Military Review

1941 year. Defense of Borisov

21
Borisov is an old Belarusian city on the banks of the Berezina River. The Brest – Moscow road passes through it - a traditional path for invaders of different times, who were marching to Russia from the west. Another tragic test for the inhabitants of the city was the summer of 1941.

The situation for 30 June 1941: On the 5 day of the war, the Germans captured Minsk, surrounding the main forces of the Western Front in the triangle Grodno-Brest-Minsk. The huge mass of Soviet troops had not yet been destroyed, but the troops were not trained to operate in such conditions. Before the war, according to the curriculum, actions in the offensive, attacks, marches were practiced; working out the defense, and even more, actions in the environment could well have become the basis for repression against the developers of such plans. Soviet propaganda vigorously introduced hats and slogans like “We will fight on foreign territory with little blood” to the masses. Although as early as the beginning of the 30-ies, there was a well-established system of training military leaders in environmental conditions in the Red Army, and in Ukraine and Belarus stocks were stored in caches weapons, ammunition and food for supplying troops in conditions of a deep penetration of the enemy. All these caches were destroyed by the NKVD, and many trained commanders of the Red Army and the personnel of the Red Army Intelligence Directorate, who specialized in sabotage and partisan actions, were shot in 1937. Therefore, the surrounded troops in the amount of about 250 thousand personnel quickly ceased resistance. Only a small part managed to break through to the east to their own, most were taken prisoner, many military personnel settled in the surrounding villages. By the end of June, the Western Front had only a few divisions at its disposal, which had suffered significant losses, while in Minsk two German tank groups - 2nd Guderian and 3rd Gotha. The 47th Panzer Corps of Guderian's group was supposed to advance as quickly as possible along the Brest-Moscow highway to Borisov, Orsha, Smolensk, in order to prevent the Soviet troops from organizing a solid defense.

From the memoirs of the famous Soviet writer and poet Konstantin Simonov:

“... On both sides of the highway between the posts, all telephone and telegraph wires were torn. Near the road lay the corpses. For the most part - of civilian refugees. The bomb funnels were most often off the road, behind the telegraph poles. People made their way there, by the side, and the Germans, having quickly adapted to this, bombed just there, on the sides of the road. On the road itself there were relatively few craters, only a few all the way from Borisov to the turn to Orsha. As I later understood, the Germans probably hoped to pass this section quickly and without obstacles, and deliberately did not spoil the road ...

1941 year. Defense of Borisov


Women, children, old people, girls with small knots, girls, young women, mostly Jewish, judging by clothes from Western Belorussia, in the miserable, turned into dusty rags of foreign coats with high shoulders, went from west to east along the road. It was a strange sight — these coats, knots in their hands, fashionable hairstyles on their sides. And from east to west along the road were civil guys. They went to their recruiting centers, to the place of gathering the units, mobilized, who did not want to be late, did not want to be considered deserters, and at the same time did not really know anything, did not understand where they were going. They were led forward by a sense of duty, complete uncertainty and disbelief that the Germans could be here, so close. It was one of the tragedies of those days. These people were shot from the air by the Germans, and they were suddenly captured for themselves ... ”


There was actually no one to defend the city of Borisov, located in 80 km east of Minsk, only a tank technical school (TTU) was stationed in it, where students studied around 500. From Moscow region, the 1-I Moscow Motorized Rifle Division was moving to Borisov — a fairly strong military unit that had more than 200 BT-7 tanks and several T-34, but would she have time? For the organization of defense along the Dnieper at the turn of Vitebsk-Orsha-Mogilev-Gomel there was a catastrophic lack of time, and it was vital to detain the enemy in Borisov, at the turn of the Berezina river. Meanwhile, the head of the Borisov TSU Corps Commissar Ivan Zakharovich Susaykov organized the defense of the city with the forces of his cadets: they dug trenches, communication lines, shooting cells. From the west, through a large concrete bridge to Borisov, one after another a group of Soviet fighters left without control, confused, did not understand - what was going on? Stepping heavily on dusty boots on the pavement, they walked onto the eastern bank of the Berezina, and the locals looked at them frowningly. Everything changed overnight. Suddenly he heard loud, clear commands emanating from a fit, self-confident colonel-tanker, who appeared on the shore accompanied by several commanders. Retreating soldiers unwittingly quickened their pace, corrected uniforms; here at the assembly point of them formed temporary military units - offices, platoons, companies. The collection and accounting of weapons, the supply of food and ammunition, and the entrenching tools were established. The colonel-tanker who organized this assembly point and the formation of the joint detachment of the retreating servicemen was Alexander Ilyich Lizyukov.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General A.I. Lizyukov (center) with his friends at the meeting. Bolshaya Vereika Village, July 1942. The photo was taken shortly before A.I. Lizyukova


Alexander Lizyukov Alexander I. Born 26 March 1900, in the city of Gomel. Participated in the Civil War by the Red Army, commander of the artillery platoon, battery. In 1923 He graduated from the Higher Automobile Armored School in Petrograd, in 1927. Military Academy im.MVFrunze. From January 1933 of the year - the commander of the 3-th separate tank battalion, at 1934 he commanded a separate heavy tank regiment, and from March 1936, with the rank of colonel, became the 6-th separate heavy tank brigade. SM Kirov, which was armed with tanks T-28 and T-35. In 1935 was sent to France as part of the Soviet delegation of military observers on the maneuvers of the French army. 8 February 1938 was arrested by officers from the Special Section of the Leningrad Military District on suspicion of involvement in an anti-Soviet military conspiracy. During interrogations with torture, he was beaten up with evidence that Lizyukov allegedly "was going to commit a terrorist act against the Commissar Voroshilov and other leaders of the CPSU (B.) And the Soviet government by hitting a tank on the Mausoleum during one of the parades." 22 of the month was kept in the prison of the State Security Department of the NKVD of the Leningrad Region until December 3 of 1939, when the verdict of the military tribunal of the Leningrad military district was acquitted. 24 June 1941, Colonel A.I. Lizyukov was appointed Deputy Commander of the 17 Mechanized Corps and left Moscow for the front at the location of the corps headquarters ...

