Military Review

Soviet oil. Two hundred meters to the victory of Germany

107

If the Germans had captured Stalingrad, this gasoline simply would not have reached the front.


I must start this article with some apologies. When I described the seizure of the Maikop oil by the Germans, I took into account the context of the German oil plans, reflected in some archival documents. This context was known to me, but was not known to the readers, which gave rise to some misunderstanding of why the Germans were not particularly in a hurry to restore the Maikop oil fields. This context was that the Germans could not take the captured oil to Germany, and came to this conclusion even before the start of the war with the USSR.

An unusual circumstance that forces us to make significant adjustments to the understanding of the causes and background of various twists of the war, in particular, to the understanding of why the Germans tried so hard to seize Stalingrad, and in general why they needed it.

The oil problem has been the focus of the Nazi leadership since the earliest days of the Nazi regime, due to the fact that Germany was largely dependent on imported oil and oil products. The management tried to solve this problem (partly solved it successfully) by developing the production of synthetic fuel from coal. But at the same time, they looked at other sources of oil that could be in their sphere of influence, and calculated whether they could cover oil consumption in Germany and other European countries. Two notes were devoted to this issue. The first was compiled for the Research Center for War Economy by Professor of the University of Cologne, Dr. Paul Berkenkopf, in November 1939: "The USSR as an oil supplier to Germany" (Die Sowjetunion als deutscher Erdölliferant. RGVA, f. 1458, op. 40, d. 116). The second note was drawn up at the Institute of World Economy of the University of Kiel in February 1940: "The supply of Greater Germany and continental Europe with petroleum products in the current military complication of the situation" (Die Versorgung Großdeutschlands und Kontinentaleuropas mit Mineralölerzeugnissen während der gegenwärtigen kriegerischen Verwicklung. op. 500, d. 12463).

Soviet oil. Two hundred meters to the victory of Germany

Title page of the note by the Institute for World Economy, University of Kiel

Just an explanation about Greater Germany. This is a political-geographical term with a clear meaning, meaning Germany after all territorial acquisitions since 1937, that is, together with the Sudetenland, Austria and a number of territories of former Poland annexed to the Reich.

These notes reflect German views of a certain stage of the war, when Romania, with its oil reserves, was still a country that was unfriendly to Germany, and its oil was still under the control of French and British firms, who did not want to sell oil to the Germans. The USSR at that time was still a country friendly to Germany. Therefore, it is clearly noticeable that the authors of both documents talk about the possibility of using Soviet oil exports without attempting to redistribute the consumption of oil and oil products in the USSR in favor of Germany.

How much oil do you need? You can't get so much!


Oil consumption during wartime in Germany was estimated at 6-10 million tons per year, with reserves for 15-18 months.

Available resources were estimated as follows.

Oil production in Germany - 0,6 million tons.
Synthetic gasoline - 1,3 million tons.
Expansion of synthetic gasoline production in the near future - 0,7 million tons,
Import from Galicia - 0,5 million tons.
Import from Romania - 2 million tons.
Total - 5,1 million tons (TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12463, d. 190, l. 3).

However, there were other estimates of military fuel consumption, which ranged from 12 to 15-17 million tons, but the authors of the Institute for World Economy in Kiel decided to proceed from consumption of 8-10 million tons per year. From this point of view, the situation did not look so stable. The production of synthetic fuel could be brought, according to their estimates, to 2,5-3 million tons, and the import accounted for 5 to 7 million tons of oil. Even in times of peace, Germany needed a lot of imports. In 1937 consumption amounted to 5,1 million tons (and in 1938 increased to 6,2 million tons, that is, by more than a million tons), domestic production - 2,1 million tons, import 3,8 million tons. tons; thus, Germany supplied itself by 41,3% (TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12463, d. 190, l. 7). Together with Austria and the Sudetenland, consumption in 1937 (calculated figures were used) reached 6 million tons, domestic production - 2,2 million tons, and the coverage of needs with its resources was only 36%.

Polish trophies gave the Germans another 507 thousand tons of oil and 586 million cubic meters of gas, of which 289 million cubic meters were spent on obtaining gasoline - 43 thousand tons (TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12463, d. 190, l. 12) ... A little, and this did not bring a serious improvement in the situation.

Oil imports to Germany before the war were in the hands of potential adversaries. Out of 5,1 million tons of imports in 1938, the United States accounted for 1,2 million tons of oil and petroleum products, the Netherlands America (Aruba) and Venezuela - 1,7 million tons. Romania exported 912 thousand tons of oil and oil products to Germany, the USSR - 79 thousand tons. In general, one disorder. The Institute for World Economy in Kiel has calculated that in the event of a blockade, Germany can only count on 20-30% of the pre-war imports.

German experts were interested in how much oil is consumed by the neutral countries of continental Europe, which, in the event of a blockade of sea transport, will turn either to Germany or to the same sources of oil as Germany. The conclusion of the calculations was not particularly comforting. The neutrals together consumed 9,6 million tons of oil and oil products in 1938, and the import into them amounted to 9,1 million tons, that is, almost the entire volume (TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12463, d. 190, l . 17-18). 14,2 million tons of the needs of the whole of Europe, Germany and neutral countries, which are satisfied by imports, of which 2,8 million tons are from Romania and the USSR, and the rest is from the hostile overseas.

The Soviet Union attracted Germany with its large oil production, which in 1938 amounted to 29,3 million tons, and huge oil reserves - 3,8 billion tons in reserves confirmed at the beginning of 1937. Therefore, in principle, the Germans could count on the fact that they would be able to improve their oil balance, as well as the oil balance of the neutral countries of continental Europe, at the expense of Soviet oil.

But, to the great chagrin of the Germans, the USSR consumed almost all of its oil production itself. They did not know the exact figures, but they could deduct the volume of export from the production, and they found that in 1938 the USSR produced 29,3 million tons, consumed 27,9 million tons and exported 1,4 million tons. At the same time, the consumption of the civilian sector was estimated by the Germans at 22,1 million tons of oil products, the military - 0,4 million tons, and therefore in Kiel they were confident that the USSR was accumulating annual reserves of 3-4 million tons of oil or oil products. (TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12463, d. 190, l. 21-22).

The USSR and Romania exported oil to different countries. If, in the event of a naval blockade of continental Europe, the entire volume of export Romanian and Soviet oil will go to Germany and to neutral countries, then in this case the deficit will be 9,2 million tons - according to estimates of pre-war consumption (TsAMO RF, fund 500, op. 12463, d.190, l.30).


Table with calculation of oil deficit in continental Europe

From this it was concluded: “Eine vollständige Selbstversorgung Kontinentaleuropas mit Mineralölerzeugnissen nach dem Stande der Jahre 1937 und 1938 ist also nicht möglich, auch wenn eine ausschließliche Belieferung Kontürgetaleuropas durch Rumändendendenrußen That is, even if all the export oil from Romania and the USSR will be sent to continental Europe, it will still not be enough. Whatever one may say, but 5-10 million tons of oil must be obtained from somewhere else, not from Europe. Let the Italians think about where to get oil, since Romanian and Soviet oil must be exported to Germany.

Transportation difficulties


In addition to the fact that there was clearly not enough oil at all, it was also difficult to deliver it to Germany and to most of the neutral countries of continental Europe. Soviet oil exports went through the Black Sea, especially through Batumi and Tuapse. But the fact is that Germany had no direct access to either the Black Sea or the Mediterranean. The tankers were supposed to sail around Europe, through Gibraltar controlled by Great Britain, across the English Channel, the North Sea and on to German ports. This path was already actually blocked at the time of drawing up the note at the Institute for World Economy in Kiel.

Romanian and Soviet oil could be transported by sea to Trieste, then controlled by the Italians, and loaded onto the railroad there. In this case, part of the oil would inevitably go to Italy.

