The truth about the seized Maykop oil


German tanker monitors burning oil storage in the area of ​​Maikop

В stories of the battle for the Caucasus, which unfolded in the second half of 1942, there is a remarkable moment associated with the oil-producing region located near Maikop, or with the Maikop oil. In July 1942, the German Army Group "A" crossed the Don, defeated the Southern Front and began to pursue the retreating Soviet troops across the steppe. The 17th German army was advancing west, in the direction of Krasnodar, the 1st German tank the army advanced eastward to Armavir. The tank army managed to achieve significant success, on August 6, 1942, they captured Armavir, on August 9 - Maykop, and then the 1st Panzer Army advanced south, on the left bank of the Kuban, in the direction of the coast and Tuapse. True, they did not manage to reach the port, the offensive fizzled out on August 15-17, and then the tank army was transferred to the eastern direction, to Mozdok.

The 17th Army took Krasnodar on August 12, 1942 and continued its offensive on Novorossiysk. On August 31, the Germans managed to capture Anapa, on September 11, units of the 17th Army reached Novorossiysk. The fighting there was extremely heavy, the Germans failed to capture the entire city, and from September 26, 1942, German troops in Novorossiysk went on the defensive.

The scheme of the German offensive in August-October 1942

This is the general outline of the German offensive in August-September 1942, during which they got the Maykop oil-producing region for some time. The Maikop oil was at the forefront of the 1st Tank Army's attack, since the oil fields were located in a vast area southwest and west of Maikop. Soon after 1st Panzer Army withdrew east, the area came under the control of 17th Army and the commander of rear area 550 (Korück 550), subordinate to the command of 17th Army.

Micromyth comes from war propaganda

In this regard, a kind of micromyph has developed in the literature, the essence of which is that the fields and equipment of Maikopneft were almost completely destroyed, so that the Germans did not get anything. I saw this myth in several variations, little different from each other, as an example, you can cite the article by E.M. Malysheva "Russian oil and oil workers during the Great Patriotic War", see "Economic Journal", 2008, No. 4 (14). There it is said in some detail about this.

First, it claims that Germany was running out of oil in Romania, and all the salvation was only in the seizure of the Black Sea oil. This, of course, is not entirely true, or even not at all true, and a separate analysis can be devoted to this interesting issue.

Secondly, it is said that 850 wells were liquidated at Maikopneft, an oil refinery in Krasnodar, compressor stations with 113 compressors, well equipment and drilling equipment were destroyed. 52 thousand cubic meters of oil were also destroyed during the fighting, about 80 thousand tons of oil products at the refinery. So it was impossible to use the Maikopneft oil fields.

Thirdly, there is a well-known article from the Grozny Rabochiy newspaper of October 10, 1942, which is quoted in almost all works that pay attention to the Maikop oil:

“Having occupied the area of ​​Maikop, the Germans immediately rushed to the oil fields. However, the Nazis' hopes for Maikop oil did not come true, they found ruins on the site of the fields. The wells were blocked, the oil pipeline was destroyed. From this the Maykop partisans began their work. They did not give the enemy oil. Maykop became a dead city. People tried not to be seen by the fascist thugs. Life went into the forests and mountains, where several partisan detachments operated. In vain are the fascists looking for oil workers. They are here. The partisan detachment killed 100 German soldiers and officers on forest roads in a short time. The Germans cannot find the oil workers of Maikop, but the oil workers find the Germans every day and mercilessly destroy them. "

In general, stories in the style: "Not a single liter of oil to the enemy!" In my opinion, such a presentation of events is a derivative of the military propaganda of that time. As an example of war propaganda, the article in Grozny Rabochiy looks great. The situation was difficult and it was necessary to somehow encourage the soldiers at the front and the rear workers. The Germans first cut into the Southern Front, then the North Caucasian Front, in a month they captured a huge territory. They stopped their advance with great difficulty. What could political instructors and agitators say to people in such conditions? Here's just this: yes, we retreated, but at least the Germans did not get oil, thwarted their plans of plunder, without oil the Germans would not fight for a long time, and so on.

After the war and the victory, when it was no longer relevant to encourage the soldiers and workers of the rear, it would have been possible to understand the issue in more detail and in detail, with the study of German documents. But that did not happen. The outlined micromyph was a rehash of the propaganda of the war years, and Soviet and Russian historians did not go further than this.

Why didn't this happen? Firstly, because the researchers would have to learn German, correct the exit permit, and dig into the German archives. The case itself is suspicious. And besides, one could read all sorts of things in German documents: like how the engineer Filippov repaired the oil fields in Ilskaya or how the 1st Cossack regiment "Platov" (which later became part of the 1st Cossack division of von Pannwitz) guarded the Ilskaya road - Derbent. For such archival finds one could receive a "reward" in the form of dismissal with a wolf ticket. Secondly, a detailed examination of the issue would show that the situation was not at all as dashing as described in the newspaper Grozny Rabochy. Those who knew well the pre-war economy of Maikopneft, of course, understood that, in addition to destruction, there were also factors that prevented the Germans from using oil, but preferred to keep quiet. Why do people need difficulties? Rewrite a newspaper article in your scientific work - and the task is completed.

