The Houthis who failed and Russia who missed opportunities
Image generated by the Fast Stable Diffusion XL on TPU v5e neural network
It is no secret that the operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of Ukraine against the ships of the Black Sea fleet The Russian Navy is planned and supported by the armed forces (AF) and intelligence structures of the USA and Great Britain. Their activities cause us significant damage, while we do not respond in any way to practically open acts of aggression, we do not even destroy strategic reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are essentially the most important link in the reconnaissance and strike circuits that ensure the delivery of attacks on our ships and infrastructure.
At the same time, thousands of kilometers from the borders of our country, there is a confrontation between the Yemeni Houthis, tacitly supported by Iran, and the same United States and Great Britain. But the Houthis have not yet been able to achieve any significant victories over such a serious enemy.
Let’s try to figure out why this is happening, and also how Russia could help the Houthis, and at the same time itself, by forcing the United States, Great Britain and France to reconsider their approaches to trampling on our “red lines.”
Reasons for the Houthis' failures
Since the beginning of the Houthi attacks on civilian and military vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, many have had high expectations about their possible success. In fact, the Houthis quite cheerfully began to launch various types of anti-ship missiles (ASMs), kamikaze UAVs and unmanned kamikaze boats (UAVs) towards commercial ships and warships of the US coalition and its allies. At the same time, if the Houthis still hit commercial ships from time to time, there are no confirmed hits on ships of the naval forces (Navy) of the United States and its allies at the time of preparation of this article.
Reports of Houthi attacks look impressive - several dozen UAVs were launched, several dozen anti-ship missiles were fired, but this impression is deceptive. The weapons used by the Houthis are not capable, both in terms of quantitative and qualitative characteristics, of ensuring a breakthrough of the air defense (air defense) of modern surface ships, especially those united in ship-based or aircraft carrier strike groups (CAG/AUG).
The kamikaze UAVs used by the Houthis are to one degree or another comparable to the Russian Geran-2 UAVs; their speed does not exceed 200 kilometers per hour, the mass of the warhead is about 50 kilograms, and for many modifications even less. What works well against stationary targets is not very suitable for attacking surface ships on the high seas.
Some of the anti-ship missiles used by the Houthis are for the most part obsolete subsonic products, with a large and effective dispersion surface (RCS), their significant size and flight altitude make them easy targets for ship-based anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), others, at best, correspond to the initial versions of the American Harpoon anti-ship missile systems or the Russian anti-ship missile Kh-35. The effectiveness of the ballistic anti-ship missiles used by the Houthis, especially those based on outdated anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs), raises questions.
Anti-ship missiles used by the Houthis. Image Military Balance+
But the main thing is that the number of kamikaze UAVs and anti-ship missiles of various types simultaneously used in a salvo is clearly not enough to counter such a KUG/AUG, which was formed by the United States and its allies. If against (conditionally) twenty ships and twenty planes and helicopters in the air the Houthis launch only two dozen kamikaze UAVs and anti-ship missiles of various types, then per surface combat unit there is only 1 attack ammunition (conditionally), which is clearly not enough. At the same time, we should not forget about the huge number of other intelligence assets concentrated by the United States and its allies in the region.
During the Cold War, to defeat the American AUG in the USSR, it was planned to strike with the forces of several aviation regiments of long-range bombers Tu-22M3, using heavy supersonic anti-ship missiles X-22, for which the anti-ship missiles and kamikaze UAVs of the Houthis are no match. It is not surprising that the ships and aircraft of the US Navy and its allies deal with the launched kamikaze UAVs and anti-ship missiles by the Houthis with relative ease.
Moreover, it is even surprising how, in the face of so many ships, planes and helicopters of the United States and its allies, with the capabilities provided by US space reconnaissance assets, the Houthis even manage to launch kamikaze UAVs and anti-ship missiles against civilian and military vessels located in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, and from time to time even get into some dry cargo ships and tankers.
As for BEC-kamikazes, cases of their use, apparently, are completely isolated. For example, the successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine in the use of BEC kamikazes against ships of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy are based on the fact that up to half a dozen, or even more BEC kamikazes, equipped with high-speed satellite communications, providing target designation and BEC control in real time. The BEC kamikazes used by the Houthis are most likely equipped with much more primitive means of communication, possibly susceptible to the influence of electronic warfare (EW) weapons.
