Trying to stop Hitler

The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, GSh - General base, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, Cova - Kiev Special VO, NCOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, OdVO - Odessa VO, Pribovo - Baltic special VO, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - intelligence department of the General Staff, sd - rifle division, SCWO - North Caucasian VO.

In the previous part the events that took place in the USSR in March - April 1941 of the year are considered, from which it follows that the leadership of the spacecraft and the country did not expect a war with Germany in the near future (in May - June). This follows from the fact that many measures for the recruitment of troops with equipment and reinforcement of armor tanks posted for the period from July 1 to the end of the year. At the same time, in military planning, tank and motorized divisions are considered full-fledged.

World events

The leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union knew about the inevitability of a war with Germany, but believed that the beginning of the war would be associated with the outcome of future negotiations.

The RM has repeatedly said that Germany's attack on the USSR will occur after the defeat of England or the achievement of peace with her. Therefore, the intelligence paid special attention to tracing Germany's contacts with Britain and the United States. In different countries, the German military and officials say the same thing: a war with the USSR is a last resort if negotiations are not successful. In the course of negotiations, ultimatum demands may be put forward.

There were also other reports in which, among the reliable information, there was disinformation. Data that was not always confirmed and could raise doubts about the sources in the future.

An example is the anti-fascist organization "Red Chapel" (this name of the organization will be given later). In early March, they received information that the Germans would attack the Soviet Union in the spring. Later, the RM arrives with the date of the attack on April 15, then on May 20. Now we understand that this was due to the outbreak of the war in the Balkans. But the leadership of the USSR did not know about this. It has seen messages with deadlines that have not been confirmed from time to time ...

On June 11, the Republic of Moldova received from the "Red Capella" that the issue of an attack on the USSR had been resolved, but no details were given in the message.

Could such information be believed if the rate of concentration of German troops at this time is sharply reduced? ..

April 1941 years... Soviet residencies in Europe were ordered to intensify their work, bringing it in line with wartime conditions.

The British ambassador to Moscow is confident that Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union.

In the spring of 1941, German submarines intensified the war on British supply routes. Losses of merchant ships reach their maximum in April. Perhaps it was pressure on the British government before Hess's arrival?

Roosevelt announced that "Defense zone" expands to 25 degrees west longitude. In this zone, from April 24, the American fleet, together with the British fleet will begin escorting British merchant ships.

13 April unexpectedly for Germany, the Soviet-Japanese Treaty of Neutrality was signed, which was ratified on April 25.

18 April The British ambassador handed our government a memorandum stating that England's defeat in the war would entail an attack by Germany on the USSR in alliance with defeated Britain and some circles from the United States.

21 April the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars was issued, agreed with the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), on the construction of two special-purpose shelters on the territory of the Moscow Kremlin. One of them should be handed over on September 1, and the second - on March 1.03.1942, XNUMX.

NKGB note:

We are sending the contents of the telegrams of the British ambassador to the USSR ... from 23.04.41:
“Below is a summary of my impressions of the state of Soviet-German relations in the context of recent events: ... the military ... are convinced that war is inevitable, but they yearn for a postponement at least until winter ...
The most powerful counterbalance is the fear that we can conclude a separate peace on condition that the Germans evacuate the territory they occupied in Western Europe and give Hitler a free hand in the East ... "

5, 9 и 12 May the USSR ambassador to Germany meets in Moscow with the German ambassador. At the meetings, the issue of possible Soviet-German negotiations is being discussed.

6 May R. Sorge informs Moscow that Hitler will decide on a war with the USSR "Either already in May, or after the war with England".

10 May the strongest German raid was carried out aviation to London. Hess flies to England.

11 May ended the massive German air raids on England. Probably to facilitate the fulfillment of the mission by Hess.

13 May The British ambassador proposed to dissolve the rumor about the conclusion of the Anglo-German peace with the mediation of Hess. In the 20th of May, the RM comes to the effect that negotiations with Hess are continuing.

State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry Weizsacker wrote after the war:

Former SS Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff said that in a conversation with him on the night of April 17-18, 1945, Hitler himself admitted that Hess was fulfilling his will.
What did it consist of?
In persuading Britain to conclude a "peace" with Germany and to take joint actions against the Soviet Union ...

What the British said to him in response is unknown, but the materials on the Hess case are still closed.

USSR Ambassador to England I. M. Maisky wrote in my diary:

On June 3, Beaverbrook (Minister of Aircraft Manufacturing) was with us for breakfast. I asked him what he thought of Hesse.
Beaverbrook replied without hesitation:
“Hess is Hitler's emissary. Hess must have thought that as soon as he laid out his plan, all these dukes would run to the king, topple Churchill and create a "reasonable government" ... Idiot!

The RM arrives in Moscow about the actions of the British intelligence, aimed at provoking a clash between Germany and the USSR. British intelligence is spreading rumors that "The Soviet Union intends to immediately undertake further aggressive military action as soon as Germany is drawn into major operations.".

In the previous part, it was shown that the German military leadership did not experience fear of the spacecraft invasion.

14 May The NKGB reported:

At the headquarters of German aviation, preparations for an operation against the USSR are being carried out at the most intense pace ...
First, Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding wider exports to Germany and the abandonment of communist propaganda ...
The presentation of the ultimatum will be preceded by a "war of nerves" in order to demoralize the USSR ...

15 June a version was circulated through diplomatic channels that by early July Germany would clarify relations with the USSR by presenting certain requirements.

19 May our scout Costa reported: "From the information collected, it can be established that at present Germany has concentrated 120 divisions in Poland, and by the end of June there will be 200 divisions on the Soviet border ..."

The number of German divisions near our border at the end of June in the message coincides with the number considered by the General Staff in March-April 1941 in the event of a war with Germany.

Similar information comes from the "Lyceum" double agent:

25.05.41/XNUMX/XNUMX, in an interview with a source of the NKGB "Lyceist" said the following:
“Germany has now concentrated about 160-200 divisions on the Soviet border ...
A war between the Soviet Union and Germany is unlikely ... The German military forces assembled on the border must show the Soviet Union determination ...
Hitler expects that Stalin will become more accommodating in this regard and stop all sorts of intrigues against Germany, and most importantly, will provide more goods, especially oil ...

A. P. Sudoplatov wrote that Moscow suspected (or knew) that the "Lyceist" was a double agent.

26 May our intelligence obtained a document from the British Foreign Ministry, which dealt with the Soviet-German negotiations.

On the same day, the NKGB reported: «[USSR Ambassador to Germany - approx. auth.] is still in Moscow, where he could deliver from Berlin the expected German demands ... "

27 May Roosevelt stated:

The war turned into a war for world domination ... The Axis powers must seize England in order to establish control over the seas ...
US policy is to actively resist attempts to establish German control over the seas ...
The United States will provide all possible assistance to England and those countries that by force weapons resist Germany ...

In mid-May, Germany was notified of Stalin's opportunity to arrive in Berlin for negotiations. At the same time, information about the USSR's intention to defend its interests was communicated to Berlin through various channels.

In May-June, rumors were initiated: about the preparation of the Soviet Air Force to strike at Berlin in an attack by Germany, about the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The government of the Soviet Union is trying to involve Germany in negotiations.

In May-June, Secretary of State Meissner told our ambassador that Hitler was preparing to take an important step towards strengthening relations with the USSR, hinting at his desire to meet with Stalin.

31 May NKGB reports: "President [Finland - approx. auth.] at a government meeting, he said ... some negotiations are underway between the USSR and Germany ... "

From the diary of Gebels (31.5.41 G.):

“Operation Barbarossa is progressing. Let's start a big disguise. The entire state and military apparatus is being mobilized. Only a few people are aware of the true course of things ... "

Churchill:

[31 May the chiefs of staff warn that - approx. Auth.] the Germans are now concentrating huge ground and air forces against Russia.
Using them as a threat, they are likely to demand concessions that could prove very dangerous to us. If the Russians refuse, the Germans will act ...

An order was sent from London to the commander-in-chief in the Middle East and India:

I order to begin preparations for the occupation of Iraq, which would give the Royal Air Force the opportunity to start the greatest fire in its entire existence in the Baku oil fields ...

R. Sorge (November 1.6.41, XNUMX): "The expectation of the start of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based ... on the information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl brought with him from Berlin, from where he left on May 6 ..."

Message Sir Sargent:

The latest information from our intelligence about troop movements, etc. definitely point to the decisive preparations of the Germans for the invasion of Soviet territory; in other words, they indicate the intention of the Germans to make such far-reaching demands to Stalin that he will either have to fight or agree to "Munich" ...

On June 5, this information was reported to Stalin, Molotov and Beria.

Churchill:

5 June the joint intelligence agency reported that, judging by the scale of German military preparations in Eastern Europe, there was probably a more important issue at stake than an economic agreement.
It is possible that Germany wants to remove from its eastern border the potential threat of the increasingly powerful Soviet armed forces.
The management did not yet consider it possible to say whether the result would be a war or an agreement ...

Special message from Berlin (9 June):

Next week, the tension in the Russian question will reach its highest point, and the question of the war will be finally resolved ...
Germany will present the Soviet Union with a demand to provide the Germans with economic leadership in the Ukraine, to increase the supply of grain and oil, as well as to use the Soviet navy, primarily submarines, against England ...

May Day parade

German industrialists who came to the USSR accompanied by Abwehr employees were shown the factories, which made a great impression on them.

However, from the incoming reports, the German military command drew an unexpected conclusion: "We must move immediately, otherwise the risk of attack will be too great."... Therefore, increased attention was paid to the observation of the parade. It was expected that, given such a tense situation, Russia would show new equipment on it. Schellenberg was sent to Moscow in addition to the office of the military attaché.

On April 25, a telephone conversation was recorded between the German military attaché General Köstering and his deputy, Colonel Krebs: “Krebs: They still don't notice that we are preparing for war. Have you seen what troops arrive at the parade? .. "

Our leadership noticed that the Nazis were preparing for war. But the leadership did not have unequivocal answers to the questions: "When will the war start?", "How will it start?"

