Submarines of the Black Sea Fleet could bury the grain deal forever
Project 636 diesel-electric submarine. Image aoosk.ru
“Ukraine has agreed with its partners to receive warships to ensure the safety of ships in the grain corridor in the Black Sea. According to President Zelensky, obtaining ships for convoying merchant ships is a matter of the near future.”
"Ukrainian Truth".Grain in exchange for weapons
The grain deal between Russia and Ukraine, concluded with the participation of Turkey and the UN, has become one of the most controversial decisions taken by the leadership of our country.
You can talk as long as you like about the hungry countries of Africa (which still won’t receive this grain), but this will not change the essence: in fact, Russia allowed Ukraine to sell grain and pay for the supply of weapons with the money received for it, which are then used to kill our fellow citizens, and These weapons were most likely delivered by the same ships that later exported new shipments of grain.
After the Ukrainian attack on the Crimean Bridge, Russia withdrew from the grain deal and even took a number of measures to suppress the circulation of grain from the ports of Ukraine, however, at the moment, grain supplies continue, albeit in smaller volumes, as well as supplies weapons. Apparently, the attacks carried out by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) on Ukrainian ports do not bring the desired result, that is, they cannot stop the work of the port infrastructure. It can be assumed that the actions of the RF Armed Forces as a whole and the Black Sea fleet (Black Sea Fleet) of the Russian Navy in particular are complicated by a number of factors.
Firstly, the air defense systems available to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) do not allow the Russian aviation approach a distance allowing it to be used against port facilities in Odessa and on the Danube powerful high-explosive bombs FAB-500 and FAB-1500 with unified planning and correction modules (UMPC). At the same time, the RF Armed Forces have a limited number of cruise missiles (CR) and operational-tactical missiles (OTR) that can be spent on these purposes, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - kamikazes of the "Geran-2" type do not cause serious damage to the enemy from -for a relatively small warhead (according to open data, about 50 kilograms),
The attacks on Ukrainian port facilities in Odessa and the Dnieper have not yet led to a complete stop in the transportation of grain and weapons
Secondly, the presence of anti-ship missiles (ASM) and unmanned boats (BEC) - kamikazes in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, apparently forces the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy to keep surface ships away from the coastline of Ukraine, in turn, transport ships follow as close as possible to the coast of Ukraine and NATO countries (Romania).
In addition, it can be assumed that the actions of the RF Armed Forces in relation to ships transporting grain, as well as, presumably, weapons for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, are limited for political reasons.
Judging by the latest information from open sources, President of Ukraine Zelensky expects to receive from Western countries some warships to escort transport ships with grain and weapons, which could further complicate the life of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy, of course, if these revelations are not a consequence of the abuse of prohibited substances.
There are two ways to completely close a grain deal.
The first is to destroy the entire port infrastructure of Ukraine to such an extent that it will be impossible to use it for many years to come - there are ways to do this, however, so far they have not been used by the RF Armed Forces.
The second is to create such a serious threat to transport ships transporting Ukrainian grain that the issue of transportation by sea will be completely closed. Potentially, to solve this problem, the submarine forces of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy, that is, diesel-electric submarines (diesel-electric submarines) of Project 636.3, could be involved.
We will talk about the second method in more detail.
Benefits of Stealth
Based on open data, the underwater component of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy participates in the SVO to a minimal extent - in fact, only in a few launches of the Kalibr-PL complex. This is largely due to the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not have surface ships and submarines that would go out to the open sea so that they could be sunk by anti-ship missiles or torpedoes.
The breakdown of the grain deal allows us to consider the possibility of using Project 636.3 diesel-electric submarines from the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy to destroy transport ships heading to Ukrainian ports.
Currently, diesel-electric submarines of Project 636.3 are the most modern submarines in service with the Black Sea Fleet, although the only diesel-electric submarine "Alrosa" of Project 877B "Halibut" in service could potentially join them. Project 636.3 and 877V Halibut diesel-electric submarines can sink enemy transports in three ways: by anti-ship missiles from the Kalibr-PL complex, by 533 mm torpedoes, and also by laying minefields.
The use of anti-ship missiles from diesel-electric submarines does not make any sense - it is easier to do this from surface ships or from aircraft.
The issue with torpedoes is more complicated.