My interest in this issue consisted in answering the question: why did the Germans fail? Oil was indeed very important to them and they made an attempt to restore oil fields by sending a special unit of Technische Brigade Mineralöl (TBM) to Maikop. It was impossible to answer this question without German documents. However, Bundesarchiv kindly scanned several files from the 550 rear area archive, among which there were three files (RH 23/44, RH 23/45, RH 23/46) dedicated to the oil region of Maikop. These documents were mainly devoted to the protection of the oil production area, the recruitment of oil specialists among the civilian population and prisoners of war, providing them with food, various administrative issues and correspondence. But among them were several reports on the state of the oil fields, as seen by the German troops.

This, of course, is not all, since the documents of the technical brigade itself were not there (perhaps they will be found somewhere else), but it already allows you to look at the Maikop oil fields captured by the Germans in great detail.

How much oil did the Germans get?

"The Germans immediately rushed to the oil fields ..." German documents, however, do not confirm this at all. Units of the 1st Panzer Army appeared southwest of Maykop in mid-August, August 10-15, 1942, and the oilfield area was occupied by units of the SS Viking division, which created the Ortskomandatura there. According to the chief of the Ortskomandatura I / 921 Major Merkel, the SS men left the area on September 19, 1942, handing over their commandant offices in Neftegorsk, Oil, Khadyzhenskaya and Kabardinskaya security battalion 602 (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/44 Bl. 107).

Only after that did the Germans go to inspect the oil fields. On October 13, 1942, the security battalion drew up a report on what they found during a survey of the area from September 28 to October 2, 1942. We will return to this report a little later.

A month and a half had passed since the seizure of the oil fields, before the Germans took care of inspecting the captured economy. They very slowly "rushed to the oil fields." There was a good reason for that. Units of the 1st Panzer Army, in particular the SS Viking division, from mid-August to mid-September 1942 tried to advance south on Tuapse, and this was a priority for them. For them, it was more important to defeat the Soviet troops, and the oil wells will not go anywhere, the trophies can be dealt with later.

There was another reason why the Germans "rushed to the oil fields" so slowly. Judging by the letter from the Ortskomandatura I / 918 dated October 10, 1942, they had not yet captured part of the oil fields. The letter indicates that work can only be carried out in Neftyanaya and Khadyzhenskaya, the village of Asfaltovaya Gora, 6 km from Khadyzhenskaya, was under artillery fire, and some other oil fields were occupied by Soviet troops (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/45 Bl. 91). Hence it is quite obvious that the German tank units, with their initial onslaught, captured only a part of the oil fields, their eastern half. There is a report that the Asphalt Mountain and Kutaisi oil fields (west of Khadyzhenskaya) were captured by October 24, 1942 (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/44 Bl. 40). By December 1942, the front passed about 20 km west and 40 km south of Khadyzhenskaya. Artillery shelling no longer reached the oil fields. And in general, on the Khadyzhenskaya - Tuapse direction, the Germans tried to launch an offensive twice, in mid-October and in mid-November 1942.

German front line scheme for December 1942: TsAMO f. 500, op. 12473, d. 121, l. nineteen

"They found ruins at the site of the trades." When security battalion 602 went to inspect the area, apparently instructed in advance what exactly he should look for and what to reflect in his report, his findings were still larger than ruins.

For example, well 341 (clogged). With her were found: 20 long drill rods, 60 sucker rods, a damaged pumping unit, two oil tanks, one destroyed drill tripod and one hook. Well 397: destroyed wooden oil rig, 30 drill rods and 30 sucker rods, damaged pumping unit (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/45 Bl. 68). And so on.

The truth about the seized Maykop oil

Beginning of the report of the security battalion 602 on the results of the survey of the oil fields: Bundesarchiv, RH 23/45 Bl. 68

The total finds were:

Drilling rigs (fit for service) - 3
Oil tanks - 9
Gas tanks - 2
Drill rods - 375
Sucker rods - 1017
Pump pipes - 359
Borehole pumps - 5
(Bundesarchiv, RH 23/45 Bl. 68-72.)

This is only in the fields, without finds in other places.

Pipes captured at the Maikop station. Photo by Italian correspondent Lamberti Sorrentino

This report and other reports make it possible to say definitely that the Maikop oil fields were badly destroyed, but not completely. A number of wells went to the Germans in working order. Out of 34 wells, 6 worked in the Adagym area (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/45 Bl. 104). Utash - out of 6 wells, 2 wells worked. Dzhiginskoe - 11 of 6 wells remained in working order (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/45 Bl. 113). Kaluga (south of Krasnodar) - 24 wells, of which one well with a blown-up pump and pipeline and two more without pumping units; the rest of the wells were closed. The oil field worked until August 4, 1942 and was destroyed in haste. The Germans got 10 drilling rigs, and they assessed the damage to the pumps and pipelines as minor (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/45 Bl. 129, 151). Ilskaya (south-west of Krasnodar) - out of 28 wells, 3 wells remained in working order. At well 210, a concrete plug was squeezed out by oil and gas pressure. It was on this well that the engineer Filippov and 65 assistants from the civilian population worked. In well 221, oil also began to squeeze out a concrete plug (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/44 Bl. 53). Khadyzhenskaya - from well 65 oil was poured directly onto the ground (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/45 Bl. 151).

In general, having collected from various documents references to the estimated production capacity of wells that were in working order or could be easily restored, I made the following list (tons per month):

Adagym - 60
Kesslerovo - 33
Kievskoe - 54
Ilskaya - 420
Dzhiginskoe - 7,5
Kaluga - 450
Neftegorsk - 120
Khadyzhenskaya - 600
Total - 1744,5 tons.

