Strategic impasse in Ukraine
Disposition 2023–2024
The situation that has developed in Ukraine after the unsuccessful summer offensive can be divided into components - political and military.
Let's start with the first one.
After five months of an extremely inexpressive offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny, in an interview with The Economist, described the situation on the fronts as a dead end. In fact, the military leader of Ukraine formalized the end of the offensive and the transition of events to a new phase. The subtleties of the situation are not fully understood, but the Ukrainian Armed Forces are clearly preparing for strategic defense.
The point of view of the military leadership is not shared by Zelensky, who claims that nothing is over yet and continues to talk about the Ukrainian Armed Forces entering the 1991 borders of Ukraine. Many sources began to talk about some kind of split in the political circles of the Ukrainian regime.
Despite all the optimism for Russia, the situation is far from a real confrontation between Zelensky and Zaluzhny, as they are trying to present it. But a new outline of the internal routine in Kyiv is being outlined. Zaluzhny, as the main alpha male of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, enjoys unquestioned authority in Ukraine. Both among the military and among the civilian population sympathizing with the nationalists. Zelensky has no guts to remove the commander-in-chief, although only he has the mandate to do so.
There are rumors that it was decided to undermine Zaluzhny’s position by eliminating two of his close associates - the commander of the Special Operations Forces of Ukraine Viktor Khorenko and his assistant Gennady Chistyakov. While the first was removed from his post at the request of the Minister of Defense, the second was literally liquidated.
The explosion of a grenade in the hands of Chistyakov is now explained by three versions - revenge/warning to Zaluzhny from the Presidential Office, the work of the Russian special services and the banal inability to use weapons. However, the assertion that the Ukrainian Armed Forces major was unable to distinguish a German DM 51A2 grenade from a dummy does not stand up to criticism. Zaluzhny also does not believe in the accidental death of his assistant. According to his version, “an unknown explosive device went off in one of the gifts.”
The author and executor of the failed offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is now looking for a recipe for hacking Russian defenses in 2024
Summing up the events, we can confidently speak about the beginning of a search for those to blame in the highest circles of Ukraine. They are looking for someone to blame primarily for the failure of the summer offensive. The Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to advance only seventeen kilometers in five months, having spent all their offensive potential. Zaluzhny’s dry and clear logic is not to the liking of Zelensky’s cabinet. The latter continues to talk about continuing the offensive even in winter. Zelensky’s faith in the power of the Ukrainian army is increasingly looking like Hitler’s dreams about Wenck’s army. Dull confidence in the Ukrainian army reaching the borders of 1991 will cost the military and foreign sponsors dearly.
There is tension at the top of the Kyiv regime, and it is intensifying along with the traditional freezing of fronts for the coming winter. But the political situation in Ukraine is now determined not by the mood in Zelensky’s team, or even by the volume of Western assistance, but by the course of military operations. Until the Ukrainian Armed Forces suffer catastrophic losses, preferably in a short period of time, the deadlock on the fronts is unlikely to move forward.
The offensive is over
The end of 2023 will obviously end with Russian superiority in defense. The world-famous “Surovikin Line” seems to have become the most impassable line of defense in modern times. stories. Zaluzhny himself describes it as 15–20 km minefields, over which there are constantly hanging drones observers. As soon as the enemy invades the defense lines, artillery immediately begins to fire at him.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine remembered the name “Agriculture” very well and told the whole world about it through The Economist. According to him, the remote mining system quickly locks the erupted units into fire bags, dooming the nationalists to inevitable death. This is where the army works aviation Russia, and the widespread use of electronic warfare systems. The latter quite effectively reduced the dangers from HIMARS and Excalibur, and practically paralyzed the army of Ukrainian drones, which they boasted so much about back in the spring. To be completely precise, electronic warfare did not allow the concentration of large masses of attack quadcopters, which significantly reduced their efficiency. This is far from a complete assessment of the progress of the enemy’s offensive, and it requires a separate discussion.
