How the West sees us in conflicts
A picture of our vulnerabilities
History, among other things, is engaged in the creation of myths that complement each other hand in hand with analysis. Inevitably, our myth and the myth about us among our opponents will differ as much as the assessment of what is happening.
While we devote a significant part of our energy to studying and glorifying our successes, our enemy does the opposite - he glorifies and studies our failures, aspects of the vision that are often hidden from us behind successes and myth.
The enemy will always judge and analyze us not by our best episodes, but on the contrary, he is interested in the aspects in which we do not show ourselves to be strong or resilient and suffer losses. By noticing patterns in these traditionally weak points, he forms a picture of our vulnerabilities, our pain points and blind spots.
In order not to receive sudden and painful blows to these pressure points, you should ask yourself the question - how do they see the picture on the other side of the chessboard? Without embellishment, as they say. Awareness of your weaknesses and working with them has never harmed anyone.
It should immediately be noted that our weaknesses have historically manifested themselves as a system much more often than our strengths. One could start with some Livonian War or traditional insoluble social contradictions, but I’m interested in starting with the War of 1812.
So, Napoleon and his army invaded the Russian Empire, reached Moscow and took it, essentially leaving the field of general battle behind him. As we understand it, this is understandable, but in the West, of course, they see the situation somewhat differently.
Yes, Napoleon was unable to conquer the Russian Empire or force it into an alliance and blockade against the British Empire - however, he was able to solve tactical problems (except for the complete defeat of the army of the Russian Empire), he took Moscow, caused significant damage, and so on - having, in general, an open second front (Great Britain) in its rear.
What conclusion would the West draw from the Napoleonic campaign?
That the Russians traditionally fear a pitched battle with an experienced and numerically equal or superior enemy. That the Russians can and will use their territory as an exchange to weaken and stretch the enemy. That a partisan movement will arise in the extended rear. That the Russian fleet should not be considered as a serious factor. Finally, that the Russians will delay a general battle and, in general, will prefer to pull it apart and tear it apart where this can be done.
Let me remind you that now I am not talking about our strengths, but looking at the past through the eyes of the West through the prism of our shortcomings and habits.
In the 1812th century, Western countries made a number of analytical conclusions based on the War of XNUMX. Previously, of course, there were individual elements that could form a system. This is the murder of Paul, and the increased manipulation of us by various Western forces, directly through the sympathies of our elites, divorced from the people, and the significant influence of the personal abilities and habits of our monarchs on making key decisions for the country.
I believe that back in the 19th century, Western thought put forward a number of theses about “what we are” and how we make decisions and implement them, how we think about what we are ready to do and what we are not ready to do - and in what cases.
Through the prism of our shortcomings
The Napoleonic campaign showed that if our “hornet's nest” is well stirred up, we can show considerable agility and “second wind”, reaching the lair of our exhausted enemy. However, the path to this is definitely not easy for us - it is the path of threshold potentials and sacrifices. By limiting the localization of the conflict and not reducing it to the nature of an existential threat, we can be controlled; our second wind will not open without this.
This is what the Crimean War showed - despite the abundant coalition of opponents, the issue of an existential threat was not identified for us, despite a number of incidents, the conflict turned out to be local and, despite the advantage of our field, which we traditionally glorify when we talk about our strengths, we lost. Threshold escalation, localization of conflict, increasing pressure and advantage, logistical and demographic - these are the factors that brought us down, among other things.
The West noticed that we have some shortcomings in the military sphere and integrated them into a system. These shortcomings include the archaization of military science and technology, ineffective organization of the military hierarchy during a limited conflict, poor logistics and supply, and fear for secondary fronts during the main conflict.
The defeat in the Crimean War was a significant blow to our image after the victory over Napoleon. However, we tried to work on the mistakes, and although our traditional shortcomings have not gone away, the situation has improved over time.
Traditional shortcomings are like weeds with deep roots - you can pull them out, plant something new, make it look beautiful, but if the roots remain, then as attention falls, everything will return to normal. In our case, the situation has returned to the times of the Russo-Japanese War.
In this conflict, we were faced with many problems identified back in the Crimean War - this is the problem of ensuring the security of distant territories, and poor logistics in crisis situations, and an unsuitable hierarchy, and the archaization of military technologies and military art, and, of course, the fact that I highlighted it as a frank localization of the conflict.
Based on the experience of the Crimean and Russian-Japanese wars, we can conclude that in our case significant efforts are required to move from a state of threat and minor conflict to a state of threatening conflict.
