On the way to Tsushima: our fleet without aircraft carriers
Recently, on the pages of "Military Review" a heated discussion has developed on the topic of the Navy and especially aircraft carriers. Although a discussion is it? For this word predetermines both a worthy level of discussions and disputes, and their culture ... Alas, but the phrase "Burn with a verb" will be more accurate and appropriate:
A. Timokhin very often appeals to the combat value of aircraft carriers, constantly trying to sum up the need for their construction within the framework of tasks that have no real justification. Avoiding serious questions concerning the real state of affairs in Russian politics, he charms the gullible public ...
The supporters of the aircraft carrier lobby, unfortunately, still do not understand ... They continue to use this class of warships as a subject of technological fetish, adjusting it to their own inappropriate fantasies. One of the striking examples of this are many articles of Timokhin, who regularly tries to promote the interests of fleet (or, perhaps, persons interested in increasing its funding) in accordance with their fantastic scenarios ...
Why try to argue with populism and unscientific fiction? Let's try to mature at the root - in the very expediency of the connection between the military necessity of an aircraft carrier and our political capabilities and ambitions!
The supporters of the aircraft carrier lobby, unfortunately, still do not understand ... They continue to use this class of warships as a subject of technological fetish, adjusting it to their own inappropriate fantasies. One of the striking examples of this are many articles of Timokhin, who regularly tries to promote the interests of fleet (or, perhaps, persons interested in increasing its funding) in accordance with their fantastic scenarios ...
Why try to argue with populism and unscientific fiction? Let's try to mature at the root - in the very expediency of the connection between the military necessity of an aircraft carrier and our political capabilities and ambitions!
Well, what can I say to that?
It is written with a "twinkle" (Mr. Voskresensky), but there is simply no reasoning for this point of view (as will be shown below). There is only misunderstanding, just lies and crafty manipulation of facts.
Let me emphasize that the effectiveness of an aircraft carrier cannot be a subject of discussion (in the sense of this word). "Argumentation" (in quotation marks) of the level "our stones (anti-ship missiles) will kill all their aircraft carriers in half an hour" - direct evidence of the complete amateurism of those who claim this. Only his appearance (and air groups) and models for solving problems can be the subject of dispute.
In connection with the repeated accusations of the aircraft carrier's supporters of "sofa argumentation", I will say about myself: I have, among other things, the experience of military command and control bodies (anti-aircraft division and strike force groupings), including the development of new tactics (and for interspecific groups of anti-aircraft forces). Despite the fact that "by education and upbringing" the author is an anti-submarine and a submariner, aviation the questions were carefully studied and monitored. The author's views and works are reflected in a number of articles. For example:
The ability to fight at sea is a necessity for Russia!
About the naval Su-34.
Long-range anti-ship missiles on submarines are good, but even better (and many times) they are on airplanes. Incl. because submarines do not fly from navy to navy by air, but we, alas, have 4 separate theaters ...
It is worth noting the very first article by the author (2007) on the problems of naval aviation:
Aviation of the Navy. Was. There is? Will be?
Note that the article was written during the period of service, it was read by his superiors. And, despite the harsh criticism of the realities of the Navy, there was no pressure on the author (however, all this was in the 2000s, and already at the turn of the 2010s, the situation in the Ministry of Defense changed a lot, and in a bad way).
Speaking about the "aircraft carrier discussions", it should be specially noted that The so-called “aircraft carrier lobby” in our country, in fact, is not simply not, in fact, opposing real combat-ready aircraft carriers as part of the Russian Navy. The point is that “lobbying” implies the presence of a personal “interest” (usually financial), in the interests of certain financial and industrial groups and individuals. And they in our conditions from the combat-ready operational formations (with an aircraft carrier) of the Navy "one concern": in this case, they will be asked for the result and the funds spent, moreover, with combat-ready ships (and not slipways and long-term repairs).
There are still more than enough opportunities for "tasty use of budget funds", and without any real responsibility for the real combat effectiveness of the manufactured military products. And first of all it concerns our submarine. Examples, moreover, documented, the author cited a lot in the articles.
What interests our "aircraft carrier lobby"? Beautiful different models, research projects without any responsibility and a real, practically usable result.
In short, a "process" with no result. And the longer, the better. The number of "pictures and models" of various aircraft carriers that have appeared "for the delight of the public eye" over the past ten years exceeds all foreign aircraft carrier PR combined. Russia has become the leading aircraft carrier power (in terms of the number of new projectors and their models). Especially funny (or rather sad) are projections and models, which obviously cannot be built. And not only for financial reasons, but also simply because of the lack of a slipway of the appropriate size and bearing capacity (for example, project 23000).
At the same time, the only aircraft carrier in the Navy was in a chronically "half-choked" and absolutely incapacitated state. And this was quite suitable for the command of the Navy. After the successful implementation of the project with the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier for the Indian Navy, there was every opportunity to bring the Kuznetsov back to normal relatively quickly and for reasonable funds. And the money was then ...
