Strong are not attacked
It is highly desirable to understand how, and most importantly, why the fleet of domestic means of warfare is evolving in the foreseeable future.
The issue of equipping the army, fleet, special services and law enforcement agencies with modern weapons systems, military and special equipment (VVST) at all times has been the focus of attention of the leadership of our country. It is extremely important to organize the process of creating new and modernizing existing designs weapons taking into account the real and potential threats, as well as the economic capabilities of the state. On the eve of the formation of the next State Armaments Program, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, spoke about the problems of development planning for the VVT.
"MIC": In Russia, for the needs of weapons in the long term to 2020, huge budget funds are allocated - more than 20 trillion rubles. Is there any certainty that they will be spent wisely, will give the state and society a strategically significant result?
- Confidence in obtaining a result is. It is supported by the political will of the country's leadership, expressed by the requirements of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 7 of May 2012 No. 603 “On the implementation of plans (programs) for the construction and development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies and the modernization of the defense industry”.
In fulfillment of these requirements, under the auspices of the Military Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation, painstaking work has been organized on priority areas for the development of weapons, military and special equipment (hereinafter - VVST) and equipping them with our army, Navy, special services and law enforcement agencies.
Problems of the development of weapons of warfare are in the center of attention of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and its staff. So, in August, at the meeting of the Security Council, 2012 addressed topical issues of ensuring the development of the domestic defense industry complex (hereinafter referred to as MIC) and the implementation of the State armaments program for 2011 – 2020 years.
An interdepartmental working group has been established under the President of the Russian Federation to monitor the implementation of the state defense order and the implementation of the state armaments program.
The effective spending of budget funds allocated for the development of weapons is facilitated by the formation of a strategic planning system in Russia. The draft law “On State Strategic Planning” is currently under consideration by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.
Thus, the measures taken by the state at the present time in the area of ensuring the development of the military anti-military weapons allow us to count on a decisive re-equipment of all Russian military and security forces in the face of new challenges and threats to national security of the 21st century.
MIC: What is the place in the state strategic planning system for long-term weapons development planning?
- The development of VVST is certainly a strategically important and, to a certain extent, independent process, requiring effective state planning and control.
At the same time, despite the key, sometimes revolutionary role that the means of warfare can play in the development of military affairs, their creation should take into account the general logic of the development of the state’s military organization. And the development planning of the AMS should be considered in the context of military planning and general military planning.
Thus, in accordance with the Regulations on Military Planning in the Russian Federation (approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 3 2010 number 1205) military construction activities are determined for the future to 10 years. The adopted procedure for long-term program-oriented development planning of the WWTE according to the Federal Law 31 of May 1996 No. 61-ФЗ “On Defense” provides for the development of an 10-year state armament program every five years and submitting its project for approval by the President of the Russian Federation.
The measures for the development of the VVST and their financial and economic indicators in the 10-year state armament program for the first five years are determined for each year. In the second five years of the program, the development of VVST is characterized by total (for five years) indicators.
Moreover, the entire process of the formation of the project 10-year state armament program takes more than three years.
Thus, long-term planning of the development of VVST, carried out through the development of state armaments programs and control over their implementation, is an integral and without exaggeration one of the most important components of domestic strategic planning.
Moreover, the planning of the development of VVST is one of the most developed for today state components in this field of activity. After all, if the State Planning Committee of the USSR, and with it the whole system of state planning, formed in the era of socialism, practically ceased to exist in the 90 of the last century, in the military administration, despite all the collisions of the transition period, the development and implementation of strategic planning documents ceased, absorbing all the previous methodological experience.
As the general system of state strategic planning in Russia revives, the theory and practice of developing long-term state armaments programs will improve.
As is known, the Government of the Russian Federation in 2012 approved a number of state programs through which it is planned to fulfill the bulk of budget expenditure commitments.
The procedure for developing, implementing and evaluating the effectiveness of state programs of the Russian Federation was approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 2 August 2010, No. 588, and 21 of May 2012, No. 499. At the same time, this order does not apply to the state armament program. Apparently, some work will be needed to harmonize the rules for developing and implementing state weapons programs with the general procedures of state strategic forecasting and planning. Clarification of these rules is directly provided by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 7 of May 2012, No. 603. The Government of the Russian Federation is working on the preparation of relevant proposals to the President of the Russian Federation.
"MIC": To what extent is the existing domestic, including Soviet, experience of state planning useful in modern conditions for the development of VVST?
- In general, the experience of long-term planning and strategic management, accumulated in the USSR, must be given its due, is truly enormous, and for a number of its components (starting from the GOELRO plan) is unique. This is confirmed by the borrowing in the middle of the last century of key ideas and methods of the Soviet national economic forecasting and planning by the advanced states of the world, their creative development by government bodies and business circles, including transnational corporations.
But having past experience is not enough. It must be able to be passed on to new generations of managers, developed and used in relation to fundamentally new economic conditions and tasks. Much work remains to be done in this field.
As for the development planning of the VVST, it should be noted that the leading role in the substantiation and formation of draft plans in this area has traditionally been played by the national military science complex represented by the military science committees of military command bodies, branches and branches of arms (forces), research institutions The Ministry of Defense and other power ministries and departments. It would not be superfluous to note that the positions of professional managers in the field of weapons development were largely replaced by people from military science. Domestic experience in this field has been around for more than 40 years.
