The US Navy is still the strongest in the world. But their strategic blindness will affect sooner or later. In the photo - the aircraft carrier "Nimitz" and part of the wing in the parade. Source: US Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Keenan Daniels
The reader is invited to an article by a member of the US House of Representatives from Virginia, a member of the Democratic Party, vice chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on the Armed Forces, a retired commander of the US Navy (commander - a rank equivalent to the 2nd rank captain in the Russian Navy) Elain Luria (Elain Luria ).
E. Luria is the only example of a female officer in the US Navy who has fully served the entire service life in the Navy (in her case, 20 years) only in the seafarers, without going to coastal services. She graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis, receiving civilian bachelor's degrees in physics and storiesas well as having mastered French. She then attended the Nuclear Power School. Her service began on the command ship Blue Ridge, during which she earned her Master's degree in Engineering Management. Over the years, she participated in combat services six times, including with the real participation of naval ships in hostilities.
Her last position was in command of the Assault craft unit 2, at the Little Creek Naval Airborne Base, Virginia. The detachment includes landing boats of various types and auxiliary boats. The number of the detachment's personnel is 2 people.
She demobilized in 2017 and went into business actively, showing good results. Then it was time to run for Congress.
Luria is a harsh critic of the current command of the US Navy, including the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday, who is having a hard time at any hearings in which Luria is involved. Apparently, Luria plans to play a large role in American naval development, as evidenced by the regular publication of articles on strategic topics in various publications for her authorship.
The continuation of the trend is her article on the site cimsec.org, which is called A new US Maritime strategy.
This is a very curious text, the analysis of which can say a lot about what ideas about the future use of the US Navy are roaming in the heads of the American elites today, and what, in principle, the future of the US Navy, as well as the actions of the US Navy, may turn out to be. against America's rivals in the world.
All statements in the article are on the conscience of the author, not the translator. The entire test below is a translation of this article into Russian.
Article "New US Naval Strategy"
This article describes the path that led to the current "strategic failure" of the US Navy. and a framework is proposed for a new Naval Strategy, which I believe should be developed immediately, together with an appropriate assessment of the [naval] force structure. With a small 5% increase in funding, the Navy will be able to achieve 90% of the changes dictated by this strategy over the next five years.
Death of a Naval Strategy 
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 effectively did away with Naval Strategy. Through this act, Congress secured the right to intervene and the ability to "get the ship back on track."  after a series of well-publicized military failures, the responsibility for which, as it was then seen, stemmed from the inability of the Armed Forces to work together, without the influence [on them] of narrow departmental interests.
The Golduther-Nichols Act reaffirmed and strengthened the role of the Secretary of Defense and significantly expanded the powers of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, effectively removing the Chiefs and Secretaries of the Armed Forces from any role in the operational command structure and from the role of advisers to the President. They were turned into "budget warriors" , and the Navy ended up as a ship without control.
The law was also aimed at improving the quality of officers in positions in inter-service (common to formations from different types of the Armed Forces) command structures.  and demanded that all officers serve in such positions with the precondition of being promoted to a flag officer or receiving a general rank.
As a result, the services of the Armed Forces have changed the career paths of officers in accordance with these new requirements to spend time in positions related to inter-service command-administrative structures. Each type of the Armed Forces had to meet the new requirements for the advancement of officers, which ultimately determined the career growth of each officer, as a result of which the officers moved as quickly as possible from one crucial stage of service to another. The officer could no longer afford to spend several terms in positions at the headquarters of the Navy, studying the strategic art. The strategy was only for the Joint Headquarters  - only for the Chairman of the OKNSH.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the only service chief with an operational title in his title, has had a unique role since his inception in 1915. The official role of the chief was consolidated in 1947 in accordance with General Order No. 5 as:
"(A) the command (the chief himself is de facto the commander) of the operational forces, (b) the chief naval adviser to the president and the Secretary of the Navy."