Instead of repairing the "Kuznetsov" in the early 2010s, the fleet enthusiastically got involved in a scam with the "Admiral Nakhimov".
According to the situation for today I will give just one quote about the PD-50 floating dock (let everyone draw conclusions from it):
At 22:30, the dock crew, located in various areas of the dock, felt a shock in the dock hull, after which the power supply to the equipment and lighting was cut off. The emergency lighting was automatically turned on and the emergency diesel generator was started. The dock lurched to starboard.
It is also worth noting here the discussion, administratively “strangled” at the turn of 2010, on the appearance and options for the development of aircraft carrier topics in the professional community (with harsh “gagging” even for participants with “big stars”).
In a real public discussion on aircraft carrier topics, in fact, there are three groups: lobbyists (to whom the aircraft carrier itself has "one concern", but if they are always happy to "master budgets" on this topic, they are always happy), supporters (who understand the significance, need and capabilities of an aircraft carrier ) and opponents. Moreover, for the latter, there is an irrational-ideological, so-called, "argumentation" that boils down to "three nots": "not necessary", "we cannot (technically and organizationally)", "we cannot financially."
Irrationality in the direction of such a "curve of logic" applies precisely and only to the aircraft carrier. When ignoring the indicated "three no" (factors: tasks, capabilities and effectiveness) for any other combat assets (and even more so - to compare them according to the criterion "effectiveness-cost"):
Indeed, I have never concealed that I am opposed to the theoretical construction of these dull and expensive troughs.
"Logic" just "shines" (in quotes)! But the "ideological signboard" is already ready ...
And "no need" is also "already ready" - Far Ocean Black Hole.
For 30 years of Russia's existence, there was one operation off the "distant shores", which, it should be admitted, the Russian fleet failed. This, of course, is about supplying the group in Syria.
Excuse me, but what is more, the period of "Serdyukov reforming" was taken away from the fleet and has long been referred to as "here" the fleet ?! For what is at stake (auxiliary fleet), the Department of Transport Support (ATO) of the RF Ministry of Defense - Logistics of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (which, among other things, took away from the fleet and the General Staff building in Moscow)? That is, this is a real logistical failure in Syria (including the knocked-out resource of our VTA) - this is not Chirkov's or Korolev's fault, but Mr. Bulgakov's.
I. Orlov's meeting with A. Yaroshevich, head of the Russian Defense Ministry's anti-terrorist operation (photo: press service of the Governor of the Arkhangelsk Region) and General of the Army Bulgakov.And the fault of the same Mr. Chirkov is only that, when in 2012 there was a real possibility of restoring and building a normal structure of the Navy's command (and revising a number of erroneous decisions), which was promoted by Admiral Suchkov, Adviser to the Minister of Defense, he did not show strong-willed qualities to go "Across Bulgakov".
We continue:
More than once, communicating with the crews of bombers in Buturlinovka (there were enough reports from there), my colleague Krivov and I asked this provocative question. Why not ask? The pilots perceived with a fair amount of humor and said only that if the MiG-29K was hung with everything that the Duckling was carrying on itself, the wings of the MiGar would break off and the landing gear would bend. Because 2–2,5 tons versus 8 is ridiculous.
Yes, it's funny. In the sense: such "arguments" (in quotes). For earlier, our opponents said that "democracy in Russia will be saved" by the Tu-160, with the bomb load of which, in turn, the "duck" will "break off the wings and the landing gear will buckle."
Only bad luck, the overwhelming majority of sorties in Syria were carried out with a bomb load of less than 2 tons (with its high-precision application).
Typical "Syrian" combat load of the Su-34.At the same time, the combat load of the MiG-29KUB can exceed 5 tons, and this is a real value (checked by a foreign customer on the Vikramaditya), with the provision of takeoff from a springboard.
More than 5 tons on external hangers MiG-29KUBWhat will happen to the pilots "with a good dose of humor from Buturlinovka" when they try to somehow provide assistance to the Kaliningrad enclave (in the conditions and opposition of the Polish F-16C with AIM-120C with AWACS) without an aircraft carrier, look clearly:
Allegedly "not necessary"
However, even this is not the main thing, but the fact that if the "Sultan" struck, then our Su24M / 34 / 30SM in Khmeimim would immediately become "burning bonfires" (under the blows of long-range rocket artillery), after which the significance for the Syrian and Russian troops would have a combat load of air-to-air aircraft.
Moreover, at the initial moment of the Syrian operation, everything really hung on "one airfield" (located in the affected area of long-range jet artillery from the territory of Turkey). It is better for our public not to know what at that moment were the "alternate airfields" (for it would take a lot of validol).
And here again one cannot but recall Mr. Voskresensky with his "Naval dramas: on politics, war and expediency".