Long-term planning for the development of weapons was introduced in our country by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 10-1969-433 dated June 157, “On Further Improving the Planning for the Development of Weapons and Military Equipment”.
One of the main motivations for "improving planning" was the diversity of the range of weapons and military equipment (hereinafter - IWT), created by nine defense industry branches of the USSR for five types of Armed Forces.
Suffice it to recall that the nomenclature of intercontinental ballistic missiles, adopted in service during the Soviet period, approached two dozen. The type of Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems caught up in this class of weapons with the total type of all NATO countries.
The main result of the Soviet stage of long-term target-oriented planning for IWT was the Weapons Program for the period 1986 – 1995 and the Main directions of IWT development up to 2000 - the latest strategic planning documents in the considered area adopted in the USSR era.
At that time, the weapons and military equipment fleet was updated and increased at relatively high rates along all the numerous type lines - dozens of ships, hundreds of missiles and airplanes per year, a huge mass of automobile, armored vehicles and rocket artillery weapons, the unprecedented scale of capital construction for the installation of weapons and military equipment.
In addition to resource-intensive strategic nuclear forces and space rocket forces, ocean fleets, long-range and military transport aviation more than a dozen front-line ones were gradually updated, and they included more than forty army sets of weapons in groups of forces outside the USSR and military districts on the territory of the USSR - under the plans and plans of strategic operations in all potential theaters of military operations. At the same time, 5-10% of the total costs for each type line were allocated to R&D for the creation of new weapons.
In addition, under the auspices of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Science and Technology, the five-year plan of fundamental and applied research in the interests of the defense and security of the country was implemented as a ground for the future.
By the way, after the end of the service life, that is, after about 25 – 30 years, the entire mass of Soviet weapons, at about the same rate as they accumulated, inevitably began to turn into a faulty burden, which was “finished” and “maintained” for a long time. Russia. And to prevent this regress in the new economic conditions was impossible.
The next cycle of work on the formation of a draft armament program before 2000, which began in the second half of 80, during the political crisis of socialism, was not completed. In 1990, work was resumed and completed with a draft of this program in relation to the Armed Forces and the economy of the USSR. However, after the adoption of the Bialowieza Accords, it lost its relevance. The development of weapons has become determined by annual plans.
Thus, as regards the Soviet stage, for all its grandeur, in my opinion, the experience of planning the development of weapons in the USSR should not be idealized. If only because planning is essentially just one of the forms of foresight, the most important, but not the only management tool, which is always subordinated to the general development paradigm in specific historical conditions.
In 1993, an attempt was made to develop a draft armament program for Russian conditions. But with inflation galloping at the time, the economic parameters of the program were very uncertain. Therefore, instead of the Armament Program, only the IWT Development Concept up to 2000 was approved by the President of the Russian Federation. And only in 1995, taking into account the provisions of this Concept, a draft of the first Russian armaments program for the period up to 2005 was prepared on the basis of more specific financial projections.
In the process of its consideration and revision, the needs of not only the Ministry of Defense, but also other security agencies (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service, Ministry of Emergency Situations, etc.) were taken into account. On this basis, the armament program received the status of “state” and November 16 of 1996 was approved by the President of the Russian Federation B. N. Yeltsin.
Thus, 1996 year is the year of birth of the first planning document that determined the goals, objectives and ways of long-term development of the VVST in relation to the Russian military construction in the conditions of the emerging market economy in the country.
But this birth was truly in agony, for the objective conditions, and with them the methodology of weapons development planning, underwent dramatic changes at the turn of the ages.
"MIC": What has become fundamentally new?
- The main limiting factor in the development of VVST has changed.
They were not labor resources and production capacities, which was typical of a socialist economy, but budget allocations proper (with an excess of production capacities).
And if in the conditions of the USSR, under the needs, opportunities were somehow sought (including by attracting new labor resources and production capacities), which gave rise to the formulation of the so-called direct problems of substantiation (optimization) of the plan - to minimize the forthcoming costs at a given level of efficiency (degree of achievement of the goal VVST), then in the conditions of an acute shortage of budget allocations, it became possible only to set up “inverse” tasks - to maximize the result at a given cost. Another word is to choose the “best” development plan from the “bad” ones. However, in these circumstances, planning was not essentially targeted, and the development of VVST inevitably turned into an ineffective “budget utilization”.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, dozens of expensive developments and productions of new domestic weapons were stopped and then stopped, and this greatly depreciated the huge past resource costs. A number of modern types of conventional weapons have been preserved in Russia only because of the income from their exports.
It should be noted as a negative and a factor in the loss of personal responsibility for mistakes in planning and implementing programs for the development of VVST.
"MIC": Is the current methodology and planning system for the development of the VVST effective in modern conditions?
- The existing experience of developing, adjusting and executing state weapons programs in Russia objectively indicates that there are a number of long-standing problems in this field of activity, the solution of which will require special attention of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
Virtually every Russian state armaments program needed to be adjusted after only one or two years after approval. In these circumstances, the annually formed state defense order actually became the main tool for planning and managing the development of the VVST in Russia. At the same time, it was far from fully complying with the parameters of the state armament program, approved at the highest state level. In practice, if you call a spade a spade, it was largely ignored.
