mm
4-152mm
L45

Cane

11-152mm
L45

Amstrong

14-152mm
L42,5

Amstrong

10-152mm
L42,5

Amstrong

14-152mm
L42,5

Muzzle energy mj

13,3

13,3

13,3

10,4

10,4

10,4

Drives
Loading

А
PM

M-PA5
R-PM

M6
R7

М
Р

М
Р

М
Р

Shooting range kbt / km

61

61

61

49

49 / 9,1 55 / 10,210

49 / 9,1 55 / 10,2

The thickness of the pierced armor with 30kbt normal mm

43 / 0 °
"TO"

43 / 0 °
"TO"

43 / 0 °
"TO"

35 / 0 °
"TO"

35 / 0 °
"TO"

35 / 0 °
"TO"

Fire temp
volley per second:

12

FI10

10

10

10

10

Torpedo armament

4-381mm

4-381mm
2-457mm

5-381mm

4-457mm

5-457mm

5-457mm

Torpedo launch range km

0,9

0,9
3

0,9

3

3

3

Distance meter stations DS
type / number

F2A / 2Pieces
Inside the BR

F2A / 2Pieces
Inside the BR

F2A / 2Pieces
Inside the BR

F2A / 2Pieces
Open

F2A / 2Pieces
Open

F2A / 2Pieces
Open

Viziry central guidance VTSN

2pcs at the posts of posts ВП14inside the BR

no

no

no

no

no

Bearing guidance

Semi-center - central to the tracking system ВЦН15

Local

Local

Local

Local

Local

Range guidance

Local Instrument

Local Instrument

Local Instrument

Local Instrument

Local

Local

The calculation of the lead angles of HV and GN

Manual
Devices and
Ballist
shooting tables

Manual
Devices and
Ballist
shooting tables

Manual
Devices and
Ballist
shooting tables

Manual
Devices and
Ballist
shooting tables

Manual
Devices and
Ballist
shooting tables

Manual
Devices and
Ballist
shooting tables

Data transmission of the HV and GN prediction angles to the AU

On receiving and transmitting devices

On receiving and transmitting devices

On receiving and transmitting devices

The voice

The voice

The voice

Data transfer DS and bearing in the AU

Machine. on tracking system VTsN and auth. input far in the LMS from DS16

Machine. input far In the LMS from DS

Machine. input far In the LMS from DS

The voice
For receiving-transmitting devices SUO12

The voice

The voice

Protection of the citadel and ЖЖЧ mm

194 / 0 ° + 40 / 30 °
+ 40 / 0 ° = 31413
"TO"

368 / 0 ° = 368
"TO"

229 / 0 ° + 51 / 30 °
= 331
"G" + "NI»

229 / 0 ° + 76 / 45 °
= 336
"K" + "G"

457 / 0 ° = 457
"Mr.NI»

178 / 0 ° + 51 / 30 °
= 280
"G"

Mm tip protection

145 / 0 ° + 40 / 30 °
= 225
"TO"

76 / 45 ° = 107
«NI»17

83 / 30 ° = 166
«NI»

102 / 0 ° + 51 / 45 °
= 174
"K" + "G"

no

89 / 0 ° = 89
"G"

Deck protection mm
(in different places)

51 + = 40 91
24 + 32 + 40 = 99
51 + 32 + 40 = 123
51 + 51 + 40 = 142
"TO"

51
76
«NI»

51
64
«NI»

51
76
51 + = 51 102
"G"

64
«NI»

51
«NI»

PTZ mm

40 / 0 °
"TO"
False bottom

False bottom

False bottom

False bottom

False bottom

False bottom

Protection AU24 GK mm

254 tower
229 barbet
"TO"

254 tower
254 barbet
"G" 18

229 tower
203 barbet
"TO"

254 tower
FI203
barbet
"TO"

152 tower
FI229
barbet
"Mr.NI»22

152 tower
152 barbet
"G"

Protection AU SK mm

152 tower
152 barbet
"TO"

127 tower
127 barbet
"G"

-

-

-

-

Protection of the board and casemate AU mm

FI51
"TO"

75
“X” 19

FI102
"G"

152
"TO"

FI102
"Mr.NI»

FI127
"G"

Note:

