Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the "Thundering" firing
The first part of the article The Leaky Umbrella of the Fleet caused a violent reaction, up to the accusation of the author of lying and of blaming the new ships of the Russian Navy and their weapons. Actually, the arguments of the opponents boiled down to the fact that
especially since it was
"The developer will finalize"
etc.
Obviously, a detailed analysis of the "Thundering" firing is necessary (and the real work of the IBMK "Zaslon" to ensure the operation of the "Redut" air defense missile system). In addition, it is advisable to uncover complex (including old) air defense problems of ships and the Navy. For the situation is such that only the media can objectively do this today.
But first - according to the official information of the Ministry of Defense (Department of Mass Communications of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (DIMK) of Konashenkov). From the official response to the report of the author of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on unreliable publications of DIMK, No. 203/366 dated 06.03.2019, signed by the first deputy head of DIMK A. Komarov:
As the saying goes, "read and enjoy." And about the landing ships in the role of minesweepers with trawls (as it was in the official information of DIMK on the exercises "Caucasus-2020"), and about the "conquest" of the target rocket with 30-mm machine guns "Thundering". All this was prepared by “specialized specialists” and “governing bodies” of the Ministry of Defense (in quotes) and “chief experts” of DIMK (as the deputy head of DIMK A. Komarov officially stated) ...
And there is no need to ask the author questions about why he makes a start from the official comments of the Ministry of Defense.
Well, now - to the shooting.
Rocket fire "Thundering"
The missiles went to the target.
DIMK published a video of the shooting, where, incl. the screen of the optoelectronic system was demonstrated at the moment of hitting the target missile (RM-15) of the 9M96 SAM.
The data indicated on the information field of the reticle clearly indicates the flight altitude of the RM-15 target missile at the time of its destruction (at a distance of 9 km) about ... 100 m (70-120, according to various estimates).
Sorry, but after all real anti-ship missiles (anti-ship missiles) fly at completely different heights! At the same time, at the terminal section, the height of their flight can be almost 1,5 meters above the crests of the waves!
Shooting at the US Navy BQM-74E Chukar target missile, "sultans" in the water from being hit by 20 mm shells.
The obvious "price" of the fraud and forgery with RM at 100 meters in the shooting of the "Thundering" is visible from the memoirs ("historical sketches ") Captain 1st rank Pechatnikov V.K. (officer URAV USSR Navy):
Finally, the impossibility of effectively dealing with such targets, which are in service with the SAM ships, was revealed during the large-scale exercises "Proba-77". 20 RM-15M target missiles were allocated, with a modified radio altimeter. In practice, due to the scatter of aerodynamic characteristics, the target flight altitude was 8–11 meters. The results were disappointing. The complexes designed to combat enemy aircraft and quite confidently shot down missiles flying at altitudes of more than 100 meters, turned out to be ineffective against low-flying targets (NLC). Of course, because they were designed as anti-aircraft, and the lower boundary of the affected area was 100 meters (for "Osa-M" - 50).
Exercises "Proba-77" fully answered - the probability of shooting down a rocket flying at an extremely low altitude for different complexes is in the range of 0,12-0,17.
Calling a spade a spade, the rocket firing of the Thundering is a shame and a disgrace. Such targets were effectively hit by the air defense system of the 60s. type "Wave", - wrote A.P. Mikhailovsky in his work "Ocean parity. Commander's Notes fleet":
By repeated launch, Marshal Tymoshenko set fire to the target, but did not shoot it down. Engulfed in flames, leaving a plume of black smoke behind it, the lionfish continued to rush straight towards the cruiser. It is not enough good if this barrel of burning kerosene falls on your deck! ..
The problem was solved by the fire of the cruiser's bow battery of anti-aircraft machine guns. The burning ugly creature fell apart and fell into the water just two cables on the right side of the Alexander Nevsky.
The last target RM-15, meanwhile, under the guise of finished off "Ognevoy".
That is, calling things by their proper names, the result of the “Thundering” firing would not be at all bad for another “Thundering” - this one.
