Will Ukraine be able to build its own “Surovikin Line”
Resources of Ukraine
“Surovikin Line” should definitely become the phrase of the year in Russia. The dedication of Russian soldiers, coupled with a layered line of defense, predetermined the failure of the offensive operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. By the fall, it became clear that the Ukrainian advance to the east had finally stopped. Mud and cold were added to the minefields, ditches and “dragon’s teeth”.
Everything would be fine in this situation if Russia began a rapid offensive to the west. At first glance, the disposition is obligatory - the Ukrainian Armed Forces have clearly worn down their best combat units, and now is the time for a counter-offensive. Strike before the enemy recovers from losses, which, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, are simply prohibitive.
But tank the wedges do not cut the enemy’s battle formations, which means Ukraine gets invaluable time to prepare its defense. At the end of November this resulted in official statements. Zelensky assembled a working group for the construction of fortifications. According to open data, the first line will be built by the army, the second and third by civilian contractors.
The Ukrainian military leadership will never admit this, but the Ukrainian Armed Forces will simply copy the “Surovikin line.” Simply because nothing better has yet been invented for this theater of military operations.
Will the enemy be able to build an equally impenetrable line of defense?
Russian fortification at the front is a very developed network of trenches and dugouts, pillboxes and bunkers, as well as many kilometers of minefields. In addition, in critically dangerous areas, the defense lines are duplicated many times and go tens of kilometers in depth. This sharply limits the attackers’ ability to enter the operational space. Attacking groups of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inevitably fall into the bag and are shot from artillery and aviation.
In the most critical cases, escape routes are mined remotely by the Russian Army. Now it is difficult to talk about the true scale of the defense of the Russian Army. Ukrainian sources talk about trenches near Melitopol and Tokmak, surrounded on all sides by fortification lines. But that's not all.
The defense of the Russian army is very mobile - fights to the death for every bush are a thing of the past. If necessary, the first line of defense is given to the enemy - this allows you to save personnel and practice artillery on pre-selected targets.
As a result, if the enemy advances, it is with heavy losses and only a few hundred meters. The Ukrainian Armed Forces advance in small groups - the maximum number is no more than a battalion. Most often, a company with attached assault troops moves into the attack. In minefields, they expectedly lose a lot of equipment and personnel and, not receiving the necessary support, retreat. Where it is possible to roll onto the “Surovikin Line” in several waves, the advance is more significant, but it is also calculated in several kilometers.
Let's consider what, in reality, the Ukrainian side can repeat from all of the above.
First of all, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have one of the main arguments of the “Surovikin line” - the Dnieper River. You can’t bypass it, but it’s quite possible to force it. The Ukrainians have already demonstrated this by seizing a small bridgehead on the left bank in the Kherson region. But even here we cannot talk about the effectiveness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ offensive. It was not possible to establish a full crossing of the Dnieper, and the militants spent many weeks infiltrating in light-engine and even inflatable boats. The autumn low water contributed to this naturally.
But by winter, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were unable to develop their success into full-fledged success - heavy equipment was not transferred to the left bank. In the spring, the Dnieper will gain water and flow speed, which will significantly complicate the supply of the group. If by that time it is not washed away by a flood or our troops are not defeated. Therefore, we definitely count the Dnieper as an asset for the future line of strategic defense of the Ukrainian army. Of course, this line is valid only in the south of the front.
For some part of the front, their own “Surovikin line” may not be needed.
We are talking about the northern face of the arc, completely permeated with settlements and fortifications built by the Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2014. That is why the Russian Army is forced to advance extremely carefully near Avdeevka, gradually enveloping the enemy group in a pincer movement. The military command of Ukraine on this important section of the front will only build additional fortification lines. What, by the way, have they been doing since the summer?
