25 years of tragedy. Fight at Pervomaisky: betrayal or setup?
We have dates in Russia that the country does not mark. And he doesn't even remember. These are the dates of tragic mistakes of the military and / or political leadership. Such blunders are especially costly in the fight against terrorists.
We believe that such failures should be especially kept in mind. And disassemble them in detail. It’s not just to find out, but who was actually responsible for the death of our guys, as well as the fact that the terrorists were then “helped” to leave from above? It is also important to remember about such tragedies, first of all, so that this never happens again.
And further. For the sake of the blessed memory of the guys who heroically died in that battle ...
January 18, 2021 marks exactly 25 years of the tragedy near the village of Pervomayskoye. Maybe today, after a quarter of a century, it is already possible to speculate on the topic of who, at the top, was then profitable to “release” the leaders of the terrorists? Could it be that ardent liberals in power then helped Raduev to leave?
After rereading eyewitness accounts once again, we tried to reconstruct the course of events on the eve of that fateful battle.
Lies of Yeltsin
So, on January 18, 1996, the twenty-hour evening Vesti broadcast the words of Boris N. Yeltsin:
Banditsif only someone hid underground, destroyed all.
82 hostages were released, 18 were missing.
That is, they could hide somewhere, run somewhere. We must still consider them alive, we must look. Now the search groups have been specially created and remain there, and for two days they will be engaged only in this work ”.
Note. The village of Pervomayskoye is a settlement in the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan. It is located on the right bank of the Terek (Dzerzhinsky Canal), 40 km north-west of Khasavyurt, on the border with the Gudermes (land) and Shelkovsky (along the Terek) regions of Chechnya.
It seems to be the speech of the first person in the state, but there is not a word of truth in it. Why and why did he lie then? What did those in power hide from the people in those fateful days?
Why was there no single command center and coordination of the actions of the units in the hostage rescue operation? Why were elite counter-terrorism units ordered to dig trenches instead of capture? Why was a possible assault on the militants canceled many times? And why did the terrorists know about every step of our soldiers? And for some reason ours did not even have the same radio frequency?
Let's remember how it all happened.
A Chinese proverb says:
But when such a moment comes, a lot can depend on the soldier. If not all.
This fateful moment came for them exactly 25 years ago in January 1996. When our guys fought in the village of Pervomayskoye.
At the time, Russia was worn out by terrorist intimidation and atrocities. The people already dreamed of the end of the war and the defeat of the militants. But the elites were then so far from the people that they threw the guys into that battle with the thugs, completely leaving them without warm clothes and food.
Of course, the defeat was followed by exclamations:
"The intelligence of their terrorists?"
"Or the stupidity of our generals?"
"And, maybe, all the same, snickering politicians?"
Be that as it may, one should not think, of course, that only generals and colonels bear full responsibility for that unsuccessful operation.
Chubais knows
Undoubtedly, the politicians of that Russia also had a hand in the sad turn of events at that time.
How did they stigmatize and exterminate the army with their sweeping seven-mile redundancies, conveyor conversion and sheer begging of the officers?
If we are not to blame for those who deliberately destroyed the army and special services (possibly on the orders of the West), then who?
Yeltsin's Kremlin? And his liberal, almost thoroughly pro-Western team?
And let's, for the sake of interest, remember a couple of names from those who were then at the very top in that fatal January for our guys.
So, January 1996.
The first government of Viktor Chernomyrdin is in charge. His first deputy chairman until January 16, 1996 was Anatoly Chubais (from January 25, Vladimir Kadannikov will take over this post). Deputy Chairpersons - Alexander Shokhin (until January 5) and Sergey Shakhrai. Until January 10 - Minister without portfolio Nikolai Travkin. Until January 5, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and since January 9 - Yevgeny Primakov. Defense Minister - Pavel Grachev. Minister of Emergency Situations - Sergei Shoigu. Interior Minister - Anatoly Kulikov.
Until January 15, the Presidential Administration is headed by Sergei Filatov, and from that date by Nikolai Egorov (who will be replaced by the unsinkable Anatoly Chubais in the same post by the summer of 1996).
