Some issues of the number and combat readiness of the armed forces of the Russian Federation

As part of the development of proposals for the report "MILITARY REFORM AS A COMPONENT PART OF THE SECURITY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: SYSTEM-DYNAMIC ESTIMATION ”aimed at improving RF Defense Plan, members of the Izborsk club asked to answer a number of questions, outlining their vision of the number of problems, recruiting the army, its state of combat readiness, with the definition of some ways to improve the system. One of the questions was as follows:  the results of the introduction of a new number of personnel (with an assessment of the quality of decisions made with a breakdown of officers, sergeants and privates) and terms of service for conscription and contracts.

The size of the structure of the Armed Forces depends on the degree and nature of existing and prospective threats, on the state of the country's economy, on the willingness and political will of state leaders to pursue a particular policy, including elements of the country's sovereignty on a global scale and on other factors.

The current number of personnel does not meet the needs of the army in ensuring its combat readiness and ability to repel or eliminate the threat with available means. This is proved by the actions of the reformers, first by reducing the officer corps, and later, by its declarative increase. 

Approximate strength of the Armed Forces, in the event of a world war in modern conditions, from 3 to 5 million people or more can be estimated, taking into account the mobilization, the threats themselves and the combat power of the army. At the same time, a clear organization of such armed forces should be adopted in the state, including a regular army, recruited by conscription and by contract, a regular army reserve, previously called reduced-strength formations, and a mobilization reserve, previously called cadre formations.

The number of regular army must be at least 1% of the total population and fluctuate within 1,3 - 1,5 million. This is the minimum that allows you to maintain and combat readiness and match the combat capabilities for solving emerging problems, or repelling the enemy’s sudden strike, which, given the development of high-precision weapons and new weapons systems and defeats are no longer considered impracticable.

 Active army reserve, should number from 0.5 to 1 million people, and its number depends on the amount of equipment stored in reduced formations, the needs of all types and branches of troops, threats and their development. A distinctive feature of the current reserve from the rest is that they are paid 50% of the prescribed monetary allowance for servicemen in accordance with the position held and 100% with participation in exercises and trainings. When recruiting regular units for replenishment in the event of hostilities during a CTO, the calculation is carried out as with regular troops, increasing the amount three times, and possibly more.

The number of mobilization reserve can be from 3 to 5 million people, and depends on the availability of military equipment stored in bases and warehouses, on the industry's ability to increase the output of military equipment in a special period and in the course of an armed conflict, on the need to recruit a reserve component or deploy local units self-defense to perform the tasks of the territorial defense of the country.

Officer corps in the existing structure does not correspond to the tasks facing the governing bodies. But it is also unreasonable to increase its number. So, central government, in accordance with the emerging tasks, it requires clarification and perhaps a slight increase in certain areas. As part of the central government should be provided for the creation of additional government. Four types of armed forces should be recreated, since the air defense of the country and the army in modern conditions comes to the fore. USC (fleet) management, require significant processing with the definition of real possibilities and their practical approbation on real, not ostentatious exercises and a return to the functions of districts. Additionally, the management of the Siberian military districts within the boundaries of the pre-existing association should be created. Army control require expansion to perform those functions that are defined by the current state and capabilities of subordinate connections and parts. The structure of the armed forces should be division management reconstituted, because military formations, as a rule, do not fight on their own. And in time, and in the course of hostilities, they are organizationally included in the composition: the regiment is part of a division; division - in the army; Army - in the composition of the front (USC). And the brigade is part of the army, as they say, directly, which in itself is unnatural. Based on this, the need for officers must be calculated, and not in connection with some percentage of the total number.

Officer corps According to tradition, the Russian army is the main guiding, educational and driving element in the country's military organization and depriving it of certain functions and reducing positions only results in the loss and non-fulfillment of combat missions. This has already been confirmed by the results of the involvement of special-purpose units in 2012 for participation in a special operation.

Ensigns,  the first after officers, and from 1649, the standard-bearers, appointed from among the most courageous warriors, physically strong and proven in battle, began to be called ensigns. The abolition of warrant officers as a class in the Russian army caused irreparable damage to the combat readiness and combat capability of the army. In conditions when the equipment is constantly being improved and technically military rank becomes more complicated and the position of ensign acquires great importance.

Positions that can be appointed as position ensign, in a modern army there may be: the position of commander tank; squad leader; the commander of a self-propelled gun. Position ensign, this is the position of deputy platoon commander and platoon technician, chief of the control room. Position senior warrant officer, this is the position of a company technician; company foremen; material support platoon commander; the commander of a maintenance platoon; many positions in other services. If we take combat support units, then these are deputy group commanders, deputy platoon commanders, chiefs of control rooms, UAV platoon commanders, instrument operators, instructors, and others. These are the positions that require additional education, a certain period of mastering this position and the period of service in it (at least 5 years). The restoration of this category of servicemen is a top priority.

Sergeants, and the experiment with the replacement of officer posts with sergeants, the abolition of the posts of warrant officers in the course of the reform has successfully failed. The number of trained sergeants, their extended training period do not allow, and they will not allow to staff the army with the necessary specialists, and the thoughtfulness of their service is generally absent. The biggest drawback is that a sergeant who graduated from college does not differ from a sergeant who received a rank in the army neither in behavior, nor mentality, nor special skills and abilities, unlike, say, former warrant officers. And a sergeant cannot completely replace an officer in the conditions of the Russian army, and this has already been proven by practice. 

Military service personnel, military personnel who signed the first contract for three years, retrained in the chosen specialty at the military school during 2-6 months and passed the final exams should be appointed to sergeant positions. A sergeant is assigned a primary rank of junior sergeant, and during the service he has an incentive to grow in rank and to increase his salary (annual additional payments). The military rank of sergeant is awarded at the conclusion of a second contract for three years with an increase in salary and receipt of additional benefits. The military rank of senior sergeant and foreman is assigned in the same way after signing the third and fourth contracts. For a senior officer, after two years of service, a military rank of ensign can be given the rank with an increase in salary and benefits.