By decision of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 2012, the state customers of the state defense order were tasked to ensure that its nomenclature parameters and indicators comply with the parameters and indicators of the State Armaments Program for the 2011 – 2020 years.
"MIC": But it is well known that in past years, the Russian state armament programs and the annual defense orders were simply not funded at the proper level. What does this have to do with the methodology of program development and the strengthening of control over their implementation?
- A reverse question is also appropriate: why develop and submit for approval by the President of the Russian Federation such federal programs that will not be funded by the state, whose initial data are unreliable, development goals are vague, prices are erroneous (downward), and the risks are exorbitant?
In recent years, the state defense order is funded almost in full. Budget costs are steadily growing. And new, objective methodological requirements are being made to the tools for planning the development of the VVST in the light of new tasks and prospects for military construction. What are they?
First, to raise the quality of strategic goal-setting and to ensure the quantitative measurability of the result of the development of VVST (to carry out result-oriented budgeting).
Secondly, to generate the largest possible number of development options, that is, to ensure the breadth of choice for the search for the optimal variant of the development of VVST in terms of efficiency and costs.
Third, adjust the planning horizon and the frequency of adjustments to the state armaments program (rolling planning), while linking them with the parameters of the overall system of state strategic planning.
Fourthly, to coordinate state programs for the development of weapons, the development of the defense industrial complex and other federal programs that are important for defense and security.
Obviously, the adopted horizon of development planning for Russia in military technology (10 years) does not fully correspond to the duration, resource intensity and inertia of the rearmament processes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, restructuring and technological modernization of the Russian defense industry, the implementation of the results of fundamental scientific research and other critical long-term processes, as well as the life cycle duration of VVST products reaching 25 years or more.
It is highly desirable to understand how, and most importantly, why the fleet of domestic means of warfare is evolving in the entire foreseeable future. This requires sustained indicators and targets, approved at the highest state level, a long-term plan and a plan to provide military units and agencies with military equipment for military service in accordance with their combat (operational) composition and reserves of emergency reserves and reserves, that is, a clear overall development concept for military service forces for the long term.
Of particular relevance is the development of the long-term concept of the development of the VVS in the light of the requirements of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 7 in May 2012 No. 603, which provides for the creation of a qualitatively new system of analysis and strategic planning in the area of countering threats to national security for the period of forming state weapons programs.
If, however, in planning to limit the 10-year horizon, then we, as they say, "we will not see the forest for the trees." For example, if we stop financing events that go beyond the 10-year period, we will not prepare a scientific and technological reserve for the future. As a result, resources will be fragmented, short-term results achieved to the detriment of long-range, and strategic goals may remain ephemeral.
Thus, one of the manifestations of myopia in forward-looking planning was the exclusion from the armament program (at the initiative of the past leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Russia) research projects that do not bring real results in the next five years. Among them were virtually all fundamental and exploratory research in the field of defense and security.
To remedy the situation, a special decision of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in this field of activity was required. In pursuance of this decision, the Federal Law on 16 of October 2012 of the Year No. 174-FZ established the Advanced Research Fund to organize the search, order for development, testing and support of innovative scientific and technical ideas, advanced design and technological solutions in the development and production of high-tech military products. , special and dual use, as well as bringing these ideas and solutions to the project level. These are studies with a high degree of risk of unrealizability. But it is in such an environment that truly breakthrough ideas are sought.
Thus, the strategic process of re-equipping, creating and mastering new generations of means of warfare should not be visible through the window of the 10-year program, but in its entirety, albeit in general terms.
Currently, the strategic target for the future is the requirement of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 7 of May 2012 of the year No. 603 to equip the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies with modern samples of military equipment, bringing their share to 2020%.
"MIC": But the modern world is very dynamic. And the strategic objectives of the development of the VVST, and the general conditions of the country's socio-economic development can quickly change. Are long-range designs appropriate in these circumstances?
- It is really impossible to program reliably the development of the VVST for decades to come.
The main uncertainty in the plans of military construction and the closely related plans for the development of armaments objectively results from the uncertainty of the timing of the start of the war, if such becomes inevitable for the country. The war, which will require full tension and all the accumulated weapons. So, if a war is likely to be expected in the coming year, it is objectively required that all resources be directed to the repair and modernization of existing weapons, the acquisition of mass-produced models. The possibility of a relatively long-term peaceful development under the nuclear “umbrella” allows us to allocate resources for long-term projects. At the same time, I quote the President of the Russian Federation, “we must not lead anyone into temptation with our weakness.”
Undoubtedly, strategic goal-setting in the development of weapons is the lot of politicians. It is extremely responsible. There is nothing more ruinous and dangerous than the pursuit of an erroneous goal in the global military-force rivalry. But there is no aimless development in human society, even if the goal is not to change anything.