The initial burden of hostilities fell on our strike aircraft, stationed at the Iranian Hamadan airfield, where the Tu-22M3 and Su-34 were based. Where, dear readers, do you see a place for an aircraft carrier in these events? Does A. Timokhin deliberately distort the facts and mislead?
Good question, huh? Especially considering that in fact there is no any long-term basing of our aviation on Hamadan did not have, and the first strikes from this air base were delivered only in August 2016. Despite the fact that the operation in Syria has been going on for ten months! Accordingly, the question is: Is A. Voskresensky himself deliberately ("Fleet dramas: about politics, war and expediency") distorts the facts and misleads (here already without quotation marks)?
By the way, the statements of Mr. Voskresensky about the alleged "inability" of the serial production of aerofinishers is also a banal and rather stupid lie. For their serial (!) Production is carried out, both by order of India (including for a new aircraft carrier), and for the repair of our "Kuznetsov".
Actually, what he wrote in "questions to the supporters of the aircraft carrier" (for example, in paragraph 3, about the alleged "Avoidance of the R&D problem"), speaks only of his complete incompetence in this topic. In one of the upcoming articles, the author will return to these issues, especially with regard to the actual topic of differences between works on ROC and serial GOST.
Is Voskresensky ready to confirm his statement about allegedly "7 years of training specialists for the operation of nuclear power plants?" Or, in his opinion, have the terms of training in the engineering schools of the Navy changed from the actual 5 years? The example seems to be "small", but it shows the level of "argumentation" (in quotes) of the opponents.
Returning to Syria, I will emphasize that the situation at the beginning of the operation was extremely acute (a very nervous reaction in the Ministry of Defense was caused by the photographs of our aircraft in Khmeimim, handed over by the author to officials, taken from the bushes near the airfield by foreign journalists). Even without Turkey, with the timely reaction of the owners of the "bearded pets" (Nebenz) at the initial moment of the operation, the very possibility of basing and using aircraft from Khmeimim could literally be under attack.
And it was at this moment that V.V. Putin's phrase sounded:
Where is our aircraft carrier ?!
Next specialist quote The OPK directly involved in the subsequent "emergency action":
Last fall, the Dark One told the admirals to deploy aircraft from Kuznetsov across Syria this fall. He was told that it would not work - no accuracy. He asked: are not admirals shaking their shoulder straps? So that everything will be in the fall.
Well, the admirals found an office that finished 2 links for them by the required date, they flew to an aircraft carrier and arrived at the shores of Syria. Now they fly from Khmeimim, and sometimes from Kuznetsov.
Well, the admirals found an office that finished 2 links for them by the required date, they flew to an aircraft carrier and arrived at the shores of Syria. Now they fly from Khmeimim, and sometimes from Kuznetsov.
And the phrase of Mr. Voskresensky:
It cannot be called anything more than a direct insult to the intellectual abilities of the officers of our General Staff.
What's this? "Argument" (in quotes) or is it still a very dubious bogey?
Actually, it will be possible to lead to this once again here is this example:
No. 312/4/4421 of 15.05.2019, the handling of information on the state of the submarine forces of the Navy and the Northern Fleet received by the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, by the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has been reviewed. This situation is not true.
I. Dylevsky, Deputy Head of the General Staff School.
I. Dylevsky, Deputy Head of the General Staff School.
To put it mildly, this answer from the General Staff is not true.
And, by the way, the fact that until very recently at the Pacific Fleet we did not have a single modern minesweeper (and even an anti-mine NPA) - this is what it was “news"For the corresponding" officers of the General Staff "? And there are many such examples. So there are serious questions about the "officers of the General Staff". And, all the more, it is not a worthy method of dispute to openly avoid real issues behind the “fig leaf” of officials and statements.
Allegedly "we can not"
R. Skomorokhov's opinion:
I will also tell you, in theory, what will happen if it comes down to hitting opponents in the face for Tanzanian uranium, for example. Your carrier group, consisting of separately taken troughs of forty years ago, will be blown to bloody shreds by a five times larger American group. Exactly five times, these heroes do not know how otherwise. Therefore, against your aircraft carrier there will be 4–5 American ones, against several covering ships there will be about 20 destroyers and other pleasures. And any attempt by Russia to mew out something in the zone of US interests will end in bloody snot and payments to the victims. Simply because Russia today does not have a fleet capable of operating on distant frontiers, and even more so in the zone of US interests. And it won't. We have lagged behind the States forever.
The question involuntarily arises - maybe then “it's time to go to the shroud and crawl to the cemetery”? However, we will not be in a hurry with this. Moreover, the reality is somewhat different.
First. Yes, Timokhin's "African example" is extremely unfortunate. And there really is no need for us to get the Armed Forces into various adventures of new "obrazovskoy gangs".