This is very little. The production of 1744 tons per month corresponds to 20,9 thousand tons per year, or 0,96% of the pre-war production level (in 1938 - 2160 thousand tons). This, I note, even before the restoration work began (this data was collected at the end of September - in October 1942), even before the clogged and cemented wells were opened, that is, so to speak, immediately available.

Well, and in a bunch: "In vain are the fascists looking for oil workers." The Germans really had problems with recruiting workers for the oil fields. But it would also be a mistake to say that the Germans could not win anyone over to their side. On November 3, 1942, the Technical Brigade sent to the command of the rear area 550 a statement about their personnel and vehicles. They had in different places: 4574 German soldiers, 1632 civilians and 1018 prisoners of war. The brigade had 115 motorcycles, 203 cars and 435 trucks at the disposal of the brigade (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/44 Bl. 30). At a meeting on October 24, 1942, the commander of the Technical Brigade, Major General Erich Homburg, said that if he was given, in addition to 600 prisoners of war already engaged in the restoration of oil fields, another 900 immediately and another 2500 before the onset of winter, he would be able to put the Ilskaya field into operation ( Bundesarchiv, RH 23/44 Bl. 40).

Small loot and uncertain plans

In the studied German documents, almost nothing is said about oil production. Only on Ilskaya, as follows from the message of the headquarters of the security battalion 617, in early October 1942 a small distillation plant with a capacity of 1 ton per day was installed. She received 300 liters of kerosene, 200 liters of gasoline and 500 liters of oil residues. Fuel was supplied to collective farms in the Severskaya area (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/44 Bl. 53). Another example of the use of oil is a bakery in Anapa, which worked for the needs of the 10th Romanian division. Its furnaces were fueled by oil, and the Romanians took oil from Dzhiginskaya, to the displeasure of the German Ortskomandatura I / 805 in Anapa (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/45 Bl. 45). The Germans used this oil for the municipal economy and enterprises of Anapa.

Why did the Germans not attend to the early restoration of oil production? There were several reasons for this.

First, they had good trophies in various places, contrary to the assurances of the Grozny Rabochy newspaper:

Naphtha - 157 cubic meters (124 tons).
Petroleum - 100 cubic meters (79 tons).
Fuel oil - 468 cubic meters (416 tons).
Engine oil - 119 cubic meters (107 tons).
Tractor fuel - 1508 cubic meters (1206 tons).
Gasoline - 15 cubic meters (10 tons).

A total of 1942 tons of oil and oil products in tanks and barrels (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/44 Bl. 152-155). This is slightly more than the monthly production of the remaining wells in working order. Moreover, most of these trophies are ready-made tractor fuel, most likely naphtha.

Secondly, the Krasnodar oil refinery, which before the war had a capacity of about 1 million tons per year and processed about half of the Maikop oil, was actually destroyed, first by German bombing, and then by detonation during the retreat of Soviet troops.

Photo of the ruins of the Krasnodar oil refinery, taken in August 1942

Another snapshot of the destroyed Krasnodar refinery, more detailed. In essence, the plant was to be rebuilt. Although the railway station was less destroyed, which made it possible to set up a temporary plant operating on the oil supply by rail

The technical brigade worked to dismantle the ruins and, according to the brigade commander, it was possible to build a temporary plant with a capacity of 300 tons per day (about 110 thousand tons per year) until January 1943 and 600 tons per day until March 1943.

Third, the power supply to the oil fields and a significant part of the pumps were destroyed. Therefore, it was possible to extract oil only by hand, it was poured out by itself. And not only from wells. The Germans discovered 12 oil wells (Brunne in German) with a total capacity of 12 tons per day or 360 tons per month.

Fourth, the export of oil to Germany was impossible. Although the Germans seized an oil pier in the port of Novorossiysk, where pipelines, a loading station, pumps and five tanks with a capacity of 4500 cubic meters were in good condition (Bundesarchiv, RH 23/45 Bl. 63), they could not use it due to ongoing fighting and lack of the necessary oil fleetto take oil at least to Odessa. The Germans never captured the port of Tuapse.

For these reasons, the Germans refused to immediately restore wells and resume production, limiting themselves to only small production of oil for local needs, mainly for various local enterprises: mills, bakeries, water pipes, collective farms, partly working for the Germans and Romanians, partly for the local population.

What further plans did they have? Judging by the distribution of forces, the main attention was paid to the restoration of the field infrastructure and oil pipelines in Khadyzhenskaya, Neftyanaya and Neftegorsk, the Khadyzhenskaya-Kabardinskaya-Krasnodar and Khadyzhenskaya-Belorechenskaya-Armavir oil pipelines. In Khadyzhenskaya, Absheron and Kabardinskaya there were 2670 people from the Technical brigade and 860 people in Armavir. Apparently, it was supposed to restore or build large oil depots in Maikop and Armavir. Armavir, as one can assume, was conceived as a transshipment base, from where oil could be sent by rail to Krasnodar or to other places. There were very few forces at the refinery in Krasnodar: 30 Germans, 314 civilians and 122 prisoners of war. Apparently, they were clearing the ruins and awaiting the delivery of refinery equipment. Only then could the refinery become a major center for the supply of petroleum products.

The plans are somewhat vague, and, in general, are designed, rather, to supply the troops. For now, I will not put an end to this, since there may be other archival finds that can shed light on this issue. We can only say that the Germans clearly did not regard the Maikop oil as a source capable of supplying Germany, at least in the foreseeable future for them.