When a strategic goal or the conditions for achieving it are changeable, there is nothing left to do but change (adjust) the plan, plan and development program oriented towards the goal. To do this, a rolling planning procedure is used throughout the world, when a prospective plan is regularly updated before its expiration. Thus, the Russian 10-year-old state armaments program, as already noted, is customary to be updated once every five years. In this case, the first five-year period is of crucial importance. Since the program is approved by the President of the Russian Federation, it is not possible to promptly “fix” it under the terms of subordination, without going through the entire cycle of developing a draft program (more than three years).
Other scientifically-technologically and militarily developed countries provide examples of more flexible long-term military-technical planning. For example, in the USA, the development of weapons is carried out for a six-year period with an annual review (adjustment of the program) and its extension for a year. At the same time, general plans and forecasts of military construction are much longer-term. In Germany, the 15-year plan for the construction of the Bundeswehr is annually updated. In France, the 30-year prospective military construction plan is updated annually.
Thus, the dynamism of the external world and the uncertainty in the data do not cancel prospective planning, but only regulate its rational content and tools. In other words, in the development of weapons in today's world, it is necessary to look further, and to revise (if necessary) more often.
"MIC": Maybe you should not approve a weapons program at the highest state level?
- Today, this is required by the Federal Law "On Defense". And this, of course, has its reason from the point of view of the formation of reliable, endorsed by the President of the Russian Federation guidelines for the defense industry and business circles (including investors), who are building contractual relations with government customers of the VVST. But at the same time, the unsatisfactory quality of planning can reduce the managerial authority of the state.
Modern computer technologies allow, in principle, to contain an armament program and dozens of its indicators in electronic form (including an electronic signature) and to tweak it at least quarterly - as needed, planning and predicting for any prospect. And such “programming”, as I see it, can be the prerogative of the executive branch. But the long-term concept of VVST development, which implies political goal-setting and corresponding quantitative requirements, should certainly be approved by the decision of the President of the Russian Federation.
In addition, it is clear that in the foreseeable future, the actual development of the VVST is expressed more completely and more reliably by the totality of the contracts concluded with the executors of the state defense order and the results of their execution within the budget process. The more long-term contracts among them, and such a tendency takes place, the closer the state defense order is to the effective state armaments program we are seeking.
At present, the issue of programming the development of VVST for a period of six years (two three-year state budgets) is being discussed with the possibility of adjusting such a program at least once every three years. In this case, we are talking about the program period, bearing in mind that the planned, as well as the forecast periods for which goal-setting is carried out, should be much longer.
In any case, the regulation of the procedures for planning the development of VVST should be brought in line with the general procedures provided for by the draft law “On State Strategic Planning”. If a six-year cycle of updating strategic forecasts and plans is established by federal law, it makes sense to adjust the state armaments program and other military planning documents for them accordingly.
"MIC": How does the state armaments program relate to the federal defense industry development program?
- These are related by strategic objectives, similar in forms of implementation (through the state defense order), but substantially different in content federal programs.
The first one operates with samples (complexes, systems) of VVST in the dynamics of their creation, production, maintenance and repair, as well as disposal and destruction of decommissioned products. The second is with the production technologies and equipment of the defense industry organizations, as well as with measures for the staffing of the defense industries necessary to fulfill the state armaments program and government defense orders.
According to the Federal Law of 31 of May 1996 of the year No. 61-ФЗ “On Defense”, approval of federal state armament and development programs for the military-industrial complex is attributed to the powers of the President of the Russian Federation in the field of defense.
But in practice, the federal program for the development of the defense industry complex was not presented to the President for approval by the Russian Federation. In March 2012, the Government of the Russian Federation approved the federal target program “Development of the defense-industrial complex over the 2011 – 2020 years”. Currently, its activities are included in the state program "The development of industry and increase its competitiveness" for the period up to 2020 year.
It should be noted that according to the current Rules for the development and implementation of state armaments programs, they should be developed simultaneously with the development programs of the military-industrial complex. But this, in practice, as we see, is not respected.
There are different points of view.
On the one hand, measures of the state armament program should set the direction for the development of the defense industry organizations, technologies and materials, and be a guide for industrial defense programs. After all, the essence of the activities of most defense enterprises (with the exception of state-owned) is a competitive business, and the goal of their economic activity is not to increase the equipment of the Armed Forces, but to make a profit. And it is precisely this stimulus in a competitive market economy that the state endeavors (through a defense order) draws on the needs of defense capability.
Many of the enterprises of the defense industrial complex produce and successfully sell civilian products. And measures for the development of research, design and production and technological base of such organizations, carried out under the defense order, to a certain extent subsidize the commercial potential of the defense industry, contributing to the technological modernization of enterprises.
On the other hand, the effective development of the VVST requires advance preparation of knowledge-intensive industries, training of qualified personnel. And breakthrough technologies in the field of materials development, electronic component base, as well as the latest information and nanotechnologies developed by scientific defense organizations, set fundamentally new vectors in the development of means of warfare.
In these circumstances, it is important to put the processes of formation and implementation of interrelated federal programs that are strategically important for ensuring defense and state security of interconnected federal programs on a solid methodological and legal basis.
In conclusion, I would like to assure you that the pressing legal, organizational, as well as scientific and methodological problems of planning the development of the VVST will be solved in a timely manner - on the eve of the formation of the next state armament program.