The State Duma on January 17 was headed by Gennady Seleznev. Until that date, Ivan Rybkin was in this post throughout the first half of January.
In addition, let us also recall that 1996 was the year of the re-election of the president in Russia. In this connection, in Moscow in high offices there was a dominance of American consultants. As they say, they (Western curators) were swarming everywhere at the top of the power.
As you can see, January 1996 was a month of constant reshuffling in the highest echelons of power. And everyone (of both those who leave and those who come), probably, really wanted to steer enough then. Who exactly of the then high-seated officials in Moscow put their 5 kopecks into the tragedy in Pervomayskoye, today we can only guess.
Perhaps the West itself was also interested in escalating the conflict?
After all, in fact, who, if not the West, benefits from terrorism in itself today? Who, if not the Americans, is ready to train and nurture these very "puppets" -terrorists in order to keep entire peoples, countries and even continents in fear and numbness? After all, it is possible, in essence, now to speak openly about a kind of cloning of terrorism as a phenomenon and a phenomenon in separate "educational laboratories" of specific Western states. Is not it?
How else can they intimidate the rapidly impoverished civilian population? Viruses and terrorists - it's simple and fast. Well, that's by the way.
In other words, until we understand the main thing - who can / could benefit from it, we will not be able to find answers to all the above-mentioned questions either.
Thus, in order to understand what happened that day, not behind the scenes in Moscow, but in reality - there, in Pervomayskoye, let us turn to specific documents and evidence.
How was it?
Here is a quote from the Group A special reporting folder:
Each hour can be restored in chronological order.
Chkalovsky
Makhachkala
At 20:00 the personnel arrived in a vehicle at the FSB department of Makhachkala, where the head of the Anti-Terrorist Center of the FSB of Russia, Colonel-General V.N. brought the operational situation at the current moment. "
Kizlyar
So, the Alpha fighters arrived in Kizlyar to free the hostages.
But by that hour, for some reason, the militants were “released” by decision of the leadership (republican or federal). In fact, our guys found there only the tail from a string of buses with terrorists leaving the city with hostages.
The fact is that the Dagestani official authorities (this is according to one version. And according to another - the federal authorities) decided to release the terrorists from the city hospital and, moreover, ordered them not to obstruct them, but to guarantee them a calm passage up to the border with Chechnya. Allegedly, for this the bandits intended to release the hostages at the border.
Around the time Alfa arrived in Kizlyar (exactly at 6:40), the terrorists with hostages had already started from the city in two KamAZ trucks provided to them and in a pair of ambulances, as well as in nine more buses. The terrorists mined the abandoned hospital.
Who broke the storm?
Of course, they were not released on all four sides. Escort was organized. In other words, a chase.
But the whole trouble was that the leadership of the operation to free the hostages was constantly changing plans.
At first, it was planned to block the convoy along the way of the bandits and free all the captives.
To be honest, this plan was quite risky. Indeed, among the captives there were several VIPs of Dagestan, including the deputies of the republic. Moreover, the terrorists had not one bus, but 9. Plus 2 KamAZ trucks and 2 ambulances. There are 13 vehicles in total.
It is hard to imagine what kind of howl would then rise in the countries of the West and throughout Europe if at least one of the hostages had died. And in this situation, it would have happened without fail. There weren't just two or three bandits. And they were not armed with sabers. They had grenade launchers, machine guns and machine guns.
Operation management is understandable. It was hot in the Caucasus then, the situation was tense, blood was pouring. Of course, the managers rushed about.
In other words, no one stopped Raduev or his pack of terrorists. The go-ahead for blocking did not come.
The bandits made it to the border village of Pervomaisky without hindrance. There they took more hostages. This time, the Novosibirsk riot police from the checkpoint were captured. The bandits took their weapons. This is according to one version.
Another version looks like this.
It is believed that the Raduevites organized almost the capture of Pervomaisky. But in reality, there was no assault. The fact is that a checkpoint of a special police detachment (from Novosibirsk) was then located near the village. And the convoy with militants and hostages was accompanied not by anyone, but by a local resident. It was a colonel of the local police, who appeared on TV.
