Military Review

A fight with a shadow. Black Sea Fleet in the Great Patriotic War

42
A fight with a shadow. Black Sea Fleet in the Great Patriotic War

I must say right away that the Black Sea people fought heroically, especially on land. Defense of Sevastopol - the golden page of Russian glory weapons, landings on the Black Sea, that of Kerch-Feodosia, that of Novorossiysk, that of Mariupol, that others - a crazy risk and unparalleled heroism. But there were also nuances.


Let's start with the fact that sailors in combat on land is, of course, formidable and glorious, but they prepare them for something else, and they prepare them much longer and more expensive than infantrymen. Landing troops from random ships and vessels is also good, but there are special landing equipment, inexpensive and quickly built. And in general, the fleet must fight at sea. And especially the second (if not the first) fleet of the country. The Black Sea Fleet in 1941 is one battleship (out of three), five cruisers (out of nine), three leaders (out of seven), 16 destroyers (of which 11 are new), 44 submarines, two TFR, 87 torpedo boats, etc. .d.

There was complete order with the ships, the problem was with the enemy. Our eternal enemy - Turkey, of course, had the battleship Geben (Yavuz), but otherwise it was a rather sad sight: four destroyers, five submarines and two torpedo boats, with an extremely weak air force - not the kind of force that is capable of attacking our coast. There was also Romania - four destroyers, three submarines, three torpedo boats, and in theory Bulgaria - about a dozen torpedo boats and other rubbish.

Even if all these formidable forces together attacked the Soviet coast - one aviation The Black Sea Fleet (632 aircraft) would be enough so that there would be no military and civilian fleets left on the Black Sea (from the word - at all). Well, if suddenly Stalin's falcons missed, there was also coastal artillery. Only in Sevastopol the shores stored 8 - 305 mm guns, 4 - 203 mm, 15 - 152 mm, 6 - 130 mm and others with a smaller caliber. But Sevastopol is not everything, only 180-mm guns in the coastal defense of the Black Sea fleet there were 18 pieces, the equivalent of two cruisers of project 26. And also mines (three minelayers), anti-aircraft gunners and divisions allocated to cover the coast. I repeat - even without ships, this would be enough to carry out all the fleets of the Black Sea combined, and the pogrom of Constanta, and by DB-3 forces, in the amount of 61 pieces, and not only Constanta.

All these forces were not prepared against the Romanians and the Turks, of course, they were prepared for the Crimean War 2.0, that is, against the attack of the Anglo-French fleet. Until 1939, it made some sense, but after the outbreak of World War II, it completely lost. Our admirals also understood this, who began to prepare for the invasion of the Italian fleet, which will by all means abandon its grouping in Africa, leave its shores unprotected and rush to storm Sevastopol, and the Turks, who are squeezing the straits, will support him in this.

Everyone can assess the reality of such a scenario for himself, but he made his own contribution to the chaos of the first days of the war - the Black Sea Fleet set up minefields on the way to its bases.

“One of the first tasks for the Black Sea Fleet was, in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov, the setting of a defensive minefield in the Sevastopol region. The production began on June 23rd and ended on June 25th. In the Odessa area, a minefield was set up in accordance with the decision of the fleet commander. "

The only victims of this were the Soviet ships.

On the whole, of course, the Black Sea Fleet had tasks.

Tasks


Still, the main task of the fleet in a purely land war is to support and supply its troops. The second is the landing of friendly troops and the reflection of the landing of foreign troops. The third is the evacuation of the encircled troops. The fourth is the interruption of the enemy's sea communications. The fifth is the destruction of enemy ships and the neutralization of enemy bases. The sixth is specific for the Black Sea fleet - support for the actions of the Danube Flotilla. The means for these tasks were, in contrast to the enemy, who had only the Air Force and gradually transferred by rivers and land what was possible - torpedo boats, landing barges, small and midget submarines.

The tasks were, the funds were at first, but with the nuances it came out as always.

And the first nuance is basing. Here, of course, there is not much to blame for the fleet - no one could have foreseen the option of losing most of the airfields and disabling the main base of the fleet in the first months of the war. Squashing aviation in record time - too. The fact that submarines will have to be used as transports is even more so. And the fact that only planes and mosquito forces would become the enemy of the ships did not fit in the head at all.

Performance


In 1941, the fleet coped with the first task by five with a plus - Odessa was supplied, the OOR was supported by the fire of large ships, when the Crimea was threatened, the whole Primorsky army was taken out unnoticed and practically without losses. Sevastopol was also supported and supplied uninterruptedly at first.

But 1942 was a frankly disastrous year, but what does the fleet have to do with it?

Ships do not live long without an air umbrella, it was not there. You can talk as much as you like about the fact that the garrison of Sevastopol was abandoned, but if sailors with ships lay down next to the soldiers and marines, would it change anything?

Evacuation without fighter cover was impossible, and we practically did not have long-range fighters, and there were no short-range ones either, in 1942 every pilot and plane counted. Again, if we had a mass of fighters, there would be no need to evacuate Sevastopol, it would have resisted. And what happens without air cover, was proved by the detachment of the captain of the 2nd rank of Negodos a year later, when the leader and two destroyers were easily drowned by dive bombers in the open sea.