As soon as the ink on the general order was dry, the forces in Congress and the White House began to further launch trends in the subsequent unification of the armed forces. Over the next 20 years in the series of laws, the role of the chief in operational matters was completely eliminated, and by the 1970s the then CNO, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, was convincedthat the Navy was "confused about the excuses for its existence."
Thomas Hohn in his book Power and changementioned that the headquarters of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) was rather a "weak confederation" rather than an operational management body.
This was, however, only until 1978, when the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Thomas Hayward, who had just come from the post of the commander of the Pacific fleet USA, turned Zumwalt's criticism into real change. Hayward was convinced that the Navy needed to be reborn, both strategically and tactically - in other words, the Navy needed a strategy, starting from which, it would be possible to plan and create programs.
As Professor John Hattendorf of the Naval War College observed,
"Hayward sought to move ... from a budget battle to an analysis of the strategic issues of a global maritime power."
In 1981, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman bet on Hayward's Sea Strike concept. to set the goal of creating a Navy of 600 ships which he almost reached before leaving his post.
The Chief of Naval Operations (de facto Commander of the Navy) Admiral Tom Hayward (in the background wearing a helmet) prepares to take off in an A-6 attack aircraft from Subic Bay, Philippines. The purpose of the flight is to visit the aircraft carrier "Midway", the man in the cap in the foreground is the pilot. Source: PH3 Kenneth Flemings, via US National archives
Then came the Goludter-Nichols Law. No one can deny that he was successful in integrating the armed forces into a single force, however, no one can also deny the harmful consequences for Strategy и procurement in the types of the Armed Forces separately, which occurred as a result of the entry into force of this law.
As I wrote in my article “Look Back in the 1980s to Enlighten the Navy on Today” (link), The Navy has not and did not have a Naval Strategy over the past 30 years. Moreover, in the last thirty years one could see failures in the creation of one class of ships after another, which ultimately led to the loss of an entire generation of shipbuilding.
As "budget warriors", many chiefs of naval operations still tried to leave their mark on the development of their armed forces, and some succeeded - for good or not. Nevertheless, the fact that the success or failure of the Navy rested on the shoulders of a single Chief of Naval Operations or Secretary of the Navy was clearly a consequence of the Navy's lack of strategy. As I mentioned in my article, the bullish stubborn approach of secretary Lehmann: "First the strategy, then the requirements, then the memorandum with the programs and their goals, then the budget" - remains in stark contrast to the Naval leadership of the following [Lehman era] decades driven by budget struggles.
What is Naval Strategy and what is it not?
Strategy in military affairs is the achievement of political goals by force or, as Clausewitz is often quoted, "the continuation of politics by other means." (so in the text - Transl.).
This year, as in many years, military leaders announced at a hearing in the House Armed Services Committee that they are ready to "compete globally, fight and win the wars of the nation." .
Nevertheless, when they were asked “what does it mean to win?”, Some military leaders found themselves bewildered. Army Chief of Staff recently saidthat "victory over China is when you didn't have to fight with China" (in the sense: China refused to war - Transl.)... I agree with him, except that it was not a question, but a problem statement. We cannot define what victory means. When you cannot define what victory is, you cannot write a strategy [to achieve victory].
What will a victory over China look like?
Numerous naval strategists, including Sir Julian Corbett, have argued that a war cannot be won solely by naval or air operations. Likewise, the chairman of the JCC, General Mark Milli, more recently saidthat "decisive results in war can be achieved exclusively on the ground."
Does this mean that we cannot achieve decisive results with China without a land invasion of its mainland?
Today, China's military growth threatens the global balance of power, and, as Thucydides wrote, the rise in power of one player threatens all others. This is not to say that China, like any other country, cannot defend itself, but a country that does not share the ideals of a free, democratic world violates international norms.
As with Russia's destabilizing actions, if not properly managed, China's actions could be misinterpreted and lead to unintended conflict.