  1. The documents are designated as 40-caliber, but the Japanese, according to the British model, measured the barrel length only by its rifled part, whereas in the Russian and German fleets the charging chamber was also included in the barrel length. In order to bring the values ​​of barrel lengths to a common denominator, the length of Japanese guns was recalculated according to the Russian standard of measurements.
  2. Often in documents are designated as 40-caliber, but in fact were 45-caliber (according to Japanese standard) and therefore L47,5 on the Russian standard of measurement.
  3. A - automatic ones at all stages of the loading process, they do not require the direct use of human muscular strength or mechanisms that transform it, but only pressing buttons.
  4. PM - semi-mechanical ie at some stages, mechanisms that transform the human muscular strength work, and at some stages, operations are performed completely manually.
  5. PA - semi-automatic ie in a series of operations is performed automatically, and some mechanisms that transform the human muscular strength.
  6. M - mechanical with the help of mechanisms that transform the human muscular strength.
  7. P - manual ones requiring direct physical work.
  8. The data are given for standard projectiles with mass 95,3kg. Also in the ammunition of the ship included 203mm projectiles mass 113,4kg. The firing range of heavy projectiles reached 65kbt or 12km, but the feed pipes and chutes of the MH of the gun mounts of the Asama armored cruisers were not designed for these shells and therefore they could only be used by placing the ammunition in the stern of the turret. Naturally, without such "trifles" as the expelling panels and fire wall.
  9. K - Krupp armor. The most powerful armor at that time period. Therefore, it is taken as a base with an 1,0 resistance coefficient.
  10. For deck 152mm art installations.
  11. The data are given for standard 203mm projectiles of mass 95,3kg. In the case of the use of heavy projectiles with 113,4kg mass from the ammunition in the turret's aft niche (20 projectiles intervened), this rate of fire was maintained only until these 20 projectiles were exhausted (10 volleys). Then the rate of fire fell sharply.
  12. A set of transceiver devices on the Mikas was available, but they either did not work, or the Japanese did not know how to use them, and therefore the data was transmitted like on other Japanese ships - just with a voice or messenger-sailor messenger.
  13. The data are given for the ships "Eagle", "Glory", "Prince Suvorov". The battleships Borodino and AlexanderIII»Was: 203mm / 0 ° + 40mm / 30 ° + 40mm / 0 ° = 323mm of Krupp armor in total normal.
  14. VP - sight post. The ships of the Borodino series were located inside the conning tower on the left and right sides (one per board).
  15. VTSN - center-view sight. Located on the sight post.
  16. DS - distance measuring station.
  17. NI - Nickel armor. The coefficient of resilience in relation to the base (Krupp armor) - 0,7.
  18. G - Harvey armor. 0,8 resistance coefficient.
  19. W - iron armor. 0,4 resistance coefficient.
  20. For the outer (above the upper deck) part of the barbet.
  21. For the outer (above the upper deck) part of the barbet.
  22. "Mr.NI"- Harvey's stalike nickel armor. 0,85 resistance coefficient.
  23. KRB - armored cruiser.
  24. AU - art installation.


After analyzing all the listed myths and facts, it gradually comes to the conclusion that the most shameful defeat in the entire history of the Russian Navy does not lie in the quality of military equipment or the incompetence of civilian specialists. Of course, there were sins behind them too. The main one is a frail OFS5 and weak torpedo weapons. Powerful, long-range 457mm torpedoes were carried on board only battleships of the Poltava type.

The rest were more modest, caliber 381mm. And the difference is - whether to approach the “wounded game” on 2-3km, or on 900 meters. However, torpedoes are generally the strong point of the Japanese. They frightened Americans a lot with their huge "Long Lans" and (in other things, the Japanese did not help). But torpedoes are not the main thing! So why did this happen? And who is to blame? The main responsibility for such a rout lies with:

1. Admirals Z. P. Rozhestvensky, V. K. Vitgeft, O.V. Stark.
2. Angry rock, pursuing our fleet all this war.

Let us examine these two main reasons for the defeat. Point one. Were these three men clinical idiots who had themselves strangled all the basics of combat training, operation and maintenance of the ships and ships entrusted to them? They really strangled all the basics, but yet they were not idiots. These were people of a kind of abilities that were in demand in the then royal navy. In the fleet, whose leadership seriously believed that only a demonstration of the newest weapon to the enemy could be defeated, warriors were not needed. And needed business executives. Whatever the ships clearly kept operation, did not "delay", always glittered with new paint, the curbs on the shore were also painted and all the leaves on the ground were turned upside down to the visit of "His Majesty". All three could not be better suited to the implementation of such activities. Well, it is necessary to recognize that they could also solve the problem of logistics (moving over long distances). Logistics, to some extent, was one of the reasons for the defeat of the 2 th Pacific Squadron. The Japanese fleet went into battle, fresh, rested and prepared. The Russian squadron, after six months of the hardest swimming, immediately went into battle. And the fact that the combat potential of the fleet is reduced by N% per each 1000km distance from the home base has been known for quite some time.