As for the enemy's strategic landings, somehow it did not work out, in the absence of the enemy's fleet, but with ours - quite. The Black Sea Fleet landed landings regularly, successfully and where it was necessary for the command. All this was done without special landing ships and developments. Yes, there are a lot of critics of the landing in the same Kerch-Feodosiya operation, but the goal was achieved, as in other cases. Landings in general have become a kind of visiting card of the Black Sea people, unlike, say, the Baltic, where they, of course, were, but much more bloody and less successful.

With the evacuation of their troops, it was different: Odessa can be entered into textbooks, Sevastopol was not tried to evacuate, due to its complete impossibility. Likewise, with communications: they started cheerfully, from Italian tankers to Turkish schooners, but with the loss of the bases and the air force of the fleet, everything practically came to naught. And 1944, when the Germans removed 130 troops from the Crimea, is an undoubted failure. There were successes in the process, of course, but these are the successes of the pilots, the large ships never left the sea. Which is logical in its own way - after the loss of the leader and two destroyers in 000, they decided to take care of the fleet.

There was a problem with the enemy ships because of their absence, but the shelling of Constanta in 1941 was, however, for it it is necessary to put zero on a five-point scale. To lose a leader out of the blue is still necessary to be able to, the enemy did not suffer much. Rare raids on the Crimean coast also did not bring success, only losses. But the flotillas - both the Danube, the Dnieper and the Azov, fought heroically and performed a huge amount of combat work.

We are traditionally strong in improvisation and coastal defense, in contrast to the actions of heavy ships.

Сonclusion


The result is strange - large warships on the Black Sea were not needed. There was not enough aviation, there were no electromagnetic trawls, there was also a shortage of escort and landing ships, and a battleship, two new cruisers (at least "Tashkent"), and a six-seven-U would look very good in Murmansk, not bad in Vladivostok, but not in Sevastopol. And it was possible to think of this long before the war: for the Grand Fleet or Regia Marina it was narrow, but for the Turks it was wide.

As a result, a full-fledged squadron fought with a shadow, occasionally shooting along the coast, for which the old cruisers with Noviks would have been enough, and since 1943 it peacefully sat at the bases.

There are no questions for the sailors - the Black Sea men fought heroically, perhaps, which is more effective than the Baltic, the question is for the command, which, clearly acting in line with tradition, overestimated the threat to the Black Sea and sharply underestimated for the Arctic, where the USSR Navy kept purely nominal forces. The experience of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, when, without a fleet, we completely reached Istanbul, was completely forgotten, but the scenario, in essence, repeated itself, except that the mine boats were replaced by aviation.

One positive thing - unlike Sevastopol during the Crimean War and Port Arthur, during the Japanese war, along with the main base, the fleet was not destroyed either.

Where does the question come from: Do you need powerful surface ships in closed theaters?
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  1. Bashkirkhan
    Bashkirkhan 27 September 2021 18: 07
    +4
    a battleship, two new cruisers (at least "Tashkent"), and a six-seven-U would look very good in Murmansk

    And where would this battleship in Murmansk dock? The battleship "Arkhangelsk" (aka HMS Royal Sovereign) after the war, the Soviet sailors, due to the lack of conditions for basing in the Northern Fleet, returned the British to such a beaten track that even the main battery towers were out of order.
    1. Sergey M. Karasev
      Sergey M. Karasev 27 September 2021 18: 45
      +4
      And where would this battleship in Murmansk dock?

      It was worth thinking about this topic before the war. An additional dock with increased capacity will never be superfluous. It was possible to build at least in reserve.
      1. Bashkirkhan
        Bashkirkhan 27 September 2021 18: 54
        +11
        Quote: Sergey Mikhailovich Karasev
        It was worth thinking about this topic before the war

        For 74 years of Soviet power, a dry dock capable of receiving a battleship never appeared in the Northern Fleet. In Sevastopol and Kronstadt, large dry docks remained from the tsar, and battleships in the Baltic and Black Sea fleets docked there.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 28 September 2021 14: 57
          -1
          Quote: Bashkirkhan
          For 74 years of Soviet power, a dry dock capable of receiving a battleship never appeared in the Northern Fleet.

          Duc, this ... at first the war prevented the construction of a dock in Molotovsk under ave. 23, and then the damned bourgeois knocked out of the way and pantalyk Soviet people, having built us floating docks. smile
          1. Bashkirkhan
            Bashkirkhan 28 September 2021 16: 05
            +1
            Quote: Alexey RA
            the sworn bourgeoisie knocked the Soviet people out of the way and built a floating dock for us.

            And now, when large imported floating docks are gradually leaving for seabed conservation, like the captured T-4 from Tirpitz and the Swedish PD-50, there are reasonable claims to the communists. But the tsar-father understood that the descendants should be left with dry docks, which could not be drowned or drunk.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 28 September 2021 16: 28
              +3
              Quote: Bashkirkhan
              But the tsar-father understood that the descendants should be left with dry docks, which could not be drowned or drunk.

              Not only the tsar-father, but also the mother-empress. smile
      2. Aleksey Kuznetsov
        Aleksey Kuznetsov 27 September 2021 23: 06
        +3
        It was possible to build at least in reserve.