Staying on the brink of conflict or even beyond it is energy-consuming for us, and this drains us quite a lot, since we are in a dual situation, combining peaceful and military organizations and efforts that are quite in conflict with each other.
In the event of a major war, we need to overcome this resistance. It will also require a lot of effort and time to shake up and rebuild our society and organizational structures, which have traditionally been rather amorphous and difficult to lift.
It is more profitable for our enemy to keep us in tension until this “transition line”, because in this case the internal forces of the country will do a significant part of the work for him, taking a position favorable to him, consciously or not.
Anglo-Saxon methodology
The example of the Russo-Japanese War and the subsequent revolution of 1905 largely repeats the logic of our war of 1914–1917 and our participation in the First World War. Our front in that war was secondary (compared to the scale of the meat grinder on the Western Front, of course), and although the conflict was significant, it cannot be said unequivocally that it posed an existential threat to us. On our second front (the Caucasus) we traditionally held the German ally well, and on the main front it was obvious that the Germans (until the revolutionary mess) were not capable of becoming this existential threat to us. In that conflict we had allies effectively tying up the German forces - that is, I am pointing out that the logic of our actions during the First World War was our traditional logic of "limited conflict."
Our government was not too concerned about completely reformatting the economy for military needs, although the conflict was complex and costly for us and had lasted quite a long time. As a result, the same factors came into play as during the Russo-Japanese War - forces within society became active, which actually played into the hands of our opponents.
In the First World War, French and English society and politics showed themselves to be more resilient than ours. They will certainly remember this moment and take it into account as our minus and weakness. In fact, it was on the basis of the history of the First World War that Hitler’s ideas were formed that “Russia is a colossus with feet of clay.”
Failures in our revolutionary campaign were also due to our traditional shortcomings - poor logistics, poor supplies, archaic military science and technology. In offensive wars, which we wage without a preliminary existential threat, we, generally speaking, quite often did not show ourselves at our best, demonstrating a galaxy of our traditional shortcomings.
This was the case during the Polish campaign of the Red Army. The West also came to conclusions similar to those they made about our exit from the First World War.
The “Curzon Line” style approach, as opposed to the “anti-Bolshevik campaign to the east,” which also had supporters, is a fairly rational solution. It is based on the assumption that we cannot mount an effective march to the west unless there is a real and direct existential threat. In this case, we will be held back by our traditional shortcomings.
The alternative would be for the West to formulate a strategy that would force us to show our strengths. This would create a real threat, stretch out supplies and logistics, and strain forces in conditions where the game would be on our field. The Anglo-Saxon elites showed the wisdom of observation, not making the mistakes of Napoleon, and probably believed that the USSR, as some kind of misunderstanding, would collapse on its own, sooner or later.
However, not all Western elites shared this point of view. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon methodology, which tried to objectively study our weaknesses and strengths based on an array of historical situations, there was a conditionally German position. It was based on the study of more recent historical periods and postulated “weakness and strength as absolute concepts,” which in itself was very far from analytical.
This view of things did not take into account factors of strengthening or weakening. He took certain patterns from the short term and used them out of context, as if he did not notice its influence on whether the steel would be steel or cast iron. A wooden wall supported from behind will be stronger than a stone wall built at an angle. But for the Germans, with their racial theories, the material of the wall was an absolute in matters of its durability.
It is worth noting that on the eve of World War II we did not prove ourselves to be a powerful military power or a confident system. Despite the fact that in 1939 we were better armed than the Germans, had more strength and the level of militarization of society, and despite the open antagonism of fascism and communism, which began since the Spanish War, we chose to come to an agreement and divide Poland rather than increase confrontation.
I don’t want to point out the rightness or wrongness of this path, I just want to look at events through the eyes of the West and through its analysis of our behavior.
From the point of view of the West (and the Germans in general), the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a manifestation of weakness, indecisiveness, uncertainty and non-compliance with principles. We signed an agreement with an obvious enemy, who was already understood as a future and undisguised enemy, and this agreement did not provide any security guarantees (for example, because the Germans had a similar agreement with Poland). This was not an indication of a strong position.
Then we took a wait-and-see attitude and spent a whole year watching the “strange war” and the French campaign. We decided to conduct the Winter War with Finland to demonstrate our power outside of military training grounds and test it in practice.
Unfortunately, the results were not very good. The show of force had the opposite effect and once again confirmed the German thesis about “feet of clay” and exaggerated power in general. Perhaps, if we had not started the Finnish war, remaining an “open secret” outside of Khasanov and Khalkhin Gol, with colorful parades and monstrous five-tower tanks, we would be more effective as an anti-Hitler bogeyman. But it turned out the way it turned out.
