What did our intelligence know about German large headquarters?

The article is a continuation of the cycle on intelligence reporting by the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union about the presence of German troops near the Soviet-German border. Earlier, in the intelligence cycle, information was provided about what the headquarters of the four border districts knew about the enemy troops as of 21.6.41. Intelligence data on Wehrmacht infantry divisions and regiments were examined in detail. At the request of readers, I provide a link to site with data on German troops. The materials on this site can only be used as reference data. Some information from the site should be cross-checked with other sources.

The materials of the cycle can be found on the Military Review website (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, Part 11).

The following abbreviations will be used in the article: А - field army AK - army corps, IN - military district, GraA - Army Group, u - motorized housing Goals Difference - intelligence materials; Ro - intelligence department of the headquarters of the military district, RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, SHVG - headquarters of the Eastern Group.

Intelligence reports on headquarters of army groups and armies in 1940

In the Summary of RU it was said that on 15.6.40 in the territory of East Prussia and Poland the following were established: SHVG in the city of Lodz; the headquarters of the 1 and 4-th A in Warsaw and in Krakow; AK headquarters in Poznan (21), in Lodz (3), in Lublin (32), in Krakow (7). The headquarters of buildings of undetermined numbering are available: in Warsaw, in Koenigsberg and in Insterburg.

At 16.7.40, intelligence confirmed the presence of these headquarters and noted the appearance of the headquarters of the 20 AK in the city of Danzig. 20-th AK will be recorded by our intelligence in the city of Danzig before the outbreak of war. It was possible to establish that the indicated corps was never stationed in Danzig. Since November 1940, the building was located in the city of Schneidemuhl (currently the city of Pyla, 182 km from Danzig), on the 12.12.40 - in the city of Stettin (Szczecin, 288 km from Danzig), and from the beginning of the 1941 year to June - in the city of Thorn (149 km from Danzig). For the headquarters of the 20th AK, the headquarters of the 20th VO was deployed, which was stationed in Danzig, which is an intelligence mistake.

In the RU Certificate, as of 8.8.40, the presence of the indicated headquarters is again confirmed and an increase in the number of corps headquarters by one unit is noted.

At that time it was considered natural that intelligence was able to determine the exact designations of headquarters, associations, formations and regiments. In the certificate as a lack of intelligence, it is noted that "the numbering of parts and compounds is not fully identified". Everything would be fine if the RM were true ...

The only accurate information is the presence of SHVG, the designation of which the German command did not hide. SHVG by our intelligence was defined as the headquarters of the army group (GRA) and in this intelligence data turned out to be correct. Prior to 20.9.40, the SHVG played the role of command of all armed forces in the East, and from September 20 this role was assumed by the command of the GRA “B”.

Since September 1940, the SHVG served as the headquarters under the commander of the military forces of the Governor General and was subordinate to the highest command of the Wehrmacht. Subordinate to the SHVG were commandant's offices and security units, which were deployed on the territory of the Governor General.

It should be noted that the Governor-General constituted only part of the territory that used to belong to Poland. Therefore, when the Republic of Moldova speaks of "former Poland", then it refers to the whole territory of Poland, and when "Governor-General" is mentioned, then it refers only to a part of the former state.

German name for SHVG: Der Millitarbefehlshaber im Generalgouvernement. Designation in correspondence - MIG. Before the outbreak of the war, our intelligence tracked this headquarters and mistakenly believed that it was leading all the armed forces located in the territory of former Poland and East Prussia.

In the published RM there are incomplete data on the presence of large headquarters from September 1940 to May 1941 of the year in the above territories. Some writers believe that it was easier for the semi-literate leadership of the spacecraft to consider enemy troops in divisions, and not in corps, in armies or army groups (in fact, these were fronts). Only these persons cannot explain: why RM in Romania and Hungary consistently include information about the corps and about the armies.

The graph below shows information about the concentration of the army headquarters and tank groups in East Prussia and Poland.

It is seen that the actual data are significantly different from verified and confirmed RM. In the period from May 15 to July 20, there are no army headquarters in the indicated territories, and the reconnaissance “sees”, double-checks and confirms the information about the presence of two headquarters of the 1940 and 1 armies.