June 27-29, 1941 The soldiers of the consolidated detachment of Colonel Lizyukov strengthened on the western and eastern shores of the Berezina, carry out the engineering equipment of the positions. Tank cadets took up positions in the city itself. On the western coast of the Berezina, where the bridgehead of the Soviet troops was located, the first clashes with the Nazis began. German aviation daily bombing the city and the position of our troops in the area of ​​the bridge.

30 June 1941. In the second half of the day, units of the 1 of the Moscow Motorized Rifle Division, Colonel Yakov Grigorievich Kreyzer, approach Borisov from the east. At the same time, the advance units of the German General Nering's 18 Panzer Division rush towards the city. The concrete bridge across the Berezina is mined by a group of sappers, the teams do not give explosives, as the situation is unclear, and groups of retreating Soviet troops periodically pass through the bridge. In particular, the approach of the retreating parts of the 20 and 44 corps of the Red Army was expected. On the morning of July 1, a massive Junkers raid took place, in which at least a hundred aircraft took part, at the position of the Soviet troops in the area of ​​the bridge. Many German tanks appear on the west coast, they rush to the bridge, destroying the bridgehead fortifications already broken by the bombing. Despite the fierce resistance of the surviving defenders, the Germans manage to destroy their positions near the bridge, as well as the sappers, who were supposed to blow up the bridge, and gain a foothold on the east bank. The bridge went to the Germans in one piece, and it was very bad. However, the capture of strategically important bridges was quite common for the Germans at that time, for example, they also managed to seize bridges across Zapadnaya Dvina in Dvinsk in the actions of Army Group North, Berezina in Bobruisk to the south. In Borisov itself, fierce battles involving the combined detachment of Lizyukov, tank cadets, and units of the 1 motorized rifle division of J. Kreizer boiled. Ruben Ibarruri, the son of the famous Spanish communist Dolores Ibarruri, became one of the heroes of Borisov’s defense. He skillfully commanded a machine gun platoon, fought desperately, was seriously wounded. On July 1, the Germans dropped an airborne landing north of Borisov, which was destroyed in a fleeting battle by units of the 1 of the Moscow division.

To return the bridge or destroy it is very important. On July 2, Yakov Kreyzer, who concentrated a tank regiment from Borisov from his division, gives the order for a counterattack. High-speed BT-7 and well-armored T-34 hit the flank of the 18 TD, which operated in the area of ​​Borisov.



A tank battle began in which hundreds of combat vehicles took part. From the letter of the German sergeant-major who was following in the column of the 18 TD:

"... suddenly they appeared. We heard the roar of engines from afar, but still late. Soviet tanks T-26 and T-34, firing continuous fire, advanced parallel to our column. After a few seconds, hell began to pitch. Three trucks carrying ammunition in the center of the convoy blew up. A terrible explosion swept in all directions their fragments ... "


The German units suffered heavy losses in the battles of 2 on July, they first met then with the Soviet “Thirty-four”, whose armor was difficult to break through. The commander of the German 2 Tank Group, Colonel General G. Guderian, wrote in his memoirs:
"... 18-I tank division received a fairly complete picture of the strength of the Russian, for the first time they used their T-34 tanks, against which our guns at that time were too weak ..."


However, the Germans did not succeed in knocking down the Germans from the bridgehead seized on the eastern bank of the Berezina, mainly because of the actions of German aviation, which literally raged over the battlefield. July 1 and July 2 were fierce battles in Borisov and its environs, the Germans were forced to take house by house by storm, trench by trench. The tremendous numerical superiority of the German strike force could not but affect the outcome of these battles, and by the end of July 2, Borisov was abandoned by Soviet units. The surviving cadet tankers and fighters of the joint detachment of Colonel Lizyukov joined the division of J. Kreizer. Together with her, they went through a glorious battle journey from Borisov to Orsha, at every convenient turn to defend, arranging the Germans a cruel rattle. Let it be a retreat, but given the balance of power, these were truly heroic actions, and what is equally important is a vivid manifestation of the commanding talent of Soviet commanders: Alexander Lizyukov, Yakov Kreyzer, and others.

Results of Defense Borisov:

Skillful actions of the fighters and commanders of the Borisov Tank Technical School, the combined detachment of Colonel Lizyukov, the 1 of the Moscow division allowed for a few days to delay the advance of the Wehrmacht strike forces in the Moscow direction and made it possible to organize defense of the second strategic echelon of the Red Army along the Dnieper and Zapadnaya Dvina rivers the turn of the cities of Vitebsk-Orsha-Mogilev. The enemy suffered heavy losses. The commander of the Wehrmacht’s 18 Panzer Division, Major-General V. Nering, in his order on the results of the battles, wrote:

"... Losses with equipment, weapons and vehicles are unusually large ... This situation is intolerable, otherwise we will find our own death ..." According to various estimates, the 18-I TD lost from Borisov to Orsha at least half of its combat equipment. "


P.S:

After being wounded under Borisov, Corps Commissar Ivan Susaykov returned to political work and ended the war as Colonel General of Tank Forces, a member of the Military Council of the Second Ukrainian Front and Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Romania.

On July 11, the commander of the 1 Moscow Motorized Rifle Division, Colonel Ya. G. Kreiser, was successfully promoted to the rank of Hero of the Soviet Union for his successful leadership of military units and personal courage and heroism, and on August 7 was appointed commander 25 th army of the Bryansk Front, which participated in the Battle of Smolensk and the defense of Moscow. In 3, Yakov Grigorievich was given the rank of army general.

Colonel A. I. Lizyukov for the defense of Borisov was presented to the Order of the Red Banner, but the submission was revised and he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. 23 July 1942. Major-General Lizyukov, commander of the 5 tank army, died in the course of a heavy battle in the Voronezh region under unclear circumstances, his exact burial place is doubtful, since the corpse of the general was severely disfigured and was not properly identified. However, in the memory of all patriots of the Fatherland, he will forever remain an example of loyalty to duty, a courageous man and a talented military leader.

