The task is to restore the defeated in the army and on navy12 February 2013 of the Year in the Committee on Defense of the State Duma held a round table on the topic "100 days after the change of leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: preliminary results and prospects." According to the results of the event, military experts formed proposals for the further revival of the Armed Forces of Russia. Weekly "MIC" provides readers with excerpts from the most interesting speeches.
Executive control
Such a “round table” took place only three months ago. But during this time there have been radical changes. Those painful points of the military reform that were noted began to be gradually eliminated. Nevertheless, one cannot rely on the goodwill of the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense; parliamentary control over the actions of the executive branch is necessary. Therefore, we return to the same subject. In this case, with a view to constructively look at the transformations that have occurred.
According to the results of the previous event, a note was prepared addressed to the Supreme Commander, who read it carefully and instructed the new leadership of the Ministry of Defense to meet with us. The last conversation showed that the ideas and assessments that you express here do not remain within these walls. They reach the highest military-political leadership of the country and to some extent influence the formation of a new defense structure.
The outcome of this discussion will be a document that we will send to the Security Council, the Minister of Defense and the Public Chamber. Therefore, all your considerations will be carefully considered and communicated to those who are interested.
Vyacheslav Tetekin,
State Duma deputy, member of the State Duma Committee on Defense
The army can not be blurred control system
The idea to speak out three months ago on painful problems turned out to be true. The questions you posed were concentrated in a research note. The newly appointed Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu quickly responded. The meeting was held at a thorough and energetic pace. In any case, there was a frank conversation and no secrets.
In such a short time, of course, it is difficult to expect weighty practical steps from the new military leadership. Especially in the conditions when any sound decision connected with the previous approaches in the construction of the Armed Forces meets with fierce resistance.
For example, it was worth only giving a hint about increasing the service life from one year to a year and a half to conscription servicemen, applying it to the extraterritorial principle of recruiting troops, as the General Staff head had to justify publicly that they allegedly offered these methods.
However, speaking at a meeting of the 26 Academy of Military Sciences in January, the head of the defense department outlined the main priorities for the development of the Armed Forces: improving the effectiveness of troop control, equipping with modern weapons and military equipment (IWT), improving the training of military personnel, developing the mobilization base ensuring and improving the quality of military education.
The most interesting thing is that the previous military command was guided by exactly the same priorities.
So, in order to improve management efficiency, eliminate concurrency in the work three times in his history, starting with 1946, the main command of the Ground Forces (SV) was liquidated. Also, in fact, in order to eliminate duplicate functions. The last time (the fourth in its history) the Main Board was brought to a sham state: 99 people. In 1946, he was 3700 people. Later, he was consistently brought to the 2,5 thousands, then to 500 and 250 people. And now less than 100 people are in command of the Ground Forces - a type of Armed Forces. For comparison: in the United States of America army headquarters - 2,5 thousands of people.
Each time, his functions were transferred to the General Staff, who generally has a pathological urge to somehow manage to steer troops - to take over the functions of daily leadership. But his direct task is to assess the military-political situation in the world and develop a plan for the use of the Armed Forces. And the day-to-day command of the troops must be carried out by the chief command of the types and types of troops.
From the same series the inexplicable combination of the Air Force and Air Defense is also in order to improve the management system. There is an unacceptable reduction in the number of military districts and armies, a change in their names, the unification of logistical and technical support bodies, but these are like two poles, completely different tasks and volumes.
The pilot becomes commander-in-chief of the Air Force and restrains the development of air defense, while the peveoshnik reduces the units and units of the Air Force accordingly.
To obtain a high-quality military education, a number of the oldest military educational institutions were promptly expelled from Moscow and St. Petersburg to the provinces, some of them disbanded and enlarged, the scientific and cultural potential of the capital’s garrisons, which had a beneficial effect on the education of the officers, was lost. Now university graduates are taking with them into the depths of primitivism inherent in provincial cities. Previously, an officer who had studied for several years in capital cities and cultural centers was a fairly educated, intellectually developed, art-savvy person who came to the Far East, extreme north or south, was interesting to his subordinates. What now? The Academy of Chemical Protection was transferred to Kostroma. One of its leaders happily declares that now the listener can have lunch here for 20 rubles a day. That is, they put material food above the spiritual one, and they don’t care about the fact that the families of these officers live in ruins, culturally degrade. After three years, they travel to distant bearish angles, carry primitivism in everything, both in communication with people and in preparation.
But all this was done according to the priorities that I voiced. Therefore, it is not enough to talk about the main directions in the construction of the Armed Forces, you need to see how the vector of their practical implementation will be indicated, where it is directed.
The first steps towards the Main Commissariat of the Army - the number was slightly increased, they returned the right to award military ranks to certain categories of servicemen. But its formation as a full-fledged body for managing the Armed Forces seems problematic. That is, the main issue is not solved. In the whole world practice of military construction, it is accepted that the governing body should combine four types of responsibility. When personally responsible for the condition of the species, he is also obliged to monitor the construction and development - technical policy, training and use of troops.