Our intelligence officer at the German embassy G. Kegel wrote:

The air part of the parade was attended by modern planes of the Soviet Air Force: MiG-3 and Pe-2. It is unlikely that the position of the leadership of the Wehrmacht and Hitler would have been influenced by the display of numerous T-34 and KV-1 tanks. In addition, the leadership of the spacecraft "knew" that the Germans had heavy tanks and divisions of heavy tanks.

On May 5, in front of graduates of military academies, Stalin makes a speech in which he notes the presence of 300 formations in the spacecraft and reveals the number of motorized and tank divisions.

On May 13, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, graduates of command and military-political schools were sent to the troops. In some schools, graduation took place in the month of April.

In KOVO, several military infantry schools, after early graduation, are relocated to the inner districts (Belotserkovskoe, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, Cherkasskoe and Lvovskoe (in 1940 - in Ovruch, and in April 1941 - further to the East)). In other VOs, the redeployment of schools did not take place before the start of the war.

On May 14, the head of the Main Armored Directorate, Ya. N. Fedorenko, submitted a Memorandum to the People's Commissar of Defense stating that due to the incomplete provision of mechanized corps with tanks by state, they:

are not fully operational. To increase their combat effectiveness, until they are provided with tanks, I consider it necessary to arm the tank regiments of mechanized corps with 76- and 45-mm guns and machine guns so that, if necessary, they could fight like anti-tank regiments and divisions ...

It was proposed to allocate 80 machine guns, 24 76-mm and 18 45-mm guns to the tank regiment. For the transportation of personnel and weapons, it was required to allocate 1200 ZIS vehicles and 1500 GAZ vehicles.

Attached to the note was a statement of the distribution of weapons and vehicles by mechanized corps: 19th, 16th, 24th (KOVO), 20th, 17th, 13th (ZAPOVO), 2nd, 18th (OdVO ), 3rd, 12th (PribOVO), 10th (Leningrad VO), 23rd (Oryol VO), 25th (Kharkov VO), 26th (SKVO), 27th (Central Asian VO ) and 21st (Moscow VO). The note was approved by the People's Commissar of Defense on May 15.

On May 16, the head of the General Staff sent directives to the districts on the implementation of this event by July 1, which followed:

carried out in such a way as not to violate the organizational principle of the regiment as a tank unit, bearing in mind that tanks will subsequently enter service ...

Cannons and machine guns were in the warehouses and could have entered the regiments by July 1. The problem was different: there was no free vehicle in the spacecraft. There was a shortage of transport in mechanized corps, in anti-tank artillery brigades and in rifle divisions. And no one determined the priority of the arrival of transport in the formations, since the war was supposed to take place sometime in the future ...

It seems that Fedorenko's proposal was motivated by the fact that the weapons and personnel of the mechanized corps were kept and not transferred to other formations. It is possible that this issue was discussed at the time. It is unlikely that the proposed event could change something in the border battles. Most likely more weapons would remain at the border ...

A similar situation was with weak airfield divisions after the Battle of Stalingrad, when Goering also did not want to transfer the Air Force personnel to the Wehrmacht.

The problems of the spacecraft were different: in the weak training of the command of all levels, in the execution of orders that had lost their relevance (lack of reasonable initiative), in the low saturation of mechanized corps with infantry, in an insufficient number of transport, in the absence of a number of extremely necessary ammunition, in problems with communication, in weak intelligence work, because of which the troops at the border were not rationally located in the military.

On May 16, the border districts were instructed to accelerate the construction of fortified areas on the new border. The General Staff allows the covering troops to keep ammunition in tanks.

On May 27, in order to increase the combat readiness of the headquarters for command and control, the commanders of the western districts received an order from the People's Commissar of Defense to start building command posts for the fronts and complete it by July 30.

Change of plans of the General Staff

In accordance with the plan of the General Staff on strategic deployment of 11.03.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, in April, the Directive on the development of District Operational Deployment Plan.

Since the directive lists Japan as one of the possible opponents of the USSR, the document was prepared before the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese treaty. The directive repeats information from the plans of the General Staff of March 11 that Germany "Will be able to send up to 200 divisions against our borders, of which up to 165 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized"... Based on the indicated number of divisions, the General Staff at this time develops its plans.

After the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese treaty, the General Staff decided that the situation in the Far East and Transbaikalia was becoming less tense. Therefore, before the war, it was decided to transfer part of the troops to the European part of the USSR from these territories.

In April, a decision was made to form anti-tank artillery brigades and airborne corps. The personnel of 11 rifle divisions will be used to form these formations.

On April 26 (the day after the ratification of the treaty), several directives were sent on the redeployment of troops to the west:

- from the Far Eastern Front - 211st and 212nd airborne brigades. It was also necessary to prepare for dispatch in the second half of May, the management of the 31st Rifle Corps, 21st and 66th SD;

- from the Siberian VO - 201st and 225th rifle divisions;

- from the Ural VO - 203rd and 223rd SD;

- to prepare the 5th mechanized corps and the 32nd rifle corps for dispatch in the Zabaikalsky VO.

On April 29, a directive was sent to the Moscow VO on the direction of the 224th and 231st SDs to ZAPOVO.

Probably, directives on redeployment to the west were also sent in April: 207th Rifle Division from North Caucasus Military District, 230th Rifle Division from Kharkiv VO, 234th Rifle Division from Privolzhsky VO, 211st and 226th Rifle Division from Oryol VO. The division needed to be staffed with fully and well-trained personnel. According to the plans of the General Staff, at this time the 5th Mechanized and 32nd Rifle Corps, on additional instructions, should be sent to the Voronezh Region.

In mid-May, the Operations Directorate of the General Staff is developing a new document "On considerations for a plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies." A map with a note is attached to the document: "Major General Vasilevsky 15.5.41".

On June 30.06.2021, 15.05.41, the following documents were submitted: "The scheme of deployment of the strategic forces of the USSR" and "The scheme of the balance of forces" (annex to the memorandum of the People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. wars with Germany and its allies from XNUMX). It was said that the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin and his deputy A.M. Vasilevsky worked on the scheme.

It was noted that

The diagram of the balance of forces "shows that in the Soviet General Staff, five weeks before the start of the war, it was correctly predicted that the Nazis would deliver the main strikes against the USSR by three groups of armies:" North "," Center "," South ".

How can the diagram reflect the correct opinion of the General Staff about the German plans, if the intelligence data at that time greatly distorted the distribution of German troops along the border?

Historian S. L. Chekunov Online "Militera" wrote:

References (in fact, there is two document) Vatutin attached a map, the content of which is described in the document ... According to the May document - there is nothing but a map ...
[On the map - approx. auth.] all movements are documented, relocation points are indicated ...
The May project did not imply an operation in the foreseeable future, it only recorded the current situation and gave proposals for changing the planning ...

When carrying out similar planning work at the General Staff in February-March, a much larger number of documents were prepared.

S. L. Chekunov explained the lack of registration number and signatures on the document:

In 1941, the document was taken into account only if it passed through the common part. If the document remained with the developer, or was transferred inside the control, then it was not counted in the accounting logs.
In addition, there are documents transferred personally between executors of different departments, which were also not recorded in the accounting journals ...
The absence of an approving signature does not mean absolutely anything. The approval could be done in several ways.
So, for example, on one of the district deployment plans for 1941 there is an inscription: the plan was reported during a personal visit.
The plan as a whole was approved by Comrade Tymoshenko, taking into account the following remarks ...
However, there is no signature of Tymoshenko's autograph in place of the "sealed" signature, that is, Comrade Tymoshenko verbally approved ...

There are pencil edits in the document. According to one version, the document was developed by A.M. Vasilevsky and corrected by the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff and the 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin.

On the first page of the document there is a link to the information (summary) of RU from 15.05.41 about German divisions near our border. Therefore, the textual part of the document could be prepared only after May 15th. The document indicates the total number of German divisions (284) and sets out the assumptions of the specialists of the General Staff about the directions of the attacks of the German troops. The number of German divisions (180), deployed by Germany in the event of a war with the USSR, has been clarified. There are 180 divisions operating in the General Staff a little more than a month before the start of the war. None of them can imagine that having 124-125 divisions, the German command will unleash a war with us. The specialists of the General Staff reflected their opinion that, most likely, the enemy grouping would be deployed according to the Southern option.

The General Staff assumes that five airborne divisions will appear at the border before the German attack. It was German disinformation. The same as the divisions of heavy tanks ... In vain reconnaissance tried to track these divisions near the border ...

The document indicates the location of the remaining 104 divisions:

Romania is not included in the list.

What's the catch?

RU considers divisions concentrated at our border only on the border territory of Romania (in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja).

According to reconnaissance data, as of May 15, six more German divisions are located in the central part of Romania (at a distance of up to 250 km from the border), which are not included in the calculation of the formations concentrated at our border.

The document also reflects the point of view of the General Staff, according to which the entire German grouping on the territory of Romania is intended for a war with the USSR.

And rightly so.

In East Prussia, a grouping concentrated at a distance of 300–400 km from the border is considered to be concentrated at the border. In Romania, however, a grouping 200–250 km away from the border is not considered troops intended for an attack on the USSR. After the start of the war, RU will consider the entire grouping of German troops in Romania intended for the war with the USSR.

Below are data on the change in the General Staff of the number of SC troops in directions as of March 11 and May 15, 1941. In the figure, the number of formations of the Western direction (as of May 15) includes the reserve troops of the main command, concentrated behind the Western and South-Western fronts.

After the conclusion of an agreement with Japan, the situation in the zones of responsibility of the Far Eastern Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District became less dangerous. Therefore, in preparation for repelling the German attack, it is planned to transfer ten divisions from these territories, including 4 - tank, 5 - motorized and motorized rifle.

Information began to arrive about the presence of German troops on the territory of Norway, and therefore the grouping of the Leningrad Military District was being strengthened: by 3 tank and 2 motorized divisions.

The grouping of the Transcaucasian Military District has slightly increased, from which the mechanized corps is planned to be sent to the west.

