Military Review

Americans about the war in Chechnya

68
An excerpt from the book I.Popova:


The US military experts are very carefully and critically studying the experience of the actions of the Russian army in urban conditions in the Chechen campaign. The military actions in Chechnya, in their opinion, are a prototype of future clashes between regular armed forces and an irregular adversary, a typical example of the fourth generation war. The United States, as American military experts note, must be prepared for such actions in the future, so the Russian (and Chechen!) Experience has universal significance.

The US Army instructions FM 3-06 “Operations in the city”, published in June 2003, directly states: “The Russian experience of operations in Chechnya in 1994 demonstrated the increasing importance of operations in urban areas. Chechen rebels, after failing to confront Russian troops outside the city, decided to turn the city of Grozny into a battlefield. The leaders of the Chechen crushed formations realized that fighting in urban areas provided them with the best chance for success. The complexity of the fighting in the city and the obvious advantages in the defense neutralized their numerical and technical gap. The urban landscape provided Chechens with fire protection, guaranteed their lines of communication, hid their positions and maneuver. Having received all these advantages provided by the city, the smaller and technically weak armed forces decided to fight precisely in the urbanized area. ”

The American military experts almost immediately after the first December 1994, the operations of the Russian troops in Grozny gave their first comments. In the summer of 1995, the Strategic Forum bulletin No. 38 of the National Strategic Studies Institute of the National Defense University of the United States published the analysis of Lester Grau “Russian tactics in the city: lessons from the battle for Grozny”. L. Grau is considered to be one of the most experienced and authoritative military specialists in Russia and the armed forces of the Russian Federation, therefore, his opinion was taken seriously in the United States.

In accordance with the tenets of the Soviet military science, L. Grau argues, large-scale offensive operations must be carried out at a fast pace, while unprotected cities must be taken, and settlements prepared for defense must be bypassed. The military campaign in Chechnya has put these well-established notions upside down.

The Russian military command viewed the Chechen campaign as “another march against Prague or Kabul”, where the local armed forces offered only symbolic resistance. When the first New Year offensive of the Russian troops was repulsed, the American expert writes, “instead of organizing and preparing a military operation against the Chechen capital, the Russians sent a ragged force assembled to the city for a police action. The result was utter failure. ”

Of the unsuccessful first lessons of the military operation in Chechnya, according to L. Grau, the Russians learned several of the most important lessons.

First of all, the storming of cities is required to prepare. The city should be isolated, “key objects” on the outskirts of the village should be seized, residential and industrial areas should be taken under control. Enemy forces must be broken, minefields removed, weapon - collected, and the city must establish full control (for example, in the form of a curfew).

Intelligence plays a critical role in operations in the city. Before the start of the military operation, the Russian military command did not have small-scale maps (1: 25000), access to images of aerial photography and space reconnaissance was limited.

The conceptual attitudes of the Russian command did not correspond to modern reality. L. Grau writes: “The Russians used assault groups and assault troops to act in the city. These formations proved to be ineffective. The best solution was to use the existing divisions, strengthening or strengthening them in accordance with the requirements of the situation.

The Russian experience in operations in Grozny showed a great need for units and subunits in melee weapons, primarily hand grenades, smoke grenades, hand grenade launchers and flamethrowers, as well as special equipment (ropes, hooks, prefabricated ladders, etc.). In the fight against enemy snipers and firing points on the upper floors of buildings, anti-aircraft installations and helicopters proved to be the best, but by no means Tanks. The experience of using floodlights and various pyrotechnic devices to blind the enemy turned out to be effective.

Artillery on the outskirts of the city fired at maximum distances, but within the city, artillery was used more and more effectively for direct fire.

L. Grau considers the RPG-7, a very light, cheap and simple grenade launcher, made in the USSR back in the 1961 year and now produced in different countries of the world as one of the most effective weapon systems used in combat operations in the city.

After analyzing the experience of Angola, Somalia, Afghanistan and Chechnya, an American expert concluded: “The RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher is one of the most common and effective weapon systems in modern conflicts. RPG-7 is widely used by regular infantry and partisans, whether for the destruction of American Blackhawk helicopters in Somalia, or Russian tanks in Chechnya, or the strongholds of government troops in Angola. ”

RPG-7, the effective range of which reaches 300-500 m, is an extremely important fire support system for small units operating in the city. Its effectiveness is the higher, the closer the enemy is, that is, in situations where the use of artillery and aviation impossible because of the danger of defeating their own troops. Namely, such a situation is typical for actions within the city.

The lessons of the first Chechen campaign of the Russian army were critically analyzed in the summer of 1999 by the captain of the American army, Chad Roop. In the magazine Armor, he elaborated on the tactics of Chechen militants in December 1994 - February 1995. Following other authors, C. Rup leads shortcomings in the preparation and actions of the Russian troops in that operation: weak intelligence, lack of maps of Grozny necessary for the commanders, underestimation of the enemy. The American expert states: “The Russians expected that poorly trained gangs from among civilians would surrender without a fight. The weapons were not loaded, and the soldiers simply fell asleep in the stern compartments of the armored personnel carriers during the attack. ”

Chechens formed a large number of strike groups of 3-4 people. These groups included a grenade launcher with an RPG-7, a machine gunner, an ammunition carrier, and a sniper. Attack groups were combined into larger militias - combat groups of 15-20 fighters. Each of these Chechen militant groups “accompanied” one Russian convoy of armored vehicles along its entire route through the city. Shock groups were spread over the entire length of the Russian armored columns, and in a convenient place (a narrow street, debris and destruction along the side of the road), the signal at the same time disrupted the first and last vehicles of the column. After this, the organized execution of the Russian column began.