Western (and German) analytics carefully studied our experience in that war: tanks, control, experience and equipment of troops, equipment with small arms weapons, efficiency aviation and so on.
The findings were confirmed that in the absence of an existential threat, the Russians fight much weaker, even in such geographically contiguous regions. And everything according to the traditional list: weak logistics and supply, interaction, command staff, archaic military thought that was still somewhere in Spain, at best.
Considering the problems with winter uniforms in the Finnish campaign (and numerous frostbites), the West concluded that the Russians were generally unprepared for a real conflict, because in a cold country it is not enough to provide adequate winter uniforms; this, frankly speaking, is important.
This, by the way, is why the ears of all these UK forecasts that “the Russians will hold out for a maximum of two months” are growing - the analysts there have fallen into depression regarding our real capabilities.
However, unlike the British, Hitler did not understand the importance of the factor of space and existential threat, as well as the influence of these factors on adjusting the analytical picture.
Usually, the build-up is our weak point in conflicts, as is opposition to a military restructuring. But behind all these Stalinist upheavals, often quite stupid, analytically Hitler and his entourage lost sight of the fact that the restructuring of society on a war footing and its crisis mobilization had already taken place several years ago. Numerous paranoid processes, plantings, spy mania and the build-up of heavy industry, harsh propaganda had been “pumping” the brains of Soviet citizens for about 5 years, and there was practically no need to bring them to “harsh measures”; they were already in a borderline or close to it state. Mobilization to fight the existential threat took even longer - however, they were preparing to fight the British and French.
Thus, the weak organizational readiness was to some extent compensated for by advance moral preparation - thanks to this, we swayed much faster than it would have been under normal conditions.
For all the shortcomings of Stalin and his leadership, many of these people went through the Civil War and understood the importance and effectiveness of stretching the enemy, guerrilla warfare and brain training not from textbooks, but from the real experience that surrounded them. Which, however, only compensated for many of our other traditional shortcomings, which have not gone away. Quality of logistics, planning, supply, management, command staff.
Of the benefits
One of the advantages that I would like to note is that we very quickly reached the level of existential war. This is our strong point, although at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, judging by a number of documents, there was still ideological fermentation, and in certain ethnic groups this remained for quite a long time. However, for the most part, opposition to the “military transition” was broken in advance and quite effectively.
For Western analysts, this factor (preliminary effective propaganda processing) turned out to be quite new and revolutionary. They, of course, understood the propaganda of the masses, but the scale and effect of such preliminary processing, I believe, surprised them very much. Like a vaccine that boosts immunity against disease, these factors hastened the response to a military threat.
Previously, the quality of propaganda in conflicts was not our strong point. The low literacy of the population, its ideological alienation and religiosity had an effect, and in general the emphasis was more often placed on direct coercion and a hierarchy of suppression rather than on appeal.
Based on the results of the Great Patriotic War, the West clearly concludes that Russians are very susceptible to propaganda and manipulation. Although they had known about the manipulation of elites since at least the 19th century, the receptivity of the population (and, in principle, the inclusion of similar tools in their repertoire of influences) turned out to be a great discovery for them.
Here I will note that Western propaganda of the early 20th century rather exploits a caricatured, humiliating image of the enemy, rather than the image of the formation of strong appealing patterns.
We can say that the discovery of the USSR was the deep development of provocative images that appeal to morality, conscience and spiritual qualities, and the implantation of these things is extremely expansive, forming not only an effective anti-image, but also an extremely juicy image, and quite competently using all new methods of manipulation. What began as a propaganda factor went much further, and the West later adopted this art and outplayed us on this field.
Based on the results of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War, the West studied us as a whole - about our ability, like a jack-in-the-box, to reach the capitals of our opponents at the final chords of an existential crisis, it, of course, knew since the time of the Napoleonic Wars. But the move towards the “Iron Curtain” zone surprised him somewhat. Because this was accompanied by a significant material gap between the Soviet standard of living and the standard of living of these countries included in the “Soviet bloc.”
In English analytics, probably since the Civil War, there has been a thesis that, adjacent to more well-fed and traditional states and forced to interact with them, the Union would gradually, or as a result of a revolution, slide back to a more understandable and classical formation. Observing the arrival of the NEP, they seemed to confirm their hypothesis.
But then the strengthening of Stalinism and the war happened, which actually significantly delayed these inevitable and in some ways even logical changes, and after the USSR became a superpower and was forced to adhere to much harsher forms of ideological antagonism for decades - all this delayed the transition that the British had expected in many more years. sometime in the 1930s for more than 40 years. And the transition itself happened fragmentarily (not completely), smoothly and practically not revolutionary.