        Of course, the country then had nowhere to put money, materials and highly qualified specialists in order to build "in reserve" (!!!) a huge and complex structure, which must be continuously maintained and maintained in order and which is still unknown when and if necessary. request
        1. Proxima
          Proxima 27 September 2021 23: 55
          +3
          “Where does the question come from: do you need powerful surface ships in closed theaters?"- from the text. This question has long been answered by Soviet naval strategists - the answer: NO, NOT NECESSARY! stop And from here the fact: open fleet (Pacific and Northern) in the USSR (Russia) - the most numerous fellow , closed fleet (Black Sea and Baltic) the most small.
        2. Niko
          Niko 28 September 2021 00: 17
          +4
          Quote: Aleksey Kuznetsov
          It was possible to build at least in reserve.

          Of course, the country then had nowhere to put money, materials and highly qualified specialists in order to build "in reserve" (!!!) a huge and complex structure, which must be continuously maintained and maintained in order and which is still unknown when and if necessary. request

          And to keep ships in a puddle, to perish, or to be afraid to use "so as not to lose" is an excellent investment of money
    2. knn54
      knn54 27 September 2021 20: 10
      +1
      Let's start from the end.
      - Where does the question come from: do you need powerful surface ships in closed theaters?
      And what about the Mediterranean open theater? And there were battleships and aircraft carriers.
      Regarding the "mosquito" fleet. A tragic mistake was the Tupolev concept of torpedo boats, or rather the British-purely sabotage ships, in contrast to the German one. Which sailed from Crimea to Poti and Novorossiysk. Moreover, the Kriegsmarine did not lose a single boat on the Black Sea
      -In 1941, the fleet coped with the first task by five with a plus - Odessa was supplied, the OOR was supported by the fire of large ships, when the Crimea was threatened, the whole Primorsky army was taken out imperceptibly and practically without losses.
      Maybe because the defense of Odessa was commanded by General Petrov, who was relegated to secondary roles in Sevastopol.
      There were admirals, but there were no FLEETERS.
      Why? Which of the officers was not lowered into the hole by the drunken and stoned so-called "revolutionary" sailor (most of the anarchists "were destroyed by Trotsky and Co.).
      And no one canceled the continuity.
      1. ja-ja-vw
        ja-ja-vw 27 September 2021 21: 54
        +3
        Quote: knn54
        There were admirals, but there were no FLEETERS.

        and vice admiral Ivanov F.S. Oktyabrsky
        Per "skilful management of the fleet and shown courage, courage and heroism in the struggle against the German fascist invaders "by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 20, 1958, Admiral Oktyabrsky (Ivanov) Philip Sergeevich was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 10800 ).
        what
    3. The comment was deleted.
  2. bk316
    bk316 27 September 2021 18: 24
    +3
    Where does the question come from: Do you need powerful surface ships in closed theaters?

    Well, wow eyeliner - a whole article. laughing The answer to this question regarding the Black Sea is known: only as targets.
  3. Rakovor
    Rakovor 27 September 2021 18: 30
    +6
    Lord, how I got this enchanting nonsense that these "couch posleznantsy" constantly carry - you can't think of any other phrase.
  4. Xnumx vis
    Xnumx vis 27 September 2021 18: 43
    +1
    I remember that in the early nineties of perestroika, this topic was intensely exaggerated ... Like - "Why the Black Sea Fleet? They'll drown everything and lock it up ..." rapa saw warships. Loss of positions in the Indian Ocean (the squadron was there on a permanent basis). Loss of positions in the Mediterranean ... There were times when in the Mediterranean there were up to twenty-five thirty-five warship pennants. Thank God that they didn’t throw at least to the Tartus base in Syria. Although, they did everything to close it ... And warships are now sailing in the Mediterranean sea ...
    Not so much yet. But they proudly carry the Russian flag! There was a whole program to capture the straits in the Black Sea. And, quite realistic! My answer is this. The Black Sea Fleet should include ocean-going ships. Not because it is beautiful. But because they are needed.
    1. Army soldier2
      Army soldier2 27 September 2021 21: 42
      +2
      It is clear that in the 30s there was a different concept of using the Navy. But today the Black Sea Fleet's area of ​​responsibility extends far beyond the Black Sea zone. Apparently, a certain number of ships of the far sea (ocean) zone is needed. Although, of course, before discussing this topic, you need to navigate the operational tasks of the Black Sea Fleet
  5. Konnick
    Konnick 27 September 2021 18: 48
    0
    The leader of the destroyers Tashkent would not have looked in the Northern Fleet either, due to the weak anti-aircraft weapons. It can be compared with the main German ship on the Black Sea BDB (high-speed landing barge), and she was armed with two anti-aircraft guns 88 mm and two to four anti-aircraft 20-mm or 37-mm machine guns. Tashkent had 2 76-mm anti-aircraft guns, 6 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 6 DShK. Moreover, the 37-mm anti-aircraft guns after 100 shots had to be cooled within an hour or 15 minutes to change the barrel.
    1. sibiryouk
      sibiryouk 27 September 2021 19: 11
      +6
      Tashkent was designed for the southern seas according to the Italian type - weak hull, high speed. In the North, it could have been torn apart by a storm, like the 7-ku Crushing.
      1. WapentakeLokki
        WapentakeLokki 27 September 2021 20: 57
        +3
        The crushing one was not 7 but 7u ... which means, with the same performance characteristics, it was not a linear but an echelon arrangement of the boilers (And not the 1st but the 2nd pipes, respectively) .. a bit longer and therefore an even MORE weak body .. <+ > Soviet construction ... but Tashkent was built in Italy and how strong its hull was to say ... but ... during the last breakthrough of Tashkent to Sevastopol (this was generally the LAST breakthrough of surface ships, and EM Perfect was sunk - (who cares there is an owl-film `` I am following my course '') Tashkent, from close explosions of air bombs, gained .. a lot of tons of water so that the half-tank became level with the water but .. managed to reach the base (where the Luftwaffe drowned it safely after a couple of months )) .. so, what kind of corps did Tashkent have is a question ...
        1. ban
          ban 13 October 2021 10: 14
          0
          Crushing - still a clean seven
  6. Xlor
    Xlor 27 September 2021 18: 51
    0
    I'll tell you right away - the Black Sea people fought heroically, especially on land
  7. Wildcat
    Wildcat 27 September 2021 19: 05
    +1
    The article seems to be not bad, but the "result" did not work out well.
    Most of all it looks like a synopsis before the exam (such a good "spur synopsis"): Odessa, Sevastopol, communications, shelling, landings, again Sevastopol and ... that's all.