It is this ambiguity that drives the Navy's need for a new global Maritime Strategy - and a complementary national Maritime Strategy that includes the full range of commercial maritime activities, domestic shipbuilding and repairs, and maritime law enforcement. This is especially important when defense resources are limited due to competing priorities on the side of non-defense spending and among the branches of the armed forces themselves. This naval strategy should be developed by naval leaders and not by the JCS or the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Since the end of World War II, the US defense planning strategy has been a form of a two-front policy. Today's "National Defense Strategy"  calls on the armed forces to be able to
"To suppress aggression from the leading power, while restraining [simultaneously] opportunistic aggression anywhere."
By defining offensive (smashing aggression) as the primary capability of our forces, Strategy limits thinking about offensive-defensive balance in military strategy and results in a large standing army and Cold War combat tactics as the preferred training and equipment for our troops. ...
Today's "Marine Strategy"
In "Naval Strategy" 1984 (Maritime strategy - Transl.) "Victory" meant maintaining the conflict within the framework of a conventional war and supporting the ground forces in pushing the Soviet troops back to their own borders. This “stop and punish” approach is still used today. The Navy developed the strategy on the assumption, backed by intelligence, that any conflict with the Soviet Union would quickly spread across most of the globe. This required the presence and readiness of the navy in three key regions simultaneously instead of a moderate strategy. preferred by the Joint Headquarters.
The Navy has developed a Naval strategy based on the conflict in three theaters , and concentrated it around the aircraft carrier battle group. The strategy did not take into account restrictions in service, training or employment. It was assumed that each ship would be available in the conflict, and the required number would be 600.
If the same approach were applied to our forces today using the current National Security Strategy, the Navy could determine the number and type of ships for all Navy, simply using the most difficult contingencies as a guide from the commander of the forces in the Indo-Pacific region .
This resulting force structure will be well below the 355 ship requirements, even with "opportunistic aggression elsewhere," and will likely drop below 250 ships.
So how, then, did the Navy come up with their plan Battle force 2045, which calls for approximately 382-446 manned ships with crews and 143 to 242 uninhabited ships?
Rather than starting with [analyzing] one or more [such] contingencies, the Navy simply figured out what the future forces would be and how to apply them later. The ship types featured in Combat Strength 2045 did not originate from global Naval Strategy: instead, three different studies were simply combined into a single force structure assessment, and the resulting force requirements represent a range based on the end product of each study.
As noted in research RAND Corporation for Defense Planning 2019, "Different assumptions and types of recommendations can lead to very different outcomes in this process." In other words, our assumptions largely determine the results. Combat commanders develop contingency plans to deal with specific scenarios in their theater of operations, while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is tasked with global strategic planning through the Joint Headquarters. The study concluded that
“There is a widespread assumption that the plans and programs of the defense planning process should be determined by strategy, but the final size and shape of the force largely depends on the budget. In this area, defense planners do not have a reliable way of assessing or quantifying risk. ”
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Michel Flornoy said in the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2015 that the planning process for the armed forces of the Joint Staff, the process that materializes strategy into the forces we need, is deeply flawed and is much more determined by narrow departmental interests than national interests. She further says that
"The current process runs counter to the kind of competition of ideas and innovation that the [Defense] Department really needs."
When assessing the [required] naval structure begins with data such as the formation and use of forces and assets in specific scenarios, the outcome will always depend on current approaches to their use.
The "Optimized Fleet Response Plan" uses a 5: 1 model, where having five ships means deploying one.
For example, if one wants 100 ships to be deployed around the globe every year (the traditional naval deployment rate), the required force structure would be 500 ships.
However, if you change the force generation model to 4: 1, then only 400 ships are required. In addition, if the force formation model were a forward deployed naval force (FDNF) model, where ships are available two-thirds of the time (3: 2), then only 150 ships would be required. These force generation models are critical assumptions that govern the force structures used in defense planning.
In a foundational article Cruising: Maritime Rivalry in the Anti-Access Era naval college professors Jonathan D. Coverley and Peter Dombrowski, the authors note that "the most likely place for friction between the great powers is the sea." ... Many scientists have written about the balance of power that affects competition on land, especially over the past 20 years, but much less has been written about maritime rivalry and the balance between attack and defense in the oceans. However, the truth remains:
"When offensive gives an advantage, the security dilemma becomes more acute, the arms race intensifies, and the likelihood of war increases."