The ground forces are the basis of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. If you ask yourself who today is personally responsible for their condition, you will not find the answer. The Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff are responsible for all the Armed Forces, and the commander-in-chief cannot be responsible for the state of the Army, as the operational-strategic commands are not subordinate to him on any issue. The question is: why then the commander in chief, and with whom will the demand for the condition of this species?
Allegedly, formally, the Glavkomat is entitled to participate in the construction and development of the Armed Forces, but this is a technical policy. How can the Commander of the Ground Forces do this? He does not have a research organization that would develop a set of weapons, systematically approached him, gave proposals to the state defense order. How can he determine priorities in armaments and military equipment if he is not a distributor of budget allocations? The budget is blurred for all incomprehensible customers, developers and structures. Glavkomat unable to influence the situation. He formally signs the state defense order, the plan for the development of weapons and military equipment. But really can not influence them. Therefore, today the weapons system of the Ground Forces is completely unbalanced. A lot of fairly good means of destruction, but it is absolutely impossible to use them, because there are no systems for intelligence, communications, automated control and navigation. For example, at a distance of 70 kilometers there is the possibility of hitting the enemy. But intelligence tools today can identify or detect targets for destruction in the mountains not more than three to five kilometers, and on the plain - within 10 kilometers. Big money was spent to make a new weapon system, and it was constrained by the means of supply. Of course, if the commander-in-chief was the manager of the budget, he would say: that's all, there are enough means of destruction, today we are planning and developing systems of automated troop control, weapons, navigation and so on. It would be a completely different approach.
Who prepares the ground forces? Should the idea of a commander in chief. But nothing like that. The Main Directorate of Combat Training is the legislature, which determines its direction, is subordinated to the First Deputy Minister of Defense. The General Staff is responsible for the use of the Armed Forces, together with the operational-strategic command. How? Today there is no person responsible for the Ground Forces. There is no one to deal with issues of balanced development of weapons and equipment. The First Deputy Minister of Defense is responsible for combat training and, accordingly, for the training of troops. As they say, seven nannies have a child without an eye.
The most unpleasant thing is that such a disconnected control scheme does not allow building up the entire system of leadership of the Armed Forces. There is an unwritten rule: everything connected with command and control must be carried out before the start of the war. As for the command post and control body, communication system, automated troop control and armament, it should be built in peacetime and in no case be subjected to any reorganization in wartime. Otherwise it will be a loss of control. But the current structure of the Armed Forces does not fit into this. Imagine seven operational commands - these are seven armies, how can you talk about serious defense with seven armies? So, it is necessary to further organize everything. But where to get so much operational staff? Controls are coordinated for decades. It takes five to ten years for the army headquarters to function effectively in a combat situation. This is a very difficult job. And to create a management structure, especially a communication system, in the coming wartime is not at all possible.
The General Staff needs to be bolder to get rid of functions that are not specific to him, go about his business, transfer the daily leadership of the Armed Forces to the species. The situation with the Ground Forces is similar to the state of affairs in the Navy, Air Force and the combat arms.
It is necessary to gradually deal with the people who will come to these high posts. We have knocked out all the middle link, left lieutenants and immediately colonels, but the layer of officers who received actual experience is completely knocked out. And who will come now to teach in military schools?
And another very important point is the reserve component of the Armed Forces. No war has ever ended in victory at the expense of those regular forces and means that started it. It was always achieved with the attraction of a reserve. Six, seven pickings are needed in order to win. We started the Great Patriotic War as part of 4,5 million and brought to 1 in May 1945 year to 11 million 700 thousands. This is three times the size of the prewar period. Eight million died and eight million were commissioned for various injuries. Total - still 16 of millions. So, you need to have a prepared mobilization reserve, five to seven times the existing army. Probably, there will be no such large-scale armed conflicts as before, but nevertheless the proportion remains. And all the armed forces must have their reserve component. The Americans, confident that there will never be hostilities on their territory, have such a reserve, maintained in very good condition. If regular troops are made up of 12 divisions, then an organized reserve is also made up of 12 divisions. Mobilization training and the system of local military control — the military registration and enlistment offices have been completely reduced, they are now incapable of engaging in the mobilization of the reserve component, and this is a global problem.
Referring to other expressed intentions of the Minister of Defense, they will have to be judged in their practical implementation. At present, the control system is still blurred. Responsibility between the branches of the Armed Forces, the General Staff, the Minister of Defense is absolutely non-specific, and this is the worst of all. The army should be very clearly and clearly defined, who is subordinate to whom, who is responsible for what.
Yuri Bukreev,
Chief of the Main Directorate of the Ground Forces (1998 – 2001), Colonel-General
Who will build ships
From the first steps of Serdyukov, we saw the depth of the so-called reforms. All events held by the former Minister of Defense were not systemic, but destructive. Added to this banal theft.