Also "Thundering", but BOD project 57 (1960-1991) with the "Volna" air defense missile system. RM-15 at 100 meters, just his target.
As for the thesis “there will still be shooting, they will learn” (hereinafter, an insider's quote from one of the special resources, actively advertising the IMBK Zaslon):
The following must be said. State tests are, first of all, confirmation of the fulfillment of the specified requirements of the TTZ (tactical and technical assignment).
The way the IBMK "confirmed" them (in quotation marks) clearly says that the RM-15 with the radar seeker (and the EPR is more than an order of magnitude larger than the EPR of real targets), was specially "lifted" to a hundred-meter flight altitude and shot down by only 9 km! Before the Gos stage, there is a preliminary test stage ("Chief Designer tests"), where products or a complex are "taught to walk" (detect, hit ...).
And if what the "Thundering" "shot" is still suitable for the first shooting of the PI stage (and even then, only the first, with such a "result" on the Gos it is impossible), but in no way acceptable for the Gos. Moreover, the insider's quote directly states that the customer's TTZ was not confirmed during these "tests" (in quotes). "Then, someday" (and for the next big money of the customer).
Of course, the TTZ itself is a closed document. However, there is an "open version" of it (albeit a very truncated one) - this is an escort advertising passport of the MFRLS "Zaslon":
The first thing that can be noted is that 70 km of the IBMK range against a target with an RCS of 1 m2 is, to put it mildly, sparse. Those interested can compare this parameter with aviation Radar "Irbis", and the comparison will be quite correct, because the Navy of JSC "NIIP" proposed a radar complex for small ships based on "Irbis" (this did not arouse interest, but more on that below).
Second, assuming the worst conditions - the radar height of 20 m and the target flight height in these tests, 70 m, we get the radio horizon according to the RM-15 in these tests 48 km (in reality - more). We take the declared 0,95 for the STC, we get 44,5 km, on which the IBMK simply had to detect and conduct the RM-15 with an EPR of 1,3 m2 (while according to the TTZ it is obvious that this figure is much higher). This value is close to the far border of the 9M96 missile defense zone.
Let's take the reaction time of the air defense missile system for 10 seconds (for a ship in combat readiness No. 1 there are a lot), then the missile defense system will be launched at a distance of 40 km to the target. Let's say the average speed of convergence between RM and SAM is 1 km / s, then the target will be hit in 40 s at a distance of about 26 km.
In fact, we have a target defeat at 9 km! Forgive me, but even the Sosny missile defense system works at such ranges (an order of magnitude cheaper than the gold 9M96)!
Moreover, such "results" (in quotation marks) of the "promising super-radar of the Navy" turn out to be rather pale even against the background of firing by the land-based air defense system "Tor-2MKM" on the frigate "Admiral Grigorovich", despite the large number of shortcomings in the organization of these firing "Torah "And the preparation of equipment for them.
What (and who - their creators) really worked at "5+" on these firing - SAMs 9M96.
At the same time, the presence of an active radar seeker (ARGSN) in them made it possible, in general, to organize firing in such a way that the defeat of the RM-15 would be ensured even without turning on the IBMK (by the console target and the stopwatch). Moreover, according to unofficial information, the issue of "firing missiles at the stopwatch" was considered, but nevertheless they decided not to disgrace themselves at all ...
The screen of the navigation radar of the Corvette "Thundering" with a "high-speed target" console broadcast from the ship's means (the "sword" of the velocity vector is highlighted on the screen) from the direction of the designated launch of target missiles.
SAM 9M96 are of extremely high importance and value for our air defense, primarily for increasing the ammunition load of the S-400 ground-based air defense systems. And in this situation, firing 9M96 missiles to hit a target at a distance of 9 km -
We have very serious budgetary constraints on the 9M96 series.
Until now, none of our S-400 air defense systems has received "additions" to the ammunition of the new 9M96 missiles. And the only thing where they went en masse was the Turkish S-400.
