Military Review

The beginning of the concentration of the Wehrmacht mobile forces near our border

31

The following abbreviations are used in the article: GSh - General base, Spacecraft - Red Army, cd (kn) - cavalry division (regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), MSP - motorized rifle regiment, pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, td (tbr, tp, tb) - tank division (brigade, regiment, battalion).


Earlier, two articles were presented on the site with an analysis of the reliability of the Republic of Moldova, which were received by the leadership of the USSR and the spacecraft in 1938–41. In one of them, RM was considered about the presence of our border German troops (mostly infantry)and in the second - dislocations large headquarters. In a new article, we will examine in detail the Republic of Moldova on the German mobile forces. This article completes the cycle of information that came from intelligence to the leadership of the country and the spacecraft on the eve of the war.

The mobile forces in the German armed forces included motorized infantry regiments, motorized rifle, tank and cavalry regiments, anti-tank divisions, motorcycle and infantry, scooter and reconnaissance battalions (bulletin No. 276 of 29.2.40). The article will only consider materials related to the presence and deployment of infantry regiments, infantry, motorized regiments (hereinafter - mp), cd, army divisions, infantry motorized divisions (hereinafter - md).

1938 year. Estimation of the number of German troops


24.3.38 the head of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov prepared a Note stating:

The Soviet Union needs to be ready to fight on two fronts: in the West against Germany, Poland and partially against Italy with the possible accession of the Limitrophs to them and in the East against Japan. Italy is very likely to be involved in the war. fleet, the sending of an expeditionary force to our borders can hardly be expected ...

The limiting countries were Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. According to the estimates of the General Staff, in Germany there were 96 pd, 5 ppm, 5 cd and 30 TB (a total of 111 divisions).

The beginning of the concentration of the Wehrmacht mobile forces near our border

The reserve divisions and landwehr divisions did not even closely correspond to the infantry divisions, but even taking into account them, the RMs on the number of infantry fighting forces were greatly overestimated. RM about mobile troops were quite accurate. Intelligence just did not track the rejection of the use of the Wehrmacht cd.

The General Staff suggested that Germany (if it had an enemy represented by Czechoslovakia and France) would set up against the Soviet Union up to 60-65 pd (63 ... 68% of all compounds of this type), 4 cd (80%), 4 ppm (80 %), up to 20 TB (67%). Thus, from among the available mobile forces, Germany will have more than 74% of formations against the USSR.

Where was the German grouping concentrated against the USSR stationed?


Since the summer of 1940, as troops concentrated in the East or against the Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova has provided information on the divisions deployed on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland (Warsaw direction, Lublin-Krakow district and the Danzig, Poznan, Thorn area).

In the RU report dated 4.4.41, the territories located near the Soviet-Romanian border (Moldova and Northern Dobrudja) were added to the above territories. On April 26, German divisions concentrated in Hungary (Carpathian Ukraine) were included in the report.

By 15.5.41, the grouping of German troops, concentrated against the Soviet Union, was finally determined in the Republic of Uzbekistan. This group was stationed on the territory of East Prussia, former Poland, Romania (Moldova and Northern Dobrudja), Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia.

According to intelligence, German-Romanian troops were deployed on the Black Sea coast of Romania, which could be used for landing operations in the rear of the OdVO (including in the Crimea). However, these troops were not included in the grouping concentrated against the USSR.

1940 year. Reconnaissance materials about the mobile forces


17.5.40, the report of the 5th Spacecraft Administration (the future of the spacecraft RU) indicates: “According to a noteworthy source, the German army on May 5 [on the] …the territory of former Poland - 20 PD and 2 TD ... " The report does not say anything about the troops that were in East Prussia.

According to Müller-Gillebrant, in the territory of East Prussia and former Poland from November 1939 to July 1940 there were no divisions that could be attributed to the mobile forces.


20.7.40, the report of the 5th Directorate indicates: “In the territory of East Prussia on June 15 it was established up to 7 pd and 2 kp. In the territory of the former Poland ... there were up to 20 pd and 4 kp ”. By June 15, intelligence was somehow able to obtain information about the absence of tank units at the border. However, in the summary, the amount of PD turned out to be overstated by 3,9 times.