Only now there is another format of the conflict, which we are simply obliged to enter, and acting quickly and toughly - ensuring the rescue of civilians in actions such as the "landing in Mogadishu" in 1978. The status is binding. And this is not something "virtual", but a very specific pillar of the state (and not abstract, but with very specific political and economic consequences). The Power must be able to effectively respond to such challenges.
As for the thesis of Mr. Voskresensky:
All modern powers with corresponding foreign policy ambitions strive to implement their military presence in other countries with the most compact units and mercenaries.
Then the best answer to these crafty words would be the example of Somalia in 1993, the massacre of the Hutu and Tutsis, northeastern Syria (where the United States was forced to transfer large army units, and their PMCs and special forces there survived only thanks to their support and aviation). As for the "size of participation", the optimization for the "minimum costs" occurred for purely "economic reasons" - the financing of the corresponding PMCs by corporations. Only in the absence of real strength against any serious opponent, such an economy ends up very badly.
Second. When the United States “appears on the horizon,” we have not only nuclear weapon and effective tactics of conventional actions to contain a multiply superior enemy (an illustrative example of 1973 in the Mediterranean).
The third. We need, first of all, a "coastal defense aircraft carrier", but with the possibility of using it in the ocean and distant sea zone as part of an expeditionary force against a "weak enemy".
A. Voskresensky writes:
A. Timokhin deliberately misleads the readers of Voenniy Obozreniye, trying to set the Navy with such tasks as a hypothetical prevention of a nuclear strike ... Our strategic nuclear forces are provided, and by no means hypothetical aircraft carriers. The Russian nuclear arsenal has full numerical parity with the American one, but has more advanced types of delivery vehicles. There is no real guarantee that the first disarming strike can work. By the way, now we don't have them (and even if we start building them tomorrow, there won't be at least 15–20 years) - why are American nuclear warheads still not falling on our heads?
Such words speak of the complete dilettantism of those who state this. For, just in order to ensure the combat stability of our ground group of strategic nuclear forces, there is a complex system: from the early warning system, the "black suitcase" and "Perimeter", and ending with strategic submarines on duty. At the same time, the fact that the mine launchers and mobile ground launchers themselves are vulnerable to a "disarming" nuclear strike was not only not denied by experts, but this was directly stated many times!
And in this situation, the role of NSNF is very important. And, accordingly, the possibility of providing them with general-purpose forces and an aircraft carrier (as a factor ensuring combat stability).
As for the thesis "they did not strike at us," the enemy did not set such a task at that time, simply because of the corresponding military-political conditions. However, they change. Moreover, the delivery of such a blow is practiced by the "so-called partners."
A. Voskresensky's statement:
In the highest military and political circles of the United States, there is no consensus even about whether it is worth developing a nuclear arsenal and whether it is worth abandoning it altogether.
This speaks of a complete misunderstanding of both the issues of nuclear strategy and military policy. Moreover, not only the United States, but all the leading countries of the world (the latest example is the recent "nuclear guarantees" of the United States to Japan, the subject of which is worthy of a separate article).
As for A. Voskresensky's article "The Rotten US Nuclear Shield" and his assessments of the new US nuclear warheads, this is purely his private opinion, with which the author does not agree on a number of fundamental points, however, from a public analysis of this issue in an open publication on will refrain from the public resource. I will only note that with pleasure, having trampled on the old "Minutemans", he "preferred not to notice" the relatively modern "Tridents" SSBNs (technologies for which are preserved).
And here is the opinion of R. Skomorokhov:
Epic trip "Kuznetsov" to Syria. Having made all of Europe laugh and outraged environmentalists, the ship was dragged to the shores of this country, so what? And nothing. Having lost two planes out of the blue, having made a number of "combat" sorties with a half combat load (and in terms of fuel too), so that there was no risk, the "aircraft carrier" safely crawled to the base. This is called "imitation of ebullient activity" and "demonstration of the flag."
"Kuznetsov" was poisoned to Syria by order of the Supreme. As part of a virtually large-scale verification of the maximum range of weapons of the RF Armed Forces. And extremely serious problems with real combat effectiveness were revealed in very many samples of our weapons. Yes, the "TV" preferred not to talk about these problems, but many of them were known among specialists and experts, and this topic was discussed, including on specialized public resources.
And all that happened, of course, shows that there was a point in sending the ship. Precisely "look and check". And draw conclusions. Moreover, at the level of the Supreme, the task of forming an effective operational unit (at least one) has been set. But in terms of its actual implementation, the situation does not even seem to be window dressing and deception, but simply direct sabotage (of course, “under plausible pretexts”).