Information sources:
1. The Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945. Encyclopedia "M., Soviet Encyclopedia, 1985.
2. Simonov K.M. "Different days of the war."
http://militera.lib.ru/db/simonov_km/1_01.html/index.html
3. Kreizer JG "In the battles between Berezina and the Dnieper."
http://www.rkka.ru/oper/1msd/main.htm
4. G. Guderian "Memories of a Soldier"
http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/GERM/guderian.txt
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  1. Pula
    Pula 26 October 2012 08: 26
    +9
    Good article. Thanks.
  2. Samovar
    Samovar 26 October 2012 09: 49
    +4
    We always fought for our land to the last, even retreating fought and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. A deep bow to all who, at the cost of their lives, have stopped fascist evil!
  3. Skavron
    Skavron 26 October 2012 10: 06
    +5
    Heroes ....
    Eternal glory !!!
  4. rennim
    rennim 26 October 2012 10: 16
    +5
    Such articles and films should be shown on central television instead of advertising ... So that people see who our ancestors were and they felt ashamed ... and at the same time took pride that they live in a state with such a history that many will envy ...
  5. Oleg S.
    Oleg S. 26 October 2012 10: 49
    +5
    They were not born in this city; they don’t really know who lives here. But these people knew that under their feet the land for which many generations of their ancestors shed blood, for their native piece of land .... No, this is not fanaticism, not patriotism, not the feeling that you owe something, it’s a simple realization that this land is, this city is part of the homeland and not one scum has a right to a nigo, albeit for protection it will be necessary to part with the joys of this world.
  6. borisst64
    borisst64 26 October 2012 12: 13
    +2
    In Voronezh there is a street General Lizyukova, who became famous throughout the country after showing the cartoon "Kitten from the street Lizyukova"
    1. Eugene
      Eugene 26 October 2012 17: 06
      0
      The cartoon is a little off topic. But, on the other hand, the name of Lizyukov does not allow to forget. Surprisingly!
    2. geo1286
      geo1286 26 October 2012 21: 09
      0
      In Gomel there is also the Lizyukov Brothers Street. There were three brothers - Peter, Eugene and Alexander. Alexander and Peter died during the war at the front, and Eugene in the partisans.
  7. wulf66
    wulf66 26 October 2012 13: 28
    +1
    Everlasting memory!
  8. wown
    wown 26 October 2012 17: 04
    +1
    Minsk was taken on June 28, actually. And it was no coincidence that the 1st Proletarian was there like the entire 7th mechanized corps. Just deployed the troops of the second echelon. Yes, and the proletarian division is elite. My grandfather served there
  9. nnz226
    nnz226 26 October 2012 18: 58
    0
    Yes, it seems like a couple of years ago they found the grave of Lizyukov, near some monastery (church) on the outskirts of the village at the site of his last battle. They even carried out a genetic examination for identification, then they buried it with honors in Voronezh.
    1. geo1286
      geo1286 26 October 2012 21: 18
      0
      I am familiar with General Lizyukov’s great-nephew (who works in the department at Gomel State University), so he went for a genetic examination and reburial in Voronezh. The results confirmed that the remains belong to Lizyukov.
  10. ikrut
    ikrut 26 October 2012 21: 40
    +1
    In June 41, our tank crews showed miracles of courage and courage. I just finished reading a book about the Brody tank battle in June 41. I found out something interesting for myself and clarified about those days. We need to be proud of our grandfathers and fathers, who managed in those difficult days to adequately confront a very powerful enemy. And do not be fooled by liberalistic snot about our total superiority in technology at the beginning of the war and the inability to fight. Not everything was so simple.
    And I was particularly struck by the recollections of a German officer who told me that the Germans were very surprised by the Russian tanker, who, leaning out of the hatch of a damaged burning tank, shot him with a pistol. When they got him out of the tank, already killed, it turned out that both legs were torn off by him in an explosion. And in this state, being conscious, he fought to the last bullet. Such a people cannot be defeated by anyone. Eternal memory to the heroes!
  11. Gren9
    Gren9 26 October 2012 22: 49
    0
    Good article, it’s only a pity that liberal stamps about bloody gebnya were stuck here too
  12. Aaron Zawi
    Aaron Zawi 27 October 2012 01: 25
    +3
    Kreiser Yakov Grigorievich - commander of the 1-th Moscow Motorized Rifle Division of the 20-th Army of the Western Front, Colonel.
    He was born on October 22 (November 4) of the 1905 of the year in the city of Voronezh in the family of a military official. Jew. Educated in a classical gymnasium. After completing the courses in construction and road construction for workers in Voronezh, he was appointed ten-trainee to the Committee on State Structures.
    In the Red Army since February 1921. Volunteer joined the 22-th Voronezh infantry school, which he graduated in the 1923 year. A cadet participated in the suppression of peasant uprisings. Since January 1923 of the year - squad leader, rifle platoon commander, assistant company commander in the 144 rifle regiment. Since January 1924 - the head of the guard team for the protection of the Pavlovsky Central Artillery Warehouse. Since November 1925 of the year - platoon commander in the Pavlovsky Posad separate local rifle company, from 1927 of the year - in the 18 th separate local rifle company. Member of the CPSU (b) since 1925 year.
    From January 1928 to 1937, he served in the 3 rifle regiment of the Moscow Proletarian Rifle Division: commander of a rifle platoon, company, rifle battalion, training battalion, head of the regimental school. In 1931, he graduated from the Shooting and Tactical Improvement Courses for the command staff of the Red Army "Shot" named after the Comintern. Since July 1937 of the year - Assistant Commander of the 1 th Infantry Regiment of the same division. Since April of the 1938 of the year, he has been the interim commander of the 356th Infantry Regiment of the 1th Moscow Infantry Division.
    In January-August of 1939, he was an assistant commander of the 84 Tula Rifle Division of the Moscow Military District. From August 1939 to March 1941 of the year, he was the commander of the 172th Infantry Division of the Belarusian Military District, and then he studied. In 1941, he graduated from the Advanced Training Courses for the Higher Command at the MV Frunze Military Academy.
    Member of World War II since June 1941. In March-August of the 1941 of the year - commander of the 1-th Moscow Motorized Rifle Division (1-I Panzer) of the 20-th Army on the Western Front. Colonel Y. G. Kreiser in early July 1941 in the area of ​​the city of Borisov, Minsk Region (Belarus) well organized the fighting of the division, which, after delivering a counterattack to the enemy, delayed its advance for two days at the turn of the Berezina River. In battles near the city of Orsha, J.G. Kreiser ensured the conduct of successful military operations in the main direction of the army. His personal participation in the battle and fearlessness inspired the soldiers.
    By the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 22 of July 1941 for the successful leadership of military formations and shown personal courage and heroism, Colonel Kreizer Yakov Grigorievich was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Golden Star medal. He became the first Hero of the Soviet Union in the infantry during the Great Patriotic War.
  13. Dr. No
    Dr. No 29 October 2012 13: 22
    0
    More on this topic, about the battles in Belarus in the early days of the war, can be found in the memoirs of Dmitry Timofeevich Pikulenko loading the BT-7 light tank (the book by Vladimir Pershanin “Death Field” “Oktopnaya Pravda” of the Great Patriotic War)
  14. Sergei Lilishentsev
    Sergei Lilishentsev 23 February 2022 23: 03
    0