In reality, the 1 and 4-I have been in the West since the autumn of 1939. After 20.7.40, the first army headquarters - the headquarters of the 18-th A. will begin to relocate to the East. With 16.8.40 the relocation of the command of GRA “B” will begin in East Prussia. In September of the 1940 year, the headquarters of the 4 and 12 A. will go to the East. On the basis of the headquarters of the 12 Army in January 1941, the formation of the Headquarters of the 17 Army will begin, and the headquarters of the 12 Army will leave for Romania to lead the troops in the Balkans.

Since the summer of 1939, the German command has been masking its headquarters under code symbols so that they are not tracked by enemy intelligence. After the end of the war in Poland, the designations of the two GRA commands and four (out of five) armies that participated in the war against Poland were changed. Later, before the start of World War II, many German armies, tank groups, corps repeatedly changed their code designations. It was possible to find a document according to which in the spring of 1940, German divisions located in the West were also assigned codes.

A large number of readers consider themselves well versed in the events on the eve of the war, but it is unlikely that any of them will answer the question: which headquarters of army groups, armies and tank groups did the German command seek to hide from our intelligence, and which of them did not hide?

What was hiding the German command?

To answer this question, you do not need to look at numerous materials on the website of the “Russian-German project on digitizing German documents in the archives of the Russian Federation”, although there you can find the correct answer based on numerous documents. It is enough to see the well-known document on the treatment of commissioners: “Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht No. 44822 / 41 6.6.41, “In the appendix to the decree of the Fuhrer from 14.5 on the use of military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region,“ Instructions on the treatment of political commissars are sent". Let's see: where was this document sent from OKH.

Our intelligence was allowed to learn about the presence in the East of Army Group B, the headquarters of the 2, 4, 11, 18 Field Armies and 4 TGr. Of the four army headquarters, two were not deployed in Poland and East Prussia: 2-I was in the Balkans, and 11-I, although it had the name "High Command of German Forces in Romania", But until 21.6.41 was stationed in Germany.

In the German headquarters, the mess reigned the same as in the headquarters of the KA. It is possible that not all officers involved in the correspondence knew about the impending war and about the meaning of the codes. In documents, addressing and mailing by codes are found many times, and in the text of documents the closed names of field armies and, for example, the 2 TGr are indicated. The same thing happens on maps. On some of them, the location of the TGr or micron is indicated using the code mark, but on the map prepared after a short period of time, the code mark and the true mark are present at the same time. The same applies to the advanced groups of the command of the Gra ...

Our intelligence could “find out” about the presence of the GrA “B” headquarters with the subordinate headquarters of the 4 and 18-th A, as well as the headquarters of the 4-th TGr. To complicate the task of our intelligence, the address for the mail correspondence of the command of the GRA “B” was disguised under the code name “Petrus"(" Peter "). However, when transmitting telegraphic messages, the true name "seldomHeersgruppe b"With location"Posen».

Why was intelligence allowed to detect the 4 th TGr?

Why did you give the opportunity to detect the 4 TGr? Perhaps because if there is a fourth group, then there must be three more other groups. And the presence of three other TGr at the border, the German command tried to hide, which they did.

4-I TGr began its formation 17.2.41 on the basis of the headquarters of 16-th MK, which was stationed in East Prussia. The indicated TGr was the smallest in terms of the number of tanks, and our intelligence should have had the impression that the formation of the group was not yet over. However, our intelligence did not know about the formation of the 4 TGr before the start of the war. Perhaps misinformation simply did not reach the sources of our intelligence ...

It seems that the German command was confident in the significantly greater capabilities of Soviet intelligence ... But our intelligence did not find either the GrA “B” headquarters, the forming 4 TGr, the other three TGr or a single mk headquarters. In May 1941 of the year, a special message was received about the arrival of the commander of the German tank corps, but for a whole month not a single reconnaissance was able to detect this corps ...

Field Army Headquarters Intelligence

11.9.40 RU Summary states border presence five armies: one in East Prussia (army headquarters in Koenigsberg, commander General Küchler), two armies in the northern and middle parts of Poland (army headquarters in Warsaw (1-I A) and, presumably, in Radom and two armies in the middle and southern parts of Poland (the headquarters of 4-th A in Krakow and 3-th A, presumably in Lublin.) The commander of all German troops in the East, presumably, is Field Marshal Rundstedt, with headquarters in Lodz.