Don't make up myths

As you can see, the history of the captured Maikop oil fields is very noticeably different from what is usually written about it in the literature. The micromyph about the Maykop oil is completely unsatisfactory, because it is presented in such a way that it distorts the whole picture. First, the myth focuses on destruction, although according to German documents it is clear that the proximity of the front and the activity of the partisans were the main factor hampering the restoration work. In addition, the front line passed in such a way that it cut off the Maikop oil from the ports in Novorossiysk and Tuapse, as well as from the Grozny oil refinery.

Secondly, even before the war, the Maikop-Krasnodar region was not self-sufficient in oil refining. The Krasnodar refinery processed only half of the production, the rest was sent to ports for export by sea, to the Grozny refinery (which was powerful - 12,6 million tons, and by today's standards, large; while Grozneft produced 1938 million tons in 2,6 oil; the refinery processed mainly Baku oil) or was consumed locally in raw form. Therefore, given the position of the front, which took shape at the end of 1942, and even if the entire oil production, transport and processing infrastructure remained completely intact and ready for work, the Germans would still have to cut oil production by half due to the impossibility of exporting it. This feature of Maikopneft was well known to oilmen, but oil historians did not ask.

Third, the destruction was great and could not be repaired with a snap of the fingers. The Germans began work only at the end of October 1942, and already in January 1943, the Black Sea group began an offensive, which on January 12-19, 1943 managed to break through the German defenses near the village of Goryachy Klyuch and reach the approaches to Krasnodar. Here the Germans, under the threat of encirclement, had to abandon everything and retreat to Krasnodar and Novorossiysk. Maykop was taken on January 29, 1943, which for the Germans meant a complete loss of Maykop oil. Thus, they had not five and a half months for all the work, as they say in the literature, but only a little more than two months, from the end of October 1942 to the beginning of January 1943. As you might guess, winter is not the right time for restoration work.

In addition, after the liberation of the Maykop oil, Soviet oil workers also had to spend a lot of time and effort to fix the oil fields. In July 1944, the daily production reached 1200 tons, or 438 thousand tons on an annualized basis - 20,2% of the pre-war production. This is the result of more than a year's work, and in conditions incomparably better than those of the Germans, because they were not threatened by a close front and there was the possibility of exporting oil to Grozny.

The moral of the story is simple: Don't make up myths. The real story turns out to be more interesting and entertaining than the rehash of propaganda from the war.
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  1. +22
    24 August 2020 05: 38
    “Having occupied the area of ​​Maikop, the Germans immediately rushed to the oil fields. However, the Nazis' hopes for the Maikop oil did not come true, they found ruins on the site of the fields

    In the summer of 1942, saboteurs of the Brandenburg-800 regiment took part in the seizure of the oil fields in Maikop and played an important role in disorganizing the Soviet defense. In the course of the rapid German offensive, a group of Brandenburgers, consisting of the Baltic and Sudeten Germans, who spoke Russian and disguised as NKVD servicemen, entered Maykop on August 2 in captured ZIS trucks. The saboteurs were headed by the Baltic German Lieutenant von Voelkersam, acting under the guise of State Security Major Trukhin. On the evening of August 8, Voelkersam's group blew up the city communications center and disabled all communication lines, after which they occupied the telegraph station. To spread panic, the saboteurs sent one answer to the requests coming here: “The city has been abandoned. The telegraph stops working! " The next day, von Voelkersam and his subordinates moved around the city and spread misinformation that Maykop was about to be surrounded, the garrison would be cut off and the positions should be abandoned and moved faster to the rear. At the same time, members of the group simulated artillery shelling with grenade explosions, trying to cause panic, and some of them went to drilling and oil storage facilities with an order to cancel their destruction. The strategically important bridge across the Belaya River was captured by soldiers of a Brandenburg platoon, disguised in Soviet uniforms, commanded by Lieutenants Prochazka and Seuberlich, who were traveling in four trucks. When they were stopped by a general of the Red Army, they explained that they were moving to strengthen the protection of the bridge. Arriving at the scene, the saboteurs eliminated the protection of the bridge and held it until the approach of the German troops. By their actions, the Voelkersam group helped the German assault detachments to capture the city center and avoid its long siege. As a result of the rapid seizure of Maykop, most of the weapons and ammunition remained here, documents and material values, including many enterprises, fell into the hands of the Germans. They did not manage to evacuate the wounded Red Army and Red Navy men from the city. At the same time, the "Brandenburgers" failed to fulfill the main task of the operation - to prevent the destruction of oil fields and oil storage facilities.
    a photo... saboteurs of the Brandenburg-800 regiment in the captured Maykop on August 13, 1942