    On the "conclusions-results": "The result is strange - large warships in the Black Sea were not needed"
    lol lol lol
    Here, as the author himself says, "... there were some nuances" (here gentlemen hussars remember, but do not write a well-known anecdote about Petka and Vasily Ivanovich laughing laughing laughing ).
    In general, it is the same with the article.

    The most underestimated in the article - "The same is with communications: they started briskly, from Italian tankers to Turkish schooners, but with the loss of the bases and the Air Force of the fleet, everything practically came to naught."
    The fact that the Black Sea Fleet interrupted the supply of oil to the Italian fleet in the most effective way is, in general, a strategic success, which, IMHO, largely fettered the Axis actions in the Mediterranean. Italy and Germany constantly complained about "no fuel, including for ships".

    Regarding the defense and evacuation of Sevastopol, actions on communications, landings - well, as if the opinion of the author is good (even if it is wrong, IMHO), but still there are "textures" to it ... even when and how the war in the region ended Of the Black Sea and what the fleet was doing before that date ...
    It's really bad about the evacuation of Sevastopol - well, you could write better, to put it mildly ...

    IMHO, the best thing about the Black Sea Fleet was written by M. E Morozov:
    1. "Cube-brick": "The Black Sea Fleet in the Great Patriotic War. A short course of hostilities" (read very poorly, "blood from the eyes").
    2. A series about the submarine in the part concerning.
    3. "Torpedo bombers ..." in the part concerning.
    4. And a very well written "Air battle for Sevastopol".
    5. "Sea hunters" in the part concerning.
  8. parusnik
    parusnik 27 September 2021 19: 55
    +4
    An article for the Opinions heading, but this heading is overflowing today.
  9. Non-fighter
    Non-fighter 27 September 2021 20: 47
    -5
    In fact, Yavuz was a formidable force. In the interwar period, it was replaced by the MSA (Italians) and the boilers were transferred to the oil industry. Let's remember how he alone chased the Russian Black Sea Fleet before the appearance of the "empresses".
    The Turks were on the verge of joining the war on the side of Germany. The Black Sea Fleet was sharpened precisely for the fight against Yavuz, hence the mining of the approaches to the base.
    1. Catfish
      Catfish 27 September 2021 21: 00
      +8
      Let's remember how he alone chased the Russian Black Sea Fleet before the appearance of the "empresses".

      Specifically, in what particular battle did he "chase" the Russian fleet? Can you remind me? I mean exactly the core of the battleship fleet.
    2. Army soldier2
      Army soldier2 27 September 2021 21: 46
      +7
      In fact, he did not drive the Black Sea Fleet, but upon contact, he left him, taking advantage of the superiority in the course.
  10. The comment was deleted.
  11. Army soldier2
    Army soldier2 27 September 2021 22: 05
    +4
    Evacuation without fighter cover was impossible, and we practically did not have long-range fighters, and there were no short-range ones either, in 1942 every pilot and plane counted.

    Plus every ship was counted. There were only fighters and commanders without counting.
    Throwing 70 thousand battle-hardened fighters ... Perhaps at that particular time it was no longer possible to evacuate them. And 3 days before that? In 10 days? After all, the ammunition has already been taken out. Oktyabrsky and Petrov were afraid to report on time? Couldn't convince the Bet?
    Everyone knows the principle of the art of war - focusing efforts on a chosen direction at a certain time. Someone suggested covering the escape routes for two days with the necessary aviation squad? Someone did the calculations?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 28 September 2021 15: 18
      +2
      Quote: Army 2
      Perhaps at that particular time they could no longer be evacuated. And 3 days before that? In 10 days? After all, the ammunition has already been taken out.

      The ammunition was taken out in 1941. When there was a working port in Sevastopol. For the summer of 1942, there was nothing to take out and nowhere.
      Quote: Army 2
      Someone suggested covering the escape routes for two days with the necessary aviation squad? Someone did the calculations?