Therefore, the Germans offered another option, which now seems fantastic. The USSR was supposed to export Caucasian oil by its ships along the Volga, through the channels of the Mariinsky water system to Leningrad and there to load it into sea tankers (TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12463, d. 190, l. 38). The Volga was the largest waterway through which oil was transported, and according to the second five-year plan, as the Germans knew, the canals of the Mariinsky system had to be reconstructed and their capacity was to increase from 3 to 25 million tons per year. This would be the best option for them. In any case, researchers at the Institute for World Economy in Kiel advocated precisely for him.

Other options for transporting Soviet oil to Germany were also considered. The Danube option was also very profitable, but required an increase in the Danube tanker fleet... The Institute of World Economy believed that it was necessary to build an oil pipeline in South-Eastern Europe in order to facilitate the transportation of oil along the Danube (TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12463, d. 190, l. 40). Dr. Berkenkopf had a slightly different opinion. He believed that transportation along the Danube was difficult, firstly, due to the apparent lack of capacity of the Danube fleet of barges and tankers, which are involved in the transportation of Romanian oil, and, secondly, due to the fact that Soviet tankers could not enter the mouth of the Danube. The Romanian port of Sulina could only accept ships up to 4-6 thousand brt, while Soviet tankers were larger. Tankers of the "Moscow" type (3 units) - 8,9 thousand grt, tankers of the "Emba" type (6 units) - 7,9 thousand grt. The Sovtanker fleet included 14 more tankers of various types and capacities, but the newest ships were actually excluded from oil transportation along the Danube route (RGVA, f. 1458, op. 40, d. 116, l. 18). In some perspective, the Danube was very profitable, and in May 1942, at a meeting between Hitler and Reich Minister of Armaments Albert Speer, the issue of building large harbors in Linz, Krems, Regensburg, Passau and Vienna, that is, in the upper reaches of the Danube (Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Hitlers Konferenzen mit Albert Speer 1942-1945. Frankfurt am Main, "Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion", 1969, S. 107). But in order to launch the Danube route to the capacity required for Germany and even more so for the entire continental Europe, it took several years for the construction of a tanker fleet and ports.

Railroad transportation of oil in the USSR was commonplace. Of the 39,3 billion tonne-kilometers of oil transportation in 1937, 30,4 billion tonne-kilometers fell on railway transport, of which 10,4 billion tonne-kilometers were routes over 2000 km long (RGVA, f. 1458, op. 40, d. 116, l. 12). Petroleum products, produced mainly in the Caucasus, were transported throughout the country. But the Germans, in particular, Berkenkopf, looked at this with horror, as an irrational consumption of resources and overloading of railway transport. River and sea transport from their point of view was more profitable.

Oil was transported to Germany by rail from the port of Odessa and further along the route: Odessa - Zhmerynka - Lemberg (Lvov) - Krakow - and further to Upper Silesia. In oil supplies from the USSR to Germany, which were in 1940-1941 (606,6 thousand tons in 1940 and 267,5 thousand tons in 1941), oil was transported by this very road. At the Przemysl border station, oil was pumped from tanks on the Soviet track to tanks on the European track. This was inconvenient, and therefore the Germans would like the USSR to allow the construction of a highway on the European 1435 mm gauge directly to Odessa (TsAMO RF, f. 500, op. 12463, d. 190, l. 40).


Przemysl station. Transferring oil from Soviet tanks to German

Why is that? Because, as Dr. Berkenkopf wrote, the Soviet railways were overloaded and could not handle a large volume of export cargo, and this line, Odessa - Lvov - Przemysl, was relatively little loaded. Berkenkopf estimated its throughput capacity at 1-2 million tons of oil per year; for the transportation of 1 million tons, 5 thousand tanks of 10 tons each were required (RGVA, f. 1458, op. 40, d. 116, l. 17).

Since the USSR did not alter the main line to Odessa on the European track, but on the contrary, managed to alter part of the railways in Western Ukraine to the Soviet track before the war began, the Germans had to be satisfied with what they had: severely limited supply opportunities through Odessa and by rail. Berkenkopf expressed the idea that it would be nice if an oil pipeline was built in the USSR to the border station, but this also did not happen.

200 meters to the victory of Germany


This is what German specialists wrote about the situation with oil. Now is the time for extravagant conclusions.

The first and most striking conclusion: the Germans, with all their desire, could not rob Soviet oil, simply due to the lack of opportunities to export it to Germany and other European countries. The pre-war oil transportation infrastructure did not allow Germany to export more than a million tons per year, practically even less.

Even if the Germans won a complete victory and captured the entire oil industry in perfect working order or with minor damage, it would take them 5-6 years to build a fleet or oil pipelines for the Caucasian oil to actually go to Germany and the rest of Europe.

In addition, of the 21 Sovtanker tankers in 1941, the German aviation and the fleet sunk 3 tankers and in 1942 - 7 tankers. That is, the Germans themselves have reduced the Soviet tanker fleet in the Black Sea by almost half. They got only one tanker, Grozneft, a former cruiser rebuilt into a tanker (it turned out to be armored, since the cruiser's armor was not removed), which in 1934 was converted into a barge, and since 1938 was laid up in Mariupol and was sunk there in October 1941 during the retreat. The Germans raised him. Formally a tanker, but unsuitable for sea transportation.


Tanker "Grozneft", sunk in Mariupol


Tanker "Mikhail Gromov", 836 brt; such a tanker could easily enter the port of Sulina on the Danube. German torpedo bombers sank it on June 2, 1942, 40 miles from Yalta. The undoubted success of the pilots. Getting into such a small ship with a torpedo is not easy. But this success alienated Germany from Caucasian oil

So, the Germans did not get the Soviet tanker fleet in the trophies, they did not have their own on the Black Sea, the Romanian tanker fleet, Danube and sea, was busy with current shipments. Therefore, the Germans, having seized Maykop, were not particularly in a hurry to restore the oil fields, in view of the fact that there were no opportunities for the export of oil in Germany and were not foreseen in the near future. They could use the captured oil only for the current needs of troops and aviation.

The second conclusion: we clearly perceive Hitler's well-known thesis that it is necessary to seize the Caucasian oil. We are used to thinking that we are talking about exploitation. But Hitler undoubtedly read either these notes or other materials based on them, and therefore knew well that the supply of Caucasian oil to Germany was a matter of some distant future, and it would be impossible to do this immediately after the seizure. So the meaning of Hitler's demand to seize the Caucasian oil was different: that the Soviets did not get it. That is, to deprive the Red Army of fuel and thereby deprive it of the opportunity to conduct hostilities. Purely strategic sense.

The offensive on Stalingrad solved this problem much better than the offensive on Grozny and Baku. The fact is that not only mining, but also processing before the war were concentrated in the Caucasus. Large refineries: Baku, Grozny, Batumi, Tuapse and Krasnodar. A total of 32,7 million tons of capacity. Cutting communications to them would be tantamount to seizing the oil-producing regions themselves. Water communications are the Volga, and railways are highways to the west of the Don. Before the war, the Lower Volga had no railway bridges, the lowest of them was only in Saratov (commissioned in 1935). Railway communication with the Caucasus was carried out mainly through Rostov.