    1. +18
      24 August 2020 06: 08
      Until now, a fundamentally important question remains controversial - whether the Germans managed to prevent the destruction of oil production facilities, after all, this was the key task of a large-scale deployment of troops and a sabotage operation in Maikop. If you believe the memoirs of Otto Skorzeny and other sources, "Brandenburgers" managed to ensure the safety of oil depots , which is indicated among the grounds for awarding Felkersam on September 14, 1942 with the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. However, in the evening report of the Sovinformburo on August 16, 1942, it was reported that “the equipment of the Maikop oil fields and all available oil reserves were promptly removed, and the oil fields themselves were completely unusable.
      The German fascists, hoping to profit from the Soviet oil with the capture of Maikop, miscalculated: they did not receive Soviet oil and will not receive it "
      (quoted from the report of the Soviet Information Bureau on August 16, 1942).
      I think here we can assume that the information was "corrected" by both the Germans and ours. Perhaps some part of the equipment was destroyed, and some survived. The Brandenburg-800 operation itself, it must be admitted, was carried out boldly and successfully, and all subsequent attempts of this kind were successfully suppressed by our troops and partisans, such as, for example, a parachute assault of 25 people under the command of Chief Lieutenant Lange into an oil basin near the city of Grozny. This group was seen and fired upon in the air and then destroyed. one after another, they send their landing forces to the rear of the Soviet troops. But each time they are destroyed. In September 1942, a group of 12 saboteurs led by NCO Reckert was thrown into the territory of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. In total, it is known about five attempts to infiltrate the "Brandenburgers" reconnaissance and sabotage groups, and each time they managed to either be destroyed or taken prisoner.
      1. VIP
        24 August 2020 14: 57
        Brandenburg did a good job for them. There is on the Internet and so you can find ts "combat path" Brandenburg-800.
        Oh, and a lot of "firebrands" Skoda have done.
      2. VIP
        24 August 2020 15: 01
        "some of the equipment was destroyed, and some survived" the author gives a report on what was destroyed and what was preserved
    2. +3
      24 August 2020 10: 26
      Photo. saboteurs of the Brandenburg-800 regiment in the captured Maykop on August 13, 1942

      I would not be so sure that these are Brandenburgers and in Maikop.
      Perhaps (in the bottom photo), this is the Abwehr team, hivi or RNNA.
      Well, they don't make any signatures to the top, depending on the topic into which this photo is stuck.
      Well, let's attach the signature "Br-burg 800 in Maykop" to this photo too ....
    3. BAI
      24 August 2020 13: 49
      Photo. saboteurs of the Brandenburg-800 regiment in the captured Maykop on August 13, 1942

      The 1st photo is called "The captured Soviet commander. Summer 1941 years.
      2nd photo - "Saboteurs of the Abwehr, June 1941"
      Both photos have nothing to do with Maykop.
  2. +11
    24 August 2020 05: 52
    Summing up the results of the 1st stage of the Battle for the Caucasus
    The first stage of the battle for the Caucasus took place from July to December 1942. The German-Romanian troops, having suffered heavy losses, managed to reach the foothills of the Main Caucasian ridge and the Terek River. However, on the whole, the German Edelweiss plan failed. In just the first stage of the battle, Army Group A lost almost 1 men; Although the Germans managed to seize the Maikop fields, but destroyed - not by workers, the front line passed so that it cut off the Maikop oil from the ports in Novorossiysk, Tuapse, and also from the Grozny oil refinery.
    They failed to break through to the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. Turkey did not dare to enter the war on the side of the Third Reich.
    And the most important thing. One of the factors of the failure of the Germans in the Caucasus was the fact that the German command focused on the battle of Stalingrad, where events were by no means the best for the Wehrmacht. In September 1942, to protect the flanks of Army Group B at Stalingrad, the 3rd Romanian Army was deployed from the Caucasus direction. In December 1942, in connection with the setbacks at Stalingrad, some German formations were also withdrawn from the Caucasian front, as a result of which the German group in the Caucasus weakened even more, and by the beginning of 1943 it began to be inferior to Soviet troops in numbers - as in personnel , and in technology and weapons
    1. +5
      24 August 2020 06: 25
      Quote: Rich
      Summing up

      Quote: Rich
      One of the factors of the failure of the Germans in the Caucasus was the fact that the German command focused on the battle of Stalingrad.

      Not being aware that the economy and the military machine of the Reich, by this moment was at the peak of its power, the Nazis still had to take into account the emerging strategic situation, and prioritize the distribution of forces and resources according to the situation.

      Yes, and fought against the USSR, the Soviet people, not comparing their capabilities with the will to Victory of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers.
    2. +2
      24 August 2020 08: 35
      Yes, the main factor was that they cut them well in winter, and on this the Nazi's wet dreams of Caucasian oil ended.
  3. +8
    24 August 2020 05: 53
    Another essay in the style of Nikolai Desyatnichenko. He completely turned the contents of the "unearthed documents" inside out. The conclusions are as follows - and indeed, the Germans did not kill or rob, they simply did not have time for this ...
    1. +16
      24 August 2020 06: 09
      pmkemcity (paul)
      Another essay in the style of Nikolai Desyatnichenko.
      And what to want from this author, he is a well-known Nazi lover, blogger, active fighter "for free Siberia" in general, it is rare negative , in the sense of the bottom.
      1. +6
        24 August 2020 06: 27
        Rare subchik. You must disgrace the glorious Urengoy
      2. +6
        24 August 2020 06: 32
        Quote: Varyag_0711
        blogger, active fighter

        You read such a phrase, and on the machine you remember the well-known illness Leshenka, a fighter against red, and you want to spit ...
      3. +26
        24 August 2020 06: 46
        To be honest, I personally have not seen in the literature on the war in the Caucasus a mention of the "complete destruction" of the Maikop oil fields by our troops during the retreat. On the contrary, it was mentioned everywhere that wells, oil pipelines and other oil-producing equipment were only "partially destroyed" and destroyed during a hasty retreat, and despite this, the Germans did not manage to organize the extraction and export of the Maikop oil on any significant scale, according to " different reasons. " The author found some controversial article in some newspaper and on its basis writes that this is such a myth, established in Soviet-Russian historiography, about "the Maikop oil industry completely destroyed by our troops during the retreat so that the enemy does not get it" - yes nonsense, sucked from the finger ..
        1. +16
          24 August 2020 06: 51
          yes nonsense, sucked from the finger ..
          I rarely agree with you, but here I completely agree!
        2. +5
          24 August 2020 07: 12
          Quote: Snail N9
          I have not seen in the literature about the war in the Caucasus a mention of the "complete destruction" of the Maikop oil fields by our troops during the retreat. On the contrary, it was mentioned everywhere that wells, oil pipelines and other oil-producing equipment were only "partially destroyed" and destroyed in a hasty retreat

          In written sources of that period, there is evidence that at least some of the wells were only "bit by bit" destroyed, imitating pouring them with concrete, which in turn can speak in confirmation of the cases described by the author "extruding concrete plugs(plugs) "oil pressure.

