Colt made men equal, and missiles made fleets equal. The photo shows the launch of anti-ship missiles from the Project 58 missile cruiser "Admiral Golovko". Photo from A. Andreev's archive
Every time you try to justify the need to prepare for war "in a real way" (© V. I. Lenin), an immediate raid of hidden enemies of the people begins, claiming that
"Anyway, we cannot compare with NATO, we cannot win such an arms race, and therefore ..."
Further, depending on the personal preferences of the enemy of the people, options are offered in the form of general nuclear suicide, unconditional surrender, refusal to conduct combat training until the moment of building socialism. And so on until
"Do nothing at all, because that's how I see it."
Alas, this contingent often manages to confuse normal people. Often, the enemies of the people resort to demagogic methods such as:
“Do you agree to nuclear suicide? So this means Katz is offering to surrender, or what? "
Which confuses normal people even more. Therefore, it is worth dealing with this issue in order not to let the enemies of the people confuse people further.
A little about superiority in numbers and its significance
Immediately from the doorway, we will send these figures to the knockdown - superiority in numbers does not mean superiority in efficiency... In 1941, the Red Army had much more tanks and aircraft, rather than in the Wehrmacht and the Allied troops. The result is known, the enemy had to be driven from near Moscow, from the banks of the Volga and from the Caucasus Mountains.
Numerical advantage does not always mean superiority in real military capabilities.
Let's fix the first conclusion - we do not need numerical superiority over the enemy, but the ability to break it. It's NOT THE SAME!
We will analyze the argument that without a comparable or superior number such an opportunity cannot be obtained. For now, let's just fix the difference in goal-setting - the question of overtaking the US and NATO in strength is NOT WORTH. The question is quite different. And this is especially true for the Navy.
The last big war in which it was possible to resolve the issue of victory at the expense of victory at sea was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In it, by the way, in general, the numerical superiority was ours, which is worth remembering, but our people, obsessed with land and continentalism, do not want to remember this. Therefore, we will not return to this war anymore, noting only that proper preparation would have ensured victory for Russia, but instead of it there was a hurray-patriotism - the same as today, without serious differences.
In the Russo-Japanese War, the initial superiority in numbers was with the Russian imperial fleet... But the Japanese did not whine that they lacked strength, but simply did everything they could.
Numerical superiority turns out to be decisive if the qualitative parameters of troops and forces are more or less equal, as well as in the absence of random unpredictable factors and the ability of the sides to destroy all enemy forces with one blow due to fire superiority.
But it must be admitted that there is a solid foundation under this opinion (that superiority in numbers is decisive). Russia fought its most important wars on earth. And on land, the importance of numerical superiority is undeniable. And it is not always possible to block this resource with military art.
At sea, numerical superiority also played a role. But adjusted for examples of the type of Russian-Japanese. War at sea is incomparably more complex than war on land. The outcome of battles in it depends on a much larger number of factors than on the ground. And therefore there, as they say, there are options (although they happen on land the same way).
But, nevertheless, for a long time, all other things being equal (comparable technology and level of training), it was the number of pennants that determined the total power of the fleets and the balance of forces between them.
Now, however, this is not the case. To understand why, let's look at a few basic mathematical models used in the past in military planning.
First, about those times when the quantity was almost everything.
In 1902, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Chase, who served at the Naval War College in Newport, developed his quadratic law to describe how much strength would remain with the strongest side in a battle after the weakest side was completely destroyed. Chase immediately pulled out his calculations for the naval forces, measuring everything in ships and gunfire. This is what the very first analytical expression looked like, which made it possible to somehow mathematically evaluate the combat strength of the naval forces.
m: Number of ships on the M side
n: Number of ships on side N
a1: Vitality side M, hits (shots) / ship
a2: Vitality side N, hits (shots) / ship
b1: combat strength side M shots / ship
b2: combat strength side N shots / ship
For calculations, all hits and shots are counted as a shot / ship unit.
