Did the People's Commissariat of Defense expect a war at dawn on June 22

The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, GSh - General base, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, Cova - Kiev Special VO, NCOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, Og - operational readiness, OdVO - Odessa VO, Pribovo - Baltic special VO, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, sd - rifle division, Ur - fortified area.

A small digression

Previously, the factors that influenced the defeat of spacecraft in border battles in the first hours and days of the war were considered. Reconnaissance failed to detect the advance of German mobile groupings to the border. Therefore, it was not possible to determine the direction of their strikes. As a result, the General Staff was unable to correctly assess the danger of the situation on the border and in a timely manner to reinforce the forces and resources of the groupings in the directions of the main enemy strikes, as well as to move the troops of the 1st echelon of the covering armies to the border, start mining the borders and evacuate the families of servicemen.

Consider the events that took place on the night of June 22, of which there are many memories. But these memories contradict each other. It seems that these events are connected with a secret that hides the actions of the leadership of the spacecraft and the country.

What is known about this period?

From the memoirs of the military, it follows that on the eve of the war, the leadership of the spacecraft sought to bring the army to combat readiness, but Stalin did not allow this to be done.

Stalin imposed on the leadership of the spacecraft to send a very lengthy directive to the troops.

Due to Stalin's fault, the time of sending the directive was delayed, which led to the fact that it did not have time to reach the troops before the start of the war ...

The period on the night of June 22 can be judged only on the basis of memories that may turn out to be unreliable. The people who wrote these memoirs are no longer with us, and it is impossible to find out the truth. The available documents do not make it possible to determine exactly how the leaders acted and the sequence of their actions. Therefore, one can only assume these events ...

In the two final parts, the author will voice his version of these events. The version is based on the fact that the spacecraft leadership does not expect war on June 22. This has been shown in many parts of the article.

Now let's touch on history creating a directive without a number. In Soviet times, it was called "Directive No. 1", and the author will call it in the same way in the future. Since the history of the well-known directive is touched upon, then to substantiate the version, it is necessary to cite material that is large enough in volume, which can hardly fit into two parts.

I would like to say thanks to Sergei Leonidovich Chekunov, who expressed on the site Militera.lib.ru a lot of their own considerations and clarifications of the comments of the forum participants. His statements are based on deep knowledge of the pre-war period. The considerations of a highly qualified historian prompted the author to prepare this cycle.

I want to express my gratitude to the site moderators "Military Review" for their professional work.

I would like to express my gratitude to the site administrator "Military Review" V.I.Smirnov, who helped to solve technical issues and allowed to supplement the parts that passed moderation with newly discovered interesting materials.

In the previous part

In the previous part the events taking place before 23:00 on June 21 were considered. It was not possible to find information that until 20:00 the leadership of the spacecraft or the Soviet Union was carrying out measures to prepare the army for the outbreak of war at dawn on June 22. Nothing happened that could alert the leadership of the army and the country.

After the receipt of the RM from G. Kegel (an employee of the German embassy in Moscow) and, possibly, other information, Stalin summons the People's Commissar of Defense, Chief of the General Staff and Marshal S.M.Budyonny.

From the diary of S.M.Budyonny it is clear that at 20:50 the leaders of the army came to Stalin, unaware of the start of the war on June 22. They did not have with them the draft directive to the troops. The leaders of the spacecraft did not fear the outbreak of war at dawn on June 22, or did not believe in its beginning.

S.M.Budyonny leaves Stalin's office at 22:00. He does not write in his memoirs that before his departure a certain directive was written to the troops. We know that Directive No. 1 was written in Stalin's office only from the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov: "Stalin, having listened to the draft directive and read it himself again, made some amendments and handed over to the People's Commissar for signature."

Let's try to understand this issue.

The leaders of the spacecraft left Stalin's office 20 minutes after the departure of Budyonny. The author spent 11 minutes rewriting the text of the directive. The military could rewrite it from a draft in 11-12 minutes. But in Stalin's office, the directive still needed to be formulated. After that, Stalin was supposed to read it. Further, it was required to voice it in front of other persons present in the office and, possibly, discuss it.

Is it possible to do all this in 20 minutes?

Unlikely ...

If the draft of Directive No. 1 was written in Stalin's office, then it is rather difficult to explain the delay in the correspondence of the document with the NCO.

Was the draft of Directive No. 1 written in Stalin's office?

Indeed, after the departure of S.M.Budyonny, the leadership of the army could prove to the leader that nothing dangerous, according to their data, was happening on the border. In Stalin's office, the leaders of the KA could only speak out the provisions of the future directive, promising to draw it up in the non-profit organization. In this case, Stalin mistakenly trusted the military ...

Let's check this version.

At 22:20, Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Malenkov and Mekhlis leave Stalin's office. At the end of the meeting, Stalin might have received information that some employees of the German embassy had gone to spend the night in their apartments. Among them was the intelligence officer G. Kegel. Calmed down by the military, Stalin leaves for his dacha after 23:00: after all, everything on the border is under the control of the leaders of the spacecraft ...

Text of Directive No. 1

In the published text Directive No. 1 no edits by Stalin.

And in draft notes the German government revised comrade. Stalin are available.

It seems that Stalin did not amend Directive No. 1. The text of the directive shows that many changes were made directly when the provisions were formulated. This is evidenced by the spacing in the text and the location of the edits. The terminology of clarifications of the text was made not by the leader, but by a military man.

What are the reasons for not trusting the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov?

1. No changes by Stalin.

2. If Directive No. 1 was written in Stalin's office, then it took no more than 12 minutes to rewrite it in a notebook for cipher telegrams, and it took more than half an hour to rewrite it.

3. After 22:35, the People's Commissar of Defense calls up the western districts and does not speak about the content of Directive No. 1. Maybe at this time the provisions of the directive had not yet been formulated?

4. Directive No. 1 is signed by SK Timoshenko and GK Zhukov. The following Directives No. 2 and No. 3, in addition to the indicated comrades, are signed by GM Malenkov.

Perhaps Malenkov did not sign Directive No. 1 because he was absent from the Commissar's office?

Small calculations

At 22:20, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff left Stalin's office, which was located on the second floor of the Senate Palace. The distance from Stalin's office to the exit from the palace is about 100 m.

When the spacecraft leaders move at a pedestrian speed (5 km / h), they will leave the building in 72 seconds.

The waiting time for an approaching car and boarding is taken as 30 seconds.

The distance from the corner of the Senate Palace to the building where S.K. Timoshenko's office is located is no more than 1 m.

How fast could the leaders of the army go?

"A special decreethat forbids A. Mikoyan to drive at a speed of 80–100 km / h ... and exceed the speed of 50–60 km / h ”.

In memories G.K. Zhukova talks about a trip to the Kremlin on June 22:

The cars of the People's Commissar and mine covered the short way from the People's Commissariat to the Kremlin at extremely high speed.

We assume that the maximum speed is 90 km / h.

For the accepted conditions on June 21, the leaders of the spacecraft covered the path from Stalin's office to their mansion in 3–3,5 minutes.

G.K. Zhukov:

SK Timoshenko and I drove to the entrance of the People's Commissariat in silence ... Leaving the car, we agreed to meet in his office in ten minutes.

According to the author, the leaders of the spacecraft were traveling in the same car and discussed the preparation of Directive No. 1. At 22:25, the People's Commissar of Defense could already be in his office.

Events in the office of the People's Commissar of Defense

In 1940, it turned out that the overlap of the second floor of the main building of the NCO needs to be replaced. This building housed the offices of S. K. Timoshenko, S. M. Budyonny, G. K. Zhukov and K. A. Meretskov with their secretariats. The non-profit organization was able to temporarily take one floor in a two-story mansion for its own needs, which already housed the Spacecraft Combat Training Directorate.

Thus, on the eve of the war, the above leaders were located in offices on the same floor. At 22: 26 ... 22: 30 Meretskov could come up to the People's Commissar of Defense on call. According to the dialogue cited in the memoirs of KA Meretskov, the conversation with the People's Commissar of Defense took about 3-5 minutes.

At 22:35 S. K. Timoshenko could start calling five border districts. By this time, G.K. Zhukov could have approached the office of the People's Commissar, having previously summoned several generals of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff there.

After 22:35 Directive No. 1 was formulated by the chief of the General Staff, the generals of the Operations Directorate, and SK Timoshenko joined the discussion between phone calls.

Since the main provisions of the directive have not yet been formulated, the People's Commissar speaks on the phone only about possible provocations at the border and about the readiness of the district command for these events. Probably, the People's Commissar does not believe in the outbreak of the war on the morning of June 22 and believes that there is still enough time to convey his instructions.

M. E. Morozov ("Transfer of the western fleets and flotillas of the USSR Navy to operational readiness No. 1 on the night of 22.06.41/6/2018", Military history magazine No. XNUMX, XNUMX):

Decree of the Defense Committee under the USSR Council of People's Commissars No. 67ss of 20.04.38 provided for the operational subordination of the NKO and the General Staff of the Red Army in the event of the outbreak of war.

At 23:00 S.K. Timoshenko finished his conversation with the commander of the OdVO and dials the number of the People's Commissar of the Navy.

In the memoirs of N.G. Kuznetsov, the fact of permission to use weapons People's Commissar of Defense.

Why does N.G. Kuznetsov need such an indication, if in the North navy have they been firing on German planes since June 18, with exhaust gas No. 2?

Why would the People's Commissar for Defense clarify the directive if he does not allow his troops to do so?

After all, the opening of fire can provoke a conflict ...

If the People's Commissar of Defense doubts the start of the war after Stalin's instructions to prepare troops for a possible repulse of aggression, then how can Tymoshenko take responsibility for allowing the servicemen of another People's Commissariat to open fire?

There is a movie on the internet "On the Eve" by M. F. Timin and S. L. Chekunov about the events preceding the start of the war. The film says that at 23:02 Admirals N.G. Kuznetsov and V.A.Alafuzov leave the office of the People's Commissar of the Navy and arrive at the office of S.K. Timoshenko at 23:10 pm.

At 23:20 pm, Admiral Alafuzov leaves Timoshenko's office and goes to the People's Commissariat of the Navy to transmit the signal that the fleet will switch to OG No. 1.

At 23: 15 ... 23: 25 the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff GK Malandin prepares a handwritten copy for the NKVMF, and at 23:30 Kuznetsov leaves with the received copy of the directive to his People's Commissariat.

There are memoirs of the Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy, Admiral V.A.Alafuzov.

November 13.11.1965, XNUMX Vladimir Antonovich Alafuzov in a letter to N. G. Kuznetsov, he clarified some details of the events that took place in S. K. Timoshenko's office (M. E. Morozov "Transfer of the western fleets and flotillas of the USSR Navy to operational readiness No. 1 on the night of 22.06.41").

V. A. Alafuzov estimates the time for encryption and decryption of a directive using a manual cipher. The General Staff used encryption machines for correspondence with the western districts, which made it possible to speed up the encryption process. A simplified idea of ​​how different encryption methods differ from each other can be obtained in article.