The issue of equipping the army, fleet, special services and law enforcement agencies with modern weapons systems, military and special equipment (VVST) at all times has been the focus of attention of the leadership of our country. It is extremely important to organize the process of creating new and modernizing existing designs weapons taking into account the real and potential threats, as well as the economic capabilities of the state. On the eve of the formation of the next State Armaments Program, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, spoke about the problems of development planning for the VVT.
"MIC": In Russia, for the needs of weapons in the long term to 2020, huge budget funds are allocated - more than 20 trillion rubles. Is there any certainty that they will be spent wisely, will give the state and society a strategically significant result?
- Confidence in obtaining a result is. It is supported by the political will of the country's leadership, expressed by the requirements of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation 7 of May 2012 No. 603 “On the implementation of plans (programs) for the construction and development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies and the modernization of the defense industry”.
In fulfillment of these requirements, under the auspices of the Military Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation, painstaking work has been organized on priority areas for the development of weapons, military and special equipment (hereinafter - VVST) and equipping them with our army, Navy, special services and law enforcement agencies.
Problems of the development of weapons of warfare are in the center of attention of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and its staff. So, in August, at the meeting of the Security Council, 2012 addressed topical issues of ensuring the development of the domestic defense industry complex (hereinafter referred to as MIC) and the implementation of the State armaments program for 2011 – 2020 years.
An interdepartmental working group has been established under the President of the Russian Federation to monitor the implementation of the state defense order and the implementation of the state armaments program.
The effective spending of budget funds allocated for the development of weapons is facilitated by the formation of a strategic planning system in Russia. The draft law “On State Strategic Planning” is currently under consideration by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.
Thus, the measures taken by the state at the present time in the area of ensuring the development of the military anti-military weapons allow us to count on a decisive re-equipment of all Russian military and security forces in the face of new challenges and threats to national security of the 21st century.
MIC: What is the place in the state strategic planning system for long-term weapons development planning?
- The development of VVST is certainly a strategically important and, to a certain extent, independent process, requiring effective state planning and control.
At the same time, despite the key, sometimes revolutionary role that the means of warfare can play in the development of military affairs, their creation should take into account the general logic of the development of the state’s military organization. And the development planning of the AMS should be considered in the context of military planning and general military planning.
Thus, in accordance with the Regulations on Military Planning in the Russian Federation (approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of October 3 2010 number 1205) military construction activities are determined for the future to 10 years. The adopted procedure for long-term program-oriented development planning of the WWTE according to the Federal Law 31 of May 1996 No. 61-ФЗ “On Defense” provides for the development of an 10-year state armament program every five years and submitting its project for approval by the President of the Russian Federation.The measures for the development of the VVST and their financial and economic indicators in the 10-year state armament program for the first five years are determined for each year. In the second five years of the program, the development of VVST is characterized by total (for five years) indicators.
Moreover, the entire process of the formation of the project 10-year state armament program takes more than three years.
Thus, long-term planning of the development of VVST, carried out through the development of state armaments programs and control over their implementation, is an integral and without exaggeration one of the most important components of domestic strategic planning.
Moreover, the planning of the development of VVST is one of the most developed for today state components in this field of activity. After all, if the State Planning Committee of the USSR, and with it the whole system of state planning, formed in the era of socialism, practically ceased to exist in the 90 of the last century, in the military administration, despite all the collisions of the transition period, the development and implementation of strategic planning documents ceased, absorbing all the previous methodological experience.
As the general system of state strategic planning in Russia revives, the theory and practice of developing long-term state armaments programs will improve.
As is known, the Government of the Russian Federation in 2012 approved a number of state programs through which it is planned to fulfill the bulk of budget expenditure commitments.
The procedure for developing, implementing and evaluating the effectiveness of state programs of the Russian Federation was approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 2 August 2010, No. 588, and 21 of May 2012, No. 499. At the same time, this order does not apply to the state armament program. Apparently, some work will be needed to harmonize the rules for developing and implementing state weapons programs with the general procedures of state strategic forecasting and planning. Clarification of these rules is directly provided by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 7 of May 2012, No. 603. The Government of the Russian Federation is working on the preparation of relevant proposals to the President of the Russian Federation.
"MIC": To what extent is the existing domestic, including Soviet, experience of state planning useful in modern conditions for the development of VVST?
- In general, the experience of long-term planning and strategic management, accumulated in the USSR, must be given its due, is truly enormous, and for a number of its components (starting from the GOELRO plan) is unique. This is confirmed by the borrowing in the middle of the last century of key ideas and methods of the Soviet national economic forecasting and planning by the advanced states of the world, their creative development by government bodies and business circles, including transnational corporations.
But having past experience is not enough. It must be able to be passed on to new generations of managers, developed and used in relation to fundamentally new economic conditions and tasks. Much work remains to be done in this field.As for the development planning of the VVST, it should be noted that the leading role in the substantiation and formation of draft plans in this area has traditionally been played by the national military science complex represented by the military science committees of military command bodies, branches and branches of arms (forces), research institutions The Ministry of Defense and other power ministries and departments. It would not be superfluous to note that the positions of professional managers in the field of weapons development were largely replaced by people from military science. Domestic experience in this field has been around for more than 40 years.