The beginning of the twentieth century was a time of faith in the limitless possibilities of the human mind. That science has almost explained the universe. And, consequently, the processes taking place in the world can be described mathematically - everything.
Such immeasurable categories as martial arts, military cunning, and even simple luck in those years were considered something of secondary importance. Something that can play a role somewhere, but most likely will not. There were, of course, exceptions. But mostly these things were not taken into account. Everything was decided by the numbers.
Later, during the First World War, the quadratic laws of war of attrition were independently discovered by the Russian general Mikhail Pavlovich Osipov (1915) and the English mathematician and engineer Frederick Lanchester (1916), now for the battles of ground armies. The scale of the meat grinder in Europe by that time completely allowed to ignore everything that could not be measured by numbers. And suddenly it turned out that if we consider the battle in isolation and simplified (two detachments or formations of a known force are fighting without reinforcements until the weaker side is completely destroyed), then its outcome is fully modeled by the ratios:
A - the strength of one of the parties (for example, the number of fighters)
B - the strength of the second side
α - coefficient of combat strength of each unit A (for example, one shooter)
β - the same for B
In expanded form, you can see here, with solutions for different tasks.
In the future, these equations were continuously improved - added the ability to assess the impact of suitable reinforcements, surprise attack, and much more. The theory of probability lay on top of all this, which helped to take into account the fact that, for example, shells sometimes do not explode. Those interested will find a lot of information on the Internet and will be able to calculate various scenarios for different events. We will limit ourselves to stating a few facts.
First. In all cases, it was about processes lasting in time. So, the equation (as seen from the link) can be used to calculate the state of the fighting groups at any time between the beginning of the battle and its end (the complete death of the weakest of them). What if the process turns out to be instantaneous? Nobody asked such a question in those days, and this could not have happened.
Second. In calculations, the number of forces is of paramount importance. Everything repels from her. Modernity has made significant adjustments, as modern algorithms require taking into account the firepower of combat systems participating in battles. And since different groups are fighting, in which there may be, for example, tanks, multiple launch rocket systems and helicopters, it is also necessary to take into account the potential of the systems weapons, reduce the estimates of the firepower of any of them to a certain reference value (for example, measure the firepower of a tank battalion in salvoes of helicopter squadrons), etc. For more information on how such data is calculated for modern combat - here (pdf, keep in mind that any event is probabilistic, all these simulations are indicative and incomplete, including "for regime reasons").
The third. In all cases, we are talking about simulating an attrition battle. That is, the strongest side spends its strength during the battle, and the weakest one too. And so on until complete death.
For naval combat, all this also worked, as long as the battle was a "combat competition of the parties", an integral part of which was the prolonged and systematic use of weapons by the forces of the parties against each other.
Of course, it was necessary to bring the power of battleships and destroyers to a single value, to come up with coefficients for successful ambushes of submarines and unexpected hits on minefields, but for the time being, all this was solved. The picture was spoiled by aircraft carriers and, in part, by submarines, which fought with one-time and powerful strikes. But even in the Pacific, the American deck aviation destroyed only 25% of all warships in Japan, the rest was done by other forces.
On the other hand, if we consider not the battle between aircraft carriers, but the battle of their aircraft with each other or with ships, then with correctly calculated coefficients of combat strength, everything "works out": the battle is normally modeled, and calculations with a large scale and number of battles will be more or less reflect reality.
In general, while the battle was a battle with a long-term fire effect of the sides on each other and a low probability of complete destruction of a howling unit from the first shot, quadratic laws worked, and the number of forces themselves (people, ships, aircraft, tanks, guns) wore a decisive character, subject to a comparable quality level. There was no reception against scrap in that era. Large battalions and squadrons dominated, especially when those who fought in their composition were also better prepared and trained (for example, the US Navy was distinguished not only by material and technical superiority over the Japanese, but also by better fighting personnel).