      What kind of outfit of forces are we talking about if our IA cannot cover the ships on most of the route? Physically unable - the range is not enough. It will not be possible to use the only long-range fighter of the Air Force - the twin-engine Pe-3 - it will not live long when it meets the "hundred and ninety".
      As soon as the army left the Kerch Peninsula, most of the route to Sevastopol was left without air cover (somewhat reminiscent of Tallinn in August 1941). In addition, the situation was aggravated by the fact that the enemy of the Black Sea Fleet ships and the Black Sea Fleet ships became, perhaps, the most professional of the Luftwaffe air corps - the eighth.
      Moreover, not only communications, but even bases on the "mainland" were under air strikes. With great difficulty, the Tashkent, which had escaped the backlash, was finished off by them a few days later right in the harbor of Novorossiysk.
      1. Wildcat
        Wildcat 29 September 2021 00: 17
        +1
        In short, the main problem of the evacuation of Sevastopol is that, unlike Odessa, no one planned it and it was not considered "above" inevitable.
        But.
        Resources - primarily ammunition and equipment - were expended in Kerch. At first, no one prepared the defense, the solution to the problem of the siege of Sevastopol and its last assault was seen in a blow to the besieging Germans from Kerch.
        The tragedy of Kerch changed everything at once. At the same time, the situation of Sevastopol, by analogy with the previous assaults, was not considered critical. Unfortunately, for many reasons and not only objective (difficulties with the supply of Sevastopol were solved IMHO), the Germans managed to win "on the brink".

        However, the resources that the Germans spent in Crimea then, the fact that Sevastopol defended itself to the last extreme and even further, - IMHO, did not allow this tragedy to be repeated in Leningrad and, IMHO, in Stalingrad.
        Yes, the heroes lost this battle, but they won the war.

        The evacuation was carried out "after the fact", all the capabilities of the fleet and aviation were not used for this.
        The losses of the fleet from aviation during supply / evacuation could be less with a different organization. The author of the article, by the way, writes correctly about the problem of our minefields - they interfered with us.

        But here I have to scold my IMHO, because "everyone imagines himself a strategist seeing the battle from the outside."

        However, the fall of Sevastopol, IMHO, is a tragedy even greater than the Tallinn passage - even the fleet did not take its own people on board .... I could not or could not - a difficult question. My answer: the fleet had to go to the end, the ship has been under construction for 3 years, the tradition is 300 years.

        From memory: the fact - from the well-known document was always removed "..the troops wavered ..".
        The evacuation of "responsible workers" began, and when "from above" they asked "and how the rest" - they answered "the boats were sent" ...
        Tough story.
        1. Army soldier2
          Army soldier2 29 September 2021 16: 55
          +3
          CM. Budyonny Report to the General Staff of the Red Army (Otd TsVMA. F.83. D. 488) "In addition to the enemy's advantage in tanks and his domination in aviation, the reason for the premature fall of Sevastopol was the lack of significant reserves of combat supplies and, in particular, ammunition, which was the main mistake of the command Crimean front. It was not the numerical balance of forces that decided the fight in the end by 3.07.42, but the weakening of the fire power of the defenders.
          What was taken out specifically can be seen in the Results of the work of the auto business for two years of the Patriotic War. Service report of the Black Sea Fleet. -: Poti, 1943, pp. 27-29. The tables are big there. To summarize, they took out in November-December 1941 approx. 15 thousand tons of ammunition from 305 mm shells to 7,62 mm rounds. By the way, the 30th and 35th batteries fell silent, not because they were destroyed by the Germans, but because they ran out of ammunition.
          Well, for the sake of completeness. In November, two zenap (out of three), three zenap (out of five), one RUS-2 radar (out of two), fighter squadrons of 62 sap, 93, 101 oiesk were redeployed from the SOR to the ports of the Caucasian coast.
          Of course, in such conditions it is difficult to talk about planned evacuation.
          I am definitely not a fleet headquarters operator. But nowhere was he able to find a mention of the fact that the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet was planning to evacuate the troops of the IDF, but the developed plan was not approved for some objective reasons.
          1. Wildcat
            Wildcat 30 September 2021 00: 42
            +2
            hi
            Thanks for the docs comment, this is the case when a comment is better than an article.
            Regarding evacuation planning ... here's how it started ...
            "Oktyabrsky, who until recently was convinced that the enemy would stop the assault from hour to hour because of the heavy losses suffered, gave a telegram with the following content:
            “The enemy rushed from the North side to the Ship side. The fighting took place in the nature of street fighting. The remaining troops are very tired, trembled, although the majority continues to fight heroically. The enemy sharply increased the pressure with aircraft and tanks. Given the strong decline in firepower, we must assume that in this position we will hold out for a maximum of 2-3 days.
            Based on the published specific situation, I ask you (the telegram was addressed to the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov and Marshal Budyonny. - M. M.) to allow me on the night of June 30 to July 1 to take by air 200-250 people in charge, commanders to the Caucasus, and also, if possible, to leave Sevastopol myself, leaving here his deputy, Major General Petrov. "
            To correctly assess the meaning of this telegram, you need to focus on two main points. First, unlike the existing practice, it was signed not by the Military Council of the SOR, but personally by Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky. Even among the leaders of the defense, its existence was not known until the evening of June 30.
            Second, the Speaking about the fact that the defenders of Sevastopol "wavered", the admiral, to put it mildly, erected vain on them. A characteristic moment: in the military-historical study published in 1979 by the publishing house "Nauka" - the memoirs of P. A. Morgunov "Heroic Sevastopol" the word "wavered" was bashfully replaced by an ellipsis."
            https://booksonline.com.ua/view.php?book=104989&page=119
            The link is an interesting book, easy to read, but hard ...
            1. Army soldier2
              Army soldier2 30 September 2021 19: 18
              +2
              Thanks for the link, I will definitely read it.
              By the way, Major General Petrov was also taken to the mainland.
              1. Wildcat
                Wildcat 30 September 2021 20: 22
                +1
                "In the meantime, at 19.00 a telegram was received from the People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov:" The evacuation of responsible workers and your departure to the Caucasus are permitted by the Headquarters. Kuznetsov. "