The beginning of the redeployment of troops

The official point of view (for example, in the book "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions") is as follows: "From May 13 to May 22, the General Staff received orders to begin the advancement of three armies to the western border (22, 21 and 16) ... Along with this, a schedule was developed for the transfer from the North Caucasus Military District to the Cherkassy region, Belaya Tserkov of the 19th Army ..."

In one of articles the opinion of historians about the beginning of the redeployment of troops to the western borders in May 1941 has already been considered. Historians noted that in May only one 19th army was nominated, and the 16th went to the Transcaucasus (somewhat later) ...

Consider where the 19th Army advanced and why did it begin to advance in general?

At the end of April and the beginning of May, the RM received information about a possible German attack on the Soviet Union in mid-May or at its end. Below is one of these messages:

On May 5, RU received a message:
“... According to the data of a German officer from Hitler's headquarters, obtained through a third person, the Germans are preparing an invasion of the USSR by May 3. The invasion is supposed to be carried out from the directions: Finland, the Baltic States and Romania ...

At the same time, the RM received an increase in the number of German divisions at our border.

For simplicity, the author will consider the concentration of German divisions against the troops of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO, as well as against the KOVO and ODVO. In this case, you can see how the accumulation of German troops took place in the directions corresponding to the Northern or Southern option.

One point should be clarified.

In the border area of ​​Romania, our intelligence monitored a fairly large German group. On May 31, it consisted of 17 divisions. The figure below shows a fragment of the KOVO headquarters map, already familiar from the intelligence articles, with the situation starting from June 19, 1941.

It can be seen that most of the German grouping is concentrated in the area of ​​responsibility of the KOVO: on its left flank. In the area of ​​responsibility of the ODVO there are six divisions. Therefore, our grouping on the territory of the OdVO did not increase before the start of the war. In addition, on the territory of the OdVO there were two corps of the reserve of the main command: the 2nd mechanized and 7th rifle.

It should be noted that the presence of a large German grouping on the southern flank of the KOVO was also noted in the RM of the NKVD border troops, which confirms the imitation of these formations by the German command.

Help from the NKVD of the USSR (prepared after May 24):

“... Along the Soviet-Romanian border:
In April-May [1941 - approx. ed.] in Romania concentrated up to 12-18 divisions of German troops, of which: 7 md and up to 2 td ... The largest concentration of German troops is noted in the area of ​​Dorohoi, Redeutsi, Botosani. On May 21-24, up to 6 md, 1 td and 2 pd were located in this area ...

The certificate refers to the border area. The settlements indicated in the document are shown in the figure above.

In a small area of ​​territory on the left flank of the KO, a German grouping of 9 divisions is concentrated, of which only two are infantry. In fact, as of June 22, there were only six German infantry divisions throughout Romania, one of which was still unloading.

The figures below show data on the change in the number of German troops at the border in different directions and on the change in their average concentration rate. When building dependencies, we used the PM from February 1, March 11, 4 и 26 April, 5, 15 и 31 May.

Two dependencies for each of the directions characterize the minimum and maximum number of divisions indicated in the RM.

The figure shows that in the period from April 26 to May 5, there is a sharp increase in the number of divisions in the areas of responsibility of the KOVO and ODVO. According to unverified intelligence information, up to 56 German divisions may be deployed against the troops of these districts, of which up to 19 divisions in Romania (excluding 6 divisions in the central part of the country). By May 31, reconnaissance discovered a German grouping in Slovakia in the amount of five divisions.

After May 5, the average speed of concentration of enemy formations sharply increases (unverified information from the RM was not taken into account when plotting the graph).

The figure below shows the number of divisions of the 1st and 2nd echelons of the districts, taking into account the combat mechanized corps (1st stage of recruitment). The number of divisions is given in brackets, taking into account the reserves of the districts (also without the mechanized corps of the 2nd stage). Enemy troops are counted in accordance with RM from the RU reports.

What conclusions can be drawn from the information provided?

The number of German divisions in the PribOVO and ZAPOVO zones of responsibility does not change significantly.

Starting from June 5, in the area of ​​responsibility of the KOVO and ODVO (especially on the southern flank of the KOVO), there has been a sharp increase in the number of German divisions. It is impossible to predict in advance when the speed of concentration of enemy troops will decrease or, conversely, increase even more is impossible.

It could not be ruled out that an increase in the invasion grouping to 100-120 divisions had already begun, as the spacecraft leaders saw it, in the event of a concentration of enemy forces according to the Southern option.

P. A. Sudoplatov wrote about the events on the eve of the war:

The leadership of the NGOs and the General Staff aspired prevent creation by the enemy on our borders of a grouping that would have overwhelming superiority over the spacecraft.

Achieving at least a balance of power on the border was the most important direction of the military policy of deterring Hitler from attacking Russia....

By May 15, the grouping of enemy troops could be equal to our grouping in KOVO, and later it could already exceed this grouping.

This is probably why the General Staff decides to start a covert redeployment of part of the troops from the North Caucasus Military District.

On May 13, a telegram arrives at KOVO about the deployment of a rifle corps (34th) with corps units, four 12-thousandth rifle divisions (38th, 129th, 158th, 171st) and 28th mountain rifle division.
Corps units, rifle and mountain rifle divisions will begin to arrive from May 20, and the remaining formations - from June 2-3.

The telegram says that "All formations ... remain part of the North Caucasian Military District and are subordinate to the North Caucasian Military District".

The call-up of the assigned personnel for training in the 28th Mountain Rifle Division was not planned. For one reason or another, the division was not sent to KOVO. On June 22, she is located in the area of ​​Sochi.

There is a mention that the 171st rifle division was in the process of redeployment by the beginning of the war. If this information is correct, then by June 10, only three divisions from the North Caucasus Military District arrived on the territory of KOVO. It is possible that this redeployment did not become critical, since from May 15 the speed of concentration of German divisions decreased. After May 31, the speed of concentration of enemy formations decreased even more.

The figure below shows the deployment locations of four divisions that arrived from the North Caucasus Military District, which were located south of Kiev. The figure additionally indicates the direction of the strike of the German-Romanian troops on Zhmerinka, which is reflected in the document "On considerations for the strategic deployment plan ..."prepared somewhere around May 15th.

The 34th Rifle Corps, as if on purpose, is deployed to cover the capital of Ukraine from a strike from Romania, in which, according to intelligence, the number of German divisions is increasing.

There is conflicting information on the time of the creation of the 19th Army on the Internet. Most often it is posted without links to sources. On the site "Memory of the People" I.S.Konev has been listed as the commander of the 19th Army since 26 June. There are two more dates for the creation of the army (without links): May 29 and June 13.

In the military encyclopedia and in the multivolume "History Of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. " indicates that the 19th Army was formed in June 1941. It also talks about the timing of the creation of other armies of the internal districts: the 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th, 25th and 28th.

There is an order to the troops of the North Caucasus Military District No. 00123 dated 6.6.41, signed by the commander of the district Konev, a member of the Military Council Sheklanov and the chief of staff of the district Zlobin. Another order to the troops of the North Caucasus Military District No. 0125 of 8.6.41 has already been signed by the acting Reuters, Pinchuk and Barmin. Consequently, on June 6-8, the commanding staff of the district (the future army) departed into the operational group of the North Caucasus Military District.

G.K. Zhukov in his memoirs, he quotes the memoirs of the marshal I. Kh.Bagramyan:

No sooner had the five divisions from the North Caucasus Military District finish concentrating on the territory of our district, when the General Staff announced in early June that by the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense, the administration of the 19th Army had been formed, which would arrive in Cherkassy by June 10. The army will include all five divisions of the 34th rifle corps and three divisions of the 25th rifle corps of the North Caucasus Military District ...
It is headed by the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, Lieutenant General I.S.Konev.
A day later, the General Staff warned the district command to prepare to receive and deploy one more - the 16th Army of Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, which was being transferred from Transbaikalia ...

Consequently, G.K. Zhukov agrees with this interpretation. Therefore, we will take as a basis the memoirs of I. Kh. Baghramyan.

Then, by the arrival of the directive in early June, the 25th Rifle Corps was already subordinate to the SKVO operational group.

On June 6, I.S.Konev signed an order in the district as the commander of the North Caucasian Military District, and on June 8, he signed an order for the district by the acting commander of the troops. Somewhere during this period, I.S.Konev could leave the district for Moscow, meet with the People's Commissar of Defense and arrive at KOVO by June 10.

There are two inaccuracies that can be checked:

- the fifth division (28th mountain rifle division) did not arrive in KOVO and remained in the North Caucasus Military District until the start of the war;

- the location of the 16th Army in KOVO will be determined after June 10.

The 19th Army initially included the 25th and 34th Rifle Corps, the 26th Mechanized Corps, the 38th Rifle Division and a number of separate units. Information about the locations of the 34th Corps formations (including the 38th Infantry Division) was given above.

The 25th Rifle Corps (127th, 134th and 162nd Rifle Divisions), according to the directive of the General Staff of May 13, was to be redeployed to the camps.

The 127th Rifle Division left the Chuguev camps on May 18 (after receiving the enrolled personnel) and arrived at the Rzhishchev camps on the territory of KOVO on June 6-8. On June 10, the division began training. On June 24, she received the remaining enrollment.

The 134th Rifle Division departed from Mariupol for Zolotonosha on the territory of the Kharkov Military District by rail, leaving one regiment (unknown - rifle or artillery) in the camps near Mariupol. Previously, the division was replenished with an assigned composition, called up for a 45-day training camp. Some parts of the division were in Mariupol on June 22. Perhaps we are talking about an abandoned regiment or other parts (subunits) of the division.

162nd rifle division was located near the city of Lubny on the territory of the Kharkov Military District.

Of the three divisions of the 25th Rifle Corps, two were stationed outside KOVO, and by the beginning of the war the corps was concentrated on the territory of KOVO near the city of Korsun.