People who sincerely worry that we cannot compare in numbers with the United States and NATO (we do not consider enemies of the people) simply think in terms of that era. They forget about one small nuance.
After World War II, guided missiles appeared. And with them a completely different era came.
The world of the salvo model
Let's imagine that we have one missile cruiser (for example, the Ticonderoga or the upgraded Admiral Nakhimov) with forty anti-ship cruise missiles. For example, with anti-ship Tomahawks or Onyxes.
And against the cruiser - four frigates, each with eight anti-ship missiles, no matter what. In total, the group has 32 missiles.
The question arises - how to "sew" it into the equation, even according to "Chase", even according to "Lanchester" (no difference)? What to take for the strength of the forces?
Ships? But then it turns out that the cruiser is guaranteed to lose the battle: she is alone against four enemy ships. Or missiles? Then it will turn out the other way around? But how to take into account the fact that missiles can be shot down?
And most importantly, how to take into account who hit first? What if the cruiser outpaces the frigates with a strike? How then to be with the unfavorable numbers?
In the battle of tens or hundreds of rocket ships, which drags on for days, the quadratic law is probably applicable. But who has such fleets? And where can a situation of a long and protracted battle arise between them? In reality, we would be talking about units of ships fighting in strike groups. Maximum - about one and a half dozen. And again, the specifics of missile combat would work here as well.
The specifics listed above required a more adequate model than the Chase-Osipov-Lanchester model. And such a model was found.
Today it is called the "salvo model". And the equalities describing it are salvo equations. For a long time, this model, created by the American Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske in the 10s of the last century, was in the shadow of the Lanchester laws. Why?
It's simple. The logic of Fiske's salvo model was based on the following - sides A and B, entering the battle, have some initial strength. The battle itself looks like an exchange of volleys, and the stronger side has a stronger volley (for the artillery era, this was very logical). Moreover, each volley leads to the fact that the strength of the side that received this volley loses some of its power. In the end, the weaker side in an artillery battle dies, and the strongest has some part of the forces left - the residual.
Why didn't this model become dominant for a long time?
First, volleys are a conventional thing. Just watching battleship fire on a target in a ship destruction exercise (SINKEX) in 1989. Where are the exact boundaries of the volley?
Secondly, for calculations "according to Fiska" it was required to withdraw some given combat force and use it in the calculations. Aren't they coefficients in Lanchester's equations?
And thirdly (and this is the most important thing), taking into account how many conventional volleys were needed to completely destroy the enemy, the process became stretched out in time. The order of numbers describing the number of volleys turned out to be quite large. And in the end, calculations of battles between artillery ships and their detachments according to the Fiske model led to almost the same results as according to the Lanchester model.
The difference was always, but always minimal. In fact, it was about getting the same result in a different way: with the number of conventional volleys instead of time.
But the arrival of missiles in the fleets changed everything.
The missile era has changed the nature of naval combat beyond recognition. In the photo - Chinese ships on exercises. Photo: China daily
First, the salvo model operates with the number of salvos, not time. For the artillery era, it was the same thing. That is, in principle, it was even possible to deduce the dependence of volleys on time. In the missile era, a missile salvo can be viewed as a one-step action - target designation is formed, targets are distributed, a missile salvo is formed, launch. After that, after a short time, the blow is applied to all enemy ships over which it was distributed. That is, a discrete process (such as a single missile strike on a detected target, after which it is destroyed and the battle ends), the salvo model describes quite adequately, in contrast to the Lanchester equations.
Secondly, the salvo model made the difference between the strength (number) of the salvo and the number of units fighting the battle. This was her fundamental difference.
Thirdly, the fact that the force of the volley was set made it possible to take it into account not as a certain definite value, but as the difference between the initial force of the volley and that “part” of it, which the enemy can repulse, reflect. In reality, this is part of the missiles in a salvo that the enemy can shoot down.
As a result, the salvo model suddenly turned out to be incomparably more suitable for missile battles than any other. The question was who fully adapts it to the new realities.