The approach existing in the modern army to the determination of the official salaries of all categories of servicemen, the order of their growth, the receipt of additional payments and, especially, benefits requires careful processing and clarification. It does not allow, not to select quality personnel for career growth, not to have an incentive to serve and to grow in military positions. And as a result, there is a lack of incentive in the development of military skill, and therefore an increase in the combat readiness of the army. It is necessary to provide for an increase in the official salary by a certain amount, for officers, depending on the period of tenure (10% annually), the rest of the category of military personnel, after the conclusion of the next contract (5%) and in the period between contracts, depending on the development of the position and specialty (five%). Such an approach will allow to have in certain positions for a long time trained, competent specialists who have clear prospects for themselves in service and everyday life. This proposal is connected with a number of prohibitions imposed on military personnel, which prevent them from fully functioning in modern market conditions.

The soldiers can be both on appeal and by contract. In Russia, a compulsory army recruitment system should remain mandatory. The invocation recruitment system allows you to prepare a high-quality mobilization reserve, sending personnel either to a contract or to an existing reserve after military service. This should happen voluntarily.

Life time on appeal in modern conditions should be one year, but the intensity of training and combat training must radically change. This is the most pressing issue in discussions about the impossibility of training a soldier in one year and the impossibility of staffing brigades, and therefore their non-readiness. Indeed, the brigades will be negegotovy with such a service life, and 1,5 will not solve this problem, since the brigade will always have a shortage of more than 30%, especially taking into account the vacations of officers and military personnel under the contract. And adding here both temporary and current incomplete, we get again the staffing of the brigade at the level of 60%.

Ensuring constant alert can be achieved by the following measures:

- to have in the structure of the armed forces divisions of the regimental composition, constant readiness. This will allow, even with partial non-readiness of one of the three motorized rifle regiments, to consider the division fully operational;

- to have in the structure of the armed forces of the division of reduced strength and division of the frame;

- to return to the army of the institute of ensigns, revising the positions to be replaced by them, the conditions of service, benefits, the growth of titles and monetary allowance. To introduce the positions of sub-ensigns, ensigns, senior ensigns and the possibility of growth in a particular position by rank, to officer;

- to revise the principles of recruiting troops, having decided on the delivery to certain parts of the complete set of personnel of the same recruitment period, taking into account the presence in part of the rest of the category of servicemen (contract soldiers). This will allow to approach the acquisition, the preparation of the parts themselves in a complex. With this approach, in the division (regiment, battalion), one regiment will begin initial training, one will begin a step-by-step general training and, taking into account the presence of contract servicemen, will be able to perform combat tasks in full force, and one will be in the final stage of combat reconciliation perform any task set by the command;

- to revise approaches to the training of military personnel in the training units, having disbanded district training centers, and on their basis formed military units. For training for four months, the incoming military personnel in selected military specialties, return to the regiments and battalions regimental (battalion) training schools. According to the combat schedule and in the intervals between teaching and vacations, the teaching officers from these schools fulfill their duties in accordance with the purpose of the reduced divisions, participating in exercises with the involvement of an organized reserve. Plans, schedules, and everything connected with it is easy to create. The peculiarity of service in such schools is determined by the special situation and the need for growth, so the officers are moved from school to military units and back. Thus, a company commander and an abbreviated regimental commander can be a teacher, which qualitatively enhances the primary knowledge of the incoming draftees.

- with such an integrated approach to recruiting and training in a division, always two regiments (battalions, companies) will be fully combatant, and one partly. Partial combat readiness of this regiment (battalion, company) will be due to the absence of two to three days of young recruiting, the young replenishment from the young during the first two weeks of skills in a single training, and during the remaining three months its combat readiness will constantly increase. The bulk of the vacations of the officers of the regiment are distributed so as to invest in four months of the immediate training of the soldiers in the regimental school with the regiment. In the event of a sudden exacerbation of the situation, officers of training schools replace vacant posts, and personnel are called up from the current reserve, the arrival of which may be limited to 10-24 for hours.

- a temporary shortage in officers, warrant officers when they are dismissed on vacation from any military unit, at another time, if necessary, replaced by officers of the regimental schools, and contract servicemen calling for an organized reserve;

Such an approach will allow solving the main and unresolved problem with the existing approach in organizing combat training and the daily activities of the army with combat readiness, training, fighting ability of associations, formations and units of the army.

In order to solve this problem it is necessary to solve a few more. organizational and combat issues for the correct existence of the army:

- to abandon two periods of combat training, switching to an annual cycle of continuous training of a specific formation, unit, removing the preparatory periods and everything connected with this;

- transfer of equipment to various modes of operation is carried out in a planned manner by the forces of the repair teams of the outsourcing and the respective crews without stopping the educational process;

- to outsource training grounds, shooting ranges, training centers and other property to private military companies specially created and approved in accordance with the law by the President of the country, which are able to carry out maintenance of the relevant equipment and equipment at a high professional level. In addition to these responsibilities, in the conditions of the unresolved issue of the protection and defense of military camps, when leaving them by formations and units, both during exercises and during the conduct of hostilities, and preventing the looting and loss of stocks of weapons and other means, in everyday peaceful life and in the conditions of hostilities, the protection of military camps and towns with families of military personnel will be assigned to the established private military companies, in which retired military personnel will mainly serve. This is a kind of solution to the social problem of discharged servicemen. The same private companies in war conditions can be used to solve other important tasks, from ensuring territorial defense to acting as part of partisan special detachments. 

As for the direct training of conscripts, it may look like this. 

Primary general training recruit should take place at school or in DOSAAF, and where the deployment of reserve formations will allow, and at their base, in their free time, or in the evening.

Initial training in military specialty calling up a military unit or in a training unit must be carried out during four months of study including two weeks of single preparation.

General training in military specialty, includes training conscripts and improving the skills of a contract serviceman. After that, the soldier enters the unit, he is given weapons, equipment, and he, the rest of the time of service, does not part with him. Further classes are held, which include: combat reconciliation as part of the crew - 1 month, as a part of the platoon -1 of the month, as a part of the company - 1, month, as a part of the battalion - 1 of the month.