The same report states that for the period from June 19 to July 14, 1940, a transfer to East Prussia and to the former Poland of up to two mb, twelve CP, TBR, TP, six TB and the tank unit of an unknown number and numbering was established. A total of more than seven divisions of the mobile forces, which did not actually exist, arrived at our border ...

In the Certificate dated 8.8.40, the total number of mobile troops concentrated near the border can be estimated by the number: up to 6 AP, over 3 cd and 4 mp. Intelligence data on mobile troops is again unreliable, because Until September 1940, there were no tank, motorized, cavalry units or formations at the border.


The summary and reference states the presence of tb at the border. It is now known that before the outbreak of war in the Wehrmacht there were six TBs that were not part of the tank or light divisions.

The 40th TB was formed on 8.3.40 and in 42 days arrived in Oslo.

The 100th flamethrower TB was formed on 1.3.40 and was in Germany until July 1940. From 10.6.41, it was part of the 47th microns (2nd TGr).

The 101st flamethrower TB was formed on 4.3.40 in Germany. By the beginning of the war, it was part of the 39th mk 3rd TGr.

The 102nd flamethrower TB was formed on 31.5.41. By the beginning of the war, it was part of the 1st TGr.

The 211st TB was formed on March 24.3.41, XNUMX in Germany and was sent to Finland.

The 212nd TB was formed in the summer of 1941 on the island of Crete.

From the information presented it is clear that for the 100th and 101st battalions there is no data on their location in the summer and autumn of 1940. As an estimate from above, we accept that they were near our border and that the information on two TBs is correct.

For the tank units were either mythical units or units that had tracked vehicles. In one of the messages received in 1941, it was said that the tank unit was unloaded at the railway station. Nobody saw the tanks themselves, but the source determined that light tanks were in the armament of the unit and this was determined (!) By the track of the tracks on the ground ...

It should be noted that the intelligence services of the Soviet Union were able to obtain accurate information about the name of a sufficiently large number of divisions and regiments, and this is very strange ... It is strange that intelligence knows 24 exact names of the out of 39 available at the border and 135 exact names of the out of 154. It is sad that in reality there are no more than fifteen of these divisions and, therefore, nn - no more than 45 ...

How can this be? This can be only in one case, when the German command specifically spreads rumors or "illuminates" fictitious formations using signs on the shoulder straps of military personnel. A similar situation can be observed with the mobile forces. Of one TD, four TP and eight CP with well-known reconnaissance numbers, the border has neither a tank unit, nor a unit ...

It turns out that the German command consciously from the spring of 1940 imitated the presence of mobile troops at the border before the start of their redeployment from the West and even before the war ... Why did the German command have to do this? According to the author, this was done for the sole purpose: to link the observation of our intelligence sources over the locations of mythical units. In this case, it becomes clear why a significant number of these fictitious regiments and divisions, according to our intelligence, were at their deployment points (quite far from the border) on 21.6.41.

The certificate of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD dated 6.11.40 indicates: “During the operations in France, the German command kept in East Prussia and former Poland up to 27 pd ... [RM RM also has 27 divisions. - Note auth.].

After the surrender of France, the German command began in early July 1940, the mass transfer of troops from west to east and south-east, with the result that concentrated in East Prussia and former Poland:

- until July 16 - up to 40 pd and over 2 td
[according to RM RU - 40 pd, up to 2 ppm, tbr, tp and 6 tb. - Note auth.];

- on July 23 - up to 50 pd and over 4 td [according to RM RU - up to 50 pd, two tbr, two tp and 6 tb. - Note auth.];

- on August 8 - up to 54 PD and up to 6 TD [According to RM RU - up to 52 pd, 2 ppm, one td, two tbr, 5 tp and 3 tb. - Note auth. ”

It can be seen from the above document that the data received from the NCO and NKVD intelligence services do not significantly differ from each other and, therefore, all of the indicated RMs are unreliable.

According to Müller-Gillebrant, in East Prussia and former Poland as of 7.10.40 there is one cd, one md and three td. It can be seen that in the Republic of Moldova the number of German formations of the mobile forces is significantly overestimated.