                At the same time, Marshal S.M.Budyonny, the commander of the North Caucasian Front, received instructions from the Headquarters. On the same evening of the 30th, on the basis of them, he gave instructions to the command of the SOR and Rear Admiral ID Eliseev, who was in charge of the Black Sea Fleet from the ports of the Caucasus. In the interest of clarifying the truth, it makes sense to cite both documents. The text of the first one was as follows:

                "1. By order of the Headquarters to Oktyabrsky, Kulakov (member of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet. - MM) urgently leave for Novorossiysk to organize the removal of the wounded, troops, valuables from Sevastopol.

                2. Major General Petrov remains the commander of the SOR. To help him, assign the commander of the landing base as an assistant with the naval headquarters.

                3. Major General Petrov immediately develop a plan for the sequential withdrawal of the wounded and units allocated for the transfer to the loading site in the first place. With the remnants of the troops to conduct a stubborn defense, on which the success of the export depends.

                4. Everything that cannot be exported is subject to unconditional destruction.
                5. The SOR Air Force operates to the limit of its ability, after which it flies over to the Caucasian airfields. "

                And here are the instructions directed to Eliseev:

                "1. All the MO boats, submarines, patrol boats and high-speed minesweepers in service should be sent to Sevastopol to take out the wounded, soldiers and documents.

                2. Before the Oktyabrsky arrives in Novorossiysk, the organization is assigned to you.

                3. On passing flights, bring in ammunition needed by the defenders to cover the export. Stop sending replenishment. Organize a reception in Novorossiysk and Tuapse.

                4. For the entire period of the operation to evacuate the Black Sea Fleet Air Force to maximize strikes against enemy airfields and the port of Yalta, from which the blockade forces operate. "

                What is the difference between the instructions issued by the People's Commissar of the Navy and the Commander of the SCF? In one very important point: N.G. Kuznetsov gave the go-ahead to Oktyabrsky's request to evacuate responsible workers, and Budyonny, based on the decision of the Headquarters, planned to evacuate, if not all the surviving defenders of Sevastopol, then at least the wounded and those who have not lost their military organization and control. It is clear that the success of this plan directly depended on the efforts of the SOR command, its ability to understand the situation and mobilize all forces to solve the assigned task. And what did it do? It did just the opposite!
                The last meeting of the Military Council of the SOR took place at about 19-20 hours. It was opened by Oktyabrsky. Describing the situation, he stressed that during the period of the assault, the troops suffered heavy losses, there was practically not a single combat-ready unit left, there was no ammunition. He further said that a response from the People's Commissar of the Navy with permission had been received to his telegram about the evacuation of the leadership. The evacuation was planned to be carried out on the night of July 1 by airplanes, submarines and boats. At the same time, Marshal Budyonny, on the basis of the decision of the Headquarters, issued a directive to organize the evacuation of the wounded and troops from Sevastopol. To direct the defense, to cover the evacuation of the wounded and troops, Oktyabrsky proposed leaving Generals Petrov and Morgunov in Sevastopol, and three days later they were ordered to evacuate.

                In fact, in his speech, the admiral brought to the attention of those present the current situation and the general tasks that were to be solved by the SOR in the near future. Then, logically, the setting of specific tasks for each of the responsible persons should have followed, but instead, a discussion of the orders of the high command that was completely unthinkable in the military environment took place.

