Ukraine goes on the defensive: consequences, risks, opportunities
It seems that the Ukrainian counter-offensive, which began on June 4, 2023, is coming to an end, at least Ukrainian President Zelensky announced the construction of a layered defense line, which has already been nicknamed the “Zelensky Line”, by analogy with the Russian “Surovikin Line”.
According to data from open sources, during the failed counter-offensive, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) lost over 90 thousand people killed and wounded, about 1,9 thousand units of equipment, including over 550 tanks.
Presumably, at the moment, the creation of defensive positions, including several fortified defense lines and minefields, will become a priority task for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A change in tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: from offensive to defensive, will lead to certain consequences, create new risks for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces), but at the same time provide new opportunities.
Aftermath
It is necessary to understand that any transition to defense for the Armed Forces of Ukraine is temporary, since Western countries are endlessly investing in the swamp called “Ukraine”
they won’t, but they may well give the Ukrainian Armed Forces another chance for a “counter-offensive”. From the moment the Ukrainian Armed Forces decide to switch to strategic defense, the nature of combat operations will change significantly.
First of all, the “meat assaults” that irritate Ukrainian society, as well as the stupid sending “for slaughter” Western armored vehicles, whose public death under the attacks of Russian FPV drones irritates Western countries and their defense concerns. The surviving armored vehicles and the most trained units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be withdrawn to the rear, where they will be used to prepare a new strike force to break into Russian defensive positions.
Armored vehicles supplied by Western countries and destroyed on the territory of Ukraine. Photo by the Russian Ministry of Defense
The emphasis in the weapons used by the parties will shift even more to artillery, missile systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and mine explosives. It can be assumed that, along with the construction of ground defensive positions on the line of combat contact (LCC) and further into the depths of Ukrainian territory, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will strengthen their air defense systems against Russian air attack weapons.
For Ukraine, the ability to minimize the effectiveness of Russian air strikes is vital because they need to:
– guarantee the survival of the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, especially in winter;
– ensure the operation of enterprises of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex (DIC);
– increase the likelihood of survival of the remnants of the Ukrainian aviation at airfields located deep in the territory of Ukraine, as well as those aircraft that can be supplied by the Armed Forces of Western countries;
– reduce losses of fuel and ammunition at storage depots, as well as equipment and manpower located in the rear;
– reduce the impact of Russian high-explosive aerial bombs (FAB), equipped with unified planning and correction modules (UMPC), on the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the LBS area, and prevent their use deep in the territory of Ukraine.
FAB with UMPC have become a huge problem for the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Without the implementation of the above measures, the transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the defensive will not give the desired effect - it will not be possible to form a strike fist for a new counter-offensive, since the Ukrainian army will melt under the methodical, gradually increasing attacks of the Aerospace Forces (VKS) of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, one should not expect that after the transition to strategic defense, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will abandon offensive operations. Most likely, only the nature of offensive actions will change, and these changes may carry certain risks for the RF Armed Forces.
Risks
It can be assumed that after the transition to strategic defense, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will concentrate their efforts on causing maximum damage to the Russian Armed Forces, as well as the infrastructure of our country, while the priority goal will be the image component - in the absence of success in seizing territories, it is necessary to show what “terrible” blows are being delivered to Russia. Nevertheless, these strikes can indeed carry significant risks for Russia in general and the Russian Armed Forces in particular.
At the LBS of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, high-precision artillery shells of the Excalibur type, high-precision missiles of the HIMARS complex, including ATACMS operational-tactical missiles, as well as various tactical-class UAVs, will be used as a priority.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces will receive coordinates of targets from NATO countries, as well as from a sympathetic intelligence network in the territory controlled by the Russian Federation BC. The high-risk zone will include any concentrations of people and equipment, ammunition and fuel depots, command posts, hospitals and any other objects worthy of precision-guided munitions.
Attacks on infrastructure located in the interior of the country will intensify, primarily on bridges, including the Crimean Bridge, railways, power plants and power lines, and fuel storage facilities. Attacks on Black Sea ships will continue and intensify fleet VFM of the Russian Federation located in naval bases (NVB), as well as on airplanes and helicopters at airfields. The number of strikes against critical industrial enterprises, including defense industry enterprises, will increase.
The targets will be the objects that are most complex and expensive to restore - strategic aircraft, carriers of the Kinzhal complex missiles, the most modern surface ships and submarines of the Russian Navy. It must be taken into account that objects located in the deep rear, right up to the Far East, may be subject to attack (we will not talk about methods of carrying out such attacks, however, our enemy is by no means stupid). We cannot exclude the possibility of striking particularly dangerous objects - nuclear power plants, hydroelectric power plants, and chemical industry enterprises.
Russian Air Force aircraft are under threat of attacks from Ukraine
Those already supplied by Western countries will be used to carry out strikes. cruise missiles (CM) of the Storm Shadow / Scalp-EG type, and later, possibly, American JASSM-ER cruise missiles with a flight range of up to 1 kilometers. The number of strikes carried out using kamikaze UAVs and unmanned kamikaze boats (BEC) will increase, some of which will be assembled on the territory of Ukraine.