In the draft Note of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated 18.9.40, the number of German troops is estimated:

Germany currently has 205–226 pd deployed (including up to 8 motorized) and 15–17 td, and in total ... 10000 tanks ...
With the war still unfinished with England, it can be assumed that ... of the above ... divisions up to ... 15-17 td, 8 md ... will be directed against our borders ...

In the fall of 1940, the General Staff considered that all the TD and MD (100%) available in the German army would be directed against the USSR.

The summary of RU in the West No. 8 says:

The total number of units of the German army is 229-242 divisions, including 15-17 TD and 8-10 MD. On 15.11.40/6/7, in East Prussia and on the territory of former Poland, it was established ... 8 md, 21-XNUMX td, ... XNUMX kp ...

RM on the total number of divisions in the German armed forces is significantly overstated. As of December 21.12.40, 180,7, there were up to 40 divisions in total. This number includes 20 divisions that were in the process of formation or on vacation. Information on the presence of tank and motorized troops is close to their actual number: 12,7 TD and XNUMX MD.

Compared to September 25.9.40, 2.11.40, reconnaissance established a slight increase in mobile troops by one md and two infantry units near the border. Information on the presence of mobile troops at the border can be checked using the map of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht (General Staff OKH) with the situation on XNUMX



On the territory on which the troops are concentrated against the USSR, a part of the 60th MD, 1st Cd, 1st and 6th TD is actually deployed. Up to four divisions, which can be attributed to the mobile forces. And intelligence recorded in this territory up to fourteen TD and MD, as well as 21 CP ...

Is such information reliable? Of course not! These RMs are very similar to misinformation from the German command. How can such a gross error in RM take place? According to the author, this is possible only if there were rumors about the presence of mobile troops near the border in specific settlements or field camps, as well as if certain formations of German troops actively depicted non-existent units and formations ...

The author remembers his promise to provide links for a more detailed examination of the maps of the General Purpose OKH. Links will be presented in the 3rd part of this article. At the address you can find many maps with German intelligence data about the spacecraft.

Early 1941 Reconnaissance Materials on the Mobile Forces


Did the refinement of the Republic of Moldova take place at the beginning of 1941? In February 1941, another RU report was published:

The grouping of German troops in East Prussia ... at 1.2.41 is ... two AP, one MD ...
The grouping of the German troops against the ZAPOVO (without East Prussia) ... is ... two TD, one MD ...
The grouping of German troops against KOVO ... is ... three md, one td ...

In total, over 60 divisions are concentrated at the Soviet-German border, including five md and five td. The report notes that part of the mobile forces was relocated from the territory of East Prussia and former Poland to the Balkans. The figure below shows a fragment of the map of the General Staff OKH with the situation on 6.2.41.


On the fragment of the map of the General Staff OKH you can see only 27 German divisions concentrated near our border. This number includes one cd and two td. The locations of all three divisions have not changed with respect to the data from 2.11.40. For three months, all Soviet intelligence services could not find out that instead of 8-10 md and so on, there are only two md and 5-8 mythical formations at the border!

In accordance with the plan of the General Staff on the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of 11.3.41, it is assumed that Germany will put up all the md and md against the USSR:

Germany currently has deployed 225 infantry, 20 TD and 15 MDand all in all ... 10000 tanks ...
Given the end of the war with England, it can be assumed that ... up to 200 divisions, of which up to 165 pd, 20 TD and 15 MDwill be directed against our borders ...

It turns out that from the autumn of 1940 to March 1941 in the General Staff it is assumed that in the event of a war with the USSR, all tank and motorized divisions available in Germany will be concentrated at our borders.

In the RU message received on 11.3.41, the number of German TDs and MDs has already increased:

The total number of divisions of the German army as of 1.3.41 was about 263 divisions, of which ... 22 TD and 20 MD ...

Recently, information has been received about the formation of heavy tank divisions. The increase in parachute and landing divisions continues. If by the end of active operations in the West there was one parachute and one airborne division in the German armed forces, now there are three parachute and three airborne divisions ...

PM on the number of PDs is again very high. Information on the availability of 22 TD is close to reality, because there were actually 21 of them (including the 5th light division, which included a tank unit). Information on the number of ppm is also close to reality: the report refers to 20 divisions, but in fact there were about 14,3. The difference is quite large, but if we add five more mythical MD at our border to 14,3 md, the total number of divisions practically coincides with the Republic of Moldova. Only there are no five fronts at our borders ...