The Russian military command soon realized that it was dangerous to operate in the same order of battle, and began to make movements as part of combined columns, which usually consisted of one tank, two infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers and an infantry unit to "clean up" buildings along the column’s route.

A sharp critical assessment of the actions of the Russian troops during the first battles for Grozny was given by V. Goulding. In a serious theoretical article in the Parameters magazine, he cites an anecdote (in which, he believes, there is some truth) about how the Russian operation was being prepared at the end of 1994. V. Goulding writes: “Two colonels from the General Staff were given the task to go to the state archive for collection historical information about the armed conflict in the North Caucasus. Despite attempts by archival staff to send them to shelves with important information, it soon became clear that the colonels were quite satisfied with popular general brochures. Therefore, the full-scale collapse of Russian intelligence is not surprising. ”

Another major critic of the Russian combat experience in Chechnya was Major Norman Kuling. According to him, during the first operation in Grozny in 1994, the Russian army acted extremely ineptly. The intelligence of the Russian army underestimated the mobilization potential of Chechen militants in Grozny, with the result that 6 to thousands of Russian soldiers fought 15 thousands of Chechens. World experience shows that offensive military operations in the city can be conducted with the balance of forces 6: 1 in favor of the attackers. The real balance of forces in Grozny at that time was 1: 2,5 in favor of the defenders. Thus, initially the military operation was doomed to failure.

The column of the Maikop brigade did not move in combat, but in marching order. Militants missed the convoy into the narrow city streets and suddenly attacked it. During 72 hours, 80% of the soldiers and officers of the Russian brigade were disabled. The loss of the brigade in the material part reached 20 tanks from 26 and 102 BMP and BTR from 120 available.

According to N. Kuling, during the first military campaign in Chechnya, about 6 thousands of Russian soldiers were killed, 1,2 thousands were missing. The losses of Chechen militants made 2-3 thousands of people killed and 1,3 thousands missing. Losses of civilians reached 80 thousands killed and 240 thousands injured. Most of the victims were recorded during the fighting in Grozny.

Timothy Thomas, a retired US lieutenant colonel and one of the most respected military experts in Russia, fully associates himself with the assessments and positions of previous American authors. In 1999-2000 in several military journals, he published a series of articles examining the lessons of Chechen battles for fighting in the city.

The author identifies five major lessons of the first Chechen campaign of the Russian army:

Know your opponent deeply and deeply. T. Thomas cites some facts testifying to the “complete misunderstanding of the Russians by either the Chechen culture or the specifics of the area of ​​operations”. In particular, the Russian military command not only ignored the “deep feeling of hatred that left the Russian domination of the centenary for Chechen souls”, but also failed to understand the cultural characteristics of the region — in particular, the adat (code of honor based on revenge); tribal organization of the Chechen society.

Do not assume, but prepare, prepare and prepare again. According to T. Thomas, the Russian side on the eve of the conflict made several mistakes based on assumptions, and not on accurate knowledge of the situation. So, the will of the Chechens to fight was clearly underestimated; revalued their own ability to organize and conduct complex operations; Inadequately evaluated the state of combat readiness of Russian troops sent to Chechnya.

Choose the right weapon. Chechen militants were armed with grenade launchers, cell phones, commercial metal control systems, television and the Internet. In their arsenal, Russian troops relied more on the Kalashnikov assault rifle, grenade launchers, flamethrowers (comparable in effectiveness to 152-mm artillery guns). Both sides widely used snipers, which had a serious combat and moral and psychological effect.

To adapt the tactics of action to the situation. The conduct of hostilities in the city forced both parties to creatively choose the tactics of their actions. The Chechens preferred the so-called “defense without defense”, that is, they did not concentrate on holding individual strongholds or defensive positions, but preferred to conduct maneuverable actions and strike in an unexpected place for the Russian troops. Militants have often and successfully resorted to "dressing up" in civilian clothes, which allowed them to escape persecution, disappear, "dissolve" among the civilian population. They widely used mines, land mines and traps, secretly mining Russian roadblocks and locations of Russian units. The tactics of the actions of the Russian troops consisted mainly in the systematic assault of cities — house by house, quarter after quarter, and the subsequent “cleansing” of the occupied areas.

To solve problems of maintaining reliable communication in advance. Bad communication was one of the main shortcomings of the Russian army in Chechnya. In the platoon-battalion link, at the beginning of the conflict, the communication system was extremely poorly organized. This was aggravated by the initial decision not to resort to secret communications equipment, which allowed Chechen militants to be aware of the plans and intentions of the Russian side, and sometimes directly interfere with Russian radio networks. The quality of communication left much to be desired, and communications with portable radio stations were priority targets for Chechen snipers.