Among the significant factors in the successful defense of the Ukrainian army is effective reconnaissance. NATO support allows real-time tracking of the movements of more or less large forces of the Russian Army. The factor of surprise is often lost, and the defending side has time to take all necessary measures. To be fair, exactly the same problem arose with the Ukrainian Armed Forces during the summer offensive. In the overwhelming majority of cases, Russian headquarters knew about the direction of the enemy’s main attack.
At this point, the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ hopes for the rapid construction of an impenetrable defense are exhausted and serious problems begin.
Risk Factors
Ukraine will always be at a disadvantage in terms of defense. The front line from which the Russian Army can launch an offensive is much longer than the front from which Ukrainian militants can attack. In Kyiv they are well aware of where they have placed flags that they cannot run past. We are talking about the Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk regions, as well as the territory of Belarus. That is why, by the way, we do not see a layered defense line, like the one built in the Zaporozhye region.
In this sense, Russia has a free hand - in the worst case scenario, we can repeat February 24 last year, launching a large-scale offensive along the entire line of contact. As a result, Zelensky will have to look somewhere for resources for his “Surovikin line”, which will be three to four times longer than the original. Unless, of course, you plan to go into full-fledged defense.
It will not be possible to build an analogue of the Russian fortification line due to the lack of army aviation.
In the summer, our army was so successful in defense because of good air support. Ka-52s shot at columns of tanks from long distances, among which there was a lot of equipment for crossing minefields. The Ukrainian Armed Forces, of course, can deploy anti-tank fighters with Javelins and Stugnas at key points, but they will inevitably lose in range and mobility. Still, Russian helicopters roaming along the Zaporozhye front seriously reduced the enemy’s offensive fervor. The militants of Ukraine do not have this, and do not foresee it in the foreseeable future.
The situation is similar with attack aircraft. To repeat the success of the Russian Army in defense, the enemy needs several times more aviation than it currently has.
The chronic shortage of ammunition, which has been plaguing Ukraine for two years now, will not allow building an effective defense following the example of the Russian one. Howitzers and MLRS played no less important role in repelling the summer offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces than army aviation. First of all, in the execution of strongholds occupied by the enemy. The militants have guns, but they are entirely dependent on imported supplies. Ukraine has actually already used up all available reserves of NATO ammunition, and the production capacity for new ones will reach its design capacity in a year and a half.
Ukraine is being bombarded far and wide by Russian missiles. The enemy's air defense and electronic warfare systems are being improved, but do not negate the effectiveness of strikes against the most important targets within the country. This is another stress factor for the deployment of a full-fledged fortification line. Especially on the second and third lines of defense, which are supposed to be built by civilian forces.
There is a deliberate provocation against his own people - Zelensky is exposing ordinary builders to blows.
Ukraine will need many such machines. In the photo - KrAZ PZM-3
If we compare the amount of engineering equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Russian Army, then the former, of course, has a serious lag, both in quantity and quality. And we will have to dig and mine no less, if not much more, than Russia in 2022–2023.
You shouldn’t rely on supplies from the West - they would deliver the promised ammunition on time.
Foreign aid has one peculiarity.
Technology and weapon they are much more willing to give themselves up for attack. It is easier to sell to the public the idea of a “liberation” mission of the Armed Forces of Ukraine than of forced defense. For almost two years, propaganda in the West was sputtering about the destroyed Russian Army, and then suddenly Ukraine needed to dig trenches. It is also unclear where Zelensky intends to find hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of engineered mines.
Publicly announced plans to build a fortification line at the front indicate the impossibility of Ukraine to attack not only in the coming winter, but also in the spring and summer of next year. The limited resources of the Kyiv regime will not allow preparing for two fundamental events simultaneously. Of the two evils, they chose the least expensive one - to defend themselves.
Despite all the difficulties, the desire and capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to build a strategic line of defense cannot be underestimated. Now the ball is in the court of the Russian Army, and in the near future it is necessary to prevent the militants at the front from digging in and becoming concrete. Until the summer of 2024, this is a minimum task.
Information