It turns out that Stalin entrusted the military to prepare and send to the troops the text of Directive No. 1. The leaders of the NCOs, not sure of the start of the war, delayed sending the instructions to the districts and did not duplicate these instructions over the phone.

Now the words become clear K. A. Meretskova:

The NPO by the end of June 21 made it clear that the fascist Germany would attack the USSR the next day.
It was necessary to quickly inform the troops and withdraw them from the attack, relocate Aviation to alternate airfields, to occupy the lines of the 1st echelon favorable for repelling the aggressor ...
Unfortunately, in the 5-6 hours remaining before the start of the war, NGOs and General Staff were unable to solve this problem ...

The author would clarify that it was not the inevitability of an attack that became clear to the leadership of the NPO, but information was brought by Stalin about a possible German attack on the USSR at dawn on June 22.

The movie "The Eve" says: "At 23: 35 ... 23: 40, amendments are made to the text of the Directive for the ground forces, which are entered by General Malandin ..."

To bring the air defense to combat readiness without additional raising of the assigned personnel. Prepare measures to darken cities and objects.

How can this be?

In the text of Directive No. 1, allegedly edited by Stalin, some general calmly makes changes ...

This is possible in the only case - if Directive No. 1 is drawn up in the office of the People's Commissar of Defense and GK Malandin makes changes with the consent of SK Timoshenko.

From the film "On the Eve" (M. F. Timin and S. L. Chekunov):

At 23:40, the directive was sent for encryption to the Operations Department of the General Staff.
At 23:45 pm, the department receives the directive and passes it on to captains M.N. Agapov and K.I. Khramtsovsky for encryption.
At 00:30 the cryptogram was sent to the communication center of the General Staff.

After GK Zhukov left the General Staff, KI Khramtsovsky would become his personal cipher officer.

Events in NGOs. Northwest direction

Leningrad VO

The chief of staff, D. N. Nikishev in Leningrad, remained the only head of the district. Commander MM Popov with a member of the Military Council NN Klementyev ride in the Polar Arrow train. Their arrival in Leningrad is expected around noon on June 22nd.

The deputy commander of the troops of the district KP Pyadyshev is on the territory of Estonia in the 22nd rifle corps, probably with a check. By this time, part of the leadership had been replaced in the corps. In addition, there was an idea to transfer the territory of Estonia to the Leningrad District.

S. L. Chekunov: "Ideas [in the General Staff - Approx. auth.] changed throughout June before the start of the war. The latter is the transfer of the territory of Estonia to the Leningrad Military District and, accordingly, the alteration of the cover plans ... "

In the previous part, it was said that on June 22, closer to one in the morning, A.A. Novikov (who had passed the duties of the commander of the air force of the district) arrived home. At 00:47, Directive No. 1 was received at the communications center of the district headquarters. Control over the reception was carried out by D.N. Nikishev, who at that time did not call A.A.Novikov. After reading the decrypted text of the directive, D. N. Nikishev urgently summoned A. A. Novikov and sets him the task of dispersing aviation. A. A. Novikov reads the directive somewhere around two o'clock in the morning.
Thus, until 01: 00–02: 00 the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District from Moscow was not informed by phone about anything specific on the content of Directive No. 1.

According to A.A.Novikov's recollections, at midnight on June 22, the head of the Air Force Education, Formation and Combat Training Directorate A.V. Nikitin called the chief of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the spacecraft P.F.Zhigarev in order to find out the situation:

The conversation was short-lived. Nikitin reported that he had finished business in Leningrad and asked if he should go to Arkhangelsk or return to Moscow.
From the expression on Aleksey Vasilyevich's face, I understood that Zhigarev was surprised by such a question.
“Well, here,” Nikitin said after hearing the response from his superiors, “Arkhangelsk was ordered to fly immediately. Apparently, there is nothing new or did not want to say ...

Pribovo

V. I. Morozov (Commander of the 11th Army):

By phone at about one o'clock on 22.6.41, the chief of staff of the front ... gave me to understand that it was necessary to act, to withdraw troops to the border, that, they say, an order had been prepared about this, and you would receive it.
On the basis of this, by my conditional code on the phone, between 1 and 2 o'clock ... orders were given to the troops, and the latter, on alarm, acted on the decisions made earlier to carry out the combat mission ...

It seems that the conversation between the PribOVO chief of staff and Morozov takes place after 01:30, when the district commander was informed of the directive from Riga by telephone.

The directive to the troops from the district military council suggests more drastic measures than those specified in Directive No. 1, but these measures imply a slow development of events at the border ...

SOBOVO

In the previous part, the conversation between the People's Commissar of Defense and the commander of the OdVO and the possible consequences of similar negotiations with the command of some districts was considered. According to the testimony of the former commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlova one can judge about the conversation with the People's Commissar at a later time:

Again in the negotiations, there are no direct indications from Moscow in accordance with Directive No. 1. It is possible that the first part of the conversation actually took place around midnight.

S. L. Chekunov noted: "Pavlov began calling headquarters around midnight".

It turns out that until about two o'clock in the morning on June 22 in the office of the People's Commissar of Defense and in the General Staff they are not particularly worried about the events on the border. Probably, at about two o'clock in the morning, the incoming messages turn out to be too alarming, and the General Staff was somehow worried ...

S. M. Shtemenko:

On the night of June 22, at exactly 2 o'clock, a messenger arrived at my apartment and sent an alarm signal. And half an hour later I was already at the General Staff ...

The commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District will sleep at home until three in the morning. Also at home are members of the Government, the Politburo and Comrade Stalin.

Magazine combat operations of the 1st Air Defense Corps (Moscow Air Defense Zone, subordinate to the Moscow Military District):

22.06.41/00/10 XNUMX:XNUMX. The corps commander, Major General of Artillery, was summoned to the commander of the Moscow Air Defense Zone, Major General Gromadin.
01:40. Based on the instructions received from the Military Council, the corps commander, Major General of Artillery Comrade Zhuravlev, ordered 80% of all units to be deployed on alert ...

Magazine combat operations of the 2nd Air Defense Corps (Leningrad Military District):

22.6.41. 02:10. Pom. Major General of Artillery Kryukov, commander of the LVO troops, ordered: Everyone to be on the ground. Act on alarm no. 3.
2: 10–2: 50. Alarm number 3 was announced to the corps units ...

Historian S. L. Chekunov wrote about the passage of Directive No. 1 in the ZAPOVO:

S. L. Chekunov:

Around 03:00, a transmission from the communications center in Minsk to the communications center of the 4th Army began ...
The directive in the 4th army was deciphered at 4 am, and in the 3rd [army - Approx. ed.] before the outbreak of hostilities, even the transfer was not completed ...
They began to raise the 4th army, too, at one o'clock in the morning ...

Magazine military operations of the Western Front:

22.6.41. At about one o'clock in the morning a cipher telegram was received from Moscow with the order to immediately put the troops on alert in case of an expected German attack in the morning.
At about 2: 00–2: 30, a similar order was issued in code to the armies, and units of the UR were ordered to immediately occupy the UR. At the signal from "Thunderstorm", the "Red Package" was put into operation, containing a plan to cover the state border.
The cipher telegrams of the district headquarters were received by the army headquarters, as it turned out, too late, the 3rd and 4th armies managed to decipher the orders and make some orders, and the 10th Army deciphered the warning after the outbreak of hostilities ...

B. A. Fomin (head of the 1st branch of the operational department of the district headquarters):

I ... left Minsk by train to Obuz-Lesna to set up the command post of the front headquarters there. I reported on the readiness of the command post to the chief of staff of the Klimovskys at 1:30 22.6. The latter did not tell me anything about the orders received to bring the troops of the district to combat readiness, only promised to arrive with the headquarters in Obuz-Lesna by the morning of 22.6 ...

L. M. Sandalov (Chief of Staff of the 4th Army):

“[About 3:00 - Approx. author] communication with the headquarters of the district ... was restored ...
At 3:30 Korobkov was summoned to the telegraph office by the district commander and announced that a provocative raid by fascist bands on our territory was expected that night. But he categorically warned that we should not succumb to provocation. Our task is only to capture the gangs. It is prohibited to cross the state border.
When asked by the army commander what specific measures are allowed to be carried out, Pavlov replied: “All army units should be put on alert. Immediately begin to move the 42nd division out of the fortress to take up prepared positions. Covertly occupy pillboxes with parts of the Brest UR. Relocate the regiments of the air division to field airfields. "
Until 4:42, the army commander managed to personally hand over the order to the chief of staff of the 4nd division and the commandant of the UR, and at XNUMX:XNUMX in the morning the Germans had already opened artillery fire on Brest and the fortress ...

P. I. Lyapin (Chief of Staff of the 10th Army):

Much later than 23 hours on June 21, General Golubev was summoned to headquarters for negotiations with Pavlov.
[After 40 minutes, PI Lyapin was also summoned to the headquarters - Approx. auth.]
It was about two o'clock in the morning ... Lieutenant Colonel Markushevich reported to me the following: some particularly important cipher telegram was being sent over the telegraph, and the army commander was waiting at the direct telephone for orders from the commander of the troops [district - Approx. auth.] ...

Report Chief of the 3rd Department of the 10th Army Elk (15.07.41/XNUMX/XNUMX):

On June 21.06.41, 24 at 00:XNUMX a member of the Military Council called me and asked me to come to the headquarters ...
The commander of the 10th Army Golubev said that the situation was extremely tense and there was an order from the district to the commanding staff to wait for orders without leaving the apparatus. In turn, by this time, all corps and division commanders were called to the wire and awaited orders.
At about 1 am on June 22, the former commander of the ZAPOVO Pavlov called on "VCh", ordered to bring the troops to the combat readiness plan and said that he would give the details in code. In accordance with this, instructions were given to all unit commanders ...

M.V.Bobkov (Chief of Staff of the 5th Rifle Corps):

The order to enter the State Border and occupy defensive lines was given by the commander of the 10th Army via Morse telegraph at 2: 00–3: 00 on 22.06.41.
... Corps divisions began to enter the State Border at 3: 00–4: 00 ...

From the book A. Popova "15 meetings with KGB general Belchenko" (S. S. Belchenko - Head of the Office of the NKGB in the Bialystok region):

At about two o'clock in the morning I was informed that the commander of the 10th Army had received an order by radio, in accordance with which military units were to occupy combat lines.
Having received this information, I literally burst into General Golubev's office without a preliminary call. I saw him in field uniform, with a bag on his side, in a hurry, closing the safe. In a nervous, breaking voice, the general told me that, apparently, a war was beginning, and advised me to bring all forces into a mobile state, he himself went to the army command post ...

S. L. Chekunov:

A study of the set of documents clearly shows that Pavlov clearly followed all the orders of the General Staff. No gag, just following orders ...
Pavlov put in place cover plans. There is documentary evidence of his order. Moreover, he introduced cover plans on his own ... He introduced it upon the outbreak of the war.
Acted according to the situation ...