Final training during combat reconciliation, includes training conscripts and improving the skills of a soldier under the contract, and may consist of training as part of the regiment - 2 month, as part of the division - 1 month, in the army - 1 month.

Contract service, requires a separate justification and extended consideration, especially in terms of providing money allowances, providing various benefits and advantages, determining the minimum and maximum service life in the active army, being in the existing reserve and stock. An important role will be played by resolving the issue of further employment of a soldier under a contract who has served as a full-time officer for the entire service life (up to 35 years) and has an even larger temporary reserve for service in an organized reserve (up to 45 years for an ordinary position) and in the reserve (up to 60 years). Here, a private military company can partially resolve the issue of its employment, about activities that have already been mentioned in the interests of the Ministry of Defense. 

The crown of all operational combat training, in the course of a one-year service as a conscript soldier and a contract soldier for one year, may include carrying out various exercises, exercises, training, different in scale, time, place, method, both independently and with the attracted forces and means, including interacting ones, and may include working out several options, themes and continuous real episodes, including those with live firing mandatory at each exercise, and may include:

- Tactical and tactical-special exercises in the squad, platoon, battalion company, regiment.

- tactical exercises in the division.

- operational exercises in the army.

Participation in operational and strategic exercises It is carried out according to a separate plan and can occur both in the period of fixed-term service (contract) and during the period of being in an organized reserve.

The peculiarity of combat coordination, in the structure of the new approach, is that the soldier works out the elements of tactical training in cooperation with other disciplines in the complex in the form of tactical exercises on all possible options for conducting combat operations.

The second feature is that in the course of combat training, all practical actions are worked out on standard equipment after they have been worked out on stands, programs, and simulators.

For an example of an understanding of the scope of necessary tasks, workload of personnel, officers, equipment and weapons, the required volume of tactical and training fields at training grounds and shooting ranges, based on the experience of conducting combat operations in various armed conflicts, we present the subject of training for the crew of a combat vehicle (squad).

Approximate list of occupations for the department (crew):

1. "The action of the department when making a march as part of a unit and independently under its own power";


2. "The actions of the department in conducting reconnaissance during the march";


3. "The actions of the department when advancing to the line of defense occupation";


4. "The actions of the department in the organization of defense in the platoon";


5. "The actions of the department in the organization of defense at the forefront";


6. "The actions of the department in the organization of defense in isolation from the main forces of the platoon or in a separate direction";


7. “Branch actions in repelling enemy air strikes in various types of combat”;


8. “Separation actions during the withdrawal from the forward position, during the withdrawal in the platoon composition and during the withdrawal in the platoon rearguard”;


9. "The actions of the department during the transition to the offensive, on the defense prepared in engineering terms";


10. "The actions of the department in case of a sudden meeting with the enemy during the march";


11. “The actions of the squad in the depth of the enemy’s defenses, when advancing into the flank and rear, while making a detour”;


12. “The actions of the squad in the rear of the enemy when meeting with superior forces, reserves of the enemy and the destruction of uncovered objects in the rear”;


13. "The actions of the department in overcoming the water barrier by swimming, on the ferry, on the pontoon ferry";


14. "The actions of the department in repelling helicopter strikes and the destruction of the airborne forces in the rear of the defending troops"; 


15. "The actions of the office in the GPP, TPZ, BPZ";


16. “Branch actions during movement as part of a military echelon”;


17. "The actions of the department in the assault of the settlement and the designated object";


18. "The actions of the department in the defense of the village";


19. "Branch actions during the defense in the forest";


20. “Branch actions during an offensive in a forest and on rough terrain”;


21. "The actions of the department when blocking a terrain during the CTO";


22. "The actions of the department during the cleaning of the area, the object during the CTO";


23. "The actions of the department when located at the checkpoint";


24. “Branch actions accompanied by a military column and repelling an attack by militants”;


25. “Branch actions during the defense of a large settlement within a platoon and independently in a separate direction, in a separate building”;


26. "The actions of the personnel of the department upon hovering their aviation";


27. "The actions of the personnel of the department in the adjustment of artillery fire."

They designated only the main 27 topics, only for the squad (crew), but this is not a complete list of topics for training, which objectively shows that during properly organized combat training, all these topics are first worked through by the squad on their own within the allotted time. Therefore, during a month, the soldier can have free time only for servicing equipment on Saturday and rest on Sunday, the rest of the time is devoted to complex exercises, which include tactics and fire and engineering training and all other subjects not separately, but in combination.

Here, the main burden falls on the officers, on the command, which, by virtue of its professionalism, must clearly plan everything, in essence, the daily combat operations of the subunit, unit, and compound. With the right approach, the whole mass of existing problems disappears, which do not seem to be solved. This method finally resolves the issue of hazing and non-statutory relations. An equal load on the entire staff erases the possibility of superiority and a curved individuality. 

In the future, these same themes are already being worked out as part of a platoon, company, battalion, regiment, division and army, in cooperation with other divisions, units and formations.

It is necessary to take into account that each topic with a department should be worked out theoretically, then on different layouts of the area and on interactive maps, then on simulators. After mastering and working out theoretical issues, practical actions are practiced, on a machine-side pesy, on a fixed combat vehicle, using imitation, on a fixed combat vehicle, using full ammunition (combat ammunition). With such an integrated approach to training, one can raise the question of real combat readiness both individually for each soldier and for the collective as a whole.

In this way, during the year, all topics are completely closed for a military serviceman, practicing not theoretically and on the fingers, but practically in the field with a phased increase in combat shooting. Such an intensity of combat training, on the one hand, is guaranteed to prepare a soldier and allow him to master his specialty in full, on the other hand, will allow not to call this soldier for training during the next few days. three - five years.