Therefore, the capture of Stalingrad by the Germans would mean an almost complete loss of Caucasian oil, even if it was still in the hands of the Red Army. It would have been impossible to take it out, with the exception of a relatively small export from Baku by sea to Krasnovodsk and further along the railway in a roundabout way through Central Asia. How serious would that be? We can say that it is serious. In addition to the blocked Caucasian oil, Bashkiria, Emba, Fergana and Turkmenistan would remain with a total production in 1938 of 2,6 million tons of oil, or 8,6% of the pre-war allied production. This is about 700 thousand tons of gasoline per year, or 58 thousand tons per month, which, of course, is pitiful crumbs. In 1942, the average monthly consumption of fuel and lubricants in the army was 221,8 thousand tons, of which 75% was gasoline of all grades, that is, 166,3 thousand tons of gasoline. Thus, the needs of the army would be 2,8 times more than the remaining oil refining could supply. This is a situation of defeat and collapse of the army due to lack of fuel.

How long did the Germans not reach the Volga in Stalingrad? 150-200 meters? These meters separated them from victory.

Well, is your hair moving? Genuinely documentary история much more interesting and dramatic than the one described in colorful myths.
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  1. apro
    apro 6 September 2020 05: 43 New
    +6
    How long did the Germans not reach the Volga in Stalingrad? 150-200 meters? These meters separated them from victory.

    In addition, the mining of the Volga is also a threat to tanker shipping.
    The author has correctly stated. So let it not get to anyone ... Mother oil.
    But the fact that 200 meters was not enough for them is so. For a word of mouth. They did not have enough reserves. They too much opened their mouths.
    1. Kisa
      Kisa 6 September 2020 06: 39 New
      +7
      and I didn’t catch it - if the author develops the thesis to block the Volga as one of the methods of oil transportation, then why was it impossible to reach the Volga above or below Stalingrad and achieve the same result without such catastrophic losses?
      1. Sugar Honeyovich
        Sugar Honeyovich 6 September 2020 14: 18 New
        -1
        Quote: kitty
        to reach the Volga above or below Stalingrad and achieve the same result without such catastrophic losses?

        Warranty?
      2. zenion
        zenion 6 September 2020 14: 59 New
        +3
        Higher or lower? And there was a railway, the main supplier of the Wehrmacht? Who needs the steppe if there is nothing to transport across it? The Germans tried across the Kalmyk steppes, but nothing worked. How much has gone, so much has been lost.
    2. Reviews
      Reviews 6 September 2020 06: 54 New
      +7
      Quote: apro
      the fact that 200 meters was not enough for them is so.

      ... besides, they have overcome these "150-200 meters":
      "At 16 o'clock on August 23, 1942, the strike group of the 6th German Army broke through to the Volga near the northern outskirts of Stalingrad, in the area of ​​the villages Latoshinka, Akatovka, Rynok"
      1. Ascold1901
        Ascold1901 7 September 2020 09: 27 New
        0
        Right. Corridor 8 km wide.
    3. The comment was deleted.
  2. Mavrikiy
    Mavrikiy 6 September 2020 06: 20 New
    +1
    We are used to thinking that we are talking about exploitation
    belay Yes Yes. Krivoy Rog ore, Donetsk anthracite, Georgian Barzhomi. All from the wheels. what
  3. Captivity
    Captivity 6 September 2020 06: 46 New
    +1
    But they could have struck south of Stalingrad, in Kalmykia. Walk to the Volga. And cut the oil delivery.
    Only for some reason the fascists were fixated on Stalingrad.
    For Hitler it was a matter of principle
    1. mat-vey
      mat-vey 6 September 2020 08: 17 New
      +1
      Quote: Captivity
      But they could have struck south of Stalingrad, in Kalmykia. Walk to the Volga. And cut the oil delivery.
      Only for some reason the fascists were fixated on Stalingrad.
      For Hitler it was a matter of principle

      Are you "stuck"? The Stalingrad front was a lengthy one. about 520 km.
      1. Captivity
        Captivity 6 September 2020 08: 38 New
        +2
        In Kalmykia, there was no continuous front either. It happened that one battalion covered 10 km.
        1. mat-vey
          mat-vey 6 September 2020 08: 40 New
          -1
          And where would they get the strength? Should we remove from other directions? Well, then there will be even less battalion by 10 km ...
          1. Captivity
            Captivity 6 September 2020 10: 00 New
            -5
            Well, that's usually what they do. They are taken from other directions. It was possible straight from Stalingrad. They didn't do a damn thing.
            1. mat-vey
              mat-vey 6 September 2020 10: 25 New
              +3
              Quote: Captivity
              They didn't do a damn thing.

              Is this a joke?
              1. Captivity
                Captivity 6 September 2020 11: 36 New
                -1
                For whom and a joke.
                Can be hammered into the wall. And you can go around.
                1. mat-vey
                  mat-vey 6 September 2020 11: 45 New
                  +5
                  Quote: Captivity
                  For whom and a joke.
                  Can be hammered into the wall. And you can go around.

                  Well, yes, will the "wall" watch you cut across the steppes, or will it move to your rear?
                  1. Captivity
                    Captivity 6 September 2020 12: 30 New
                    +1
                    All operations were carried out this way.
                    Blitzkrieg is generally based on this only.
                    1. mat-vey
                      mat-vey 6 September 2020 12: 32 New
                      0
                      Quote: Captivity
                      Blitzkrieg is generally based on this only.

                      Blitzkrieg, 1942? Clearly ...
                      1. Captivity
                        Captivity 6 September 2020 13: 30 New
                        -1
                        Of course it's clear. Is there only blitzkrieg? In fact, all military operations are carried out in secret. Is that clear too? Or does this not apply to 1942?
                      2. mat-vey
                        mat-vey 6 September 2020 13: 41 New
                        0
                        Well, of course it's clear - in order to carry out operations, human, material and technical resources are needed, and just as they say logistics now ... Or does this not apply to the German army?
                      3. Captivity
                        Captivity 6 September 2020 18: 32 New
                        -1
                        And indeed, where did the Germans get the human, material and technical resources, and how do they say logistics now? Especially in 42.
                      4. mat-vey
                        mat-vey 7 September 2020 05: 10 New
                        0
                        Quote: Captivity
                        And indeed, where did the Germans get the human, material and technical resources, and how do they say logistics now? Especially in 42.

                        Really fools - everything was there, but they did not use it ... probably you were not enough in the General Staff ...
                      5. Captivity
                        Captivity 7 September 2020 07: 59 New
                        +1
                        It is stupid when decisions are made not by the General Staff, but by a fool who has seized power, who thinks himself a great and infallible strategist. In this sense, Stalin turned out to be much more prudent and did not meddle in his own business and let the military do what they knew how.
                      6. mat-vey
                        mat-vey 7 September 2020 15: 36 New
                        0
                        Quote: Captivity
                        It is stupid when the decisions are made not by the General Staff, but by a fool who has seized power, who thinks of himself as a great and infallible strategist.

                        If you asked, you would be aware that the Germans fought in the steppes more than in Stalingrad itself ...
                      7. Ruswolf
                        Ruswolf 7 September 2020 15: 50 New
                        +2
                        Quote: Captivity
                        It's stupid when decisions are made not by the General Staff, but by a fool who has seized power

                        What does a fool mean. This fool came to power, freed Germany from shameful treaties, conquered Europe, North Africa. And he did all this in a short time.
                        But Mother Russia was too tough. Like many others at all times. She is strong by the Russian spirit and by her people. And he tried to calculate it by the availability of equipment and the number of soldiers. Like Europe. Only there, except for the Yugoslavs and Spanish patriots, no one fought.
                        IMHO hi
                  2. Ruswolf
                    Ruswolf 7 September 2020 15: 40 New
                    0
                    Quote: Captivity
                    And indeed, where did the Germans get the human, material and technical resources, and how do they say logistics now? Especially in 42.