This very local then approached the commander of the riot police and invited them to peacefully lay down their arms. Which they did. It is known, however, that not all surrendered. Some part of the OMON officers then refused to surrender to the bandits, and withdrew with weapons. After that, the militants collected the policemen's weapons. And those who surrendered were added to the hostages. The terrorists themselves entered the village of Pervomayskoye. That, in fact, looked like, according to eyewitnesses, the whole procedure of the alleged capture of the village by the militants.
Let us remind once again how the people of Raduev got to Pervomayskoye.
As follows from the report of group "A" (service), at first it was planned to capture the militants in the direction of movement.
A special scenario for capturing bandits was even developed.
For this, a group that arrived from Moscow worked out in detail the task:
Predictably, the bandits changed their plans. Raduev will renounce his words. Instead of the promised release of hostages, the terrorists will capture new ones. The bandits decide to gain a foothold in the village of Pervomaiskoe. For this, firing points are equipped.
Here we turn to the recollections of the officers.
One of them is the Hero of Russia, Colonel Vladimir Vladimirovich Nedobezhkin. At that time he commanded a detachment of army special forces, which was in Khankala before these events.
The commander of the United Group of our troops, General Anatoly Kulikov, assigned Nedobezhkin's unit the task of storming buses with militants and hostages on the way to Chechnya. The paratroopers were supposed to land and block the site of the operation, and Nedobezhkin's group was to storm buses, neutralize the militants and free the hostages.
The colonel recalls that on that day everything was ready for the capture. Army special forces were waiting for the bandits just across the bridge. Suddenly…
Suddenly, the crews of our two MI-24 helicopters launch a missile attack on this bridge.
The column (of the bandits) immediately turns around and returns to Pervomaiskoye back. "
So who gave the command to the helicopter pilots in front of the very nose of the column to destroy the bridge on the way to the place where our people were already waiting for Radulov?
It is clear that if the assault on the column was nevertheless carried out according to the plan / variant of General Kulikov, then, firstly, our guys would not have to freeze for a week in the trenches in the vicinity of Pervomaiskoe. And secondly, there would definitely be annoying losses, both among the hostages and among the military, much less.
There is information in the public domain that the commander of the 58th Army, General Troshev (who commanded that operation at the first stage), the military, who were then sitting in ambush behind the bridge that was just blown up from the air, managed to ask the question:
And then Troshev seemed to answer them:
So who exactly turned the course of events at Pervomaisky back then, in a literal sense, still remains unknown to this day.
The terrorists are warm and the soldiers are in the cold
So, the column of terrorists turned around in front of the blown up bridge (behind which the commandos were waiting for them). And she sat down in Pervomaiskiy.
It should be admitted that this turn has greatly strengthened the position of the terrorists. Having settled in the village, they changed the rules of the game. Those who were chasing them as part of a special operation to free the hostages were now forced by the bandits to engage with them.
All the previously outlined plans of the commanders and the tactical alignments of the special forces fighters were now inapplicable. The operation was retrained from that moment into a military operation (or a special KGB-military operation to eliminate bandit groups). Until now, the military has no unity on this issue on its classification.
For example, the Ministry of Defense describes this episode in Pervomaiskiy as a special operation. Whereas the FSB interprets it as a combined arms. There is a discrepancy. Or inconsistency? But is it possible that these are just different-military approaches?
Given the number of forces involved in the operation, it was supposed to be commanded by General Anatoly Kvashnin, then the commander of the North Caucasian Military District. But FSB director Mikhail Barsukov and Interior Minister Viktor Erin were at the scene. "
The experts who entered the discussion reasoned something like this. The presence of hostages, the issuance of ultimatums from terrorists, the execution of captured prisoners - gave all the grounds for starting an anti-terrorist operation.
The difficulty, however, was that there were many terrorists. Not a couple of three. And not even two or three dozen. And over three hundred thugs armed to the teeth.