According to T. Thomas, the experience of the hostilities in Chechnya is not at all confined to the lessons formulated above. However, the main thing that needs to be remembered by military experts, as the American author notes, is “there are no two operations in the city that are similar to each other”

The operation of the Russian troops to capture the city of Grozny in 2000 was already organized and carried out taking into account the mistakes of the previous campaign of 1994-1995. According to T. Thomas, many past mistakes were eliminated. Thus, instead of a frontal assault on the city by heavy armored vehicles, Russian troops used armored vehicles to surround the city and its complete isolation. Following this, several hundred snipers were sent to the city, who had the task of destroying enemy personnel and conducting reconnaissance. For the first time, Russian troops decentralized the management of their artillery: it began to solve tasks in the interests of the advanced units, hitting the enemy at long distances, which significantly reduced losses among Russian troops. Improved communication system. Moreover, the political leadership of Russia has taken successful steps to win public opinion inside the country; The second round of propaganda war (in contrast to the situation of 1994-1995) turned out to be outside of Moscow. The military command organized and conducted several successful psychological operations on the battlefield. Thus, on the radio, local residents were shown several routes of exit from the besieged city. This took advantage of the militants, who under the guise of local residents tried to escape. However, the Russian military command was expecting such an outcome and sent the militants on the right route to pre-prepared minefields and ambushes.

American military experts are creative in studying the Russian experience of conducting military operations in Chechnya. Putting aside political moments, they compare their armed forces with the Russian in the sense that in future wars and conflicts they will have to face the same problems and difficulties that Russian troops face in the North Caucasus. That is why the Pentagon is carefully analyzing all the successes and failures of the Russian side.

Following the first unsuccessful Russian military campaign, Vincent Goulding concluded: “Of course, the Russians have given many examples of how not to fight in the city at all levels. The commanders of American units cannot indulge in a sense of complacency about the fact that they will never send their soldiers into battle without deciding the command, a clear formulation of combat missions and the necessary maps. The essence of the matter is that the Chechens have shown themselves worthy opponents and won - perhaps not quite “honestly” by our standards - but still won. Their success is a much more important phenomenon to explore than a Russian failure, since this is something that American troops may encounter in a similar situation in the future. Comparing ourselves with Russians is unproductive if it only serves the purpose of satisfying our sense of superiority. Although there is truth in this feeling, the main question is how much better we are than Russians. ”

Despite numerous (objective and subjective) critical assessments of the Russian experience in Chechnya, some positive examples of actions by the Russian army were included in the US charters. The FM instruction 3-06 notes:

"During the conflict 1994-1995. in Chechnya, Russian troops encountered difficulties distinguishing the Chechen rebels from the civilian population of Grozny. In appearance, they could not be distinguished, so Chechen fighters could freely walk around the city, suddenly disappear and just as suddenly appear again, firing from basements, windows or dark alleys. To identify the militants, Russian troops began to check the shoulders of men for bruises and bruises (the result of firing weapons) and their forearms in search of tan or burns (the result of hitting cartridges). They carefully examined and sniffed the suspects' clothes for gunpowder remnants. To identify Chechen artillerymen, Russian soldiers checked the folds and cuffs of clothing sleeves in search of oil stains from shells and mines. They forced Chechens to turn out their pockets, checking them for the presence of silver-lead plaque - the result of storage in the pockets of ammunition in the placer. Grenade throwers and Chechen mortar gunners were identified by Russian soldiers on the presence of cotton rags on their clothes for cleaning weapons. The command staff of the US Army needs the development of such ingenious methods of identifying threats. ”

The experience of the actions of the American armed forces in Iraq during and after the military operation against Saddam Hussein showed that the US military command tried to take into account the positive and negative experience of the Russian troops in Chechnya to the maximum.

An excerpt from the book I.Popova
Author:
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http://twower.livejournal.com/1025857.html
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  1. vladeinord
    vladeinord April 13 2013 07: 10 New
    18
    They learn from our mistakes, and we began to learn, or not again?
    1. Retx
      Retx April 13 2013 21: 21 New
      +1
      In 93 Americans were in Somalia ... I think everyone saw the film on those events. Learn what they learned, but many diseases remained, the same connection, for example. Slow-moving officers are the main pests.
      And so, if you look at Syria, its troops act in the same way:
      The Russian military command soon realized that it was dangerous to operate in the same order of battle, and began to make movements as part of combined columns, which usually consisted of one tank, two infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers and an infantry unit to "clean up" buildings along the column’s route.
      It leads to many thoughts ...
    2. brelok
      brelok April 13 2013 22: 51 New
      +1
      Quote: vladeinord
      They learn from our mistakes, and we began to learn, or not again?