As for the second point, we come to one of the most interesting questions of that war — and what could we have done then? The author of these lines had to read quite a few “alternative” variants of the Tsushima battle. They all started with the same thing: “But if - (commanded by Makarov / armadillos were not overloaded / shells exploded well / your version), then OOO ………” Then they followed, perhaps quite logical, but completely delusional with historical point of view reasoning. Historical processes have enormous inertia and the change of just one fact of history to fundamentally change the entire subsequent chain of events is simply unrealistic. To do this, it is necessary to change all previous events and momentous decisions in a historical retrospective for many years to a significant date in order to change the logical chain itself preceding it. This simply does not make any sense that it is clear to any student. The most "tasty" alternative is obvious - Admiral Makarov did not die, but continued to command the 1 Pacific Squadron. But to calculate what would be in this case reliably practically unrealistic. Therefore, without going into details regarding the 1 Pacific Pacific squadron, which is inactive and operating in conjunction with the ground forces, we’ll dwell in detail on the 2 squadron of ZP Rozhestvensky. What could she expect to do, exhaustedly drawing into the Tsushima Strait in the evening of 13 in May of 1905, when the ship’s radio stations had already detected the presence of an enemy fleet over the horizon? So let's try to figure out what the 2-I Pacific Squadron could do if ... No, no - do not be intimidated. If she was just lucky in battle this time. And two. Rozhdestvensky, no - he did not change to another, equally gifted figure, but he would just seriously fall ill and spend the whole battle in the ship’s first-aid post without disturbing anyone to fight. Calculations show that in this case it would not have been possible to win anyway. The maximum that 2 Pacific squadron could count on in this case was to keep the game in a draw.

So. Virtual reality. Morning 14 May. Admiral Felkersam died. Admiral Rozhestvensky in the cabin in serious condition. Admirals Nebogatov and Enkvist do not know about it and therefore almost do not survive. The squadron is commanded by someone on the battleship "Prince Suvorov". And so:

“At the beginning of the sixth, our signalmen and midshipman Shcherbachev, armed with binoculars and telescopes, noticed on the right a steamship rapidly approaching with us. Approaching the cable at forty, he lay down on a course parallel to us. But he walked this way for only a few minutes and, turning to the right, disappeared into the morning mist. He had at least sixteen knots. The flag could not identify him, but by his behavior he immediately suggested suspicion - undoubtedly it was a Japanese intelligence officer. We should have immediately sent him after two high-speed cruisers. Would they drown it or not, but at least find out an extremely important question: are we open to the enemy or are we still in the dark? And in accordance with this, the line of conduct of the squadron should have been determined. But Admiral Rozhestvensky did not take any measures against the mysterious ship. [17 - It was, as it turned out after the battle, the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru, who was in night reconnaissance.6»


To intercept the Shinano Maru, the cruiser Svetlana and two destroyers were sent in time, and they quickly sent it to the bottom. An auxiliary cruiser, the Shinano Maru, was added to the 24 warships listed in the 3 table. Further:

“About seven o'clock on the right side, fuming with two pipes, one more ship appeared which was moving along a converging course. When the distance to him was reduced to fifty cables, then they identified the light enemy cruiser Izumi. For an hour he walked with us in one course, as if teasing us. Of course, it was not in vain that he stayed in front of us. This affected our radio station, which nervously perceived the cipher that was incomprehensible to us, then reports to Admiral Togo, informing him of which ships our squadron was made of, where we were, how fast and what course we were going, how our squadron was built. The Admiral of Rozhdestvensky ordered the ships of the right column to hoist the right-hand cannon and stern towers to Izumi with a signal. But they only limited themselves to taking him on sight. And our high-speed cruisers did nothing this time. ”