                    Human resources supplied by allies
                    In Stalingrad, in addition to the 6th Army of Paulus and the 4th Panzer Army of Gotha, there were 2 Romanian armies (covering the flanks, and further north along the Don was the 8th Army of Italians and the 2nd Hungarian Army.
                    They are certainly not so hot fighters - not like the Germans, but they did the same.
                  3. mat-vey
                    mat-vey 7 September 2020 16: 05 New
                    0
                    Quote: Ruswolf
                    there were 2 Romanian armies (covering the flanks, and further north along the Don was the 8th Italian Army and the 2nd Hungarian Army.

                    If the Germans had free resources, no one would have put these warriors on the flanks ... how much better there is one German soldier per kilometer of the front than the Romanians ... a quote from memory (I can’t vouch for literalness of course) I don’t remember which German general.
                  4. Ruswolf
                    Ruswolf 7 September 2020 18: 58 New
                    0
                    Quote: mat-vey
                    If the Germans had free resources, no one would have put these warriors on the flanks ...

                    I agree with you. The encirclement of Paulus began precisely with the fact that the Romanian armies were crushed. And in addition, the Germans had to pacify the Romanian-Hungarian parties. They fiercely hated each other because of territorial claims.
          2. Ruswolf
            Ruswolf 7 September 2020 15: 28 New
            0
            Quote: Captivity
            In fact, all military operations are carried out in secret.

            “In theory, the surprise factor can play into your hands. But in practice, frictional force comes into play when the creak of your car warns the enemy of danger.
            Carl von Clausewitz
            All the secret becomes clear.
          3. mat-vey
            mat-vey 7 September 2020 15: 39 New
            0
            Yes, sabotage groups roamed about the steppes, but in the steppes you cannot hide the movement of large groups - "I can see everything from the top, you just know" ...
  • Cypa
    Cypa 8 September 2020 08: 19 New
    0
    Normal heroes always go around. Aibolit 66
  • aglet
    aglet 6 September 2020 10: 03 New
    -2
    "The Stalingrad front was about 520 km long."
    after the seizure of the Stavropol Territory, holes were formed in the front, in short, the Germans could reach the tank without problems, but they did not, it was evident that they realized that oil could not be taken out to Vaterland, and they decided to block it in Stalingrad, again it did not work
    1. mat-vey
      mat-vey 6 September 2020 10: 25 New
      0
      Quote: aglet
      "The Stalingrad front was about 520 km long."
      after the seizure of the Stavropol Territory, holes were formed in the front, in short, the Germans could reach the tank without problems, but they did not, it was evident that they realized that oil could not be taken out to Vaterland, and they decided to block it in Stalingrad, again it did not work

      The question is the same - And where would they get the strength? To remove from other directions?
  • Olgovich
    Olgovich 6 September 2020 08: 38 New
    0
    Quote: Captivity
    And cut the oil delivery.

    it was discontinued in July 1942
  • Trapp1st
    Trapp1st 6 September 2020 12: 31 New
    +7
    But they could have struck south of Stalingrad, in Kalmykia. Walk to the Volga.
    And get hit from the flank with the prospect of a boiler in the steppe.
  • bk0010
    bk0010 6 September 2020 14: 03 New
    +7
    Quote: Captivity
    But they could have struck south of Stalingrad, in Kalmykia. Walk to the Volga. And cut the oil delivery.
    Only for some reason the fascists were fixated on Stalingrad.
    For Hitler it was a matter of principle

    There they could not be supplied, IMHO. No railways or highways.
  • Ascold1901
    Ascold1901 7 September 2020 09: 29 New
    0
    How to supply troops in Kalmykia?
  • your1970
    your1970 8 September 2020 07: 02 New
    0
    Quote: Captivity
    in Kalmykia

    In Kalmykia in the late USSR, even then there was not much logistics, and only in the 40s ...
    Throwing a division there is like a handful of sand in the Sahara ...
  • parusnik
    parusnik 6 September 2020 06: 54 New
    +6
    Well, is your hair moving?
    ..No, didn’t move ..
    We clearly perceive Hitler's well-known thesis that it is necessary to seize the Caucasian oil. We are used to thinking that we are talking about exploitation.
    .. There is no need to generalize here .. smile ... Dig up the history of the civil war, the defense of Tsaritsin, Astrakhan, and especially where and in what quantities oil went to the Soviet Republic when it was surrounded by fronts ... And in many works about the Battle of Stalingrad, the battle for the Caucasus, it is indicated that the purpose of these operations, the deprivation of the Red Army, the resource base, transport communications ...
    1. your1970
      your1970 8 September 2020 07: 06 New
      0
      About Algemba also ... That saga was also ...
  • Vitaly Tsymbal
    Vitaly Tsymbal 6 September 2020 07: 46 New
    +1
    War is not only logistics ... True, at that time, probably in Russian (I don’t know about German) there was no word “logistics”, there was logistical support for the army. The author cites pre-war documents, and not those that were during the Stalingrad battle. Ever since my school days, it always bothered me that some historians explained that Hitler (precisely as a person, as the leader of the German people, as the Fuhrer of fascist ideology) clung to Stalingrad to the last because of oil. Then in the Soviet school they did not speak openly about the fact that in 41-42 many Soviet servicemen were taken prisoner, about betrayal, etc. For that, it was clearly indicated that Hitler was counting on the fact that as a result of the first crushing blows in the west of the USSR, the country would fall apart into separate national states. Stalin and the party, despite the losses and defeats of 41-42 years, managed to keep the country united. Hitler would have taken Stalingrad, and the city was already practically captured and the Germans reached the Volga and seemingly interrupted the "water oil route", but there was no crisis with the supply of oil and fuel for the army from Baku and Grozny. The forces and means were accumulated to encircle Paulus's army. My opinion is that the Battle of Stalingrad was more of an ideological nature. Hitler with his "maniacalism of superiority" - I am stronger than Stalin, tried to solve the issues of consolidation around Germany, not only of those who had not yet joined in the hostilities against the USSR (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Japan), but also to strengthen the faith of the Germans in their infallibility (German losses on the eastern front were very palpable for the citizens of the Reich, and ferment was already beginning in German minds). Therefore, the material is interesting, but it shows only one side of the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad. Thanks to the author.
  • Olgovich
    Olgovich 6 September 2020 08: 33 New
    +1
    Oil consumption during wartime in Germany was estimated at 6-10 million tons per year, with reserves for 15-18 months.

    In principle, it was possible to ensure such consumption in Germany:

    in addition to the above-mentioned sources of oil, Germany received oil from Hungary -1,5 million tons, Austria -1,5 million tons, Germany itself increased production from .05 million to 1,5 million tons (in Hanover), and hundreds of thousand tons went from Czechochlovakia, Albania, Poland and Western Ukraine.

    The problem is that the actual consumption turned out to be 15 million tons.

    The Germans performed very unsuccessfully in Iraq, where they were defeated by the British, and Iran was taken by the same British and the USSR, so that oil did not come from there either.

    The Germans also worked poorly with Romania: before them, in 1936, the Romanians mined 8,5 million tons, and under the Germans, only ... 5,5 million tons per year ...

    How many Germans did not reach to the Volga in Stalingrad? 150-200 meters? These meters separated them from victory.

    Strange statement: Germans out to the Volga north of Staligrad for several kilometers (Latoshkino, etc.) back in August 1942, in Staligrad itself they also reached the Volga in more than one place.

    And already with July 1942 d. navigation on the Volga was interrupted, oil delivery has stopped.
    1. aglet
      aglet 6 September 2020 10: 07 New
      +2
      "The Germans performed very unsuccessfully in Iraq, where they were defeated by the British, and Iran was taken by the same British and the USSR, so the oil did not come from there either."
      How could one then deliver oil from Iraq to Germany, even if no one interfered?
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 6 September 2020 10: 30 New
        -1
        Quote: aglet
        how could oil be delivered from Iraq to Germany then, even if no one interfered?

        The land route, as it were, but without pipelines, yes: Iraq-Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Germany.