      God bless the leadership to draw the right conclusions! And the amers are not stupid: they use our experience. But they just missed one moral factor. They will not stand to death. That's for sure.
      1. Maks111
        Maks111 April 14 2013 11: 09 New
        +1
        They won’t stand to death. That's for sure.
        I ask you to understand me correctly. Here you all hail the American soldiers that they say they have no spirit. Does our youth have this spirit? After all, spirituality must be educated. This is a lot of work. And what is the spirit of modern Russian youth (with few exceptions)? True, the spirit of idleness, amiability, despondency, cowardice. Do not underestimate the American soldiers. Better let us overestimate them. And then the Japanese, we once once 100 years ago threw hats.
        1. Denis
          Denis April 15 2013 11: 31 New
          +1
          Quote: Max111
          Does our youth have this spirit?
          Why blah blah?
          Did the old Chichiks beat?
    3. APASUS
      APASUS April 14 2013 15: 52 New
      +1
      Quote: vladeinord
      They learn from our mistake

      Who are they ? What are they learning ?? Read and almost about ...
      Know thoroughly and deeply your opponent. T. Thomas cites some facts testifying to the "complete misunderstanding by the Russians of neither the Chechen culture, nor the specific location of the operations." In particular, the Russian military command not only ignored the “deep feeling of hatred that left the centuries-old Russian dominance in Chechen souls”, but also failed to understand the cultural characteristics of the region - in particular, the “adat” (a code of honor based on revenge); tribal organization of Chechen society

      This is a complete portrait of an American in Afghanistan !! I read a report by British officers where they complained about the Americans approaching the war. They are not negotiating with the local population! Weakly use informants and do not delve into the interior at all !! They simply bombard the terrain and then proceed to analyze the situation !!! Here from here so many victims among the civilian population !!!
      What conclusions are you talking about ?!
  2. CCA
    CCA April 13 2013 07: 37 New
    16
    This is truly where the experience of General Ermolov should come in handy, taking into account amendments to modern weapons ...
    1. Black Colonel
      Black Colonel April 13 2013 12: 08 New
      +2
      Ermolov did not fight in cities.
      1. Botanologist
        Botanologist April 13 2013 13: 26 New
        +4
        Quote: Black Colonel
        Ermolov did not fight in cities.


        Ermolov took the settlements very efficiently and without large losses. Cossacks entered the city and set fire to houses on the front line. The smoke served as a guide for artillery, which fired deep into the battle lines of the Chechens. For five to seven hours of battle, small-sized settlements were taken completely, since there were only basements on the ruins. By the way, after the second village, the Chechens came in peace. It’s one thing to die under the code of honor, another thing is to be fried in the ruins of your home with your family.
        1. Black Colonel
          Black Colonel April 13 2013 13: 32 New
          +7
          You understand that such tactics (in the territory of the Russian Federation) are unsuitable. For Yermolov at that time, the Chechens were not citizens of the Russian Empire and treated them as an enemy, regardless of whether he was armed with weapons. It was easier for him.
      2. ochakow703
        ochakow703 April 13 2013 15: 51 New
        +2
        Yes, no difference. He just fought GOOD! And our fathers-commanders preferred cap-tacking tactics and put more than 6 thousand boys.
      3. Denis
        Denis April 15 2013 11: 34 New
        0
        Quote: Black Colonel
        Ermolov did not fight in cities.
        But what about the fact that the winner is always right?
  3. Fox
    Fox April 13 2013 07: 39 New
    39
    so it’s true. only the author did not take into account the main factor-betrayal!
    1. Kolya
      Kolya April 13 2013 09: 30 New
      +4
      Precisely betrayals! Yeltsin’s circle planned the strategy and tactics to catch the Chechen gang. Treason was at the top, so how can one judge the actions of a group of troops if it was merged.
      1. olegff68
        olegff68 April 13 2013 12: 29 New
        +2
        Quote: Kohl
        Precisely betrayals! Yeltsin’s circle planned the strategy and tactics to catch the Chechen gang. Treason was at the top, so how can one judge the actions of a group of troops if it was merged.

