Multi-Domain Forces - A New Level of Integration of the Armed Forces
American initiative
Modern automated control systems (ACS) make it possible to organize the interaction of combat units and various levels of command in the armed forces (AF) at an unprecedented level, allowing them to act as a single organism. In particular, the United States is developing the concept of multidomain operation - the simultaneous waging of war in different physical environments (domains): on the surface, on water (under water), in the air, in space and in cyberspace.
In fact, this is an extended version of network-centric warfare, which involves the deepest integration of combat units among themselves, which are part of the air force (air force), naval forces (navy), ground forces and other elements of the US armed forces.
The "multi-domain" battlefield is a development of the concept of network-centric warfare
This does not mean that the US Armed Forces will abandon the Air Force or the Navy as structural units, but it means that their interaction within the framework of a single combat operation will be much deeper than now. As part of a multi-domain combat operation, weapons launched by one type of troops, for example, from a ship or a submarine, receive target designation from a combat unit of another type of troops in an automated mode. Combat planning and command and control are also carried out taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of all domain elements.
For example, when they talk about the interaction of the RF Air Force and the naval fleet (Navy) of the Russian Federation, it is believed that the Air Force and the IMF will not be able to organize interaction at the proper level - the Air Force will give priority to its tasks, the Navy - to its own. Therefore, for example, it is believed that the Russian Navy needs its own aviation, and we are not talking about specialized vehicles, for example, anti-submarine defense (ASW), but about strike vehicles - naval missile-carrying aviation (MRA), the tasks of which can be effectively solved by the Air Force missile-carrying bombers (provided they are integrated with the appropriate weapons).
Long-range missile-carrying bombers, previously part of the MRA of the Navy, were transferred to the Russian Air Force, it is believed that in order to ensure effective operations of the Russian fleet, it must have its own MRA. Photo: Airwar.ru
In the framework of multi-domain operations, such a situation will most likely not be possible. For example, the US Navy does not have its own MPA, but due to the strengthening of the fleet of a potential enemy (we are talking about China), the application of massive strikes with LRASM anti-ship missiles with the help of B-1B bombers from the Air Force is being actively worked out. There is no doubt that the newest B-21 Raider... That is, the US Navy is not considering the possibility that the US Air Force will ignore their requests to destroy targets. At the same time, the US Navy does not plan to acquire its own MRA based on long-range / strategic bombers, and aircraft from aircraft carriers cannot be called an equivalent replacement.
The US Air Force B-1B bomber can deliver 24 LRASM anti-ship missiles in internal compartments (32 - including anti-ship missiles placed on external sling) at a range of about 5500 kilometers, while the US Navy F / A-18E fighter carries 4 LRASM anti-ship missiles at a range of about 700 kilometers
The war zone within the framework of a multi-domain confrontation is divided into combat zones and support zones.
Combat zones:
- close area up to 200 kilometers (Close Area), in which ground, surface and air combat units are in direct physical contact with the enemy on the line of contact;
- a zone of deep maneuvering from 200 to 500 kilometers (Deep Maneuver Area), in which, in addition to ground, surface and air combat units, actions from the space and cybernetic domains are added;
- the zone of application of weapons from 500 kilometers and further (Deep Fires Area) to the operational and strategic depth of the enemy's defense.
Support Zones:
- a tactical support area from 500 to 1500 kilometers (Tactical Support Area), which provides operations in the Close Area, Deep Maneuver Area, Deep Fires Area. In this zone, lower-level command structures and reserves are concentrated;
- the operational support area from 1500 to 5000 kilometers (Operational Support Area), in which the middle-level command structures and auxiliary strike systems of the land, sea and air domains are located. In this zone, the integration of the actions of the US Armed Forces with the armed forces of the allies is carried out;
- the strategic support area from 5000 kilometers onward (Strategic Support Area), providing strategic interaction and control - in fact, the high command in the United States.
War zones in the framework of multi-domain confrontation
There are several key differences in multi-domain confrontation:
- horizontal control links providing direct interaction between combat units of different types and arms of the Armed Forces;
- the use of advanced communication systems, including satellite, with multiple redundancy and wide high-speed data transmission channels (the pinnacle of the development of the concept of network-centric control);
- the use of control systems with elements of artificial intelligence, providing automation of decision-making.
Deep domain integration will dispel the "fog of war" due to the synergistic effect of receiving and processing information from various sensors and sensors of all participants in multi-domain interaction.
According to Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of the United States Pacific Command,
"The US Army must be able to sink ships, neutralize satellites, shoot down missiles and deny the enemy the ability to command and control their forces."
From this phrase, the main thing is "Deprive the enemy of the ability to command and control their forces", and the main means for accomplishing this task is "Neutralize satellites", since only the space segment can provide the armed forces with reliable high-speed communications on a global scale.