But such intensive training, without which the army will not be an army, requires a different approach to the deployment of troops, to the equipment of landfills and shooting ranges, to the functioning of the administrative apparatus, to the functioning of service structures, to the functioning of the military industrial complex, carrying out timely repairs, upgrading old equipment and supplying in the troops of the new technology and the integrated solution of other tasks.

Comments

[Krasnoyarsk]

There will be no World War, since nuclear weapons are a means of deterring the enemy.

[Pinochet000]

Quote: Krasnoyarets

There will be no World War, since nuclear weapons are a means of deterring the enemy.

Yeah, it needs to be S. Korea, or rather tell Kim, otherwise he does not know.

[bask]

Yesterday, this topic was indirectly passed., In the light of the war in Syria. And in many comments it was said that the Syrian army was preparing for a war with Israel, not militants. They could have fought with Israel in cities ((WWII experience))

Some issues of the number and combat readiness of the armed forces of the Russian Federation

Yesterday I raised this question., But it is one of the main ones.
WHAT WAR IS THE RUSSIAN ARMY PREPARING. ???
AND OUR ARMY IS READY FOR AN ASYMMETRIC WAR IN THE C. CAUCASUS OR ANOTHER REGION (((SIMILAR TO THE SYRIAN)))
WHAT FOR THIS IS WEAPONS AND ARMOR EQUIPMENT FOR TODAY.

[Pinochet000]

Quote: bask

WHAT WAR IS THE RUSSIAN ARMY PREPARING. ???

Yes, in fact, in my opinion, it should be ready for the Syrian scenario, and for the local (type 888), and in the light of recent events and for the third world, and nuclear .... for predicting the development of the situation, in the case of a missile nuclear strike, either side ... IMHO impossible

[Pinochet000]

PS I thought the question was, what kind of war should I prepare for at all. The text is poorly perceived in capital letters and without signs.

[alicante11]

At least, according to reformers, the army is preparing just for the confrontation of illegal armed groups and terrorist threats. And also to cover the strategic nuclear forces from a disarming strike.
Indeed, only a suicide can attack Russia until the SNF is suppressed. A disarming strike with the help of ground forces is also impossible. Therefore, the main focus is on the Air Force and air defense systems. As for the ground forces, they must be able to repel strikes from the regular troops of the "cordon sanitaire," that is, pshek, sprat, rodents. It's just that since they don't shoot at sparrows from cannons, it's stupid to throw nuclear warheads at all this trifle. The most dangerous adversaries against whom our ground forces are sharpened are the Turks and the Japanese (it is clear that without NATO). The Japanese could theoretically try to chop off the Kuril Islands from us, and a confrontation with the Turks could arise on the basis of their invasion of the South Caucasus (for example, actions against Armenia).

[Botanologist]

Quote: bask

Yesterday I raised this question., But it is one of the main ones. WHAT WAR IS THE RUSSIAN ARMY PREPARING. ???

There is no answer to this question. Scenarios - thousands, and all real. It seems to me that there are various troops, and as part of their strategy, they should be able to do everything. Marines - carry out their tasks, submariners - their own, Air Force - their own. And the task of the General Staff is to tie all this into a knot in the right direction.
But we cannot and should not have in each brigade a stripping group, a group of work with agents, a radiation and chemical group. defense, a group of cyber troops, etc. The army is fighting, the General Staff plans and controls. If there is enough equipment and weapons, if the rear is strong and the people are trained, any war can be done. And if this is not the case, clearing the village turns into a nightmare.

[zambo]

Not a fact ... In light of the ongoing local conflicts, in which countries with nuclear weapons are already involved, "the gun simply cannot but bang ..."

[Su24]

This can be said based on the experience of the past (Cold) war. At present, there is a phased reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, simultaneous improvement of missile defense.

[nycsson]

A very good article! It’s immediately clear that the professional wrote!

[Vanek]

I didn’t serve in the army, and I understand that one year is not enough. Not only that to serve a year in total. So they "mow" mom do not cry. I listened to the news - the autumn call-up, 153000 people will go to serve in the troops, and 250000 have been "cut off". Finally atas.

[evgenii67]

Hello everyone! 1. Imagine if China sets the bar: "the size of the regular army must be at least 1% of the total population", an army of about 200 million people, but you can’t argue that we need an army of at least 1% of the population!
2. "A distinctive feature of the current reserve from the rest is that they are paid 50% of the prescribed monetary allowance for servicemen in accordance with the position held and 100% with participation in exercises and trainings."50% cash allowance is that from 200 to 300 rub.
3. Private (stock) up to 60 years old - no comment.

[Alexander Romanov]

Quote: evgenii67

Private (stock) up to 60 years old - no comment.

Well, that’s if there’s absolutely no one left, then yes. the truth and the lower criterion will have to be reduced to 12 years.

[antiaircrafter]

Quote: evgenii67

50% cash allowance is that from 200 to 300 rub.

Well, not so sad. Your outdated data is ten times underestimated.

[peter-tank]

Now a rookie soldier (conscript) receives a little more than 2000 rubles. per month. So the monthly increase in premium from the current reserve can be about 1000 rubles. If you make calculations for contractors, then with DD ordinary 15-16 thousand, the surcharge will be about 7,5 thousand rubles per month.

[Per se.]

Quote: Vanek

So I did not serve in the army, and then I understand

We have the Constitution and the Federal Law "On Military Duty and Military Service," and to it, "On Alternative Civilian Service." But, what is interesting, alternative civilian service is allowed only for those who are fit for military service, but do not want or cannot ... So they mow down from the army, dear Vanyok, whether civil (alternative) service is for everyone, including , mi sorry, and for women, the notion "I did not serve" will disappear forever. Otherwise it is strange that a person can work, start a family, drive a car, but work for the army fund ("in the rear") on constitutional duty is not. As for the term of service, here too, there is a Constitution, there is a debt, - amend the Law, make a term of 3 years (full urgent, for the best, with benefits and bonuses), for everyone else who cannot or does not want - civil service to the army fund (with a preparatory course for an army or civil defense reservist, from 2 to 6 months). This is the solution to the problems with budget savings and manning the army.