        Drained - very good. to say the least !!! For example, the gangs that lived in the Samashkinsky forest were well aware of flight plans at the airfield in Engels !!! For this reason, the bombers who arrived to "process" previously explored habitats of animals, dumped the load on the extinct fires.
  4. Maxim Bely
    Maxim Bely April 13 2013 07: 40 New
    +6
    Amer, it seems to me, studied to the same extent with the militants, judging by Syria. The Syrian "rebels" are also certainly not alien to the Chechen experience, only on the other hand. Essno not without the help of NATO specialists.
  5. Denis
    Denis April 13 2013 07: 40 New
    +4
    He did not say anything new, I really want to believe that our military experiences will not be forgotten
    What made me happy:
    One of the most effective weapon systems used in military operations in the city, L. Grau considers RPG-7 - a very light, cheap and simple grenade launcher, created in the USSR back in 1961 and now produced in different countries of the world
    He really bothers them, bakes whales and rightly, let it be our answer for the Stingers set for the spirits
    And not only in the city, he is good in the desert
  6. Strashila
    Strashila April 13 2013 07: 51 New
    +4
    Well, yes, the approach is approximately the same as for considering cases in Syria ... government troops deal only with their fellow citizens ... but about mercenaries and special services, military advisers from other countries ... they are not there. And about weapons, such as sticks and stones against tanks ... one-sided examination of the Americans ... such as they took into account, but in Iraq they piled on them lyuley ... from the same RPG-7 and Kalash.
  7. AntonR7
    AntonR7 April 13 2013 07: 52 New
    +7
    I hope we will be attentive and with dignity to the enemy no matter how weak he seems then I think we will not make fatal mistakes.
  8. fenix57
    fenix57 April 13 2013 08: 07 New
    11
    Let me be known as a cynic, but I will hope that the experience of our military is very useful in the US. Let them know what it is - a war in your house ...
    1. Denis
      Denis April 13 2013 09: 11 New
      +1
      Quote: fenix57
      war in your house ...
      And who will fight there will be, fila with sec, or femen?
      Consumer society is not capable of
      1. 123dv
        123dv April 13 2013 11: 29 New
        +3
        From another forum, pepper wrote about three years ago about Canada, for example.
        He himself lives in Canada. So, in one of the black areas of which I do not remember the city, the police carried out an anti-drug raid.
        Spent, everything is fine. But!
        During the raid, up to a dozen heavy automatic firearm trucks were seized ......
      2. Black Colonel
        Black Colonel April 13 2013 12: 11 New
        +4
        Indians need to cook.
  9. smile
    smile April 13 2013 08: 25 New
    +8
    They study ssobaki ... moreover, they study honestly ... But I did not like two points - the opinion about the allegedly ineffectiveness of the formed assault groups (I will add a miserable attempt to repeat the experience of Stalingrad), supposedly as a counterbalance to more successful actions, in their opinion "existing units" with amplification tools. well, without comment, everyone already knows everything ... and the allegedly unsuccessful actions of tanks against snipers and firing points on the upper floors .... nothing like that, if even “alien” tankers could be begged for, then they worked only on our way for our serifs .. ..and the question of choosing a position to defeat the upper floors is already a joint task - tankers-choose a position, ours is not to burn our beloved and respected :))) ...
    1. pav-pon1972
      pav-pon1972 April 13 2013 10: 42 New
      +2
      I agree, with you, + were actively used to reinforce assault groups by demolition engineers to make passages or to mine the flanks of the passage of the groups, and tankers or artillerymen knew in which square their lead group was.
      1. Black Colonel
        Black Colonel April 13 2013 12: 27 New
        +2
        It seems to me that “Bahcea” with its 100 mm, 30 mm automatic guns and 60 degrees of vertical aiming for work in the city is the most optimal. Around the necessary number of DZ and this system will be GOD and KING in the city!
        1. elmi
          elmi April 14 2013 00: 57 New
          +5
          Quote: Black Colonel
          Around the necessary number of DZ and this system will be GOD and KING in the city!

          Add and crate for additional protection
  10. sibircat
    sibircat April 13 2013 08: 47 New
    +6
    It is unpleasant to admit, but the analysis is not without objectivity.
    1. Black Colonel
      Black Colonel April 13 2013 12: 29 New
      +1
      What is it about this? Peter 1 Charles 12 called his teacher.
      1. Denis
        Denis April 15 2013 11: 40 New
        0
        Quote: Black Colonel
        Peter 1 Charles 12 called his teacher
        He called after he was given something
  11. Vladimir_61
    Vladimir_61 April 13 2013 08: 57 New
    10
    "Comparing ourselves with the Russians is unproductive if it serves only the purpose of satisfying our sense of self-superiority. Although this feeling is true, the main question is how much better are we than Russians."

    The truth is in the conceit of American warriors, but against the Russian soldiers they are frail.
    1. skeptic
      skeptic April 13 2013 12: 44 New
      +3
      Quote: Vladimir_61
      "Comparing ourselves with the Russians is unproductive if it serves only the purpose of satisfying our sense of self-superiority. Although this feeling is true, the main question is how much better are we than Russians."

      The truth is in the conceit of American warriors, but against the Russian soldiers they are frail.


      Well, do not convince a potential adversary of the opposite, even if their opinion is not high about us. Arrogance is easily confused. The main experience of our successful decisions is to save, and not to start, as always from scratch. I think that it would be nice to study their instructions, knowing the train of thought of a potential adversary, you can better find out your weaknesses, make appropriate corrections in your affairs. The battles in Syria show that there is an intensive development of sabotage war using non-traditional methods, it is necessary to thoroughly learn experience and develop methods of counteraction. Like that.
      1. Vladimir_61
        Vladimir_61 April 13 2013 13: 42 New
        +2
        Quote: skeptic
        it is necessary to thoroughly learn experience and develop methods of counteraction.

        I agree. Although in his commentary he meant precisely the spiritual fortress of compatriots - this is the main thing. Great is the power of truth.
        1. skeptic
          skeptic April 13 2013 14: 53 New
          +1
          Quote: Vladimir_61
          I agree. Although in his commentary he meant precisely the spiritual fortress of compatriots - this is the main thing. Great is the power of truth.

          hi
      2. hrych
        hrych April 13 2013 21: 30 New
        +2
        Here, it was the underestimation of the Russians that led to the failure of the planning and implementation of the South Ossetian company by overseas strategists.
        1. sibircat
          sibircat April 13 2013 21: 43 New
          0
          And you got acquainted with the plan of this, as you put it, South Ossetian company.
          1. hrych
            hrych April 13 2013 22: 20 New
            +2
            I am naive, believe in our General Staff.