Naval "platforms" are ideal for providing flexible deterrent capabilities, however Barry R. Posen и Jack Snyder postulate that the US military is offensive, and this can be seen from the public testimony and statements of our military leaders. The defensive component of offensive-defense is often seen as the natural outcome of a powerful offensive. This was also the case in the Naval Strategy of the 1980s, which provided for exclusively offensive plans, and this is what Coverly and Dombrowski call the "cult of the offensive." They argue that even if the Navy had the ability to instantly create a future fleet, the power projection doctrine [by this future fleet] would still dominate thinking. .
In the 1984 Naval Strategy, the deterrent role was complementary to the wartime strategy based on the [military's] situational demand, which resulted in the need for 600 ships. In this strategy, deterrence was a [spin-off] product of the naval force structure, requiring a peacetime presence to perform deterrence functions, shorten response times and provide policymakers with options to respond to naval crises. One third of the ships required to carry out combat missions in each theater of operations will, in theory, always be deployed forward in accordance with this strategy.
However, by 1987, the need for 600 ships was tied solely to the deterrent presence model. Vice Admiral Hank Masteen indicatedthat reducing the requirements for the number of aircraft carriers to 15 units will require discussion of "which [region] do you want to abandon"?
Containment as a strategy
I agree with many of today's military leaders that war is not inevitable, but to conclude that the only way to win in the face of vicious or belligerent nations is not to go to war is naive at best and not based on a strategy in which containment is the first principle.
It would be better to admit that we are not going to conduct a ground campaign against China, so from the point of view of traditional thinking the US cannot “win” the war, however, as in the case of nuclear war, [successful] deterrence should be considered “victorious”. When military leaders use phrases such as “fight and conquer,” they downplay the primary purpose of deterrence and may ultimately shape the [wrong] force structure and force it to be used in the wrong direction.
Containment strategy should not be a by-product of an offensive strategy. According to a study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) 2017, in the decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union:
“The US Navy pursued a containment policy that relied on moderate forward forces that were smaller representatives of the larger force. To avoid the instability caused by regional powers, containment was based on the promise of punishment that would come with subsequent forces. ”
Brian Clark, witnessing on the study in 2017, confirmed that:
"The emergence of great power competition places the burden on us to prevent conflict with these great powers."
Every contingency plan has a containment phase, or what the Navy calls “presence,” what is required of ships day after day. Over the past 20 years, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have dominated the naval force projection requirements, and structural flaws in our patterns of power generation and use... Many ships were deployed - back to back - with a reduction in their presence in routine maintenance, only to in the future face an increase in the duration of these works twice or more from the originally envisaged time, which required the deployment of another ship in place of the one that for maintenance or repair. The Navy tried several times to "reset" this cycle, but they were required to speed up again to meet the emerging demands .
Today, the aggregate daily tasks of commanders in [different] theaters of operations for all theaters will require 150 ships more than now in the fleet. Moreover, while the Navy can provide flexible strike options without the need to consider overflight [over third country territory], the past two decades of war have shown that our naval forces are not adequately sized for current force patterns to provide this long-term capability.
The inherent mobility of a fleet is a deterrent when a fleet is present, but when it is removed it reminds enemies - and allies alike - of the unfixed nature of mobile forces and can mislead the possibility that there is an opportunity for aggression. An example is the recent deployment of the forward-based aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan from Japan to the Middle East... A ship can only be in one place at a time, so political decisions or requests from theater commanders can also deprive you of the deterrent that was present yesterday.
The same does not apply to forward-based ground forces. For the past twenty years, the Army has not reduced the number of troops in Korea or Germany to redeploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, but that is exactly what the Navy has done with its own deployment commitments. Naval forces that would otherwise be present in the Mediterranean, western Pacific and North Atlantic are instead permanently stationed in the Middle East, leaving a huge presence gap that China has exploited.