The misinformation of the German command is received by the RM about the formation of tank divisions armed with heavy tanks and anti-tank anti-aircraft regiments, as well as the formation of up to four landing and landing divisions ... In accordance with the above RU report dated 11.3.41, up to 61 divisions are deployed in the East, including 5 ppm and 4 td. In fact, there are all the same two TDs (1st and 6th) and 1st cd.

In the RU report dated 26.4.41. states that as of April 25th:

In the East Prussian direction (against Pribovo) [concentrated. - Note auth.] ... 3 md, 1 td ... In the Warsaw direction (against ZAPOVO) - ... 1 md and 4 td. In addition, one motocavalry. In the Lublin-Krakow region (against KOVO) ... 3 md, 4 td ...

Altogether, according to intelligence data, seven md and nine td are concentrated in East Prussia and former Poland ... In fact, the same 1st cd, 1st and 6th td are located at the same points of deployment at the border. This can be seen from the map of the General Staff OKH with the situation on 23.4.41. The only change is the beginning of the arrival of the 4th building in the vicinity of the city of Poznan.


The reconnaissance again brought false data ... The number of md is three times overstated, and instead of the seven detected md there is not one ...

The RMs, which were far from reality, also came from the reconnaissance of the NKVD border troops:

From April 1 to April 19, 1941, the following data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the Governor General were obtained by border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border ... In total, arrived in these areas: ... connections 3 md, ... 2 megapixels, 7 kp, ... up to 7 TB ...


To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
What did the intelligence report? The wars at dawn 22 did not wait for June
What our intelligence knew about German large headquarters?
31 comment
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. Mitroha
    Mitroha 17 May 2020 06: 42 New
    12
    the group was stationed on the territory of East Prussia, former Poland, Romania (Moldova and Northern Dobrudja), the Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia.

    Nothing changes, except for the addition of the Baltic states, and the name has changed from Germany to NATO. History teaches nothing to adversaries
    1. antivirus
      antivirus 18 May 2020 17: 39 New
      +2
      Nothing changes, except that added

      - I wonder at the authors - no data from the archives of the United States (OKH exported there?)?
      -where it should be the truth of someone and how to deceive Zhukov-Shaposhnikov, for what?
      -How did they share the Red Army against Germany-Zap border, Japan -Dostok, Transcaucasia and TurkVO ???
  2. Bar1
    Bar1 17 May 2020 06: 54 New
    +8
    that's right, it’s better to overstep than not to finish. But by the beginning of the war it turned out that the Red Army had understaffed divisions and the number of German troops entering the battle at the same time was greater than ours. The Red Army had more tanks and planes and it was by the day the war started , to the day of SUMMER SOLAR CONSTITUTION -June 22. After all, it is known that Napoleon also went to Russia on June 22, too. This could not be ignored.
    How did it happen that at the beginning of the war a significant part of the spacecraft’s aviation was destroyed? It is known that airplanes were concentrated at several airfields, and the remaining airfields were only created on June 22, the day when everything was favorable for the start of the war. In whose competence was the solution to this issue? Stalin, the General Staff or the command of the districts? It is precisely with this issue that it is advisable to fully understand.
    Then the blow was so strong that the Red Army simply could not adequately respond, was defeated and bent under German blows.
    It is surprising, for example, that 2 thousand. German tanks broke 10 thousand., Including 1,8 thousand. T34 and KV1 of our tanks and this happened only because of violation of command and control. That is, all the problems of the outbreak of war were associated to a greater extent with the poor preparation of the top command level or the possible betrayal of this particular command link.
    For example, the famous Dubna tank battle, when our mechanized corps had significantly more tanks than the Germans and still lost, there is at least weak tactical training of the top command level, command of districts and corps, and even Zhukov got in for some reason. just the opposite, very good command and control.
    The conclusion is that the Red Army commanders were much weaker than the German and in the strategic / tactical planning, could not organize any adequate defense and could not organize a response attack.
    And why did the Red Army have such commanders at the start of the war? All the same, only one thing comes to mind, the level of competence of the military command cannot exceed the level of political leadership of the country.
    1. +5
      +5 17 May 2020 11: 06 New
      11
      Yes, they sucked everything a thousand times, it was full of suitable books. Thousands of tanks and planes were on paper, there were actually fewer combat-ready ones, but certainly more than the Germans had. And all this was to a depth of hundreds of kilometers.
      In the direction of German attacks, they had a multiple advantage in everything. Beat in pieces. The Germans had an organizational prodigy, a tank division, with an optimal ratio of tanks, artillery, motorized infantry, and so on. From France alone, the Germans took away the truck how many in total in the USSR. They stupidly traveled around places of defense ... Well, a much higher educational and cultural level of soldiers and officers.
      In 41, the Red Army could not save anything. Therefore, the "stupid top political leadership", knowing everything about the red soldiers following the results of the Finnish war, even before the war prepared the Evacuation .. She and the suicidal counterattacks of thousands of naked tanks and eventually saved the country
      1. Nehist
        Nehist 17 May 2020 14: 41 New
        +9
        Hmm, well, actually the optimal TD in the Wehrmacht was created only by the end of 42 years. But the interaction they established was excellent what the Red Army until the end of the war could not achieve
        1. +5
          +5 18 May 2020 10: 51 New
          +6
          Well, no need, in operational and tactical art, the SA surpassed the Wehrmacht probably in the middle of the 44th .... which cannot be said about our flyers and, especially, krasvoenormor, the sense of which was zero even in the 45th.
    2. EvilLion
      EvilLion 18 May 2020 11: 59 New
      +6
      Or maybe we won’t pull Belarus, where Pavlov was operating, so that he had the Germans on one airfield on foot by the evening of June 22nd come to the rest of the military districts?