            According to A. A. Nogovitsyn, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Georgian Clean Field operation against South Ossetia was developed by Georgia together with the United States.

            Erosi Kitsmarishvili, the former Georgian ambassador to Russia during the war, said on November 25, 2008, citing sources in the Georgian government, that US President George W. Bush gave the go-ahead to the outbreak of war in South Ossetia.
            1. sibircat
              sibircat April 14 2013 14: 57 New
              +3
              No offense. There is no catch in my question.
              Thank you for the comprehensive answer. But I would not call a provocation of Georgia a military company.
              Unfortunately, I am not personally acquainted with A. A. Nogovitsin. However, with officers gene. headquarters to communicate and discuss these events I had.
              1. hrych
                hrych April 14 2013 20: 03 New
                +3
                Everything is in order, Colleague Sibirsky Kot, but the presence of instructors seized vehicles with equipment (which they first demanded, then begged and asked to be sold to top US officials), barring Avaks, well, turning off the civil GPS channel, transferring the Georgian contingent from Iraq by American planes, the destroyer Mcfaul-74 and the US Coast Guard Dallas sailed with either humanitarian cargo or corpses of Ukro-Americans, as well as the subsequent information war of American media controlled by yourself you know to whom, all this without intelligence from the General Staff says that the American guys put up arms here .
                1. sibircat
                  sibircat April 14 2013 21: 49 New
                  +2
                  Quote: hrych
                  the American guys put in handles here.

                  I absolutely agree with you on this.
                  The confusion that reigned in the first hours, in the highest echelons of our political power, nevertheless left an unpleasant aftertaste.
                  And the connection left much to be desired. Let's not talk about sad things. This has been discussed more than once.
                  The main thing was given to the adversary snot! Nothing pug yapping at an elephant.
  12. Kazbek
    Kazbek April 13 2013 09: 26 New
    +6
    They probably would never have figured out how to identify the militants, the ingenuity of the Russian is not an American couple, it is a pity they now know.
    1. smile
      smile April 13 2013 10: 47 New
      +3
      Kazbek
      Do not worry ... :))) The presence of such collections written by clever Americans does not mean that something will get into the minds of ordinary Americans ... even if they read such books in the army every morning in the morning ... :) ))) I certainly understand. which sounds boastful enough .... but how many similar books have already written about us ... and the result is one - the authors of the books, having successfully escaped, then write memoirs with a hint towards their armies buried by us, and we warned, we always said - not we need to go there ... it’s not good there ... there are not good Russians there dishonest butt in the ass ..... :)))))
  13. user3970
    user3970 April 13 2013 10: 17 New
    +4
    Too much has been said about Yeltsin’s betrayal and his entourage (we will not forget the “Chechen advice notes” and their concealment). The main thing is the complete degradation and debilitation of the general of the middle officer link. And here, Yeltsin, if weapons and military secrets were sold to militants by officers. It's not such an old story when a civilian spokesman in the rank of Minister of Defense swore an officer of the Airborne Forces and part-time the head of the Airborne Forces School and the latter wiped himself out, instead of becoming a hero of Russia. I’m thinking, would I, as a student of this school, salute the “lowered” commander?
    1. 123dv
      123dv April 13 2013 11: 34 New
      0
      Degrading another, humiliating himself!
  14. Gorchakov
    Gorchakov April 13 2013 10: 39 New
    0
    Americans are easier. Having provoked local conflicts and wars all over the planet, they have the opportunity to study the enemy’s strategy and tactics under certain conditions ... When will we study their strategy, well, say in Texas? Of course I don’t want to be like these murderers and bandits, but it’s a shame that they, hiding behind the ocean, have the opportunity to crap on the whole planet and at the same time observe and analyze, but we don’t ... I would like to watch how the Anglo-Saxons behave when their women would cry for the dead children, and we, and this time, would teach them democracy and write their conclusions on the networks ....
    1. Garrin
      Garrin April 13 2013 10: 43 New
      +7
      Quote: Gorchakov
      Americans are easier. Having provoked local conflicts and wars on the entire planet, they have the opportunity to study the strategy and tactics of the enemy in certain conditions ...

