What kind of nuclear forces does Russia need?
History more than once she taught that the most developed countries, for their own benefit, from time to time resort to force to redistribute the world. Today, certain circles in China and Japan are raving to reject “lost territories” from Russia and the CIS, and in the US there are people who dream of dismembering the Russian Federation and reducing its expanses to the size of the Moscow principality in order to ensure free access to the use of the resources of the Russian Federation. How not to recall here about one candidate for the presidency of the United States, who in 2011 year, advocated the elimination of the Russian Federation for the sake of the American nation achieving the necessary living space for it.
Can Russia rely on its general purpose forces (non-nuclear forces) to defend its territory and interests? Let's make a small comparison. In NATO, the regular forces of the ground forces of infantry, motorized infantry, mechanized and tank there are four to five times more brigades, and in China - three times more than in the Russian Federation. On the balance of forces aviation, fleethigh precision weapons in our country and in total in the countries of the West and the East it is not necessary to speak. So, the guarantee of the inviolability of our territory, the independence and security of our country is nuclear weapons.
IN THE CIRCLE FIRST
The implementation of nuclear war plans is ensured by the maintenance of nuclear warheads (5000) in the US armed forces, and in France, Great Britain and China, nuclear warheads on 200 – 300 YaBZs in each country. To the south of the Russian Federation, in Asia, there are all the other nuclear countries of the world, carrying out a qualitative and quantitative build-up of nuclear weapons (first close, then medium and then long range) - Israel, India, North Korea, Pakistan. With the completion of the creation of a Shiite nuclear bomb in Iran around the Russian Federation, the arc from the nuclear countries will close.
Paradoxically, with the reduction of nuclear weapons to the lowest levels, the likelihood of their use will increase due to a decrease in the total level of damage caused to them.
The meaning of nuclear deterrence with deterrence currently consists of two positions. To show the potential adversary its strength, ability and ability to inflict deliberately unacceptable damage. To persuade the likely adversary in his will and determination to use nuclear weapons on him if necessary: first demonstratively in the form of limited or selective strikes, and then massively in the form of counter-forces ("disarming" and "decapitating") and counter-values ("crushing retaliation" in cities a) strategic nuclear strikes.
Depending on the scope of the actions of the likely adversary, the defending side may cause him minimal, proportional, or maximum unacceptable damage. But there is still damage not only for the belligerent countries, but also for all of humanity. Since 1945, 10 countries exploded using more than 2400 nuclear explosive devices with a total capacity of over 510 megatons (Mt) and more than 100 thous. YABZs (excluding reused after upgrading) with a total capacity of more than 50 ths. Mt.
Since the beginning of the 80-ies of the last century, scientists have been investigating the influence of nuclear war with simultaneous massive undermining of nuclear weapons on the flora and fauna of the planet and clarifying the maximum permissible total power of nuclear weapons simultaneously used by the parties, after which nuclear nuclear winter will come. The military-political leadership of a number of countries was forced to take into account the evidence of scientists, and the leading countries began a drastic reduction in their stockpiles of weapons and a revision of the parameters of unacceptable damage and the required number and power of YBZ in their ammunition.
At the end of the Cold War, there were experts who believed that the 1 thousand delivered to the YABZ targets would be enough for a superpower subjected to a nuclear attack to partially recover and reach the level of a third world country through 30 years after the war. Here it will be useful to mention that the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were subjected to the atomic bombing, after 30 – 35 years, healed their wounds and increased their population. It is interesting to change the position of some analysts on the issue of sufficiency of nuclear weapons for the two main powers of the world. In the 90s in the United States, it was proposed that, given the strategic strategic nullities of nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia could agree, on a contractual basis, that Russia, given its proximity to the nuclear states of Asia, had more than the United States, non-strategic YABZ.
In the new century, the pendulum swung from one extreme to the other: why not have an equal number of SARs in the USA and the Russian Federation (for example, in 3000 SARS in each country), but with an advantage in the USA in strategic SARS (in the USA 2000, 1000) and with an advantage for the Russian Federation in non-strategic YABZ (for the Russian Federation 2000, for the USA 1000). If in the 50 – 60 of the last century in the United States they dreamed of 160 thou. YaBZs, then in the 2011 year there began to consider the possibility of reducing the number of YABZs (without specifying their purpose) in stages to 1000 – 1100, 700 – 800, 300 – 400. As far as we know, the Russian leadership has previously proposed a ceiling in strategic nuclear weapons in 1000 – 1500 YABZ. Now the ceiling of the “strategic operatively deployed” (SOR) YABZ does not exceed the numbers in 2100 units both in the US and with us. These nuclear weapons facilities are located in strategic nuclear forces (SNF): a) on ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in silo launchers (SPU) and on mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK), and earlier they were on ICBM combat railway missile systems (BZHRK); b) on nuclear missile submarines (SSBN) with intercontinental missiles (SLBMs); c) on long-range aviation air bases for heavy bombers (TB) with their cruise missiles (ALCM) and air bombs (AB). This triad ("triad") of land, sea and air forces in strategic nuclear forces in the foreseeable future may become a pair or four of strategic horses.