      It is surprising, for example, that 2 thousand. German tanks broke 10 thousand., Including 1,8 thousand. T34 and KV1 of our tanks and this happened only because of violation of command and control.


      Or maybe due to the fact that these 10 thousand tanks (which is already doubtful) did not have the same amount of infantry and artillery as the Germans had? German TD - with 200 tanks, up to 20 thousand people. And yet, yes, technology is technology, the Germans piled it with meat.

      Do not write, in general, stupidity.

      All the same, only one thing comes to mind, the level of competence of the military command cannot exceed the level of political leadership of the country.


      Well done, worked out 500 p. How can you be sausage from Stalin, like vampires from silver. Afraid of the dead.
    3. antivirus
      antivirus 18 May 2020 17: 45 New
      +3
      all the same, only one thing comes; the level of competence of the military command cannot exceed the level of political leadership of the country.
      Could the level of recruits be the main thing? literate lacked, not only tactically and strategically.
      who prevented EBN from subjugating Chechnya "like a textbook"? who allowed the death of Peshkov and Filippov in Syria? What else is needed to correct the obvious miscalculations.?
      WHY DO EVERYONE KNOW ABOUT MORTALITY ON THE HIGHWAY AND CONTINUE TO DIE? look in the mirror more often and not on the hair, but in the soul.
      "deductionists" will continue to muddy historical stories after Solzhenitsyn
  3. cost
    cost 17 May 2020 07: 11 New
    16
    The Soviet military-political leadership incorrectly assessed the extent of the threat of a German attack, the Red Army, having begun in May 1941 strategic concentration and deployment in the Western theater, which was supposed to end by July 15, 1941, was taken by surprise on June 22 and had no offensive , no defensive group. Soviet troops were not mobilized, did not have deployed rear structures, and only completed the creation of governing bodies on the theater of operations. At the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, out of 77 divisions of Red Army cover troops in the first hours of the war, only 38 incompletely mobilized divisions could repulse the enemy, of which only a few managed to take up equipped positions on the border. The rest of the troops were either in places of constant deployment, or in camps, or on the march. If we take into account that the enemy immediately threw 103 divisions on the offensive, then it is clear that an organized entry into the battle and the creation of a continuous front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. Having outstripped the Soviet troops in strategic deployment, having created powerful operational groups of their fully combat-ready forces in selected areas of the main attack, the German command created favorable conditions for seizing strategic initiative and successfully conducting the first offensive operations.
    1. strannik1985
      strannik1985 18 May 2020 11: 03 New
      11
      having begun in May 1941 strategic concentration and deployment in the Western theater