        And the pipelines went to the Basra port, and in the sea - the British, you are right.

        BUT, on the other hand, through Spain, the Germans through the Anglo-Saxon Atlantic quite got oil products for themselves ... So I think there were options.

        But they were nipped on horseback ...
        1. aglet
          aglet 6 September 2020 10: 46 New
          +2
          "BUT, on the other hand, through Spain, the Germans through the Anglo-Saxon Atlantic quite themselves received oil products ... So, I think there were options."
          there gasoline went from yus, therefore there were no options_- trade with neutrals, who will touch them
        2. Nikolai Miracles
          Nikolai Miracles 6 September 2020 14: 46 New
          0
          Since 1934, the following oil pipelines were in operation: Kirkuk - Tripoli (Lebanon) and Kirkuk - Haifa. Lebanon was a French mandate (Vichy since 1940).
          https://e-migration.ru/iraq/neft-v-irake.html
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 6 September 2020 15: 43 New
            -1
            Quote: Nikolai Chudov
            1934 oil pipelines worked: Kirkuk - Tripoli (Lebanon) and Kirkuk --- Haifa. Lebanon was a French mandate (Vichy since 1940).

            1.Tripoli is Libya

            2. Again, the Mediterranean was also largely controlled by the British.
            1. Nikolai Miracles
              Nikolai Miracles 6 September 2020 18: 06 New
              +1
              Two cities named Tripoli: in Libya and in Lebanon. Oil pipeline to Lebanese Tripoli. https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8_(%D0%9B%D0%B8% D0% B2% D0% B0% D0% BD)
              Quote: Olgovich
              Again, the Mediterranean was also largely controlled by the British.

              After the capture of Crete, the Eastern Mediterranean was not very controlled. The path along the Turkish coast, through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to Romania, then along the Danube or by oil pipeline, by rail.
              1. Olgovich
                Olgovich 7 September 2020 09: 19 New
                +1
                Quote: Nikolai Chudov
                After the capture of Crete, the Eastern Mediterranean was not very controlled. The path along the Turkish coast, through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to Romania, then along the Danube or by oil pipeline, by rail.

                Those. Iraqi oil was quite accessible to Germany, they simply let it go, or rather, they didn't have enough strength for everything ...
                1. Nikolai Miracles
                  Nikolai Miracles 7 September 2020 17: 05 New
                  +1
                  The military coup in Iraq in April 1941 came as a surprise to Hitler; it was a purely Arab initiative. In Germany, they did not know what to do about it, otherwise the whole war could have gone differently.
                  1. Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko
                    Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko 7 September 2020 18: 48 New
                    0
                    I couldn't - Germany was already tearing up resources, army and logistics in April! Resist still Greece and Yugoslavia, and on June 22 it did not take place at all. And, I agree with you, the war would have acquired a completely different course - the transfer of "Barbarossa" to 1942 and so on, but this is an alternative. The story happened the way it happened.
                    1. Nikolai Miracles
                      Nikolai Miracles 7 September 2020 19: 13 New
                      +1
                      "Barbarossa" on Iraqi oil is a completely different story. Hitler slept through Iraq.
  • Fitter65
    Fitter65 6 September 2020 09: 04 New
    +4
    How long did the Germans not reach the Volga in Stalingrad? 150-200 meters? These meters separated them from victory.
    And it is possible to clarify, but did not the distance from the Volga bank of 150-200 prevent the German troops from controlling the transportation on the river? Even with the greater remoteness of the German troops from the coastline, the number of traffic on the river was greatly reduced, and in some periods it was completely interrupted.
    1. Victor Red
      Victor Red 6 September 2020 16: 47 New
      +1
      Why do you think the BAM was dismantled?
      The complete capture of the city would create the preconditions for crossing the Volga with all that it implies.
    2. antivirus
      antivirus 6 September 2020 21: 42 New
      +1
      28.3.17.
      antivirus 2 Today, 19:36 ↑
      On the issue of starched shirts and honor.
      Yakov Mikhailovich Glazunov, captain of the Volga Shipping Company, brother-in-law of my acquaintance, b.
      "They summon him, in the summer, to the management of the shipping company, to Gorky (perhaps Kuibyshev?), They say:
      - "go to Stalingrad, everyone who can be evacuated there"
      Loaded at the pier. A raid began, they were quickly kicked out of the pier.
      He went along the shore.
      - "if it hits, then I will swim to the coast, and others who will survive"
      And the second ship went in the middle and drowned,
      children injured.
      They laid out white sheets with red crosses on the deck.
      "The fascist threw, threw, but missed. I kept dodging and left."
      "Every time he told me with a cry"
  • ccsr
    ccsr 6 September 2020 11: 19 New
    +1
    Author:
    Dmitry Verkhoturov
    How long did the Germans not reach the Volga in Stalingrad? 150-200 meters? These meters separated them from victory.

    This is clearly a far-fetched conclusion - by the beginning of 1943, we not only learned how to fight, but also created huge production capacities inside the country, so if there were delays in the provision of fuel, it would not be for long, if only because we simply built a new bypass railway. etc. the road. So in 1943 it was already clearly evident that the German military potential was not able to provide compensation for combat losses, but the Soviet military-industrial complex not only coped with this, but also constantly increased the production of weapons, which ultimately became the basis of our Victory. In general, some clever German commanders determined the outcome of the war back in 1941, when the blitzkrieg broke - they simply realized that Germany would lose to the allies in a protracted war, and this was obvious to military professionals, not fanatics.
    1. antivirus
      antivirus 6 September 2020 21: 45 New
      +1
      in 1941, when the blitzkrieg broke, they simply realized that Germany would lose to the allies in a protracted war, and this was obvious to military professionals, not fanatics.
      about fanatics and pros: does everything depend on Putin? Or are there solutions that are brought to him by ready?
      so with Hitler - to take oil from there, sugar --Xcountry, rubber --xxx country, conclusions from the rutabaga winter were correct. thousands of analysts-directors-accountants worked without fanaticism (now they are effective managers)
    2. Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko
      Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko 7 September 2020 18: 53 New
      +1
      And why does everyone discount the supply of fuels and lubricants under Lend-Lease? Iran was occupied by us in September 1941. The supplies would simply go through Turkmenistan and further to the central part of the country. In any case, the USSR would have gotten out, but Germany was doomed until September 1, 1030. Alas, Fact.
  • VS
    VS 6 September 2020 11: 52 New
    +7
    Actually, beyond the Volga, the rails were thrown - those that were removed from the Baikal-Amur Mainline))) The Germans completely went out to the Volga and shot the river - having blocked navigation on it, but in the steppe beyond the Volga from Astrakhan, a railway was already ready)))
    1. Trapp1st
      Trapp1st 6 September 2020 14: 06 New
      +4
      beyond the Volga from Astrakhan, a railway was already ready
      I remember
      During the war, Stalin instructed Baibakov to discover new oil fields. When Baibakov objected that it was impossible, Stalin replied: - There will be oil, there will be Baibakov, there will be no oil, there will be no Baibakov! Deposits were soon discovered in Tataria and Bashkiria.
  • Knell wardenheart
    Knell wardenheart 6 September 2020 13: 09 New
    0
    The logic of the export of crude oil from the USSR by the Germans after its seizure is incomprehensible - after all, there were capacities and hands to process it into fuel already in place - which would require much less transport capabilities.
    And yes, very interesting conclusions ..
    1. your1970
      your1970 8 September 2020 07: 15 New
      0
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      because there were power and hands in order to process it into fuel already in place