The activities of Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRG) and terrorist cells are intensifying. The main threat will be complex strikes using several types of weapons simultaneously.
Taking into account the above, it is necessary to carry out intensive measures to increase the security of all high-risk objects, including by installation of booms for coastal infrastructure, surface ships and submarines stationed in the naval base, construction of shelters for aviation equipment - prefabricated hangars and reinforced concrete caponiers, widespread use of highly detailed decoy targets.
It is necessary to take measures to increase the level of security of Russian infrastructure
A little over a year ago, in September 2022, the author considered the possibility of destroying transport structures across the Dnieper, which would potentially make it possible to denazify the entire left bank of Ukraine by the end of 2022. However, only the lazy did not talk about the need to destroy bridges across the Dnieper at that time, but for some reason this was not done.
Now the construction of echeloned defensive positions by the Armed Forces of Ukraine will significantly complicate the offensive of the Russian Armed Forces even in the event of the destruction of transport structures across the Dnieper, however, this decision will significantly reduce the number of long-range precision-guided ammunition (and any ammunition) falling on the left bank of the Dnieper, and will push the border of their launch deeper into the territory of Ukraine , which will devalue the possibility of them hitting targets deep in Russian territory (the range will not be enough).
At the same time, it is necessary to take into account that the transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to defense will provide the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with certain opportunities.
Capabilities
Of course, you can count on the fact that the Russian Armed Forces themselves will create a mighty strike fist and, having broken through the defensive positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, will rush into the breakthrough - into the operational space, surrounding huge groups of enemy troops and forcing them to surrender.
Yes, even if they wanted to, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will not be able to create a defense comparable to what the Russian Armed Forces can organize, at least they don’t have remote mining systems of the "Agriculture" type, absent combat helicopters capable of effectively destroying armored vehicles rushing into a breakthrough, however, this will largely be compensated by comprehensive information support from Western countries - satellite intelligence data, the results of the work of NATO analytical centers.
It can be assumed that a breakthrough of the Ukrainian defense line in any case will be associated with significant losses, and without achieving strategic air superiority deep breakthroughs risk ending in a hasty retreat and transition to the defensive.
At the same time Ukraine is now a testing ground where it is possible not only to test the latest weapons and tactical methods of combat, but also the opportunity to test the concept of inflicting strategic defeat on the enemy without directly seizing its territory by ground forces.
As we said above, using the positional impasse, Ukraine will try to inflict as much damage on Russia as possible, destroying the most difficult facilities to restore. Number of precision strikes weapons long-range (VTO DB) will only increase - it is already increasing, judging by information coming from open sources.
In turn, Russia can also increase the number of high-tech weapons strikes, but it is necessary to solve two problems:
– maximum increase production volumes of long-range precision weapons, and do it faster than Ukraine can or Western countries are ready to deliver;
- ensure systematic application of the WTO database, with a single goal, according to a single plan, with a clear understanding of what results we want to achieve.
А We must achieve a comprehensive weakening of Ukraine or even its complete degradation as a state, for which you need:
– maximum disrupt the operation of power supply systems, railway transport, television and radio broadcasting;
– the existence of a modern state without electricity is practically impossible, if the main power plants are covered by air defense and electronic warfare means, then it is necessary to destroy secondary infrastructure facilities, achieving a cumulative effect.
Ukrainian power supply and railway systems should become one of the highest priority goals - and this time the issue must be resolved finally
- Disrupt the Internet – without an Internet connection, not only will document flow significantly slow down, and, as a result, the work of the entire bureaucratic apparatus of the state and commercial structures, but it will also become impossible to carry out non-cash payments;
- Ensure the destruction of major financial institutions and cash vaults, which, in combination with the previous point, will return Ukraine to barter payments;
- if possible ensure the destruction of the political and military leadership of Ukraine - let those who survive, or their successors, rule from bunkers or from abroad - without communication it will not be easy to do this;
- ensure the destruction of such rear military infrastructure facilities as military registration and enlistment offices, recruitment centers and passport offices, which will sow chaos and significantly weaken the effectiveness of mobilization measures.
Conclusions
You can advance through the territory of Ukraine for years, destroying enemy soldiers and losing your own fighters, turning city after city, village after village into piles of ruins. You can bomb factories that supply the enemy’s armed forces with equipment and weapons for months, until they turn into ruins.
The question is, is it necessary?
It is possible that the positional impasse in Ukraine is a good reason to rethink the very concept of warfare, to work not on liberating territories, but on “enforcing peace” by striking at pain points critical to the existence of the state.
Without centralized power supply, Internet communications, railway transportation, with the country's leadership hiding in bunkers or abroad, with a destroyed financial system and chaos in the system of registration and recruitment of citizens, it will be extremely difficult to ensure the effective functioning of a modern state. Even if the collapse of Ukraine does not take place, then there will be no talk of any victory over the Russian Armed Forces and a return to the 1991 borders - only unconditional surrender.
Victory in the format of “peace enforcement” will become not only an example, but also a warning for other countries that have a desire to test Russia’s strength.
Information