Briefly on the AWACS factor and carrier-based fighters
R. Skomorokhov:
We, unlike potential adversaries, do not have such a necessary component as a deck-based AWACS aircraft. And even in the future it is not planned, since we cannot figure out the A-100 yet. And without such an aircraft, the aviation group will be doomed to protect itself in the air above the aircraft carrier. Civilized countries have AWACS aircraft. Which are equipped with the appropriate equipment and crew members working on it. In our country, out of poverty, the pilot of a one-seat fighter will deal with this. Well, I congratulate you on solving the problem, Alexander. How these fools of AWACS build or buy all over the world, I do not understand. It turns out that all you need to do is send one naval fighter into flight, and it will become the eyes of a whole strike group.
First. Today there are good reasons to question the existing concept of the AWACS aircraft (at least for the weaker side). The effectiveness and combat stability of "classic" AWACS aircraft in the past was largely determined by the low efficiency of air-to-air missiles with radar seeker (especially in conditions of powerful interference).
Second. The A-100 problems are the A-100 problems, and there were no technical problems to receive in a short time (for example, on the basis of the Tu-214 in storage) there were no "tactical" AWACS aircraft - only "organizational" ones.
The third. Taking into account the new conditions, the question arises of a new appearance of the AWACS aircraft, with the provision of a significantly higher speed and maneuverability. And we had such a platform - a very promising Su-33UB aircraft.
Let me stress that according to the situation at the beginning of the 2010s. Su-33UB was absolutely real ... Today? I will not quote the heavy words of the Chief Designer K. Kh. Marbashev, spoken not so long ago ...
As for the thesis about the "outdated MiG", for example, A. Voskresensky:
Avoiding issues of timing and cost of developing advanced weapons. Even in the case of the most optimistic scenario, it can be assumed that our first aircraft carrier will be laid down sometime in 2030 (taking into account the completion of all current defense programs). Its construction will take at least 7-10 years. By that time, the MiG-29K will become an exhibit for aviation museums, and what else, even the Su-57 will not be considered a new machine (after some 15–20 years!).
It should be noted that it is precisely the opponents who avoid the "questions of the cost and timing of the development of advanced weapons", replacing this with a meaningless stream of letters. Yes, if we talk about an aircraft carrier in the 2030s, it will be a new aircraft. Which will still be done (including taking into account the obsolescence of the Su-57).
But now there is a plane for the aircraft carrier - the MiG-29KUB. Yes, not perfect. However, those who criticize it forget that its development (this word would be more correct, as opposed to revision) in the late 2000s - early 2010s. she just went for scanty money for work of such complexity. And against this background, the result turned out to be more than worthy. Moreover, the modernization potential of the MiG is far from exhausted (like other aircraft of the 4+ generation, an example of which is the recent order of the US Air Force for new F-15s).
Even the problem of "F-35B as an adversary" has effective solutions for the MiG (if the problem is solved with an integrated system, of which the MiG is an element).
Allegedly "we cannot financially"
But with the thesis “we cannot financially”, the opponents somehow immediately “made a mistake”.
It is worth starting with the plans for the current GPV:
As they say, "facts on the face."
Yes, the numbers were then corrected (including due to a large-scale disruption in the construction of new ships). However, the fact is that at the turn of the 2010s, there were both the means and the possibilities for a full-fledged repair of the Kuznetsov or the construction of a new aircraft carrier (taking into account the experience of the Vikra).
Today everything is "much more interesting." R. Skomorokhov writes:
I perfectly understand that what has been said today, no one will check it in a month, and in a year they will not remember it. Therefore, you can write whatever comes to mind. His Majesty His Opinion rules the ball. I am ready to argue for anything, neither in 10, nor in 15 years, Russia will not have any aircraft carriers. And not because they are simply not needed by anyone other than couch strategists. Not because we don't have technology. Not because we have nowhere to build them and there is no one especially. Because no one will allocate these huge sums. There is none of them.
The amounts have already been allocated. Moreover, the "boxes" are already being built. I'm talking about the Kerch UDC (the displacement of which has already taken off beyond the completely aircraft carrier 40000 tons). Here you can add the attempts of certain individuals and groups to "dig up a stewardess" with a VTOL aircraft.
Only now, all this is, in fact, an “aircraft carrier lobby” just in the sense said at the beginning of the article: the topic is to open, the means to “master”, and nothing comes out.
The scale of the UDC's tasks requires two tough conditions: reliable air support (and we have a “little housekeeper Kuzya” with this) and a powerful floating rear (with which we have an “ambassador” called ATT under the leadership of the genius General Bulgakov). But there is a theme. And funding is underway (of course, the sums there are not at all miserable, publicly announced 100 billion rubles, but much, much more).
ABOUT TARKR "Nakhimov" and "Lazarev"
R. Skomorokhov wrote (Which is more useful, "Admiral Nakhimov" or ten "Buyans"?):
In general, I hope that instead of the "Admiral Lazarev", with whom we said goodbye, our fleet will receive more useful and, most importantly, new ships. Although the huge sums that will be spent on putting in order "Admiral Nakhimov", too, frankly, it is a pity. It would be better if ten Buyans were built. Delight is delight, but protection is still protection. There is a difference, as it were.