The squadron fired a concentrated salvo at Izumi and one projectile hit the target. In addition, several projectiles exploded next to the board, filling the Izumi superstructure with a hail of fragments and flooding with water. As a result of such an execution, the small Japanese cruiser abruptly poplohelo. Further, the most high-speed cruisers "Oleg" (23,5), "Emerald" (24,5) accompanied by a pair of destroyers (26,5) were sent to intercept. Izumi quickly set fire to artillery (the original 50kbt distance was quite accessible to the guns of the Oleg cruiser) and after the torpedoes finished off the cruisers. Izumi added to 152 a place on the list of dead Japanese ships. Report on "Mikasu" full information, he did not have time. Further:

“At ten o'clock on the left, in front of the beam, at a distance of about six cables, four enemy ships seemed already. One of them was two-pipe, and the rest - one-pipe. From our front bridge, we looked at them for a long time before we identified their names: “Hasidate”, “Matsushima”, “Itsukushima” and “Chin-Yen” (two-pipe). These were second class armadillos7, old, slow speed, with a displacement of four to seven thousand tons. On our ships struck alarm. The guns of the left side and twelve-inch bow towers were sent to the enemy detachment. Many of us assumed that our high-speed battleships of the first detachment and Oslyabya from the second detachment, as well as the most powerful cruisers Oleg and Aurora, would immediately rush to the Japanese. As long as their main forces arrived, these four ships would have been smashed. But Admiral Rozhestvensky again refrained from decisive action. ”


To intercept a detachment of Japanese ships sent the cruisers "Oleg", "Aurora", "Svetlana", accompanied by a cruiser II-rank "Emerald" and five destroyers. From a safe distance, they quickly knocked out the old Chinese with a hail of 152mm shells (the range of 305mm guns "Chin-Yen" did not exceed 20 cable), then giving it to the tears of "Emerald" and destroyers, themselves switched to the three remaining cruisers. Those with their hopelessly low rate of fire of a single 320mm gun had practically no chance against our modern large cruisers. As a result, Matsushima and Itsukushima are sunk. The damaged Hassidate managed to escape. Some injuries received cruiser "Aurora". The cruisers Matsushima, Itsukushima and the battleship Chin-Yen were added to the list. Hassidate is disabled. Further:

“Now, four light and high-speed cruisers appeared on the same left side to replace them. They identified: "Chitose", "Kassagi", "Niytaka" and "Otava". Now there was no doubt that the fateful hour was approaching. The enemy forces were being pulled up to us. Four cruisers, like the previous ships, went with us on the same course, gradually moving closer to the squadron. They also had the duty to inform their commander about the movement of our fleet. And our command, as before, did not think to prevent this.

On the auxiliary cruiser “Ural” there was an improved apparatus of a wireless telegraph capable of receiving and sending telegrams at a distance of seven hundred miles. With the help of such a device it was possible to kill the reports of Japanese cruisers. Why don't we take advantage of this? With the "Ural" on the semaphore requested permission from Rozhestvensky. But he answered:

- Do not interfere with the Japanese wire.

On the "Ural" were forced to abandon their very reasonable intentions. "


The cruiser "Ural" hammered the air with noises, as a result of which the Japanese cruisers were not able to transmit to the "Mikasu" data on the composition and disposition of our squadron. At the same time with the Japanese squad of cruisers, the cruisers Oleg, Aurora, Svetlana, Izumrud and five destroyers immediately fought. The Dmitry Dmitriy Donskoy and Vladimir Monomakh cruisers were sent to their reinforcements, but by the time they reached the point, the battle was already over. Enemy cruisers, having received damage, retreated at top speed. Received a series of damage and Russian ships. The Emerald and destroyers returned to their squadron. "Oleg", "Aurora" and "Svetlana" overtook and finished off the damaged cruiser Ottawa with torpedoes. 30 ranked. Well - already not bad. In the meantime, the main forces of the Japanese fleet emerged from the fog and a general battle began.