                Trial balloons were launched by members of the Military Council of the Primorsky Army Chukhnov and Kuznetsov. They expressed doubts about the advisability of leaving Generals Petrov and Morgunov. Since the formations and units, in essence, are no longer there, they said, there is already nothing to lead at such a high level. Therefore, it will be quite enough to leave one of the division commanders together with his headquarters. After that, the commander of the Primorsky Army took the "bull by the horns". He expressed doubt that in the current situation it would be possible to hold Sevastopol for three days, but since the command made such a decision, he is ready to stay (thank God, the commander agreed to obey the order !!!) and do everything to complete the combat mission. In subsequent speeches of P.A.Morgunov himself and divisional commissar N.M. Kulakov, the same was said. Instead of stopping the discussion and recalling the military duty, Oktyabrsky asked Petrov's opinion, who exactly should be left in Sevastopol? We stopped at the candidacy of Major General P. G. Novikov, the commander of the 109th Infantry Division, who had suffered the least in previous battles. At this the meeting ended, but Oktyabrsky prudently decided not to report to Headquarters about the decisions taken there. He was fully aware of what he was doing - later, when he learned about Stalin's reaction to the complete evacuation of the SOR leadership, he hastened to declare that he had not given Petrov any permission. And one more characteristic moment - despite the fact that there was quite enough time, the command did not make any appeal to the subordinate troops. Their task remained the same - to fight to the last breath, but not to keep Sevastopol, which Oktyabrsky and Petrov no longer believed, but to cover the evacuation of "responsible" workers.
                .
                The next few hours were devoted to beheading the remains of compounds and parts with their own hands. Their commanders at the time of the evening report on the situation were summoned to the headquarters of the SOR, located at the 35th battery. "
              2. Wildcat
                Wildcat 30 September 2021 20: 29
                +1
                “This is how: the“ order is the law ”was discussed by a man who, just a couple of hours ago, discussed the order of the Headquarters on the organization of evacuation and defense.
                As night fell, the flight began. Oktyabrsky was evacuated by air. According to the recollections of eyewitnesses, when Oktyabrsky and Kulakov approached the "Douglas", they were recognized. The wounded who had accumulated at the airfield made a noise, and indiscriminate shooting into the air began. It is not known how further the situation could have turned if it had not been for the commissar of the 3rd OAS B.E. Mikhailov. He was able to explain to everyone present that the commander was leaving for the sole purpose of organizing the evacuation of the defenders of Sevastopol from the Caucasus. The same flights also evacuated the command of the 3rd OAS. Soon the plane took off, and Mikhailov remained at the airfield. According to Rakov's recollections, he wanted to avoid repeating the situation in 1941, when he was unreasonably accused of cowardice only on the grounds that he had arrived with a personal report on the situation at the rear headquarters. The commissar remained on Chersonesos, preferring death in battle to a shameful flight.
                ...
                At about 3 am on July 1, on the submarines "Shch-209" and "L-23" Chersonesos left the headquarters and the Military Council of the Primorsky Army, headed by General Petrov.
                .....
                ... the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet Eliseev continued to maintain contact with General Novikov. At 14.10 he asked: “Report: can you accept the Douglases?”, To which he received an affirmative answer. Then at 20.10 and 20.45 two more telegrams were received from Novikov, where it was said about the activity of the enemy and that the situation was continuing to deteriorate. Nevertheless, the latter ended with the following phrases: “The command staff of 2000 people [are] ready [for] transportation. The 35th battery is working. " Despite this, Eliseev replied: “By order of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, the Douglases and naval aviation will not be sent. To put people on the BTShch, SKA and submarines. There will be no more funds, the evacuation will end there. " Why did Oktyabrsky treat so cruelly those who, with their heroic struggle, repeatedly proved their high military skill and moral and psychological qualities? Onshore ships and aircraft, which after several months of attempts to supply Sevastopol were not so many? Or, perhaps, he wanted to have as few witnesses of his shame as possible left alive?

                One way or another, having received this telegram, on the night of July 2, Novikov and the personnel of his headquarters went over to patrol boats. The general himself went on a boat "SKA-0112". In the morning, he and the SKA-0124, which was walking alongside, were intercepted by four German torpedo boats. In the ensuing battle, "SKA-0124" sank, and "SKA-0112" was seriously damaged and was taken by the Germans on board. Thirty-one Soviet servicemen were captured, including General Novikov, commissar of the 31th division A. D. Khatskevich, former commander of the cruiser "Chervona Ukraine" I. A. Zaruba, and several other senior officers. Novikov and Khatskevich died in captivity, so there is no complete data on the last days of the organized defense of the SOR. In addition to SKA-109 and SKA-0112, on the morning of July 0124, the Soviet side lost the SKA-2 patrol boat, which was severely damaged at dawn by German aircraft and sank around noon, but after the people on it crossed aboard "SKA-021" and "SKA-023".
                .
                A number of defenders were able to independently sail to the Caucasus on improvised floating means. In total, in the period from July 1 to July 10, 1726 people were rescued from Sevastopol by sea. Those rescued along their lines reported the situation to the higher authorities. In the second half of July 4, Marshal Budyonny received an encrypted message from the General Staff signed by the head of the operations department, General N.F. Vatutin:

                “On the coast of the SOR there are still many separate groups of fighters and commanders who continue to resist the enemy. It is necessary to take all measures to evacuate them, sending small ships and sea planes for this purpose.
                The motivation of the sailors and pilots of the impossibility of approaching the shore because of the wave is incorrect, you can pick up people without approaching the shore, but take them on board 500-1000 m from the shore.
                I ask you to order not to stop the evacuation, but to do everything possible to evacuate the heroes of Sevastopol. "
                Budyonny immediately "sent down" the encrypted message to Oktyabrsky, who reacted rather nervously to it:
                “Moscow, General Staff. Vatutin, Budyonny, Isakov, Alafuzov.
                Operations for the survey and removal of individual groups of command personnel, soldiers of the SOR did not stop and do not stop, although this is associated with very great difficulties and losses of the ship's personnel.
                Submarines cannot break through to Sevastopol. The enemy closed all the fairways with his boats. Information about three submarines has not yet been received where they are, although all the terms of their return have passed (all submarines that were at that moment near Sevastopol later returned to their bases. - MM). The returning boats were pursued all the way by aircraft, hunting boats, hundreds of bombs were dropped on each boat.