Cova

M. A. Purkaev (chief of staff of KOVO):

I [arrived - Approx. Auth.] to Ternopil ... at about 3 o'clock in the morning on 22.6.41. By my arrival, the commander of the troops of the district, General Kirponos, had already received an order from the General Staff to bring the troops into combat readiness, but did not give any orders to anyone. Having received instructions from General Kirponos about the order of the General Staff in connection with the expected German attack, I immediately summoned all the army commanders to Bodo's apparatus personally. And in the period from 3 to 4 hours he gave everyone an order to bring the troops to full combat readiness, to take up defenses according to the plan ...

A. V. Vladimirsky (head of the 1st department of the operational department of the headquarters of the 5th army):

At one in the morning on 22.6.41, the 5th Army directorate, headed by the chief of staff, Major General D.S.
The NKO directive on bringing the troops into combat readiness and their occupation of firing points on the border was received at the army headquarters and reported to the army commander at 2:30 on June 22 ...
The army commander, having familiarized himself with the contents of the directive, personally at the beginning of the fourth hour by phone ordered the corps commanders to raise the alarm, repeating the requirement of the NKO directive “not to succumb to any provocations,” which was understood by some commanders of the formations as a warning - not to give the Germans have a reason to inflate the border conflicts they provoked into the war ...

Z.Z. Rogozny (Chief of Staff of the 15th Rifle Corps):

At about 3:20 ... the commander of the 5th Army ... on my home phone sent something like the following: “The Germans here and there began to fight with our border posts. This is another provocation. Don't go for provocation. Raise the troops on alert, but don't hand out cartridges ... "

N. P. Ivanov (Chief of Staff of the 6th Army):

In the evening of 21.06.41/6/XNUMX, the KOVO headquarters warned the commander of the XNUMXth Army, General Muzychenko, that provocations from the Germans were possible and ordered all commanders to be at the telephone sets in the headquarters of the army, corps and divisions ...
On the night of June 21-22, the Military Council of the 6th Army was in its premises in the center of the city, without taking any measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the troops, due to the prohibition to do this by the commander of KOVO ...
Only in the afternoon of June 22 (I don’t remember the hour) was it ordered from the KOVO headquarters to move troops to the border without touching the 4th mechanized corps without the permission of the KOVO commander ...

The chief of staff of the 12th Army B.I.

Having received such an order, B. I. Arushunyan contacted by telephone with the headquarters of the corps and divisions and brought them the message about the beginning of the war and the order of the front commander. At the same time, on alert, the army headquarters was assembled.

N.P. Borovyagin (Senior Assistant to the Chief of Communications of the 26th Army): "Army formations into battle with the enemy ... were introduced at 4:30 on 22.06.41 ..."

D. I. Ryabyshev (commander of the 8th mechanized corps of the 26th army):

21.6.41 troops of the 8th mechanized corps lived an ordinary life ...
At 1 am on June 22.06.41, 3, I went to bed. At 26 o'clock in the morning ... the commander of the XNUMXth Army ... called me to the apparatus and ordered me to wait for an order, the meaning and content of which I was not told ...
At 4:30 the chief of staff of the army told me that the Germans had violated our border, warning that do not succumb to provocations, do not open fire on enemy aircraft and wait for an order ...

OdVO

In the memoirs of the chief of staff of the OdVO MV Zakharov, it is indicated that he was summoned by the commander of the district at 22:00. In fact, the negotiations took place after 23:00. The commander of the ODVO delegated authority to M.V. Zakharov regarding the adoption of a decision on behalf of the Military Council of the district on encryption of particular importance from the General Staff.

Magazine military operations of the 9th army:

At 24:00 21.6, army units covering the state border were put on alert by telegraphic order. An order was given to occupy the areas according to the cover plan ...

В the magazine combat operations of the 14th Rifle Corps recorded:

22.6.41. 03:05 An order was received to raise the alarm and withdraw the winter apartments and camps from the districts. Border units to occupy defensive areas ...

At the same time in the magazine The 25th Rifle Division of the 14th Rifle Corps states: "22.6.41 2:00 31st cv [rifle regiment - Approx. auth.] and the 54th joint venture completely occupied the defense areas ... "

P. M. Verkholovich (Chief of Staff of the 35th Rifle Corps):

At 00:30 on June 22, an order was received from the commander of the district to raise the troops of the Chisinau garrison and troops located in other garrisons, on a training alert without warning about the danger of war.

Magazine combat operations of the 95th rifle corps (35th rifle corps):

At 02:00 22.6.41 [the headquarters of the 35th Rifle Corps - Approx. ed.] an alarm was announced to units of the 95th Rifle Division with the task of being ready to repel the enemy when crossing the river. Rod. In 1:45, the units were ready to carry out the order ...

P. A. Belov (commander of the 2nd cavalry corps): «[9th Cavalry Division - Approx. auth.] two regiments took up the defense of the r. Prut by about 3:00 22.6. "

D. A. Myakushev (5th Cavalry Regiment of the 9th Cavalry Division, the regiment was on the state border):

At about 02:30 am the squadron duty officer shouted: "Alarm!"
... Quickly dressed and, taking apart rifles and checkers, ran to the stable to saddle the horses ...
We were given RGD combat grenades. It began to be realized that this was not an ordinary alarm ...
Then ... the commander of our platoon ... brought the medallion, and we ... filled in the forms with the addresses of the parents ...

Events in the People's Commissariat of the Navy

Arriving at the People's Commissariat of the Navy, VA Alafuzov prepared a telephone message with a signal about the transition of fleets and flotillas to OG No. 1.

At 23:37, the Red Banner Baltic and Black Sea fleets received these signals.

After that, probably, he also prepared a cipher telegram:

Military councils of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the Northern Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, the Commander of the Pinsk and Danube flotillas.
Move immediately to operational readiness # 1.
Admiral Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the USSR Navy.

The encryption was signed by N.G. Kuznetsov. It was handed over to the encryption department, where it received the number / 87 and sent to the addressees at 23:50.

It was said above that Admiral Kuznetsov took a copy of Directive No. 1 for the NKVMF. The author would suggest that the copy was delivered to the NKVMF after 24:00. This may be evidenced by the following entry: "A copy of the NKVMF was sent ... 22.6.41".

Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the fact that a rather small cipher telegram was delivered to the communication center only at 01:12.

The directive of the People's Commissar of the Navy No. 9760 / ss / s of 23.06.39 is familiar to many who are interested in the events on the eve of the war:

For the conduct of hostilities, an additional signal from the People's Commissariat is required ...

What is the "combat core of the fleet"?

M. E. Morozov ("Transfer of the western fleets and flotillas of the USSR Navy to OG No. 1 on the night of 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX"):

OG No. 1 was not identical with full combat readiness, into which only the combat core was brought, which, as can be seen from the table, made up about 25% of the forces of the fleets.

M. E. Morozov:

The fact that OG No. 1 and full combat readiness differed from each other was indicated by the directive of the Chief of the Main Naval Staff No. 10305ss of 14.11.39/XNUMX/XNUMX:
"The practice of bringing fleets and flotillas to OG No. 1 and No. 2 ... has shown that not everywhere in fleets and flotillas they correctly understand the essence of operational readiness, and unit commanders confuse operational readiness with combat readiness, while allowing overstrain of material and personnel ..."
The signal to bring it to OG No. 1 did not give fleets and fleets permission to use weapons against enemy ships and aircraft. This required additional instructions.
In the memoirs of N.G. Kuznetsov and V.F. But in the received KBF, after this conversation at 02:32, directive No. zn / 88, there were no instructions on the use of weapons ...

The commander of the Black Sea Fleet did not take upon himself such a responsibility, as did the chief of the General Staff, to whom FS Oktyabrsky turned ... The chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral I. D. Eliseev, assumed responsibility.

From the book “Naval Commander. Materials about the life and work of the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov ":

On 11.11.39, the People's Commissar of the Navy approved the Instruction on operational readiness developed by the Main Naval Headquarters: “... 5. Changes in operational readiness are made by the Military Council of the Fleet by order of the People's Commissar of the Navy. The military council of the fleet independently has the right to increase operational readiness with an immediate report of this to the People's Commissar of the Navy ... "

Now it becomes clear: why the commander of the Northern Fleet announced on June 18 OG No. 2 for the fleet. He had the right to do so and subsequently reported on his actions to the People's Commissar of the Navy.

N. G. Kuznetsov wrote in his memoirs:

I, on my own responsibility, ordered to give the fleets an official notification of the start of the war and of repelling enemy strikes by all means, on the basis of this, the Military Council of the Baltic Fleet, for example, already at 5:17 am on June 22 announced in the fleet: “Germany has begun an attack on our bases and ports ... By force of arms to repel any attempt to attack the enemy "...

The ending should ...

Comments

[rocket757]

History is something that cannot be changed !!! And it is useful to know, even very much.
There is no superfluous knowledge.

[for]

There is no superfluous knowledge.
It happens, it still happens. It depends on who they are invested in.
What food is in the article for our opponents.

[rocket757]

Did you find the intimate, secret knowledge in that article?
Specialists already know everything, but those who hype without working, without looking for important, interesting topics ... show them a "finger", they will start winding their "snot" around it.
Some of the classics read such a definition / reminder that not everyone can read the Bible, study, because they can go crazy, finally ... in the same place a clear example was shown!
And what now, to give out the Bible with the help of a psychiatrist?

[for]

Did you find the intimate, secret knowledge in that article?
Based on such non-secret data, you can turn the story out as you (not you) need it. I haven't read any further yet, but I'm sure there is a war going on, and who needs it. The outcome is important We Won! And let the analysis be carried out and the correct conclusions are drawn, and they will not succeed.

[rocket757]

Quote: for

Based on such non-secret data, you can turn the story out

This is understandable.
To force EVERYONE to learn the history of their country is not realistic at all, but now, when the curriculum has been discarded for the sake of ... wrapped ...
Alas and ah, we are now not an age of enlightenment, dullness is coming ...
how to deal with it? What will be the consequences if everything remains so?
Always the same thing - If something happens, then it means whoever needs it! -
On my own I will add - it means that someone paid for it!
Who benefits from breaking the connection between our generations? Who benefits from the distorted history of our country?

[ccsr]

Quote: rocket757

Did you find the intimate, secret knowledge in that article?
Specialists already know everything, but those who hype without working, without looking for important, interesting topics ... show them a "finger", they will start winding their "snot" around it.

I completely agree with your assessment, especially since the author distorts the facts in this article, referring to Chekunov:

S. L. Chekunov:

A study of the set of documents clearly shows that Pavlov clearly followed all the orders of the General Staff. No gag, just following orders ...
Pavlov put in place cover plans. There is documentary evidence of his order. Moreover, he introduced cover plans on his own ... He introduced it upon the outbreak of the war.
Acted according to the situation ...

The lie in this case is that Pavlov, having received the Directive w / n, did not introduce cover plans, but sent out directives himself, although he had the right by the decision of the military council to raise the armies and formations of the district with an established signal, which was approved by the People's Commissar of Defense:

1. The raising of units for combat alert shall have the right to produce:

a) people's commissar of defense;
b) the military council of the district;
c) military councils of armies;
d) persons having instructions signed only by the people's commissar of defense or the military council of the district;
e) tocommanders of formations and units in the part [concerning] the units subordinate to them.