Long-term planning for the development of weapons was introduced in our country by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 10-1969-433 dated June 157, “On Further Improving the Planning for the Development of Weapons and Military Equipment”.
One of the main motivations for "improving planning" was the diversity of the range of weapons and military equipment (hereinafter - IWT), created by nine defense industry branches of the USSR for five types of Armed Forces.
Suffice it to recall that the nomenclature of intercontinental ballistic missiles, adopted in service during the Soviet period, approached two dozen. The type of Soviet anti-aircraft missile systems caught up in this class of weapons with the total type of all NATO countries.
The main result of the Soviet stage of long-term target-oriented planning for IWT was the Weapons Program for the period 1986 – 1995 and the Main directions of IWT development up to 2000 - the latest strategic planning documents in the considered area adopted in the USSR era.
At that time, the weapons and military equipment fleet was updated and increased at relatively high rates along all the numerous type lines - dozens of ships, hundreds of missiles and airplanes per year, a huge mass of automobile, armored vehicles and rocket artillery weapons, the unprecedented scale of capital construction for the installation of weapons and military equipment.
In addition to resource-intensive strategic nuclear forces and space rocket forces, ocean fleets, long-range and military transport aviation more than a dozen front-line ones were gradually updated, and they included more than forty army sets of weapons in groups of forces outside the USSR and military districts on the territory of the USSR - under the plans and plans of strategic operations in all potential theaters of military operations. At the same time, 5-10% of the total costs for each type line were allocated to R&D for the creation of new weapons.
In addition, under the auspices of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Science and Technology, the five-year plan of fundamental and applied research in the interests of the defense and security of the country was implemented as a ground for the future.
By the way, after the end of the service life, that is, after about 25 – 30 years, the entire mass of Soviet weapons, at about the same rate as they accumulated, inevitably began to turn into a faulty burden, which was “finished” and “maintained” for a long time. Russia. And to prevent this regress in the new economic conditions was impossible.
The next cycle of work on the formation of a draft armament program before 2000, which began in the second half of 80, during the political crisis of socialism, was not completed. In 1990, work was resumed and completed with a draft of this program in relation to the Armed Forces and the economy of the USSR. However, after the adoption of the Bialowieza Accords, it lost its relevance. The development of weapons has become determined by annual plans.
Thus, as regards the Soviet stage, for all its grandeur, in my opinion, the experience of planning the development of weapons in the USSR should not be idealized. If only because planning is essentially just one of the forms of foresight, the most important, but not the only management tool, which is always subordinated to the general development paradigm in specific historical conditions.
In 1993, an attempt was made to develop a draft armament program for Russian conditions. But with inflation galloping at the time, the economic parameters of the program were very uncertain. Therefore, instead of the Armament Program, only the IWT Development Concept up to 2000 was approved by the President of the Russian Federation. And only in 1995, taking into account the provisions of this Concept, a draft of the first Russian armaments program for the period up to 2005 was prepared on the basis of more specific financial projections.
In the process of its consideration and revision, the needs of not only the Ministry of Defense, but also other security agencies (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Security Service, Ministry of Emergency Situations, etc.) were taken into account. On this basis, the armament program received the status of “state” and November 16 of 1996 was approved by the President of the Russian Federation B. N. Yeltsin.
Thus, 1996 year is the year of birth of the first planning document that determined the goals, objectives and ways of long-term development of the VVST in relation to the Russian military construction in the conditions of the emerging market economy in the country.
But this birth was truly in agony, for the objective conditions, and with them the methodology of weapons development planning, underwent dramatic changes at the turn of the ages.
"MIC": What has become fundamentally new?
- The main limiting factor in the development of VVST has changed.
They were not labor resources and production capacities, which was typical of a socialist economy, but budget allocations proper (with an excess of production capacities).
And if in the conditions of the USSR, under the needs, opportunities were somehow sought (including by attracting new labor resources and production capacities), which gave rise to the formulation of the so-called direct problems of substantiation (optimization) of the plan - to minimize the forthcoming costs at a given level of efficiency (degree of achievement of the goal VVST), then in the conditions of an acute shortage of budget allocations, it became possible only to set up “inverse” tasks - to maximize the result at a given cost. Another word is to choose the “best” development plan from the “bad” ones. However, in these circumstances, planning was not essentially targeted, and the development of VVST inevitably turned into an ineffective “budget utilization”.
At the turn of the twenty-first century, dozens of expensive developments and productions of new domestic weapons were stopped and then stopped, and this greatly depreciated the huge past resource costs. A number of modern types of conventional weapons have been preserved in Russia only because of the income from their exports.
It should be noted as a negative and a factor in the loss of personal responsibility for mistakes in planning and implementing programs for the development of VVST.
"MIC": Is the current methodology and planning system for the development of the VVST effective in modern conditions?
- The existing experience of developing, adjusting and executing state weapons programs in Russia objectively indicates that there are a number of long-standing problems in this field of activity, the solution of which will require special attention of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
Virtually every Russian state armaments program needed to be adjusted after only one or two years after approval. In these circumstances, the annually formed state defense order actually became the main tool for planning and managing the development of the VVST in Russia. At the same time, it was far from fully complying with the parameters of the state armament program, approved at the highest state level. In practice, if you call a spade a spade, it was largely ignored.