Russian response
In the 16th issue of the publication “Aerospace Forces. Theory and Practice "of December 2020, a proposal was published by specialists from the Air Force Academy named after Professor N. Ye. Zhukovsky and Y. A. Gagarin (Voronezh) on organizing countering the American concept of multi-domain operations, the main component of which is inflicted by the enemy integrated massive air strike (IMA), which is a coordinated massive impact on the most important critical objects of the opposing side, carried out at the initial stage of the multi-sphere operation of the US Armed Forces (NATO).
Integrated massive air strike structure
As part of the countermeasures strategy, it is assumed that the Russian Federation is capable of moving from a policy of containing a potential adversary to nuclear weapons to the policy of intimidation of inflicting unacceptable complex destruction on it with all types of weapons as part of preventive actions in the context of the threat of a local war looming over the Russian Federation.
In these conditions, the question arises, does the Russian Federation currently have a sufficient number of forces and means to carry out a preemptive strike: not only by the forces of the United States and NATO, but also by individual countries such as Turkey and Japan?
According to the author, to solve this problem, a separate branch of the armed forces should be formed - the Strategic Conventional Forces (SCS).
The task of the Strategic Conventional Forces is to inflict damage on the enemy with non-nuclear weapons, which significantly reduces his organizational, industrial and military capabilities from a distance, minimizing or eliminating the likelihood of a direct combat clash with the enemy's armed forces. In more detail, the prerequisites for the creation, the tasks being solved and the armament of the SCS were considered in the articles: Strategic conventional weapon. Damage и Strategic conventional forces: carriers and weapons.
The second question is how a preemptive strike can be delivered in conditions of the enemy's superiority in intelligence and communications, the superiority of the United States and NATO in which can hardly be denied. It can be assumed that the beginning of a preemptive strike will be revealed by the enemy's reconnaissance, as a result, only those means to which the enemy physically will not have time to react with a maneuver - hypersonic and ballistic (quasi-ballistic) missiles, will be effective.
The US Armed Forces have significantly greater intelligence capabilities than the RF Armed Forces, not to mention the capacity of satellite data transmission channels.
There is no need to rely on the fact that it will be possible to disable the US satellite constellation. This is a very non-trivial task. This issue was previously covered in a series of articles: Capella Space's All-Seeing Eye: Harbinger of the Satellite Intelligence Revolution, Достучаться до небес, Orbital Cleaners... In the case of deploying thousands or even tens of thousands of reconnaissance, control and communication satellites in the near future, the complexity of solving this problem will increase many times over.
Promising intelligence, command and communications satellites based on commercial technologies can be launched into orbit by the thousands, it will not be possible to destroy them all even with the help of nuclear weapons.
From the materials of the article:
“Counteraction to a“ multi-sphere operation ”at the initial stage is possible by conducting an air operation and disrupting an integrated massed air strike by inflicting unacceptable damage to the enemy through the complex use of elements of the reconnaissance and strike system of a grouping of troops (forces) in a theater of operations. Failure of an integrated massive air strike will lead to failure to achieve the goals of the "multi-sphere operation" at the initial stage and to a guaranteed refusal of the NATO military-political leadership from its further implementation. The complex use of elements of the reconnaissance and strike system in the theater of operations in the implementation of the disruption of the IMS of the "multi-sphere operation" will allow obtaining a number of advantages: - promptly depriving the enemy of the ability to make timely decisions on the conduct of the operation, including the possibility of false perception of the current situation.
It is practically impossible to carry out simultaneous deep engagement of critically important objects that ensure the conduct of IMS, located in the first and second echelons of the defending enemy, only by means of engaging combined arms formations and units, since it is necessary to allocate a large number of forces for their delivery, which, unfortunately , lacks. Therefore, an increase in the capabilities of fire destruction of the enemy in operations (combat operations) is possible, both by using heterogeneous forces and means of destruction: artillery systems, MLRS, tactical and operational-tactical missiles, aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, and by creating a system for their reconnaissance information support. At the same time, an increase in the effectiveness of destruction of critical enemy targets is expected through the use of a rational composition of diverse forces and means of reconnaissance and fire destruction by an optimal combination of methods for their complex destruction in real time. "
It is practically impossible to carry out simultaneous deep engagement of critically important objects that ensure the conduct of IMS, located in the first and second echelons of the defending enemy, only by means of engaging combined arms formations and units, since it is necessary to allocate a large number of forces for their delivery, which, unfortunately , lacks. Therefore, an increase in the capabilities of fire destruction of the enemy in operations (combat operations) is possible, both by using heterogeneous forces and means of destruction: artillery systems, MLRS, tactical and operational-tactical missiles, aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles, and by creating a system for their reconnaissance information support. At the same time, an increase in the effectiveness of destruction of critical enemy targets is expected through the use of a rational composition of diverse forces and means of reconnaissance and fire destruction by an optimal combination of methods for their complex destruction in real time. "
In fact, it is proposed to create a similar multi-domain system, but with reduced capabilities - there is no information on the interaction of the Air Force and Lands with the Navy, on the use of cyber weapons, which should be applied at the very beginning of the conflict.
In this regard, questions arise - does Russia have sufficient information support in the form of a space echelon of reconnaissance, control and communications equipment capable of ensuring effective interaction of diverse forces and assets within a single group? Are the protocols for exchanging data between the Air Force, Ground Forces, Navy, and other branches of the armed forces unified?