The raiders who had entrenched themselves in Pervomaisk had sniper rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers and large-caliber machine guns.
In addition, these bandits dug not holes for themselves, but full-profile trenches. And they equipped a defensive fortified area. Moreover, they did it according to the canons of military art (forward and cut-off positions, communication passages, and even blocked slots, etc.). They say they dug all these fortifications with the hands of hostages.
If you use the hint of a military specialist, then it all looked like a motorized rifle battalion (MRB) in defense.
Moreover, since this SMB did not bury itself in the ground at all in a desert field, but entrenched itself in a large rural settlement (about 1 inhabitants), then its attacking forces during the operation would have to storm the settlement. With far from bright prospects.
What specific prospects could there be?
Let's say right away, quite depressing. And with all sorts of "ifs."
Any attack of such a fortified area in a settlement will result in failure and numerous casualties without preliminary artillery preparation and if the firing points of the bandits are not suppressed. Without threefold (five- or any multiple) superiority in manpower. And the main thing is that it is impossible to lead unprepared soldiers and officers to such an assault.
People who dare to attack a settlement outside the aforementioned conditions will simply die. Here is the conclusion of the experts.
Which, in essence, was to be expected. There was almost no artillery preparation as such. Although they fired a pair of anti-tank guns for the sake of warning. In fact, they pressed a little psychologically. But the real destruction of the gang's firing positions, according to the recollections of the participants in the events, did not happen.
And it immediately became clear. As our first detachments moved to the attack, they were met by a hurricane of fire from the bandits. Several people from the Dagestani OMON were killed and wounded at once. And the assault group retreated.
From a tactical point of view, this indicated that the terrorists did not lose their firing points, and their front defensive edge could not be suppressed. That is, everyone who, in this situation, goes on the attack, will face inevitable death.
And here is what the documents tell about it. From the report of group "A" (service):
During the hostilities on January 15-18, the department employees identified and destroyed the firing points of the militants, provided fire cover for the Interior Ministry units, provided medical assistance, and evacuated the wounded from the battlefield. "
There is so much unsaid behind the short reporting phrase: “the wounded were evacuated”. For example, these guys from group "A" took and rescued fighters of the "Vityaz" detachment from the fire sack.
From the memoirs of Colonel Vladimir Nedobezhkin:
Then I talked to the guys from Vityaz. They said: “We entered, caught on, we are fighting in the village for each house. And "Alpha" could not follow us. "
That is, the back of "Vityaz" remained open. After all, "Alpha" with such a battle formation had an order to go behind and help "Vityaz", to concentrate, to storm houses together and so on.
In a populated area, going forward with an open back is just suicide ...
As a result, the "Vityaz" was surrounded, and from this boiler it left on its own, with great losses. "
This, by the way, is about the effectiveness and quality of the offensive fire preparation.
And here is what an eyewitness of that battle recalls about the accuracy of missile guidance:
Our MI-24 helicopter appeared from behind. Launches rockets at the houses that we have indicated.
And suddenly two missiles come out, but they don't fly forward, but fall behind us and explode.
We - to the helicopter pilots: "What are you doing?"
And they: "Sorry guys, the missiles are substandard."
But it's funny to remember this just now. Then there was no laughing matter ... "
Again, from the comments of experts: if this happened in the war, then the actions could be as follows.
First. For example, if the attack had choked, then they would again drag artillery and again iron the front edge of the enemy's defense.
Second. Better yet, call in aircraft and strike with bombs.
Or third. The advancing units would seek to bypass the epicenter of resistance and begin to advance.
But all three of these options were impossible in those conditions. The authorities and the media then left the guys no other options, except one.
The fact is that from the very first shots a screeching arose in the liberal press, turning into hysteria - hostages were being killed, the village was being destroyed.
And the journalists, and the West, and the authorities, it seems, wanted only one thing then - to tear our guys to pieces. Throw their bodies into the embrasures of the bandits. Destroy the best commandos. All at once. And "Alpha" and "Vympel" and "Vityaz".
