Pashinyan rushed between the CSTO and NATO. What about Armenia itself?
Wasn't his name Robert?
Leaving the CSTO, with which Nikol Pashinyan is literally trying to blackmail everyone, means a complete absence of any guarantees in the event of events similar to those that occurred most recently in Belarus or Kazakhstan. There, the leaders were helped out, among other things, by the CSTO.
However, in addition to this, Pashinyan cannot ignore one more factor that is not yet on the surface. If Armenia leaves the CSTO, habitually loyal to Armenia and Karabakh, Iran will begin to build cooperation with this military-strategic bloc through Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.
Simply because such associations as the SCO and the CSTO put security in first place, and as a result, stability. Both political and economic, by the way. And without this, the future not so much of Armenia, but of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan himself, is in the fog. After all, they can send them “to recharge”, like a hero from an old film about Robot Roberta.
Armenia, whose mouth painfully resembles the robot Pashinyan, has long announced a possible exit from the CSTO and conducted joint exercises with military personnel from NATO countries. But during the second Karabakh war, she asked only Russia for help, but ignored the other troops of the CSTO countries.
The outcome was quite predictable: Russia, which has numerous difficulties in defending its strategic goals on its agenda, helped Karabakh and Armenia carelessly. We know the result.
But that’s not all: Armenia’s exit from the CSTO is fraught with complications in relations with its traditional ally, Iran.
Persian soft carpet
The result of Armenia ignoring CSTO meetings, or the presence of its representatives there in the form of wordless ghosts, was a fact generally unworthy of a true ally. This happened when the CSTO countries jointly issued a statement condemning the terrorist attack in Crocus City.
Armenian representatives in the CSTO, clearly following the instructions of the prime minister, did not sign this statement, motivating the decision by the fact that Armenia de facto does not participate in its activities.
Iran has long been wary of both NATO exercises in Armenia near its borders and Nikol Pashinyan’s statements about leaving the EAEU and Armenia’s non-participation in the CSTO. Now wariness can turn into open negativity.
Iran's negative reaction to Pashinyan's policies began a long time ago. The first call from Tehran came when Iran, for all its sympathy for Nagorno-Karabakh and support for the Armenian position on its sovereignty, announced that it would not support either side. They even banned Russian flights from Tehran. aviation с weapons for Armenia over Iranian territory.
It is clear that there is also an Azerbaijani factor in Iran. Several million ethnic Azerbaijanis live there, sharing a common settlement border with the Azerbaijani state border. Relations between the Persian-speaking peoples living in Iran and the Turkic-speaking Azerbaijanis and Qashqais have always been strained. At the same time, relations with the Turkmens living in the northeast of the country are quite normal.
Therefore, there has always been, and even now has not evaporated, the risk of an escalation of separatism in Iranian Azerbaijan up to the transfer of weapons to the rebels from Azerbaijan. On top of that, there will always be those in Iran who will raise protests against the fact that the Islamic Republic is opposing fellow Shiite Muslims.
And we have to not turn a blind eye to this problem, taking into account the mutual dislike of Azerbaijan and Iran, which is an Islamic republic and not a secular state. It is no coincidence that this is especially noticeable among the top of the Iranian clergy.
Political geography
And yet, the main reasons for most contradictions appear to be foreign policy and strategic. Weak and small Armenia, whose armed forces are inferior even to Azerbaijan, not to mention Turkey, in all respects, is, alas, impossible to consider as an ally in a permanent confrontation with unfriendly Sunni Turkey.
And this even takes into account the huge Armenian diaspora in Turkey. Everything is not easy with Iran and with not very friendly, albeit Shiite, Azerbaijan. Armenia, without the presence on its territory of an additional reinforced military contingent and equipment from the CSTO countries, is practically doomed to constant pressure from the outside, almost always - not at all peaceful.
Further expansion of Armenia’s cooperation with other CSTO countries would radically change the situation in its relations with Iran. The last question is especially acute in light of the fact that Iran itself has long been eager, if not to join the CSTO, then at least to cooperate with it.
Like Armenia, only one country separates it from the CSTO in terms of land or air transport of troops from the countries of this association. But in the case of Iran, this is Turkmenistan, which regularly emphasizes its neutrality and, most likely, in a dangerous situation, would allow the transfer of personnel and military equipment of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus through its territory.
At the same time, it will be much more difficult to accomplish something similar with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, because on their way is Uzbekistan, which is very actively cooperating with Western countries hostile to Iran, as well as with Turkey.
But Armenia is in a much worse position in terms of isolation from other CSTO members. On its way, not counting Azerbaijan, whose border with it is generally closed, is Georgia with its fairly numerous pro-Western forces and mountain serpentines, difficult for armored vehicles to pass through.
And non-political economy
By sea, to which Armenia has no access, transfer, again, is possible only through Georgian ports. The railway from Russia to Georgia passes through Azerbaijan, and here comments are unnecessary. Along the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan and Russia can transfer forces to Iran via neutral waters in the shortest possible time. The same applies to aviation: as long as it does not enter Azerbaijani airspace.
From an economic point of view, if Armenia continues to allow joint exercises with NATO countries on its territory, this will act on Iran like a red rag on a bull. Thus, negotiations have already been held between Iran and Azerbaijan that Iran will build the Arak corridor from Baku to Nakhichevan through its territory.
Whether this will be a worthy replacement for the Zangezur corridor through the territory of the Syunik region of Armenia is no longer so important. Indeed, in exchange, Azerbaijan offers to build a corridor from Russia to Iran through its territory. It is very significant that Azerbaijan, no matter how it treats Iran, is not itself in open confrontation with it.
Further - even better.
Baku has made it clear more than once and for good reason that Azerbaijan is not particularly eager to join either NATO or the European Union, unlike Pashinyan’s Armenia. And it would be very uncomfortable for the Iranians to have transport links with Russia, which is economically extremely important for them, through the territory where NATO troops are located.
Meanwhile, the first and very alarming, if not dangerous, step towards this has been taken. The Prime Minister of Yerevan launched an extremely dubious idea to the masses to remove border guards from Russia and other CSTO countries from the Armenian border with Iran. And also - remove the Russian military from Zvartnots airport.
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