In fact, only the headquarters of the 18-th A and the command of the GRA “B” were at the border in the indicated period. It is possible that there were groups of tenants, but these groups are not a fact of having a full-fledged headquarters.

Intelligence data for 18 and its commander are reliable. Information at the location of the headquarters is not correct, because the headquarters at this time is in the city of Bromberg (Bydgoszcz, 240 km from Konigsberg). In this city, the headquarters of 18 will be located at least until the beginning of October 1940. 16.9.40 and the command of the GRA “B”, which at the beginning of October 1940 of the year will already be marked in the city of Posen (Poznan), will go to the same city. In the specified city, the command of the GraA will be until 19.6.41. The 22.6.41 headquarters of the Center Center will be celebrated in a suburb of Warsaw.

The headquarters of 4 is marked in Warsaw in October 1940 and will remain there at least until 11.6.41. It is interesting that he will be deployed in the city center on Hitler Square in the hotel "Europe". Perhaps this location of the headquarters is due to our intelligence finding it faster. After all, the army headquarters is not near the border, but rather far from it. And this is evidence of the imminent beginning of the war ...

The headquarters of 12 and October 4 on October 1940 is located in the city of Krakow.

The headquarters of the 3-th A does not exist during this period, since it was renamed the headquarters of the 1939-th A. back in the autumn of the 16 of the year.

Rundstedt at that time was the commander of the occupation forces in France and responsible for coastal defense in the Netherlands and Belgium.

It seems that our intelligence did not track the change in the names of the headquarters of the armies and the GRA after the end of the company in Poland. At that time, Rundstedt carried out command of the armed forces in the East for a short period of time. What intelligence took for the headquarters of the commander of the armed forces in the East in the city of Lodz is SHVG. It turns out that the reliability of the RM in terms of finding large headquarters in the 1940 year was extremely low.

The special message from the head of RO Zapovo from 19.9.40 says: “... It was established that in Warsaw on the Hitler Square (formerly Pilsudski) the headquarters of the 8 Army, the army commander, General Blaskowitz, are deployed. (The information is reliable) ... "

After the defeat of Poland, 8-I was renamed 2-A. The location of the 8-A headquarters in Warsaw, as well as the non-existing 3-A headquarters in Lublin, will be regularly confirmed by our intelligence until the outbreak of war. The constant confirmation by reconnaissance of two non-existent field army headquarters from the fall of 1940 to 21.6.41, according to the author, can only be the purposeful work of the German command to misinform our intelligence.

Summary No.6 (West) (September 1940 of the year): “... As a result of ... the transfer in East Prussia and former Poland to 25.8.40 established: ... 12 AK headquarters, of which nine - with the established numbering; ...identified forces combined into four armies, of which the location of the three army headquarters is established - Warsaw, Radom and Krakow, the fourth army headquarters is supposed to be in Koenigsberg. ... In the depths (areas: Danzig, Tori and Poznan) two AKs are concentrated ... ".

German Corps at the Border in 1940

Before the summer of the 1940 year of arrival, there were only 19 two headquarters of the reserve corps: zbVXXXIV and zbVXXXV. In July, the headquarters of five AKs (3, 17, 26, 30 and 44) arrive. In September, the headquarters of another five AKs will arrive (1, 9, 12, 16 and 40), and in October the 14 will arrive.

In RM, five AKs with known numbers are mentioned: 3th (Lodz), 7th (Krakow), 20th (Danzig), 21th (Poznan) and 32th (Lublin). Check the reliability of these RM.

3th AK - since the fall of 1939, he has been in the West and 5.7.40 is returning to Poland. PM confirmed.

7th AK - is in the West until January 1941 of the year. PM are not confirmed.

20th AK - was considered above. PM are not confirmed.

21th AK - From the fall of 1939 to January, 1940 is in Germany. In March 1940, he was reorganized into the “21 Group” and sent to Norway. PM are not confirmed.

32th AK - will be formed only in April 1945 of the year. However, the headquarters of the reserve 32 corps (zbV XXXII) was deployed in Poland, which 14.5.40 left for the West and did not appear in the East anymore. It seems that it was our intelligence who took it for the headquarters of the 32 AK and did not track its disappearance. The finding of the mythical headquarters of the 32 AK in Lublin will be regularly observed and confirmed by our intelligence up to 21.6.41. PM are false.