Of course, the state is obliged to rescue the hostages. But instead of organization, planning, coordination, firepower and other means of military affairs, only one means was proposed from above - to put all our best fighters in this field at Pervomaysky at once? Not to mention that our best special forces guys were used as infantry in Pervomayskoye.
In spetsnaz schools they teach a three-pronged task:
rescue as many hostages as possible,
destroy the terrorists. "
For this, the fighters of group "A" are trained to successfully storm the captured cars, liners and premises in which terrorists are hiding. But, as they later tried to justify the failures at the top: they are supposedly not so strong in combined arms tactics, and especially in digging trenches ...
By the way, our guys were not very lucky with the weather then. Every night there was frost, and during the day - frost. So my feet and all my equipment were wet all day long. They usually slept there on the ground, someone in the trenches. Then the sleeping bags were brought in, and the guys made capes from them.
And who was in charge of all this action?
From the memoirs of an eyewitness:
There was practically no leadership, and each unit lived its own separate life. Everyone fought as best they could.
For example, one task was assigned to us, and another to the paratroopers to our right. We are neighbors, we are a hundred meters from each other, and different people command us. It is good that we have more or less agreed with them.
We had communication with them both visually and by radio.
True, the radio communication was open, the militants must have listened to our talks. "
This is where I would like to explain why we began our story precisely with the Chinese wisdom that a soldier is fed a thousand days to use one minute. The fact is that just under the May Day soldiers, in fact, there was nothing to eat. And they were freezing in the open air.
Employees of group "A" later said that Russian soldiers, numb in the cold, knocked on their buses in the evenings.
And at this time, by the way, the central TV channels bawled around the clock about Pervomayskoye. And they were reporting about the alleged complete blocking of militants. But this very blocking looked like sitting in winter trenches in a cold field. By the way, the militants were warming themselves at the villagers in warm huts.
Maybe someone needed such a breakthrough?
Now someone is asking:
Yes, it turned out that he escaped, breaking through in combat.
Eyewitnesses say that a continuous encirclement was not organized there then. And, all the more, there was no external or any other ring there.
And there were only rare defensive islands. One such bridgehead was held by thirty army special forces. This was exactly the same group of fighters who were suddenly closely attacked by the Raduev terrorists. It was these guys who put most of the bandits down.
Recall that the terrorists then had over three hundred mercenaries. And against them - 30 people from the 22nd brigade. The opponent has a tenfold advantage.
It is not surprising that almost all of our commandos were wounded. There were also those who died among them. But they are all real Heroes.
There are few of them left after that battle. Yes, and they left then, who where. Someone occasionally gives interviews and tells how it really was then.
And it looked, we must honestly admit, as an open betrayal or a setup. Judge for yourself:
The density of the front was 46 man and a half kilometers. Imagine! For all standards, the excess of the length for each fighter is three times. And weapons - only small arms, light, but two armored personnel carriers attached.
These guys were put in the most difficult place. Most likely, the leadership knew that every one of them would have to die.
Why?
Because only here, in a single place, you can cross the Terek. I emphasize, in the only one.
There, an oil pipeline is stretched across the river, and above it is a bridge.
And the fool was clear: nowhere else to go.
Everything turned out as if on purpose. It turns out that everyone knew that Raduev would go here? And by and large, they did nothing. As if "from above" let him pass? Or is it just an accident?
And what's strange? With this pipe came the order not to destroy. And the guys, it turns out, can you ruin as much as you like?
Well, about that ill-fated trumpet - a real gift for terrorists, different versions were circulated by both soldiers and officers. For example, here's the look of a fighter:
No, it's oil, big money. People are cheaper.
But they would blow up - and the "spirits" have nowhere to go. "
And here is the officer's testimony:
I suggested: "Let's blow up the pipe."
And to me: "And let's leave the whole republic without gas?"
I again: “So what is the task? Don't miss it? Then to fight like this. "
And me again about a republic without gas.
At our own peril and risk, we put mines in front of the pipe. All of them subsequently worked when the militants climbed the pipe.
All these days of waiting, no one knew what would happen: an assault or defense when they came out. And on January 17, a command comes: tomorrow at dawn there will be a re-assault. We were preparing for the assault. But it turned out the opposite.