The 26th mechanized corps was in the North Caucasus Military District until July 1941. As of June 1, the corps had 235 tanks (as of June 22, it is said that there were 184 tanks), of which 87 had a gun. The tanks were badly worn out. Therefore, after the start of the war, the corps as part of the 19th Army was replaced by the 25th mechanized corps (Kharkov VO), in which there were 375 tanks, of which with a gun - 119. At the beginning of the war, the unloading of the 25th mechanized corps was planned in the Cherkassy - Belaya Tserkov area ...

If you look at the map above, you can see that the entire 19th Army was concentrated on the flank of a powerful group that could strike from Romania.

According to the author, the redeployment of the 19th Army troops to the southern flank of KOVO was due to unreliable RM, which included misinformation about the rapidly growing enemy force in Romania.

By June 20, RU estimates the German grouping in Romania at 28-30 divisions, and on the evening of June 22 - at 33-35 divisions, of which 4 are tank and 11 are motorized. This is the largest mobile force on our western border.

According to the RM, which arrived in the spring of 1941, for all variants of military operations, it was said about a strike from Romania. The last such mention took place after May 15. Therefore, this direction in the General Staff is of paramount importance. This is evidenced by the telegram of the 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin to the commander of the KOVO, sent immediately after the start of the war (at 4:15):

4th PTABR to conduct reconnaissance against the boundaries of Khotin, Proskurov, Mogilev-Podolsky, Nemirov.
The brigade should be in full readiness to occupy the defense lines in the direction of Novaya Ushitsa, Lipkany ...

The figure below shows the location of the 4th anti-tank artillery brigade and the settlements indicated in the telegram.

The problem was one thing: the General Staff did not take into account that the anti-tank brigade did not have tractors for transporting artillery pieces ... For the General Staff it was a full-fledged formation ...

In the second half of May, the command of the 9th Rifle Corps and the 106th Rifle Division were sent from the North Caucasus Military District to the Crimea. The 32nd Cavalry Division began redeploying from KOVO to the Crimea. The increase in the grouping of troops in the Crimea took place in order to strengthen the defense of the coast from enemy assault forces, which could sail from ports in Romania.

It can be concluded that from the North Caucasus Military District and the Kharkov Military District in May - at the beginning of June, up to six divisions arrived from the internal districts to the territory of the KOVO and OdVO, which is two rifle corps. Information about the full concentration of the 19th Army at the end of May - at the beginning of June is not confirmed. A mech corps from the army before the start of the war was not supposed to be redeployed to KOVO, as it was a corps of the 2nd formation stage or a "non-combat" corps. It is most likely that the two divisions of the 25th Rifle Corps remaining on the territory of the Kharkov District began redeploying to the territory of KOVO after June 12.

To understand how mobile were the rifle divisions that were redeployed to the west, you need to understand their staffing.

Mountain rifle divisions were contained in a peaceful state of 4/140 (8 people). Wartime staff 829 people.

The rifle divisions were contained in peaceful states of 4/120 (5 people) and 864/4 (100 people). The 10/291 wartime staff was 4 people.

The rifle divisions in the interior districts were kept on a staff of 4/120. Also, such divisions were on the territory of PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO and Leningrad VO.

In accordance with a government decree, it was allowed to call for fees: 975 people, 870 horses and 57 cars.

The mountain rifle divisions were drafted into 1100 apprentices. The rifle divisions of the state 4/120 conscripted 6 registrants, and in the division of the state 000/4 - 100-1900 people. A total of seven mountain rifle divisions, sixteen rifle divisions of the 2000/4 state and 100 rifle divisions of the 67/4 state, 120 assigned personnel were called up. Another 464 thousand of the assigned staff were sent to other formations and associations.

To bring the rifle division of the 4/120 state to the 4/100 state, 6 men, 000 horses and 1 vehicles were required.

In order to bring 67 rifle divisions to the 4/100 state, it was required to attract 70 350 horses and 17 353 vehicles to the collection. And in accordance with the decree, it is allowed to take from the national economy only 57 horses and 500 cars.

In addition, the number of cars and horses attracted for collection in the formations, where the remaining 337 thousand of the assigned personnel ended up, is unknown. It is also unclear how many horses and vehicles were used for training in the 4/100 State Rifle Divisions and the 4/140 State Mountain Divisions.

Consequently, the 67 rifle divisions of the 4/120 state, which received 6 registrants each, were limited in mobility due to a lack of road and animal transport. And the available amount of transport was sufficient for the training of appointees in permanent camps.

This conclusion is confirmed in the work "Strategic Sketch of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", prepared in 1961, when Marshal BM Zakharov was the chief of the General Staff:

The mobilization of only personnel did not solve the problem of bringing the formations into combat readiness. Motor vehicles and a horse train came from the national economy in very limited quantities. Many divisions, as before, could not provide the normal supply of troops with the available transport, fully raise artillery and other military equipment.

Particularly in a difficult situation were the divisions sent from the inner districts to the west. Having received a mobilization staff and additional weapons, they, as before, were left with the transport assigned to them by the 6-thousandth staff. In case of full mobilization, these divisions left mobile cells in the former deployment areas, which were supposed to send everything that was missing to new areas ...

When official sources talk about Big Training Camps or hidden mobilization, the issue of lack of transport is simply silent ...

The divisions of the 25th Rifle Corps, which went to the camps in the month of May, were of limited mobility. Therefore, the number of artillery pieces and other military equipment of these divisions, which were left at the points of permanent deployment, is unknown. Four divisions from the North Caucasus Military District were nominated with the same limited mobility.

Limited mobile were also six divisions from the Volga and Ural VOs, which began their advance on June 12. Most likely, they took all the weapons with them, but moving it from the unloading stations was already a big problem ...

In June 1941, the 44th Rifle Corps began to move to Minsk, in which rifle divisions were also kept on a staff of 4/120 prior to gathering. After the start of the war, Captain Malkov (commander of the 163rd artillery regiment of the 64th rifle division) said:

On 21.6.41, the regiment was loaded into the echelon at the Dorogobuzh station, where the rifle corps was camped, for what purpose it was not known.
At 22.6 at 7 o'clock, they got better at the Smolevichi station, by 17 o'clock they drove up to Minsk, where they just learned about the beginning of hostilities.
The regiment was loaded on the train was understaffed, 50% of the materiel had no traction... There were only shells for the whole regiment 207 pieces. They took all the property with them, that is, bedding, tents.
In this form, they moved to the front. This was the situation throughout the division. She had live ammunition, only a training stock ...
During the period of the battle at the UR, the division received cartridges from the UR sector, and I received a sufficient number of shells for the 76-mm cannon, there were no shells for the 122-mm shells ...

It can be seen that the division did not have enough transport. Therefore, they took with them all the materiel, as they were transported by rail. But the artillery regiment was limited to mobile. Shells with a caliber of more than 76-mm and mortar mines in the warehouses of the UR simply could not be, since this is ammunition for weapons that are not in the fortified area. As well as grenades for arming the UR pulbats and the whole rifle corps.

The rifle corps, which in June went on foot to the front, also left about half of their anti-aircraft and artillery pieces at their permanent deployment points due to lack of transport. But they took educational equipment, bedding, tents and even sports equipment.

After all, no one told them that they were going to fight ...

To be continued ...

Comments

[smaug78]

Another crazy article, the title does not match the content ...

[haron]

Quote: smaug78

Another crazy article, the title does not match the content ..

So evaluate the content, not the headline.
In terms of content, the impression was that Russia is such a sword of "King Arthur", which will give a global advantage to those who are with him in comrades.

[Illanatol]

In terms of content, the impression was that Russia is such a sword of "King Arthur", which will give a global advantage to those who are with him in comrades.

H'm. Does this contradict the facts?
Were with the allies in the Northern War against the Swedes - the Swedes lost.
Were in an alliance against Frederick the Great - he too was a loser, the Russians visited Berlin.
Were in the anti-Napoleonic coalition - the war ended in Paris.
Were in anti-Turkish - Greece gained independence.
Well, we sorted out the Reich ... in short, really. "heartland".

[polpot]

Thank you, I read it with interest, I look forward to continuing.

[Ross xnumx]

Articles of this volume require a long analysis, but for myself I have highlighted one thing:

On May 13, the British ambassador proposed to dissolve the rumor about the conclusion of the Anglo-German peace with the mediation of Hess. On the 20th of May, the RM comes to the effect that negotiations with Hess are continuing.
State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry Weizsacker wrote after the war:
Former SS Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff said that in a conversation with him on the night of April 17-18, 1945, Hitler himself admitted that Hess was fulfilling his will.
What did it consist of?
In persuading Britain to conclude a "peace" with Germany and to take joint actions against the Soviet Union ...
What the British said to him in response is unknown, but the materials on the Hess case are still closed.

Our so-called "allies" were not honest with us during WWII as well as today. And trusting them with something intimate or hoping for understanding is useless. This is akin to holding a poisonous snake in your hands: it is not known at what moment it will inflict a fatal bite,

[paul3390]

Actually, how do we know that the Naglich people then did not agree with Hess?

[Doctor]

Actually, how do we know that the Naglich people then did not agree with Hess?

From there, that Great Britain did not make peace with Germany and did not jointly attack the USSR.

[Illanatol]

Actually, how do we know that the Naglich people then did not agree with Hess?

And then they staged a "fight of the Nanai boys", carrying out Operation Overlord to divert their eyes.

The alliance England-Germany, France-USSR and similar combinations were unprofitable for Uncle Sam, ruining all his plans. And Uncle Sam is the chief cook, who made porridge with two world wars.

[Doctor]

Our so-called "allies" were not honest with us during WWII as well as today. And trusting them with something intimate or hoping for understanding is useless. This is akin to holding a poisonous snake in your hands: it is not known at what moment it will inflict a fatal bite,

At the time of the flight of Hess (May 10, 1941), the British were not our allies.
Rather the opposite.

[Xlor]

Quote: ROSS 42

Our so-called "allies" were not honest with us during WWII as well as today. And trusting them with something intimate or hoping for understanding is useless

I agree. We trusted them in the 90s. As a result, a monstrous decline in production, massive unemployment and the transformation of the country into a kind of Upper Volta ... Instead of such "friends", it is better to have more tanks, fighters and missiles ...