From the article by A. Khramchikhin "The problems of the Russian air defense are surrounded by silence":
However, in reality, the regiment will not recover in any hour, and in two, too. Just because the composition Air defense systems do not include charging vehicles; divisions do not even have at least one spare ammunition. All this should be brought from the missile storage and preparation bases. ...The United States has a very real opportunity to "load" Russian air defense systems with a huge number of BGM-109 Tomahawk, AGM-86, AGM-158 JASSM-LR missiles, "and so on and so forth."... This problem is becoming more serious, which we are already seeing on a small scale in Syria. But here she is turned into a "figure of silence".
This extensive quote is worth citing (interested readers are encouraged to follow the link. There is a very iconic "correspondence" in the media on this topic. With very clumsy attempts by the RF Ministry of Defense to object). Those. SAM 9M96 (and its long-range modifications) are very, very necessary for our anti-aircraft gunners. And "to hammer nails in with them" is, to put it mildly, "a mistake is worse than a crime."
And this is not only and so much about "the economy must be economical" (and the military economy - even more so). This is precisely the question of the effectiveness of the military system of the state, its real defense capability. When money for defense begins to simply squander on "cartoons" (effective only in "presentations"), then there will simply be no reliable and effective defense, because there will not be enough funds for it: all will be "eaten" by "effective managers" and "reputable businessmen" ...
Artillery shooting
The data of the ship sighting devices show that immediately at the time of the firing of the SAM, a very successful and accurate 100-mm gun mount A-190 looked exactly in the direction of the RM approach (to the starboard side).
The real shooting was carried out at a simulated target (like all previous ones, according to the RF Ministry of Defense) on the left side.
The desire of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (and the Navy) to receive the ship (corvette "Thundering"), in fact, without real tests of artillery - hitting real targets from under the radar fire control system, causes bewilderment. At the same time, very expensive ammunition at sea was “regularly thrown away” - for simulated targets.
What prevented you from working out at least on the Saman mass missile targets? Or to drive a Grad launcher to Cape Taran and at least once shoot at real air targets (albeit very far from the enemy's real anti-ship missiles)?
Here, in a positive regard, it is necessary to note the command of the Pacific Fleet, where for the two previous corvettes there was much greater adherence to principles and responsibility for testing new technology than at the Baltic Fleet. ... For example, the shooting down of the RM-15 at 7 km by artillery (the result is very, very good) was during the tests of the Pacific Fleet's lead corvette. The firing accuracy was then ensured by the Puma radar, designed to guide artillery to the target.
It is worth quoting from the comments to the previous article:
With a high probability, the Pacific Ocean would not have allowed to "lift" the target a hundred meters during the tests of the "Redut", as it was "allowed" at the BF, but as regards artillery, they raised the question harshly. Unlike the Baltic Fleet, the gun fired at the Pacific Fleet, and, according to rumors, the target was lower than in the Baltic. On December 17, the project 20380 Aldar Tsydenzhapov corvette, equipped with a simplified modification of the IBMK, successfully shot down the RM-120 target missile launched by the Iney MRK. True, "Tsydenzhapov" did not fire rockets ...
It should be noted that, on the one hand, the RM-120 is a very tenacious target (for which the developers of the air defense missile system do not like it very much), but on the other hand, it is a large-sized and rather high-flying target (lower than the RM-15 on the Thundering tests, but higher than the modified RM-15M can go at extremely low altitude). The fleet simply does not have targets adequate to real goals. They are afraid to shoot at the RM-24 (hitting a heavy engine or the missile itself on the side). They are also expensive. And there are very few of them. Mass “Samanas” (converted old SAM “Osa-M” SAMs) attacking anti-ship missiles cannot really imitate).
Photos from the round table on the topic of air defense of naval ships at IMDS-2019.
Here one cannot but recall the extremely problematic "near line" of most of our new ships (projects 20380 and 11356) - 30-mm AK-630-02 assault rifles. From the article by A.V. Zhukov "On the effectiveness of naval artillery installations in repelling anti-ship missiles":
Separate placement of the gun mount and control system in the AK-630M leads to large firing errors due to the impossibility of taking into account the deformation of the ship's hull and inaccuracies in the parallax correction between the posts.