This work was completed by the captain of the US Navy Wayne Huges, who is now considered in the US the creator of missile battle tactics in its final "for now" edition.
What do the salvo equations of missile combat look like?
Something like this.
∆ A - change in forces A after an enemy volley
∆ B - the same for B
α - offensive firepower A (anti-ship missiles in a salvo)
β - the same for B
y - defensive power A - the number of missiles capable of hitting anti-ship missiles
z - the same for B
u - damage A, hits / ship, for B the same parameter as vare defined as
u = 1 / w, v = 1 / x, where
w - survivability, the number of missiles, the passage of which leads to the death of any ship A
x - the same for any ship B
In reality, of course, the salvo model in this capacity is not entirely applicable. It lacks something important - the probability of hitting a target or repelling a strike. Meanwhile, all events in the war are of a probabilistic nature.
A trivial example. A missile going to an enemy ship can fail and fall into the water. Or an anti-aircraft missile launched towards an anti-ship missile can (due to a random factor) miss.
In fact, salvo models, adjusted for the probabilities of events and possible reinforcements for the fighting sides, as well as many other factors, exist. We will not contact them. Because it is important for us to understand the principle of WHAT really gives superiority in war at sea.
Let's fantasize about how the battle of small ship strike groups looks in a salvo model.
So, we have a clash of forces "Red" and "Blue". The "Reds" are poor, they have no money, the population is five times less than that of the "blue" (if we count with allies), they cannot count on a numerical superiority, and, accordingly, they do not have it. The strength of the "blue" forces will be defined as "A", the "red" as "B".
Suppose the Blues have five ships in a battle group. A = 5. Let's say each ship has 50 anti-aircraft missiles and 20 anti-ship missiles (the rest of the blue cells are occupied by other weapons).
In an extremely simplified form, we will assume that either side has 2 missiles to defeat one anti-ship missile system.
Next, we solve the first equation, and we will immediately look for the answer to the question - WHAT SHOULD THE RED SHOULD BE IN ORDER TO BEAT THE BLUE WITHOUT LOSS?
Why not, after all?
Then we have ∆ A = -5, that is, equal in magnitude to the original composition of the "blue" ships (100% loss), u will be taken as 0,5 (enough for 2 missiles to break through the air defense fire, one of which will be destroyed by the air defense systems the near zone, the second will finish off the ship, u = 1/2), we will determine the ratio β * B, respectively, it remains to determine y.
We believe that the "red" missiles are moving towards the target at a height of 5 meters, with a speed of 660 m / s. The height of the blue radar antennas will be 20 meters, then the line of sight for the blue ship will be 27650 meters. And within this radius, the "blue" will detect a salvo going on them 41 seconds before this salvo hits the designated targets (approximately).
We take 1 second for the automatic triggering of the ship's air defense (AEGIS has such a mode, and it works exactly in such a time), 40 seconds remain. We believe that all missiles have radar homing, the horizontal component of the flight speed is 1100 m / s, they do not need target illumination, the channeling of the complex does not matter, the target firing algorithm is 1 missile defense system per anti-ship missile system (we will take an unrealistic assumption in favor of the "blue" missiles knocks down 1 anti-ship missile in any case), the fire performance of a single ship is 1 missile defense system in 1 seconds. So it's even cooler than Arleigh Burke.
Breaking through such defenses is very difficult. We need a lot of rockets.
How many missiles under such favorable conditions will one blue ship be able to repulse? Answer - 13. The first anti-ship missile system will (?) Be struck at the 16th second after the launch of the first missile defense system, the last at the 40th. Respectively, y accept as 13.
The defender loses the first second by triggering the air defense system in the auth. mode, during this time the anti-ship missile will fly 660 m / s, then a missile defense system will come out to meet it. With the horizontal component of the SAM speed of 1100 m / s, they will meet at the 16th second.
Now let's just transform the first equation to determine the desired product β * B.