[Shiden]

And why do you think that others are to blame for everything, but not we in the collapse of the union. Or do you want to say that all the Anglo-Saxons have torn apart the legacy of the USSR and the current oligarchs have amassed capital with blood and sweat. Convenient position cannot be said. So in this article, the mistakes of the above leadership also want to be blamed on others.

[Xlor]

Why do you think that others are to blame for everything, but not us

Because the country under the leadership of EBN and his entourage came under the external control of those whom you call them "others." Eventually:

a monstrous decline in production, massive unemployment and the transformation of the country into a kind of Upper Volta

[Shiden]

That is, you want to say that the people did not elect presidents, deputies, it was the Anglo-Saxons who appointed them. Sorry, but if the history of the distant past can be somehow distorted, then the times when you lived, saw what was happening, you will not be able to distort. And I am sure that such articles are published with only one purpose to show the layman that there are enemies around and you need to rally around the leader, tsar, sultan, hetman, and so on.

[Ross xnumx]

Quote: Shiden

And why do you think that others are to blame for everything, but just not we in the collapse of the Union.

I hate it when they start to write the name of my country in lowercase letters. Write your name like that.
===========
It was on the part of the authorities that all attempts were made to break up statehood. The government, which possesses repressive bodies, law enforcement agencies, judicial institutions and powers, betrayed its own people by constitutional law, spitting on its expression of will, and officials from the committee engaged in double-dealing and covered up open enemies of the people, extremists and pseudo-economists.
The population of the country, like a herd without a shepherd, scattered in search of places with an abundance of food, the availability of which was provided by those interested in the destruction of the USSR. The symbiosis of corrupt officials and foreign mentors was not disclosed and neutralized in time. People believed in the strength of the KGB. As a result, the USSR was destroyed because it provided an opportunity for the development of a socially just state, for all segments of the population.
The perversions that took place in the country were caused by the physiological properties of the human body, their inability to resist the "copper pipes": glory, flattery, servility. This gave rise to the awakening of base instincts and feelings: arrogance, acquisitiveness, self-interest and cynicism.
The process was organized from above and took place despite all the attempts of the population to prevent it. One shooting of the White House is worth a lot. And it is wrong to blame the common people for not immediately recognizing the essence of the veiled reforms. Lies are always at the service of hypocrites and speculators. They go to all the tricks, for the sake of their own selfish goals.
An evil and kind policeman is no better than a chatty and stupid president. The only worse thing is the president, who does not fulfill his promises and tramples on the guarantees and rights of the country's citizens. History will put all the dots in their places and reward with the people's curse those who had a hand in the collapse of the attempt to build a bright, socially just society, devoid of the main vice - the exploitation of man by man for the sake of unlimited profit. Even if, even with the presence of errors and blunders.

[Babay Atasovich]

Quote: ROSS 42

History will put all the dots in their place and reward the people with a curse to those who had a hand in the collapse of the attempt to build a bright, socially just society, devoid of the main vice - the exploitation of man by man for the sake of unlimited profit

I would love to meet the humpback and make the dream of the majority of former USSR citizens come true!

[ABC-schutze]

Well, from the article, it is just clear that these "blunders" were on the conscience of the top military leadership (including Timoshenko and Zhukov, who concentrated their main forces in the South-West direction, although it WAS ALREADY KNOWN that the Germans were the main a blow will be delivered in the defense zone of the Western OVO. And for the "general" state of affairs in the Red Army and the "innocently" repressed Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik Uborevich and cop Shaposhnikov made this prediction justified even before his "departure" from the post of Chief General and without support on the "fresh" RM), and not the fault of the top political leadership (JV Stalin).

Marshall of Artillery Yakovlev:

“When we undertake to talk about June 22, 1941, which covered our entire people with a black wing, then we need to distract ourselves from everything personal and follow only the truth, it is impermissible to try to shift all the blame for the surprise attack of Nazi Germany only on JV Stalin. The complaints of our commanders about the "surprise" are an attempt to absolve themselves of all responsibility for the blunders in the combat training of troops, in their command in the first period of the war. a state of combat readiness. It is their professional duty, and to explain the failure to fulfill it with references to IV Stalin does not suit the soldiers. "

Air Chief Marshal Alexander Evgenievich Golovanov: "The General Staff missed the war!"

He, in a conversation with Chuev:

"Vasilevsky writes: the decision on combat readiness was ordered to be given at 8 o'clock in the evening, but they (Zhukov and Timoshenko) only handed it over at 4 am, and at XNUMX o'clock the Germans already attacked. From eight to one in the morning! This, you know, for one the place should be hung for such things! Vasilevsky writes: of course, we are late with this matter.

But we know who the chief of the General Staff was. Everyone should be in their place. When the wolf eats cabbage, and the wolf eats lamb, this is one thing, but when the wolf begins to eat cabbage, nothing happens. Zhukov did not sit for six months, probably on this matter, he was put in his place - to command the front, the deputy of the Supreme Commander - this is his place ...

Everything fell into place when Shaposhnikov again became the chief of the General Staff. Zhukov was no chief of the General Staff and could not be one - for this you need to have a different character ... "

[knn54]

-What the British told him in response is unknown, but the materials on the Hess case are still closed.
Gorbachev's proposal to amnesty Hess ended with hanging for the latter.
And the fact that Hitler will attack the USSR (after France) can be understood by analyzing "Mein Kampf", which was actually dictated to Hitler by the same Anglophile Hess.
The British, once again, were at their best.
The author is PLUS.

[Luminman]

the materials on the Hess case are still closed

Good and kind deeds never hide!

[citizen]

The British ambassador handed our government a memorandum stating that England's defeat in the war would entail an attack by Germany on the USSR in alliance with defeated Britain and some circles from the United States.

What kind of memorandum is this? Link please?

[AsmyppoL]

The text of the document could not be found, but there is a mention of it on several sites.
Finding is easy enough

[Konnick]

You have a typo in your text. Fedorenko is not the head of the school, but the department.

[Doctor]

What kind of memorandum is this? Link please?

This is not a memorandum. Oral note, Cripps gave Vyshinsky for Molotov.
But there is a little about something else.

[citizen]

Looks like a fake. Was Vyshinsky at that time in diplomatic work? It is difficult to imagine that the British ambassador threatened war against the USSR, and even in an alliance with Germany.

[Doctor]

Looks like a fake. Was Vyshinsky at that time in diplomatic work? It is difficult to imagine that the British ambassador threatened war against the USSR, and even in an alliance with Germany.

Vyshinsky at that time was the first deputy of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
On April 18, 1941, he received British Ambassador Cripps, who handed him the text of the statement.

 Show / Hide text

CONVERSATION OF THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR AL. VYSHINSKY WITH THE AMBASSADOR
GREAT BRITAIN IN THE USSR R.S. CRIPSOM

Sent to: Comrade Stalin, Comrade Molotov, Comrade Voroshilov, Comrade Kaganovich,
t. Mikoyan, t. Lozovsky, t. Sobolev, t. Gusev, General Secretariat
18 April 1941 city

At the beginning of the conversation, Cripps said that he wanted to visit Comrade VM Molotov.
and for this purpose prepared a translation of the oral statement in writing for
M. Molotov, but since he did not receive an appointment with Molotov, he
I have to make this statement
Cripps further stated that this afternoon, when he requested an appointment with
t Molotov, received an "unusual answer" from the Secretariat t Molotov -
“The People's Commissar cannot accept” - without any explanation. He,
Cripps, considers this response unusual because such an answer could
start that he is generally deprived of the opportunity to see the people's commissar.
Cripps added that he does not want to exaggerate the importance of this issue, so
nevertheless, I would like to know whether this refusal of admission was a misunderstanding or
it has a political character, and depending on this, it must be decided
whether he will report this fact to his government.
I will answer Cripps that Comrade Molotov is not only a people's commission
sar, but also the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, which makes it necessary
sometimes entrust the reception of ambassadors to their deputies.
“But besides this, I must say,” I continued, “that Comrade Molotov
extremely dissatisfied with the fact that until now the British government has not
wishes to positively resolve such a relatively small question as
the question of the departure of the Baltic sailors from England.
- So, I correctly think that Mr. Molotov's refusal to accept me
is a political act? Cripps asked.
To this I replied to Cripps that Mr. Molotov and our government are very
unhappy with the situation on the Baltic seafarers and that Cripps should
take this into account and draw the necessary conclusions from this.
Then Cripps began to argue at length that the whole thing was with the Baltic
sailors rests against the Swedes, who do not want to give their steamer
Cripps also said that negotiations for the evacuation of sailors in Swedish
steamer leads to London Maisky that there is still no final decision
Swedish government. To my comment that there is no need to wait for Swedish
steamer, when there are Soviet steamers in England, and that the refusal is great
the Ritan government to return even one steamer to us, at least the "Eve-
reyu ", for the transport of seamen gives every reason for our dissatisfaction,
Cripps preferred to state that it would be better to settle general issues,
and then go to private. I objected to Cripps, stating that before
all it is necessary to do away with private issues and thereby create
appropriate environment for general discussion.
Cripps then moved on to the main topic.
Cripps stated that in an oral statement he had prepared, 238 in writing
private issues are also reflected for Comrade Mologov, and
me a handwritten translation of the "oral statement in writing",
as he called it, on 14 pages. I have read the text of this statement and
declared to Cripps that since this document was intended for Comrade Molotov
V.M., I will transfer it to its destination and act in accordance with those decrees
knowledge that I will receive from Comrade Molotov V.M. As for me personally,
then the note, since it can be judged by the first reading, I do not consider
serious, and that for its discussion there are no suitable
government relations, as I explained to Cripps in a conversation with him
March 22 * ​​on a similar occasion.
Moreover, the note contains even completely unacceptable
places like the English government is not interested in
inviolability of the USSR as it is interested in inviolability
France, etc. On the question of immunity and security
USSR239 I told Cripps that the USSR itself would take care of this, without help
advisers Strange also impresses Cripps' question, name
whether the Soviet government improved its relations with Britain or
it wants to leave them as they are now.
I told Cripps that the very posing of such questions is
strange and incorrect, since not the Soviet government, but the English
the government has brought the porridge of the relationship to the state in which they
now are I must remind Cripps of a number of hostile
actions of England against the USSR (requisition of gold, ships, preservation of the diplomatic
lomatic missions of the Balts, etc.)
As for the other questions of the note, then they can only cause
bewilderment. Does Cripps think I am a very naive person?
Cripps stated that he would not like to discuss with me that the English
government in modern relations between Germany and the USSR
has good reason to regard the USSR as a channel and source
supply of Germany, which determines the nature of relations with the USSR with
sides of England.
I rejected Cripps' attempts to challenge our right to trade with Germa.
with any other state, stating that this is our business and only
our.
Then Cripps said that if, after all, the question of the Baltic
sailors has such a meaning for the USSR - he, Cripps, about this can
judged by the fact that he was even denied by the People's Commissar
eme - then this question can be resolved. The British government will go
on this. He only needs to be sure that the resolution of this issue
will ensure the possibility of establishing good relations between the USSR and
Great Britain
I objected, emphasizing that it was not only about the Baltic sailors, that
Cripps greatly simplifies the question that, moreover, we cannot allow
presentation of some conditions to us: the Baltic and other issues should
be resolved regardless of any conditions, the very formulation of the question of
which I resolutely reject.
At the end of the conversation, Cripps said that if I do not see anything in the note
serious, then, perhaps, it should not be passed on to Comrade Molotov and bother
his reading of such a document, and what would be best for Cripps this note
take figuratively. Anyway, he, Cripps, will inform his government
about the impression that this note had on me. He, Cripps, is not
doubts that his government will take this into account when deciding the question of the Baltic states
sky sailors.
I replied that this was the case of Cripps and the British government, but that
I consider myself obliged to give the note to V.M. Molotov, and about the subsequent,
if necessary, I will notify Cripps. Record mentioned in the text
I donated Cripps to V.M. Molotov *.
The conversation lasted 1 hour and 15 minutes.
Comrade Gussv was present at the conversation.
A. Vyshinsky
AVP RF, f. 07, op 2, p 9, d 20 l. 30-34.