          But at the same time, you need to understand that this was done with an eye to the fact that the Nazis did not manage the fields for a long time, and production would have to be resumed ...
          1. -3
            24 August 2020 13: 32
            Quote: BDRM 667
            In written sources of that period, there is evidence that at least some of the wells were only "bit by bit" destroyed, imitating their pouring with concrete

            Actually, that was not the case at all. Stalin set a task for Baibakov - if the Germans get even a drop, I will shoot him. But if you destroy the deposits, and the Germans do not come, I will shoot them. Think, they say. There was no "make-believe" - ​​the plugs were torn not because they were molded temporarily, but because of poor-quality work due to haste. Do you know that a group of British engineers who had experience in killing wells in Burma before the arrival of the Japanese were brought to the Caucasus? So, their methods were immediately abandoned, since they assumed the further use of wells, which categorically did not suit Baybakov, over whom the Domokles sword hung.
            What kind of "pretend" and "imitations" can we talk about, what kind of nonsense ???
        3. VIP
          24 August 2020 14: 45
          Snitcher, I met materials that the Maikop oil field was completely disabled and the listings were made. But I also met such material as yours: "partially destroyed"
          How many years ago, somewhere there was information that a well was closed in Ilskaya, which worked without stopping for 40 years
      4. +4
        24 August 2020 06: 47
        His book "Stalin's Industrialization" made a good impression on me.
      5. -4
        24 August 2020 14: 25
        Quote: Varyag_0711
        And what can you want from this author, he is a famous Nazi lover

        and where, I wonder, the author demonstrates "love for the Nazis"? Why slander something?
  4. +13
    24 August 2020 08: 13
    The classic trick is to take a propaganda article from the times of the war and solemnly refute it.
    1. +2
      24 August 2020 12: 21
      I wonder if there will be a triumphant disclosure of "Die deutsche Wochenschau" too?
      1. -3
        24 August 2020 12: 57
        If you find a good example, why not?
        Studying the discrepancy between propaganda and reality is very interesting, and reveals the belligerent's thinking better than any memory.
        1. +1
          24 August 2020 13: 13
          Quote: wehr
          If you find a good example, why not?

          well, let's say, in November 42, Berlin radio announced that the work of the Maikop fields was established, and a third of the Reich's oil was Caucasian. Is it necessary to refute this Goebbelsian pulp?
          And it’s not serious, you know, to choose as a target the spirit-lifting and bravura article by I. Lapigonov in "Grozny Rabochy" and vigorously debunk it. Ridiculous, by God. I admit that there are a number of comrades in VO who do not know how to separate historical seeds from propaganda chaff, but you will not convince such people of anything. They are comfortable in their matrix. Look, you see - already this Kolya-s-Urengoy was dragged here to the village, they began to talk about nonsense about "paying and repenting."
          1. -4
            24 August 2020 13: 46
            Can you link to this message?
            You need an exact date and content. There are reasons for lying too.

            This article could have been neglected if it had not been quoted in every work about the Maykop oil during the war, and if everything had not been adjusted to its content. Well, okay, it was a seed for the topic. And so, we do not know anything about the specific plans for the use of the captured oil, there were probably directives and this gap has not yet been closed.

            Three or four people write about Kolya, and tens of thousands read the article.
            1. 0
              24 August 2020 14: 05
              Quote: wehr
              Can you link to this message?
              You need an exact date and content.

              mid-November 42nd. I will try to find the original.

              Quote: wehr

              This article could have been neglected if it had not been cited in every work about the Maykop oil during the war.

              well, yes - they quote, alas. I don't understand - what for? If there is, damn it, first-hand data - from Baybakov. I do not argue that his "Oil Front" is also, of course, ideologically polished, but, at least, this is not a heroic bullshit from a large circulation!
              Look, look, to what they have already finished writing - "they poured concrete for fun" .... If the person who wrote this, instead of giving out idiotic fantasies, read Baibakov's memoir at least diagonally, he would not be carrying such nonsense. Well, if you please - this is the "micromyph" (according to your classification)) - senseless and merciless in its stupidity.
              1. -8
                24 August 2020 15: 54
                What for? So that there are no problems. We do not like very smart people.

                Well, yes, when there is no exact description, myths are generated with extraordinary ease.
                1. -3
                  24 August 2020 23: 45
                  What are you minus? Doesn't it hurt your eyes? laughing
                  1. -1
                    25 August 2020 12: 20
                    What are you minus?

                    Firstly, I do not give or take for the simple reason that my karma does not allow. Secondly, what, nafig, "truth", and who needs it here, if, for example, in chorus they add an idiot who broadcasts about "make-believe plugs"? What is it all about?
  5. +4
    24 August 2020 08: 44
    "The moral of the story is simple: don't make up myths."
    They got ahead of me. The author, another "Kolya s Urengoy"!
  6. BAI
    24 August 2020 09: 48
    This is very little. The production of 1744 tons per month corresponds to 20,9 thousand tons per year, or 0,96% of the pre-war production level (in 1938 - 2160 thousand tons).