The cipher telegram of the military council on the commissioning of this cover plan will be as follows: "To the commander of the (3rd, 4th, 10th, 13th) army. I announce the alarm (Grodno, Bialystok, Belsk, Kobrin), 1941. Signatures ".

Army commanders indicate the following conventional texts of cipher telegrams (codograms) for formations and units of the covering area: "To the commander of the corps (division) No. I announce the alarm with the opening of the" red "packet. Signatures ".

As you know, Pavlov did not send such a code in the army before the attack, and, unlike Marshal Zakharov, acted indecisively. As for the wording "on the fact of the attack", this is imputed to any commander, especially in the border area.
There are many more nonsense in the text of the article, such as this one:

In the memoirs of N.G. Kuznetsov, the fact of permission for the use of weapons by the People's Commissar of Defense is questionable.

This very fact of Kuznetsov's memories does not raise doubts, because his ships could be located outside their bases and their territorial waters. That is why Kuznetsov clarified this point, understanding the situation, and giving permission to defeat the enemy in any situation after this directive.

[rocket757]

In fact, different people, leaders, had the courage to take responsibility and received the marks ... that they received.
We must learn from any examples to do the right thing and not repeat the same mistakes.

[north 2]

Quote: rocket757

History is something that cannot be changed !!! And it is useful to know, even very much.
There is no superfluous knowledge.

History is not what was told, but what happened ...

[rocket757]

Quote: north 2

History is not what was told, but what happened ...

No problem! Then go to the archives, study, learn, THAT WAS.

[Bar1]

all these actions of the political and military leadership cannot be called confusion.
Yes, it seems, according to these documents, they reacted to the threat of invasion, but until recently they did not understand that it would be a full-fledged invasion or a stupid "provocation".
The policy of "evading provocations" by the great country of the USSR from the aggressor state, which has already defeated the whole of Europe, is somehow stupid, this is the position - a mouse under a broom does not deserve respect.
- not to conduct reconnaissance over the enemy's territory, while the Germans have long been not ashamed to conduct reconnaissance, this is not at all far-sighted and they lost their face as a great country, and even limited themselves in strategic and operational-tactical vision.
If the main type of repulsing aggression is the conduct of a COUNTER BATTLE, then you must at least understand what is going on in front of you to a depth of at least 50 km, and this is not possible without reconnaissance. And here every commissar / army commander is concerned with only one thing "not to succumb to provocations."
You can say openly that Stalin's policy is to keep everyone on a short leash and beat them on the hands.
So there are probably already two points of view
- did not expect an invasion on June 22
- waited, but were late (did not manage to decipher the telegrams, did not receive orders by phone, moved to the deployment areas, but without cartridges)
And the DESTRUCTION of the aviation of the Western district / front, then in general, how can you explain that the orders did not reach them at all?
Here, twist it, do not twist it according to the analysis of the situation, but EVERYTHING rests against Moscow at the very top - Stalin, Timoshenko, Zhukov. Or a clear crime / conspiracy with the enemy or criminal slowness, negligence and incompetence in the performance of their direct duties.

[rocket757]

It was easier for us to reason, WE KNOW!
Then everything was more complicated ...

[Bar1]

and we are here to finally understand what happened then.

[rocket757]

I agree, there is such a goal ... but, this is a serious question, you cannot take it on swoop.
You can't blame everything on the treachery of the enemy and the conspiracy of world capitalism ... it was, but our miscalculations, or even criminal neglect of our direct responsibilities, can be recruited for more than one verdict, a military tribunal.
Here is where to draw the line, how to arrange who is to blame, who is the victim, and who is the HERO ???

[zenion]

The point was that the United States announced that whoever attacks first will be considered the aggressor and there will be no help from the United States. That is, in the States they made it clear that the USSR should not resist, and Hitler was told - your arms and legs are untied, kill them. This was needed by the United States and England, which created the Nazis and the Wehrmacht for this. They armed them and left them with large-caliber cannons and a million tons of fuel, initially which should have been enough for two months of the war. And then they helped both ours and yours.

[rocket757]

To rake in the heat with someone else's hands ... there are always willing ones.

[ycuce234-san]

"And the DESTRUCTION of the aviation of the Western district / front, then in general, how can you explain that the orders did not reach them at all?"

Most likely she was doomed then. The fact is that in the 30s the range of flights increased and all the old airfields became easily accessible faster than they were being rebuilt. M. Gromov in 1937 flew to Los Angeles, as to his summer cottage, which aircraft of the biplane era were not capable of a few years ago. Moreover, he seemed to fly without refueling in the air (I'm not sure here, it seems like it was), although the refueling itself at that time was already known and even began to be applied.

[ivan2022]

Quote: Bar1

And the DESTRUCTION of the aviation of the Western district / front, then in general, how can you explain that the orders did not reach them at all?
Here, twist it, do not twist it on the analysis of the situation, but EVERYTHING rests against Moscow at the very top - Stalin, Timoshenko, Zhukov. Or obvious crime / conspiracy with the enemy or criminal slowness

Or criminal boredom by half a century of media efforts. First "as if Soviet" and then anti-Soviet.
Both Stalin and his generals are being covered up for what they glorify Kutuzov, who, objectively speaking, surrendered Moscow to Napoleon in September.

And if the aviation had really been destroyed, it would not have existed at all for many months. It is unclear how the destroyed aircraft and destroyed tanks were able to stop the enemy .... In the minds of the townsfolk there is complete insanity and not science fiction; "the immense mountains of Russian corpses from under which the unfortunate Germans look out ..." .. darkness ...

[Pessimist22]

They did not bring the troops to full combat readiness, demanded not to succumb to provocations, did not give out ammunition, in short, Stalin and everyone who was near to shoot, some in the camps, and to entrust the command of the troops to such officers as Kuznetsov and others.

[paul3390]

demanded not to succumb to provocations

Here's an interesting thing - the entire experience of the 20th century clearly showed that if a country is not ready for a major war - provoke it, do not provoke it - one hell of a war will not happen. A striking example is our relationship with Japan. Avon - even such a real conflict as Khalkhin Gol did not lead to a big war.

And if the country is ready to attack, there is no provocation before the pager. She herself is an excellent pretext for war. Again - we look at the actions of Aloizievich.

So it was quite obvious that Tolstoyism was on the border if that did not stop Germany. Then the reasonable question is - a WHOM then, was Comrade Stalin so afraid of provoking?

[zenion]

The Wehrmacht troops were not dispersed along the entire border, there were three columns that were supposed to unite after the breakthrough, to destroy more Sov. Army and disperse in the directions of further attack. The Germans were out of luck. Not all fled from the border, many resisted, but as in darkness, there was no connection. The headquarters were not looking for their troops.

[Lech from Android.]

There are so many generals, encrypted messages, staffs and still this mechanism did not work as it should at a critical moment ...
Kuznetsov alone, at his own peril and risk, managed to adequately meet the first wave of the Germans' attack.

[Crowe]

On the embankment of the Northern Dvina in Arkhangelsk there is a monument to the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Nikolai Gerasimovich Kuznetsov

with a very characteristic inscription

"I take responsibility for myself"
In the book of the admiral "On the course to victory" you can read almost a verbatim account of the events.

[Crowe]

June 22, 1941 at 3 a.m. Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral I.D. Eliseev ordered to open fire on German aircraft.

There was still an hour before the war, but Sevastopol had already fought and our people had already died there.

[Charlie]

The Germans attacked at 3 o'clock European time, at 4 Moscow time. What time zone is Sevastopol in?

[chenia]

Quote: Charlie

at 3 o'clock European time,

Not. Central European in 2 hours difference from Moscow (maternity). But the Germans introduced daylight saving time (and for some reason it lasted until 1943) at the hour of the difference with Moscow.

[Charlie]

Yes, it's still muddied with summer time

[vladcub]

Somehow I'll get together and read. This book should be online

[Cat Alexandrovich]

Dear VO editors, have you seen what the photo for this article looks like on the "History" page?

[Doctor]

Dear VO editors, have you seen what the photo for this article looks like on the "History" page?

In accordance with Zhukov's memoirs.

“We’ll wait for Molotov to return,” he replied. After a while, V.M.Molotov quickly entered the office:

- The German government has declared war on us.

JV Stalin silently sank into a chair and thought deeply.

There was a long, painful pause.

[vladcub]

"Let's wait for the return of Molotov" we were told for many years that "without an announcement" and Molotov, many years later, told Karpov that there was an announcement. So Zhukov lied a little. It is known that V. M. Molotov told Chuev: "Believe Zhukov less," and this leads to some reflections

[Doctor]

"Let's wait for the return of Molotov" we were told for many years that "without an announcement" and Molotov, many years later, told Karpov that there was an announcement. So Zhukov lied a little. It is known that V. M. Molotov told Chuev: "Believe Zhukov less," and this leads to some reflections

An interesting question, I was interested in it in detail in due time.

Whether the announcement was made or not depends primarily on the TIME of the announcement.
Molotov's conversation with Schulenburg took place in 5.30 the morning of 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. This is recorded in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

 Show / Hide text

CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY IN THE USSR F. SCHULENBURG
22 June 1941 g.,
at 5 hour 30 min in the morning
Secretly
Schulenburg, who appeared at the reception accompanied by adviser Hilger,
said that he must declare with the deepest regret that yesterday
in the evening, when he was at a reception at the People's Commissar of Comrade Molotov, he knew nothing. Several telegrams were received from Berlin tonight, he says.
The German government instructed him to transfer to the Soviet government
the following note:
“In view of the intolerable share of the threat posed to the German East
borders due to the massive concentration and training of all the armed forces of the Red Army, the German government considers itself compelled to immediately take military countermeasures.
The corresponding note will be simultaneously transmitted to Dekanozov in Berlin. ”
Schulenburg says he cannot express his depressed mood caused by the unjustified and unexpected action of his government. The ambassador says that he devoted all his strength to creating peace and friendship with the USSR.
Comrade Molotov asks what does this note mean?
Schulenburg replies that, in his opinion, this is the beginning of the war.

It took Molotov some more time to convey the information to Stalin and those present.

Thus, the leadership of our country received confirmation 1,5-2 hours after the actual start of the war.

Could this be called an ad? I think no.

[Charlie]

Bringing this memorandum to Stalin's attention is, of course, necessary. But the fact of communicating this to Molotov can already be considered an announcement. Molotov is an official and is a representative of the USSR

[ee2100]

To make a decision, information is needed, and as we can see from the author's work, at the end of the day on June 21 it was not there.
Intelligence provides the country's leadership with information for making a decision to start a war. And then there are 2 options: either it was not in sufficient quantity, or the country's leadership did not particularly trust it. The work of the General Staff is to analyze the available information. And for making a decision, the conclusions of the General Staff are the main ones.
In previous articles, the author considered the question of the available intelligence and the conclusions are not encouraging. The data are incomplete and often not reliable.
An attempt to find out the cause of the disaster on 22.06.41. - a very important task (mission).

[rocket757]

How to find one MAIN CAUSE, the tragedy that happened at the beginning of the Second World War ???
And is she SHE, the most MAIN ... maybe there is a whole tangle of circumstances, contradictions, events ...
The perpetrators, of course, were appointed and not one at a time, the "most just" time, and WHAT BECAME EASIER?
Questions are answers, but the truth may remain somewhere around the corner ...