[citizen]

But there is also no that

England's defeat in the war would entail an attack by Germany on the USSR in alliance with defeated Britain and some circles from the United States.

[Doctor]

But there is also no that
England's defeat in the war would entail an attack by Germany on the USSR in alliance with defeated Britain and some circles from the United States.

This is diplomacy. Everything is very soft, in half hints ...

Specifically in the statement like this:

In the same conversations, I also touched on the issue raised already in conversation with
Your Excellency, that it is not excluded, in the event that the war stretches for a long period, that Great Britain (especially certain circles in Great Britain) might smile at the idea of ​​concluding a deal to end the war on the basis again proposed in some German circles, in which Western Europe the previous situation would have been recreated, while Germany would not have been hindered in expanding its "living space" in the eastern direction.
This kind of idea could find followers in the United States of America. In this regard, it should be remembered that preservation
the inviolability of the Soviet Union is not of direct interest to the British government, such as the preservation of the inviolability of France and some other Western European countries.

[citizen]

But what to see here

England's defeat in the war would entail an attack by Germany on the USSR in alliance with defeated Britain and some circles from the United States.

you must have a very developed imagination.

[Doctor]

you must have a very developed imagination.

I say - the language of diplomacy.
For example, here is how Schulenburg declares war on us. Even Molotov did not enter at first.

By the way, the formal reason is the very teachings, the harmlessness of which the author of the article is trying to convince us.

CONVERSATION OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF GERMANY IN THE USSR F. SCHULENBURG
22 June 1941 g.,
at 5 hour 30 min in the morning
Secretly

Schulenburg, who appeared at the reception accompanied by adviser Hilger, said that he must declare with the deepest regret that even yesterday evening, when he was at the reception with the People's Commissar Comrade Molotov, he did not know anything. Several telegrams were received from Berlin tonight, he says.

The German government instructed him to convey the following note to the Soviet government:
"In view of intolerable share of the threat posed to the German eastern border as a result of the massive concentration and training of all the armed forces of the Red ArmyThe German government considers itself compelled to immediately take military countermeasures. The corresponding note will be simultaneously handed over to Dekanozov in Berlin. "

Schulenburg says he cannot express his depressed mood caused by the unjustified and unexpected action of his government. The ambassador says that he gave all his strength to create peace and friendship with the USSR.

Comrade Molotov asks what does this note mean?
Schulenburg replies that, in his opinion, this is the beginning of the war.

Comrade Molotov declares that no concentration of the Red Army troops was carried out on the border with Germany. The usual maneuvers took place, which are held every year, and if it was stated that for some reason the maneuvers, in the territory of their conduct, were undesirable, it would be possible to discuss this issue ...

[citizen]

Well, here at least it is talking about military measures. There are not many interpretation options. And where in that conversation and notes they saw the "defeat" of England and on the basis of this attack by England in alliance with Germany on the USSR is absolutely unclear.

[Doctor]

Well, here at least it is talking about military measures. There are not many interpretation options.

Our government threatens to retaliate against any movement of NATO. And sometimes send to hell.

This is precisely the wording that is very muddy, which is why Molotov specified it. And even in my answer, Schulenburg muddied: "in his opinion."

The memorandum passed to Dekanozov is more specific, but there are no words "declaration of war" either.

Thus, the Soviet government violated the treaties with Germany and intends to attack Germany from the rear, while she is fighting for her existence. The Fuehrer therefore ordered the German armed forces to counter this threat with all the means at their disposal.

This was done on purpose, at the direction of Hitler, in order to slow down the reaction of the USSR (partly succeeded).

[Doctor]

And where in that conversation and notes they saw the "defeat" of England and on the basis of this attack by England in alliance with Germany on the USSR is absolutely unclear.

I agree here. It is said on the conclusion of a deal for the end of the war.

But here is a free interpretation of the author of our article.

[nnm]

Colleague, thanks for the article. Could you also highlight the actions of Finland during this period. It seems that this information is also worthy of attention, especially taking into account the awareness of the approaching time "M"? And if, perhaps, the actions of the Abwehr with the involvement of the special services of Poland and Finland.

[A. Privalov]

The article is extremely difficult for unprepared readers to perceive.

The call-up of the assigned personnel for training in the 28th Mountain Rifle Division was not planned. For one reason or another, the division was not sent to KOVO. On June 22, she is located in the area of ​​Sochi.

Quite by chance, I am familiar with the combat path of this division. (Almost 20 years ago, helped a veteran prepare a book of memoirs for publication.)

On June 22, everything is exactly like that, but from July 1 she was already in the reserve of the South-Western Front.

Let the reader not be surprised by the use of a mountain rifle division in the forests of Kiev. Soviet mountain rifle units did not receive any specific mountaineering training. In fact, these were somewhat lightweight conventional divisions. A feature of mountain formations was mainly horse-drawn transport in the rear and artillery, mountain guns in the artillery regiment. Germans in 1939 and 1941 used mountain rifle units in the Lviv region, although this city is not surrounded by snow-capped peaks. Both sides quite freely used the divisions, which had only a slope towards the "mountain" side, but were quite capable of being used on the plain and in the forests.

On July 12, the division, having arrived in the Kiev area, was included in the 27th Rifle Corps and began to concentrate at the Strakholissya. Its task was to prepare and defend the Rossokha-Priborsk line.
Already on June 19, she started stubborn battles on the southern edge of the forest near the villages of Raevka and Borovka.

In August, the 28th Guards Division continued to fight on the approaches to Kiev. On August 25, she occupied the field fortifications of the Kiev fortified area along the Irpen River from its mouth to the village of Belogorodok, entering directly under the headquarters of the 37th Army. On August 25 - 26, units of the 28th State Infantry Division, together with the garrisons of the Pillbox of the KiUR, successfully repelled the enemy's attempt to force the Irpen River by the forces of the 44th Infantry Division near the villages of Demidov and Guta-Mezhigorskaya

In mid-September, the Germans closed the ring around Kiev, forming the Kiev cauldron. In the course of further hostilities, the 28th rifle division was destroyed.

The division commander, Major General Konstantin Ignatievich Novik, with a group of fighters and commanders managed to get out of the encirclement. As in those days it was customary to say: "in uniform and with a weapon."

[AsmyppoL]

Of course you are right ...
Unfortunately, I am setting out the material as I can ...
I read with interest a little material about the 28th State Road

[A. Privalov]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Of course you are right ...
Unfortunately, I am setting out the material as I can ...
I read with interest a little material about the 28th State Road

I am not with a claim to you, but simply expressed my impression. In fact, this is a completely gross topic.
Unfortunately, among the vast amount of publicly available literature written today, there are very few statements in such a format that, on the one hand, would be detailed, and on the other hand, easily understandable to a not very prepared, but interested reader, alas ...

[Okolotochny]

Unfortunately, I am setting out the material as I can ...

I don't mind at all, I just expressed my opinion. You have worked hard, so at least thanks to you. Simply (in my opinion!) Paid too much attention to details and too little conclusions from them. IMHO of course.
A little below a colleague Knell wardenheart clearly stated the conclusions.

[Okolotochny]

The article is extremely difficult for unprepared readers to perceive.

Reading even the middle of the article (not to mention the end) I forgot about the beginning. Lots of numbers, dates, etc.

[ccsr]

Quote: Okolotochny

Reading even the middle of the article (not to mention the end) I forgot about the beginning. Lots of numbers, dates, etc.

