Exchange of blows between Israel and Iran. Interim stage of the struggle for normalization in the Gaza Strip
Much has already been written and will be written about the exchange of blows between Israel and Iran. These events, on the one hand, are expected, but on the other hand, let’s be honest, few believed in this.
Changes in the mosaic of international politics
Nevertheless, the fact of a direct military clash between Israel and Iran has become a reality, and this will bring quite serious changes to the mosaic of international politics.
The technical side of the issue will be debated for a long time, both by specialists and observers on both sides.
Israel and its fans will defend the view that “all objects were shot down, and those that were not shot down were simply flying in a safe direction.”
Iran is emphasizing the limited nature of the strike given the scale of the Iranian military machine, as well as the successful testing of systems such as medium-range missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads. And I must admit that, judging by a number of videos, such systems actually achieved some goals.
Of course, Tel Aviv (modern West Jerusalem) was not alone in repelling the Iranian attack. All night long, fighter jets from the United States, Great Britain and, which will be discussed separately, the Royal Jordanian Air Force, flew in the skies over Jordan, Iraq and the areas of Syria bordering Iraq. The sky from Iraqi Kurdistan to the Red Sea was “transparent” by the radar systems of the American coalition.
Personally, the author, after there were reports that UAVs like the well-known “Shaheds” were launched in Iran in the first wave, interest in the purely military component of the Iranian action began to fade. But the political component, on the contrary, should increase.
It was simply clear that UAVs of this type, which were supposed to fly 1–000 km to Israeli air defense through Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, were a demonstration. They could not break through anything, and here it was the missiles that posed the greatest danger to Israel. But the demonstration of what and, most importantly, in what context: this is an essential question.
If Iran wanted to strike, bypassing the political part of the game (and the chances of this, by the way, were, although not very high), then in the first wave it would have been a UAV with a speed of 180 km/h and an approach time of 8–9 hours in three did not launch four borders. Israel is not Ukraine in terms of area and air defense density; you can’t fly circular routes and zigzags there.
Everything that happened indicated that we were formally facing an action – “Shayrat-2.0”, which is often called the now popular word “agreement”, and they are doing it in vain. Yes, this is a complex political game with certain rules that are still in effect, but the game is not negotiable.
Long-term effect of the promotion
If anyone remembers, in 2017 D. Trump responded to the “chemical attacks of dictator Assad”, and in fact to the British provocation with chemical weapons in the city of Douma, ordered a strike on the Syrian military base where the “chemicals” were allegedly stored and from which they were allegedly used.
A spectacular strike by the entire ammunition load of an American destroyer, 56 Tomahawk cruise missiles, partly dissolved along the road, partly hit runways and parking lots with aircraft dismantled for spare parts, and also pulverized one unused building (such as a “chemical laboratory”) and several sheepfolds on hills.
It was obvious that the response was dosed and indirectly coordinated between political opponents through various channels. However, behind all the media frenzy in the style of “the mountain gave birth to a mouse,” the long-term effect of D. Trump’s action went unnoticed.
And only after some time, when the analysis of the technical part and counting the number of craters from Tomahawks faded into the background, as did the emotional part, the significant part remained and influenced long-term policy.
No one could blame D. Trump for his lack of determination to act tough. The United States directly entered the zone of responsibility of Russian forces, which at that time dominated western Syria.
What happened after Shayrat?
And a little less than a year later, Hisham was already with the march of part of the “Wagners” with the Syrian military across the river. The Euphrates to the oil fields, the passage to which was opened through negotiations with Arab tribes and which was leaked by local agents to the Americans, who prepared a fire trap.
History with a trip across the river The Euphrates was already discussed in much less ironic tones. But “Shayrat” and “Hisham” are connected with each other, they are simply spaced out in time.
In this case, pro-Israeli commentators pointing to “a couple of holes in the Negev” should also not be ironic for too long.
The Iranian action is undoubtedly the pinnacle of international diplomacy along the “US-Iran-Arab countries” line.
At a minimum, because while they are discussing the craters in the Negev and two or twelve Iranian missiles have flown, at this time no planes are flying over the Gaza Strip and over the city of Rafah, which B. Netanyahu threatened to clear and show the depths of hell, no Israeli bombs are falling and In general, “a major regrouping is underway.”
One replacement division, after regrouping, will work along the border between the northern and southern parts of the Gaza Strip, and the second will guard the perimeter of the humanitarian mall that the United States is building to deliver food to the strip from the sea. Quiet nights have fallen in the Gaza Strip. Yes, there will still be bombing, and there will still be operations there, but how active?
And there are only three ways for B. Netanyahu’s cabinet to reduce activity in the sector.
The first is to resign and finally leave everyone alone, which is unrealistic.
The second is to go north, to southern Lebanon, which Israel really does not want to do first.
The third is to stir up the story of the response to Iran, in the hope that the United States will traditionally smooth out the sharpest corners “as a partner.” After all, why does the United States need the State Department and National Security Advisor J. Sullivan? To smooth out the corners left by B. Netanyahu.