However, the Western elites grasped the pattern of this back in the 1920s–1930s, as well as the possibility of manipulating this process by maintaining subcritical escalation parameters for a long time.
Since the end of World War II, they have tried to keep us at a sub-critical level of readiness for conflict, preventing us from relaxing or definitely moving into preparation for an existential confrontation. This quite logically contributed to the formation in the USSR of a layer of people who played conditionally “to the West”, without necessarily realizing it. These could be people who preferred certainty over uncertainty, and the more often they encountered the absence of a “hot” conflict, the closer they were mentally to the idea that there is no conflict or there should not be.
In this they came into conflict with Soviet agitprop, which was increasingly less able to maintain a healthy balance of levels of readiness and anxiety.
In the West, there has long been a thesis regarding us, which can be expressed something like this: “Russia produces nothing but depression.” This thesis has evolved - in the West they actually believe that most of the implemented technical solutions belong to them, because only within their framework it was systemic, in other states it was rather targeted or contrary.
It is impossible to say unambiguously whether this thesis is completely false or true, but in our case it is partly true - the potential for modernization based on our own technological cycles has indeed always suffered or limped. Even when we could make some of the most advanced computers in the world, we did not cling to systematic progress in this area for long, preferring to buy or copy ready-made solutions to developing our own. This is one of our objectively existing historical shortcomings that we need to overcome, because the West, knowing this, will exploit our habit, alternating periods of detente and tension, forcing us to endlessly change favored regimes between creating our own and buying ready-made solutions.
Caribbean crisis
The Caribbean crisis became a very good model for the West to analyze what we are. In fact, then we showed deep initiative and planning, deciding to create a center of pressure on the enemy’s shores, just as the enemy created such centers on our borders.
Much has been written about the Cuban missile crisis, and I would like to highlight here the main conclusions that the West could draw from its results.
Firstly, the Russians were already capable of carrying out such long-range and large-scale operations technically and covertly. This was a surprise for them that they will keep in mind every time a conflict brews. The myth of the dangerous “unpredictability of Russians” gained a second wind after the Cuban missile crisis.
However, beyond this myth, they also saw that the depth of elaboration of our plans was insufficient. Even our best plans were plagued by few if-thens. If, at the planning stage, Khrushchev had worked out options for action in the event of discovery of the preparation of starting positions, then the plan itself could have been implemented with a greater probability, or the achievements from its curtailment would have been greater, since it would have become a more significant element in the bargaining. But the option was not worked out in breadth, and everything happened as it happened.
The USA, in turn, gained the points that we lost. Kennedy showed himself to be a more confident leader than Khrushchev, and America itself was more principled and organized than the USSR. The fact that the missiles were withdrawn from Turkey was frankly an incentive prize for us.
Based on the results of a comprehensive analysis, Western analysts came to the conclusion that the USSR could not effectively play the role of the “white” side, although they noted an increasing tendency towards this in the future. Subsequently, it was precisely this increasing trend that prompted the West to go for détente, fearing that the USSR would seek to equalize security imbalances by improving its material and technical capabilities.
This would impose on the West the game that it imposed on us - uncertainty tense to the limit.
However, the West chose to abandon this quite quickly, since it understood the destructive potential of the influence of these factors on its life.
The fact that we went for détente gave the West the understanding that we did not seriously consider the potential of this instrument. For the first time since World War II, the West was convinced that the Russians did not want their security configuration to improve at the expense of their (Western) positions in this security, and that the Russians were satisfied with the current situation at the moment.
This gave the West a lot to think about because it diverged significantly from our rhetoric and even from some elements of our foreign policy.
Loyalists and confrontationists
And it was clearly interpreted by Western analysts as a deepening split in the vision and planning of the Soviet elites into conditionally “loyalists” and conditionally “confrontationists,” with the dominance of the former reigning.
The very processes that were noticed even before the new economic policy entered the terminal phase - and the West could only wait. As in the Chinese expression “Sit quietly on the bank of the river” - approximately the same picture.
You see where your opponent is swimming. It floats on its own, and it is not necessary to push it at all, you can only slightly guide it. This is what they did, consistently luring us into an Afghan trap.
Again, the West operated with the idea that has already been mentioned many times: that the Russians organically resist reformatting for a confident victory in local conflicts that do not threaten their existence as a state and community.