It proceeded in approximately the same way, with one BUT:

“On the 50 minute of the Tsushima battle, a Russian projectile pierced the aft armor of the 305-mm Fuji battleship tower and exploded inside, igniting the prepared powder charges. The fire ran down the elevators, a little more, and “Fuji” would have blown up the air, but ... an occasional splinter broke through the pipe of the hydraulic line and struck a stream of water to extinguish the flame. Once again, happiness was on the side of the Japanese. "


Not turned out. Fuji battleship exploded and sank. The Japanese squadron has already lost two strike ships: the battleship Fuji and the armored cruiser Assam, which left the battlefield and suffered heavy damage. “Honorable” 31-place in the list. But let's not return for a long time again to the cruisers:

“From the very first Russian shots, the Izumi cruiser began to suffer defeat. Hits fell on its front end. He began to bury his nose. Fifteen minutes later the enemy cruiser turned to the right and, increasing the course, began to move away. For a short time he disappeared into the mist. But soon they saw him again. He walked towards the "Monomakh" in forty cables. On it again opened heavy fire. This time the Izumi feed was enveloped in smoke, and this forced him to leave the battlefield and head left. [40 - The English newspaper The Japan Daily Mail, published in Yokohama, dated 31 on May 1905, was published: “The cruiser Izumi (formerly Esmeralda, 2950 tons) was heavily damaged and had to leave the battlefield.” ]


"Vladimir Monomakh" remained intact. The enemy shells made undershoots or flights, and only one of them hit him. Commander Popov exulted. When the senior gunner Nozikov approached him, he, trying to shout over the hubbub of still not settled chickens, solemnly spoke:
“But we cleverly chopped it!” As set strekacha! In full swing rushed from us. "


In place of the already sunk Izumi cruiser, there was another similar cruiser. After he turned to the right and began to move away, he was already trimming and serious damage, the cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh" squeezing all the 16-17 units from his old worn-out cars caught up with the damaged Japanese cruiser and finally finished it off. The forces are simply not equal, the Japanese had no chance and stupidly to watch how he flees was not for anything. 32-place. Lucky and destroyers:

“About eleven o'clock ahead, a second destroyer appeared on the right, who intended to cross the course of“ Loud ”. Kern ordered to develop the most complete course. The rear destroyer began to lag behind, and the one on the right approached and opened fire. There was a battle with unequal forces. It was necessary to decide on something audacious to get out of a difficult situation. And the commander Kern went for it. The specialty of the miner suggested to the commander the idea that the moment had come to discharge the two surviving mine apparatuses at the enemy. They were located on the upper deck. At his disposal, both mines were prepared for shooting. "Loud" made a sharp turn and rushed to the enemy, who was walking behind. As they learned later, it was the Shiranui fighter. Kern decided to blow it up, and then conduct an artillery duel with another destroyer. The distance between Siranui and Loud was quickly reduced. The team was aware that a decisive moment had arrived. Komendory increased fire. But at that moment the main role was assigned to the minerals, who stood at the ready of their vehicles. Suddenly, near them, flashing a short lightning, smoke curled up like a whirlwind on the dusty road. From the fire and smoke, something heavy separated and flew overboard. Senior officer Paskin pushed the air to the casing at the back of the chimney. Recovering, he rushed to the site of the explosion. The apparatus had dead miners Abramov and Telegin, and all that was left of the mine-conductor of the Bezdenezhnykh was a peaked cap that was thrown off to the stand of the onboard tracker. Lieutenant Paskin delivered Tsepelev, Bogorytsev and Ryazdievsky to the staff of the miners. The enemy was approaching the traverse. The distance to it did not exceed two cables. From the bridge, the commander commanded to release a mine from the apparatus number 1. But she barely moved forward and, hitting her tail overboard, fell into the water like a log.

- Drowned, mean! - screamed on the bridge vigilant signalman Skorodumov and swore firmly. The commander, who was closely following the actions of the miners, clenched his fists and not in response to him, not to clarify to himself what had happened, he said through clenched teeth: “The gunpowder ignited badly — it was damp. The second mine, released after the enemy, went right to the goal. Already they were waiting for an explosion, but when it reached the surface of the sea almost to the stern, it suddenly turned to the side, thrown away by raging streams from screws. In this attack, all the advantages were on the side of "Loud". "
The "loud" was lucky and the torpedo was working. The Japanese destroyer Shiranui quickly set off for Yasukuni Shrine.

"The enemy, obviously, shot his mines last night, and his vehicles were fixed in a traveling manner."