I do not consider such indicators as reliability, range, accuracy, reaction speed, speed of destruction, ability to overcome the air defense / missile defense system and others. We are talking about the sufficiency of nuclear weapons, taking into account the survivability of nuclear weapons. The sufficiency of a nuclear weapons facility is a vague concept, changing depending on the time, degree of threat, opportunities and intentions of a country. For example, in the US military in 1967, there were 31 ths. YABZs, and now there are about 5 ths. Sufficiency implies redundancy YABZ, because with a sudden attacker’s attack and a retaliatory strike by the defender, the attacked country will be destroyed or neutralized, and this country it will have to rely only on the surviving, smaller part of its nuclear ammunition, primarily on the guaranteed nuclear reserve. With the presence of strategic operational deployed 160 (SOR) YABZ, the UK continuously holds one invulnerable SSBN at sea with 40 – 48 YABZ with a capacity of about 4 – 5 Mt, that is, its guaranteed nuclear reserve is 25 – 30% YABZ. In France, with its ammunition in 280 SOR YABZ, 80 – 86 YABZ with a capacity of about 8 – 9 Mt (29 – 31%) is in the sea on invulnerable SSBNs. The United States, in the presence of 2100 SOR JABZ, holds at least six invulnerable SSBNs with 600 YABZ simultaneously with a capacity of at least 60 Mt in the oceans, that is, they have 29 – 30% of all COP YABZs in the guaranteed nuclear reserve.
In the old days, the British aimed at 58, the French at 60, and the Americans at 200 – 250 cities of the Soviet Union. As recently as the end of the last century's 70, the American president boasted that one American SSBN with the Poseidon SLBM could destroy all major and medium cities of the USSR. It is difficult to find reliable information in the Russian media about our current indicators of sufficiency and guaranteed nuclear reserve (if it exists). If we look at the past, then the official 1998 data of the year are very disappointing: out of 6 thou. YABZs of our strategic nuclear forces (SNF) would guaranteedly have reached the USA only 600 (total 10%).
Do we now have a guaranteed nuclear reserve, similar to that of the US, French and British Navy? Judge for yourself. In 2001 – 2008, with almost the same number of SSBNs in the USA and the RF, American SSBNs performed more patrols than the Russian ones in 13 times. Patrol our boats from continuous turned into episodic. Our submarines, standing at the piers and converted, in effect, into rocket barges with a nuclear reactor, cannot participate in the enemy’s sudden nuclear strike, because by the beginning of the retaliatory strike they will already be destroyed. According to information from 2011, the combat sustainability of our SSBNs is reduced to zero already on the second day after leaving the bases. This means that with a sudden nuclear strike, the enemy will immediately sink them with conventional weapons (one US Navy minister back in 1985, said that our SSBNs would be attacked “in the first five minutes after the start of the war”).
Let me remind you: back in 1987, the USA believed that 20 – 60 hours after the start of a search operation in the Atlantic and Arctic oceans, 95% of Soviet SSBNs in combat service would be located in the Sea of Okhotsk, and in 90-ies The Russian Federation believed that about 30% of our strategic nuclear forces could have been destroyed in the war using only conventional weapons by the enemy (obviously, our SSBNs were part of these 30%). As recently as last decade, one of the American journals addressed the issue of destroying the SSBNs of the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet in bases using Tomahawk sea-based cruise missiles in conventional equipment. It was reported about the ability of any of the Sivulf type submarines with 45 ammunition of such missiles to launch four Tomahawks for each of the SSBNs of the SFNB at the 11 piers. On land, in the event of a sudden nuclear strike by the enemy, only accidentally surviving ICBMs in the silo tank will remain for our retaliation (93 – 95% ICBMs in the silo silo) and not detected by the intelligence of the enemy PGRK and TB outside their permanent bases, that is, hardly more than 5 – 10% of forces and facilities of the Strategic Missile Forces and Long-Range Aviation. Consequently, now we do not have a permanent and definite composition of carriers and equipment equipped to defeat the objects of the aggressor, even with a predetermined damage, under no circumstances.