And if it is really possible and necessary to agree with the dubious expediency of modernizing Nakhimov as a “battle missile cruiser”, then “what is the right way to spend money on” is not.
"Buyan-M" is a very low-seaworthy (primarily in terms of the use of weapons) and low-speed platform. And its feasibility for the Navy was in doubt from the beginning. Another thing is "Karakurt" ...
But…
Remember how you changed a Chinese diesel engine that "suddenly" went out of order at one of the "Karakurt"? I had to cut the side to remove the engine.
Given that the facts are as follows: Chinese diesel engines (just on the "buoys" ("Buyan-M") on the "Karakurt" there are domestic "stars" (which actually "threw" through specially provided removable sheets in a day).
The following thesis is even difficult to comment on:
Can fight off submarines? Theoretically, yes, but the bulk of the ship does not differ in controllability, and inertia is the same in general, 25 tons is not a little. So a torpedo is the worst thing you can think of for a cruiser, and the best thing that the enemy can use.
Forgive me, but it's not the middle of the twentieth century "outside", now anti-torpedo protection is provided by means of counteraction, not to mention the fact that the project 1144's maneuverability is quite worthy. Note that the horizontal maneuverability of the Project 949A APRK, which is close in displacement, is close to that of the Project 971 multipurpose nuclear submarine.
However, everything changes completely regarding the repair and modernization of the Admiral Nakhimov, if a decision was made to rebuild it into a light aircraft carrier. It would be much simpler, cheaper (current real modernization). And in this case, the aircraft carrier "Nakhimov" would have had time to take part in the Syrian operation.
TARKR "Admiral Nakhimov" and close in displacement light aircraft carrier "Hermes" with "Phantoms" and "Buccaneers", which were tested on it.To the question - what do the opponents of aircraft carriers propose to spend money on?
As for the aircraft carrier, it is already "clear": it is only to blame for the fact that it is an aircraft carrier (despite the fact that there has never been a question of "increasing funding" for it for the Navy - only the redistribution of funds within the usual funding of the Navy, primarily at the expense of submarines). However, let us return to the question - what the opponents propose to spend money on.
Build new boats. Urgently, at Stakhanov's pace. And here again, not everything is smooth. Russia today has one nuclear submarine, thank God, a universal one that can be built. Project 855M Yasen-M submarine missile cruiser. Plus the project 955 strategic submarine Borey.
At the same time, the author, in a series of articles, citing a large number of documents, showed and proved the presence of extremely serious shortcomings in our submarines (with which they are, at best, "of limited combat capability"). However, according to the "opponents" of aircraft carriers, huge funds should not only be spent on them, but at "Stakhanov's pace" (as well as on the stupid "buoys" of Project 21631).
The statement of Mr. Voskresensky that the work on the Vikramaditya allegedly caused the deadlines for three of our 4th generation nuclear submarines to be missed is simply a lie. And the lie is very stupid. For the fact that the aircraft carrier left Sevmash 8 years ago is well known, as well as the massive disruption of the deadlines for the nuclear submarines of the current GPV up to the present time. Apparently, because "someone must be to blame," and "the aircraft carrier is to blame already because it is an aircraft carrier."
R. Skomorokhov's thesis (hence):
We have coastline guard fleets. This is a fact, dear readers. In addition to strategic missile carriers, all other ships are simply not able to move away from the coastline without damage to themselves.
It doesn't stand up to scrutiny. For without support, the submarines indicated by him (including the NSNF) will simply be shot at sea. There were enough facts of this in my articles.
With and without an aircraft carrier - tasks and conditions for their solution by the armed forces
I will repeat what was said in the article again. "The ability to fight at sea is a necessity for Russia!":
An opponent who surpasses us and has the initiative will not bluntly knock his forehead against a solid wall where we are strong, he will strike where we are weak.
The presence of even a light aircraft carrier "coastal defense" provides a qualitative increase in the combat stability of the forces of the fleet, and a sharp increase in the effectiveness of its strike potential (figuratively speaking - "efficiency of missile use"). Let me emphasize that within the framework of the same funding, the difference in efficiency may differ (without and with an aircraft carrier) by an order of magnitude. This question was modeled in detail and qualitatively studied, and described in a number of works (for example, in the works of the GosNII AS and VMA Rear Admiral Matveychuk). However, they are still closed (although today they no longer carry real classified information).
The same aircraft carrier can be the basis of an effective operational formation when operating against a "weak enemy" in the far and oceanic zone.
Figuratively speaking, the question is not in the "hack" with the "United States in a certain Bandustan" - in this situation, the SNF (the factor of nuclear deterrence) rules. The question is “Bandustan instead of the United States,” but in military-political and geographic conditions that are extremely inconvenient for us. A vivid example of this is the Russo-Japanese War. Where England, at that moment our enemy number 1, "technically stepped aside", replacing itself with "weak Japan."