The destroyer "Loud" launched the second torpedo on the second Japanese destroyer, but he managed to dodge and began an artillery duel. Excellent training crew Kern did not leave him a chance. The Japanese destroyer received fatal injuries, lost speed and sank after a while. The destroyer "Loud" showed the highest class, destroying two Japanese destroyers in a duel and safely reached Vladivostok. 32-e and 33-e place occupied by Japanese destroyers. The day before the duel of the armored giants continued. Already lost "Oslyabya", "Suvorov" and "Alexander III" (the last two are still afloat and still fired). Later, the crew of the destroyer "Violent" arranged lynching, throwing overboard Vice Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky with the words "Missing". The commander of the destroyer NNKolomeytsev did not support the idea, but he treated the situation with understanding. Admiral Kheykhatiro Togo stood on the upper bridge with all his staff. Russian 305mm fragmentation shell hit the foremast at the level of people's heads and exploded. From all those who were on the upper bridge including and Admiral Kheyhatiro Togo, only shapeless stumps remained. So in one second the Japanese squadron was completely beheaded. And although the command quickly passed into the hands of Rear Admiral Kamimura, the actions of the Japanese began to give a slight hysteria, which usually happened to them, as soon as something started to go not according to their plan.

The effectiveness of the fire of the Japanese squadron immediately fell so much that the Borodino battleship had enough power and vitality to “drag” the battle before dusk. Admiral Kamimura gave the order to stop the persecution. After the onset of silence, the battleship Borodino, managed only by sailors and having machines in full repair, increased the course to the maximum possible 17-18uz (there was no sense from him in battle anyway) without unnecessary complexes, keeping the course N / O-23 ° Behind him, he tried to catch the same number of “Eagle”, but because of the armor plate on the nose at the waterline turned upside down, the speed did not rise above 16,5. The rest of the ships with the flagship "Nikolai-I" followed along with a speed of about 14. The cruiser "Emerald" went with them in complete darkness without spotlights. News of the death of Admiral Togo, with all its headquarters, had a depressing effect on the Japanese sailors. The activity of the Japanese fleet dropped sharply while it was decided in Tokyo what actions to take next. This hitch was enough for the battleship Borodino, Orel, Nikolai-I and BRBO Apraksin and Sevyanin to reach Vladivostok, where they were taken under the protection of the powerful armored cruisers Russia and Thunderbolt ". As a result, with the most favorable set of circumstances and maximum luck, the Russian 2-I Pacific Squadron could additionally destroy the Japanese battleships Fuji, Chin-Yen, six different cruisers and two destroyers. At the same time, partly break through to Vladivostok, retaining such ships as Borodino, Oryol, Nikolai-I, Apraksin, Sevyanin, Izumrud and Loud. Purely by the number of ships sunk and destroyed - of course, it’s still a loss, but not so disgraceful that the world promised on more favorable terms while preserving the Kuril Islands behind Russia. Both admirals, Russian and Japanese in this virtual reality die. Only a person who does not understand the essence of those deep-seated crisis processes, which at that time already covered all of tsarist Russia, can count on something more, for example, on the complete defeat of the Japanese fleet at Tsushima. So maybe lucky - once in 1000 years. The absurd death of Sergei Makarov showed that the war "did not work out" from the very beginning.

Lessons of war

Lesson №1. To defeat the enemy with only one presence, even the most modern weapons is impossible. It is necessary to be able to use the entrusted military equipment and to be proficient in all the techniques of its use. How are things today with combat training in our fleet? I would like to think that it is better than in the 1904 year. Probably better.


Lesson №2. A combat vehicle is a very complicated mechanism, even one broken screw of which can deprive or in any case limit its functionality. In the 1904-1905 Russian-Japanese War, such “broken cogs” were over-moistened pyroxylin in projectiles, the low power of the CFC and the overload of the ships above the norm with any nonsense. And in what condition are the ships and submarines of the modern Russian fleet? And how many “broken screws” they have, despite the fact that they are immeasurably more complicated than even the most modern ships of the type “Borodino” and “screws” in them are significantly larger.


Lesson №3. Ships of that period (meaning battleships), unlike modern ones, had phenomenal strength and vitality with relatively compact dimensions and forgave admirals and commanders for such mistakes that no modern ship would ever forgive. In other words, with the same “style of command” today, the defeat of the fleet will be an order of magnitude more terrible and transient than it was in the Tsushima battle. In order not to be unfounded, you can see photos that explain everything.