By decision of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 2012, the state customers of the state defense order were tasked to ensure that its nomenclature parameters and indicators comply with the parameters and indicators of the State Armaments Program for the 2011 – 2020 years.
"MIC": But it is well known that in past years, the Russian state armament programs and the annual defense orders were simply not funded at the proper level. What does this have to do with the methodology of program development and the strengthening of control over their implementation?
- A reverse question is also appropriate: why develop and submit for approval by the President of the Russian Federation such federal programs that will not be funded by the state, whose initial data are unreliable, development goals are vague, prices are erroneous (downward), and the risks are exorbitant?
In recent years, the state defense order is funded almost in full. Budget costs are steadily growing. And new, objective methodological requirements are being made to the tools for planning the development of the VVST in the light of new tasks and prospects for military construction. What are they?
First, to raise the quality of strategic goal-setting and to ensure the quantitative measurability of the result of the development of VVST (to carry out result-oriented budgeting).
Secondly, to generate the largest possible number of development options, that is, to ensure the breadth of choice for the search for the optimal variant of the development of VVST in terms of efficiency and costs.
Third, adjust the planning horizon and the frequency of adjustments to the state armaments program (rolling planning), while linking them with the parameters of the overall system of state strategic planning.
Fourthly, to coordinate state programs for the development of weapons, the development of the defense industrial complex and other federal programs that are important for defense and security.
Obviously, the adopted horizon of development planning for Russia in military technology (10 years) does not fully correspond to the duration, resource intensity and inertia of the rearmament processes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, restructuring and technological modernization of the Russian defense industry, the implementation of the results of fundamental scientific research and other critical long-term processes, as well as the life cycle duration of VVST products reaching 25 years or more.
It is highly desirable to understand how, and most importantly, why the fleet of domestic means of warfare is evolving in the entire foreseeable future. This requires sustained indicators and targets, approved at the highest state level, a long-term plan and a plan to provide military units and agencies with military equipment for military service in accordance with their combat (operational) composition and reserves of emergency reserves and reserves, that is, a clear overall development concept for military service forces for the long term.
Of particular relevance is the development of the long-term concept of the development of the VVS in the light of the requirements of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 7 in May 2012 No. 603, which provides for the creation of a qualitatively new system of analysis and strategic planning in the area of countering threats to national security for the period of forming state weapons programs.
If, however, in planning to limit the 10-year horizon, then we, as they say, "we will not see the forest for the trees." For example, if we stop financing events that go beyond the 10-year period, we will not prepare a scientific and technological reserve for the future. As a result, resources will be fragmented, short-term results achieved to the detriment of long-range, and strategic goals may remain ephemeral.
Thus, one of the manifestations of myopia in forward-looking planning was the exclusion from the armament program (at the initiative of the past leadership of the Ministry of Defense of Russia) research projects that do not bring real results in the next five years. Among them were virtually all fundamental and exploratory research in the field of defense and security.
To remedy the situation, a special decision of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in this field of activity was required. In pursuance of this decision, the Federal Law on 16 of October 2012 of the Year No. 174-FZ established the Advanced Research Fund to organize the search, order for development, testing and support of innovative scientific and technical ideas, advanced design and technological solutions in the development and production of high-tech military products. , special and dual use, as well as bringing these ideas and solutions to the project level. These are studies with a high degree of risk of unrealizability. But it is in such an environment that truly breakthrough ideas are sought.
Thus, the strategic process of re-equipping, creating and mastering new generations of means of warfare should not be visible through the window of the 10-year program, but in its entirety, albeit in general terms.
Currently, the strategic target for the future is the requirement of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 7 of May 2012 of the year No. 603 to equip the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies with modern samples of military equipment, bringing their share to 2020%.
"MIC": But the modern world is very dynamic. And the strategic objectives of the development of the VVST, and the general conditions of the country's socio-economic development can quickly change. Are long-range designs appropriate in these circumstances?
- It is really impossible to program reliably the development of the VVST for decades to come.
The main uncertainty in the plans of military construction and the closely related plans for the development of armaments objectively results from the uncertainty of the timing of the start of the war, if such becomes inevitable for the country. The war, which will require full tension and all the accumulated weapons. So, if a war is likely to be expected in the coming year, it is objectively required that all resources be directed to the repair and modernization of existing weapons, the acquisition of mass-produced models. The possibility of a relatively long-term peaceful development under the nuclear “umbrella” allows us to allocate resources for long-term projects. At the same time, I quote the President of the Russian Federation, “we must not lead anyone into temptation with our weakness.”
Undoubtedly, strategic goal-setting in the development of weapons is the lot of politicians. It is extremely responsible. There is nothing more ruinous and dangerous than the pursuit of an erroneous goal in the global military-force rivalry. But there is no aimless development in human society, even if the goal is not to change anything.
