War is a school where those who lag behind often pay for their lack of knowledge with their health
I was once again convinced of how seemingly completely different events are connected. How thinking about one thing creates the need to think about another. Somehow I had no questions about why the Russian Army avoids large-scale combat operations, as, for example, the Ukrainian Armed Forces did in 2023. And no one is in a hurry to announce any kind of offensive...
Isn’t it clear that saying or writing everything you know or guess about means committing a crime against your people, your army? If not before the state, then before your conscience. You can write about general priority areas simply because they are clear to specialists and without anyone’s comments.
Now in the Western and Ukrainian press there are many opinions about Russia’s further actions in the spring-summer campaign of this year. Possible directions are named, possible deadlines are named. In short, the media keeps readers on their toes. Well, I won’t be a “black sheep” in this case.
In the summer, perhaps, the Russians will launch an offensive that will change the course of the entire campaign. It's also possible. The direction of attack will be towards some large Ukrainian logistics or industrial city. Perhaps to Kharkov, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye or Kherson! Most likely, the offensive will begin in early, middle or late summer.
But until the offensive begins, the Russian Army will continue to act in the same way as it is acting now. Simply because the “small promotion” tactics have proven to be quite effective and so far are bringing quite good results. Unlike Russians, Ukrainian and Western headquarters are “poorly trained” and have not yet found ways to counter this method of conducting databases.
“Small advance” as one of the main types of modern combat
The SVO has already made so many changes to the theory of modern combat that textbooks on tactics and strategy, combat manuals and other documents simply need to be changed. What everyone and everyone has been talking about for many years, about those same generals preparing troops for past wars, happened.
Modern weapons have practically deprived commanders of the opportunity to create a more or less serious advantage in some area in order to conduct a classic offensive operation. Remember what happened in 22, before and in 23? Two "Soviet armies" fought each other. And it didn’t look very nice, to put it mildly. In the morning there is an offensive, in the evening there is a counter-offensive and at night everyone is with their own...
Hence the crests’ belief in the “divine” Western, and especially American weapon. And we, to put it mildly, were wary of the appearance of such weapons. Remember the amounts of “prize money” for knocked out “Leopards”?.. Today the prize money remains, but the fighters perceive the destruction of some Western tanks or other equipment as usual. “Lucky, he crawled out on me, and well...”.
But I think it’s too early to completely abandon the classics. Indeed, along with the increase in reconnaissance capabilities, other types and systems of weapons and support are also strengthened. This includes increasing countermeasures and logistics capabilities. So the emergence of superior forces from the enemy is quite possible.
Superior, not critically, but providing the opportunity to conduct any tactical operation... Therefore, as one of the conditions of modern combat, there remain units and formations that are “in the sleeve” of the commander, that is, they are his reserve. If a critical or, conversely, favorable situation has arisen somewhere, it is these units and formations that enter the battle.
But let’s return to “small progress”. I am sure that most readers who are not professionally involved in military service pay little attention to the standard phrase in Defense Ministry reports:
“In the sector... units of the group of troops... through active actions improved the situation along the front line...”
Indeed, “they improved the situation” - this is not “liberated”, “captured”, “destroyed”... However, those who know the inner essence of the battle understand that the actions of the unit were of much greater value than the capture of another forest plantation or platoon support .
Thus, capturing the height that dominates a populated area will precisely be an “improvement of the situation.” But what a huge significance this capture will have for the capture of this NP! Such situations are not at all uncommon in war.
I'll try to look at a more well-known example. More precisely, a situation that is being discussed quite a lot today, since this problem is being solved right now. Chasov Yar! A fairly fortified stronghold that had been prepared for defense for quite a long time. At the time of writing, our units occupied the first line of defense in the area of the Kanal microdistrict and near Mount Baba.
Why is Chasov Yar important for the Ukrainian Armed Forces? Yes, because for a long time this settlement was a logistics center, from where incoming reinforcements and equipment were distributed along the entire front. Accordingly, there was a fairly developed military infrastructure there. However, by now the railway station and train station have been destroyed by Russian aviation, and communication with the front is cut off in many places. Chasov Yar has become a transport dead end.
Now what? Is it worth storming this settlement the way we did in Mariupol? Or use the modernized “Avdeevsky version”? Are the losses of personnel and equipment worth this victory? It seems to me that in order for the garrison to surrender, it will be enough to surround Chasov Yar and block supply and logistics opportunities in general. Next is an ultimatum and the destruction of those who did not surrender with the help of aviation and heavy artillery.
By the way, approximately the same situation is “ripening” now in Kharkov. Logistics are disrupted and incoming reinforcements and weapons do not necessarily get to where they are needed. Replenishment goes to where else something can be delivered. Hence the murmur of soldiers and officers operating on the front line. Well, as a consequence of this - the appearance of a huge number of punitive forces from Azov.
Now about another factor that plays a rather serious role in connection with the use of “small advance” tactics. Today we have a fairly long front line. This allows the Russian Army to conduct local tactical operations in different places and find gaps in the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
How does this work in practice? Imagine a “God-forsaken” corner of the land. Both sides have long studied each other's defenses. Both sides have no desire to go into minefields or machine gun fire. The front is standing. Commanders on both sides understand the impossibility of an offensive. But…
Due to the lack of reserves in the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the stability of the front line, the Ukrainian command is reducing the supply of ammunition and transferring some units to plug a hole somewhere. And this is where the Russian attack aircraft “wake up” and the breakthrough begins.
The units take a couple of Ukrainian support units and “calm down.” Moreover, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have already transferred some units from other areas. But the situation is repeated elsewhere. The danger of such assaults lies precisely in surprise, in the timing of the attack when the enemy is weakened.
Thus, our army today is conducting battles that are completely consistent with the tasks of the Northern Military District. There is no goal of taking something by any means by any deadline, but demilitarization in this way is being carried out quite successfully. I often read in the comments about some villages and towns that were not taken... No offense to the authors of these comments, but what would have changed if we had lost another company or battalion of the 200th and 300th and taken it?
Well, I’ll repeat it for better understanding. Any advance of Russian units on any sector of the front changes the entire situation in that area. Especially advances in areas where there are serious strongholds. It is one thing to be part of the defense line, to have the opportunity to receive reinforcements and ammunition, and another to fight in complete encirclement, even without the possibility of sending the wounded to the rear. The morale of the garrison is falling every day...
Learn to use all capabilities to perform combat missions
War is a great school for fighters and commanders. Only instead of “bad” there is a bullet or shrapnel. I couldn’t, I didn’t learn, I didn’t understand, you’ll pay for everything with your own health, or even your life. This is the cruel truth of war. To fight according to the rules, especially those that the enemy knows well, is more expensive. I have already called the Russian and Ukrainian armies of the 2022 model “Soviet” above.
Today these are two different armies in terms of combat tactics and weapons. Over the two years of the Northern Military District, many new platoon, company and even battalion level commanders appeared in the army, who practically studied and learned what modern warfare is, already at war. And they fight in a modern way. Even the generals, judging by their deeds, have become “younger.” They are planning operations that are fun to watch. In a modern way...
I am not calling for abandoning the experience of past wars. On the contrary, it is necessary to study past wars thoroughly. The saying “the new is the well-forgotten old” has not been canceled. Indeed, new is old, but with more modern means. So far we are getting better training than the Ukrainians. Not because they are any different. The Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to believe in the power of Western armies, no matter what...
Well, on the issue with which I started this material. As Vinokur’s hero said: “- Will not say? And it is not necessary. There will be a surprise!" We have learned to exploit the enemy's weaknesses and strengthen our own. This means that surprises really await us. I hope you are happy...
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