New Naval Strategy
In the same 2017 CSBA study, cited earlier, provides a compelling model for developing a new Naval Strategy.
This study proposes a revolution in naval strategy and presence organization. This new "containment strategy" will combine the forces and capabilities of the Navy into separate Containment and Maneuverable Forces, each with separate force structures and missions.
The study suggested that the Navy should “focus on maintaining an effective position for non-nuclear deterrence rather than cost-effective (and only expenses, here the meaning is exactly like this - Transl.) presence to meet short-term operational needs. "
Much has been written over the past 70 years about the real success of containment strategies, and many believe that this strategy is worth pursuing. Deterrence cannot be measured in real time, and although it is the cornerstone of our national defense from nuclear conflict to conventional conflict, there is no way to accurately measure its success or failure. It is only by looking back that we can learn that our containment strategy worked - and it clearly worked in a nuclear conflict, but not always in a non-nuclear conflict.
In a containment strategy, the defender's commitment, in this case the United States, must be determined and unwavering. How noticed Robert Jervis, "Perception is the dominant variable in the success or failure of containment."
Bruce Russett has concludedthat deterrence fails "when the attacker decides that the defender's threat is unlikely to be realized." This does not mean that the United States should respond to every provocation, as it often did during the Cold War, but how noticed Michael J. Mazarr, "Successful containment usually involves ... taking action that demonstrates both the ability and the determination to eliminate the threat."
It was this ability and determination that could have prompted Michelle Flornoy statewhat if the US had the opportunity
"To credibly threaten to sink all of China's warships, submarines and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours, Chinese leaders might think twice before, say, launching a blockade or invasion of Taiwan."
The Navy and the Marine Corps, by their internal structure, are uniquely positioned to form both permanent and urgently formed temporary containment forces. In a 2020 article by Eric Garzke and John R. Lindsay stated that
“One of the defining characteristics of naval forces is their special role in the projection of power. Naval forces allow countries to influence policy in more places, more decisively, further from home. "
The article discusses in detail the role of naval power and identifies actions that demonstrate determination and ability to allow adversaries to reach agreement rather than conflict. That is why the US Navy must constantly be present on the high seas around the world. This deterrent presence cannot simply be a by-product of the current design of the Navy's global presence. It must be intentional, persistent and tailored to the specific theater.
В CSBA study lays out a detailed proposal for the composition and location of the containment force, and while I disagree with the entire force structure or locations outlined in the study, the overall concept it proposes is correct and should be seen as the foundation of a new Naval Strategy.
In this scheme, the Deterrence Force consists mainly of forward naval forces with a force generation model of "always have one deployed ship for every two ships in service during the year", which is 2,5 times more than we achieve today in account of purely rotational forces. The structure of forces and assets proposed in the study provides for a combination of both simple forces and assets with low-tech weaponsand ultra-modern forces - with complex, including unmanned ground and underwater vehicles. Carrier strike groups will not be part of the Containment Force.
While the Deterrence Force is the first line of defense to keep its closest competitors from confronting everyone, the Agile Force arrives to wage a protracted war and will be reinforced by the rest of the [at the start of the war] forces based in the continental United States. when they arrive later.
В CSBA study The maneuvering force is deployed on a more traditional rotational model, such as the Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP), and is focused exclusively on carrier strike teams. The study envisages the continuous deployment [as the base of the Maneuverable Force] of two aircraft carrier strike groups, but independently of the current global command plans for [the remaining] forces and assets. Instead, these forces
"Must be prepared for a wider range of possible operating conditions, more potential adversaries, more allies, and a greater likelihood of being caught up in a highly intense, protracted battle."
In the study, the Maneuverable Force is composed of multipurpose task forces that are not tied to a specific region, but can freely move between theaters of war, conduct major exercises, experiment with tactics, and interact with allies.
The Navy should develop a Naval Strategy and related force structure based on the concept of the Deterrence Force and the Maneuverable Force as outlined in the CSBA study, make operational model changes as quickly as possible, and communicate its intentions widely.