Below is a graph of the concentration of motorized and army corps in East Prussia and Poland. Again, coincidence of actual data and intelligence data is not observed except for random coincidence at one point.

In the report No.1 (in the West) RU refers to a change in the grouping of German troops from 15.11.40 to 1.2.41: “According to the testimony of the border violator ... the headquarters of the 18 army is deployed in Koenigsberg; Army Commander - Colonel General Küchler. The departure of the headquarters of the 4 Army from Krakow was established. But in Krakow the headquarters of 4 was never ...

Information on strategic directions

Our intelligence reports repeatedly contained information on strategic directions for strikes in our country.

For example, a report by the chief of the RU GSh KA (20.3.41): “... To attack the USSR, three army groups are being created: the 1 group under the command of Field Marshal Bock strikes in the direction of Petrograd, the 2 group under the command of General Field Marshal Runchsted in the direction of Moscow, and the 3 group under the command of General Field Marshal Leeb - in the direction of Kiev ... ".

Special message (Sophocles, 4.4.41): “... Germans have three groups against the USSR: Koenigsberg - General Rundstein, Krakow - General Blaskowitz or Liszt, Warsaw - General Bock ...".

Similar information came from the military attache in Germany, General V.I. Tupikova. However, this information has been discussed tens of thousands of times in various sources, which has put on edge. However, on the 70 anniversary of the Victory, a new book on the outbreak of war is being advertised. Transfusion from empty to empty is well-known information and “revelation”, which the author of the book thinks, few people will double-check.

Neither A. Martirosyan nor O. Kozinkin (who wrote the review) even began to double-check what they wrote ... Although there is a lot of information on the Internet.

Nobody shuffled anyone. It’s just that our intelligence had only information at the time the war in Poland ended. The change in the designations of the large headquarters of the associations, their movement from the territory of Poland to Germany, to France, back to Germany and the appearance of intelligence at our borders simply could not be tracked. There were no sources of information in large German headquarters. The officers of the overwhelming majority of large headquarters did not wear uniforms belonging to specific headquarters on uniform, unlike infantry divisions and regiments ...

We must understand that if the Nazis decided to advance on Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev with three army groups, then the corresponding headquarters of the GRA should appear at the border. And before the start of the war, intelligence did not find a single command of the GraA! In addition to the fictitious headquarters of the SHVG. How to advance without front headquarters?

Just imagine the picture: on the border from the Baltic to the Black Sea there are 7-9 Soviet armies and all of them are led by the entire headquarters of the front, which is deployed, for example, in Vitebsk. All armies are infantry and there is not a single mechanized corps and not a single mechanized brigade ... Can such a group successfully, expeditiously and to greater depths advance in three directions at once: in East Prussia, Poland and Romania? The spacecraft command should have come to the same conclusion - no ...

Command of GraA "S" 2.11.40 to 12.4.41 is celebrated in the city of Dresden. Somewhere on April 20, it moves to East Prussia in the city of Elbing, which is located before 19.6.41 (possibly later, but the next mark is only on June 22). In the Republic of Moldova, no German headquarters is noted in this area.

Command of GraA "B" is located in the city of Poznan before 19.6.41 (possibly later). Our intelligence also did not find it. The RM on 1.6.41 and the more detailed summary on 15.6.41 speak only of the headquarters of the 21 AK. And again confusion: the headquarters of the 21 BO was adopted as the headquarters of the AK.

In April 1941 of the year, the advance group of command of GraA “A” was celebrated in the town of Okozim, and the main headquarters still remained in the city of Breslau. In the town of Okozim, the command of the GRA "South" will be located until 19.6.41. In RM RU on 1 and 15 of June this headquarters is absent. Only in the city of Bochnia, located near Okozim, is the unknown army headquarters noted, which will also be observed there by June 21. Even if the intelligence discovered the headquarters of the army group, but tying it to another headquarters of the field army (essentially an infantry army) made a big mistake ...