Having imposed such a debilitating conflict, one could expect that it would drag on for many years and, probably, over time they would prefer to withdraw from it without achieving final goals, with the accompanying reputational and material costs.
By creating such a conflict, the West simultaneously bound and devalued the “confrontationists” and gave an increasingly powerful position to the “loyalists.” Considering how frankly weak the still formally atheistic USSR understood Muslim countries (which was repeatedly confirmed by the USSR’s disastrous bets in the Middle East), its involvement in Afghanistan was truly a masterful combination of our enemies.
As a result of the Afghan conflict, Western countries noted, in addition to our traditional shortcomings, the growing problems in the field of propaganda and engagement arising in the Soviet Union. Despite potentially powerful resources and a significant number of personnel, agitprop turned out to be unable to reformat Afghan society, demonstrating a boring and ineffective presentation of material and a growing anachronistic gap with Western technologies of imposition and manipulation.
In the West, it was quite logical to conclude (which, however, has been confirmed for many years) that the degradation of propaganda is a complex phenomenon, and the quality of internal propaganda is also weakening.
The West has once again become convinced of our weak ability to achieve sustainable results in local conflicts of a non-existential scale. They probably concluded from this that such things do not change much over time or due to technological progress - being essentially chronic companions of our civilization-mental model.
In part, these conclusions (and other conclusions about us) were confirmed by the results of the first Chechen war and partly the war with Georgia in 2008. In many respects, this was confirmed in 2014, when we fundamentally went to all lengths to at least somehow freeze the Ukrainian status quo, despite the frank and undisguised anti-Russian line.
Conclusions
So, it's time to sum up my longread.
We must understand that as a result of all these events, the West will look at us differently. Understanding this view is important in order to sometimes try to go beyond our usual actions and achieve what we want where before it may have been a little more difficult, but where our negative qualities can hinder us.
The West knows us and our shortcomings very well. He also has a pretty good idea of what our strengths are based on - he has long since learned to work around this whenever possible, like a mongoose approaching a cobra from the most advantageous directions.
To conclude this article, I would like to list some of our chronically negative qualities.
1. Weak quality study of the pre-crisis and initial stages of crisis planning. This is what we call “Russian maybe”. Unfortunately, this is a factor in our mentality.
2. The chronic decline of military thought and managers some time after the last major conflicts, the transformation of this into an ossified structure, a thing in itself, the more so as it goes on.
3. Big problems with adopting and understanding the experience of our opponents in inter-crisis times. The strong influence of denial, dogma and ideas in our constructions.
4. Traditional problems of our logistics and supply during crises.
5. A high degree of influence of subjective factors in the historical decisions of our elites. Real collegiality in making such decisions is often insufficient, which can lead to unfounded and insufficiently thought-out decisions that are not protected from objective criticism.
6. High degree of influence on our population through more attractive images, including the influence of elites in making long-term decisions.
7. Pronounced significant threshold resistance that prevents the transition from ineffective to effective methods of conflict resolution. If this stage is delayed, a protest asset may be formed, both vertically and horizontally.
8. During the inter-crisis period, big problems arise with the methodical and consistent development and implementation of complex innovations. The more time passes between crises, the more serious these problems become.
9. Within the civilizational culture there is a low focus on results.
10. During the inter-crisis period, propaganda degenerates and becomes unable to creatively evolve in space, using different sources of experience. She is like a chess pawn that either moves forward or stands still. Having reached the limit of quantitative evolution, it stops due to the inability to evolve qualitatively.
11. Unfortunately, our activities outside are often and chronically openly reactionary. The experience of the success of our expansionary operations by “white” figures is not fully analyzed in our country, unlike the West, which values any analysis of successes and failures. We do not have an adequate culture of analysis of both successes and failures. There is only one fat myth that overshadows any attempts to dissect it.
12. In this regard, we may seem predictable to Western countries as an adversary or partner. We strive for stability, but in the negative sense of the word. We have an organic reluctance to make changes even in situations where they are necessary.
While we want to be active players, we can't always fully focus on the game. Because of this, we sometimes find ourselves in obviously losing positions, although objectively we should be in a more advantageous position.
Analyzing how Western countries see us and our shortcomings, how they play on them and influence us through them is a huge topic, and today I have only touched on it in general terms, despite the inevitably large material.
I see my task as raising a debate not around individual, perhaps even controversial details, but precisely in the direction of analysis - what chronically exists in us that works against our successes, through which we can be influenced, that objectively is not our strengths.
Like any problem, once identified, these factors can be targeted to improve the country, which will undoubtedly have a positive impact on our security and sustainability.
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