[vladcub]

I don’t remember literally, but the general meaning is this: at 3-something, Molotov was in Stalin’s office when V.M. was told that Schulenburg wanted to see him on an important issue. Stalin and Molotov understood - war. Stalin said: we will wait for the military to report.
And Zhukov writes that Stalin lives in a communal apartment, where there is one telephone for the whole apartment.
About what Molotov was telling, Karpov wrote in the magazine: "Questions of history"

[Crowe]

or there was not enough of it

Was, and in sufficient quantity

or the country's leadership did not particularly trust her

There was such a thing ...

[vladcub]

"An attempt to find out the cause of the disaster: 22.06.1941/100/XNUMX - a very important task" XNUMX% agree.
I regret that I can only put one plus

[ee2100]

Good evening everyone!
The author, in my opinion, took up the "overwhelming" task - to analyze the cause of the catastrophe on 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX from the point of view of the location of the enemy troops, intelligence about this, the combat readiness of our troops and decision-making by the leaders of the USSR.
This is just one of the visible parts of the huge iceberg.
I always read the works of Alexey Ivanov with pleasure. He does a good deed.
But I always had one question - what is the real reason for the war between the USSR and Germany?
What the official propaganda says is not for sane people.

[vladcub]

"not for sane", but what was the reason for you

[ee2100]

Do not know. I do not see any direct reasons for the war. Two years ago, the allies and then an all-out war of extermination.
What happened in 2 years that turned the relationship 180 °?
I have no answer.

[vladcub]

In fact, Hitler did not consider Stalin to be an ally

[Charlie]

He was allergic to Bolshevism

[vladcub]

What to do a "sick" person

[ee2100]

Whether he considered it or not, he fulfilled the contract. Poland was divided, they did not interfere in the Baltic states. Raw materials were received, etc.

[Doctor]

Do not know. I do not see any direct reasons for the war. Two years ago, the allies and then an all-out war of extermination.
What happened in 2 years that turned the relationship 180 °?
I have no answer.

Hitler perceived the situation approximately in this way.

https://glavbuhdudin.livejournal.com/151694.html

[Silhouette]

Quote: ee2100

Two years ago, the allies and then an all-out war of extermination.

Not allies, but accomplices. Each pursued his own goal. The allies have a common interest.

[Charlie]

"As you know, from about 1938, Hitler was convinced that Britain and America would go to war against us as soon as they armed themselves enough. East and West, as had already happened in 1914. During 1941, these fears took possession of him again, he considered it possible that Russia, on the basis of its renewed negotiations with England, would attack us simultaneously with the Anglo-American offensive. The general potential of America and Russia seemed to him a terrible danger for Germany. ”The Fuhrer was greatly alarmed by the possibility of being caught in the East-West pincers in the future course of the war, being drawn into a gigantic war on two fronts devouring both people and technology. the ability to breathe freely in the East until the moment when the Anglo-American potential in the West comes into play.

This was the most important consideration of Adolf Hitler, which he explained to me after the start of the Russian war in 1941. He decided to attack, hoping to eliminate the Soviet Union within a few months. His mistake in assessing the potential of Russia and America's aid became fatal. He was not quite sure himself, for he categorically told me then: "We do not know what kind of power is behind the doors that we are going to open in the East."
This is from Ribbentrop's notes

[Illanatol]

Quote: ee2100

Do not know. I do not see any direct reasons for the war. Two years ago, the allies and then an all-out war of extermination.
What happened in 2 years that turned the relationship 180 °?
I have no answer.

The reason is obvious - the seizure of "living space" and resources.
After Hitler came to power, the Soviet government asked him a direct question: is "Mein Kampf" a guide to action for Nazi Germany? Hitler honestly kept silent and it became clear that war was inevitable.

The Reich and the USSR were not any allies. A non-aggression pact and trade agreements are not the same as a military alliance. The USSR remained a neutral country in relation to the wars of the Reich and no one disputed this fact.
The division of spheres of influence in Poland only increased the defense capability of the latter.

What happened? Hitler, he believed, ensured that a war on two fronts was impossible for Germany. The British were locked up on their island, France was defeated. Consequently, it is possible to start a war against the USSR without fear of a blow from the western direction (there is no one to beat). And after the defeat of the USSR, the issue with England can be resolved quickly.

[RED_ICE]

Generalplan Ost

[ccsr]

Quote: ee2100

To make a decision, information is needed, and as we can see from the author's work, at the end of the day on June 21 it was not there.

This lie is refuted by the author of these articles in his previous work, which exposed his own "discoveries".
There is a map of the grouping of German troops stationed on our border on June 20, 1941 in accordance with the intelligence report of 20.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
https://www.prlib.ru/item/1320066
The "legend" of the map indicates the total number of divisions that can be used against the USSR in the amount of 159-165 divisions, plus up to 11 divisions from Bulgaria, but their concentration areas have not been established.
https://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2021-10/1635578129_risunok-10.jpg

So what did you see the "lack of information" on June 22, if in the book of Hitler's Wehrmacht General Kurt Tippelskirch "History of World War II": division, 22 tank, 81 motorized, 1 police and security divisions. 17 more infantry, 15 tank, 9 motorized divisions and 22 police division were on the approach as reserves of the main command "(2). Total: 150 divisions.
As can be seen from the German source, the lower figure is indicated, but it all depends on the calculation method, because RU calculates everything that could be involved after the attack in the next few days, and the German source only what was deployed at the border on June 22. But even a big mistake is not critical, because underestimating the enemy's forces is always more dangerous.

Quote: ee2100

In previous articles, the author considered the question of the available intelligence and the conclusions are not encouraging. The data are incomplete and often not reliable.

In 2017, a certain lady named "Victoria" created a group of history falsifiers, which persistently pushed the idea that the intelligence did not give correct information about the enemy, and therefore the Red Army was defeated. Moreover, simultaneously with the VO website, they posted the same articles on several other sites, changing their nicknames, gender, and the author of this article took an active part in this, who also changed nicknames, and still continues this work to discredit Soviet military intelligence based on your lies. Their entire "theory" is based on the work of Meltyukhov, Solonin and a certain Chekunov, who never hid their hatred of Stalin, and for this they pervert that time in every possible way. Therefore, I recommend readers of "Alexei Ivanov" to think about why he, along with his accomplices Slan, Slana, aKtoR, KtoR, AlS, "Eugene" and some others, is so persistently promoting the ideas of dubious authors. By the way, this group made a stuffing that allegedly the intelligence department reported about 133 tanks in the battalion of the Wehrmacht etc., but this fake has not been documented until now. From the same series and lies about the promotion of the 16th Army, so you should be careful about their "creativity".

[ee2100]

Not quite sure what you didn't like in my comment? I commented on what I read and did not see any falsity.
The author analyzes the last pre-war hours. Which fits well with what everyone knows more or less.
The fact that "a certain lady named" Victoria "created a group of history falsifiers" (c) I am not aware.
You and me, like many others, have developed our own vision of the beginning of the Second World War. Different from the official one, maybe I'm wrong about you.
The fact that on June 21.06.41, XNUMX, no decision was made to start hostilities is a fact.
The fact that the country was preparing for war is a fact!
We are unlikely to know the true reasons for the start of the war.

[ccsr]

Quote: ee2100

I commented on what I read and did not see any falsity.

You may not have noticed, which is not surprising if you only read articles by this anonymous author, writing on behalf of a group of individuals.

Quote: ee2100

The fact that on June 21.06.41, XNUMX, no decision was made to start hostilities is a fact.

This is not a fact, but your imagination, otherwise there would be no Directive w / n and the troops of the border districts would have remained without any instructions from the People's Commissar of Defense regarding June 22-23.

Quote: ee2100

The fact that the country was preparing for war is a fact!

This is not disputed by anyone.

Quote: ee2100

The author analyzes the last pre-war hours. Which fits well with what everyone knows more or less.

On June 22, 2021, an article was published based on the chapter of one of the books by O. Kozinkin, which refutes the fictions of the author of this article.
Here's how he refutes the author's lie that the People's Commissariat of Defense did not prepare for an attack:

Stalin in the afternoon of June 21 notifies the party leadership of Moscow that there will be an attack. Gives instructions - to bring the air defense of Moscow to increased combat readiness. More precisely - gives instructions to bring in b.g. "By 75%", but in fact - is limited so far only by some general proposals, because the air defense of Moscow was formally presented in bg. only at 0.10 on June 22 ...
On June 21, Zhukov called the districts at about 18-19 pm and warned them about the attack. About which intelligence reported to him ... Zhukov also informs the commander of the Moscow Military District, General Tyulenev about this (Tyulenev described this fact in his memoirs.)
At the same time, on the evening of the 21st, and the People's Commissar Tymoshenko, sending Meretskov to the Leningrad Military District, brings to him:
“- Perhaps the war will start tomorrow! You need to be the representative of the High Command in the LVO. You know his troops well and can, if necessary, help the district leadership. The main thing is not to succumb to provocations.
- What are my powers in case of an armed attack? - I asked.
- Excerpt above all. Be able to distinguish real attacks from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into war. But be on alert. In the event of an attack, you know what to do ..."(Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - M .: Politizdat, 1968, p. 209)
Source: https://liewar.ru/nakanune-vojny/370-samyj-dolgij-den.html

Read the entire article by O. Kozinkin if you wish, and then compare it with what was written by an anonymous author, and then you will understand why I consider its text as perverting preparations for war in the People's Commissariat of Defense.

[ee2100]

Ok, I will read it

[ee2100]

Kozinkna's article leaves her with more questions than the one under discussion.
The "blooding" of Molotov carried out in the article partially explains Stalin's actions, which is quite logical.
There are also enough questions on the w / n directive.
Mentioned in the article, Martirosyan approaches the problem of the catastrophe of the beginning of the Second World War in a more radical way.
It makes no sense to compare the article on VO and the one recommended by you. Different level.
I do not see the intention of the author of the article on VO to denigrate someone.
There is an attempt to figure it out, no more.
Thank you, for the "tip" it was interesting, although it was written chaotically.

[ccsr]

Quote: ee2100

Thank you, for the "tip" it was interesting, although it was written chaotically.

I will express my personal opinion about the author O. Kozinkin, whom I have known for many years. Now, among the military historians who have studied the pre-war events, in terms of the level of awareness and vision of all the details, hardly anyone can compare with O. Kozinkin. His books, especially the first ones, are difficult for those who did not delve into the events of those years in detail. And nevertheless, among those who served more than one year in the army, he has much more supporters than those who assess that period only on the basis of the works of some advanced historians.
Kozinkin's article proves that on June 21, the upper echelons of the authorities already knew the exact date of the attack and took measures to repel the aggression, and the dispatch of the Directive b / n confirms this. And suddenly, almost five months later, an article by an anonymous author appears, or rather a group of persons hiding under this nickname, who "refute" Kozinkin's conclusions, and in a very primitive way and without sufficient evidence. If you read these articles carefully, you yourself will replace it.
This is why one of the authors explicitly pointed out:

Quote: rocket757
Did you find the intimate, secret knowledge in that article?
Experts already know everything and those who hyip without working, without looking for important, interesting topics ... show them a "finger", they will start winding their "snot" around it.