When a strategic goal or the conditions for achieving it are changeable, there is nothing left to do but change (adjust) the plan, plan and development program oriented towards the goal. To do this, a rolling planning procedure is used throughout the world, when a prospective plan is regularly updated before its expiration. Thus, the Russian 10-year-old state armaments program, as already noted, is customary to be updated once every five years. In this case, the first five-year period is of crucial importance. Since the program is approved by the President of the Russian Federation, it is not possible to promptly “fix” it under the terms of subordination, without going through the entire cycle of developing a draft program (more than three years).
Other scientifically-technologically and militarily developed countries provide examples of more flexible long-term military-technical planning. For example, in the USA, the development of weapons is carried out for a six-year period with an annual review (adjustment of the program) and its extension for a year. At the same time, general plans and forecasts of military construction are much longer-term. In Germany, the 15-year plan for the construction of the Bundeswehr is annually updated. In France, the 30-year prospective military construction plan is updated annually.
Thus, the dynamism of the external world and the uncertainty in the data do not cancel prospective planning, but only regulate its rational content and tools. In other words, in the development of weapons in today's world, it is necessary to look further, and to revise (if necessary) more often.
"MIC": Maybe you should not approve a weapons program at the highest state level?
- Today, this is required by the Federal Law "On Defense". And this, of course, has its reason from the point of view of the formation of reliable, endorsed by the President of the Russian Federation guidelines for the defense industry and business circles (including investors), who are building contractual relations with government customers of the VVST. But at the same time, the unsatisfactory quality of planning can reduce the managerial authority of the state.
Modern computer technologies allow, in principle, to contain an armament program and dozens of its indicators in electronic form (including an electronic signature) and to tweak it at least quarterly - as needed, planning and predicting for any prospect. And such “programming”, as I see it, can be the prerogative of the executive branch. But the long-term concept of VVST development, which implies political goal-setting and corresponding quantitative requirements, should certainly be approved by the decision of the President of the Russian Federation.
In addition, it is clear that in the foreseeable future, the actual development of the VVST is expressed more completely and more reliably by the totality of the contracts concluded with the executors of the state defense order and the results of their execution within the budget process. The more long-term contracts among them, and such a tendency takes place, the closer the state defense order is to the effective state armaments program we are seeking.
At present, the issue of programming the development of VVST for a period of six years (two three-year state budgets) is being discussed with the possibility of adjusting such a program at least once every three years. In this case, we are talking about the program period, bearing in mind that the planned, as well as the forecast periods for which goal-setting is carried out, should be much longer.
In any case, the regulation of the procedures for planning the development of VVST should be brought in line with the general procedures provided for by the draft law “On State Strategic Planning”. If a six-year cycle of updating strategic forecasts and plans is established by federal law, it makes sense to adjust the state armaments program and other military planning documents for them accordingly.
"MIC": How does the state armaments program relate to the federal defense industry development program?
- These are related by strategic objectives, similar in forms of implementation (through the state defense order), but substantially different in content federal programs.
The first one operates with samples (complexes, systems) of VVST in the dynamics of their creation, production, maintenance and repair, as well as disposal and destruction of decommissioned products. The second is with the production technologies and equipment of the defense industry organizations, as well as with measures for the staffing of the defense industries necessary to fulfill the state armaments program and government defense orders.
According to the Federal Law of 31 of May 1996 of the year No. 61-ФЗ “On Defense”, approval of federal state armament and development programs for the military-industrial complex is attributed to the powers of the President of the Russian Federation in the field of defense.
But in practice, the federal program for the development of the defense industry complex was not presented to the President for approval by the Russian Federation. In March 2012, the Government of the Russian Federation approved the federal target program “Development of the defense-industrial complex over the 2011 – 2020 years”. Currently, its activities are included in the state program "The development of industry and increase its competitiveness" for the period up to 2020 year.
It should be noted that according to the current Rules for the development and implementation of state armaments programs, they should be developed simultaneously with the development programs of the military-industrial complex. But this, in practice, as we see, is not respected.
There are different points of view.
On the one hand, measures of the state armament program should set the direction for the development of the defense industry organizations, technologies and materials, and be a guide for industrial defense programs. After all, the essence of the activities of most defense enterprises (with the exception of state-owned) is a competitive business, and the goal of their economic activity is not to increase the equipment of the Armed Forces, but to make a profit. And it is precisely this stimulus in a competitive market economy that the state endeavors (through a defense order) draws on the needs of defense capability.
Many of the enterprises of the defense industrial complex produce and successfully sell civilian products. And measures for the development of research, design and production and technological base of such organizations, carried out under the defense order, to a certain extent subsidize the commercial potential of the defense industry, contributing to the technological modernization of enterprises.
On the other hand, the effective development of the VVST requires advance preparation of knowledge-intensive industries, training of qualified personnel. And breakthrough technologies in the field of materials development, electronic component base, as well as the latest information and nanotechnologies developed by scientific defense organizations, set fundamentally new vectors in the development of means of warfare.
In these circumstances, it is important to put the processes of formation and implementation of interrelated federal programs that are strategically important for ensuring defense and state security of interconnected federal programs on a solid methodological and legal basis.
In conclusion, I would like to assure you that the pressing legal, organizational, as well as scientific and methodological problems of planning the development of the VVST will be solved in a timely manner - on the eve of the formation of the next state armament program.
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