[aviamed90]

This law, as you know, can be rewritten and changed. We all witnessed this when the gentlemen at the top changed the Constitution for themselves.

[Per se.]

So, aviamed90, the problem is that the "gentlemen at the top" do not make laws for themselves, but in the interests of the state. Everyone should serve, during the Second World War, some were at the front, others worked in the rear for the army (everything for the front, everything for victory). The draft system should be built on this principle. It is clear that with an increase in the term of military service to 3 years, theoretically the size of the army should increase, but if only really fit ones are taken for the urgent army, that is, not all, the number can be regulated within the necessary limits, all the rest - to give the constitutional duty in the civil service (working off in the army fund), where to leave short-term courses for army and civil defense reservists. A three-year conscript is no worse than a contract soldier, and maybe even better. In any case, options are possible here, but, most importantly, with such a system, the selection and quality of recruits are improved, a mobilization fund is created, both from the army and from the “rear”. The main thing is that the military budget is not only saved, but also replenished through the civil service. All this can be solved, but someone needs to fence their gardens with a contract army and an alternative service, and this is hardly in the interests of our country and its defense capability.

[TRex]

For what reason and when was this article written? Personally, I heard it all thirty years ago in a military school ... It is especially interesting to read about "regimental schools" and the combat coordination of regiments and divisions. Ay !!! Where are they?
For one thing, I would like to know - where did the equipment, weapons, ammunition and property for those two brigades that from time immemorial were kept near my town and which disappeared without a trace in the process of "modernization" of the Armed Forces?

[smel]

Everything that is written in the article is clear to any sane person. And if he also served, then these are common truths. It’s not clear why these truths were crushed by Serdyukov, and all the near-by agreed and clapped their hands? Yes, and why his theft was slowly unwinding (not the fact that they would be planted), but the collapse of the army was not even considered

[evgenm55]

And who, or rather whom, to consider? Those who robbed and plundered with him? He is silent and will be silent, and for this he will have a guarantee of security, the dim-witted will understand ... Or does anyone else doubt that the medvoputs were not aware of his actions? I wonder how they will now justify the restoration of the regiment-division link? a term of one year is generally laughable ... I know from myself that only after 15-17 months I began to become a fighter who forgot my mother's pies and mastered the technique and weapons.

[vilenich]

Perhaps a number of proposals will give a positive effect, but justifications like this cause bewilderment:

In the structure of the armed forces, divisions must be recreated, because military units, as a rule, do not fight on their own. Both in Miron’s time, and in the course of hostilities, they are organizationally included in the composition: regiment — in the division; division - into the army; army - in the front (USC). And the brigade is part of the army, as they say, directly, which in itself is unnatural.

I am not a supporter of the transition from divisions to brigades, but such justifications ...
Many proposals resemble canned goods from the distant Soviet past.
In general, the article is not impressive!

[Pinochet000]

Quote: vilenich

In general, the article is not impressive!

I can be mistaken, but it seems to me that I read this article for a long time, the year is 2008-9.

[vilenich]

Quote: Pinochet000

I can be mistaken, but it seems to me that I read this article for a long time, the year is 2008-9.

Many of the sentences in this article are more than a dozen years old!

[treskoed]

The question of the collection of storerooms, the work of the military commissariats, which are now practically eliminated, is missing.

[nycsson]

Quote: treskoed

The question of the collection of storerooms, the work of the military commissariats, which are now practically eliminated, is missing.

Well, of course! We have an army of constant BG! What are the fees and military enlistment offices? There is no mobilization component!

[Alikovo]

we have a population of 143369806 1433700 2 people. then the number of the Air Forces of the Russian Federation should be XNUMX. we have a shortage, it is better to make a service life of XNUMX years.

[Murat 09]

My opinion is that the article was written on outdated patterns, 1% of the population, etc., now is a different time, we need strong strategic nuclear forces and special forces, equipped on a voluntary basis by professionals who serve at least 5-10 years. And most importantly, in these special forces, it’s a willingness to die, but to destroy the enemy on any occasion, for example, the amers delivered a preemptive strike, command centers, the leadership of the country were destroyed, then these units must independently destroy the enemy to the very end by any means, and not scatter. For example, the Taliban, Sunnis in Iraq, etc. fighting to the end, although not soldiers, but parts of the secular Iraqi army evaporated under the betrayal of the generals.

[not good]

The article flashed the idea of ​​recruiting units with servicemen of the same draft in order to eliminate hazing relationships, nonsense. From my experience, I can declare with full responsibility that the problem of hazing is not solved by completing a unit with one call, but by constantly working with personnel and monitoring them in their free time, and the absence of senior military personnel complicates not only training, but also the implementation of the tasks assigned to the unit, especially fighting, because. there is no succession of generations. During the service in 2-3 years, many senior citizens knew and performed their duties better than newly-made lieutenants and were a support for commanders, including in the education of young military personnel. And in order to have fewer draft evaders, it is necessary to obtain passports, rights, and other documents will not be linked with military enlistment offices, then they will not want to, but they will have to come and check in, and travel abroad without a military enlistment office mark before serving in the Armed Forces is generally prohibited. services for those who "skipped" before the end of the draft age. Then I bet the number of draft dodgers will drop dramatically.