The final equality is as follows:
∆ A = - (β * By * A) * u
-5 = - (β * B-13 * 5) * 0.5
-10 = -β * B + 65
or the desired β * B = 75, where β is a missile salvo of one ship of the "red", and B is the number of such ships in the attacking group.
Well, then, as fantasy falls. For example, three frigates of project 22350 with the number of UKSK cells increased to 24 - this is up to 72 anti-ship missiles in a salvo, the maximum possible β * B = 72. Taking into account the fact that the ships must also have a PLUR, it turns out that four ships of the class " frigate "in our conditional problem with a margin would be enough to destroy five ships, similar to the American destroyer, without loss.
20 anti-ship missiles on each ship simply sank to the bottom without leaving the launchers.
Now is it clear how it works?
Outnumbering doesn't matter. Exactly one thing matters - the ability to strike first, with a salvo sufficient to destroy the enemy.
Let's clarify this - this is a model. And really it is necessary to add, firstly, the probability of an anti-aircraft missile hitting an anti-aircraft missile, the probability of an anti-aircraft missile arriving at the target, and a lot of other probabilities - each event in the process will have its own probability of an offensive. So, for example, in the example above, one missile defense system was guaranteed to shoot down one anti-ship missile, which cannot be used in real calculations.
The second point - the “red” caught the “blue” by surprise, and worked on them first and suddenly, as a result of which they were able to do without losses.
Later, Hughes in his equations introduced scouting effectiveness - "intelligence coefficient", which takes into account whether the "Reds" were able to detect and classify the order of "Blues" secretly for the latter, and deliver a sudden blow. Or there was an exchange of volleys until the complete destruction of one of the parties.
This is how it started to look.
where for one of the sides (A)
A - number of ships of side A
B - the number of ships of side B
a1 - defensive capabilities (number of missiles) A, for each ship
a2 - sustained damage, anti-ship missiles per ship
β - offensive capabilities B, anti-ship missiles
Sigma - intelligence factor
In principle, this is the same salvo equation, just with different designations of quantities and a "sigma", which was not in the above equation. If the reconnaissance of the attacking side B managed to identify the battle formation A and form the correct command control for the volley, then the "sigma" is equal to 1, if not - then zero.
For B, everything will be the same.
In general, let us repeat, salvo models, taking into account the probabilities of the occurrence of events, ensuring / not ensuring surprise, the effectiveness of reconnaissance, etc. - exists.
There are also calculations of the minimum forces that have a chance of winning against an enemy superior in strength, as well as the maximum number of forces, the build-up of which no longer leads to an increase in combat effectiveness, and much more.
What is important to us is the conclusion that was made above - the race for parity in pennants is not needed. Those who deny the need for sane military construction, arguing that we cannot catch up with NATO, either do not understand the essence of the issue under discussion, or are lying. There are no other options.
But what if we accept the loss of some of the ships in the attacking group? Then it will be possible to get by with less forces, we just have to come to terms with the fact that we will suffer losses (in a real war they will be in any case).
And if the enemy, who is outnumbered, will outplay us with the first salvo? Then the situation turns upside down, and we suddenly find out that there is no reception against the scrap? Not at all.
If anyone is interested, the volley equations make it easy to "play" with volleys - the first volley is delivered by A. V has so many forces left. These forces inflict retaliatory, etc. You can take the number of aircraft in the attack for B, recalculate for the attacked side y (the detection range of targets launched from aircraft according to their radar data will be several times higher, y will also be higher), take the number of missiles on one aircraft for β (for example, 2) etc. Where fantasy leads
What is important to the weaker side? Besides the fact that her ships could send a volley of the required strength to the target? Suddenness.
Fight for the first salvo
Article “Sea warfare for beginners. Interaction between surface ships and strike aircraft "was given one of the possible options for the start of the conflict. When our surface ships, tracking enemy ocean groupings, perform a successful first salvo, significantly reducing the numerical superiority of the enemy and creating favorable conditions for the start of systematic actions of our base strike aircraft against the enemy. It is the provision of the ability to execute such a volley that is the basis of sea power, and not an abstract "race of pennants" with the United States, NATO and anyone else.
