The main task of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is to ensure the protection of the sovereignty, integrity and immunity of the territory of the country, in wartime - a reflection of the aggression and the defense of the Fatherland. Therefore, defense reform should be aimed at strengthening the Russian army.
However, in general, serious mistakes were made during the reform. The reformers were probably guided by mercenary goals and interests — to free up more army property and rather sell it at discounted prices.
Many of the activities carried out were unnecessary, contrived, costly and without proper scientific justification, which ultimately led to the weakening of the Armed Forces. Despite the increased danger of war in a number of areas for the Russian Federation, the army’s number was unjustifiably reduced to one million people, a number of districts were eliminated (only four remained), as well as all divisions and regiments.
District and brigade redistribution
The biggest mistake was the elimination of a number of districts. Such a blunder was made by the Minister of War Dmitry Milyutin during the reform of the defense department in the second half of the XIX century, during which they limited themselves to the creation of only four districts. The Russian-Japanese and World War I demanded the creation of 11 military districts, including the Moscow, Orenburg, West Siberian, East Siberian and others. All the army corps he had eliminated were restored, the General Staff was subordinated directly to the Tsar. During the Great Patriotic War, the districts worked on the mobilization, deployment and preparation of reserves for the current army, provided the call and sending 29 million people to the Armed Forces (of course, now there are no such resources). It is difficult to imagine how four districts in the vast territory of our country will be able to accomplish the tasks of mobilizing and preparing reserves.
Former chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov said that our military districts were on alert and mobilized from several months to a year or more. This was not true. District troops carried out operational and mobilization deployment in one to two weeks. They spent all their war years mobilizing and training resources for the army. You can not mix these concepts.
The liquidation of divisions and regiments in the Ground Forces, their replacement by brigades, and in the Air Force by bases (in imitation of foreign armies) led to a decrease in the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces and significantly impeded command and control. Brigades have fewer personnel and weapons (tanksthan guns, mortars, mortars, air defense, reconnaissance) than the divisions, they do not have rear units for supplying soldiers and officers, providing fuel and lubricants, ammunition, and repairing military equipment. What kind of increase in combat power can be stated if this tactical formation is capable of conducting combat operations at the front of 5-10 kilometers (all existing brigades are 500-1000 kilometers along the front), and the length of our borders is many thousands of kilometers. They will not even be able to cover the state border in the most important areas.
By eliminating the divisions, the former secretary of defense and his advisers did not seem to know that there were 16 divisions in the American army, each with 18 thousands. Now they are being reorganized into light divisions of non-permanent composition and will consist of several brigades and support units.
In addition, the US National Guard, one of the main strategic reserves, has 10 divisions. The American command believes that the divisions will be able to ensure the management of brigades during their combat operations. The presence of divisions, like the armored cavalry regiments, preserves the existing traditions of formations and units and the prestige of the army. And we have renowned divisions, such as, for example, Kantemirovskaya, famous military academies are being liquidated.
We need to return to the divisions. We must not forget that in the years of the Great Patriotic War, about 500 rifle divisions were formed. It was not necessary to refuse all divisions of the reduced structure. They formed the basis for mobilization deployment. In the division you can have three or four brigades, including one reduced staff for the training of reservists and the formation of new formations and units.
Laying mobilization work on four districts will not solve the problem of mobilization. The main activity in this direction was carried out by commanders and staffs of small units and units and military commissariats (the commissioner should be a military man, not a disenfranchised civilian official).
Management miscalculations
The transition to the proclaimed three-unit system of command and control and the liquidation of armies, corps and divisions currently do not provide reliable command and control of troops. The commanders (commanders) and their headquarters with the existing means of communication will not be able to organize the interaction of a large number of brigades in certain areas. Automated systems and the network-centric method of control are still far from perfect and real implementation in the troops. The transition to a three-tier system can not provide reliable command and control of troops. In order not to lose the brigade in combat conditions, it is necessary to restore the former four-link system, primarily in the Far East.
The role of the Air Force in modern conditions has increased, they have become the main mobile and striking means of warfare and the use of high-precision weapons... Liquidation aviation divisions and regiments and the creation of eight air bases led to a weakening of the air force, the vulnerability of their basing.
The equipment of the Russian army with modern weapons, especially high-precision weapons, should be accelerated, at present there are about five percent of the required quantity. It is planned to bring it to 2015 percent in 30 and 2020 percent in 70 year. Plans must be fulfilled. But allocations for this are not enough - for 10 22 trillion years (two trillion per year).
Former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov estimated the scale of illegal financial transactions in 2011 in the year at two trillion rubles, of which about half came from the illegal withdrawal of funds abroad. It is necessary to cover the loophole for the withdrawal of foreign currency, as well as the plundering of finances in the Ministry of Defense and the military-industrial complex, and increase allocations to accelerate the equipping of the army with modern weapons.
You can not only rely on nuclear weapons. Its use is very problematic and can lead the enemy to preemptive or retaliatory strike, which will cause unacceptable damage and destroy the state and our people.
To wage a regional and large-scale war, it is necessary to have an Armed Forces equipped not only with nuclear weapons, but also with powerful conventional means of destruction.
Calculations for military reform should be clarified.
The statement of the former Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov in the State Duma that 25 billion rubles saved by him was enough for it to take place was irresponsible and showed his incompetence and inconsistency with his position. But none of the deputies even corrected the minister.
As it is known, more than 300 billion rubles have already been spent on providing the dismissed officers with apartments, and, up to now, servicemen, who have been behind the staff for many years, receive money.