If bastions are created for our SSBNs, in other words, areas that will be reliably covered by balanced air, surface and submarine forces of our Navy and become insurmountable for the antisubmarine forces (FPS) of the enemy, then we will have a sea-guaranteed nuclear reserve.
GUARANTEED NUCLEAR RESERVE
How to get closer to the level of a guaranteed nuclear reserve on land? The most important is the method of placing the ICBM. In the United States, they are already thinking about a new (mobile) method of basing new ICBMs, the PRC has long been developing a network of “cave” (tunnel underground and rock) shelters, and in Asian countries they are taking steps to deploy solid-fuel BR on railway missile complexes.
The Russian Federation has eliminated its BZHRK with heavy liquid ICBMs, and now it is exploring the possibility of restoring BZhRK, but with lighter solid-fuel ICBMs. Why should not the Russian Federation recreate a light solid-fuel small-sized monoblock ICBM on an autonomous mobile launcher (recall the 15-ton ICBM Courier). A smaller part of such missiles in camouflaged transportable, towed or self-propelled transport-launch containers would always be in motion along unpaved roads and railways. The largest part of the missiles would be “on vacation” from movements in closed premises located in populated areas (recall how the Americans were tormented by the discovery of mobile Iraqi ballistic missiles hidden in cities). The rest of the missiles would be contained in protected shelters of the "cave" type. The creation of lightweight, in motion, missiles, as well as the expected US transition from placing ICBMs in silos (with technical readiness for launching 0,5 – 2 minutes) to deploying ICBMs on mobile launchers (in technical readiness for launching 15 – 20 minutes), contributed to would reduce the risk of an accidental start of a nuclear war, since the finger would no longer be on the trigger.
It is also necessary to remember about global-range hypersonic planning missiles, which have the ability to broadly maneuver in the direction of flight and round off dangerous for air defense / missile defense areas.
In determining the level of sufficiency, the task of a reasonable distribution of nuclear weapons between types and types of carriers and delivery vehicles, depending on the degree of their vulnerability to a single nuclear warhead, is important. One enemy YABZ can destroy or neutralize for a long time: in one silo one ICBM (1, 3, 6 or 10 YABZ), in one area of the PGRK division distribution - three ICBM (3 or 9 YABZ), in one base garrison of the PGM regiment - nine ICBMs (9 or 27 YABZ), at one aerodrome of long-range aviation - up to 30 TB (180 YABZ), in one submarine-based location - up to four SSBNs (256 or more YABZ). We should not forget about the usual (non-nuclear precision) weapons. For example, one conventional ammunition of a corresponding capacity can destroy or neutralize for a long time one SSBN (64 or more YABZ), one or more ICBM PGRK (1, 3 or more YABZ), one or more TB (6 or more YABZ). Obviously, in the interests of the survivability of our strategic nuclear forces, it is more profitable for us to have as little YABZ as possible on the carrier or delivery system and to keep as many carriers and means of delivery as possible outside the bases of permanent deployment.
Loading the world's heaviest sea missile (launch weight 90 t) P-39U into the mine of the Typhoon strategic missile cruiser. The cost of nuclear weapons is derived both from their necessary sufficiency and forced redundancy, and from obvious wastefulness while maintaining and renewing them. In 2011, in the Russian Federation, there were six types of liquid and solid-fuel ICBMs (PC-20, PC-18, PC-12M, PC-12М2, PC-24 and the Avangard ICBM), five types of liquid and solid propellant submarines (PCM-50) , PCM-54, PCM-54М, PCM-56 and the Liner SLBM created), four types of SSBNs (667BDR, 667BDRM, 941, 955 projects). Compare with prudent and thrifty Americans, putting above all the cost-effectiveness. In the US, there is only one type of solid propellant MBR (“Minuteman-3”), one type of solid propellant SLBM (“Trident-2”), one type of SSBN (“Ohio”). In the United States, Britain, France and the PRC, they abandoned the creation of an intercontinental BR for liquid fuel, while in the Russian Federation work continues on the creation of both solid-fuel and liquid ICBMs and SLBMs. Nuclear weapons are too expensive to change missiles and YaBZ every 10 – 15 years. In the United States TB-52H is already 50 years (just serve 70 years), ICBM "Minuteman-3» - 40 years (50 - 60) SLBM "Trident-2» - 20 years (40-50) SSBNs type " Ohio ”- 30 years (more than 45 years), YABZ W76 for SLBMs - more than 30 years (a total of 60 years will serve). If our figures for similar types of nuclear weapons are inferior to American in 1,5 – 2 times, then we need to adopt best practices, not repeat the mistakes of our past.