Shooting errors reach 6 mrad instead of 2 mrad in the "Goalkeeper" complex.
... The multi-point scheme is sometimes offered in domestic complexing systems. Obviously, the effectiveness of artillery fire in this case will be low, which will discredit not only the caliber of shells, but also the benefits of gun mounts in the short-range air defense system ... "
I would like to emphasize that this is not a “private opinion”, but a professional opinion of the Chief Designer of the near-border marine complexes of KBP JSC.
Draw conclusions about the "effectiveness" (in quotation marks) of the close range of the air defense of naval ships. (And, accordingly, the unwillingness of the Navy to check this line by tests and during combat training. The consequences will be too scandalous).
Golden turret "Zaslon"
The aforementioned insider and lobbyist for Zaslon:
Yes, there was a price to pay for "miniaturization". Yes, integration into ships with a significantly larger displacement and the operation of the IBMK with new missiles and target types will require time and money ...
The bottom line is that I do not see any real alternatives to fine-tuning the IFRLC. "Positive-Sigma-Pantsir" from Klimov is not an alternative, but a technical degradation and (already in the medium term) a path to nowhere. The complex must (and will) be refined. Both for the reason stated above and because the money has already been spent.
I see only one serious and really ineradicable drawback in IFRLK - the price. Everything else is practically solved during the debugging.
“Marriage” of “Positive” with 9M96, 9M100, “Sigma”, “Redoubt” and the rest of the REV for 20380 is an OCD for 3-5 years, without a guarantee of a positive final result.
Although "Positive-M" itself is really a good thing, it is true ...
He is in September this year:
And this was written in September, after a half-year disruption of the deadline for the delivery of "Thundering". P-R - this is the Poliment-Redut air defense missile system of the frigate of project 22350 (with the far border of the affected area of 140 km "highlighted" in the official materials of the RF Ministry of Defense). At the same time, instead of it, a supposedly "new air defense system" is proposed (in fact, there is nothing like that), which on Gosakh was able to fill up a large target at a hundred meters only by 9 km! Moreover, the fact of very abundant and regular financing of work on the IBMK (in contrast to the P-R) is recognized.
The lobbyist is right only with the price. She is simply monstrous for this inoperative handicraft "from the Skillful Hands" circle - almost like the head corvette in the series.
Here it would be appropriate to recall the series of articles on "VO" on project 20386 with "Barrier" (“Worse than a crime. Construction of the corvettes project 20386 - error ", “Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam »), which, having a similar cost, actually "ran across the road" to the many times more effective frigate of Project 22350 with "Polyment-Redut".
Actually, the "logic" (in quotes) of these lobbyists from industry and the media (it made sense to quote them from the Internet resource, if only because similar "argumentation" is used in the "high offices" to "discourage" and "push" Barrier ") - the level of the cat Basilio and the fox Alice from" Buratino ":
At the same time, there are (lettered and serial) funds, where the problem (for which the cunning gentlemen are going to "master" huge budget money for many years) was solved "yesterday" (writes a major domestic specialist):
"Marriage of Positive and Reduta" is 3 months of coordination of the interface protocols between Varshavskaya, Setun and Kaluga.
And the comment of the same specialist about the desire of "Zaslon" "sometime later" "after all" to install means of radio correction on its "golden tower" (having spent more ... lard).
The question arises: "What is going on in general?"
And what happens is that in 2010, an organization that previously developed airfield air conditioners, takes up the development of a "promising radar complex" for the Navy. Moreover, firms with vast experience and authority on radar (specifically, for example, Fazotron and NIIP) were immediately pushed aside from this (abundantly funded) topic.
At the same time, this organization declares its readiness to make its own radars "for everything": after all, "innovative", "modular", "everything is in order" with advertising and administrative resources ...
Screen from the advertising video of JSC "Zaslon": "mriya" IBMK from MRK to a heavy nuclear cruiser.
"The subject of inspiration" of the golden turret of the "Barrier" was Thales "tower".