A 2017 CSBA study provides a compelling case for adopting this new operating model and realizing vast changes in the future of the Navy. We simply cannot continue to use the same outdated approach to traditional deterrence and expect to be successful in deterring competitors. The study concludes:
“This [current] approach to conventional deterrence is unlikely to work against potential Great Power aggressors of the 2030s, who are likely to seek opportunities to quickly and decisively defeat their adversaries. Efforts to reverse the results of aggression will require a much broader conflict and are likely to have global implications that, in turn, will generate international pressure to achieve a swift settlement. To contain the aggressors in the 2030s, it is necessary to make it clear to the aggressors that their attempts to achieve their goals will be thwarted or that the direct costs of achieving them will be prohibitive. ”
The problem we face today is that there is no time to waste in developing this new strategy and method of work. CSBA research requires significant investments in new platforms and overseas bases, which are both time-consuming and expensive.
Many of the military changes proposed in the study will take decades to implement, and proposals such as the deployment of forces in Vietnam and the Philippines are unlikely [at all] to materialize. However, deployment and formation approaches can be quickly changed, and existing infrastructure and basing agreements can be quickly used to achieve the objectives of the strategy.
With regard to the rapid establishment of the Containment Force, I have a slightly different vision than the CSBA study for the proposed locations for these forces. I believe we should take advantage of the locations where we currently conduct regular operations and have existing infrastructure. These forces could be located in a wide arc surrounding China, from Djibouti to Diego Garcia, Singapore, Guam and Japan, which [would be] very similar to the "Akhromeev map."
According to the Americans, this is the same map, redrawn and provided with English-language explanations. Source: John Lehman's Oceans ventured
This [deployment] will include the deployment of the First Fleet in Singapore, as proposed by former Secretary of the Navy, Kenneth Braithwaite.
We must work with allies in the region on more coordinated operations, and expand and strengthen our treaties with island states such as the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, which have expressed their willingness to work closely with the United States to reject Chinese influence.
In the Mediterranean and European theaters of operations, Deterrence Forces are to be based in Souda Bay, Spain and Norway to counter Russian malign actions in the region, with additional forces stationed in Alaska. It will also be a deterrent force ready to respond in the Arctic.
For the Maneuverable Forces, a slightly different approach is possible today than the one discussed in the CSBA study. Maneuvering these maneuverable forces using the Continental US Forward Deployment Naval Forces Model  will allow one carrier strike group to be deployed on each of [our] coasts, while the remaining carriers will operate on a rotational model (such as the aforementioned “Optimized Fleet Response Plan”) until it is their turn to move to the Forward Deployment model. In addition, the Japan-based forward deployment [force] operator  will remain with its current [force rotation] cycle. The two aircraft carriers on the coasts would then split the globe and act as a maneuverable force in a regional model dedicated to theater commanders.
Finally, I believe that by leveraging existing platforms, we can achieve most of the deterrent effect of this strategy in the next five years. We must increase purchases of destroyers to four per year (two per shipyard per year), rapidly build up and expand the frigate [building] program to a second production site, modify existing platforms such as the MK VI patrol boat, deploy NSM anti-ship missiles on littoral combat ships ", as well as to rebuild commercial ships in floating missile arsenals with vertical launchers.
In addition, while the Marine Corps is fully developing its concept of operations from Forward Expeditionary Bases They can begin testing this concept using the LCS littoral warships and the EPF fast expedition transports.
My guess is that this deterrent effect can be obtained with just a 5% increase in the current budget of the Navy ($ 10 billion) per year. As John Lehman wrote when discussing the development of the 1984 Naval Strategy, 90% of the restraining power of this force build-up could have been achieved in the first year. This was done by publicly announcing and explaining the strategy, especially its naval dimension, and adopting measures that left no doubt to friends and enemies that it would be implemented.
The United States plays a unique role in history.
