The Snake Island issue must be closed firmly, defiantly and definitively
Spoiler: no, we are not talking about the use of nuclear weapons
The island "Snake" in the course of the special military operation (SVO) in the literal and figurative sense is a "stumbling block" between Russia and Ukraine. At the beginning of the NMD, he was taken under the control of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces). Then, after Western countries began to supply Ukraine with high-precision long-range weapons, in particular Excalibur guided artillery shells of 155 mm caliber with a firing range of up to 60 kilometers, it became problematic to hold the Snake Island of the RF Armed Forces.
All these vicissitudes were previously discussed in the material Why did the Russian armed forces leave Zmeiny Island, how justified is it, is it a defeat or not. It can be assumed that with the withdrawal of the RF Armed Forces, Zmeiny Island and its coastal zone could be mined so that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) would bleed the entire Black Sea before they could settle on this piece of land.
However, apparently, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are present on Zmeiny Island, at least periodically, as evidenced by the strikes inflicted by the RF Armed Forces on the island from time to time. Also, with a high probability, the Armed Forces of Ukraine use Zmeiny Island for military purposes, including for attacks by Russian military and civilian shipsand attacks on Russian infrastructure.
All this raises vital questions about why the Ukrainian Armed Forces can hold (albeit partially) Snake Island and how to change this?
Reasons for persistence
The reasons why the Ukrainian Armed Forces can hold Zmeiny Island are quite simple.
The problem is that the Armed Forces of Ukraine can fire on Zmeiny Island, both with high-precision guided and relatively inexpensive unguided projectiles of cannon artillery systems and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).
Given the small area of Zmeiny Island, this leaves almost no chance for the RF Armed Forces, since there is nowhere to hide on it, and it is almost impossible to intercept all the launched shells, especially 155 mm artillery ones. That is, sacrifices and losses are inevitable. And this piece of stone is clearly not worth the lives of our fighters.
The American high-precision artillery shells M982 Excalibur of 155 mm caliber available to the Armed Forces of Ukraine easily reach Snake Island, and it is difficult to intercept them
On the other hand, the Russian Armed Forces cannot reach Zmeiny Island with artillery and MLRS, all that remains is to strike with long-range precision weapons, aviation or ships of the Naval fleet (Navy) RF. Each of these methods of influence has its drawbacks.
Long-range precision weapons are too expensive, which means there will never be enough of them to shoot at a rock at sea.
Air strikes - in fact, this is exactly what the RF Armed Forces carry out, however, these actions also carry certain risks. In the event of an attack by unguided weapons, the Armed Forces of Ukraine can attack aircraft and / or helicopters of the Russian Air Force (VVS) using man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).
An attack with guided weapons will require the aircraft or helicopter to fly higher in order to provide the necessary visual range of the radar station (radar) or electro-optical station (OES). And against planes or helicopters located at high altitudes, the Ukrainian Armed Forces can use ambush tactics using Patriot air defense systems, as they did at the border, ensuring the defeat of Russian aviation over Russian territory.
As for the ships of the Russian Navy, we have already talked about the disadvantages of using high-precision weapons, and attacking Zmeiny Island with artillery weapons is quite risky, since it will take some time to guarantee coverage of the island, during which the ships of the Russian Navy can be attacked by Ukrainian anti-ship missiles (ASMs) .
Do not forget that the sky over the Black Sea is tightly controlled by reconnaissance manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of NATO, which warn the Armed Forces of Ukraine in advance of the approach of Russian ships and aircraft.
American strategic reconnaissance UAVs RQ-4 Global Hawk are constantly "hanging around" over the Black Sea - why not highlight them with BLK "Peresvet"?
What other options do we have?
In general, there are not so many of them.
Constantly chasing the Armed Forces of Ukraine from Snake Island is too costly and carries unnecessary risks. It is necessary to expel the Armed Forces of Ukraine from there “high-quality” once, after which they still mine the “Snake” island so that any attempt to stay on it becomes synonymous with suicide, and at the same time send an unambiguous message to their owners from NATO countries, to show what consequences will sooner or late will bring this conflict.
Purification
There is a possibility of striking the Zmeiny Island with a conventional munition, the power of which will be comparable to a tactical nuclear munition.
Such a warhead cannot fit in a missile or UAV, but it is quite possible to use a ship ready for decommissioning with a deadweight of 2/000/5 tons, equipped with an automatic control system. For those who do not understand - 000/10/000 tons - this is the possibility of placing explosives on the indicated vessel with the equivalent of approximately 2/000/5 thousand tons (kilotons) of TNT, that is, the creation of a conventional ammunition comparable in its power to at least with tactical nuclear weapons.