As for the new Minister of Defense, he and the Chief of the General Staff understand the situation. And all their steps indicate that they are trying to tactfully, ethically, without emotions, to restore the vital activity of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense and other command instances and move in the right direction. Do not go back to the old, but from what is, go ahead.
At the Navy, at the last meeting, we talked about restoring the activities of the Main Command and the General Staff of the Navy, as well as the combat strength of the fleets. Something is being done. On 150 officers, the staff of the central office was increased - it was about 90. Destroyed control shipbuilding and the main technical. About reserves. The fleet must have big ones. This is all sea and river transport. Nobody does this. Now, as the Main Board has increased, the functions of ordering ships are transferred to it.
And the most important thing, as in the Ground Forces, is the control of the forces, especially in the Navy. We are accustomed to think on an ocean scale, in the entire ocean we must control both under water and under the ice without the emergence of submarines. And everything is destroyed, nothing is there.
50 years served, but I can not understand, here's how you can be commander in chief, but nothing to command? After all, a wonderful experience was during the Great Patriotic War - fleets are transferred to operational subordination for the period of performance of certain tasks in accordance with military science. Navy, like many other specialized species and kind, can not exist without a single leadership.
Another component is the combat strength of the fleets. These are ships, submarines, marine aviation. 21 years have already passed, but not a single ship, not a single boat has been built. Over the 315 years of the Navy, this has not happened. Take the story: ships were laid and produced every year, even after the defeat in the Crimean War of the 15th century. And after the Japanese war? Since our ships are put into operation for 20–XNUMX years, like the submarine Yuri Dolgoruky, the new ones will probably be built by other defense ministers and chief of the General Staff.
Valentin Selivanov,
Chief of General Staff - First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (1992 – 1996), Admiral
VKO problem persists
Aerospace defense (WKO) is determined by the priority in the development of the Armed Forces. This is a new approach. The decision to create the Armed Forces of the East Kazakhstan region as an independent branch of troops was correct, but not complete.
What is currently done? The Air Force, when they were united with the Air Defense Forces, were responsible for the country's air defense, for covering the state border, facilities, groups of troops and administrative-political centers. And when the separation of troops in the East Kazakhstan Region took place, the dilemma turned out, which is currently not being solved either in the Air Force or in the East Kazakhstan Army. Increasing the composition of the Main Committee twice does not remove the question. The problem of the country's aerospace defense continues.
The forces and means deployed in groups on various strategic, operational and air routes are absolutely not enough to reliably cover important strategic facilities for which the General Staff is primarily tasked.
Now the commanders of the Air Force and the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan armies are pulling in everything: let me be responsible for everything in the country, and they lack neither the strength, nor the means, nor the control systems, nor the regulatory framework. It turns out again, discord, which was once, but going already at a new level.
It is extremely necessary to create a state commission or committee that could determine not only the state of the country and the Armed Forces, but also the directions of their development, including the economy as a whole, in the interests of defense. After all, it is not a secret that in the aerospace defense system there is a share of the contribution made by the Navy and Land Force. Maybe it really suggests a decision to create a full-fledged, full-fledged Army of the East Kazakhstan region. If, before 1941, the decision was made on the country's Air Defense Forces, it may be to take advantage of this experience. But for this you need a military-political decision.
According to the aerospace defense system. Over the past few years, promising modern equipment of the fourth, fifth, and other generations has been received by the troops, which is much spoken about. But, unfortunately, the current samples perform tasks that were cut 10, 15, 20 years ago. For example, the system "C-4" - the first TZ were signed in 1983 year. At the beginning of the 2000-x, it was defined as an interspecific anti-aircraft missile system, which could go to the SV on a different basis and in the Navy. It included the information part, which is necessary to destroy the means of aerospace attack. But this is not in this system, although it is written in the TZ. Why? The question remains open.
To ensure interaction with fighter aircraft, command posts of these new-generation fighters at over-horizon must be deployed at command posts of these advanced systems. However, this is not. The percent of 30 – 40 of the opportunities that were laid down in the TK is really provided.
Therefore, in the aerospace defense system it is necessary to implement new requirements inherent in promising weapons systems.
As for education. The state commission should give a clear and clear assessment of the mistakes that were made in the previous few years, and determine the direction of development. We know that the disbandment of the Military Academy of the East Kazakhstan region named after GK Zhukov is suspended. But the struggle for it continues between East Kazakhstan and the Air Force. Dead-end situation: there seems to be a solution, but no further steps are being taken. This imposes certain difficulties on the management of the academy, the recruitment of students and the very work of the whole team. The adjuncture and doctoral studies ceased to exist. Where is the potential of science? Without it, it is impossible not only to prepare a promising officer, but also to talk about the development of the system and forms of combat use of troops that we have.
Regarding the base of mobilization deployment. Our educational institutions, all from the academy to the 10 – 15 schools, had a clear and precise mobilization task years ago. The Academy for Wartime became a division, the school - a regiment, they had a combat mission. Currently this is not. And this is the second echelon of the strengthening of all the capabilities of the aerospace defense groups.