The age of the “heavy” triad with large SSBNs, heavy ICBMs and heavy bombers gives way to the Century of the “lightweight” triads with small and medium SSBNs, light and medium ICBMs and medium bombers. In the development of nuclear weapons carriers and YABZ delivery vehicles in the world, there is a desire to reduce the size and mass of carriers (SSBNs and bombers) and to reduce the number of YABZs on nuclear weapons carriers and YABZ delivery vehicles.
Back in 1992, the Americans put forward a proposal to build small submersibles with a displacement of 5 or 8 thousand tons with four or eight large silos with the ability to accommodate the same number of long-range SLBMs or three to four times more ballistic or short-range cruise missiles. Within the framework of this idea, since 2012 in the USA, the possibility is being studied of equipping a multi-purpose Virginia-type PLA with intermediate-range ballistic missiles in non-nuclear equipment, using the new silos for SLBMs created for the new SSBN. The British by 2029 intend to have a third-generation SSBN of a smaller size and with eight silo tanks for existing and new types of SLBMs. The Chinese, intending to create a SSBN with 16 or 20 silo for SLBMs, build a SSBN with 12 silo. Americans with 2021 will begin construction of third-generation SSBNs, which will not have 24 silos, but only 16 or 20. It seems that there is an understanding that the age of gigantomania of nuclear combat units has come to an end due to a decrease in countries' nuclear weapons and the inevitable increase in the vulnerability of such ships in the future. And in the Russian Federation, judging by media reports, the number of silos on new SSBNs is increased from 12 to 16 and even to 20. But after all, our new SSBNs should become not water cruisers with an underwater displacement of tens of thousands of tons, but low-noise submarines with a maximum displacement of up to 10 thousand tons and a maximum with 10 light rockets. The relatively small dimensions of such SSBNs would facilitate their placement both in rock shelters and in ports and inlets of distribution.
The desire to have instead of a heavy bomber is observed in the United States. Long-range aviation of the Russian Federation needs only an average bomber (SB), capable of acting not on targets that are inaccessible to it in the United States, but on objects in the Eurasian zone (that is, to perform the function of the previously destroyed Pioneer hostel).
Miniaturization will obviously affect the ICBM. Towards the end of the Cold War, the Americans and we approached the flight design tests of mobile single-piece ICBMs weighing about 15 t ("Midgetman" and "Courier", respectively). Given the technological superiority of the United States, there is no doubt that if the nuclear triad continues to exist, they will more quickly return us to the use of the reserves in mobile small-sized single-piece ICBMs. Interesting, by the way, and other circumstances. The Americans reduced the number of YABZs on each of the Minuteman-3 ICBMs from three to one, the Russian Federation is moving to the placement of new ICBMs in the silos, not with one YABZ, but with three. It is obvious that the Americans are increasing the survivability of their nuclear ammunition in the ground component, and we are reducing, even if we do not take into account the almost double supremacy of the United States in the number of ICBMs in the silo silos.
In the last 20 – 25 years in the US, French and British Navy, there is a tendency to reduce the YBZ ammunition on each SSBN and reduce the average number of YABZ on one SLBM from six or eight to four or five (when installed on a rocket from one to six or eight YABZ ). In the Russian Navy there is a different picture. Judging by media reports, instead of four YBZs on the RSM-54 SLBMs, the Sineva rocket will have 10, and the Liner rocket’s 12 YABZs as much as possible (obviously, to the detriment of the YABZ’s power, the range of the SLBM’s flight or the combat unit dilution system). It is hardly reasonable to have at least three to five percent or more of the nuclear weapons of a country on every Russian submarine-based submarine-sensitive missile system that is vulnerable to USL. In the Russian Federation, the tendency to have on each SSBN (vulnerable to US PLS actions and immune from CSD actions) is about 100 or more YABZs, and in China - an intention to have on each SSBN (vulnerable to US PLS actions) while 12 YABZ. Wise and prudent Chinese, who value the survivability of each YABZ for retaliation against a sudden, have already installed 40 for years on each rocket (BRSD, ICBM or SLBM) for only one YABZ.
The creation and maintenance of nuclear weapons in the United States spent 8,7 trillion. dollars (in 2010 prices of the year). How much is spent in the USSR and the Russian Federation, we are unlikely to know. In 2011, it was reported that only the purchase of 80 – 100 new American bombers would cost the country 50 billion dollars. In the same year, the United States believed that the creation and maintenance of the third generation 50 SSBNs (design, construction, weapons, operation, repair, modernization, utilization, maintenance of infrastructure) will cost 12 billion. Taking into account the costs of about 347% of this amount for the actual construction, it turns out that the average construction cost of each American SSBN will be an example about 20-6 billion. USD. And in the Russian Federation in the year 7 contractor monopoly requested for the construction of a new SSBN 2011 billion. rub.