    The dual impression. First. Thank you for bringing back to life a half-forgotten (or forgotten) glorious page. Our history of the Great Patriotic War, not only in the last 20-30 years, but also in the Brezhnev era, depicted the events of the Great Patriotic War not better, but worse than they actually were. In our country (and our historiography of the Great Patriotic War began, by and large, only under Khrushchev), not all heroic episodes worthy of memory were glorified, but mainly only those events in which either those in power at the time the myths were compiled, or persons whom these authorities participated the powers that be appointed "saviors of the fatherland." And those numerous glorious pages of our history that refute concocted myths were hushed up. (What has been said should not be understood in such a way that I am trying to belittle the feat, for example, the defenders of Malaya Zemlya, no doubt, a heroic episode, but there were actually many more such episodes than are listed in our historiography of the Great Patriotic War). How many people know that, in addition to the defense of the Brest Fortress, even on the territory of Belarus there are quite a few glorious pages comparable to it? On the move - a 5-day defense of Zaslavl, a city west of Minsk, the most ancient city in Belarus, not from 2, but from 1 millennium AD. Or up to 2 weeks of defense of the bunkers of the Brest UR, on the very border. But there is a completely unacceptable passage in the article, which cannot be disputed. I quote: “Before the war, according to the curriculum, offensive actions, attacks, marches were practiced; defense training, and even more so actions in the environment, could well become the basis for repressions against the developers of such plans. Soviet propaganda intensively introduced into the masses slogans such as "We will fight on foreign territory and with little bloodshed." Although back in the early 30s, the Red Army had a well-established system for training military leaders to act in conditions of encirclement, and on the territory of Ukraine and Belarus stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and food were stored in caches to supply troops in conditions of a deep breakthrough of the enemy. All these caches were destroyed by the NKVD, and many trained commanders of the Red Army and personnel of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, who specialized in sabotage and partisan actions, were shot in 1937. "Directly a relapse of Khrushchevism - rezunism. THERE ARE NO EXCLUSIVELY ABOUT OFFENSIVE EXERCISES. ANY TEACHING ABOUT OFFENSIVE IS SIMULTANEOUSLY ABOUT DEFENSE. If the Reds attack, the Blues defend. If this is not so, then this doctrine is not about the offensive, but about nothing. Just not in the pre-war years, but in the 1920s - early 1930s, through the efforts of the Trotskys - Tukhachevskys - Yakirs - Uboryavichus, everything, including military policy, was subordinated to dreams of a so-called. Mr. "world revolution". Consequently, all the defensive developments of the times of World War I were anathematized. At PU in 1935. only separate rifle cells were provided, without trenches of a full profile and communications. For the Trotsky-Leninists who seized power in Russia, who freely babbled in half a dozen European languages, Europe is their home, and Russia is a bundle of brushwood to set the revolutionary fire in Europe. And in Spain in 1936-1937, and on Hassan in 1938. brought up by Trotsky - Tukhachevsky in the 1920s - early 1930s. the cadres demonstrated utter mediocrity, primarily in defensive actions. You can scold Stalin as you like, his attitude to the rejection of the "world revolution" and the thesis of building socialism in one single country had an extremely positive significance, including for military policy.
  15. Sergei Lilishentsev
    Sergei Lilishentsev 24 February 2022 01: 09
    0
    (continued) In the early 1930s. in the USSR, saboteurs were trained not to ensure defensive actions on their territory, but for terrorist attacks on foreign territory, to ensure the accomplishment of the "world revolution" by armed means. And I have to deal with a primitive understanding of the essence of defense (in particular, with Rezun), as a passive sitting in "fox holes". The appearance after World War I of new types of weapons (tanks, aircraft, fundamentally new artillery) made passive defense unpromising. It was in full accordance with Rezun's fantasies that Poland in 1 and the united France-Naglia-Benelux in 1939 tried to stop the Nazis with passive defense, and were shamefully beaten in a matter of weeks. And the Fritz gracefully stopped the attempts of the Poles in 1940, the Anglo-Franco-Benelux in 1939. and councils in 1940-1941. not by passively sitting in "fox holes", but by COUNTERBUILDING. As, for example, when repelling our attack on Kharkov in May 42 and our offensive near Moscow in the winter of 1942. And another refutation of the tales of an alleged "offensive deviation" at the beginning of the war. During the Battle of Smolensk in July 1942, independently of each other, officers of the tsarist army Rokossovsky and Kutepov, contrary to the regulations a la Trotsky-Tukhachevsky, gave the command to dig trenches of a full profile and communications (based on their own experience of World War 1941) . And Stalin not only did not shoot them - moreover, Rokossovsky was promoted in rank and position, despite the fact that Rokossovsky in 1-1937. was under arrest and investigation. And released, and promoted in rank and position on the personal instructions of Stalin. Which excludes Stalin's personal interest in the destruction of Rokossovsky. Like Gorbatov, Bukshtynovich, L. Petrovsky. Thanks to the author, this conclusion - and in relation to Lizyukov, I did not know about this page of Lizyukov's biography. The most important saboteur - I. Starinov - not only was not subjected to repression, but also made a career. Quote: "The instructors trained directly by Starinov in the pre-war years trained over 38 qualified partisans. During the Great Patriotic War, the instructors trained by him trained over 1000 partisan saboteurs in various schools. Only in the Operational Training Center of the Western Front, 5 people were trained" . https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Starinov_Ilya_Grigorevich. And none of them were repressed. And one more thing: “From 1600/23.01.41/22.02.41 to 7/400/22, gatherings were held in Moscow for the heads of intelligence departments of the western districts. Head Colonel Vinogradov I.V. case of forced retreat. Organize reserve intelligence networks to the same depth "". A.B. Martirosyan June 2006 blitzkrieg or betrayal of Eksmo Yauza 358 p. 1. Kolpakidi A. Prokhorov D. Empire GRU v. 1996 M 290 p. A. Military intelligence of the USSR in 291-1941 New and recent history 1945 No. 1995 p.2
    And this is the vaunted - over-praised Zhyu-yu-yu-kov, when he was chief of the general staff, limited the depth of retreat to 100-150 km Kolpakidi A. GRU Empire p. 290-291 Pavlov A. p.27 Martirosyan p.360. So the opposite is true - just in the pre-war years, and not in the early 1930s, due to the fact that many Trotsky-Leninists entrenched in Moscow are champions of the "world revolution" on the blood and suffering of the Russian people (for example, Bela Kun, Neumann) - were repressed, and the Comintern was severely curtailed in its capabilities, sabotage groups were organized for a future war, for the partisan movement in it. "Considerations on the strategic deployment of September 28, 1940" (a document that was published in spite of the resistance of the Khrushchevists - Zhukivists) - exactly like this: when the Hitlerites attack, restrain them with active defense, then, after mobilization is completed, go on the counteroffensive. The main forces of the 1st strategic echelon were located 50-100 km, and the 2nd strategic echelon - 600-700 km from the border. It is for counterattacks on the Nazis after their invasion of our territory. And to reduce losses from the first strike of artillery and enemy aircraft. And the fact that the "Considerations" of May 15, 1941 provided for a HARD DEFENSE does not matter - they were not signed by either the Chief of the General Staff Zhukov, or the People's Commissar for Defense Timoshenko, or the head of government, Stalin. This is no more than 1 of the options that were worked out by Vasilevsky, Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, from his personal safe, this draft migrated straight to the archive of the Moscow Region.
    1. Sergei Lilishentsev
      Sergei Lilishentsev 24 February 2022 01: 29
      0
      I think many will be interested in the following information: In the Khrushchev-Brezhnev times, we were firmly hammered into our heads with the lie that the first city liberated from the Fritz was supposedly Yelnya on September 06, 1941, through the efforts of the vaunted - overpraised Zhyu-yu-kov. And here's how it really is: 1. Przemysl, Lviv region, on the very border; as a result of a counterattack, ours crossed the border and advanced several kilometers across enemy territory
      23 June 1941.
      2. Rava-Russkaya, Lviv region, on the very border; as a result of a counterattack, ours crossed the border and advanced several kilometers across enemy territory
      23 June 1941.