It is quite possible to make such an improvised ammunition of increased power - there are many thousands of ships for conversion in the world. The selected vessel will not require a complex control system - the command at a given distance from the target will bring the power plant to maximum, after which it will leave the ship, and the control system will simply adjust the course before colliding with the island using GLONASS signals and/or a radio channel.
Example of a cargo ship of about 3 DWT
Previously, the use of obsolete ships as a conventional weapon of increased power has already been considered in the article Operation "Baltic Ballet".
As a warhead, decommissioned ammunition with an expired service life intended for destruction can be used. Of course, for their simultaneous detonation, a special detonation system must be placed on the ship, perhaps it will become the most complex structural element - we will return to the topic of using expired ammunition for the manufacture of combat units of increased power.
The command to undermine should be given remotely after a collision with Zmeiny Island or when passing at a minimum distance from it.
The question arises, if, as we said earlier, Russian ships near Zmeiny Island can be attacked by Ukrainian anti-ship missiles, then how can we bring our "fireship" to the island?
This problem can potentially be solved by a combination of technical measures and application tactics.
Firstly, it is possible to increase the draft of a ship full of explosives, while ensuring its tightness to the maximum to minimize the likelihood of seawater flooding. This will not only reduce the radar and visual visibility of the vessel, but will also complicate its destruction of anti-ship missiles.
Secondly, visibility can be additionally reduced by dismantling some of the superstructures, perhaps most of them, as well as the use of radar-absorbing materials.
Thirdly, it is unlikely that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are constantly sitting on the shore with anti-ship missiles "in their hands" - so it is possible to become a target for the Russian Air Force itself, most likely, they deploy anti-ship missiles only when they receive information from aircraft and reconnaissance UAVs of NATO countries about the approach of the Russian military ships. And this means that NATO intelligence may well miss an incomprehensible "barge", which will suddenly change course outside the range of Ukrainian anti-ship missiles and go at full speed to Serpent Island. Until they figure it out, until they contact the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and there is already a boom.
The explosion of the Ukrainian ammunition depot in Khmelnytsky, how many of them were there - several hundred tons?
Aftermath
What will the use of a conventional munition with a capacity of several kilotons of TNT equivalent against the Zmeiny Island lead to?
With a high probability, all living things on the island will be completely destroyed, of course, if the Ukrainians have not yet hollowed out a bunker several tens of meters deep there. All structures on the surface will be destroyed, weapons and ammunition will be destroyed. In a sense, the island will be sterilized.
After the detonation, while the Armed Forces of Ukraine have not come to their senses, a sabotage and reconnaissance group (DRG) can be landed on Snake Island, which will carry out mining of the area with mine-explosive means for various purposes, that is, it will do what had to be done even before the “goodwill gesture” - will install radio-controlled landmines, pressure mines, "frogs", "petals" and other things that are in abundance in the supply of the RF Armed Forces.
However, the cleansing of Snake Island from the Armed Forces of Ukraine is not the main thing. The explosion of a conventional munition, comparable in power to a nuclear one, will clearly be noticed by Western countries, especially those who are closer. There is no doubt that immediately after the use of such weapons, when the needles on sensitive seismic sensors falter, many will have the assumption that Russia used tactical nuclear weapons. The absence of radioactive contamination will quickly prove that this is not so, but this chill on the back, which insolent Western politicians and the military will feel, will remain.
In addition, the fact of the use of such weapons will make it possible in the future to implement potentially promising tactical scenarios, which will be based on the unfortunate experience gained by the enemy.
Considering the possibility of using such weapons against Ukraine, one should not forget that Ukraine can implement something similar. They have all the means for this, neither the Armed Forces of Ukraine, nor the SBU, nor the GUR will stand on ceremony and reflect. It is easy to imagine the consequences of detonating such ammunition near the Crimean bridge or the Russian naval base, and the experience of shelling Russian (and Ukrainian) peaceful cities by the Armed Forces of Ukraine suggests that they will not hesitate to attack coastal settlements.
It is possible that such solutions are already being worked out in Ukraine, after all, the entire intellectual potential of the armed forces and intelligence structures of the NATO bloc is now working on them.
In this war, we lack toughness - sometimes there is a feeling that we are still ready for negotiations, concessions, resumption of deals, and so on and so forth.
The problem is that, on the other hand, they are not preparing for any concessions and negotiations, but are planning more and more tough and decisive actions to achieve a “win”. I would like to hope that someday we will come to this.
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