Battleship "Eagle" (13516t, 121,2м) after the Tsushima battle. According to V.P. Kostenko, during the battle he received at least 300 hits. However, during the inspection of the ship in the Japanese dock, it turned out that the Eagle received 76 hits. Of these, 5 - 305mm shells (386kg), 2 - 254mm shells (226,5kg), 9 - 203mm shells (113,4kg), 39 - 152mm shells (45,4kg) and 21 - caliber 76mm (~ 6kg). The total mass of steel that got into the ship is non-sickly 5,3 tons. From her explosives from halftones to tons. The ship survived and retained the order of 10-15% of the original combat potential.

The British destroyer Sheffield (4350t, 125m) after a single hit with the anti-ship missile command AM-39 "Exocet" with a mass of 655kg. The rocket did not explode. However, this cardboard-plastic boat completely burned and sank. If the reader thinks that our Ave. 956 is much stronger, then he is deeply mistaken.


How can one explain the construction of such ships that do not carry the shadow of the reservation is difficult to say. They even have aluminum and magnesium steel, which burns very well. Maybe speed? But speed in modern naval war is no longer the determining factor.

The battleship "Eagle" in a creatively reworked version, with armor closed dynamic protection "Relic", with six AK-130 settings instead of 152mm, with added anti-ship missiles launched through 305mm gun barrels of GK, with AK-630 instead of 47mm guns, with radars with TVP, with a gas turbine power plant (speed from 25 to 35), with operational-tactical missiles RK-55 "Granat" with YABCh in new TA, with universal air defense missile systems and means of PLO would be a terrible and universal weapon. Moreover, this very compact and powerful ship is not the giant battleship Yamato. Building such "Eagles" can be massively and a lot. In this case, the hit of 2-5 missiles of the П-700 complex can be sustained by such a sea tank, after which it will be restored at the factory. Expensive? And how many Sheffields need to be built so that they can withstand 76 hits? No less than 77. Armor, of course, will not save from modern powerful anti-ship munitions, but it gives the hull strength of the tank and does not allow it to fall apart after hitting just one missile. These are perhaps the main lessons for civilian shipbuilders and sailors from that long-lasting war.

Notes:
1. ADB - squadron battleship.
2. BRBO - battleship coastal defense. Had the same architecture as the “big brothers”, but smaller than them in displacement 3-4 times.
3. Reported TTX Japanese high-explosive fragmentation shells of the new generation, which were first used in the Tsushima battle. High-explosive fragmentation shells of the previous types, which were used by the Japanese in the battles with the 1 Pacific squadron and the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, had a very mediocre power, at the level of the Russian fragmentation shells. It turned out after an ineffective artillery strike, which was inflicted by Japanese armored cruisers on Vladivostok 6 March 1904. 200 shells were fired. The result: one killed and three wounded from our side.
4. The data are given for "Suvorov", "Eagle" and "Glory". Borodino and Alexander III had 203mm / 0 ° + 40mm / 30 ° + 40mm / 0 ° = the equivalent of 323mm Krupp armor normal.
5. OFS - high-explosive fragmentation projectile.
6. The novel "Tsushima" A.S.Novikov-Surf. Memories of Russian sailors of the Tsushima battle.
7. The battleship among them was only one old Chinese "Chin-Yen". The remaining three belonged to light armored cruisers of the Matsushima type. Each of them carried a heavy and low-rate 320mm gun. Of course, these ships couldn’t resist even Russian rank 1 cruisers, let alone battleships. However - on the battleship bezrybe Japanese fleet it was quite a "lobster" and therefore the Japanese were in no hurry to send them for scrap. During the Tsushima battle, they were ordered to shoot at the strike Russian battleships from behind the backs of the Japanese armored units, which they did, but they never fell into anyone.
8. The scheme shows only the physical size of the Orla booking, without taking into account the tilt angles of the armor plates.
9. MZ - loading mechanisms.
10. Taking into account the "light heavyweight" cruisers project 26 and 26-bis of the heavy artillery of the Soviet Navy in the 22 June 1941 years is only 36 guns caliber 305mm (on upgraded royal battleships "Marat" type) and 40 guns B-1-P 180mm caliber (at cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and modernized “Red Caucasus”). At the same time, the inclusion of the 26 and 26-bis project in the list of formally light cruisers is an obvious stretch “for a number”, as is the case with the list of the Japanese fleet. What would be absolutely too ashamed. Aircraft carriers of the Soviet Navy on 22 June 1941, in its composition did not have.
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