At the same time, our "rationalizers" were unable to analyze even the elementary foreign development. For example, the I-MAST 400 has centimeter-band antennas placed on the “tower” as high as possible (because they actually solve the problems of a low-altitude detector, and due to the height, a long range is achieved for such targets). Accordingly, the decimeter radar antennas of the I-MAST 400 are located below.
And what about the "Barrier"? "Of course, the opposite."
As it should be "an innovative system that has no analogues." However, the approach to the issue turned out to be even more "creative" on the version of the MFRS "Zaslon" for project 20386, where the radio horizon (and the possibility of detecting low-flying targets) was maximally "slaughtered" by placing antennas on the superstructure.
Where did the Navy and the Ministry of Defense look at the same time (for example, when accepting a draft and technical design)? Unknown.
However, if we focus on the unconfirmed opinions of “insiders” about how [/ b] how [/ b] this project was approved, it turns out that the responsible persons saw it already with the signatures of the Commander-in-Chief and a number of other leaders ...
At the same time, the "Barrier" climbed not only into the ship's radar. Fans of "kicking" and "zirconizing" American AUG should pay attention to the phrase of the above-mentioned insider-lobbyist of "Zaslon":
Don't be surprised. The "Zaslon" also took over the theme of the ship communication stations with the "Liana" satellites. In 10 years they will finish, maybe. And the Navy will have to intensively “feed the process of assimilating budget funds” all this time.
That is, in conditions when the risk of a global war is constantly growing, and we, perhaps, have the last years of peace, the last money that should have been spent on weaponare spent on stuffing the pockets of literally a few people - with the connivance of the state.
But what are we going to fight then, when the time comes?
By the way, the Zaslon lobbyists carefully hide behind the answer to this simple question with the phrase:
Actually, what did you want? If the immediate head of the organization-developer and manufacturer of the "innovative supersystem" is appointed a person who left his previous enterprise in a "state of a tailspin" (and this is in the conditions of a "fat" export contract!)? The irony of fate (sad and tough): the most risky part of the concluded contract of JSC ASZ for 6 corvettes for the Pacific Fleet is precisely IBMK Zaslon (and there is not only a question of price) from an organization whose managing director is the former CEO of ASZ (with a long a train of very heavy "corkscrews").
What else can we expect? If the other leader of this "innovative development" was the person personally responsible for the disaster with the air defense of previously built corvettes? Moreover, the experts shouted about this even before the fatal decisions were made (that is, those who did it perfectly understood all the consequences).
Conclusion
1. RLC "Zaslon" is obliged to pass full-fledged State tests with full verification of the entire scope of the requirements of the TTZ. In the current state, equipping ships with it is impractical, since it does not correspond to the TTZ.
2. The most massive ships of the fourth generation - the project 20380 corvettes - have such critical air defense shortcomings that they can be drowned by a competent attack of one or two aircraft. Technically, the solutions have these drawbacks, however, tough organizational measures are required to urgently "seal the holes" in their air defense.
3. AK-630 is the most widespread air defense system in the fleet, and the issue of its mass modernization, with placement on a single foundation with gun mounts of aiming means (at least optoelectronic), is extremely important.
4. Those in charge of the technical policy of the Navy must finally understand that attempts to create a superweapon from a corvette can only lead to a collapse in the number of the Navy and to nothing else. In theory, I would like to get a corvette with the power of a frigate. But in practice, we have for the same money: instead of a series of combat-ready ships (albeit built "not according to the latest fashion"), there are several incapable ships with a superweapon that has never been obtained. And this is always the case with everyone: Americans, British, French. We cannot be an exception. And in fact they didn't.
5. Law enforcement agencies should finally pay attention to what is happening. Since (purely legally), if "Thundering" after such Gosov will be accepted into the combat composition, then the actions of each person who signed the acceptance act will have "serious legal issues." And it's time to do something about it. The personal interests of "respected" people have not just come into conflict with the country's defense capability, they are already simply destroying it.
In the near future, an analysis of the capabilities of domestic shipbuilding for mass and inexpensive saturation with naval ships, taking into account the capabilities of the domestic industry - for contrast.
PS
It would be unfair not to report everything to law enforcement agencies.
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