This is an ordinary pseudoscientific article by this author, who, due to the complete lack of knowledge of military history, adjusts a large number of all kinds of figures, fictions, etc. to his illiterate conclusions, and sometimes just lies. For example, he writes:

S. L. Chekunov explained the absence of the registration number and signatures on the document:
In 1941, the document was taken into account only if it passed through the common part. If the document remained with the developer, or was transferred inside the control, then it was not counted in the accounting logs.
In addition, there are documents transferred personally between executors of different departments, which were also not recorded in the accounting journals ...
The absence of an approving signature does not mean absolutely anything. The approval could be done in several ways.
So, for example, on one of the district deployment plans for 1941 there is an inscription: the plan was reported during a personal visit.
The plan as a whole was approved by Comrade Tymoshenko, taking into account the following remarks ...
However, there is no signature of Tymoshenko's autograph in place of the "sealed" signature, that is, Comrade Tymoshenko verbally approved ...
There are pencil edits in the document. According to one version, the document was developed by A.M. Vasilevsky and corrected by the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff and the 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin.
On the first page of the document there is a link to the information (summary) of the RU dated 15.05.41 about the German divisions near our border. Therefore, the textual part of the document could be prepared only after May 15th.

In this text, every paragraph is a lie, if only because even drafts are executed on the registered sheets or in the registered workbooks, otherwise for this it would immediately be possible to thunder into a tribunal - the development of classified materials is allowed only on the registered sheets.
Chekunov is a great dreamer about military documents, and he was more than once exposed when he presented a draft of the w / n Directive as the original of the w / n Directive found by him, although even from the outward appearance it was clear that these were just taken into account draft worksheets.
As for the transfer of documents between the performers, then this is also a lie, because the documents are temporarily transferred through the register with a seal, and no changes are made in the books of the main accounting. If the document for some reason is not returned, then such a register is sewn into the file in accordance with the rules for accounting for stamped materials.
As for the inscription "the plan was reported during a personal visit", it just says that the deadline for the report came up, the executor reported, but the chief did not approve the plan, and therefore it cannot be a guiding document at all, as the author of the article believes.
About what Tymoshenko verbally approved, you can laugh until you drop - only the author of the article and Chekunov can think of this, because this is a heinous lie, which no military prosecutor would believe, just as they did not believe Pavlov during interrogations when he said that he had called him Timoshenko and Zhukov gave conflicting instructions over the phone, which is why he did not raise the district on time.
About pencil edits - these can only remain in drafts, because it is strictly forbidden to do this in original documents submitted for approval in order to avoid forgery in case of unforeseen consequences - these are the basics of Soviet office work, which the semi-literate author of the article simply does not suspect.
In general, I completely agree with the opinion of the author smaug78:

Quote: smaug78

Another crazy article, the title does not match the content ...

[Andrey VOV]

And for whom at the beginning of all articles the author gives the decoding of abbreviations ???
Many thanks to the author for the articles, I look forward to continuing the cycle

[Okolotochny]

And for whom at the beginning of all articles the author gives the decoding of abbreviations ???

Do you memorize all the abbreviations? If not, then when meeting on the text, you must return to them.

[Andrey VOV]

Yes, I remembered, they are generally accepted and appear everywhere regarding documents, thanks to the author for giving decryptions before the beginning of each article

[AsmyppoL]

You are right, you are so fussy ..
There, of all the abbreviations, they are difficult for an ordinary citizen: sd, rm and ru ...
The rest are familiar to anyone interested in the Second World War: reductions in border districts, internal districts are given in full. North Caucasian District ... It's too long a phrase and it's not difficult to remember ...

[rocket757]

You can never be completely ready for war, BUT, you must always be ready!

[Knell wardenheart]

It started interestingly, but it all ended with literalism.

[AsmyppoL]

There are many subtleties in May - June. Without them, it is difficult to consider the events in June, in my opinion.
Therefore, the material of this part somehow jumps over the dates. The next one, unfortunately, will be the same. Further, I think in two parts we will consider the entire June 1941.
Literalism? I think a little differently.
Many people are still convinced that training camps are a hidden mobilization. I don't want to leave the sacred cow. But the distribution of the assigned personnel, the lack of transport shows that in May and even in the first ten days of June, no one was going to nominate the divisions that had accepted the assignees.
The advancement of the 19th Army is an obvious half-measure of an insignificant character. This shows that it did not have a decent mechanized corps.
After all, only on May 15-17, in the operational management of the General Staff, a new alignment of forces was developed. We decided to take a large enough mechanized corps from the Caucasus to the European part of the country, and at the end of May - at the beginning of June it was already left against Turkey ...
The General Staff planned, but did not quite correctly assess the situation. But their thoughts (the leadership of the army) were supposed to influence the events in the country on the eve of the war ...
All these (sometimes repeated) facts are intended to convince believers that they have chosen the right path. Those who disagree can stay on their point of view. The author does not want to drag people over to his side. The main thing for him is to provide the facts of logical chains for his analysis to interested people ...

[Knell wardenheart]

No, in general I liked the article, but the mouse fuss at the border by 3/5 of the volume would have been better reduced to 2/5) No matter how well we predicted the attack, the problem is that in 1941 we did not know how to adequately and modernly fight, manage and react in a timely manner in an already arisen situation. Neither competent defense, nor numbers, nor dancing with a tambourine on the border - we would not have solved this problem. The Germans already knew how to fight quickly and modernly - we still did not know how. And they could not learn on the tiny scale of Finland or clashes with the Japanese. Of course, we should have had a different approach to the arrangements on the border - to the basing of aircraft, the creation of fortified areas, etc. But this factor is not as important as the systemic and organizational one. We lost the beginning of the war much more organizationally and theoretically than tactically. In my opinion, it is necessary to pay more attention to the attempts of our authorities since 1939 to analyze the actions of the Germans and to react with changes in the theoretical part - this is a symptom of whether the preparations were really or ostentatiously. And who was preparing, actually.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Many people are still convinced that training camps are a hidden mobilization. I don't want to leave the sacred cow. But the distribution of the assigned personnel, the lack of transport shows that in May and even in the first ten days of June, no one was going to nominate the divisions that had accepted the assignees.
The advancement of the 19th Army is an obvious half-measure of an insignificant character. This shows that it did not have a decent mechanized corps.
After all, only on May 15-17, in the operational management of the General Staff, a new alignment of forces was developed. We decided to take a large enough mechanized corps from the Caucasus to the European part of the country, and at the end of May - at the beginning of June it was already left against Turkey ...

This enchanting lie is refuted by the retired colonel of the General Staff M. Khodorenok:

However, the war had not yet begun, and the strategic deployment of the Red Army was already in full swing.... And reserves were deployed, and strategic regroupings were underway, and partial mobilization was carried out by an orderly order.
Let's dwell on the latter. In Soviet times, it was called so - "under the guise of large training camps, over 800 thousand people were called up into the ranks of the Red Army."
Again, there was some kind of idea for this partial mobilization, a plan, a schedule, an explanatory note, that is, what age of persons liable for military service, what military registration specialties, from what military districts and in what volume to call, to replenish which formations and units to send. These documents have not yet been made public.
As for strategic regroupings, seven combined-arms armies began to move from the internal military districts to the western borders of the USSR in the first half of 1941. It should be noted that a gigantic volume of military transport, which must be carried out according to a single plan, plan and schedule. And the armies should be assigned specific combat missions by operational directives from the General Staff. However, even today, no plans, no plans, no schedules, no combat missions are known.

https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2021/06/22/13663214.shtml
Therefore, the lie of the author of the article about Turkey and Iran testifies that this dreamer does not know at all where the armies from the inner districts were ordered to arrive, and therefore his conjectures cannot be taken seriously.

[BAI]

1.

But the leadership did not have unequivocal answers to the questions: "When will the war start?", "How will it start?"

There were answers. Intelligence chief Golikov:

Conclusion:
1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible date for the commencement of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable world for Germany.

2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR in the spring of this year should be regarded as misinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence *.

Head of Intelligence
General Staff of the Red Army, Lieutenant General
Golikov

March 20, 1941. At the same time, the document contains a note made by Golikov after the war: "Yes, that's right."
2. Maybe

It was noted that

The diagram of the balance of forces "shows that in the Soviet General Staff, five weeks before the start of the war, it was correctly predicted that the Nazis would deliver the main strikes against the USSR by three groups of armies:" North "," Center "," South ".

But the location of the troops remained the same, according to:

People's Commissar Especially important

Defense of the USSR Top secret

September 18, 1940 In person only

№ 103202 / 05

Central Committee of the CPSU (b)

comrade STALIN

comrade MOLOTOV

I am submitting for your consideration considerations on the foundations of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941 ...

In the West -

Germany, most likely, will deploy its main forces north of the mouth of the r. San, in order to deliver and develop the main attack from East Prussia through the Lithuanian SSR in the directions to Riga, to Kovno and further to Dvinsk - Polotsk or to Kovno - Vilno and further to Minsk.

At the same time, it is necessary to expect auxiliary concentric strikes from Lomzha and Brest with their subsequent development in the direction of Baranovichi - Minsk.

The development of the operation on Riga will be combined: 1) with the landing of troops on the Baltic Sea coast in the Libava region with the aim of flanking and rearming our armies operating on the lower Neman, and 2) with the capture of the Moonsund archipelago and landing on the territory of the Estonian SSR for the purpose of an offensive to Leningrad.

It is also quite probable that simultaneously with the main attack of the Germans from East Prussia, their attack from the front of Kholm, Grubeshov, Tomashev, Yaroslav on Dubno, Brody with the aim of reaching the rear of our Lvov grouping and capturing Western Ukraine.

If Finland takes the side of Germany, then it is possible that her army will be supported by German divisions to attack Leningrad from the northwest.

In the south, it is possible to expect a simultaneous transition with the German army to the offensive from the regions of Northern Romania in the general direction to Zhmerinka of the Romanian army, supported by German divisions.

With the outlined hypothetical variant of Germany's actions, the following deployment and grouping of its forces can be expected:

- north of the mouth of the river. The San Germans can have up to 123 infantry and up to 10 tank divisions and most of their aviation on the Memel-Sedlec front;

- south of the mouth of the river. San - up to 50 infantry and 5 tank divisions with their main grouping in the area of ​​Holm, Tomashev, Lublin.

The possibility is not excluded that the Germans, in order to capture Ukraine, will concentrate their main forces in the south, in the Sedlec and Lublin region, to deliver the main attack in the general direction of Kiev.

This attack is likely to be accompanied by an auxiliary attack in the north from East Prussia, as indicated above.