      If deployment is understood as replenishment of units and formations before the state of wartime, then this was not the case. Even the formations of the cover armies were not deployed across the I / O state and by June 22 were stationed with regiments and battalions in the RPD at a distance of 0-60 km from the border (some up to 100 km).
      only completed the creation of controls on the theater

      What can hardly be called the concentration of the army itself.
    2. EvilLion
      EvilLion 18 May 2020 12: 04 New
      +9
      I am afraid that the Red Army just understood everything correctly, but could not do anything, since infantry formations could be ignored, they were unable to advance quickly, and therefore could not quickly grind the opposing enemy, but the fur. units actually arrived at the border only in June of the 41st. All that was left was to wait, since the first to attack was impossible for many reasons, the very United States was preparing to fit in with the one it was attacking.
  4. icant007
    icant007 17 May 2020 07: 13 New
    -3
    This article completes the cycle of information that came from intelligence to the leadership of the country and the spacecraft on the eve of the war.


    If it completes, then where is the list of sources used, promised by the author a long time ago?
    1. Olgovich
      Olgovich 17 May 2020 07: 43 New
      12
      Quote: icant007
      If it completes, then where is the list of sources used, promised by the author a long time ago?

      the article will be continued, the author indicates this, only part of it is published.

      As for the article, the intelligence recorded the main thing-massive the transfer of enemy units from West to East and Southeast and. accordingly, warned the leadership of the army and the country.

      Errors in quantity are inevitable.

      The same Germans, too, were mistaken in evaluating our forces and their location and very much-Halder described it in his diary ...
      1. icant007
        icant007 17 May 2020 08: 47 New
        +2
        Quote: Olgovich
        the article will be continued, the author indicates this, only part of it is published.


        I didn’t read it right away. I saw that the final article, was delighted, climbed to the end for the promised list of sources.
        But it wasn’t here) It turns out only the beginning of the end)
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 19 May 2020 12: 38 New
        -3
        Quote: Olgovich
        Errors in quantity are inevitable.

        The same Germans, too, were mistaken in evaluating our forces and their location and very much-Halder described it in his diary ...

        The fact of the matter is that now, when many documents of the war years are disclosed, one is amazed at the accuracy with which military intelligence determined the grouping of German troops and their allies throughout the border, especially given our lag in intelligence. Even now, with all types of reconnaissance, opening an enemy force group of 80-90% is considered a brilliant result, and our intelligence officers even surpassed this on the eve of the war. Much later, when all sources of information and reporting materials were analyzed, military historians came to the conclusion that the error in determining the number of enemy divisions was from 3 to 5 divisions according to different sources:
        Naturally, the desire to compare these data of our Intelligence Agency with what is written in the book of Hitler Wehrmacht General Kurt Tippelskirch “History of the Second World War”: “By June 22, the day of the offensive, in the strategic deployment areas were concentrated: 81 infantry division, 1 cavalry division, 17 tank, 15 motorized, 9 police and security divisions. As reserves of the high command, 22 more infantry, 2 tank, 2 motorized divisions and 1 police division were on their way ”(174). Total: 150 divisions. On the same issue, I will quote from the book of the collective of military historians, “World War II 1939–1945.”: “The Nazi troops (taking into account the reserve of the main command, not counting the five German divisions in Finland, as well as the Allied forces) were located in the directions whose boundaries are indicated above (175). In the main direction, in the center of the front, there were 62 divisions and two brigades, or about 43%, in the southern sector of the front - 54 divisions, or up to 36%, and in the northern sector of the front - 31 divisions, or 21% ”(176). Total: 152 German divisions (with five located in Finland).
        Finally, the official evidence on this issue is what was said in the book “50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR”: “153 divisions were allocated to attack the Soviet Union, including 33 armored and motorized divisions ...”(177).
  5. cost
    cost 17 May 2020 07: 24 New
    20
    Very rare archival photos of June 22, 1941







  6. Operator
    Operator 17 May 2020 10: 34 New
    -14
    Another article in the series: "mice injected, but ate a cactus" laughing

