The military operation in Ukraine takes on the features of the Iran-Iraq war
The military operation in Ukraine is usually compared to the First World War, due to the positional deadlock at the front, but it also has many similarities with the Iran-Iraq conflict. And there is a threat that the conflict in Ukraine will eventually escalate into just such a confrontation, which lasts for many years.
The Iran-Iraq armed conflict of 1980–1988 was one of the largest conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century in terms of duration (it lasted eight years), resources involved and human casualties. The war between the states began for a number of reasons and represented another chapter in the traditional Arab-Persian confrontation, which lasted for centuries.
This conflict had a certain similarity with the First World War - Iraq, which launched an offensive, lost the initiative after a few weeks of fighting, and the military conflict acquired a positional character, developing in waves: the opponents over and over again tried to seize the initiative from each other and alternated offensive with defensive actions.
In the material "Truce in Ukraine or direct clash with NATO: what to expect for Russia in 2024", the author has already noted that the Northern Military District may acquire the format of the Iran-Iraq war under a certain set of circumstances. Namely, if the US Democratic Party remains in power after the US elections in 2024.
Now we will look at the Iran-Iraq confrontation in more detail and try to answer the question: will the Northern Military District finally transform into the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–1988, or can this scenario still be avoided?
Iran-Iraq war: political background of the conflict
In the second half of the 1th century, before the start of the war, relations between Iran and Iraq underwent significant transformations: from participation in one military bloc (Baghdad Pact) to mutual military threats and advances to the borders of troops. Iran and Iraq had very serious differences: a territorial dispute, religious differences, the Kurdish problem, the issue of infringement of the Shiites in the south of Iraq, etc. However, things did not come to any serious armed clashes [XNUMX].
The situation worsened after Islamic radicals came to power in Iran and proclaimed a policy of “exporting the Islamic revolution” to the countries of the Middle East. The spiritual leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, accusing the monarchical regimes of the Gulf countries of departing from Islamic norms and traditions, most fiercely criticized the ruling secular Baath party in Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein [2].
Tehran criticized Baghdad for infringing on the rights of Iraq's Shiite majority, citing both religious evidence and the mistakes of the Baathist leadership. Moreover, Tehran raised the question of the need to expand Shiite representation, thereby questioning the competence of the Baathist leadership itself. In response to ideological pressure, Saddam Hussein decided to begin military operations against Iran.
Among the goals pursued by Iraq in the war are the following: leadership in the Persian Gulf region, as well as establishing control over the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, where the Arab population predominated. In addition, Iraq sought to revise in its favor the agreements that defined the borders between the two countries [1].
For its part, Iran pursued the goal of destroying the regime of Saddam Hussein, exporting the Islamic revolution to Iraq, where the Shiite population predominated, and in the future creating a belt of states with Shiite leadership: Iraq - Syria - Lebanon. In addition, war and the use of the “military danger” factor would help suppress internal opposition, achieve national consensus and consolidation around Khomeini [1].
On September 17, 1980, S. Hussein unilaterally denounced the Algiers Agreements, concluded in 1975 on unfavorable terms for Iraq, enshrining the principle of dividing the Shatt al-Arab River along the thalweg line, and five days later Iraqi troops invaded Iran. According to Hussein's plans, the upcoming military campaign was supposed to last several weeks and end with a brilliant victory for Iraq. His confidence was shared by other Gulf Arab countries. However, the reality turned out to be completely different.
A war with no winners
By the beginning of the war, Iraq had an overwhelming superiority in ground forces and aviation. About 140 thousand soldiers were concentrated in the border zone with Iran, 1 tanks, 1 guns and mortars, 700 combat aircraft. From Iran they were opposed by a group of troops of about 350 thousand people, armed with 70 tanks, 620 guns and mortars, and 710 combat aircraft. Thus, the Iraqi armed forces had a 150-fold superiority in personnel and tanks, and a 2-fold superiority in aircraft; and for artillery and mortars – 2,3 [2,4].