      3. Ustilug, Volyn region, Vladimir-Volyn region, on the very border; The Fritz 99th Light Infantry Division fought here until the end of June 1941.
      23 June 1941.

      4. Kiliya Veche, a city on the Romanian bank of the Danube. Reflection of the fire raid of the Romanians in the first minutes of the war and the attempts of the Romanians to force the Danube. Forcing our Danube, crossing the border and forming a bridgehead on the Romanian coast up to 100 km wide and up to 5 km deep. It was held for more than a month and left only under the threat of encirclement by the German-Romanian troops advancing from Northern Bessarabia
      26 June 1941.

      5. Dubno, the regional center of the Rivne region. Taken by attack not from the east, but from the west. Accordingly, the Germans draped to the east. And they were not surrounded and defeated only due to the lack of radio communications between our mechanized corps, advancing from the west and east and with aviation, front-line and army
      26 June 1941.

      6. Riga, right-bank part. The operational group of Colonel Lasha I of the German 18th Army Corps, which had seized a bridgehead on the right bank of the Daugava, was forced to flee home to the left bank. Bridges across the Daugava were destroyed. All this allowed the troops of the 8th Soviet Army to retreat and avoid encirclement.
      29 June 1941.

      7. Ostrov, district center of the Pskov district of the Leningrad region. Now the district center of the Pskov region July 05, 1941.
      From July 5, 1941, the corps (1mk without 1td, departed on 17.06.41/111/1 in the area southwest of Kandalaksha) attacks Ostrov from the north and northeast, together with units of the 6th Infantry Division, some units broke into The island, however, could not hold it under the onslaught of the 5st Panzer Division. On the same day in the evening, the corps launched a new attack, but was again driven back, including by the approaching 1941th Panzer Division. Since the evening of July 6, 1941, the corps has been retreating in a northeasterly direction. Attempts to capture the Island continued on July 7, 1941. On July 3, 41, the XNUMXrd Panzer Division, or rather its remnants, was subordinated to the XNUMXst Rifle Corps, so the corps remained in the form of command and remnants of a motorcycle regiment, which came under enemy attack south of Pskov.

      8. Parichi, in 1941 regional center of the Polessye region July 13, 1941
      Now Svetlogorsk district of the Gomel region

      9. Zhlobin, district center of the Gomel region July 14, 1941

      10. Rogachev, district center of the Gomel region July 14, 1941

      11. Soltsy, district center of the Novgorod region July 16, 1941

      12. Mstislavl, district center of the Mogilev region July 16, 1941

      13. Propoisk, now Slavgorod, Mogilev region July 16, 1941
      Three times in July 1941. after July 16, 1941 passed from hand to hand

      14. Fastov, district center of the Kiev region July 17, 1941

      15. Velikiye Luki, district center of the Pskov region and 35 July 21, 1941
      kept for days http://www.hrono.ru/statii/2011/pavl_srazh.php

      16. Starye Dorogi, district center of the Minsk region July 24, 1941

      17. Glusk, district center of the Polessye region July 25, 1941
      Now the district center of the Mogilev region

      18. Yartsevo, district center of the Smolensk region July 25, 1941
      Yartsevo station changed hands 8 times

      19. Krichev, district center of the Mogilev region July 29, 1941

      20. Petrikov, district center of the Polessye region August 03, 1941
      Now the regional center of the Gomel region

      21. Turov, Zhitkovichsky (?) District of the Polesye region August 04, 1941
      Now Zhitkovichi district of the Gomel region