The promises of eight of our new SSBNs for 2020 have existed for several years now. In addition, the question arises, why eight, when you need at least 10, and speaking business-like, 12 new SSBNs? In the UK, where its four first-generation SSBNs were patrolling at the dawn of their activities, consisting of three SSBNs 7% of the time, two SSGNs 73% and one SSBNs 20% of the whole time, considered that five SSBs of the second generation would need to have simultaneous continuous and uniform for the whole service life of patrols of two SSBNs (40%). If our SF and the Pacific Fleet each have a squadron with four new SSBNs, then at separate intervals each fleet may only have one SSBN on patrol, which is dangerous due to the possibility of unforeseen circumstances with this SSBN. If there are five SSBNs in each fleet, then two will be on patrol, and in the worst case, one SSBN from the fleet.
In 2008, the Americans, having 14 SSBNs, conducted continuous patrols with six SSBNs (43%). In the year 2011, when calculating the third generation of its SSBNs in the US Navy, it was concluded that 12 needed new SSBNs to ensure continuous patrols for all their service life at the same five SSBNs (i.e., 42%). In other words, if you want to have four SSBNs constantly and continuously on patrol in two “bastions”, then you need to have a fleet of 10 SSBNs; wish five - requires 12; dreaming of six - think about the 14 SSBN. Building only eight new type of SSBNs means that in the Arctic and the Pacific Oceans we will have on a continuous patrol (in each ocean) less than one SSBN and most of the time two SSBNs.
NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
In addition to the SNF, there are non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNS) equipped with the means of delivery and carriers of nuclear weapons with a range of no more than 5500 km. Strange as it may seem, but in the RF Military Doctrine of 2010, there is no mention of NSNS or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), although the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces in 2011 said that “non-strategic nuclear weapons of Russia are intended solely for deterrence purposes , prevention and adequate de-escalation of large-scale aggression against itself ”. It is known that the NSNW remains in the United States and the Russian Federation only for the Air Force and Navy. It is troublesome to keep NSNWS on airplanes or on NSNS ships, so it is stored in warehouses. In some cases, the distinction between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons is very conditional: the same nuclear bomb can be carried by an aircraft from both the SNF and NSNS. The erosion of the border between SNF and NSNS led to the disappearance of NSNS in Great Britain, with a sharp reduction in the United States and in France. Most likely, it can be expected that with time, instead of the SNF and NSNS, there will simply be nuclear forces. Until then, we will need “non-strategic” YABZs, carriers and means of delivery.
The difference between a retaliatory strike and a retaliatory strike against an enemy’s sudden strike is that we lose almost all of our nuclear potential before the retaliatory strike, and we can use more than half of it in the retaliatory strike. If our military-political leadership fails to make a decision on a retaliatory counter attack for 10 – 12 minutes before the explosion of the first enemy missiles in our territory, then the right to give an order to our retaliatory strike must be delegated in advance information and authority to the appropriate military duty officer.
Let's sum up. From the taxpayer's point of view, it is necessary to take into account the possible reduction of nuclear SNF ammunition to 2020 YABZ after 1000 and not to spend funds on those new strategic nuclear weapons that may have to be abandoned under the next treaty with the United States on strategic offensive arms. It is necessary to take measures for a reasonable extension of the service life of part of the existing strategic nuclear weapons in order to begin replacing them with new ones in 2025 – 2035 years simultaneously with the start of the expected rearmament of the US, British, French and Chinese Strategic Nuclear Forces.
From the point of view of the man in the street, it is necessary to create a real-life guaranteed nuclear reserve and do this by separating YABZ and BR on the maximum possible number of constantly moving platforms (on the PGRK, BZhRK and, if reliable bastions are created, on small SSBNs). It would be sensible to focus on reducing the redundancy of nuclear weapons by increasing their survivability, for example, on creating light single-charge ICBMs on mobile launchers of various types.
One seventh of the earth’s surface, occupied by our country, provides enough space for organizing the continuous movement of part of such ICBMs and placing the other part of such ICBMs in secure shelters. This will make it possible to create on their basis the forces of a truly guaranteed nuclear reserve. In this case, the SNF is unlikely to need to have a total ammunition number of more than 1000 YABZ and a total capacity of up to 150 MT. A guaranteed nuclear reserve with its share of at least 25% of the total nuclear weapon of the SNF will have the potential for us to inflict on the aggressor in a retaliatory strike on its sudden unacceptable damage to it.
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