[Murat 09]

But how then will the children of our elite rest abroad, without pressure to crush us, etc. therefore, the government doesn’t really fight with the deviators, because in the same State Duma (I almost told the State Duma)))) only 10% of the deputies served. We say in the Caucasus they give big bribes to go to serve, there are almost no deviators. I didn’t serve, I wanted to go to the landing, but my call was in 1996, my distant relative was called up, 3 months of training and they were thrown into Chechnya, they broke a convoy on the way and he died, after which it was reluctant to die for a drunken bastard and I slanted, now I would go on an urgent basis without question, but late age ((

[alicante11]

Based on my post posted above.
To counter the Japanese, they need a fleet and the Air Force, as well as strong parts of the Airborne Forces and Marine Corps. Since it is impossible to deploy large contingents of troops on the islands, the Japanese simply need to be knocked out by counter-landing troops after they land on the islands. Given the strength of potential opponents (the maximum among the Turks is 750 thousand), a million-strong army is quite sufficient. 1, however, the percentage of the population here is clearly far-fetched, about 1% of the Chinese army was already mentioned above.
About the brigades / divisions. By and large, our brigades are independent formations, such as divisions. Those. they have all the necessary means of amplification for the independent implementation of the tasks. They also come together in the army, etc. Therefore, there is not much difference in what they call the main independent formations, brigades or divisions. It's just that the brigade has fewer personnel, so it is more flexibly controlled. Considering the general reduction of the ground forces and the reduction in the size of the main formations, they will allow us to maintain at the previous level the number of independent tasks that these formations can carry out (another thing is whether they are sufficient in their firepower to carry out these tasks).
About the ensigns. By and large, no matter what the name of a junior army specialist is, a warrant officer or sergeant. Here the question is different. First, it was necessary to prepare a sufficient number of sergeants, and then abolish the rank of ensign. That is how Makarov would have liked it if he had been offered to continue the service with a decrease in rank by one step (with a corresponding reduction in salaries), but in the same place? But it was precisely on this that the reformers expected that the ensigns and warrant officers would remain in their places after demotion. What is it - just treating people like cattle? Or direct sabotage?

[peter-tank]

1. You see, in order not to engage in "counter-landing" (???) there is such a thing as "anti-amphibious defense" or "defense of the sea coast." This is what the troops did during my service on Sakhalin Island (1989-2000). It is cheaper and easier to prevent the enemy from landing on the coast and seizing bridgeheads than to knock him out of fortified positions later.
2. I do not argue - brigades are independent formations, but not "the same as divisions." They are much weaker. There are practically no means of reinforcing battalions in them. Experimental exercises conducted in 2008 with 74 Omsb Brigade (Siberian Military District) showed that the brigade was not able to independently fulfill the assigned combat mission.
And the postulate that "It's just that the brigade has fewer personnel, so it is more flexible." causes a nervous smile. Who and how tried to measure the FLEXIBILITY of control, in what units of measurement? Management efficiency is another matter. The headquarters of the division controlled six fighting organisms (three SMEs, TPs, glanders, zrp), the headquarters of the brigade must manage 9-10 fighting organisms. The staff of the brigade’s headquarters is much less than the division’s (I hope this is beyond doubt), and for the new (Makarovsk-Serdyukov) states, the qualitative composition does not fit into any framework.
In general, General Kanchukov advocates a return to the "starting position" and I personally am ready to agree with him.

[alicante11]

1. You see, in order not to engage in "counter-landing" (???) there is such a thing as "anti-amphibious defense" or "defense of the sea coast." This is what the troops did during my service on Sakhalin Island (1989-2000). It is cheaper and easier to prevent the enemy from landing on the coast and seizing bridgeheads than to knock him out of fortified positions later.

Understand. However, much less manpower and means are needed in order to sweep away the unprepared defense of the enemy who has just landed and who does not have significant superiority at sea on the islands, than in order to deter the islands from a prepared attack.
If it is possible to hold the islands, then they are being held. If this is not possible, then a good example of what happens even with a very powerful defense on the islands is the example of the defeat of Japanese island groups in WWII.

They are much weaker. There are practically no means of reinforcing battalions in them. The experimental exercises conducted at the 2008 m with the 74 ombre brigade (Siberian Military District) showed that the brigade was not able to independently carry out the assigned combat mission.

http://skeiz.livejournal.com/1380163.html

Here is the staff of the "new look" brigade. To you as a practice. What's missing in this state?
At the expense of the brigade’s non-fulfillment of the task. I am not aware of this situation, but failure to complete the task is not always associated with poor quality of the staff of the connection.

[peter-tank]

1. Antiamphibious defense is not organized at the moment the enemy lands. It is prepared well in advance in peacetime. It was prepared on our Far Eastern islands. All connections and parts were "sharpened" just for this. The Japanese have neither the strength nor the means to conduct a large-scale landing operation. The experience of WWII, by the way, testifies to this. The Amers, before starting the landing, created 3, 4 or more times superiority in manpower and equipment, ironed the Japs with artillery and aviation for up to several weeks, and then ...
2. I teach this state to cadets and I do not know it from "skeiz.livejournal". I also know the staff of the division (I held a fairly high position there). The combat capabilities of these formations are incomparable, the comparison is clearly not in favor of the brigades.
In addition, the entire world experience of militarily developed states speaks for a divisional structure. In the SA both divisions and brigades peacefully coexisted. Only then the brigades were created as part of the army corps for specific tasks, and not by the general Choch, not taking into account the specifics of a particular theater.

[Volkhov]

You are right, of course, but the current situation is absurd - the defense that was being prepared in Soviet times was destroyed - the tanks from Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands were removed, the trenches are washed out and there are simply no people - if the island or coastal area is uninhabited, then by the time the landing is discovered they are a maternity hospital out of boredom they will build and rightfully call themselves aborigines.
Under Stalinism, they tried to populate the coast, and at meteorological stations, for example, there were weapons such as machine guns in the main and spare depots, once even a 76 mm cannon in case of a submarine (in the 60s), and in the village. Ozernovsky in Kamchatka, there was a monument to local residents who drove away a Japanese destroyer in 22 - of course, they did not sink it with rifles, but they didn’t allow the landing. Under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and even more so now, the coast has become depopulated, with weapons stricter, so that local forces are unlikely to work out - they will send either a "counter-landing" or passports like Depardieu.

[alicante11]

Well, what am I talking about? The counter-landing is designed to throw off the enemy, who did not manage to organize defense only after capturing the island.
At the expense of the forces of the Japanese. Under the USSR, of course, they did not have forces. And now, compared with our capabilities, I don’t know, I don’t know.

[alicante11]

1. The airborne defense is not organized at the time of the landing of the enemy. She prepares in advance in peacetime. On our Far Eastern islands, it was prepared.