And this is an absolutely accurate description of the author of this article.

[ee2100]

"Did you find the secret, secret knowledge in that article?" (C)
You are somehow very strict about the author. He could not know anything secret, but the fact that someone is interested in this topic is already a plus!
You see how many comments on this article. If we remove yours and mine, it turns out that this topic is not interesting for a wide audience.
And here the author and the movement around Moscow Timoshenko and Zhukova timed and rewrite the directive with a pen! Analysis, however!
Someone deeply drips, someone not very much, but the soil is still cultivated!
"Kozinkin's article proves that on June 21, the upper echelons of power already knew the exact date of the attack" (c)
Few would disagree with this. And the directive did not come out of thin air. And if the military solved their problems on June 21, then Stalin and Co. solved a lot of other things besides them, including what Molotov said very much.
On June 21, the catastrophe of the first months of the war followed and this requires an explanation ...
I think that Martirosyan's position on this issue is very close to the truth.

[ccsr]

Quote: ee2100

And here the author and the movement around Moscow Timoshenko and Zhukova timed and rewrite the directive with a pen! Analysis, however!

Appreciated your irony.
In this case, the main line is traced, which is promoted by this group of anonymous authors in dozens of their articles, to show everyone how stupid everyone who served then in the People's Commissariat of Defense, led the country, was, and how the Germans easily deceived them with their disinformation measures, altering the buttonholes and changing the emblems to them. How they could have deceived our radio divisions OSNAZ the authors of this lie, and could not explain, which of course shows the level of their "argumentation". Well, the lie of these authors that the residents' reports could get to Golikov on the verge of insanity only after three days - the encrypted messages from Zorge, for example, were already on the table of the head of the intelligence department after he passed them on to M. Klausen. I can also cite dozens of different nonsense and lies that this group of anonymous people replicates, which is why I recommended you the works of O. Kozinkin, in which everything is described much more accurately and truthfully.

Quote: ee2100

Few would disagree with this. And the directive did not come out of thin air. And if the military solved their problems on June 21, then Stalin and Co. solved a lot of other things besides them, including what Molotov said very much.

Quite right, because every chief in the country must be responsible for his own area, and Stalin simply physically could not get into only the affairs of the People's Commissariat of Defense, because he had much more problems with the national economy than with NGOs. That is why, although he trusted (or did not trust in something) the military, he had to think about foreign policy consequences, and this is a different level of responsibility.

Quote: ee2100

I think that Martirosyan's position on this issue is very close to the truth.

I think that he sometimes goes too far, because he also became a hostage to his own vision of history, and does not pay attention to some details that are unfavorable to him. But the level of his historical research is certainly an order of magnitude higher than that of this group of anonymous "writers" pushing their ideas under the leadership of a certain "Victoria".

[ee2100]

We all have our own vision of history. Someone tries himself, but in most cases we relay someone else's opinion, passing off as our own. Again, it's a matter of faith - whether you believe the author or not. It is extremely difficult to double-check all the arguments and facts. That the war will start at 4 22.06. I think very few people in the USSR knew that what was about to begin, many understood. Talking with different people who survived this time, almost everyone said that they were waiting for a war between the USSR and Germany. It is very difficult for us to judge the time in which we did not live, although not so many years have passed

[strannik1985]

The announcement of "readiness" in itself does not mean anything, it is not the beginning of mobilization (which we have M + 30, i.e. the area will be fully deployed with the formation of spare parts, hospitals, etc. a month after the start of mobilization), not an order to withdraw at least SD 04/100 to the SD (after 6-8 hours after the command is given, 80% of the personnel go to positions, the remaining 20% ​​take reservists, equipment and horses).

[Crowe]

For the conduct of hostilities, an additional signal from the People's Commissariat is required ...

Okay, let's operate with documents. From the reports of the headquarters of the Northern Fleet (quotes from the collection of documents TsVMA):
"June 18th. The fleet is in daily readiness. The incursions of German aircraft into our airspace continue. During the day, the readiness of the air defense number 1 and the air raid were announced at the main base twice. Air Force fighters fired at an unknown aircraft, and anti-aircraft batteries at a German Me-110... »
"June 19. At the main base of the fleet, an air raid was announced twice. Anti-aircraft artillery opened fire on violators, and fighter aircraft drove them out of our airspace ... A signal of operational readiness number 2 was given to the fleet. The dispersal of submarines has begun ... "
Pay attention: no "additional signal" was required for this - the fleet met the war in readiness and fully armed!

[zenion]

Mobilization was announced in the western part of Ukraine. The mobilized were sent in columns to recruiting centers, captured by the Germans, these points were already captured. It was not in the field and in the headquarters of the districts, that in this case there should be reserve mobilization points. Was Stalin supposed to take care and control of this too?

[ivan2022]

The analysis may be useful for specialists, but it all looks crazy from the standpoint of "modern history", when they themselves have gouged their country and do not know what to do with the former republics, from which they were smart enough to "free themselves", but not enough

[ivan2022]

Maybe it is for specialists and useful information, but only all this is wild looks in a country where, under the nationwide "approval" in 1991, there was enough intelligence to "free" even from its union republics and not smart enough to maintain influence on them. We could not cope with the military-political task at home (!!!) on the conditions of the USSR, we set ourselves a new task in conditions much more difficult ... and we talk about the problems of preparing for the last World War almost a century ago .. ...
Is it necessary to analyze such problems at a professional level in Chekhov's "Chamber No. 6"? Or maybe first to undergo medical treatment until you understand at least common truths, and more complicated things later?

[Charlie]

What are you, how little, Mr. Olgovich. Stalin did not believe in a German attack on the USSR while Germany was at war with Britain. Stalin did not believe that Germany would decide to go to war on two fronts. Therefore, he sent the reports of all scouts to a famous mother, considering this a provocation and disinformation.

[vladcub]

"Stalin did not believe in the attack of Germany" Stalin knew that WAR IS IMPOSSIBLE another thing, when?
Stalin knew better than anyone else: the Red Army is not ready now and from here EVERYTHING was done to DELAY

[Charlie]

And "all" is what? What was being done to "delay"?

[paul3390]

Reconnaissance failed to detect the advance of German mobile groupings to the border. Therefore, it was not possible to determine the direction of their blows.

You will forgive me, of course, but at that time there were only two directions in Belarus that were possible for the use of large mobile groups. Brest-Baranovichi-Minsk, and Vilnius-Molodechno-Minsk. Only on them it was possible to push them. And now, probably - the directions have remained the same. You didn't have to be Bonaparte to understand this. Actually - on them nemchura and went. So - I think the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the Border Battle are still in something else ..

[AsmyppoL]

It's good to criticize when you know the story ...
Why is there nothing like Guderian's Panzer Group on the General Staff maps for June 20 and 22?
This grouping is also absent in the first military intelligence report of the Intelligence Directorate.
It turns out that the General Staff did not know about this road (through Brest). On June 23, the General Staff did not care about this direction ...
In Belarus, there were many roads from the border to Bialystok, and then the road to Minsk ...

[paul3390]

There are many roads. But those on which you can push a tank group of armies and its supply are few. Just two.

[AsmyppoL]

You are juggling facts ...
If, according to intelligence, there are no tank groups, then what kind of roads "along which you can push tank groups" can we talk about ??
According to intelligence, Brest has two tank regiments, a tank brigade and six cavalry regiments. Three more infantry divisions.
And there are no supply columns in the tank regiments ...
There are no motorized infantry in this area. Only according to the district headquarters there is a single motorized regiment.
Also, the reconnaissance data does not include a second tank group on a ledge in the Suwalki area.
You know this about tank groups from history. And neither in the headquarters of the ZAPOVO, nor in the General Staff, nor in the NGOs, no one knows about them ...

[paul3390]

Stop it. After the defeat of France, only an outright idiot could not guess about the presence of tank groups of armies. As well as the fact that if something happens they will be on our borders. And about the directions in which they will go.

For reconnaissance - well, you at least cut it, I absolutely do not understand, HOW could you miss the concentration of such a mass of equipment ?? This is not a needle in a haystack .. It does not happen.

I always said that in the events of the beginning of the war there are sooooo many things that are mysterious and inexplicable.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

It's good to criticize when you know the story ...

It is much worse when you pass off your own fantasies as a true story, as was the case with the 16th Army.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Why is there nothing like Guderian's Panzer Group on the General Staff maps for June 20 and 22?

Firstly, this is not a map of the General Staff, if only because it does not belong to either the chief of the operational directorate, or the chief of the intelligence directorate, or to Zhukov himself, but was made most likely in two copies for the officials of the People's Commissariat of Defense, possibly for the Deputy People's Commissars, or the same Mehlis at the direction of one of the chiefs. The second copy was destroyed, there is a mark on the map. Secondly, based on the legend, those who prepared this map did not need any details, and the main thing was to assess with what forces Germany fell upon our country and the main number of divisions, not headquarters, and how the divisions were brought together ... All this is clear from the map to any competent officer, but not to you Alexey-Evgeny-Victoria, who worked only on "Violet" in some small part of the 12th GU MO.
Even earlier you lied that there were no reconnaissance reports other than No. 5 of June 15, then by bringing this map you carved yourself, if only because the map was drawn up on later reconnaissance materials from June 20 than those that were on June 1. How will you get out now, for the lies that were spread before?

Quote: AsmyppoL

This grouping is also absent in the first military intelligence report of the Intelligence Directorate.

And you have not seen the map for the intelligence report of the RU GSh, which Golikov reported to Zhukov early in the morning of June 21, and you have no right to assert that the groupings of German troops were not plotted there until the GRU GSh publishes this map. Your fantasies are not supported by anything, and your speculations cannot be considered facts. As for the intelligence report on June 22, they still could not accurately inflict a grouping of German troops, if only because after crossing the border, almost all Wehrmacht headquarters changed their deployment points, combat units also went on the march, or took part in battles from the very beginning of the war. So your "cleverness" only showed once again that your group of authors do not know well how intelligence works, and hence all the heresy that you have been carrying over the last couple of years.

Quote: AsmyppoL

On June 23, the General Staff did not care about this direction ...

In fact, it is the responsibility of the districts to assess the most tank-hazardous areas and submit proposals to the General Staff both for the equipment of the theater of operations and for the forces and resources involved in these areas. Learn military science first, before lying about what the General Staff should do, and what is left to the discretion of the district authorities.