The creation of an outsourcing system has worsened the logistics of the troops. Units and units outside locations and in combat will be left without food, fuel, ammunition and repair equipment, will suffer heavy losses in battles and will face the fate of our mechanized corps liquidated in July 1941. Serdyukov created this system in order to dismiss the administrative functions of the minister, to create an atmosphere of irresponsibility and conditions for the plundering of public funds.
Foreign experience of the backup component
In future wars, strategic reserves will continue to play an important role. Therefore, along with the groupings of troops in the theater of operations, it is necessary to prepare and have strategic reserves to strengthen them. They must be mobile, equipped with percussion means capable of defeating the enemy and changing the course of warfare.
The military-political leadership of the United States and NATO countries are paying particular attention to the creation and preparation of strategic reserves.
In local wars, the United States, along with the regular army, made extensive use of reserve components. So, in the war with Iraq in 1991, 200 thousands of reservists were called in and airplanes of the military transport aviation transferred 35 thousands of American soldiers to the war zone. The formations and units of the National Guard took part in all the wars waged by the USA. They accounted for up to 40 percent of the personnel of US troops stationed in Iraq, and up to one-third in Afghanistan.
Similar backup components are available in the UK, Germany, Italy and other countries.
In the People's Republic of China, the construction of the armed forces is carried out in accordance with the concept of "popular war" and the new strategy of active defense of the front lines. China’s policy is aimed at ensuring the implementation of a national development strategy, the goal of which is to achieve the status of a great power dominant in the Asia-Pacific region by the middle of the twenty-first century.
The Chinese Armed Forces consist of regular formations and units - 2,35 million, a reserve - about 500 – 600 thousand and the people's armed police - 1,5 million people. In China, there are up to 20 millions of trained reservists.
Preparation of strategic reserves should be one of the important functions and military leadership of the Russian Federation.
Personnel training
In the Soviet Armed Forces, a well-structured military education system has developed that has stood the test of time: special schools, Suvorov (Nakhimov) schools, secondary and higher military schools, academies (2 – 3-year) and various courses of types and branches of troops. And finally, the General Staff Academy.
In this system they prepared quite good officers. Of course, not all of them had a sufficient general education and knew one or two foreign languages, but they were trained military professionals. Should not break this proven scheme. It was necessary to carefully calculate the present and future need for officer personnel and, on the basis of these calculations, reduce redundant educational institutions, and combine some. And of course, it is unacceptable to trust the reform of this educational system to random officials who had no relation to this kind of activity before. What a positive result could have been expected from the work of the head of the Department (essentially the head department) of the military education of Ekaterina Priezzhevoy, who previously worked in the tax service.
It is required to restore the old system of selection of personnel, appointments and assignments of military ranks. The main personnel department should be engaged in the selection of senior officers (generals, as well as colonels), and not the designation of contract soldiers and unit commanders.
Soviet example
Statements by the former leaders of the Ministry of Defense about the increase in the intensity of combat training of troops and the conduct of large-scale exercises cannot be considered serious.
I happened to take part in many exercises in the postwar years. Thus, the maneuvers conducted on the territory of the Carpathian Military District under the leadership of the commander of the district Marshal of the Soviet Union, Ivan Stepanovich Konev, involved the troops of two combined-arms and one mechanized armies, the district air army, the long-range air defense army, the air defense army, the missile army and the air defense forces. landing troops. Artillery training (with the participation of 600 guns and mortars) was actually conducted at these exercises at the Lviv training center (Yavoriv training ground). To complete the breakthrough of the main line and the capture of the second line of defense, a mechanized division was introduced, which included 250 tanks. After conditional striking of atomic strikes to capture the army strip and the development of an offensive in the operational depth, a mechanized army was brought into battle and an airborne division was deployed in full force.
The training "Dnepr", held in 1967 year under the leadership of the Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko, was attended by troops of two military districts - Belarusian and Prikarpatsky. They made a nomination for 500 – 600 kilometers, on the move attacked, forced the Dnieper, occupied the defense, put on counterstrikes. Helicopter assault and the landing of the airborne division were carried out.
At one of the exercises in Siberia, three motorized rifle regiments marched under their own power over a distance of more than 1000 kilometers in three days.
Now one or two brigades perform a maneuver at the exercises. One company is being transferred from the central part of the country by plane. Events are often ostentatious. In such exercises, the troops do not increase field training, and commanders, commanders and staffs do not receive good practice in troop control.
The role of professionals
Transformations should help strengthen the combat and mobilization training of the army. The lack of success in this activity is largely due to the fact that the reform was carried out by unprepared militaries, nonprofessionals who do not understand the essence of what is happening and are not responsible for failures, for the state of the Armed Forces and the defense of the state. It is unacceptable for the Minister of Defense to have dozens of advisers, incompetent deputies and assistants, to appoint women acquaintances as heads of departments. This contributed to the creation of conditions for the commission of official abuses, which are currently being investigated by the relevant authorities.
The current situation with the implementation of the military reform extremely negatively affected the mood of the personnel, especially officers, reduced the prestige of service among the citizens of our country. In this regard, the positive assessment of Serdyukov’s work in the post of defense minister, given by some leaders, and the call for respecting the principle of presumption of innocence regarding him are not entirely clear.
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu quickly figured out and made decisions to correct a number of mistakes made during the reform, so this article does not need to touch them.
Military reform should be amended. It is advisable to entrust a commission consisting of military leaders, war veterans and scientists, to develop appropriate proposals and submit them to the Minister of Defense.