On Ukrainian BEC kamikazes, flat antennas for high-speed satellite communications are clearly visible. Image: Telegram channel “Two Majors”
Based on the above, two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the array of forces and means used by the Houthis to carry out attacks on US ships and their allies is completely insufficient to solve this task, both qualitatively and quantitatively, which creates the illusion of significant superiority in the self-defense means of surface ships of the US and NATO countries from kamikaze UAVs, anti-ship missiles and kamikaze BEC.
In reality, if any ship of the United States or its allies were on a solo raid in the Black Sea, it could be attacked by a group of modern BEC kamikazes with the same success and with the same results as in the case of ships of the Russian Navy. Likewise, any ship in the US Navy or its allies could be damaged or destroyed by a massive attack of cruise missiles and kamikaze UAVs - with constantly repeated attacks, it is only a matter of time.
The second conclusion is that the defense of the ships of the US Navy group and its allies can be overcome by the Houthis, provided that they are provided with a sufficient number of modern anti-ship missiles equipped with sufficiently modern noise-resistant homing heads (GOS), as well as kamikaze BECs equipped with high-speed satellite communications .
The theses set out in the second conclusion allow us to assert that Russia is missing an excellent opportunity to inflict sensitive blows on the United States, Great Britain, France, as well as other countries whose ships are “wiped” in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, which could force them to reconsider their position on involvement in Russian-Ukrainian disagreements.
Window of opportunity
In fact, a window of opportunity opened for Russia at the moment when the Houthis began shelling commercial ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, after which the United States and its allies decided to intervene in the situation. It is no longer a secret that attacks on ships and infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy are planned at the headquarters of the United States and Great Britain, carried out thanks to intelligence data and global communications systems of the United States, with the help of weapons supplied by the United States and its allies (or made from components supplied by them ).
In addition, European countries, primarily France, aimed at escalating the conflict by sending their military contingents into the territory of Ukraine. In fact, they are already present there, as evidenced by numerous obituaries in Western publications of drowned colonels and generals who crashed in the mountains.
Recently, Israel made a “knight’s move” by attacking the Iranian diplomatic mission in Syria. Despite the fact that Russia and Israel have so far refrained from overt hostile actions towards each other, the events that will follow the murder of Iranian politicians and military personnel could so aggravate the situation in the region that the window of opportunity will not only open slightly, but will fly out of the window. .
What should be our goal?
Our goal is to inflict the most painful, sensitive losses, primarily on the USA, Great Britain and France, followed by the rest of the “shareholders”. They need to clearly show the consequences of arms supplies to Ukraine and “indirect” participation in hostilities, not to mention the possibility of their direct participation. It is necessary that the losses of the above-mentioned countries become visible, tangible, so that they cannot be hidden behind the crafty formulations of “drowned in the pool.”
In addition, we must get even with Western countries for our ships and aircraft lost or damaged due to weapons and intelligence from Western countries, for soldiers killed on the battlefield and civilians in cities bombarded by shells and missiles provided by Western countries. In general, the war should come to them, to begin with, in the form of striped coffins with the bodies of the crews of their warships.
We have already discussed possible measures to take more than once; we will briefly consider them again.
It is possible to break through the defenses of the naval group concentrated by the United States and its allies in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea only with the help of a massive combined strike, sudden and intense.
The first component of a combined strike could be BEC kamikazes. Judging by open data, recently Starlink satellite communication kits began to reach the RF Armed Forces in one way or another. Their use in Ukraine could pose a threat to ourselves, while Starlink complexes can be effectively used to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage activities in other regions of the world.
In particular, several dozen BEC kamikazes can be equipped with Starlink satellite communication kits, which must subsequently be secretly delivered to a given area and used as part of a massive coordinated attack on one or two warships of the United States, Great Britain or France. It would be interesting to see how the newest British destroyer type 45 Dering will try to fight off a dozen BEC kamikazes.
Detonating a BEC-kamikaze underside will clearly not benefit a Dering-class destroyer
The second component of the combined strike should be anti-ship missiles - we already said earlier on the possibility and feasibility of supplying the Houthis with anti-ship missiles, in particular the Moskit anti-ship missiles. However, you should not focus specifically on the Mosquitoes; the Houthis may well be supplied with two or three dozen Kh-Z5/Kh-Z5PD anti-ship missiles, perhaps Kh-Z1A(AD/M) and Kh-Z1P(PDUPK), provided that the X-31 family of missiles can be adapted for launch from ground-based launchers (PU).