      22. Boguslav, district center of the Kiev region August 07, 1941

      23. Staraya Russa, district center of Leningradskaya August 14, 1941
      (now Novgorod) region
      And one more thing: 1. Lomza district center, now Poland. “General Semyonov, deputy chief of staff of the front, reported to me that Lomzha had been taken by the enemy, but the enemy was again driven out of Lomzha by a counterattack of the 6th Cavalry Division.” Testimony of D.G. Pavlova. I quote from Zenkovich. Page 213.
      22 June 1941.
      2. Zhabinka district center. “Zhabinka changed hands seven times that day.” Testimony of D.G. Pavlova. I quote from Zenkovich. Page 214. June 22, 1941

      3. Zaslavl was liberated by a counterattack and was held for 2 days on June 26, 1941.
      KA belvpo.com/33743.html/ belvpo.com/33799.html/ June 1941.
      Defenders of Zaslavl And, finally, Yelnya September 06, 1941

      Everything is relative. And the shameful Poland in 1939 and the impudent French-Benelux in 1940 have a round number - 0000 (and 0 in the period that does not cancel the round zero)
      1. Sergei Lilishentsev
        Sergei Lilishentsev 24 February 2022 01: 33
        0
        The pace of the drape of the Poles in 1939, the Anglo-Franco-Benelux in 1940. compared with the pace of the retreat of the Red Army in 1941-1942.
        Drap Poles in September 1939
        3rd German Army left wing 19 Guderian motorized corps from 01.09.39/17.09.39/205 to 12/XNUMX/XNUMX from East Prussia to Brest XNUMXkm XNUMX km/day
        10 German Army right wing from 01.09.39/17.09.39/410 to 24/XNUMX/XNUMX from Ratibor to Vlodava XNUMXkm XNUMX km/day
        10th German Army left wing from 01.09.39/10.09.39/30 to 50/256/26 from XNUMX÷XNUMX km east of Oppeln to Deblin and to the east of Warsaw XNUMXkm XNUMX km/day.
        4 German Army left wing from 01.09.39/10.09.39/308 to 31/XNUMX/XNUMX from Schneidemühl to the east of Warsaw XNUMXkm XNUMX km/day

        Total - the average rate of drape of shameful Poland in September 1939. – 23,25 km/day

        01.09.39/04/05.09.39 the "president" of Poland I. Moscicki draped, 07.09.39 ÷ 10.09.39 - the "government" of Poland, on the night of 13.09.39/15.09.39/17 - whether the main one is Mr. Vladimir-Volynsky. 01.09.41/01.09.39/30 Rydz-Smigly's headquarters - in Mlynov (near Dubno), XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX - in Kolomyia (near the Romanian border), on September XNUMX, the "government of Poland" (and Mr. ... commander Rydz-Smigly) crossed the border with Romania. Let us recall the beginning of the paragraph - how on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX the "president" of Poland I. Moscickiy draped from his combat post. This is when (XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX) the Nazis on the first day of the war were still hundreds of kilometers from Warsaw! And Stalin remained in Moscow, even when the Fritz were less than XNUMX km from it. How much more worthy of respect is Stalin than the Polish-Nazi-Russophobic-gentry bastard!

        Drap Anglo-Franco-Benelux in 1940
        12th and 16th German Armies advance from Luxembourg to Boulogne 10.05.40÷27.05.40 370km 21km/day
        From 05.06.40/17.06.40/600 to 46/XNUMX/XNUMX Abbeville - Bordeaux XNUMXkm XNUMX km/day
        From 05.06.40/17.06.40/30 to 30/463/36 from XNUMX km north of Reims to XNUMX km south of Lyon and to Saint-Etienne XNUMX km XNUMX km/day

        Total average drape rates of the infamous Anglo-French-Benelux people in 1940–34,33 km/day

        For comparison. Retreat of the Soviets in 1941-42.
        From 22.06.41/30.11.41/1040 to 162/6,4/XNUMX from Brest to the Moscow Canal (Yakhroma) XNUMX km in XNUMX days XNUMX km/day
        From 22.06.41/08.09.41/830 to 79/10,5/XNUMX from East Prussia to Lake Ladoga (Mga) XNUMX km in XNUMX days XNUMX km / day
        From 22.06.41/17.11.41/1200 to 149/8,1/XNUMX from Sokal to Rostov-on-Don XNUMX km in XNUMX days XNUMX km/day
        From 17.05.42/18.11.42/688 to 186/3,7/XNUMX from Belgorod to Stalingrad XNUMX km in XNUMX days XNUMX km / day
        From 17.05.42/18.11.42/938 to 186/5/XNUMX from the Red Beam (Donbass) to the Main Caucasian Range (west of Vladikavkaz) XNUMX km for XNUMX days XNUMX km / day

        The average rate of retreat of the Soviets in 1941. - 6,74 km / day, in 1942. – 4,3 km/day

        Shameful Poles - draped 3,5 times faster than the Soviets retreated, if only 1942 was taken from the Soviets. – tov 5,5 times faster

        The shameful Anglo-Franco-Beneluxites - draped 5 times faster than the Soviets retreated, if only 1942 was taken from the Soviets. – then 8 times faster

        Shameful Poles in September 1939 and shameful Anglo-Franco-Benelux in 1940. lost their campaigns, and we won the war. From Brest to the Elbe from 22.06.41/09.05.45/1939 to 1940/800/1418, our troops went forward (and not back, like the shameful Poles and the shameful Anglo-French-Benelux people in 0,56 and in XNUMX) XNUMX km in XNUMX days, a total of XNUMX km / days ahead.
        That is, for the entire Second World War - the shameful Poles in September 1939. draped 41,5 times faster, the shameful Anglo-French-Benelux people in 1940. draped 61,3 times faster than the Soviets advanced from 22.06.1941/09.05.1945/XNUMX to XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX
        Yes, even, to put it mildly, it is strange to compare the OFFENSIVE and RETREAT, moreover, not RETRACT, but DRAP. The categories are QUALITATIVELY different. Comparing plus and minus.