And most importantly, are the types and branches of the RF Armed Forces capable of acting as part of a joint grouping as a whole, when ships attack ground and air targets, aviation strikes at enemy ships, ground forces strike enemy airfields? Moreover, this interaction should be carried out up to the tactical level. Is the top leadership of the RF Armed Forces capable of ensuring the control of such a heterogeneous grouping without bias in the direction of one of the branches of the armed forces, depending on who the commander was earlier - a pilot, a "landline" or a sailor?
Why is the creation of multi-domain forces so important?
The answer to this question is given by the OODA cycle (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) or in Russian OODA (observation, orientation, decision, action) - a concept developed for the US Army by former Air Force pilot John Boyd in 1995, also known as “ Boyd's loop ". Observation is the acquisition, collection, study, reflection of the data of the situation. Orientation is the analysis and assessment of situational data. Decision - making a decision on an operation, planning it and assigning missions to the troops. Action - direct leadership and, in fact, the actions of troops in the performance of their combat missions.
There are two main ways to achieve competitive advantages: the first way is to make your cycles of actions faster in quantitative terms, this will force your adversary to react to your actions, the second way is to improve the quality of the decisions made, that is, to make decisions that are more consistent with the current situation, than your opponent's decisions.
The OODA / OODA cycle
As part of a multi-domain strategy, additional horizontal information and control links are formed, which, on the one hand, increase the speed of interaction, and on the other hand, the parties increase the reliability of intelligence information, which ensures the adoption of the right decisions.
Thus, in a collision of opponents with weapons of approximately equal characteristics, the advantage will be given to the one who will better coordinate the actions of his forces at all levels, receive and process intelligence information faster, make decisions - that is, gain an advantage in each OODA / OODA cycle, as provides multi-domain operations.
As a result, an adversary with fewer weapons can gain an advantage over an adversary with more weapons through more efficient control of the conduct of hostilities. Something similar in stories already happened - the German armed forces were often inferior to the enemy in quantity, but due to better control and concentration of forces, they relatively easily defeated the armies of their opponents and were close enough to crushing the USSR.
Unified reconnaissance and strike system
Back in 2008, the author considered the issue of creating a unified reconnaissance and strike system of the combat area, within the framework of which a qualitatively new level of interaction between the branches and arms of the armed forces was to be implemented. The starting point for creating the concept was the understanding that at the beginning of the new millennium, multidimensional offensive actions, primarily in information and airspace, will become the most effective.
Of great importance are horizontal information and control communications at all levels of command and control, automated exchange of intelligence information and the adoption of a significant number of tactical decisions at lower levels of command to minimize the time interval between the detection and destruction of identified targets.
In multi-domain operations, horizontal communications are of particular importance, allowing combat units of different types and types of troops to interact with each other, bypassing the higher command
A unified reconnaissance and strike system of a combat area should include three hierarchical levels of control:
- the combat control center (CDC) is a ground-based mobile or underground command post located at a considerable distance from the zone of active hostilities and is the center of concentration of intelligence information and making strategic and operational decisions on the conduct of hostilities (analogous to the American Strategic Support Area);
- the control center of the zone of responsibility (TsUZO), depending on the situation, is located on a mobile ground carrier, a ship or an RUS aircraft and is designed to organize hostilities in a given zone of responsibility, including the organization of direct target designation of attached weapon systems based on available intelligence information (analogous to American Operational Support Area, Deep Fires Area, Deep Maneuver Area and Tactical Support Area);
- the control center of the battlefield (TsUPB) is a ground, air or surface / submarine combat unit operating directly on the battlefield and carrying out reconnaissance, target distribution and direct target designation in the specified sector (analogous to the American Close Area).
As part of the construction of a unified reconnaissance and strike system of the area of hostilities, it was assumed that the exercises were abandoned by forces of individual services and arms of the troops in favor of integrated exercises conducted by the united group of armed forces.
Solving the problem of creating multi-domain forces will require not only the intensive development of the space segment of reconnaissance, command and control and communications in the interests of the RF Armed Forces, as well as the unification of all combat units of the Air Force, Navy and Ground Force according to data exchange protocols, but also structural changes in terms of command and control of the armed forces and their training. ...
In the wonderful book "Starship Troopers" by the American writer Robert Heinlein (you should not associate it with the film of the same name), in the framework of ground-space operations, the interaction of the space fleet and the landing forces was carried out. At the same time, only an officer who had served in the landing force and in the starfleet could become the commander in charge of the battle.
Why is this remark?
In addition, as part of the construction of multi-domain forces, it is necessary to consider the option that the command posts of the supra-service directorate of the RF Armed Forces should be occupied only by those who have been trained (and possibly served) in all three branches of the armed forces.
It is necessary to remind once again that the concept of multi-domain operations is not a rejection of the types and branches of the armed forces, but allows them to act as a whole, complementing the advantages and compensating for the disadvantages of each other.
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