      Nevertheless, having studied our experience in Afghanistan, they themselves were treated there in full.
    2. Black Colonel
      Black Colonel April 13 2013 12: 31 New
      0
      Comrade Eun keeps Amerov tense.
  15. Mikhail3
    Mikhail3 April 13 2013 11: 11 New
    +3
    You need to calmly (spit on the stupid international agreements that no one else is going to implement) use equipment that can "see" through the walls. That is, computerized radiation analyzer complexes. In the event of a war with the "rebels" these devices are simply irreplaceable.
    Yes, you have to pay for them, and expensive. But it’s much cheaper than even military equipment, which, if not used, will be destroyed. Yes, you will have to hire and pay dearly to people and organizations that can repair this equipment and at the same time train officers to use it. Yes, you have to listen to these hated wiseacres!
    In modern conditions, it seems that for some reason the great Power is fighting with the karmultuki of great-grandfathers, instead of taking into battle weapons and equipment worthy of our science and technology.
  16. Navy7981
    Navy7981 April 13 2013 12: 32 New
    +1
    "First of all, an assault on cities needs to be prepared."
    In my opinion, this is known to first-year cadets, the first month of study. Why do amers speak common truths and it is not clear why this was unknown to the "bosses", the organizers of this assault? There are charters, there is the experience of Stalingrad, the experience of thousands of cities taken. What kind of policy is it that at the helm, so often people are worthless? And, alas, not surprisingly, no one, as always, has not been punished. Nothing. But by and large it’s a betrayal and organization of a massacre! Really, only when you finally get it, the key positions are those who can, know how, but first of all they have to fix, save, actually starting from scratch. Too often, soldiers are paying for the mistakes and meanness of politicians.
    1. skeptic
      skeptic April 13 2013 12: 58 New
      +3
      Quote: Navy7981
      Really, only when you finally get it, the key positions are those who can, know how, but first of all they have to fix, save, actually starting from scratch. Too often, soldiers are paying for the mistakes and meanness of politicians.


      Unfortunately, in peacetime, in all echelons of power, undercover rulers general intensively breed with bugs thinking (sucking the state blood), corresponding thinking does not allow, through the “bucks”, to see the real course of events. At the beginning of hostilities, as befits bugs, they hide in the folds of state power, in safe positions, for their career. When the war passes, they again, right there.
  17. Gemar
    Gemar April 13 2013 13: 24 New
    +4
    Losses of Chechen fighters amounted to 2-3 thousand killed and 1,3 thousand missing. Losses of civilians reached 80 thousand killed and 240 thousand wounded.

    That is, according to the American general, the army purposefully destroyed the civilian population ??? The delirium of a man sick with mania "Russian animals". A third of this "peaceful" population did not speak either Russian or Chechen ... And some were born in Africa ... Better let them calculate the loss of civilians in Pakistan ...
    Russians expected poorly trained civilian gangs

    These “poorly trained city dwellers” had better army connections. And about the "poorly trained" ... yes, many of them went through more than one company ... Look, the "well" trained, equipped and inspired Georgians, without combat experience, didn’t really succeed in resisting our seasoned fighters ...
    I wish our generals to wait for the time when they have to write comments on the topics “Russians about the Texas War” or “Russians about the Minnesota War” ... AMEN!
    GLORY TO RUSSIA! soldier
    1. skeptic
      skeptic April 13 2013 14: 52 New
      +2
      Quote: Gamar
      Losses of Chechen fighters amounted to 2-3 thousand killed and 1,3 thousand missing. Losses of civilians reached 80 thousand killed and 240 thousand wounded.

      That is, according to the American general, the army purposefully destroyed the civilian population ??? The delirium of a man sick with mania "Russian animals".


      Not without a dummy, but mainly to say: "The Russians are also killing civilians." About ... another, you look at this background and your sins are less noticeable.
      1. Gemar
        Gemar April 13 2013 17: 23 New
        0
        Quote: skeptic
        "Russians also kill civilians"

        And it’s not democratic, disproportionate to the threat and ... NOT BY OUR WEAPON! am
  18. Slavs
    Slavs April 13 2013 13: 51 New
    +2
    I read it, I smiled sadly .... thanks to the amers, they will teach us to fight ... They would, of course, be better bombed by depleted uranium ... Selling the upper echelons of power, this is the reason, the most important ... Betrayal ... I hope Birch already began to rot ... Or cremated it? S ... ka. And as a Russian soldier fights, there is no need to remind, there is a huge number of examples, facts, memories on this resource ... Well, the literacy of the American military can be checked in Iraq, Afghanistan ... And mind you, your government does not sell them there ... So go ahead, USArmy, on the loopholes ...
    1. elmi
      elmi April 14 2013 01: 16 New
      +6
      Yes ... one thing is to adopt the fighting experience by the Americans, but you can’t put the fighting spirit in the textbooks
      1. Denis
        Denis April 15 2013 11: 07 New
        0
        Quote: elmi
        adopt one combat experience by the Americans, but fighting spirit
        Ide to take it?
        McDonald’s spirit doesn’t give, only stink, but it is enough
  19. MRomanovich
    MRomanovich April 13 2013 14: 49 New
    +2
    Quote: Black Colonel
    Indians need to cook.

    I agree, the Indians are one of the few real forces that, with the right approach, can “blow up” America from the inside. But we seem to have missed the moment many years ago, if we take it now, then it will take a very, very long time to wait for the result.