The fighting began with massive attacks by Iraqi aircraft on the military-economic and administrative centers of Iran, as well as on its airfields, ports and naval bases. By the end of the first day of the war, the Iraqi side managed to penetrate up to 20 km into enemy territory, and in 10 days the Iranian troops were driven back 40 km [3].
However, Iraqi forces were only able to maintain the initiative during the first six weeks of the war. During this period, part of the Khuzestan province with its rich oil fields was captured, but the predominant Arab population of this province, contrary to expectations, did not side with the Iraqi army [2].
By the end of November 1980, the Iraqi offensive had ceased. From this period until the fall of 1981, the war was of a positional nature. Neither side managed to seize the initiative for a long time. Only at the beginning of September 1981, Iranian troops went on the offensive and returned part of the occupied territory. Moreover, during this offensive the Iranians suffered heavy losses.
Thus, the Iraqi leadership, having lost the strategic initiative, was unable to carry out the planned blitzkrieg and solve the assigned tasks, defeating the enemy forces in a short period. In this regard, Baghdad made an attempt to persuade Tehran to negotiate peace, the proposal to begin which, however, was rejected by the Iranian leadership.
As it became obvious that the blitzkrieg plan had failed, the attitude of the Arab countries to the war also changed. By November 1980, Saddam Hussein found that the Arab states of which he claimed leadership were divided into three categories: solid allies who fully supported Iraq's efforts; supporters who could help him more actively; and renegades who sided with Iran. Moreover, only Jordan could be classified in the first category [2].
The second period of the war, from July 1982 to February 1984, saw Iran's offensive efforts. Since the end of 1982, both sides switched to the tactic of gradually “biting into” the enemy’s defenses. Without much success. As a result, the war reached a positional deadlock and increasingly took on the character of a “war of attrition.”
The forces of the fleets of Iran and Iraq did not show much activity until 1984; their actions were limited to rare attacks on naval bases and ports, and half-hearted attempts to blockade the coast of their enemy [3]. In the period from March 1984 to August 1988, positional battles were combined with combat operations at sea, which were called “tanker war” in foreign and domestic historiography, as well as with missile and air strikes on cities.
The superpowers - the USSR and the USA - took a rather dual position, changing it as the conflict progressed. Thus, at first the USSR pursued a policy of neutrality (1980–1982), and then openly supported Iraq (from 1982 to 1987) [4]. Considering that Iraq was a traditional ally of the Soviet Union and that at the time of the outbreak of hostilities (September 22, 1980), the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was in force, this is not surprising. But at the final stage of the conflict (1988), relations between the USSR and Iraq cooled, and the Soviet Union supported Iran’s initiatives and expanded economic cooperation with it.
As for the United States, at the beginning of the conflict, the Americans, like the USSR, took a wait-and-see attitude. However, as soon as the initiative in the war began to pass to Iran, since 1982 the United States began to pursue an openly pro-Iraqi policy. In addition to military supplies, Washington provided Iraq with intelligence information and also provided Baghdad with a $2 billion loan.
However, such US support for Iraq did not mean that the Americans wanted Saddam Hussein to win. For Washington, a quick victory for any of these large Gulf states seemed unfavorable; a prolonged confrontation in the region, firstly, would weaken both regional “centers of power”, and secondly, would provide an opportunity to strengthen their military presence under the pretext of stabilizing the situation in the Gulf basin [2]. For these reasons, the exhaustion of the warring parties fit well into US plans.
This position of Washington is confirmed by the fact of the secret sale weapons Iran. The purpose of these shipments was to ultimately resolve the fate of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon and restore diplomatic relations with Iran.[1]
On August 20, 1988, Iran-Iraq negotiations to conclude a peace agreement began. The war between Iraq and Iran has ended. This military conflict did not reveal a winner, since none of the problems that poisoned relations between the two states were resolved, and both conflicting parties were unable to achieve their goals.
Having decided to start hostilities, Saddam Hussein made at least two mistakes that subsequently determined the lengthy nature of the conflict.
First, he believed that the Iranian army, weakened by the purges, would be unable to effectively resist the Iraqi invasion.