The third component of the combined strike should be the destruction of enemy aircraft and helicopters patrolling in the combat area. At a minimum, for this purpose, the Houthis can be supplied with several dozen Igla/Verba man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS). With their help, low-flying aircraft and ship-borne helicopters that search for and destroy kamikaze BECs and kamikaze UAVs can be attacked.
Without air support, surface ships will become significantly more vulnerable to Houthi anti-ship missiles and kamikaze UAVs. Image generated by the Fast Stable Diffusion XL on TPU v5e neural network
Ideally, it is necessary to ensure the supply of one air defense system to the Houthis, possibly in a reduced composition, but capable of using missiles with an active radar homing head (ARLGSN). The specified air defense system should be used not as an air defense weapon, but as means of air defense - anti-aircraft attack, for hunting enemy planes and helicopters according to external target designation data. Similarly, using air defense systems as a means of air defense, the Ukrainian Armed Forces “hunt” our aircraft, precisely according to intelligence data supplied to them by the United States and its allies, so a symmetrical response here would be more than appropriate.
Undoubtedly, the above measures are quite difficult to implement - the operation of the Starlink network in the region may be limited, so that kamikaze BECs equipped with Starlink terminals will become useless. Anti-ship missiles must be adapted to ground-based launchers, their covert deployment and target designation must be ensured; our crews must be placed on air defense systems, since it is unlikely that the Houthis will be able to quickly master such complex equipment.
However, as they say, those who don’t want look for reasons, those who want look for opportunities. There are several other ways to harm the United States and its allies.
For example, it is possible to supply the Houthis with fifty to a hundred kamikaze UAVs of the Lancet family. It seems that the latest versions have a range of about 60-70 kilometers, and it may be limited by the communication range. Potentially, the Houthis could launch kamikaze UAVs from the shore or even from some motor boats or boats, and they could be controlled from a Russian vessel located in the area, perhaps even a military one.
What, go and prove it? How long have the United States and its allies been providing attacks on Russian ships and infrastructure with their intelligence and communications equipment? We don't shoot down Starlink satellites. due to the fact that Ukrainian BEC kamikazes and UAV bombers are equipped with Starlink communication terminals?
Of course, the mass of the warhead of the Lancet family of kamikaze UAVs is insufficient to cause serious damage to large surface ships, but the ability to obtain images from a camera on board the UAV potentially makes it possible to ensure their targeting to the most vulnerable elements of the ship - the control room, radar antenna panels, helicopter (in if it is available on site). In addition, kamikaze UAVs could potentially be used to destroy helicopters in the air.
Small-sized kamikaze UAVs can target the most vulnerable objects on board surface ships
In general, the purpose of using several dozen kamikaze UAVs of the Lancet family is to maximally deprive surface ships of the enemy’s commando group of the ability to repel the attack of BEC kamikazes, “large” kamikaze UAVs and anti-ship missiles, which should come in the second wave.
For the same purpose, you can use the products of KB "Oko" - their The PRIVET-120 kamikaze UAV should have a flight range of about 250 kilometers and carry a 120 mm caliber mortar mine as a warhead. – a destroyer of the Arleigh Burke type is unlikely to benefit from a 120-mm mortar shell hitting the wheelhouse or the radar surface. In addition, UAVs from KB “Oko” are equipped with a very interesting control system with the ability to “pick up”, which ensures the flight of the UAV according to the coordinates of GLONASS and an inertial navigation system on the cruising leg of the flight and precise guidance by the operator on the final leg of the flight using a video image from the camera built into the UAV.
UAV-kamikaze "PRIVET-120" from KB "Oko". Image oko-kb.ru
Conclusions
Until the USA, Great Britain, France and other Western countries begin to receive sensitive blows to their armed forces and infrastructure, they will not stop pumping Ukraine with more and more dangerous weapons, instructors and mercenaries, and perhaps they will also to the phase of direct participation in the conflict - invasion.
The proposed format for striking the fleets of the above-mentioned countries is not exhaustive; there are probably many more ways to cause damage to the USA, Great Britain, France and other countries carrying out hostile activities against our country.
For example, you can organize the supply of shells for multiple launch rocket systems with cluster and incendiary warheads in order to practically “sterilize” one or more American bases in the region or undermine fiber optic cables located at the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean as a “thank you” for Nord Stream.
The only question is political will - victory cannot be achieved by appeasing the enemy, only by destroying him, by absolute ruthlessness, by the willingness to take any measures and use any means to achieve victory.
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