      This is unrealistic ... the refinery is too tasty and easily vulnerable target - sabotage, partisans, air raids ...
      1. Knell wardenheart
        Knell wardenheart 8 September 2020 12: 29 New
        -1
        As the author writes: "A total of 32,7 million tons of capacity." It's not easy to destroy it - this is not a heavy water factory in Norway or a bunker with a FAU-2. Too large areas with scattered enterprises, which, in principle, were built taking into account the possibility of an air strike on such an infrastructure (albeit from the British and other imperialists).
  • bk0010
    bk0010 6 September 2020 14: 05 New
    +2
    Even if the Germans won a complete victory and captured the entire oil industry in perfect working order or with minor damage, it would take them 5-6 years to build a fleet or oil pipelines for the Caucasian oil to actually go to Germany and the rest of Europe.
    In this case, they could supply their eastern front directly, without a detour through Europe.
  • Mark kalendarov
    Mark kalendarov 6 September 2020 14: 45 New
    +2
    Thank you.
    So calmly and reasonably I filled another gap in the history of the Second World War of our people ...
    Glory to the winners!
  • bubalik
    bubalik 6 September 2020 15: 43 New
    +3
    ,,, I would like to see the statistics on the oil produced in the USSR in the Second World War and how much of it was produced aviation gasoline, gasoline, kerosene, diesel fuel and oils, and how many supplies during this period were under lend-lease?
  • NF68
    NF68 6 September 2020 16: 49 New
    +3
    Therefore, the capture of Stalingrad by the Germans would mean an almost complete loss of Caucasian oil, even if it was still in the hands of the Red Army. It would have been impossible to take it out, with the exception of a relatively small export from Baku by sea to Krasnovodsk and further along the railway in a roundabout way through Central Asia. How serious would that be? We can say that it is serious. In addition to the blocked Caucasian oil, Bashkiria, Emba, Fergana and Turkmenistan would remain with a total production in 1938 of 2,6 million tons of oil, or 8,6% of the pre-war allied production. This is about 700 thousand tons of gasoline per year, or 58 thousand tons per month, which, of course, is pitiful crumbs. In 1942, the average monthly consumption of fuel and lubricants in the army was 221,8 thousand tons, of which 75% was gasoline of all grades, that is, 166,3 thousand tons of gasoline. Thus, the needs of the army would be 2,8 times more than the remaining oil refining could supply. This is a situation of defeat and collapse of the army due to lack of fuel.

    How long did the Germans not reach the Volga in Stalingrad? 150-200 meters? These meters separated them from victory.



    In 1942, the USSR built a railway line parallel to the Volga, but east of the Volga. A large part of the oil from Baku to the refineries located above Stalingrad along the Volga was supplied through this branch. Those. even by forcing the Volga, the Germans could not completely stop the supply of oil from the Caucasus, although in the Republic of Ingushetia they created not small problems for the USSR.
    1. bubalik
      bubalik 6 September 2020 18: 29 New
      +2
      ,,, that's why Stalingrad? They would have taken Astrakhan and cut all messages.
      1. NF68
        NF68 8 September 2020 16: 52 New
        +1
        Quote: bubalik
        ,,, that's why Stalingrad? They would have taken Astrakhan and cut all messages.


        Perhaps in this way the Germans did not want to move far away from those cities in the middle reaches of the Volga, where a large number of industrial enterprises important for the USSR were concentrated, and the USSR laid a railway line east of the Volga after the Germans approached Stalingrad.
  • Jmbg
    Jmbg 6 September 2020 16: 56 New
    +2
    It remains unclear why the Germans tried to reach the Volga directly through Stalingrad. They could do it anywhere.
  • 3x3zsave
    3x3zsave 6 September 2020 17: 57 New
    -1
    To the author: everything is as usual, Dmitry. Great factual part, and a lame literary and artistic ending.
    1. bubalik
      bubalik 6 September 2020 18: 09 New
      +2
      ,, and what, Anton, the hair has not moved? what
      1. 3x3zsave
        3x3zsave 6 September 2020 18: 31 New
        +2
        Don't fucking move! For the revelations that the author teaches in the final part of the article were available to any Soviet schoolchild.
    2. wehr
      6 September 2020 21: 36 New
      +1
      Want an example of a great literary-artistic ending? Found it recently.
      Goykhbarg A.G. The strategic resources of Hitlerite Germany are running out. M., "OGIZ", 1942, p. 45.
      Literally, the last paragraph of the book

      Our Red Army, whose offensive spirit is growing stronger, whose reserves are growing, for which the entire Soviet people forges in great enthusiasm under the wisest leadership of the brilliant strategist and great commander Stalin, in a fierce effort of righteous anger and the most legitimate revenge will clear our land to the last in 1942 spans of the weakening hordes of German imperialism.

      Signed for printing on May 26, 1942.
      Just in time for the beginning of the German offensive, when their "weakening hordes" reached the Volga. I think that this ending made an indelible impression on the readers.
  • BAI
    BAI 6 September 2020 20: 29 New
    +1
    1.
    But Hitler undoubtedly read either these notes or other materials based on them, and therefore knew well that the supply of Caucasian oil to Germany was a matter of some distant future, and it would not be possible to do this immediately after the seizure.

    It seems to me that Hitler and Stalin did not know this:
    Hitler:
    «I need oil from the Caucasus and the Volga, otherwise I can write off the war as lost ... "

    Adolf Hitler, at a military meeting in Poltava, summer 1942.
    Stalin:
    "Comrade Baibakov, Hitler is eager for the Caucasus, he announced that if he does not seize oil from the Caucasus, he will lose the war. Everything must be done so that not a single drop of oil goes to the Germans. Keep in mind, if you leave at least a ton of oil to the enemies, we will If you destroy the industries, but the fascist does not come, and we are left without fuel, we will also shoot you. "

    And in 1944:
    "Oil is the soul of military technology."


    2.
    Therefore, the capture of Stalingrad by the Germans would mean an almost complete loss of Caucasian oil, even if it was still in the hands of the Red Army. It would have been impossible to take it out, with the exception of a relatively small export from Baku by sea to Krasnovodsk and further along the railway in a roundabout way through Central Asia.
    .....
    How long did the Germans not reach the Volga in Stalingrad? 150-200 meters? These meters separated them from victory.

    Yes, there was no victory there. 200 m from the coast guaranteed to cut off any shipping. The Volga had already been cut.
    The oil pipeline to Rostov was cut at the end of July, and on 23 August the Germans reached the Volga north of Stalingrad. Both main oil export routes were blocked. They had to go around - they began to deliver oil through the Caspian Sea to Krasnovodsk and Guryev, then by rail through Central Asia and Kazakhstan. At the same time, a lot of problems arose - it is possible to transport oil across the sea by tankers, but further it is more difficult. Most of the cisterns were locked up in the vicinity of Baku. I had to take them off the wheels, tie them up and send them by swimming. (this is an interesting point / BAI /). Many of these "tank rafts" were transported by tugs across the Caspian in the autumn of 42. Nevertheless, it was not possible to quickly transfer oil along the new route, and the storage facilities were overflowing. Then the oil began to be partially processed at local factories, gasoline was separated and again pumped into the reservoirs, in order to then process it to the end and extract everything of value. As a result, although not so quickly, trains with oil and gasoline regularly arrived at their destinations.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 7 September 2020 09: 23 New
      0
      Quote: BAI
      Most of the cisterns were locked up in the vicinity of Baku. I had to take them off the wheels, tie them up and send them by swimming. (this is an interesting point / BAI /).

      It all started on Ladoga. Moreover, the tanks were not removed from the wheels there, which made it possible to save a lot of time when entering and leaving the water.
      We started with tanks. Their transportation to the eastern coast was organized at the suggestion of N. Gants, head of the carriage service at the Ladoga railway junction. Having previously battened down the covers of the caps and jammed the wheels, in the Bay of Morye, the tanks were slowly pushed with the help of a steam locomotive along an inclined path that went into the lake. Once in the water, the containers floated up and, coupled in six pieces, were towed to the east coast. In Kobona, near the coast, they were put on rails and pulled onto the main railway track by a steam locomotive.