The Japanese, too, was prepared, but what's the point? If you don’t have enough strength, why ruin those available under enemy attacks? I also did not take the principle of anti-airborne forces from the ceiling. And he worked out during the KSHI. This method allows holding island territories with lesser forces against superior enemy forces if it is possible to replay it in the activity of using existing forces.

The Japanese have neither the strength nor the means to carry out a large-scale landing operation.

What are our forces stationed on the islands? I do not think that there remained the same grouping as it was in Soviet times.

Amer, before starting the landing, created 3's, 4's and more superior superiority in forces and means, ironed the Japs for several weeks, and then ....

And our marines took the Kuril Islands immediately. Although, of course, no one denies the preparation.

2. I teach this state to cadets and I do not know it from "skeiz.livejournal". I also know the staff of the division (I held a fairly high position there). The combat capabilities of these formations are incomparable, the comparison is clearly not in favor of the brigades.

And I have no other sources, I'm not your cadet. Therefore, I take it from there and not in order to enlighten you, but in order to conduct a substantive discussion. After all, he asked a specific question. What is missing in this state?
And who says that the brigade and division are commensurate? A brigade is a brigade. A division is a division. I’m saying that the brigade has all the necessary services for conducting an independent military operation. If it is not, then tell me what is missing. Moreover, with your experience, this should not be difficult for you.

In addition, the entire world experience of militarily developed states speaks for a divisional structure.

World divisional experience from the strength of 200 years. Although I turned it down, of course, in the Napoleonic wars, the division is something completely different, even in the Crimean War the division was not the main independent formation. Before that, there were other basic connections. Progress does not stand still. It is possible that the firepower of the modern brigade is sufficient to carry out tasks, and the power of the division is excessive. It is necessary to look at the specific tasks facing these teams and evaluate the possibilities of their implementation.

Also, the word "division" is not a magic word that will allow you to complete all tasks. For example, the tank division of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in 1941. Both were divisions. But our TD remained at the border, while the German ones reached Moscow and Stalingrad. And near Moscow, for example, the tank brigades of the Red Army fought well.

You need to be realistic. Stretch legs on clothes. In the USSR, all resources were in the hands of the people and therefore the people could contain a huge army. Now more limited resources are mostly in the hands of the oligarchs. Therefore, we cannot maintain a Soviet-style army in peacetime or wartime. Therefore, if we can solve combat tasks with the help of brigades, then a larger number of brigades will allow us to solve a greater number of tasks than a limited number of divisions.

[as3wresdf]

The base of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of all citizens of the Russian Federation on this site twitlink.ws/baza and the main thing was done as if to search for lost relatives, but here is all the information about each of us: correspondence with friends, addresses, phones, place of work, and the worst thing is even mine nudity photo (though I do not know from where ...). In general, I was very scared - but there is such a function as "hide data" of course I used it and I advise everyone not to hesitate, you never know

[alicante11]

About the service life. IMHO, our soldiers are not terminators who can engage in combat training for days on end. Pretty stupid, IMHO, a way to get rid of bullying. As far as I understand, the entire military machine is built on hazing. Roughly speaking, if a sergeant is a "grandfather" for a private, then an officer is a "grandfather" for a sergeant. The problem of bullying is not because soldiers have a lot of free time. And because the power in the army is given to people who are not ready for this. A conscript soldier should not command his comrades, so as not to rise above them, even if he served for half a year or a year more. Therefore, all positions of junior command personnel in the army should be occupied by contract soldiers who have passed a special, incl. and psychological and pedagogical training. After all, there was the experience of using extra-conscripts for the ISS. It would be nice to develop it. And third. To create tough discipline, there must be an inevitable and tangible system of punishments for violation of command. The optimal, as it seems to me, would be to introduce an increase in the service life for failure to comply with the order. Well, for repeated violations, of course, send to disciplinary units for a full term of service with all increases. The soldier must understand that failure to follow orders is a crime followed by punishment. Another question is what will be the mechanism for imposing penalties, since the extension of the term of service violates our constitutional rights, not to mention the content in disciplinary units. Installation of video cameras in the premises of the barracks would also be a good way to protect against bullying. Thanks to this, duty officers can quickly respond to violations of discipline, and material is also collected for punishment for hazing.
As I said, loading conscripts with combat training is not a way out of hazing and is not an option to speed up combat training. Combat training should be intense. But it should not take all the time from rise to rebound. The soldier is also a man and has the right to rest and cultural leisure.
As for the training of the draftee. Yes, it should start at school in military training classes. But this should not be a formality and should not degenerate into shagistics. At school, a young man must master the design of the main small arms. Those. machine gun, pistol, possibly a machine gun. Design studies should be completed in 10-11 combat shooting classes. Where fire support weapons are also shown (hand grenade launchers, machine guns, etc.). This is necessary in order for the future conscript to determine for himself the type of weapon that he wants to master in the troops.

[alicante11]

The second stage of preparation should be a training center, which should be located in every major city or district. In this training center, a draftee, not yet in a barracks position, but already assigned but contentment, undergoes a full course of individual training in his chosen military specialty. At the same time, one should not pay much attention to shagistics, but devote more time to combat training. At the training center there should be dormitories for draftees from remote settlements.
After the training center, the draftee takes the oath and is sent to the unit in the barracks position, where he takes a place according to the combat schedule in his unit and is included in the work of fighting coordination of the unit.
The advantage of such a construction of the training process, PMSM is the fact that the troops will be absent recruits who reduce the combat readiness of combat units. A fighter will already come to the unit fully having mastered his specialty and he will only have to join the team of his unit, learn to act together with his comrades. At the same time, the institution of mentoring should not be canceled. Old-timers should help newcomers quickly join the unit.

[alicante11]

Another point that I would like to draw attention to is a very topical national issue in the army.
PMSM, combat units should be formed on a national basis by the rank and file. At the same time, units consisting of national minorities should be staffed with junior command personnel and officers from the national majority in order to prevent the possibility of using these units to promote separatism.
At the same time, junior commanders and officers from national minorities may well serve in units that are formed from the national majority.
However, this applies only to parts where they serve on conscription. In the contract parts, on the contrary, one can only welcome a mixture of nationalities.