It is worth repeating once again what he wrote in 1986 by the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy V.N. Chernavin:
“Such a specific feature as the growing role of the fight for the first salvo is becoming extremely important in modern naval combat. Preempting the enemy in striking a blow in battle is the main method of preventing his surprise attack, reducing his losses and inflicting the greatest damage on the enemy. "
Now you can see what it looks like mathematically.
The question arises - how to really ensure the advance of the enemy in a volley? The answer is intelligence is needed. For a country with limited resources, what can be said about Russia, the following rule should be taken as an axiom:
The striking power of the ships should be minimally sufficient to weaken the enemy's forward forces with the first salvo with minimal losses and create conditions for aviation operations. The power of aviation must be sufficient to inflict damage on enemy forces deployed at sea, excluding their achievement of victory over the Russian Navy (complete destruction is not necessary). And all the remaining resources should be directed to intelligence forces capable of operating in wartime conditions.
So, for example, this logic requires considering an aircraft carrier, first of all, as a means of reconnaissance, and only then as a struggle for air supremacy or providing air defense of ship formations. Naturally, this is true for a "big war" with superior enemy navies. In other situations, the logic will be different.
It is worth approaching the creation of ships with guided missile weapons not with the criterion of ensuring maximum striking power (the number of missiles), but from the standpoint of combining the minimum sufficient striking power, with the maximum possible number of reconnaissance means for a given displacement.
Let's give an example - Japanese destroyer-helicopter carriers of the Haruna and Shirane types with a displacement comparable to our destroyers of Project 956 (code Sarych), carried three helicopters.
In modern conditions, this can be a combination of a pair of universal marine helicopters (capable of fighting submarines, striking surface ships with guided missiles, carrying out reconnaissance using their radar and transmitting the received data to the ship) and a pair of small UAV helicopters, used purely for reconnaissance and occupying as much space as one normal helicopter.
The use of naval helicopters with missile weapons in war at sea has long been mainstream in the West. We must come to this too.
The second important condition is the speed of deployment of forces. In all its components: from the speed of decision-making to the speed of ships (both in economic motion and at maximum speed). Speed allows you to break apart scattered enemy groupings one by one, ensuring superiority in battle, including numerical, but not having a numerical advantage in general.
Some countries are well aware of this. Thus, the Japanese provide high speed for their warships. Their new frigates will apparently have about 34 knots of maximum speed, while the rest of the ships will have thirty or more.
Unfortunately, the global trends that speed is no longer important find supporters in our country as well - our warships today are much slower than those that went into operation thirty or forty years ago. This significantly reduces our ability to preempt the enemy in deployment, and, consequently, to fight for the first salvo.
This needs to be corrected.
Not having the technical ability to use resources comparable to the enemy for the development of sea power and technologies similar to his, you need to invest in the organization, equipment and training that allows you to win that very first salvo even in adverse conditions when the enemy is trying in every possible way to break contact, and in the future, in the course of hostilities, ensure the possibility of systematic infliction of heavy losses on the enemy (for example, by aviation).
No need to fantasize about nuclear suicide. Do not think that since the enemy is more numerous, you can only capitulate. In the end, in 1904, Japan faced a more numerous enemy, but not as ready for war, with forces divided between different theaters of operations. The result is known.
You just need to rationally approach the expected appearance of military operations in the near future, to determine the parameters of forces and means that will be used in these military operations.
And then just methodically and steadily train, prepare for military operations, not missing any trifles, carefully considering each step and rationally spending our modest resources.
You don't need anything beyond that. Including - it is not necessary to defeat even a more numerous enemy. And this can even be mathematically justified.
And the race for quantity is absolutely superfluous. Not only economically unaffordable, but also completely meaningless. Combat power can and should be obtained without it.
And this must be done.