As such, the training of the terrorists was not. They began firing, and their strike group went on the attack. Coming to a strong point of one hundred meters, the front thugs lay down, began to exert fire pressure. In the meantime, a covering group was pulled up, and everyone rushed forward in a crowd.
From a tactical point of view, they acted correctly. In another way, they could not. After the battle, we checked the documents of the dead. Afghans, Jordanians, Syrians. About fifty professional mercenaries. "
And one more look at the tactics of bandits:
The militants had a distraction group aside, a fire group with large-caliber weapons, grenade launchers, machine gunners. Their fire group did not let us raise their heads.
Basically, all the dead and wounded appeared precisely during this first strike.
The density of the fire was such that officer Igor Morozov shattered a finger on his hand. He, an experienced officer, passed Afghan and fired, sitting in the trench, sticking out only his hands with a machine gun. His finger was crippled here. But he remained in the ranks. "
And here is how the commander recalls the very beginning of the battle with terrorists:
The answer is: "Quiet."
And I gave them the command to retreat to position. I leave a third of the people to guard, and the rest I give the command to rest, because in the morning - the assault.
A week has already passed in such conditions: naturally, people began to sway slightly while walking. But in the morning you have to run another seven hundred meters. And it's not easy to run, but under fire.
... And then almost immediately everything began ...
Interestingly, there was no illumination at all that night. Therefore, we noticed the militants over forty meters.
There is frost in the air, you can hardly see anything through night binoculars.
At this time, the group that was returning followed our trenches. My signalmen, who were on duty in turn, launched a rocket and saw the militants. They start counting - ten, fifteen, twenty ... a lot! ..
I give a signal: everyone to fight!
A group of twelve people, which was walking from the observation post, was fully prepared and immediately hit the militants from the left flank.
Thus, they gave the rest of the opportunity to prepare. "
The guys say that the terrorists were doping:
So they attacked in a state of narcotic dope. They say they are fearless suicide bombers.
The bandits were afraid. "
And about how Raduev escaped:
About 200 terrorists went into battle. We killed 84 people. Apart from the wounded and prisoners.
In the morning I looked at the tracks - about twenty people escaped, no more. Raduev is with them.
The brigade also suffered losses: five were killed, six people were wounded. If two or three companies had been planted in our sector, the result would have been different.
Much was done stupidly. A small handful was planted in defense, they did not mine the approaches.
What did you expect?
Maybe someone needed such a breakthrough? »
Harsh, but true.
They break through to you
One thing is bad - the militants still broke through.
Then the guys who participated in that battle with their comrades analyzed this battle again and again. And yet they came to the conclusion that a breakthrough could have been prevented. And just a little was needed - to strengthen ours with armor.
But it looks like they weren't helping us in that battle.
Judge for yourself.
Indeed, in every joke there is only a fraction of a joke. As a rule, after all, through a very good joke, it is precisely the very unspoken truth that peeps through.
Among those who participated in the siege of Pervomaisky, there is such a bike.
By the time the militants broke through on the night of January 17-18, 1996, the entire operation was commanded by Mikhail Barsukov, director of the FSB. So that night he was told:
And he was very drunk. And he commanded:
And they answered him with malice:
Note. During the operation to free the hostages in the city of Kizlyar and with. Pervomayskoye 153 militants were killed, 11 hostages were killed, 26 soldiers and officers of federal troops were killed at the hands of terrorists, 95 people were wounded, 250 houses were destroyed, 30 militants were captured, 86 hostages were released.
Everlasting memory
In the battle near Pervomaysky, the following died:
- chief of intelligence of the 58th Army, Colonel Alexander Stytsina,
- the commander of the communications company, Captain Konstantin Kozlov,
- medical captain Sergei Kosachev.
and officers of group "A"
- Major Andrey Kiselev
- and Viktor Vorontsov.
For the courage and courage shown during the rescue of the hostages, Andrei Kiselev and Viktor Vorontsov were awarded the Order of Courage (posthumously).
Information