[erased]

In general, the offers are good and true. But their implementation is even partial in a big question.
As for pre-conscription training at school, it can only be partial. But DOSAAF is a voluntary thing and it is impossible to transfer the functions of KMB to it.

[Alekseev]

The article correctly defends the need for the presence of significant mobilization reserves of conventional forces in Russia. Nuclear weapons are excellent deterrence when approaching the middle of the last century. That is, it will not make it possible to carry out a massive invasion from a neighboring state.
But, suppose, in the Far East and Siberia there will appear areas where millions of immigrants from Asian countries will compactly live. And they can be supported by the Kosovo option. What then? For whom and why use nuclear weapons? And there is also the Caucasus. In the open sea, the Arctic question may well arise.
So the "infantry", both moto and winged, still no one can cancel.
But there are objections to combat training.
Hazing was finally abolished not by loading a soldier with lessons, but by the tough demand of capable commanders.
Outsourcing at landfills?
Is it known to the author that it is the head of the training ground who is the chief for matters regulating the stay of troops at the facilities entrusted to him for the leaders of exercises and firing. He also organizes control over the implementation of security measures. The landfill is a place of special danger. His boss is in the field as a commandant in the city.
Civil servants at combat training facilities - yes, that’s possible.
But suctioning is not appropriate here. This is not a foot wash.

[Pinochet000]

Quote: Alekseev

Hazing finally canceled not by loading a soldier with lessons, but by tough demand

In Algeria (according to a friend, a military specialist), the problem of bullying has been solved, he says, I ask how they solved it? Answer: "They shot especially gifted."

[family tree]

Radically, but efficiently, although, for starters, you could just flog before the ranks, for that matter.

[Svatdevostator]

You need to load more with practice than with theory and scribbling. I myself work on special equipment and I can say 99% that I can’t master it without practice, and the more hours of use, the higher the result !!! And remove the most indecent subject from the UCP army, forgive me political officers

[family tree]

It is necessary to load both of them, the main thing is that the practical classes immediately follow the theory, preferably on the same day, notice that it is better fixed, but at the expense of practice more, I agree, do it with your hands longer than tell in a fairy tale.

[amp]

Russia needs to switch to a territorial army following the example of the Swiss. In order to deploy a multi-million army in a few hours, and the peacetime army should be small.
SV, I would generally be completely cropped. The Airborne Forces and Special Forces, on the contrary, need to be increased. In general, in peacetime, more than 500 Russia do not need to be under arms. This is taking into account the Navy, Air Force and Air Defense.

The entire standing army must of course be contracted.

By call to serve for 8 months, with the condition that 100% is combat training. No outfits and drill, which the Jews have long abandoned, and this did not affect the fighting qualities of their army. Enough of the clueless parade ground knead!

Of course you need a strong pre-conscription training. Our country already has experience in this. Remember the 30s, about the standards of OSH. Absolutely everyone knew how to shoot.

After the initial service - permanent military training, at least 3 weeks every year - one and a half to 30 years and 2 weeks every 2 years to 45 years. In general, following the example of the Swiss army.

Near each city are cropped parts and storage bases, depending on the population.
The first wave of mobilization - people under 30, the second - up to 45.
From 45 to 55 - mobilization in militia units for the protection of settlements, roads, etc.

[aviamed90]

Territorial Army?
Then you will not collect brigades in the Primorsky Territory! And in Kamchatka?

[aviamed90]

I respect General Ivashov (one of the Izborsk club members), but I disagree on a number of the issues raised. In general - the "plus" article. In our situation, there is no time for fat! We must at least do something!

[Genoezec.]

My respect to Major General! The article is interesting and very useful.

[SPACE]

The article says a lot of the correct, but somehow more and more small, or obvious. It is necessary to preserve the existing structure of the ground forces, as in the days of the USSR, including the divisional regiment. But it is necessary to reduce the existing parts of the order to 400 000 people who are not constantly on alert, it is also necessary to create 100-200 000 teams with constant combat readiness. The main ground forces carry out the tasks of conducting positional warfare with the use of the entire range of weapons, the organization of rear activities, and supplies. The task of the brigades is internal security, antiterrorist activity. In case of threats from outside, the ground army performs the main task, the brigades are attracted by them to strengthen. In counter-terrorist operations, the main work is carried out by brigades, with the support of the ground forces. It is required to gradually get rid of the mass of small problems of the current army, mess, hazing, etc. First of all, get rid of the stupid and diby mass of the military authorities. We need a constant, uniform, long-term policy of building the armed forces, but in such a way that we don’t rush from side to side at the slightest changes in both domestic policy, economy and leadership changes, as well as external threats and changes. Do not solve the problems of uniforms, wash, do not wash, footcloths or socks, engage in endless disputes on the number of this or that type of equipment. The army must work out solutions to various threats, standing still, not shy.
The main issues must be resolved once and for all is the type, quantity and form of the army!
All the rest is the control of the armed forces, those that are identified by the basic issues, and at the same time they must resolve any issue and work out an answer to any threat.
On the question of the army’s most dirty problem, hazing, its roots lie in the presence of mediocre and unscrupulous officers in the Armed Forces, a disregard for the situation and in the absence of authority before the soldiers. These must be disposed of. It is necessary not only to teach a soldier to shoot from a machine gun or to control a tank, most importantly in the education of WARS and fraternal relations between soldiers.

[maestro123]

Quote: evgenii67

Imagine if China sets the bar: "the size of the regular army must be at least 1% of the total population," the army is about 200 million people.

.
And then I imagined the advanced and here is a herd. Yes, even if they run with stone hatchets ... the Far East needs to be strengthened.

[Avenger711]

The size of the regular army should be at least 1% of the total population and range from 1,3 - 1,5 million.

On what basis are these numbers worked out? In addition, for a large country’s population, a lower percentage of mobilization is acceptable to ensure the required amount.