        So who really "draped light," in the terminology of Markuni Solonin, the fireman of the boiler room, who imagined himself to be a so-called "historian"?
        When I studied in the 1970s at the military department of the Tula Polytechnic Institute, Colonel Tarasov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, simply and intelligibly explained the difference between a retreat and a drape - during a retreat, a line is outlined in the rear, on which defense should be occupied and retreat at this line stopped.
        This is about the garrisons of the fortified areas of the USSR, both on the border and on the border of the occupation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus by Nazi Poland in 1920. Ten pulbats - garrisons of Fortified areas on the border (at most 4000 people), and 4 rifle divisions that came to their aid (maximum 40000 people) in places for more than a month, detained more than 400000 people on the border, or 25 Fritz divisions. So the Brest Fortress, to our pride, is not at all such an exceptional episode.
        A. Krupennikov - IN THE FIRST BATTLE, a collection of articles and essays on the initial period of the Great Patriotic War - Krasnogorsk, 1998
        And Poland in September 1939. and France, Naglia, Benelux in 1940. not a single Fritz division was detained on the border. Westerplatte, Modlin, Warsaw are located not on the border, but hundreds of kilometers from it, and the Poles had the opportunity to prepare these points for defense in advance. And after the drape on September 17, 1939. Polish gentry cowards to Romania, the Germans no longer needed to storm these points - the shameful gentry from the "cauldrons" will not go anywhere - a week or two, and the gentry themselves will surrender, which happened.
  16. Sergei Lilishentsev
    Sergei Lilishentsev 24 February 2022 01: 36
    0
    [quote = Sergey Lilishentsev] The pace of the drape of the Poles in 1939, the Anglo-Franco-Benelux in 1940. compared with the rate of retreat of the Red Army in 1941-1942.
    Drap Poles in September 1939
    3rd German Army left wing 19 Guderian motorized corps from 01.09.39/17.09.39/205 to 12/XNUMX/XNUMX from East Prussia to Brest XNUMXkm XNUMX km/day
    10 German Army right wing from 01.09.39/17.09.39/410 to 24/XNUMX/XNUMX from Ratibor to Vlodava XNUMXkm XNUMX km/day
    10th German Army left wing from 01.09.39/10.09.39/30 to 50/256/26 from XNUMX÷XNUMX km east of Oppeln to Deblin and to the east of Warsaw XNUMXkm XNUMX km/day.
    4th German Army left wing from 01.09.39/10.09.39/308 to 31/XNUMX/XNUMX from Schneidemuhl to the east of Warsaw XNUMXkm XNUMX km/day

    Total - the average rate of drape of shameful Poland in September 1939. – 23,25 km/day

    01.09.39/04/05.09.39 the "president" of Poland I. Moscicki draped, 07.09.39 ÷ 10.09.39 - the "government" of Poland, on the night of 13.09.39/15.09.39/17 - whether it was the Chief ... the commander of the army of Poland Rydz-Smigly, 01.09.41/01.09.39/30 his rate in Vladimir-Volynsky. XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX Rydz-Smigly headquarters - in Mlynov (near Dubno), XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX - in Kolomyia (near the Romanian border), on September XNUMX, the “Polish government” (and Mr. Rydz-Smigly commander) crossed the border with Romania. Let us recall the beginning of the paragraph - how on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX the "president" of Poland I. Moscickiy draped from his combat post. This is when (XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX) the Nazis on the first day of the war were still hundreds of kilometers from Warsaw! And Stalin remained in Moscow, even when the Fritz were less than XNUMX km from it. How much more worthy of respect is Stalin than the Polish-Nazi-Russophobic-gentry ...!

    Drap Anglo-Franco-Benelux in 1940
    12th and 16th German Armies advance from Luxembourg to Boulogne 10.05.40÷27.05.40 370km 21km/day
    From 05.06.40/17.06.40/600 to 46/XNUMX/XNUMX Abbeville - Bordeaux XNUMXkm XNUMX km/day
    From 05.06.40/17.06.40/30 to 30/463/36 from XNUMX km north of Reims to XNUMX km south of Lyon and to Saint-Etienne XNUMX km XNUMX km/day

    Total average drape rates of the infamous Anglo-French-Benelux people in 1940–34,33 km/day

    For comparison. Retreat of the Soviets in 1941-42.
    From 22.06.41/30.11.41/1040 to 162/6,4/XNUMX from Brest to the Moscow Canal (Yakhroma) XNUMX km in XNUMX days XNUMX km/day
    From 22.06.41/08.09.41/830 to 79/10,5/XNUMX from East Prussia to Lake Ladoga (Mga) XNUMX km in XNUMX days XNUMX km / day
    From 22.06.41/17.11.41/1200 to 149/8,1/XNUMX from Sokal to Rostov-on-Don XNUMX km in XNUMX days XNUMX km/day
    From 17.05.42/18.11.42/688 to 186/3,7/XNUMX from Belgorod to Stalingrad XNUMX km in XNUMX days XNUMX km / day
    From 17.05.42/18.11.42/938 to 186/5/XNUMX from the Red Beam (Donbass) to the Main Caucasian Range (west of Vladikavkaz) XNUMX km for XNUMX days XNUMX km / day

    The average rate of retreat of the Soviets in 1941. - 6,74 km / day, in 1942. – 4,3 km/day

    Shameful Poles - draped 3,5 times faster than the Soviets retreated, if only 1942 was taken from the Soviets. – then 5,5 times faster

    The shameful Anglo-Franco-Beneluxites - draped 5 times faster than the Soviets retreated, if only 1942 was taken from the Soviets. – then 8 times faster

    Shameful Poles in September 1939 and shameful Anglo-Franco-Benelux in 1940. lost their campaigns, and we won the war. From Brest to the Elbe from 22.06.41/09.05.45/1939 to 1940/800/1418, our troops went forward (and not back, like the shameful Poles and the shameful Anglo-French-Benelux people in 0,56 and in XNUMX) XNUMX km in XNUMX days, a total of XNUMX km / days ahead.
    That is, for the entire Second World War - the shameful Poles in September 1939. draped 41,5 times faster, the shameful Anglo-French-Benelux people in 1940. draped 61,3 times faster than the Soviets advanced from 22.06.1941/09.05.1945/XNUMX to XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX
    Yes, even, to put it mildly, it is strange to compare the OFFENSIVE and RETREAT, moreover, not RETRACT, but DRAP. The categories are QUALITATIVELY different. Comparing plus and minus.