                Two MO boats have not returned yet. Today I sent six more boats from the Ministry of Defense, which returned. Each delivered more than a hundred people. I will continue operations. I report that the resistance to the enemy is normal. "" Https://booksonline.com.ua/view.php?book=104989&page=123
  12. Aleksey Kuznetsov
    Aleksey Kuznetsov 27 September 2021 23: 00
    0
    Yeah, again and again I remember the immortal quote of Shota Rustaveli about the strategist and the battle visible from afar. Particularly "pleasure" is caused by the traditionally incomprehensible praise of the evacuation of the Germans with the Romanians from the Crimea, along with the continuous "our fleet seems to have sat down in a puddle, but, on the other hand, it was impossible otherwise ...". No. laughing
    1. Tavrik
      Tavrik 28 September 2021 12: 16
      +5
      About the evacuation of the Germans from the Crimea a long time ago in "Flotomaster" there was a detailed article by M. Morozov. Well, yes, they were evacuated, and the losses were not so great ... Even when the Germans skidded, the large ships did not try to prevent this. The Luftwaffe's fears were very strong.
  13. Iskazi
    Iskazi 28 September 2021 02: 14
    +4
    The complete failure of the Black Sea Fleet command ..., there is a lot of serious enough analytics on this matter, the author is right in many respects ..., and quite objective, down with false patriotism and embellishment of the past, is still at the helm ...
  14. Forcecom
    Forcecom 28 September 2021 09: 34
    +4
    Yes, yes, all the landings at the Chernomorets were excellent. Yevpatoria, for example, ended well, too, not like the Baltic and Severomorts - where all the landings were “blood from the eyes” and ended badly. With all due respect, but according to the events of the Second World War, to which of the fleets is the phrase "loved by all polymers" fits the KChF. And the action of individual ships like "Tashkent" or KyrKyrKaz does not change the completeness of the picture.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 28 September 2021 15: 33
      +1
      Quote: Forcecom
      With all due respect, but according to the events of the Second World War, to which of the fleets is the phrase "loved by all polymers" fits the KChF.

      But isn't it to the KBF with its Tallinn passage and the enchanting beating of the forehead against the blank wall of the Nargen-Porkallaud line of the PLO?
      The Black Sea Fleet at least has mitigating circumstances in the form of a complete loss in the first six months of the war of the pre-war shipbuilding and ship repair base. due to circumstances beyond the control of the fleet... As a result, the "second fleet of the USSR" for the year of the war was whittled down to a flotilla with a pair of cruisers and 5-6 EM and LD.
      1. Forcecom
        Forcecom 29 September 2021 09: 03
        +2
        Isn't it KBF due to circumstances beyond the control of the fleet lost almost the entire basing system in the first 2,5 months of the war? Wasn't the Red Banner Baltic Fleet trapped in a patch between Leningrad and Kronstadt in an area that was in places under fire from enemy field artillery and with zero flight time for the Luftwaffe? On VO 3 years ago there was an article about how they raised and partially restored the combat capability of the Tallinn TKR, which was drowned at the outfitting wall, and the work was carried out especially in the dark, and during the day it was flooded again so it was in line of sight of the forward positions of the Wehrmacht and accordingly, in the zone of destruction of artillery fire, and in fact they raised and pulled out and until the end of the 44th year, before the ammunition was consumed, fired at its former owners. I am already silent about such trifles as the warm Leningrad winters of 41-43, which the inhabitants of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus never dreamed of even in their dreams. And of course, the daily diet of the residents and defenders of Leningrad would be envied even in the Kremlin.
        Also, do not forget that it was the Wehrmacht that operated in the Baltic States, and in the Black Sea region, from the very beginning of the war, Germany was forced to involve the troops of Italy, Romania and other allies, who were still thinner, which in turn was one of the factors in the relatively successful actions of the Red Army. in the initial period of the war in this direction.
        And with all this, the ships and l / s of the KBF played an important role in the defense of Leningrad, the boatmen and submariners of the fleet tried to complicate the life of the Germans at sea, the fleet landed troops, provided and supported the Oranienbaum bridgehead. And in 43-45, when the war rolled back to where it came from, the Krigmarine / Wehrmacht did not have such successful evacuations in the Baltic as from Sevastopol.
        Without pleading for the merits of the sailors foremen and officers of the KChF, bow to the ground and eternal memory, BUT the Chernomorets throughout the war were in better conditions than the Baltic and Severomorians, and nevertheless, the achievements of the KChF in relation to their capabilities do not look outstanding.
  15. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 28 September 2021 16: 58
    +2
    On the Black Sea, a very large number of the German fleet of minesweepers, boats, barges and several submarines were hit.
    The entire German Black Sea fleet beat lost in September 1944.
  16. Glagol1
    Glagol1 4 November 2021 14: 13
    0
    Large ships are needed only in the ocean zone. Locked seas - for corvettes, frigates and small diesel-electric submarines.
  17. Petrik66
    Petrik66 25 November 2021 11: 35
    0
    recently on VO there was an article about the evacuation of its troops from Crete by the British fleet. The comparison is clearly not in our favor. And, if we also recall the results of the opposition to the German evacuation of their troops from the Taman Peninsula and from the Crimea, then the picture is generally bleak.