[north 2]

And let's trace Tymoshenko's way back from the moment Tymoshenko was awarded the Order of Victory, and not Tymoshenko's way to the awarded Order of Victory. And just then we will ask ourselves the question, for what such successes in the Second World War was Tymoshenko generally awarded the Order of Victory and for what military successes did he wear the epaulettes of the Marshal of the Soviet Union, if Tymoshenko on the fronts failed all military operations under his command? And it's also good that Timoshenko was taken away from the command of the Stalingrad Front in time, otherwise there would have been one more Kharkov and Kiev combined, in terms of the scale of the tragedy ... And hence another question - how such a mediocrity on the eve of the Second World War could become the People's Commissar of Defense THE USSR ? What difference would it have been if the Germans attacked on June 22, or a couple of days earlier or later, if the NKO's army and navy would be prepared to be on the alert all the time, everywhere and always. Would Stalin have believed on June 20 intelligence reports that the Germans would attack on June 22? And what, an NGO under the leadership of Tymoshenko could eliminate or reduce the tragedy at the beginning of the Second World War ??? So it is not necessary only to blame Stalin for the catastrophe of the Second World War. Although there is Stalin's fault for the personnel issue in NGOs.

[Bar1]

Quote: north 2

So it is not necessary only to blame Stalin for the catastrophe of the Second World War. Although there is Stalin's fault for the personnel issue in NGOs.

you really decide on Stalin.
ALL personnel policy in the USSR sample 41g is the policy of Stalin and no one else, but such positions as the people's commissar of defense are already 100% Stalin's creature.

[Soldatov V.]

There are things that depend on the high command insofar as. As a sergeant on combat duty, I can say or state that the main responsibility for combat training is borne by the regiment commander or the commander of a separate battalion.
At all times, each unit is assigned a time of combat deployment. In the Strategic Missile Forces, in addition to the shift on duty, this is from 10 minutes to an hour (I don’t remember exactly), for example, from an hour to two, the tankers started the engines and drove out of the gates of the unit, and this was at least with a minimum ammunition load, as well as with aviation and the Navy.
And where is Stalin, Timoshenko or Shoigu? The regiment commander teaches and drives according to the standards in accordance with the standards of combat training. I don’t know how it really was, but when giving orders before the war, they and the army commanders believed that the army would take up combat positions that had been planned in advance in a short time.
History and events show that control over combat training was not all left to the mercy of the commanders of regiments and divisions.
The same thing can happen now.
And it is necessary that Putin or Shoigu give the order and all the armed forces entered the battle in an hour, the Strategic Missile Forces, by the way, in one and a half to two minutes. Pavlov was shot for the cause.

[ccsr]

Quote: north 2

And what, an NGO under the leadership of Tymoshenko could eliminate or reduce the tragedy at the beginning of the Second World War ???

They could, if Timoshenko and Zhukov insisted in Stalin's office on sending an encrypted message on the introduction of cover plans in the districts with a short encryption, and not sending the Directive w / n, which would immediately change the first hours of the war after the German attack. And the Directive itself could have been written faster, without bothering with details, and then they themselves could call the districts and demand from the district commanders to alert, if not all of the district's armies, then at least the border divisions.
Even such measures would immediately affect the repulsion of the attack of German troops in the first hours of the war, and this was perfectly proved by the border outposts, many of which fought for several hours without the approach of support detachments from the border divisions.
Unfortunately, neither Tymoshenko nor Zhukov had any idea how their directive would be perceived in the troops, how long it would take to execute it, which is why some parts of the Red Army were caught sleeping at the moment of the attack. This was superimposed on the loss of command and control, and all this eventually became the beginning of the tragedy.

[Knell wardenheart]

I believe that the construction in Stalin's mind looked like this - he knew that the GG did not trust the USSR, but he also knew that the GG went to the division of Poland and the spheres of influence from the USSR. Stalin knew that the GG were connected in a certain way by the Battle of Britain, the blockade, the North African campaign, and that behind the WB there was American aid, which torpedoed German efforts to strangle the WB. By purely quantitative indicators, Stalin assumed that an attack by the GG on us without the concentration of all forces (which is difficult to overlook and which probably requires the closure of the issue with the WB) is unlikely, because we had a solid advantage over the GG in the number of tanks, aircraft, artillery ... Stalin understood that the French operation was a success due to a combination of mistakes of the French command and excessive reliance on the impenetrability of the defense, that the success of the Polish campaign was predetermined by the incomparability of the available resources of the GG and Poland. Proceeding from this, he probably believed that, given the greater echelonment deep into the USSR forces in the West, the greater quantitative superiority in technology, the Germans would need to create a very noticeable concentration on the border at the point of the intended strike. Which intelligence will reveal in advance and we will have time for all kinds of maneuvers.
The overly cautious position on "not succumbing to provocations" was, in my opinion, from the fact that the very DECISION to attack the USSR from the point of view of the GG seemed to Stalin far from obvious in the context of the above constructions. He knew that they could do it, but he was not sure that they would be able to do it quickly and without overextending forces, which he estimated as supercritical, taking into account the German "second front", the comparable forces of the Soviet army, extremely huge spaces that in case of an attack would have to be overcome with a fight for the GG. From his point of view, FORCING something definite, extraordinary should have been. Considering that the USSR supplied resources to the GG despite the war in Europe and was not on good terms with the WB, from Stalin's point of view, such an extraordinary event could only be a large-scale provocation, which would create in Berlin real fears of the USSR preparing for an attack on the GG.

I think that was the general logic. Probably, the Germans through agents approximately represented similar views of the Soviet leadership, and they managed to use this map quite well to implement their plan.

[BAI]

then it took no more than 12 minutes to rewrite it in a notepad for cipher telegrams, and it took more than half an hour to rewrite it.

What are all these calculations based on? Did the author try to manually rewrite 2 pages of text?

[vladcub]

It is clear that nothing is clear. Zhukov writes that the directive was discussed with Stalin. In fact, Zhukov writes "on his knee" to the directive.
In this case, there are 2 options: a) the directive was worked out, at least orally, in Stalin's office.
b) Tymoshenko and Zhukov did what they wanted. But this is doubtful

[Charlie]

Option "b" is perhaps more correct. Some researchers believe that the directive without a number, which does not have Stalin's signature and which was later assigned # 1, was sent to the newly formed CP of the fronts to check the communication lines. It was sent by the leadership of the NGO without Stalin's notification. But these are just assumptions

[203-K]

In this case, there are 2 options: a) the directive was worked out, at least orally, in Stalin's office.
b) Tymoshenko and Zhukov did what they wanted. But this is doubtful

There is a more realistic option - the directive was written in advance in the People's Commissariat of Defense and it was presented to Stalin as a draft, but signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov. A discussion took place in Stalin's office and the draft began to be edited. If any graphologist wants to examine this draft directive, then it is quite possible to determine who wrote the text of the draft. I think it was Zhukov or one of his deputies.

[vladcub]

"signed by Timoshenko and Zhukov" is natural: Stalin did not formally hold any posts. Although the last word was with him, he kept the chain of command

[zenion]

Everything is sudden. Sudden rains, sudden frosts. My cousin Mikhail was the commander of a battalion of heavy tanks and they were supposed to take positions in the Baltic States, where he did not say. They put the carriages on an ordinary train and sent them to the Baltic states. They arrived at the station, which turned out to be the final one. Nobody met them. They asked the railroad workers in which direction the place was, and they showed them where to go. Arrived in the evening, while it got dark. There is no one in the town, no one in the military unit, the barracks are empty, there is no communication. We decided to sleep, figure out what and where in the morning. At night, they began shelling the barracks and the place of the officers' hostel. And they have nothing but pistols. We started to move towards the station, there was no one there. We decided to go through the forest. How many marched did not know. They were stopped and sent under escort to the commanders. They checked the documents and were surprised. Where are your tanks and everything else? Didn't arrive. The radio station contacted the command and then Mikhail reported what had happened. They were ordered to leave immediately to the district headquarters. The commander, either a regiment or a division, was ordered to issue a transport to send tankers to the railway station. We arrived at the station and find out that the war has begun. And then the loss of equipment, fuel and ammunition for equipment. Then they sent a reconnaissance plane and found it all at different stations. The Germans were advancing, and the planes bombed the trains and everything for the tanks. They were interrogated for a day how it happened. Of course, everyone said that they were not engaged in the transfer of equipment, they only had to receive it at the place where they were sent. This is how they greeted the first day of the war. He had no idea what the foot soldiers were doing deep in the forest and far from the border.

[LisKat2]

Good evening everyone.
For me, the topic is not interesting and scandalous, but it is important. It has been said long ago that we have more than one family that was bypassed by the war.
So it was with me: my grandmother's relatives died and she miraculously survived: she was with her relatives in the Crimea, were bombed, and then the Tatars finished off the wounded.
My stepfather's great-grandfather fought and now every year on June 22 he takes out an old garrison cap and puts it on. Perhaps someone remembers the movie: "Two Fyodors", he loves him

[LisKat2]

"90 km / h" I thought that the speed limit of 90 km / h appeared in 1977: my mother told me so

[AAK]

Colleagues, I propose to step aside for a while from the content of this article, to parenthesize Rezun's conclusions in his famous trilogy and try to solve one problem for yourself ...
Given: 1) Comrade Stalin, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and since May 1941 the head of the Soviet government. It is characterized ambiguously, but no one has ever considered him not only a fool, but even a fool.
2) Comrade Tymoshenko, People's Commissar of Defense, is characterized very ambiguously, but, again, no one called him a fool.
3) Comrade Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff, is characterized by extremely ambiguous characterization, but, in particular, the overwhelming majority of colleagues in military affairs just recently, evaluating his role and contribution, used the terms "strategist", "best commander", "author of all our victories", etc. .p., with a huge variety of epithets, no one, again, used the word.
These three listed comrades had the necessary state and military competence, were directly responsible for the readiness of the Red Army for the coming war against German fascism and had the full range of necessary powers for this.
And now the question: how did it happen that a significant part of the formations and units of the Red Army in the early morning of June 22 came under a sudden ARTILLERIAN strike, being in the PLACES OF PERMANENT DISLOCATION?
I will consider any answer options

[Charlie]

That is, how did you get it? Because they were in these places, and the Germans attacked. That is why they came under attack.

[Gips]

https://youtu.be/LLGYefqiDO8

[vladcub]

Quote: Charlie

And "all" is what? What was being done to "delay"?

And "not to succumb to provocations" from nefig do?

[Siberian54]

"not to give in to provocations" in borderland conditions means not to shoot on the adjacent side.

[Siberian54]

This is how the classic "fog of war" looks like. Everyone is in place, everyone is fussing, and the order does not reach the "sergeant" (the army is commanded by two commander-in-chief and a sergeant, the rest are transmitting orders )

[Kostadinov]

Previously, the factors that influenced the defeat of spacecraft in border battles in the first hours and days of the war were considered.

1. The main factor is that the German army is fully mobilized since Germany has been at war since 1939.
The USSR is not in a state of war and it is impossible to carry out a full mobilization as this will be a pretext for war.
2. German transport capabilities are at least two times better than those of the USSR, and the average transport distances to the borders are more than two times less. So with all the options, Germany is ahead of the USSR in the concentration of forces by at least two weeks.
3. For 14 years of accelerated industrialization and development of science, technology and education, the USSR was unable to catch up with the huge lag behind Germany inherited from tsarist Russia.
All other minor details (surprise, direction of attacks, etc.) do not change the inevitable retreat of the Red Army, in front of the superior forces of the enemy, in the first months of the war.