    The author is stubbornly trying to prove that we are being grossly deceived - on June 22, 1941, it was the USSR that attacked the peaceful sleeping Germany and its allies, which had troops only in intelligence reports of the General Staff of the NGOs.
  7. A. Privalov
    A. Privalov 17 May 2020 11: 45 New
    17
    My mother, from the end of 1940 she lived in a military town near Rava-Russian (Lviv region). Grandfather, commanded an engineering battalion on the construction of the Rava-Russian and partially Strumilovsky fortified areas. She was only 11 years old then, but she remembered well and told me more than once that already since the end of May 1941, tanks were roaring across the river and it was clearly visible, even with the naked eye, to the active movement of military equipment and people on the other side of the border. Then, the planes began to fly and low, so that the crosses on the wings were visible.
    1. EvilLion
      EvilLion 18 May 2020 12: 05 New
      +2
      Even remembering exactly that it was the end of May, and not, for example, mid-June, when it was 11 years old, is rather strange. So such "evidence" is of little interest. As well as a couple of planes seen.
  8. Operator
    Operator 17 May 2020 12: 37 New
    +1
    Quote: Rich
    Anticipating

    The key word - the supreme high command of the Red Army in the part of the cover army, was very worried about this issue.
    1. EvilLion
      EvilLion 18 May 2020 12: 06 New
      +6
      I’m afraid that it could have been a little better, or a little worse, but fundamentally the situation changed, only with a preemptive strike.
      1. Operator
        Operator 18 May 2020 20: 26 New
        +8
        The Red Army in June 1941 managed to somehow mobilize only a cover army, which, by definition and in numbers, is not intended for a preemptive strike. Therefore, the situation could only be changed by withdrawing the cover army to the line of the old border, exchanging the border territory for a while and withdrawing Soviet troops from the Wehrmacht's artillery and air strikes.

        The most unprofessionalism of the high command of the Red Army of 1941 was manifested in the placement of the rear services of the covering army right on the line of the new Soviet-German border.
  9. ccsr
    ccsr 17 May 2020 12: 55 New
    -7
    Author:
    Eugene
    By 15.5.41, the grouping of German troops, concentrated against the Soviet Union, was finally determined in the Republic of Uzbekistan. This group was stationed on the territory of East Prussia, former Poland, Romania (Moldova and Northern Dobrudja), Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia.

    The author reproduces this insolent lie in all his "works", although he was repeatedly pointed out that he was deceiving readers. Firstly, report No. 5 was compiled on June 1, 1941, although both before its release and after the General Staff of the General Staff, daily intelligence reports were drawn up, which were reported to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of General Staff. Secondly, the data on the grouping of German troops was constantly changing due to the fact that until June 21 inclusive, German troops arrived at our border, and about which the intelligence of the districts reported to the RU of the General Staff. So to judge what our intelligence knew on June 21 according to the data on May 31, I consider not only deceitful, but also vile in relation to those who obtained information up to the attack of German troops.
    This can be only in one case, when the German command specifically spreads rumors or "illuminates" fictitious formations using signs on the shoulder straps of military personnel.

    This crazy version has been repeatedly ridiculed by military professionals - the radio intelligence does not care what epaulets the arriving units have, it is important for them to reveal the location of the communication centers and their call signs in order to understand which units are arriving at one or another section of the border. This is not to mention that on the eve of the war, there were agents in the military intelligence who had access to German governing documents and directives, and sent information from them, from which it was possible to understand which troops were being moved to.
    Information on the presence of mobile troops at the border can be checked using the map of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht (General Staff OKH) with the situation on 2.11.40
    Once again, the author did not provide data on the documents, and the cards that he posted here do not have the details and signatures of officials, which is why they could have been cooked up with photoshop at this time. As long as the author does not post links to the documents that he places here, all this can be considered garbage and data not worthy of attention. By the way, the famous dreamer Zakoretsky draws some kind of cards in the same way and then passes them off as genuine, supposedly based on accurate data.
  10. ccsr
    ccsr 17 May 2020 13: 18 New
    -1
    Author:
    Eugene
    According to the estimates of the General Staff, in Germany there were 96 pd, 5 ppm, 5 cd and 30 TB (a total of 111 divisions).