On the one hand, it would be nice for the Russian Navy to train submarine crews and test torpedo weapons on real targets.
On the other hand, if we are talking about the fact that the destruction of transport ships providing the delivery of grain and weapons is hampered by political factors, then the presence of Russian submarines at the time of their explosion may be undesirable.
Based on the above, it would be advisable to use torpedo weapons only if Western countries actually transfer any warships to Ukraine.
Thus, the only way to destroy transport ships is to lay minefields by submarines. Since the beginning of the NWO, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have placed a significant number of sea mines in the Black Sea, many of which have left their homes and set off on a journey, until they were discovered off the Turkish coast.
Potentially, diesel-electric submarines of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy can ensure the installation of mines as close as possible to the coastline in the territorial waters of Ukraine. If the depth allows large-capacity cargo ships to pass through, then diesel-electric submarines will most likely be able to operate there, especially since, unlike nuclear submarines, they are more suitable for operating in shallow waters.
The Turkish Ministry of Defense discovered a Ukrainian naval mine near Bulgaria
However, despite the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ lack of anti-submarine weapons, there are still certain risks of using diesel-electric submarines in Ukrainian territorial waters.
Threats and Risks
Firstly, the threat to our diesel-electric submarines is posed by sea mines, which the enemy has generously planted in the Black Sea. Most likely, most of them are primitive contact mines, however, where they are installed and at what depths is unknown.
In addition, it cannot be ruled out that, as part of military-technical assistance, Western countries supplied the Armed Forces of Ukraine with modern smart mines, which pose a significant threat to our submarines.
The ability to counter the mine threat largely depends on the characteristics of the diesel-electric submarine's hydroacoustic station (GAS), in particular the MG-519 "Arfa" mine-detecting sonar. In addition, a counterargument regarding the mine threat from the enemy is the passage of large transport ships into Ukrainian ports, which could collect mines for us, and then the problem of the grain deal would be resolved by itself.
Secondly, NATO countries could potentially organize tracking of Russian submarines near the coast of Ukraine. In particular, P-8 Poseidon anti-submarine aircraft periodically appear over the Black Sea, which can potentially deploy sonar buoys. It is also possible that Turkish diesel-electric submarines are located somewhere in the area where grain transport vehicles pass - they themselves are unlikely to attack surface ships and submarines of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy, but they may well transmit information to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, although, remembering the Russian front-line bomber shot down in Syria The Su-24M, and the fact that Turkey actually got away with it, nothing can be ruled out.
In turn, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, despite the lack of submarines, anti-submarine ships, airplanes and helicopters, have means that could potentially be used to destroy Russian diesel-electric submarines. We are talking about autonomous uninhabited underwater vehicles (AUVs) supplied to Ukraine by the UK, the USA and other Western countries. Despite the fact that the indicated AUVs are not initially intended for hunting submarines, they can be used both for laying sea mines and for directly attacking diesel-electric submarines using small-sized warheads installed on them.
British AUV REMUS 600
In general, the risks for Russian diesel-electric submarines arising from the deployment of sea mines intended to destroy transport heading to Ukrainian ports are most likely small.
The operating time of sonobuoys is limited; P-8 Poseidon aircraft that collect information from them can drive away aircraft of the Russian Air Force. Without a comprehensive deployment of anti-submarine forces, including surface ships, anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, even taking into account the possible appearance of Turkish submarines, it is unlikely that it will be possible to ensure a sufficiently high probability of detecting diesel-electric submarines of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. And without this information, Ukrainian submarines drones will be useless.
As for the threat of sea mines for Russian submarines, in the area of passage of transport ships heading to enemy ports, this threat is minimal.
Conclusions
The underwater component of the Russian Navy currently plays a minimal role in conducting military operations in Ukraine.
The use of diesel-electric submarines of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy for secretly laying minefields will make it possible to close the grain deal forever, eliminating the transportation of grain from Ukraine and weapons to Ukraine, at least by sea.
Depending on the political situation, Russia may admit its participation in the “active” closure of the grain deal, use the “Glomar answer” - “we can neither confirm nor deny...” or evade responsibility with a wording like “we warned that the region dangerous for shipping."
Of course, as part of a covert operation using diesel-electric submarines to finally close a grain deal, all possible risks must be taken into account and measures taken to neutralize them.
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