Secondly, the President of Iraq really counted on the fact that the Arab population of Khuzestan would oppose the central government. However, these calculations turned out to be incorrect. Iran's hopes for help from the Iraqi Shiites also turned out to be groundless.
The consequences of the war were catastrophic for both countries. It led to the death of more than a million people, to the destruction of the infrastructure of both countries - according to experts, the damage caused by the war was estimated at $188 billion for Iraq and $369 billion for Iran.
The Iran-Iraq War and the Northeast Military District: similarities between the two conflicts
The military operation in Ukraine is increasingly taking on the features of the Iran-Iraq war, since it has been going on for almost two years, and its completion is not yet visible on the horizon.
Russia failed to win a quick victory over the Ukrainian army, and now the military conflict, just like the Iran-Iraq war, is developing in waves: the offensive of the Russian troops gave way to the defense and offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which ended unsuccessfully. After which the Armed Forces of Ukraine again went on the defensive, and the Russian Armed Forces are trying to conduct offensive actions (successes at best are of a tactical nature, without having any operational-strategic significance).
At the same time, Ukraine, despite the stalemate, has so far refused to negotiate on status quo terms, apparently counting on continued support from the United States and its allies. The West is generally on the side of Ukraine, but there is no longer unity on this issue, and the longer the conflict continues, the more doubts politicians in European countries have.
There is also no unity in the United States itself, where a significant portion of Republicans doubt the advisability of continuing financial and military assistance to Kyiv and are blocking an emergency aid package for Ukraine worth tens of billions of dollars, linking its adoption with a consensus on changes in US immigration and border policy.
Nevertheless, the current American administration and the US Democratic Party insist on continued support for Ukraine. They expect that the military conflict will continue for a long time. This is, for example, stated in the material of The New York Times “The US and Ukraine are looking for a new strategy after a failed counteroffensive” (US and Ukraine Search for a New Strategy After Failed Counteroffensive).
“The American and Ukrainian militaries are looking for a new strategy, which they can begin implementing early next year...
The Americans are pushing for a conservative strategy aimed at holding territory, defending and building up reserves and forces through 2024. The United States believes that this strategy will increase Ukraine's self-sufficiency."
The Americans are pushing for a conservative strategy aimed at holding territory, defending and building up reserves and forces through 2024. The United States believes that this strategy will increase Ukraine's self-sufficiency."
- writes the edition.
In addition, as the NYT notes, American officials say that “Ukraine will have to fight on a tighter budget.”
Many Ukrainian leaders do not realize how precarious continued U.S. funding for the war is, U.S. officials said. They say Ukrainian generals and senior civilian officials have unrealistic expectations of what the United States will supply. For example, they are asking for millions of artillery shells from Western stocks that do not exist.”
Thus, American democrats, realizing that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will not be able to defeat the Russian Army, are in favor of continuing the war of attrition and transforming the military conflict in Ukraine into the format of the Iran-Iraq war.
In connection with this, the question arises: is the final transformation of the Northern Military District into something similar to the Iran-Iraq war highly probable or even inevitable?
There is no clear answer to this question, since much, oddly enough, depends, among other things, on the political dynamics within the United States itself (the confrontation between Republicans and Democrats), as well as the position of EU countries. Ukraine is completely dependent on Western (primarily American) military and financial assistance, and its current political leadership, relying on this assistance, completely inadequately assesses the situation and has so far refused to negotiate.
And Russia, in turn, demonstrated its inability to win a convincing victory on the battlefield and fell into the trap of a positional stalemate. Therefore, the situation directly on the battlefield influences the overall strategic situation less and less significantly.
Использованная литература: [1]. Belousova K. A. The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and US policy in Iraq // Bulletin of the Ryazan State University named after. Yesenina, 2005.
[2]. Abalyan A. I. Iran-Iraq armed conflict 1980–1988. and its influence on the system of international relations in the Middle East.
[3]. Dotsenko V.D. Fleets in local conflicts of the second half of the 2001th century. – M.: ACT; St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, XNUMX.
[4]. Mirny D.S. Intervention of the USSR and the USA in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988.
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