    This infamous lie, like the data in the table, completely refutes the documents of the GRU GSH, which are now publicly available:

    [/ Center]

    [Center]
    It can be seen from the materials that as of 1.1.1939, there were no talk of any 111 divisions at all, so the lies about 96 infantry divisions, of which there were only 39, lay on the conscience of the author of these fabrications. However, I have always argued that he is a liar and you can not trust him.
  11. DDT
    DDT 18 May 2020 13: 16 New
    +7
    Yes nifiga like that! The brilliant Generalissimo Josip Vissarionych simply applied the Polovtsian tactics of luring the enemy deep into the territory am And the liberals are lying! angry
  12. VS
    VS 18 May 2020 15: 58 New
    -7
    "" According to Müller-Gillebrant, in the territory of East Prussia and former Poland, as of 7.10.40, there is one cd, one md and three so on. It can be seen that the number of German formations of mobile troops is significantly overestimated in the RM. "

    Finally, we got to the scientific method !!
    Intelligence of the General Staff of the General Staff and others is shameful shit because the German military after the war showed something else and THIS IS TRUTH!)))

    Oh how !!! And I kept thinking - WHERE our next anonymous writer scoops up the TRUTH and HOW he refutes the reports of the General Staff of Golikov - it turns out the mulers told him the whole truth?))) The regiment of admirers of German data arrived - Isaev to help))))
  13. VS
    VS 18 May 2020 16: 01 New
    -8
    Quote: Rich
    The Soviet military-political leadership incorrectly assessed the extent of the threat of a German attack, the Red Army, having begun in May 1941 strategic concentration and deployment in the Western theater, which was supposed to end by July 15, 1941, was taken by surprise on June 22 and had no offensive , no defensive group. Soviet troops were not mobilized, did not have deployed rear structures, and only completed the creation of governing bodies on the theater of operations. At the front from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, out of 77 divisions of Red Army cover troops in the first hours of the war, only 38 incompletely mobilized divisions could repulse the enemy, of which only a few managed to take up equipped positions on the border. The rest of the troops were either in places of constant deployment, or in camps, or on the march. If we take into account that the enemy immediately threw 103 divisions on the offensive, then it is clear that an organized entry into the battle and the creation of a continuous front of Soviet troops was extremely difficult. Having outstripped the Soviet troops in strategic deployment, having created powerful operational groups of their fully combat-ready forces in selected areas of the main attack, the German command created favorable conditions for seizing strategic initiative and successfully conducting the first offensive operations.

    one wrote, and for some reason you repeated (((
  14. VS
    VS 18 May 2020 16: 04 New
    -9
    Quote: Olgovich
    Quote: icant007
    If it completes, then where is the list of sources used, promised by the author a long time ago?

    the article will be continued, the author indicates this, only part of it is published.

    As for the article, the intelligence recorded the main thing-massive the transfer of enemy units from West to East and Southeast and. accordingly, warned the leadership of the army and the country.

    Errors in quantity are inevitable.

    The same Germans, too, were mistaken in evaluating our forces and their location and very much-Halder described it in his diary ...

    take a look at application 10 in the lessons and conclusion - https://liewar.ru/knigi-o-vojne/348-1941-god-uroki-i-vyvody.html - how the Germans evaluated the forces of the Red Army))) the game is full)) )
  15. VS
    VS 18 May 2020 16: 06 New
    -8
    Quote: Operator
    Another article in the series: "mice injected, but ate a cactus" laughing

    The author is stubbornly trying to prove that we are being grossly deceived - on June 22, 1941, it was the USSR that attacked the peaceful sleeping Germany and its allies, which had troops only in intelligence reports of the General Staff of the NGOs.

    not so - our anonymous player pretends that the attack did not expect that they didn’t do anything to him, but apparently they themselves wanted to attack first on July 6))) whether it was rezunism or isaevschina (((
  16. slasha
    slasha 18 May 2020 19: 22 New
    10
    "Intelligence brought false data again ..." - the subordinates of the future "Marshal of Victory" did a good job - after all, he (the head of the General Staff) directly organizes and is responsible for intelligence and communications!
  17. zenion
    zenion 3 August 2020 19: 51 New
    -1
    Troops are being concentrated near Russia, and the uniforms of the soldiers are pre-war, as if the USSR. Or maybe not around us, but around the USSR. What does today's Russia have to do with what happened in 1941 ?!