I repeat:
And, by the way, who should we rent the Kaliningrad region to? Germany, EU or Poland? And “if something happens”, only the sea will remain for us, because the “Suvalka corridor” will be tightly “sealed” by an American division, and a non-combatant one (!).
However, R. Skomorokhov already answered:
What can you say based on these numbers? Well, just that the only function that our "modern" Baltic Fleet can perform is to die heroically. Moreover, this does not even require the British and French, who play not the last violins in the NATO forces. Small-town regionals will cope.
In short, again - to the "shroud and to the cemetery." Only now, an open "drain" of the military conflict with Poland for Russia will have extremely bad political (and other) consequences ...
Supplements Mr. Voskresensky:
A. Timokhin does not at all understand the realities of relations within the NATO bloc - for some reason he seriously believes that in the event of a direct military threat, the countries of the alliance will be divided by contradictions.
The topic of relations within NATO (and especially the United States) is worth a series of good articles. However, now it will be sufficient to remind Mr. Voskresensky of the scandalous details of not confirming by the United States of Article 5 of the NATO Charter - just like that. For the way it was subsequently "confirmed" further underscores the critical attitude of the United States towards this "pillar" of NATO. Moreover, this is in no way a "sign of weakness", it is nothing more than "expanding the range of possible options for action."
It is also worth noting here that 70 JASSM-ER missiles (with which Poland can shoot through everything, up to Moscow and St. Petersburg) are, in fact, "the decision of the Washington regional committee." Yes, now Poland has a lot of problems with the armed forces. In fact, they are not ready. But that's a matter of a couple of years. But after that, the problem of how to lead the convoy to the enclave rises before us at full height!
Here it is worth noting the "great idea" "to fill the enclave with tanks" (well, and similar "green toys"). The problem is that the stronger our land grouping is there, the more acute the issue of logistics will be. And the logistics, there is only one - the sea (including for aviation).
Once again, I will repeat this in Japan:
After the amendments to the Constitution, Japan was left with the only option for the development of events in the Kuril Islands - force. Moreover, the main factor in this is not even we, but China, to counter which in Japan there is an extremely acute issue of complete "zeroing" of all military-political restrictions after the Second World War (flesh before obtaining nuclear status). All technical preparatory work for this has been carried out a long time ago. The question is a political decision, or rather, its passing through parliament. And the "little war" (preferably victorious) is very appropriate here.
View R. Skomorokhova:
The Kuril problem “if something happens” is perfectly solved from the ground airfields of Kamchatka and South Sakhalin. 300-400 km from Sakhalin to the southern islands and the same amount from Kamchatka to the northern part. Yes, and there are airfields on the Kuril Islands ...
Deliver reinforcements? Yes, this is the right thing to do. But for this, simply landing ships are more suitable, which both take more and carry on.
Cover? Yes, from the same airfields and the same frigates / corvettes.
Deliver reinforcements? Yes, this is the right thing to do. But for this, simply landing ships are more suitable, which both take more and carry on.
Cover? Yes, from the same airfields and the same frigates / corvettes.
We count the flight time. Let's say the ideal version of the MiG-31BM (Sushki will be completely sour). The problem is that the planes, if they arrive (when the ships are called), are already at the rafts. Inflatable.
Missed Opportunities
I repeat:
The experience of the Indian aircraft carrier contract has shown that we have no technical problems in order to have our aircraft carrier in good working order and combat readiness. Technical ... For there are others. Namely, the fact that an aircraft carrier is, first of all, the highest organization, it is a symphony orchestra, and we are used to it on three thieves chords ...
And in the situation of 2011–2013. we had a full opportunity for the normal repair and modernization of "Kuznetsov" or the construction of a new aircraft carrier. And for quite reasonable money and within the specified funding of the Navy. Yes, at the expense of the submarine. And this is what largely "feeds" the "intensity of the verb" of the opponents of aircraft carriers in our country.
As for the disruptions to our shipbuilding, the reasons for it were not at all technical ... Starting with the former head of the surface shipbuilding department of DOGOZ (in fact, "the project manager of our entire surface shipbuilding", including ROC for component complexes and systems and funding), which at the beginning of 2014 years quickly changed the "blazing place" (leaving behind the "ruins") for the "carefully prepared place" of the boss in one of the PKB, and ending with the actions of the "underwater lobby".
R. Skomorokhov writes:
Why are such terms unoptimistic? Yes, it's just worth seeing how many people are poking around at USC with any ship over 5 tonnes of displacement. And then 000 ...
Three examples against.
First. AICR "Omsk", released in 2008, after a complex emergency repair from the DVZ "Zvezda" a year earlier than the time planned by the fleet - this was done personally by the ex-general director of "Zvezda" Yu.P. Shulgan and the chief builder Smirnov. And for "Zvezda" it was, in general, the first order of the 3rd generation that came out of repair!