Seth Cropsey and Brian McGrath wrote in 2017: "The paradox of the American experience is that the United States is not just a great power, it is an exceptional power, whose ideals are as important as strength." ... It is this exceptional strength and responsibility that requires exceptional thinking on the part of the political and military leaders of our country.
This global Naval strategy may work, but the Navy will have to overcome significant obstacles to change at the Joint Headquarters, Combat Commands, Services, and the National Security Council and Congress. However, you can't argue with a good plan. All we need is a plan and a few champions on Capitol Hill.
This article is of interest primarily in that it reflects the strategic ideas of the use of the US Navy in the future.
At the same time, no assessment of these ideas can negate the fact that the Americans have no other ideas. There is no strategy of wars and non-wars of the future that has been formalized. For good or not, what the CSBA experts, the representative (deputies of the House of Representatives of the Congress are called in the United States) Luria and a number of other figures write, ultimately boils down to repeating the success of the Cold War - to win without joining large-scale hostilities. And to do this by creating forces that were originally intended specifically for containment, and not for war.
An example is the article by Admiral James Stavridis, "Competition between great powers requires theater containment"... There Stavridis, however, writes that the United States still has a clear concept of the use of the fleet, referring to the concept paper of the Navy "Advantage at Sea", but whoever has read it knows that this is just a set of slogans. For the rest, the experienced and honored American admiral, among other things, the former commander of the allied forces of NATO, does not offer anything, he simply says that a new concept is needed to contain local aggressive actions in the theater of operations.
Well, CSBA proposed it, and E. Luria is actively promoting it.
The translator will not give any assessments of this concept - now is not the time to give hints to our potential adversary.
It is interesting, however, that the Americans are still trying to put the horse in front of the cart again and start not with the budget and available resources, but with national goals, which should determine the strategy, which, in turn, should determine what the fleet should become. ... All the activities of E. Luria are aimed precisely at this.
Luria also personifies the phenomenon of the militarization of the American establishment - the number of people who served and fought in American politics is now simply enormous, whoever you take will become a veteran. The same Luria in her district competed for a seat in Congress with the former "SEAL". This fact must be taken into account - in the face of the Americans, we will almost without exception deal with former military personnel and veterans of military operations, which will definitely affect the foreign policy decisions made in the United States, and, most importantly, in the levels of risk acceptable to the American elites.
The article is written as a conceptual one, therefore it is full of links to other, also conceptual materials. Links to them lead to the English originals, knowledge of the language is required.
In some cases, due to lack of time, it was necessary to use machine translation followed by "manual polishing", this was a necessary measure, and, perhaps, it will be noticeable in the text. However, as usual, the translator will gratefully accept the comments on the translation.
Notes to the text
 - Actually, a long known fact - the US Navy is now in what some observers call an identity crisis. Simply put - they do not understand how they will need to act in the world of the future. They have no clear doctrine.
 - Luria uses the word Naval - naval, instead of the traditional word Maritime - Marine. Perhaps this is due to her desire to emphasize the bias of the strategic approaches of the Navy in the 80s into purely military issues, in fact, the doctrine of warfare at sea in the United States in the 80s was called "Maritime strategy".
 - The expression "right the ship" was used, the full semantic analogue of which is absent in Russian, but in this context the meaning is approximately the following.
 - Budget warrior, "budget warrior" - is a military leader whose role is almost completely reduced to knocking the budget out of Congress.
 - These include, for example, all regional commands, such as NORTHCOM and the like, some other command structures, positions in the Pentagon, etc.
 - Joint headquarters, Joint staff - inter-service military planning body, subordinate to the Chairman of the OKNSh (not to be confused with the KNSH itself, these are different structures). Its task is to work out those plans and proposals that the Chairman of the JCS can propose to the President or Congress. It is not an organ of military command. Reference to US legislation regarding (eng.).
 - Loose confederation, another commonly used American expression for a loose structure without a single purpose or internal adhesion.