    And what does the author not like? Crafts are almost completely destroyed. The remainder is less than 1%. The author contradicts himself.
  7. 0
    24 August 2020 10: 45
    Germany did not really need oil, by the beginning of the war there were about 10 factories for the production of synthetic fuel from coal, oil could not be made from coal, but the Germans were among the first to make synthetic oils from oil for aircraft. Romania drove oil at an accelerated pace. Delivery of oil from the Caucasus is a rather difficult matter, there are no tankers, and it is also quite difficult to organize transportation by hardware. It is not difficult to organize several distillation factories, but probably it was not necessary. During the winter of 1942, after the battle for Moscow, there was a relative calm, the Nazis saved up supplies. In 1940, our experts estimated the reserves of fuel and lubricants in Germany for about 5-6 months of the war. This is stock without replenishment.
    1. -2
      24 August 2020 12: 04
      I couldn't make oil out of coal

      happened. Fuel oil and oils were produced by hydrogenation and Fischer Tropsch. A little, 15 percent of the total synthetics, but, nevertheless, to say that "did not work" is not correct, IMHO.
      1. -3
        24 August 2020 15: 14
        Can you explain the minus?
    2. 0
      24 August 2020 13: 42
      Quote: Free Wind
      Germany doesn't really need oil too much

      Well, yes, of course ..... When the Fuehrer was solemnly informed that the Reich flag had been raised over Elbrus the Jaegers, he shouted, "Idiots, I don't need this stupid mountain of yours, I need oil!"
      1. +1
        24 August 2020 14: 37
        I have not read anything like that anywhere. Is there a word in German at all?
        1. 0
          24 August 2020 14: 59
          Quote: Free Wind
          Is there a word in German at all?

          which one?
  8. +11
    24 August 2020 10: 46
    A lawyer's way to deal with short propaganda campaigns that played a role in their moment, and are now no longer relevant, by long-term digging of boogers from archives and other places ...
    But the Panfilovites were not 28, but ...
    But Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya set fire to not that, but this ...
    But Manstein writes that if Hitler didn’t interfere with him, he would, Manstein, wow ...
    And also, according to the most authoritative German authors, we completely merged the battle on the Kursk Bulge, which means ...
    What does it mean? Are we offered to pay and repent?
    And not an option that we were mistaken in other dimensions? And next time there will be no more germaniums and polands ... And we'll see if the people can hold out for a couple of thousand years without statehood ... One stubborn people succeeded, why not try it?
  9. +2
    24 August 2020 11: 13
    The moral of the story is simple: Don't make up myths.

    This, of course, is understandable, but it is not entirely clear - to whom, in fact, is this message addressed? The editorial office of the Grozny Rabochy newspaper in the not-so-close, to put it mildly, 1942? Then it's pretty silly. Myths have not been invented for a long time - they are either exploited or debunked. And in general - these spiritually uplifting reports in the press of the Second World War do not carry any signs of a "myth" - propaganda falsification, usual for a war. Very, I must say, effective, given the confidence of the Soviet people in the printed word and the releases of the Soviet Information Bureau.
  10. +13
    24 August 2020 11: 13
    The efforts and pathos of the author clearly do not correspond to the scale of his "discoveries". The author was 30 years late with his "exposures of Bolshevik propaganda." Squalor.
  11. 0
    24 August 2020 12: 46
    That the patriots were sad that the Germans did not get oil !?))
  12. +7
    24 August 2020 14: 19
    Dmitry as an author gives me some bewilderment
    I decided to refute propaganda fabrication by the Bundesarchiv.
    Everyone knows that there was no history of the Second World War in the USSR. There was a complete collection of well-established myths, half-knowledge, omissions and controversial interpretations. Why kick the already dead body of Soviet historiography?
    Moreover, for such an ordinary event and with a rather loud headline. They wrote a lie in Grozny worker. What do you mean ???? belay belay
    Really interesting and controversial areas that can be covered by the Bundesarchiv:
    Real losses of the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and Panzerwaffe
    The most controversial battles are Kursk, the Ardennes.
    This is where there is where to turn around.
    And here...
    "We expected bloodshed from him, but he ate a siskin" (c)
    Dmitry, you are capable of more.
    1. +1
      24 August 2020 14: 35
      I agree with the comment completely.
    2. -8
      24 August 2020 18: 13
      Large mosaics are made from small pieces
      1. +4
        24 August 2020 21: 51
        I will throw you material for the next article -
        Mystery of "Liberty"
        Given the clear superiority of the enemy, the command of the Israeli fleet decided to act, first of all, by saboteurs from the Shayetet-13 unit. Already in the evening of June 5, the submarine "Tanin" landed 6 combat swimmers near Alexandria. The submarine was discovered by the hydroacoustics of the destroyer "Suez", but the Egyptian command forbade her to attack, fearing that it might be one of their boats that came to the shores of Israel.
        Due to the strong security of the raid, saboteurs from "Shayetet-13" were able to blow up only an old dredger, which stood at the eastern pier on the site of an old destroyer parking lot. The dredger received minor damage, and the explosion attracted the attention of the guards, as a result, around noon on June 6, all six swimmers were captured. Subsequently, it was claimed that they were able to undermine the Egyptian minesweeper, but even its name could not be found out. Winston Churchill, Jr. ””.