With this option for Germany's actions, one should expect that the Germans will allocate 110-120 infantry divisions for operations in the south, the bulk of their tanks and aircraft, leaving 50-60 infantry divisions, some tanks and aircraft for operations in the north.

The main, the most politically advantageous for Germany, and therefore the most likely, is the 1st option of its actions, that is, with the deployment of the main forces of the German army north of the mouth of the river. San.

The approximate timeframe for the deployment of German armies on our western borders is 10-15 days from the beginning of concentration.

The end of the deployment of 30 Romanian infantry divisions on our border with Romania, with their main grouping - up to 18 infantry divisions - in the Botosani, Suceava area, can be expected in 15 - 20 days.

With regard to the Finnish army, the following deployment is proposed:

On the front from the Gulf of Finland to Savonlin up to 6 infantry divisions, supported by 3-4 German divisions;
To cover the direction to Kuopio, Ioensu on the front of Onkamo, Ilomantsi, Nurmes - up to 3 infantry divisions;
To cover the Uleaborg direction on the Kuhmoniemi, Suomussalmi front - up to 2 infantry divisions;
In the Merkjärvi area - up to 2 infantry divisions;
In the Petsamo area - up to 2 infantry divisions.
The final deployment of the Finnish army according to this option can be expected on the 20th - 25th day.

The possibility of concentrating significant forces of the Finnish army in the Vyborg-Leningrad direction, supported here by German divisions, predetermines the possibility of active enemy actions in this direction.

In the future, in this theater, the possibility of auxiliary attacks by the enemy in the Petrozavodsk and Kandalashevsky directions is not excluded.

The most likely actions of enemy navies are:

a) blockade in the Baltic Sea;

b) support and landing of assault forces in the Libau area and the capture of the Moonsund Archipelago;

c) the desire to break into the Gulf of Finland and force our fleet to go to the east;

d) in the North Sea, it is possible for the Germans to develop cruising operations and submarine actions to blockade our ports in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk.

The Italian fleet will have its main operations in the Black Sea.

People's Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. TIMOSHENKO

Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army K. MERETSKOV

18 September 1940 of
A blow to Moscow was not expected. And the troops remained in deployment, aimed at repelling two attacks - in the north and in the south.

[Ales]

Yes. It seems so.
And it seems that the offensive in the Baltics was considered to provide a blow to Vitebsk. That is secondary, and then they hit with half of all their strength

[Astor 27]

For the moderator and author of the article.
Wouldn't it be better to place this kind of "research" in the "Opinions" section.
The author, firstly, does not possess factual material, and secondly, as a consequence of the first, he is not able to draw any conclusions (I am not even talking about their correctness or incorrectness). To put it simply, the author, not endowed with the ability to analyze, is nonsense.
We begin to read:

On April 18, the British ambassador handed our government a memorandum stating that England's defeat in the war would entail an attack by Germany on the USSR in alliance with defeated Britain and some circles from the United States.

The fact is that this Cripps memorandum is widely known, but even Soviet historians, for all their engagement, do not carry delirium about a possible war of Germany in alliance with England and "some US circles" against the USSR (see, for example, History of Diplomacy, Vol. 4. Diplomacy during the Second World War. - M., 1975, p. 165). The book can be read online for free at https://biblioclub.ru/index.php?page=book_red&id=275293&razdel=141 (you just need to register).
We read further:

"What the British said to him in response is unknown, but the materials on the Hess case are still closed."

The great researcher Alexei Ivanov will die in holy ignorance that all materials are declassified. I emphasize: EVERYTHING. Already 4 years ago. In 2017, the latter were declassified (there is nothing interesting about them). This was also written in the newspapers (see, for example, "Kommersant" No. 21 dated 03.07.2020/1999/XNUMX. "The Fate of a Fascist Man") and books on this matter (about the "Hess mission") have been written (see, for example, Padfield P. Secret Mission Rudolf Hess. - Smolensk .: Rusich, XNUMX - can be read on Militer absolutely freely).
I honestly read the article to the end. If I start to sort out all the inaccuracies, errors and absurdities, then this will not end.
In the end, after all, there should be at least some kind of "sanitary" supervision over the authors? After all, "this is not so much a case for military historians as for psychologists" (it's not me - it's the same Kommersant).

[Andrey VOV]

Can we be sure that everything was really declassified in the Hess case? That before the declassified people did not perform the necessary cleaning, let's say certain materials, you must agree that this is a painfully inconvenient topic for the same ruling dynasty and the relations of its members with the Nazis

[Astor 27]

In our mortal world, you cannot be sure of anything. So no one knows for sure whether the composer Gluck existed or whether he just dreamed of his contemporaries.
But seriously, I dropped the link to the booklet. Read at your leisure.
And at the expense of the inconvenience: be curious about how the British did with the Duke of Windsor (and he was king - Edward 8).

[Andrey VOV]

I agree that our world is like this ... As it is ... Thanks for the recommendation, I will read the book at my leisure

[AsmyppoL]

So present a declassified case ...

The director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service in his interview on May 26, 2021, claims the opposite.

The head of the SVR of Russia recalled that in May 1941, just on the eve of the Wehrmacht's invasion of the USSR, Hitler's friend and ally Rudolf Hess visited Great Britain. The purpose of the visit has not yet been established, and representatives of the UK, in whose archives the relevant reports should be stored, do not want to disclose this information.
Source: https://infosmi.net/politic/227480-naryshkin-rasskazal-pochemu-velikobritaniya-do-sih-por-skryvaet-tsel-vizita-gessa-v-1941-godu/?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=des

I have more confidence in the director of intelligence

[Doctor]

So present a declassified case ...

The director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service in his interview on May 26, 2021, claims the opposite.

The head of the SVR of Russia recalled that in May 1941, just on the eve of the Wehrmacht's invasion of the USSR, Hitler's friend and ally Rudolf Hess visited Great Britain. The purpose of the visit has not yet been established, and representatives of the UK, in whose archives the relevant reports should be kept, do not want to disclose this information.
Source: https://infosmi.net/politic/227480-naryshkin-rasskazal-pochemu-velikobritaniya-do-sih-por-skryvaet-tsel-vizita-gessa-v-1941-godu/?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=des

I have more confidence in the director of intelligence

There is no secret. The purpose of the visit was clear and known to everyone from the very beginning - to persuade Great Britain to a peace treaty and then go jointly against the USSR.
The British informed us about it 10 days after the arrival of Hess.

CONVERSATION OF THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN GREAT BRITAIN I.M. MAYSKY
WITH PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE GREAT BRITAIN R.O. BUTLER
Sent to Comrade Molotov, Comrade Vyshinsky, General Secretariat
21 May 1941 city
Secretly
...
3) Then I asked if there was any news in the Hess case?
Butler said there was nothing particularly new here. Butler's general impression was that there was a quarrel between Hess and Hitler, as a result of which Hess decided to make his flight to England in the hope that there he will manage to find influential circles ready to conclude peace with Germany, and he himself now realizes that a severe disappointment befell him.
There are no "influential circles" in England who think about peace, for it would be suicide for the British Empire... After all, peace now could be concluded only on the basis of all those conquests that Germany made. This means that as a result of peace, Germany would remain the master of the European continent. with all its human, material and technical resources.
Within a short period of time, Germany would be able to use all these resources to further strengthen its power (in particular, the fleet), and then the death of the British Empire would be inevitable... All this here, in England, is perfectly aware, and therefore there can be no talk of peace now. The war will continue with all determination. Hess will remain in England as a prisoner of war.

Churchill miscalculated Hitler, and therefore is considered the greatest Briton.

[Astor 27]

You should contact The National Archives: they have their own website. Work.
And the SVR director needs a bite to eat: apparently, due to the lack of any practical experience in intelligence management, he was overworked.

[AsmyppoL]

I shouldn't go anywhere.
You pouting your lips wrote something that does not answer the truth.
And now you are sending for the docks somewhere ...
It looks like you are a gentleman who is not responsible for anything and can only provide tests ...

[Astor 27]

My dear friend, Alexey Ivanov. If you decide to play in a conspiracy theory with arguments like: "but you give it", "but they will not," then this is not for me. I pointed out the book to you. A pretty serious book. There is also a bibliography. Open, read, check sources by links, work. And you are referring to me the opinion of some uncle, the brightest page of whose career was a member of the board of directors of the tobacco company "Philip Maurice Izhora". And you justify your delirium with the delirium of this uncle. And your most important argument is: "I believe him." Well, send it to you. Blessed is he who believes. What does the truth have to do with it? And proof?

[Siegfried]

maybe it's good that they left heavy weapons at the permanent deployment points ... so maybe they didn't lose everything at once and new divisions were equipped with the weapons that remained. That they did not have time to call the horses and transport can also be good ... so all this goodness would remain on the roads of Belarus and Ukraine. Could these divisions, having a full BC and transport, influence the advance of the Wehrmacht better than it was, one can only guess.

[haron]

Quote: Illanatol

H'm. Does this contradict the facts?

Sometimes yes - it contradicts. Especially when this sword is used by someone who does not understand its essence.
Examples ?! Yes please.
1. War of the first anti-French coalition, which ended in zero for the fatherland. Only thanks to the genius of Suvorov, they responded to the betrayal with the feat and blood of our soldier.
2. The third coalition - Austerlitz,
3. A feat with a draw and a sea of ​​blood of our best at Preussisch-Elau and a subsequent feat with a loss at Friedland. All without meaning for the fatherland.
4. The sixth coalition - the murder of the "great army" at a huge price the best sons of the motherland with a huge profit for the fatherland and a dubious Western campaign to save the "rotten allies" at the cost of a Russian soldier.
5. Rescue of the Habsburgs by Russian bayonets in 1848 with "reciprocal gratitude" from Austria to the Crimean.
6. Russian-Japanese disgrace from the top of 1905.
7. The attack on East Prussia in 1914 and the result of the 1st World War.
.... The list can be extended both into the past and into the future.
The meaning is the same. The Russian sword was not rarely used for direct purposes. And the sword itself has nothing to do with it.