[AsmyppoL]

Sorry, but you are criticizing my words by paraphrasing them.
You yourself have quoted the text that speaks of the first hours and days of the war. I can clarify the first two days.
Everything that you wrote, you yourself designated the terms "the first months of the war"
And in the first hours and the first couple of days, the main role was played by surprise (when the troops are not deployed, are in deployment points or in columns on the roads, aviation at the main airfields is not scattered), ignorance of the situation and the fear of taking the initiative from the command.
Everything else will appear a little later ...

[ivan2022]

Formal excuses. The main cause of problems from the first hour of the war is indeed
the problem of a collision with the army mobilized 2 years ago and the weak mobility of troops not equipped with trucks, horse-drawn traction and communications. What is the use of knowing the situation if the execution of orders lags behind and communication fails? Where does "situational knowledge" come from? The problem is the complexity of the political situation and the lag behind advanced technologies. The problem is poverty, lack of funds.

[Illanatol]

Quote: Crowe

In the book of the admiral "On the course to victory" you can read almost a verbatim account of the events.

Oh, those memoirs ...
Did Kuznetsov make the decision solely on his own, in the quiet of his office, or did the guests from the "center" come to him first?
The myth of Kuznetsov's "amateur performance" was born in Khrushchev's times, when they used everything to pour anal chocolate over Stalin's name.

Let's take into account that it was much easier for Kuznetsov to make a decision, and most importantly, to implement it than for the commander of the districts. The navy is a relatively compact structure, with the naval connections always being better. And the crews are complete and combat-ready.
And what does it mean to raise the alarm and put on alert a military district the size of a European country? Moreover, there was an active rearmament, the deployment of new units and formations and the accompanying mess.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Crowe

For the conduct of hostilities, an additional signal from the People's Commissariat is required ...

Okay, let's operate with documents. From the reports of the headquarters of the Northern Fleet (quotes from the collection of documents TsVMA):
"June 18th. The fleet is in daily readiness. The incursions of German aircraft into our airspace continue. During the day, the readiness of the air defense number 1 and the air raid were announced at the main base twice. Air Force fighters fired at an unknown aircraft, and anti-aircraft batteries at a German Me-110... »
"June 19. At the main base of the fleet, an air raid was announced twice. Anti-aircraft artillery opened fire on violators, and fighter aircraft drove them out of our airspace ... A signal of operational readiness number 2 was given to the fleet. The dispersal of submarines has begun ... "
Pay attention: no "additional signal" was required for this - the fleet met the war in readiness and fully armed!

You write about the entire fleet, and you cite an extract on the Northern Fleet as evidence. So everything is known about the Northern Fleet and the decision was made personally by Admiral Golovko ...
And you will not be able to provide similar information on other fleets. The absence of instructions from Moscow on the afternoon of June 21 led to the fact that the chief of staff Panteleev wrote in his memoirs that they bombarded from Liepaja and Hanko with telegrams asking for permission to at least scare off German planes. And the command of the fleet did not give permission to open fire.
For example, in Liepaja, anti-aircraft guns of batteries and ships opened fire only after the bombing of the airfield. And you write that the fleet met the war fully armed ...
The commander of the Black Sea Fleet also did not dare to give the order to open fire when German aircraft appeared near Sevastopol ...
The Navy was just lucky that the ships did not appear as the main targets in the first raid ...

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Cat Alexandrovich

Dear VO editors, have you seen what the photo for this article looks like on the "History" page?

You are absolutely right. In the review of articles, an unfortunate angle of the middle part of Stalin's body was chosen. It is a pity that you were minus without understanding this ...

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Crowe

June 22, 1941 at 3 a.m. Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral I.D. Eliseev ordered to open fire on German aircraft.

There was still an hour before the war, but Sevastopol had already fought and our people had already died there.

Actually, the official documents currently published were opened fire at 3:20 am. There are no documents confirming the opening of fire at 3:06 ...
Maybe you will give a link to the documents?
For documents, not memories ...
And the first people died only at 3:48

[Bobrovsky]

Maybe it's enough to crush the basics of Uncle Khrushchev and Uncle Zhukov in a mortar. They knew very well that Germany would attack the USSR. A railway runs through our village from east to west. Everyone recalled that starting from February, several military echelons passed to the east per day. Because of ignorance, such things are not done, they knew and prepared. But in order to cover up their mistakes and crimes, a story about, allegedly, "ignorance" was launched. The very same Gerhardt Kegel regularly informed the leadership of the GRU about all the measures taken at the embassy to prepare for war. And the date of June 22 was also announced in advance. I also once believed in all these false things, about the fact that they were asleep and did not know anything. And then, in 2005, I read three letters outraged by "ignorance" in the Veteran magazine. Posted by Lieutenant General, Major General and Colonel. In 1941, they were first lieutenant and commander of a tank company, second lieutenant and commander of a tank platoon and third sergeant, commander of the quadruple ZPU maxim. All of them served in different parts of the Baltic OVO and recalled that all the personnel on the morning of June 18 were gathered in clubs and read out a telegram (as they wrote) about the upcoming German attack on the USSR within the next five days. And then their units withdrew from their places of permanent deployment and went to the areas intended for defense. Family members of the military were sent to evacuation by trains on June 19 and 20. Nobody does such things without a command from the People's Commissariat of Defense. The archive contains a report from the Commander of the Baltic Fleet to the Commander of the Baltic OVO, where it is just mentioned that all measures have been taken under this directive.

[Bobrovsky]

And the fact that N.G. Kuznetsov ascribes the combat readiness of the fleet to his personal initiative is also a lie. He, just like the command of the Baltic OVO, carried out this directive of 18 June. More precisely, it could have been sent on the 17th, but reached the districts on the night of June 17-18, 1941.

[203-K]

... He, just like the command of the Baltic OVO, carried out this directive of 18 June.

In this case, you are mistaken, because Kuzntsov himself was the people's commissar and Tymoshenko did not obey. That is why the directives of the General Staff for him were only for informational purposes, not guiding ones. So we must pay tribute to the leadership of Kuznetsov and his ability to prepare the fleet on the eve of the war. Yes, and the naval pilots of the Black Sea Fleet bombed the Romanian territory - this, too, should not be forgotten ...

[Political instructor 1961]

The article is good, although of course it can be titled LATE TO DRINK BORJES WHEN ..., it is clear that all processes are inertial and the issuance of any lightning orders with the general unpreparedness of the army for war is a thankless task, I think that it is NECESSARY to carry out a wide publication of not so detailed, almost scientific articles, but materials explaining the very good reasons for the very general unpreparedness of the army for war in the second half of June 1941, because this unpreparedness arose precisely in the second half of June, when, from the point of view of military science of that time, the attack from Germany was to be postponed to the next year. It's elementary that to attack Russia with its distances, you need DRY roads, good weather, etc. that is, the Germans could provide themselves with a sufficient margin of time only by starting hostilities no later than the end of May, they missed the deadlines and, accordingly, the spacecraft and the general staff, sorry for the terminology, relaxed, began to redeploy the line of deep defense, leave commanders, etc. THIS SIMPLE STORY IS NECESSARY TO BE CONVINCED TO OUR CITIZENS (especially young people), and even to include it in history textbooks ...

[Nikolay Kurnosov]

Recently, the Main Archive Department of Moscow has posted on the Internet fragments of its phono documents about the war.

https://vov.mos.ru/title?redirect_url=%2Fmedia-library%2Flibrary%2Funforgettable

In the chapter about 1941, there is a piece from an audio interview with a war veteran by the name of Kolesov, who on the night of June 22 was the communications officer on duty in the box of the Minsk Drama Theater, where the district commander Pavlov watched a performance of the Moscow Art Theater.
So this Kolesov tells that from Moscow there were several alarm calls from Talin, Zhukov and Timoshenko.
Therefore, the General Staff tried to somehow clarify the situation.
Moreover, this Kolesov says that on the ground, the aggravation of the situation was felt long before June 22. Within a month, all the officers of the district headquarters were transferred to the barracks position. But Moscow kept jolting everyone: "Do not disturb the Germans, do not give them a reason for provocations ..."
And this fear of provocation, it seems, dominated the brains of the highest generals so strongly that it overshadowed all other - the most sensible - arguments.

[A. Kudasov]

How to re-sing the nonsense of G.K. Zhukov, read the memoirs of his accomplice N.S. Khrushchev. He writes that I.V. On June 20, 1941, Stalin announced that the war would be on June 22, 1941, and N.S. Khrushchev immediately left for Ukraine "so as not to meet the war on the train. Moreover, general mobilization, which in those days was equated with a declaration of war, was declared by Romania on June 15, and Finland - on June 17, 1941. And why are you silent, that it was the fault of the same Mr. .K. Zhukov, there were "holes" in the defense of Soviet troops - in the Baltic States between the 8th and 11th armies, which included E. Manstein's 4th tank group, and in Belarus between the 4th and 10th armies, where The 2nd Panzer Group of G. Guderian entered.At the same time, G.K. Zhukov on May 12, 1941 turned to I.V. Stalin with a proposal to be the first to attack Germany, claiming that the 27th Army (which, on the orders of G.K. Zhukova defended the Baltic coast) and the 13th Army (which on June 22, 1941 was only being formed in the rear of the Western Military District) are in readiness for an offensive "with little blood on foreign territory." from the "preemptive" attack of the USSR, and GK Zhukov himself writes that his "brilliant plan" was executed by him personally in a single copy and transferred to I.V. Stalin in a sealed envelope. So who warned A. Hitler - I.V. Stalin or is it G.K. Zhukov? From 25 to 1941 June 22 G.K. Zhukov hid from I.V. Stalin's situation on the fronts, and all this time in the border districts received replenishment personnel (as a result of which, on July 29, 1941, the command of the Hitlerite group appealed to the High Command of the Wehrmacht to increase the capacity of the camps for prisoners of war from 1 thousand to 1941 million places) and equipment ... It was for this that the head of the VOSO was arrested. After G.K. Zhukov was removed from his post as chief of the General Staff, he gave the command to the NWF troops to withdraw to the Luga line, i.e. to leave without a fight the fortifications on the old border (along the Velikaya River), as a result of which a gap was formed between the 790nd Army and the troops of the North-West Front. The famous "turn of G. Guderian to the South" also began with the fact that the 1st Army withdrew to the location of the SWF, and in addition to the 22nd Panzer Group, the 21nd Field Army of the Germans entered this gap. And the encirclement of Kiev in the South-Western Front began with the withdrawal of the 2th and 2th armies to Kiev, leaving A.A. Vlasov, who again surrendered the crossing of the Dnieper to the Germans without a fight.

[kd4243]

I am reading- According to the testimony of the former commander of the ZapOVO D. G. Pavlov, one can judge about the conversation with the People's Commissar at a later time: "At one o'clock in the morning on June 22 of this year, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, I was summoned to the front headquarters ..." It's strange somehow, at 22 am on June XNUMX, the war has not yet begun, but the front headquarters already exists ...

[Grandfather]

This document can hardly be considered a directive; rather, it is a combat order - to take places according to the combat schedule. Both of my grandfathers were called up from the reserve in May 41 and both were in the west. Didn't you prepare? How do they prepare?