        The politician and deputy Winston Churchill Jr. himself created another MYTH.
        Not a correspondent for the "Grozny Oilman" ...
        Will you investigate?
        On the basis of what Israeli data did he pass this fantasy off as reality?
        You yourself said -
        Large mosaics are made from small pieces
        1. -4
          24 August 2020 21: 53
          Not. I am interested in the military and economic history of World War II.
          1. +1
            24 August 2020 22: 01
            Sorry, sorry!
            Otherwise they would have swung at the family of the Dukes of Marlborough themselves!
            Then do your research on Donbass coal mines!
            Coal for the Germans was mined - mined.
            Or about those who did not evacuate along with the factories from the glorious city of Kharkov!
            A lot of engineers and workers simply did not evacuate and stayed in the occupied territory!
            They that did not believe in the victory of the Red Army?
            Or did they want to receive rations from the gracious Germans?
            Or did they simply not want to lose their acquired junk?
            1. -1
              24 August 2020 22: 09
              These are all important questions. But so far I have not found any documents about this. And brief retellings in the literature, as we have already seen, are unsatisfactory.

              This is one of the main questions of the history of the Second World War - why the Germans, having seized the Donbass, which was the basis of the industry of the pre-war USSR, could not use it?
              1. 0
                24 August 2020 22: 20
                This is one of the main questions of the history of the Second World War - why the Germans, having seized the Donbass, which was the basis of the industry of the pre-war USSR, could not use it?

                This question is on a par with the question - Why did Hitler need to go to war against the USSR?
          2. 0
            26 August 2020 23: 25
            Then consider writing an article about a food wagon train from the occupied Pskov region to besieged Leningrad in March 1942!
  13. -5
    24 August 2020 17: 38
    Very good article, plus to the author! It is immediately evident that he worked with archival sources, directly with documents of those years. Unlike some would-be authors (we will not give names), who, having read only Wikipedia and a couple of popular brochures, scribble a bunch of "opuses"
  14. +1
    24 August 2020 19: 08
    It's simple, Hitler's goal was Baku oil, but not for himself, but in order to deprive the USSR of the main source of oil and, as a result, stop our engines with all the ensuing consequences! Stalingrad smashed this plan against the head of Paulis and his team!
  15. +4
    24 August 2020 21: 33
    I didn’t understand the author’s suffering: "here the pump was not broken in good quality, here the pipe remained intact." The task was to render the oil field unusable. This task was completed. During the time that the Germans held the oil field, they could not establish industrial production and refining of oil. And the fact that they scooped buckets of oil for the Romanian bakery does not change the essence of the matter. And as a matter of fact, a propaganda article in the newspaper - completely corresponds to reality.
    1. +1
      25 August 2020 14: 41
      A great work is the author that the propaganda lied about the destruction of the oil production infrastructure, and right there in the article "Thirdly, the destruction was great and it was impossible to fix it with a snap of the fingers." Those. propaganda did not lie, but only exaggerated ?!
  16. 0
    26 August 2020 09: 43
    I don't understand what the author is trying to achieve with this article
    Truth! that in Soviet times they only lied! and who needs this truth of yours? she is only given out when someone needs it,
    Find this truth now,
    You will not find a single country in the world that broadcasts the truth, all around the truth that is needed by this or that ruling political system, be it communism or capitalism
    1. +1
      26 August 2020 23: 53
      "Who needs your truth, if it prevents us from living?" (C)
  17. +1
    28 August 2020 01: 31
    German oil was essential. Many German memoirs speak of a freezing fuel shortage. Of course, there were transportation solutions. For example, to whip up a narrow-gauge railway. The aviation was still strong enough for air cover. But the damage at the deposit led to the fact that the game is not worth the candle. The operation to withdraw the field was successful. The factual material in the article and the conclusions contradict each other. Ersatz processing could be arranged on the spot. Straight-run light factions for tanks would do. Diesel fuel for the fleet. The rest is in heating oil. Motor fuel from coal is very expensive to make this perversion, including the resources that can be used more efficiently.
    1. UUK
      6 March 2024 17: 57
      The Caucasian oil fields, available upon capture, could provide the Third Reich with negligible oil compared to its allies (Hungary and especially Romania). Therefore, even if the Germans managed to restore the Maykop oil-bearing region and establish transportation, this could not significantly improve their situation. If they manage to capture Baku and Grozny, it’s possible, but Krasnodar oil did not “cure” them
  18. 0
    20 October 2020 16: 33
    As a local resident, I will make a small amendment: The oilfield (and the village in the mountains) is called Kutaisi, not Kutaisi. Kutaisi, this is in Georgia, not here :)
  19. UUK
    6 March 2024 17: 52
    Myths, especially historical ones, are truly harmful things. However, regarding the topic of discussion, one thing is indisputable: the Germans were unable to take advantage of the captured oil fields. Reasons and circumstances are details that do not change the picture much. Moreover, the propaganda did not lie about everything: the fact that the oil fields were put out of commission is beyond doubt. Yes, not completely, not completely, but the object fell into the hands of the enemy in a virtually non-functional state (production at the level of a few percent of the “passport”, and even without the prospect of processing it is almost nothing). Finally, those who destroyed equipment and infrastructure clearly could not miss the prospect of “taking back what was lost.” Destroy radically - how to restore it later? Therefore, we struck a balance: to make it as difficult as possible for the enemy to use the oil fields, but at the same time maintain the potential for recovery after liberation. And - let's be honest - it worked.

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