    So who really "draped light," in the terminology of Markuni Solonin, the fireman of the boiler room, who imagined himself to be a so-called "historian"?
    When I studied in the 1970s at the military department of the Tula Polytechnic Institute, Colonel Tarasov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, simply and intelligibly explained the difference between a retreat and a drape - during a retreat, a line is outlined in the rear, on which defense should be occupied and retreat at this line stopped.
    This is about the garrisons of the fortified areas of the USSR, both on the border and on the border of the occupation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus by Nazi Poland in 1920. Ten pulbats - garrisons of Fortified areas on the border (at most 4000 people), and 4 rifle divisions that came to their aid (maximum 40000 people) in places for more than a month, detained more than 400000 people on the border, or 25 Fritz divisions. So the Brest Fortress, to our pride, is not at all such an exceptional episode.
    A. Krupennikov - IN THE FIRST BATTLE, a collection of articles and essays on the initial period of the Great Patriotic War - Krasnogorsk, 1998
    And Poland in September 1939. and France, Naglia, Benelux in 1940. not a single Fritz division was detained on the border. Westerplatte, Modlin, Warsaw are located not on the border, but hundreds of kilometers from it, and the Poles had the opportunity to prepare these points for defense in advance. And after the drape on September 17, 1939. Polish gentry cowards to Romania, the Germans no longer needed to storm these points - the shameful gentry from the "cauldrons" will not go anywhere - a week or two, and the gentry themselves will surrender, which happened.
    1. Sergei Lilishentsev
      Sergei Lilishentsev 24 February 2022 13: 03
      0
      Now about the Soviet lines of defense in 1941. - this is more than a three-day defense of Minsk, more than a three-month defense of Kyiv, more than a three-week defense of Mogilev. This is the defense of Izmail and the Romanian city of Chilia-Veke, which was captured by our troops on June 26, 1941, which lasted more than a month. Ishmael and Kiliya-Veke were left only under the threat of encirclement. These are 5-day defenses of the cities of Przemysl and Rava-Russkaya on the territory occupied by the Fritz back in September 1939. These cities on the very border were liberated (we are talking about that part of them that was captured by the Fritz on June 22, 1941) and captured (we are talking about that part of them that was under the Fritz on June 22, 1941) by our troops on June 23, 1941. This is a 10-day (June 22, 1941 - July 02, 1941) defense of Libau. This is a 9-day (June 22-30, 1941) defense of Ustilug, Volyn region, a town on the very border. This is the Battle of Smolensk, when the Fritz slowed down for more than 3 months. This is the Luga line and the defense of Tallinn, when the Fritz were detained for more than a month. These are the well-known months-long defenses of Sevastopol and Odessa. These are less known, but also months-long defenses of the Moonsund Islands (July - October 1941), from which ours in 1941. bombed Berlin. These are the defenses of the Hanko Peninsula and Osmussar Island, June 22 - December 02, 1941, these points closed the entrance to the Gulf of Finland.
      And the queen of defensive lines - the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas in the Barents Sea, on the very border. Defense since June 22, 1941 until September 1944, before the start of the Lapland War - the war of the USSR in alliance with Finland - a former ally of Nazi Germany - against Nazi Germany. The only place where the Fritz since June 22, 1941. failed to cross the border. Although they were very eager - the possession of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas opened the way to Murmansk and to the bases of the Northern Fleet - Polyarny and Severomorsk.
      I didn’t forget to mention Leningrad at all - this is still not an intermediate defensive line
      A drape is to get away from the enemy, without even trying to take up defense, and stop the enemy’s advance. Like shameful Poland in September 1939, thinking only about how to escape to Romania. How shameful France, Naglia, Benelux in 1940, thinking only about how to drape into Naglia, beyond the natural anti-tank ditch called the English Channel.
      And about the offensive operations of our army in the first months of the war against Nazi Germany and its allies. Many of our citizens, zombified by Khrushchev's and then Mark Solonin's propaganda, will have their eyes on their foreheads at these words. What offensive operations in the first months of the Second World War? Drapali light, they will answer. As far as I remember, in the year that way in 1966 - 1968. in the Tula regional newspaper "Molodoy Kommunar" there was an interview with a participant in the capture of the Romanian city of Kiliya-Veke on June 26, 1941. And the Khrushchev-prozombized girl - the correspondent who was interviewing, was sincerely surprised - I'm asking you, dear veteran, about 1941, and not about 1944!
      I continue listing:
      the defeat of the 56th motorized corps of Erich von Mannstein near Soltsy, Novgorod region in July 1941, when the Fritz were not only stopped for almost a month, but also thrown back for more than 60 km. For the first time since the start of World War II. Neither in Poland in 2, nor in the West since May 1939, was there anything like it.
      The advance of the Soviets in August 1941 under Staraya Russa for more than 60 km.
      On the map of hostilities in the battle of Smolensk in July-August 1941. in the Bobruisk area there are three arrows indicating the advance of the troops of our 21st Army. One - from the Rechitsa region in the direction of the Osipovichi station, the length of the arrow, that is, the depth to which our troops advanced deep into the territory occupied by the Nazis - about 200 km. This indicator was blocked only in December 1941. - February 1942, during the counter-offensive and general offensive near Moscow. Near Moscow, the horse-mechanized group of P.A. Belova - from Kashira to the area west of Vyazma, with all maneuvers left and right, about 450 km. But the pace of advancement of the cavalry group of the 21st army in July - August 1941. were not blocked - the cavalry group of the 21st army in July-August 1941. per day moved an average of 30 km, and the group of P.A. Belova near Moscow in December 1941. - February 1942 - 6 km per day. And the second arrow, along the western coast of the Berezina, according to the scale of the summer of 1941, speaking in youth slang, “cool”, an advance of about 80 km. This promotion was repeated only in November 1941. - during the counter-offensive near Rostov. And blocked in December 1941. - during counteroffensives near Tikhvin (120 km) and Moscow. And the third arrow is impressive - the offensive of the 63rd rifle corps of the 21st army with the crossing of the Dnieper and the liberation of the cities of Rogachev and Zhlobin (regional centers) and advancing towards Bobruisk for 30 km. But in the book "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union", and in the famous six-volume book about the Great Patriotic War, it is only about this, the smallest arrow, and even then, in passing, patter. That's a shame - if Poland in 1939, or the coalition France - England - the Benelux countries in May - June 1940. they threw back the Nazi army not only by 200, or 30, but at least even by 2 km, and would have liberated some town with a population of at least 10-15 thousand people, they would have screamed about it as victims. And here, as it is easy to see, there is silence, completely inappropriate. To all the participants in the discussion and the author - good health and success.