      Thus, 800 empty cisterns were transported from the western bank of Ladoga to the eastern one. Most of them were sent to the rear areas. In the course of the experiment, it was found that the tanks, two-thirds full, retain their buoyancy. Therefore, a number of these containers were left on Ladoga, and they were used to transport oil products to besieged Leningrad..

  • ecolog
    ecolog 7 September 2020 01: 51 New
    0
    so why then it was necessary to weaken the "Paulus grouping" and go to the Caucasus, if it was possible to take Stalingrad and cut the Volga? Supporting the flanks of the 6th and 4th TA also did not require the capture of Maikop and Grozny.
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 7 September 2020 09: 29 New
    +1
    How long did the Germans not reach the Volga in Stalingrad? 150-200 meters? These meters separated them from victory.

    The Germans reached the Volga. Moreover, in two places - north of the city (14 shopping mall) and south of the city (48 shopping mall).
  • voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 7 September 2020 09: 39 New
    0
    It has never been explained why Hitler turned to Stalingrad and not Baku. There are both production and refinery. Captured, and all the oil is yours. Why is cutting off communications better than capturing the mining site itself?
    1. Liam
      Liam 7 September 2020 09: 44 New
      -2
      Quote: voyaka uh
      It has never been explained why Hitler turned to Stalingrad and not Baku. There are both production and refinery. Captured, and all the oil is yours. Why is cutting off communications better than capturing the mining site itself?

      I wonder what Army Group A was doing in the summer / autumn of 1942
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 7 September 2020 09: 53 New
        0
        They attacked the Caucasus. But the strength was not enough. If, instead of Stalingrad, Hitler attacked the Caucasus with all his might, Baku would be captured. This would not change the outcome of the war - all the same, such long communications cannot be kept. And somewhere the Red Army would have cut them for sure. But the defeat at Stalingrad in the deep frosty steppes could have been avoided.
        1. Liam
          Liam 7 September 2020 09: 56 New
          -1
          In general, the attack on Stalingrad is precisely an operation to cover the communications of Army Group A from an attack from the north.
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 7 September 2020 10: 09 New
            0
            Stalingrad was a large military-industrial center. And it was bombed first. Why, after that, it was also necessary to capture the ruins made by our own aircraft? - there is no logical military explanation.
            Only political, propaganda: "the Fuhrer has captured a large city!" For which they paid with the encirclement and defeat.
            1. Liam
              Liam 7 September 2020 10: 25 New
              -1
              And what did the Germans have to do with the city and the Soviet troops in it? Leave them in their rear?
              1. voyaka uh
                voyaka uh 7 September 2020 10: 47 New
                0
                To do nothing. Ruins of the city remained after a massive Luftwaffe raid. What was there to look for? They could block the Volga south of Stalingrad.
                And then gradually move south until joining group A
                All the same, the Nazis would have been squeezed out of there.
                Reserves from the north continuously approached the Red Army.
                1. Liam
                  Liam 7 September 2020 10: 50 New
                  -1
                  In the OKW headquarters, as everyone knows, profane served in military affairs and did not understand such simple things.
                  1. voyaka uh
                    voyaka uh 7 September 2020 12: 24 New
                    0
                    The Wehrmacht headquarters was very professional, but disobey
                    Fuehrer's order could not.
                    It was interesting to talk hi
                2. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 7 September 2020 13: 40 New
                  +2
                  Quote: voyaka uh
                  To do nothing. Ruins of the city remained after a massive Luftwaffe raid. What was there to look for?

                  Soviet forces. The very ones that were supposed to be surrounded according to Directive No. 41, and which for some reason did not get into the boiler. smile
                  The entire northern part of the Blau plan was conceived to encircle the Soviet forces and eliminate the threat to the campaign in the Caucasus. Only at the first stage there was a bobble - the environment broke. But the Soviet forces remained. And their presence at Stalingrad creates for the Caucasian group the danger of a strike either to the rear or to the base of the "Caucasian Sack" with the cut-off of the main forces of GA "South" (a variation of the "Big Saturn").
                  Stalingrad at the time of the assault was five tank corps. And pumping them with STZ technology.
                  1. voyaka uh
                    voyaka uh 7 September 2020 14: 31 New
                    0
                    But in reality, the Germans faced in the ruins with a desperately resisting not very numerous Russian infantry. To which trickles of infantry reinforcements were continuously added. It was impossible to surround anyone. By common sense, it was necessary to retreat. But Hitler's order pressed: "take Stalingrad."
                    And when they took it with great difficulty and losses, it turned out that they were already trapped ...
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 7 September 2020 17: 17 New
                      0
                      Quote: voyaka uh
                      But in reality, the Germans faced in the ruins with a desperately resisting not very numerous Russian infantry. To which trickles of infantry reinforcements were continuously added. It was impossible to surround anyone. By common sense, it was necessary to retreat.

                      Comrade voyaka uh makes it easy. smile
                      It was a little more complicated. Having failed with Directive 41, the Germans decided to recoup the Red Army with Directive 45. The task of GA "B" was still the same - to defeat the Soviet forces north of the Caucasus:
                      Army group B, as previously ordered, has the task, along with the equipment of defensive positions on the Don River, to strike at Stalingrad and defeat the enemy grouped there, seize the city, and cut the isthmus between Don and Volga and disrupt river transport .

                      For which GA "B" even part of the tank forces of GA "A" were transferred.
                      And then everything went to dust again. Instead of a large cauldron for the Soviet forces and the capture of the defenseless city, Goth had to constantly break through the infantry defenses reinforced by tanks, and Paulus's formations that had broken through to the Volga flew between four Soviet tank corps. If Paulus could pounce on Stalingrad with all his might, then Chuikov's only army would be thrown into the Volga. But the Germans constantly had to repel the attacks of three more armies of the Red Army north of the city, which attracted attention and strength. As a result, the Germans did not have enough strength to take the city, but each time it seemed that they were only slightly lacking. And this gave rise to the dangerous illusion of "one more blow": they say, everything is fine, the enemy is exhausted, we will soon win - we just need a little more strength, and the next blow will be the last.
                      Stalingrad was defended by five armies. And retreating across the steppe with such an enemy on the tail is not the best option.
                    2. gsev
                      gsev 13 September 2020 23: 00 New
                      +1
                      Quote: voyaka uh
                      desperately resisting the not very numerous Russian infantry. To which trickles of infantry reinforcements were continuously added.