Therefore, Israel’s response to Iran will be direct or they will hit the Iraqi and Syrian formations associated with Iran, but it will be.
But whether Israel will have its own Hisham after this is really a question more for the United States and not even for the State Department, but rather for W. Burns and the CIA service with its communication channels. And during this time, and under the umbrella of such worldwide noise, B. Netanyahu will still have to somehow resolve the issue with the 133 hostages who remain with Hamas.
The plus and minus signs are placed by the winners
For the United States, the time is coming for a very difficult game, which the Iranian side, and us too, would do well to look at carefully.
The Gaza Strip for the United States is a colossal headache that diverts a lot of resources. However, even here, under the pretext of “condemning Iran’s disproportionate actions,” Washington put together another coalition well.
Few Europeans and other US satellites and partners signed up for the operation against the Houthis, but they unanimously condemned “irresponsible Iran.”
Actually, this is what Russia’s permanent representative to the UN V. Nebenzya said, openly calling it a “parade of hypocrisy.” This is really a parade of hypocrisy, but politics, unfortunately, places “plus” or “minus” signs very selectively, but in reality everything is calculated by modulo values.
Here, too, what remains for the United States is a hypocritical or not, but assembled coalition. One can, of course, treat with irony or indignation the words of German Foreign Minister A. Baerbock that "Iran, which wants to destabilize the entire region with its aggressive behavior, is isolated".
But A. Burbock’s cognitive problems are only her problems, and for Washington such a modular unification is important: whether it exists or not.
There is another coalition for the United States, and the rest is, as they say, maneuvers. After all, the assembled coalition is a cohesive policy, and after Iran, this unity, which was previously shaken by the situation in Ukraine, connected precisely with US supplies and assistance, can now be used for other purposes. Not only in the Middle East.
The United States knows how to seize these moments, and one must always look at how American diplomacy and ideology will draw out any even ambiguous story to create something common, unifying. This is their method and basic principle. They always share responsibility and expenses, although they almost never share income.
Why does the United States always need a coalition, even from countries that you can’t even find on a map without a magnifying glass?
The “plus” and “minus” signs are placed by the winners, just as the winners write history, and the winner has long been the one who has a formal majority or a created sense of majority. The United States does not always do well with a formal majority, but Washington copes quite successfully with creating the feeling of a majority.
What are they doing in Washington at the moment?
Under the assembled coalition, they are pushing a bill on immediate military and financial assistance to Israel, but just in case, they are doing this in a package with assistance to Ukraine.
So the coalition with all their media hypocrisy here works like a charm, and the “terrible Middle East crisis” fits right in there - the moment must be used, and the Biden administration is doing this. Moreover, in the United States they are closely following the trial of D. Trump, which also puts certain weights on the scales of the Democrats.
This situation shows that, in contrast to the already familiar thesis “The United States does not need an escalation between Iran and Israel,” everything is just the opposite. The exchange of blows between these players is now beneficial to them, since it contributes to the main thing - reducing military activity in the Gaza Strip. An exchange of blows should not lead to an “Israeli Hisham,” which Iran is ready for, and here the ice becomes thin for the United States, although still passable.
Political situation in the Arab world
The result of the Iranian response was a clear political alignment in the Arab world. None of the countries, except Jordan, participated in the capture of Iranian UAVs and missiles, and the alleged leaks that Saudi Arabia was involved were not confirmed.
However, Jordan, which traditionally takes a very balanced position, not only closed its airspace and took part with its air force, but also publicly confirmed its position. At first glance, the Kingdom's position is logical. Jordan is not at war with Israel, if Iran has claims against Israel, even if justified, then what does Jordanian airspace have to do with it, especially since air weapons have one feature - they sometimes fall on the road.
All this is logical, but something else is interesting - a public position that has been confirmed several times. Yes, our Air Force participated, yes, we will continue to participate. And also the fact that Jordan has opened the skies for work aviation Of Israel.
Egypt would no doubt also shoot down Iranian UAVs over its territory for the same reasons, but would it open up space for the Israeli Air Force to operate? No.
It is logical that Jordan has collected a fair amount of bigwigs in the media over these few days. At the very least, they remembered that Jordan traditionally has close relations with Britain, which keeps its finger on the pulse of regional conflicts, and Jordan has a special relationship with the British elite. In general, Jordan showed its true colors.
However, the point here, it seems, is not the true face, but the real situation that has developed in the Jordanian economy. After all, Jordan receives a significant part of its natural gas and, more importantly, water through Israeli quotas.
After 2020, these quotas were increased several times, which is extremely important for a kingdom that is poor in resources and full of migrants. So in this case it’s not a matter of face, but of vital necessity. Iran will not build a water pipeline to Jordan.
Iran will not quarrel seriously with Amman, although the media are already discussing the Iranians’ response to those who “will help Israel.” The fact is that a significant part of the financial and trade transactions of Iraq and Syria pass through Jordan. This is an important income channel for all players, including Iranian satellites.
Let us note that Jordan is much more loyal to the actions of the “pro-Iranian” Houthis, but this is a separate big topic.
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