    Quote: Vladimir_61
    The truth is in the conceit of American warriors, but against the Russian soldiers they are frail.

    what Americans should not take is a pathological reassessment of their forces. It is surprising that authoritative (authoritative for America, not for us) authors not only underestimate, but do not even notice our real capabilities and are absolutely confident in the superiority of the American army over ours. On the one hand, it’s a little disappointing, but the reassuring thing is that if something happens (pah-pah-pah), they will have to be a little more painful because of their arrogance. Perhaps we are inferior in equipment, money and some other things, but in modern wars, as well as in the not too distant future, the role of iron and man is still great, and the Americans are far from this.
  20. Alikovo
    Alikovo April 13 2013 15: 37 New
    0
    again they didn’t come up with their own and borrowed it.
  21. user3970
    user3970 April 13 2013 15: 53 New
    +1
    I want to remind you that in addition to Taburetkin, we also have Pasha, a Mercedes, in the ministers, whose son, after graduating from the military school, safely slammed from the war. Remember the swan ... Pasha promised to capture Grozny with one battalion. By the way, when he died, they buried him with honors. Shoigu is also difficult to call a professional general. Somehow everyone forgot that his first deputy. on service in the Ministry of Emergency Situations burned on werewolves from MUR. If you like Chubais, remember, Chubais and Shoigu are members of the Family.
  22. Lakkuchu
    Lakkuchu April 13 2013 17: 47 New
    +1
    The Chechens, of course, taught the bloody lesson of the Russian army how to fight in urban conditions to the first company. For stupidity, arrogance and neglect of the enemy, a Russian soldier always pays, it was 150-200 years ago in the Caucasus, it was in 90 years. The history of some teaches nothing.
  23. shinobi
    shinobi April 13 2013 18: 28 New
    0
    He put a plus. The article is not pleasant but on business. Not pleasant because their experts are not stupid. The main commandment of the strong: Not any self-deception, which means us no complacency.
  24. AlNikolaich
    AlNikolaich April 13 2013 22: 38 New
    0
    I read, I thought a lot. I would like to recall the phrase filled with sore eyes that the generals always prepare for the past war. Well, let the amers analyze the experience of the Chechen campaign. After all, it will still be not enough! They have already analyzed the experience of military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and so what? When the amers entered Afghanistan, it was already a completely different country! The same is Iraq. The modern war there and the Desert Storm are completely different levels!
    The experience of the past war is certainly good, but the main factor in victory is the human factor!
  25. elmi
    elmi April 14 2013 01: 12 New
    +3
    The operation of Russian troops to capture the city of Grozny in 2000 already organized and carried out taking into account the mistakes of the previous campaign 1994-1995 gg.

    It is bad that we are stepping on the same rake. What prevented our command from studying the experience of urban battles of the 2 of the World War before the storming of Grozny in the 1 of the Chechen. Of course, much has changed, but the principles of urban combat are the same.
    1. Denis
      Denis April 14 2013 01: 34 New
      +2
      Quote: elmi
      What prevented our command from studying the experience of urban battles
      Alas, friend, alas ...
      Not that they were busy, but they didn’t listen to those who offered the case
      Mercedes interfered, cars are good, but I'm not talking about them
      I'm talking about this filth
  26. Zomanus
    Zomanus April 14 2013 02: 47 New
    +1
    Hmm. I think that the amers really did not take into account general treason and venality at all levels, from ensign to general. When not only snipers hit him in the back, but also the press, deputies and other crap. When the families of the military forces were forcibly driven out of the house, fearing that they would explode with them. Interestingly, with amers, is this possible? In general, it is necessary to improve target designation methods. What would each shell to its target.
  27. Black
    Black April 14 2013 17: 38 New
    0
    not only amers analyzed that war. She and we are pretty well laid out in paragraphs ....
    That's just the rake still lies with its teeth up. And (God forbid) will have to fight again, more than once in the blood we will break our forehead. An example of this is 08.08.08. Communications, intelligence, coordination, mobility still left much to be desired.
  28. Khamsin
    Khamsin April 14 2013 22: 11 New
    0
    Amer at the moment extremely relying on their drones, judging by their number. How effective will they be in real hostilities given the fact that the enemy is not an Afghan with one Kalashnikov one but is technologically prepared ??? Indeed, in Afghanistan, control was established completely over the territory, except for poppy fields, and probably not all, they did not help.
  29. Himalayan
    Himalayan April 15 2013 00: 09 New
    0
    Quote: Fox
    The author does not take into account betrayal in the political leadership and in the army itself

    Exactly . But, again, taking into account the socio-ethnic differences of clan societies (the peoples of the Caucasus, ..., ...) and the post-Soviet one, which has lost the national co-identification of a Russian citizen (you can’t even name Russians anymore)
  30. Begemot
    Begemot April 15 2013 14: 56 New
    0
    And as for the losses, very interesting figures, it immediately begins to smack of Amer’s propaganda: 6 thousand soldiers of the army of the Russian Federation and 1,5 thousand militants, and 80 thousand civilians - apparently, those who, as they say, changed clothes from time to time. Some kind of "mummers" experts.
    1. Denis
      Denis April 15 2013 15: 26 New
      0
      Quote: Begemot
      80 thousand civilians
      That nonsense bullshit. The Council of the media, everyone lies, but they know the measure
  31. slaventi
    slaventi 29 June 2013 11: 42 New
    -1
    American criticism is subjective, amers supported the militants. But the fact that experience took it into account is accurate.