Second. The creation of the Karakurt MRK was completed in less time than in the USSR it took the creation of the Project 1234 MRK. And this, too, did not fall from the sky, but was done personally by the chief designer of the project, the general director and owner of the Pella plant.
Third. Chinese Navy with Project 054 frigates. Diesel, not heavily armed, but massive, reliable and efficient enough (isn't this what Timokhin shouted about in his articles?), With which the PLA Navy began the massive exploration of the ocean zone.
Accordingly, all statements of the type:
Opponents stubbornly avoid the question of the duration of all work ... "Magic realism" is turned on - here the FSB forced them to work in an emergency ... We got an incredible backlog from somewhere ... Here are the engineering personnel (by the way, the training of engineers serving ship reactors takes 7 years) ... The reality is that our defense industry has been repairing Admiral Nakhimov since 1999, and on April 6, 2021 it was announced that the commissioning of the TARK was postponed again ...
These are, in fact, “two hundred thousand reasons” that you can find not to do (and “excuse yourself” for it).
Statements like:
Appeal to the example of the restructuring of the Vikramaditya. In this case, we are dealing with a partial restructuring of a Soviet aircraft-carrying cruiser, which disrupted the construction timeframe for three nuclear submarines for our fleet.
This is simply a lie. And taking into account the volume and complexity of the repair work, the cost was really close to the cost of building a new ship.
At the same "Sevmash" at least a deepening of the pool and expansion of the bathoport are required. Remind me how many years we have been tormenting the dry dock for Kuznetsov?
In short, what is happening to the docks for Kuznetsov has too many signs of overt and deliberate sabotage.
Basing issues. This factor is ignored entirely.
No, Mr. Voskresensky. That you have no idea about the subject of the conversation. The Kuznetsov base was found (at least at the plant), and there are no problems with the basing of light aircraft carriers "dimension 1144".
Conclusion
First. Yes, we do not have a combat-ready aircraft carrier. Moreover, "Kuznetsov" not only has never been to him, but efforts are being made by certain persons so that he either simply does not leave the repair, or even after it remains in a virtually incapacitated state. This means not only that in the course of hostilities our fleet will incur heavy unjustified losses, not only that our Onyxes and Zircons will fly into milk. Without an operational connection with an aircraft carrier, it will be impossible to ensure the logistics of the Kaliningrad enclave (and our grouping there), to hold the Kuril Islands. The fact that "so far everything is quiet" (relatively quiet) is only because our "so-called partners" (and the "corresponding regional committee") did not make a decision to transfer the course of events to the "hot stage".
And our weakness here is, in fact, a provoking factor. A military defeat of the country from an admittedly weak adversary (even Japan is formally weaker, not to mention Poland) will become a military-political catastrophe. A catastrophe that certain groups and individuals wish and prepare (and in this regard, a series of “sudden problems” of “Kuznetsov” happens somehow very synchronously with the aggravation of the military-political situation).
Second. The essence and, most importantly, what is needed to create an effective fleet (armed forces and an aircraft carrier). I’ll just give you an example, without “decoding” (because for those who understand, it is already clear, and those who do not want to understand, again “avoid the question of the duration of all works, we have got an incredible start from somewhere”, etc.) ...
On November 25, 2012, at the age of 51, Luo Yang, general designer and general director of Shengyang Aircraft Industry Corporation, died on board the Liaoning aircraft carrier after the successful landing of the Chinese carrier-based fighter J-15 on the aircraft carrier.
The cause of Luo Yang's sudden death was the overstrain of forces from overlapping events: the beginning of tests of the prototype of the Shenyang fifth generation fighter J-31 and the beginning of tests of the J-15 on an aircraft carrier. The late designer took a personal part in each of the projects, delving into all the details, and during the landing of the J-15 on the aircraft carrier "was 20 meters from the point of contact with the deck." He often worked after midnight, not paying attention to his own condition and refusing to visit a doctor. Judging by the article, a large number of problems were revealed on board the Liaoning that required immediate solutions, which caused a strain on the forces of the designer, who urgently arrived aboard the ship by helicopter on August 18, 10 days after it went out to sea and a week before the officially announced first J-15 flight dates.
I highly recommend re-reading V. Kashin's article about this on the resource "Periscope-2".
And we have such people in the defense industry complex. There are admirals who are really tuned in and aim to "plow" so that the fleet and the country find a really effective aircraft carrier (aircraft carriers). There is a task set personally by the President. There is considerable and quite sufficient funding for the Navy (the lion's share of which today goes to dubious submarines, which the enemy will sink and shoot, starting from the exits from the bases). There is (for the time being, because in a number of positions we are today on the verge of losing our scientific and technical groundwork) experience and groundwork in this area.
And there is a strange "mouse fuss" in the direction, let's call a spade a spade - the preparation of the military defeat of the country.
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