About the possibility of China’s naval blockade
The Journal of Strategic Studies in February published an article by the American researcher Shon Mirski (Sean Mirski) about the US capabilities to implement China’s naval blockade in the event of war. Mirski considers the blockade as the best, under certain scenarios of military conflict, a variant of hostilities against the PRC, which allows the Chinese economic potential to be destroyed and the Chinese to admit defeat.
Mirski considers that the blockade scenario is feasible in case of “large-scale” hostilities between the United States and China, which occupy an intermediate position between a local conflict and an unlimited war. It is assumed that in such a large-scale conflict we will not talk about the use of nuclear weapons, but at the same time, the United States will fight for its vital interests in the region.
Mirski notes the high dependence of the PRC economy on foreign trade, on the 90% carried out by sea, the need for the country to import about 60% of oil consumed, as well as the concentration of more than 80% of Chinese container traffic in the country's largest ports 10. Due to these factors, a long-lasting, even if not 100%, effective blockade can have disastrous consequences for the Chinese economy.
A key political factor on which the success of the blockade depends, Mirsky considers the ability of the United States to secure the participation of China’s neighbors and, above all, Russia.
China invests heavily in alternative transport corridors to the Indian Ocean bypassing the straits, but for countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan or Myanmar, the United States can effectively apply political pressure or inflict military strikes on transport infrastructure facilities (for example, Chinese oil pipelines in Myanmar).
As for Russia, in its relation the use of military force is impossible because of its own military potential. At the same time, the Russian Federation itself is not only an important supplier of oil to the PRC (if necessary, Mirsky notes, the limited capabilities of the ESPO pipeline can be supplemented by the use of rail and road transport), but also has significant political influence on the countries of Central Asia that also supply resources to the PRC. (among them Mirsky distinguishes Kazakhstan).
Mirsky admits that at present Russia's participation in the blockade of China looks fantastic, but expresses hope for further rapprochement between the United States and the Russian Federation on an anti-Chinese basis, which should occur due to Russian fears of China. In general, without the participation of Russia, the blockade project of the PRC will remain impracticable, Mirsky admits.
Technically, Mirsky proposes to carry out a blockade using two rings: an outer ring, a long-distance blockade ring, responsible for identification and non-lethal interception, and an inner ring, responsible for non-discriminatory defeat of all targets entering the restricted area. The boundary between the outer and inner rings of the blockade will be the border of the seas adjacent to the People’s Republic of China (that is, the first chain of islands around China - the Japanese Islands, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo).
The structure of the blockade forces is dictated by the sharp increase in Chinese forces in recent years of isolation of the war zone, which made the use of surface forces in the seas adjacent to China extremely risky. Therefore, the outer ring of the blockade, consisting of surface ships, will operate outside the Chinese range aviation and coastal missiles, mainly in the area of key straits, identifying and inspecting ships, stopping ships heading to China or having Chinese registration.
The internal, lethal ring of the blockade, operating in the area adjacent to the Chinese coast and declared a restricted area, will have American and Japanese submarines as a key component (only two fleet have 71 submarines, Mirsky notes). The second component of the inner ring will be aviation operating from bases located outside the zone of operation of the Chinese forces of the blockade of theater of operations. Submarines and aircraft will attack ships, receiving target designation from a higher command. The third component of the forces of the near blockade may be mine operations.
At the same time, Mirsky notes the actual “atrophy” of the capabilities of the US Navy to carry out offensive mine-firing, and, in particular, the absence of sea mines suitable for use by submarines as of the beginning of the 2013 fiscal year.
Mirski draws on the extremely modest assessment of the anti-submarine capabilities of the Chinese fleet prevailing in the United States, which, combined with the hydrography of the seas adjacent to the People’s Republic of China, which makes it difficult to detect submarine targets, will allow the US and Japanese submarines to "operate freely in the coastal waters of China."
China’s ability to counter such a US strategy is modest. China does not have the forces to break the American blockade away from its shores.
Mirsky's work is important because it allows us to better understand Russia's colossal significance for the unfolding US-China confrontation. The transition of Russia to the camp of the allies of the United States will essentially mean that this confrontation will end in the defeat of China, and before it begins.
At the same time, the firm support of China by Russia leads to a sharp narrowing of the US military and economic leverage over pressure on China. Accordingly, Russian-Chinese transport and energy projects should also be considered from the point of view of their strategic importance for the two countries, and not from narrow economic positions.
The study of the use of nuclear submarines to damage the Chinese economy is also of great importance for Russia from the point of view of ensuring its security in the Far East. Not having, in principle, an opportunity to achieve parity with China in the field of land and ground forces in the Far East, Russia retains a powerful nuclear submarine fleet. Given the dependence of the PRC on maritime trade and the difficulties in providing reliable PLO in the seas adjacent to China, this fleet remains the only effective non-nuclear instrument of military deterrence of China available to Russia. In light of this, the decisions of the Russian leadership on the preservation and development of a nuclear submarine base in Kamchatka, significant investments in the nuclear submarine fleet and plans to deploy new types of submarines in the Far East should be considered absolutely correct and extremely important.
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