 - The concept of the 80s, according to which the Navy had to attack enemy territory directly, using first deck Aviation, and after the appearance of the Tomahawk cruise missiles - cruise missiles and aviation. Until now, both domestic and American experts argue about whether it would be successful or not. This concept was first tested in the Pacific Ocean in 1982, during the famous Kamchatka Pearl Harbor, the NorPac FleetEx Ops'82 exercise. Then the Americans brilliantly hit Kamchatka. Then, in subsequent years, things were often more complicated. Most likely, the United States would have succeeded in such actions, but not always.
 - Reagan's "600 ships" fleet building program.
 - An interesting expression "war of the nation". This is a commonly used phrase. For Americans, war is not the defense of their country and the defense of their home, but always “out there,” and it is these often aggressive wars that they consider to be the business of the whole nation. The phrase very well reflects the fact that for Americans it is normal and moral any war, including aggressive and unprovoked. An unnecessary reminder of the complete incapacity of Americans to negotiate, moreover, just the nation, and not just the government.
 - National Defense Strategy (NDS), link (eng.)
 - In fact, the 80s Naval Strategy covered slightly more regions than three, although there were three main regions. And this example shows very well the importance of owning the initiative, because the "Naval Strategy" was an important factor in the demoralization of the leadership of the USSR. A moderate strategy would not be.
 - What is most interesting is that the Americans almost succeeded, however, immediately after the end of the Cold War, this fleet had to be cut - it was not only pointless, but also impossible to support it. Part of the hypertrophied shipbuilding in the Reagan era has been linked to Lehman's corruption. Allegedly, he personally earned about $ 180 million from all this. It must be admitted that for some people the Cold War was a profitable event, especially such a part of it as the arms race.
 - Here Luria "hits the target", proposing first to create a model of tasks and threats, and then, starting from it, to come up with measures to neutralize them. This approach should be the basis for any military planning. So far, this is not the case with the Americans, and, I must say, not only with them.
 - Even after the end of the Cold War, the number of incidents between the Russian Navy and the US Navy, potentially fraught with human casualties and even military actions, is much higher than the number of those in the sky and on the ground. And this is only what can be called out loud.
 - A characteristic feature of the current moment is that we roughly know how the enemy will act. It would be an absolute plus if Russia did at least something to use this fact.
 - "Imperial overvoltage" in its purest form. They do not have enough strength to be in all the places in which they want to be, and this leads to knocking out the resource of ships. The latter has already led to very serious repairs. They already had officers who had been submarine commanders for several years, but had never gone to sea in this capacity. We had a similar story with knocking out the BOD resource during anti-piracy campaigns in the Gulf of Aden. True, the Americans at least can build their ships, unlike us.
 - The meaning of the whole undertaking is as follows. In dangerous regions, forces are located that work, in fact, as a human shield or, as the Americans themselves say, as a "stretch" (like an anti-personnel mine, in English tripwire). They cannot defeat a potential aggressor, but they can slow down his operations, inflict some losses, but not defeat. And in order to precisely destroy, forces from the United States themselves will be involved. First of all, the very same aircraft carrier groups, ready for battle and a campaign in accordance with all wartime norms, withdrawn from attack on American territory. And then all the rest.
 - Command of US forces in Japan.
 - About this in the translator's article "Step into the Unknown, or the Future of American Marines", in Russian.
 - It is possible to correlate this phrase with the MILLIONS of civilians killed after 2001 in different countries who became either direct victims of the Americans, that is, they were directly killed by them, or died due to circumstances created by the Americans. Or with tens of millions killed and killed by the fault of the United States after the Second World War. And nevertheless, the typical US citizen sees himself and his country just so idealistically, even utopian. In general, one more evidence that Americans do not see the difference between good and evil. America is good even when it finances terrorists in Syria, and those who oppose good America are, accordingly, evil, even when they are fighting terrorists. As John Tyrman, one of the few honest people in America, wrote:
“People tend to turn away from disasters very quickly, such as a war that went wrong. They turn away because it causes them moral discomfort, and also because the carnage challenges their deeply rooted self-image that their country is a force for good in the world.».