For the failure of the offensive, Zaluzhny should blame not only himself and Zelensky, but also the American leadership. The Pentagon simulated the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2023 on supercomputers at least four times, and in all cases the nationalists reached the borders of 2014. Now, most likely, they are correcting artificial intelligence algorithms for offensive planning 2.0. How NATO generals even came up with the idea of sending the Ukrainians on an attack with virtually no aviation or air defense support is beyond my comprehension.
An enemy offensive that ends ingloriously is always good. But the question arises - what to do now with the initiative that has passed to the Russian Army?
The deadlock situation at the front is associated with the transition of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strategic defense. Many are now saying that time is on Russia’s side; they say that the total economic potential leaves no chance for the Kyiv regime. We'll spread it with a roller, just give it time. Just how long is this? The obvious depletion of Western arsenals is quite conditional.
On the one hand, the enemies really turned down the valve on gift distribution. No one is ready to sacrifice their defense capability, especially in light of the events in Israel, when even for the anti-terrorist operation the Americans had to throw in shells. At that time, Jerusalem had not even begun the ground phase of the invasion. Ukraine is not expected to attack this coming winter, and playing defensively is always less energy-consuming. They will give out exactly as much as is necessary to contain the Russian Army. With the caveat that NATO analysts with their supercomputers calculated everything correctly.
On the other hand, the delay in supplies to Ukraine is temporary. By the end of next year, the first investments in the expansion of the Western military-industrial complex will begin, and in a couple of years it will begin to operate at full capacity. NATO countries have sharply moved away from the concept of reasonably sufficient accumulation of weapons to the creation of extensive mobilization reserves. A lot of shells and missiles are needed, and understanding of this came only in 2022. Part of the master's table will certainly go to Ukraine, and it will be a lot.
Apparently, for the next one and a half to two years the ball will be in Russia's court. If an offensive is planned, then it must be carried out precisely during this window of opportunity. Later it will be more difficult. But the positional impasse did not disappear. Now there is a stalemate at the front that is amazing in its complexity.
The “Surovikin Line” will obviously go down in the history of military art, but no one is stopping anyone from building a similar one on the enemy side. Something similar has already been built in Donbass since 2014. Winter in the rest of Ukraine will be relatively mild and it won’t hurt to bring thousands of “dragon teeth” made in Ukraine. Bridges across the country are intact - what problems could there be? And this is just one issue with enemy logistics, which we destroy very conditionally. When analysts say that time is now on Russia’s side, it is worth remembering the slow but sure strengthening of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defensive lines.
The further you go, the more difficult it will be to break through them. The second paradox was the forced dispersal of combat formations along the front line. Moreover, in Russia this was aggravated by the inconvenient and longer face of the arc. Reconnaissance now allows you to track the movements of large units and cover with pre-emptive strikes. Even in the operational depth of defense. That is why we are seeing an offensive in small attack groups - battalions and regiments wisely do not go on assaults, so as not to be destroyed on the way.
As a result, there are no significant defense breakthroughs on both sides. How to secretly move an army corps to the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to break through the defense? A very sensitive issue for the General Staff.
The obvious deadlock at the front does not mean a total and irrevocable transition of the special operation into a sluggish mode. Russia is obviously accumulating reserves, and it has been much easier to do this over the past year - active defense takes much less strength than attacks. The Ukrainian Armed Forces were exhausted by the end of the year, but we were not. But sufficient reserves have not yet been formed, and the military-industrial complex has not had time to sufficiently saturate the units with military equipment.
Time is running out, and now we will have to adjust the offensive strategy. The West will clearly take into account all the nuances and pump up Ukraine with air defense and electronic warfare systems, which will complicate the situation.
However, the art of war is an art because improvisations can significantly correct the landscape of creation. And in the Russian Army there are enough such creators - whatever one may say, our country learns to fight much faster than the enemy.
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