                      The transfer of reinforcements and ammunition to the western bank of the Volga was tantamount to forcing it. The artillery on the eastern bank supporting the Red Army was easier to spot from the German NP and harder to hide from aviation than the German in the city. The spacecraft had to deliver fuel to Stalingrad across the bare steppe much further than to the North Caucasian airfields. Rarely in that war did the Germans have such tactical capabilities for grinding spacecraft.
        2. Oquzyurd
          Oquzyurd 7 September 2020 20: 44 New
          -2
          The Germans knew that by heading for and taking Baku, they could leave the USSR without fuel, but they also knew that the weight of Baku was (related to fuel) mined, and if they entered the city, the Bolsheviks would blow everything up. USSR without fuel, get a victory, and then enter Baku, which is not blown up. I am outraged by the article, and not only that the role of Baku is always not noticed, even if they are noticed, belittled by any tinsel. For example, indicating "Large oil refineries: Baku, Grozny , Batumi, Tuapse and Krasnodar. A total of 32,7 million tons of capacity. "And" In addition to the blocked Caucasian oil, Bashkiria, Emba, Fergana and Turkmenistan would remain with a total production in 1938 of 2,6 million tons of oil, or 8,6, 22% of the pre-war Allied loot. " did not bother to show that apart from Baku, all these "large" refineries and Bashkiria, Emba, Fergana and Turkmenistan gave a total of 78% of all fuel. Only Baku provided XNUMX% of the front with fuel, becoming one of the main, key factors in the victory of the USSR. And this city, after the victory, was zealously (if we take into account in those years the ethno composition of the rulers and administrators in the center, it is understandable why, since Yerevan and Tbilisi would have been offended) were not given the title of a hero city. This injustice lasted until the end of the USSR. And now, this is just a reminder, no need for this title.
          1. wehr
            7 September 2020 22: 21 New
            0
            So what, what outrages you.
            History is not an endless repetition of statements that are pleasant to someone.
            1. Oquzyurd
              Oquzyurd 7 September 2020 23: 21 New
              -1
              "History is not an endless repetition of statements that are pleasant to someone." This is exactly what is outraged, because after the war years they did not say anything pleasant for Baku, let alone endlessly, not even once. And as a result, I wrote "And now, these are just REMINDERS, without any need for this title. ", thus noting that now they do not expect and do not even need this. And reminders are a call, first of all, to objectivity, without wishes about something pleasant.
              1. wehr
                7 September 2020 23: 27 New
                0
                So what's the problem? Get the Azneft archive for the pre-war and war years to be digitized and published on the Internet. Then it will be possible to write.
          2. Megatron
            Megatron 9 September 2020 22: 37 New
            -2
            And I see that you are a turkey and you lick boots all the time.
            1. Oquzyurd
              Oquzyurd 10 September 2020 00: 28 New
              0
              I am a Turk myself and they are my brothers, do you understand? And where did you get your upbringing? To what extent do you need to be cattle, to communicate like strangers and strangers?
              1. Megatron
                Megatron 10 September 2020 14: 14 New
                -2
                There were already fans of the "great Turan", somewhere shamefully merged.
  • DrEng527
    DrEng527 7 September 2020 13: 49 New
    +1
    Thank! attracted interesting sources!
  • APASUS
    APASUS 7 September 2020 20: 31 New
    0
    If Hitler weren't paranoid, we could really lose. Some of his decisions were very correct and disastrous for us.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 8 September 2020 09: 14 New
      0
      Quote: APASUS
      If Hitler weren't paranoid, we could really lose. Some of his decisions were very correct and disastrous for us.

      He-he-he ... you must also take into account that part the disastrous decisions of Hitler's paranoid upon close examination, it turns out to be decisions of the generals of the Wehrmacht, which were simply attributed to Aloizych in post-war memoirs. Fortunately, then anything could be blamed on the Fuhrer - he could no longer justify himself, for obvious reasons. smile
  • Cypa
    Cypa 8 September 2020 08: 39 New
    0
    Quote: Oquzyurd
    The Germans knew that by heading for and taking Baku, they could leave the USSR without fuel, but they also knew that the weight of Baku was (related to fuel) mined, and if they entered the city, the Bolsheviks would blow everything up. USSR without fuel, get a victory, and then enter Baku, which is not blown up. I am outraged by the article, and not only that the role of Baku is always not noticed, even if they are noticed, belittled by any tinsel. For example, indicating "Large oil refineries: Baku, Grozny , Batumi, Tuapse and Krasnodar. A total of 32,7 million tons of capacity. "And" In addition to the blocked Caucasian oil, Bashkiria, Emba, Fergana and Turkmenistan would remain with a total production in 1938 of 2,6 million tons of oil, or 8,6, 22% of the pre-war Allied loot. " did not bother to show that apart from Baku, all these "large" refineries and Bashkiria, Emba, Fergana and Turkmenistan gave a total of 78% of all fuel. Only Baku provided XNUMX% of the front with fuel, becoming one of the main, key factors in the victory of the USSR. And this city, after the victory, was zealously (if we take into account in those years the ethno composition of the rulers and administrators in the center, it is understandable why, since Yerevan and Tbilisi would have been offended) were not given the title of a hero city. This injustice lasted until the end of the USSR. And now, this is just a reminder, no need for this title.


    Why did Baku suddenly become feminine?
  • Megatron
    Megatron 9 September 2020 22: 35 New
    +1
    I didn't quite understand the author. Why bring oil to Germany, if you can bring factories to captured places and supply the attacking troops "from the wheels". They make gasoline on their knees in Chechnya, and earlier the requirements for its quality were minimal.
  • kamakama
    kamakama 11 September 2020 14: 58 New
    0
    In principle, everything is correct. Both strategy and economics. And after the war, many German generals wrote in their memoirs about the fallacy of fighting the Soviet Union, that this was not a strategically necessary dispersion of forces. Almost everyone believed that it was necessary to take this fucking Malta, after which Gibraltar would fall, Rommel's army, with normal supplies and with support from Crete, would roll the British to Suez, and from there the Iraqi fields were a stone's throw. After the fall of Suez, the shoulder to England from Australia and India grew 2 times and made this route meaningless for any transport connection, which brought England to its knees at the expense of banal food. And the seizure of Iraqi fields automatically removed any questions about the supply of oil through the Italo-German Lake (Mediterranean Sea) + brought the USSR to its knees, since from there to Baku, Stalin would have to think very hard about how and with whom to enter into war
    The British and the French worked out a similar plan and it was called Pike
  • Captain Nemo
    Captain Nemo 13 September 2020 21: 34 New
    0
    There are still moments. The fall of Stalingrad - entry into the war with the USSR, Turkey and Japan. The German generals did not understand Hitler because information about secret treaties and the state of the economy was not available to them. Hitler had high secret patrons who helped him a lot. The initial successes of Hitler were very surprising for the German generals. Stalingrad itself, in addition to the name of the leader, occupied a very important strategic position. Two railway roads converged, the westernmost protrusion of the Volga, a bridgehead for the final cutting of the railway along the Volga. In addition to blocking the supply of oil, the supply of troops, ammunition and equipment to the Caucasus was blocked. The events in the Crimea with the division recruited in the Caucasus showed the low combat effectiveness of units recruited from the locals. Also nearby were the settlements of the Volga Germans and northern Kazakhstan, where a significant number of Germans were deported. On occasion, Hitler could replenish the troops with recruits from local Germans.
    1. kamakama
      kamakama 14 September 2020 15: 45 New
      0
      Quote: Captain Nemo
      Also nearby were the settlements of the Volga Germans and northern Kazakhstan, where a significant number of Germans were deported. On occasion, Hitler could replenish the troops with recruits from local Germans.

      But this is very doubtful. For example, in the plans for the post-war reconstruction of the USSR (better known as the "Plan Ost"), the old German settlers were not assigned any role. They had come to Russia before because of a good life, usually because of religious persecution, and they were something like Old Believers for us. With different views, culture, even language - Old German. And it is not at all a fact that they would have taken Hitler closer than Stalin
  • Maestro
    Maestro 16 September 2020 20: 32 New
    0
    what 200 meters? The export of Baku and North Caucasian oil could well have been carried out by the Kizlyar-Astrakhan-Kr.Kut railway
    1. kamakama
      kamakama 22 September 2020 10: 03 New
      0
      Я не знаю пропускной способности этой дороги в 40е годы, но в 2020 году от Астрахани до Баскунчака лежит одноколейка посреди голой степи. Не уверен, что этого хватило бы, что бы вывезти всю нефть. Ну а то, что любая цель, тем более поезд с горючей жидкостью, там как на ладони и достаточно одной зажигательной бомбы, что бы дорога была блокирована на несколько дней - пока прогорит, пока разберут, пока починят пути... Так что это не панацея