More than Germans in the 41st: what NATO can oppose to Russia
strategic stalemate
Now all news agencies are absorbed in two topics - the omicron pandemic and the unprecedented increase in tension between Russia and the NATO bloc. And if from the first history everything is more or less clear, then the Ukrainian crisis evokes completely unhappy thoughts. It’s worth starting with the fact that modern analysts do not highly estimate the chance of a cold confrontation turning into a real war. Of course, no one really likes alarmists, but where were these analysts when the Kazakh rebellion broke out? Not a single, I repeat, not a single thought about the potential possibility of New Year's events in Kazakhstan was not. But then every self-respecting political scientist considered it necessary to talk about the reasons for what happened, so to speak, “sort it out”. What does it say? First of all, about the fact that in Russia there is still no clear independent structure capable of soberly assessing the geopolitical situation both in the world in general and in the immediate vicinity of the state. Unfortunately, analysts are not able to adequately predict options for the development of strategic events, but they are able to convince the broad masses, that is, simply to conduct propaganda. It remains to be hoped that outside of public policy, the Kremlin has serious analytical structures and they are sufficiently professional.
The public, which can influence the situation either in no way at all, or very indirectly, is now left not to consider possible options, but to count the number of troops and assess the existing status quo.
The main problem of the current state of affairs is the catastrophic lack of time for Russia's retaliatory steps in the event of NATO aggression. In the 90s of the last century, the North Atlantic Alliance made a real blitzkrieg, moving the buffer zone 600-1500 kilometers to the east. In total, Russia has ceased to control more than 2,2 million square kilometers of territory with a population of 210 million people. Very quickly, the countries of Eastern Europe turned from former allies, if not into enemies, then definitely into ill-wishers. Things continued to deteriorate into the 2000s, with Ukraine's border now running less than 500 kilometers from Moscow. In a straight line, of course. This is two or three days of movement of motorized columns, not to mention the flight time of cruise missiles with tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is impossible to say that Russia has been building partnerships with NATO countries for the past 30 years - we have lost in all respects on the principle of "one step forward - two steps back." And sometimes there were no steps forward. The only breakthroughs were the return of the Crimea, the creation of the LDNR and the prevention of a coup in Belarus. The last event is especially important - otherwise, NATO instructors would have already seen the Kremlin through their binoculars. From the border of Belarus to Moscow is already less than 400 kilometers and the front line is aligned in the best configuration for the enemy since 1941. Welcome, so to speak! The buffer zone is absent as a phenomenon, and this never happened at all - neither in the First, nor in the Second World War. But the return of Crimea and the salvation of Belarus are perhaps the only positive moments since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In addition to the loss of territory, there is a serious imbalance in manpower - Russia simply does not have enough fighters and workers for a protracted conflict. Even if we add the population and the army of Belarus for statistics. On the NATO side, it is enough to take the USA, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Germany and Italy, which together can mobilize up to 313 million people. Of course, this is a hypothetical number, which includes the entire population capable of holding weapon and shoot. But 313 million very clearly show the total superiority over the Russia-Belarus tandem, which will have only 75 million military reserves. We have even fewer working reserves - 74 million, while NATO has 328 million. If we take into account the population of the countries of Eastern Europe, Scandinavia and other sympathizers, then the advantage of the West will be even more significant.
Under the conditions of real mobilization, NATO will be able to gather at least 4,8 million bayonets near the Russian border within a couple of months - this is without civilian personnel, departmental forces and reserve troops. Russia and Belarus - no more than 1,1 million fighters. The imbalance is huge! Recall that in 1941 the Germans with henchmen pulled together about 4 million people for the blitzkrieg, while 2,88 million were stationed near the Soviet Union on the western borders. The difference, of course, is significant, but far from fourfold, as it is now. For comparison, in 1989 the forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO were approximately equal - on both sides there were approximately 5,8-6 million military men. It was much easier to talk back then. To all the problems, now the Russian military has very little freedom of maneuver and time to respond. NATO in 2021, unlike the Wehrmacht, does not need to fight through Ukraine and the Baltic states to get to Moscow. The uneven distribution of forces between the two opposing sides is dangerous for two reasons. Firstly, a stronger opponent is always tempted to strike first, after all "God is on the side of the big battalions". Secondly, a side with less potential may decide on a preemptive strike in the hope of gaining an advantageous geopolitical position.
saber rattling
Surely someone will object, they say, an armed conflict between Russia and NATO is impossible. The reason is a considerable nuclear potential capable of incinerating opponents. If that were the case, then there would be no American Tanks, and Russian Su-35s were not transferred to Belarus. The probability of a collision with the use of traditional weapons is high, and how much it will slide into a nuclear war depends on the case. Or from the intensity of the attack on Moscow, Berlin, Warsaw, Kiev, and so on. As a result, one has to count the conventional weapons that Russia and Belarus and the NATO countries possess. According to the calculations of analyst Ilya Topchia, the advantage is on the side of the West in almost all respects, with the exception of multiple rocket launchers and cannon artillery. The fact that there are still a lot of guns left on the territory of the post-Soviet countries is evidenced by the specifics of the Ukrainian conflict, in which artillery became the real queen of the fields. But NATO is lagging behind quite a bit here - against 19,5 thousand Belarusian-Russian self-propelled guns and rocket launchers, they can put up about 17 thousand barrels. In the West, there are more tanks in total, about 1,4 times. In 1989, the Soviet Union, together with the Eastern bloc, could put up 20 thousand of its own against 47 thousand enemy tanks. And if we count light armored vehicles, then in 2022 NATO has more than 70 thousand units, we have a little more than 31 thousand. The lag in the number of combat vehicles looks even more fatal aviation - in the first weeks and months of the conflict, NATO aircraft will most likely occupy the entire sky and provide a no-fly zone over part of the combat area. Russia and Belarus have about 6 thousand units of winged equipment, and the team of opponents has up to 20 thousand. For naval battles, Russia has about 600 ships, NATO countries have almost twice as many. However, what could be expected from the total defense budget of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, which exceeds $1 trillion, against Russia's $48 billion?
The guarantee that this entire armada will not break the resistance of the Russian troops remains 12 divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces and about 6,5 thousand nuclear charges. Here Russia has a certain advantage, and not only quantitative, but also qualitative - our nuclear arsenal is much more advanced than the American one. The only question is: will it help if the nearest missile unit of NATO troops can be only a few hundred kilometers from the Kremlin?
Now, while they speak the language of diplomacy, hybrid and information wars, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of NATO countries to the borders of 1997 looks like the most sensible scenario. This will allow you to get at least a hint of the buffer territory in front of the borders of Russia. Moreover, the benefit from such a step is present both for Moscow, which will simply become easier to breathe, and for Brussels-Washington, which also does not need Russia's unpredictable reactions. In any other scenario, all hope is only for the “black swans”, for which the Kremlin has long been famous.
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