Wikipedia and many other documents indicate that GraA “A”, “B” and “C” changed their designations to GraA “North”, GraA “Center” and GraA “South” 21 or 22 on June 1941. However, on maps of the deployment of German troops, troops that already 27.5.41 specified groups changed their names.

Something similar to the events in PribOVO on the eve of the war, when the “North-Western Front” began to be mentioned in correspondence.

In June 1941, something was suspected in RU. German troops are flowing, but something is wrong ...

3.6.41 a special message is sent from RU to the NKGB of the USSR:

“... We ask, using the means at your disposal, to help the General Staff of the General Aviation Administration in checking, identifying and clarifying the following issues:

... 6. The deployments ... of the headquarters of army groups in all theaters of military operations of Germany against the USSR ... The headquarters of army groups (fronts) in the areas of Lodz - Spala (the former residence of Moszycki) and Krakow ... "

Not far from Krakow, the concentration of the South GRA began, but in Krakow itself there were no headquarters above the AK headquarters. RU is trying to clarify the presence of the command of the GRA, but does not connect it with the unknown headquarters of the army.

In the next part, we will examine intelligence data on army headquarters

Comments

[polpot]

Thanks, very interesting.

[Slavutich]

However, this information has been discussed tens of thousands of times in various sources, which has put on edge.

Strange, sources are documents, not a discussion on the Internet?
The author himself confuses everything, relying not on documents and archives, but on the Internet

[Geo⁣]

Quote: Slavutich

confuses everything

You confuse everything, generally without relying on anything.
Or give specifics with links to the source.

Quote: Slavutich

sources are documents

Epos, in your opinion, a document or not a source?

[Slavutich]

The epic is a source and document for that time, of which little is known,

Or give specifics with links to the source.

Let's not give
the article is sucked from the finger - our intelligence did not know, did not know, who writes this? chief scout? intelligence specialist?
The author that the German archives studied? or google
What are the suggestions? what should we do? Any article comes down to this, and not from transfusion from empty to empty.
All intelligence did not know anything, at the headquarters of the Germans and we had a mess, how did you win the war without such "analysis"?

[cavl]

Could you provide links from the Internet to maps with the deployment of German troops on 23.4.41 and on 27.5.41? If the author Eugene took everything from the Internet, then this information should be there. And if from the archives, then finding it should be very difficult ...

[Slavutich]

The author writes based on nothing, therefore, does not cite any literature, without literature on this topic all conclusions are null and void.
But I don’t have to bring anything, I’m not the author.

[antivirus]

and this abyss swallowed them .. uno-uno-un-aimento ...

[Doliva63]

Quote: Slavutich

The epic is a source and document for that time, of which little is known,

Or give specifics with links to the source.

Let's not give
the article is sucked from the finger - our intelligence did not know, did not know, who writes this? chief scout? intelligence specialist?
The author that the German archives studied? or google
What are the suggestions? what should we do? Any article comes down to this, and not from transfusion from empty to empty.
All intelligence did not know anything, at the headquarters of the Germans and we had a mess, how did you win the war without such "analysis"?

Here, probably, the fact is that the war forced to relate to intelligence and analysis of its work differently than it was before the war. Although, honestly, I do not know for sure how it was before the war.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Here, probably, the fact is that the war forced to relate to intelligence and analysis of its work differently than it was before the war.

After the Finnish war, Chief of the General Staff of the General Staff Proskurov made a report on the state of intelligence and how our commanders used its data - this is on the network. If possible, read the transcript, then much becomes clear:

What did we know about white finns? We believe that for general calculations of enemy suppression forces, intelligence had the necessary input data. Intelligence reported this data to the General Staff. This is not the merit of the current composition of the Intelligence Directorate, since the basic data relate to 1937-1938. By October 1, 1939, we knew that Finland had created three defensive lines and two cut-off positions on the Karelian Isthmus.

https://history.wikireading.ru/58816

[ccsr]

Quote: Slavutich

The author himself confuses everything, relying not on documents and archives, but on the Internet

You are absolutely right, because the author never gives the data where the document came from, what time it refers to and who developed it to understand how reliable it is. Now he has given a link to some unknown German site, from which he did not even make a competent translation at the level of a military translator, and is trying to bet everyone that everyone is obliged to believe this site. This was the case earlier, and he was more than once caught cheating when he slipped a LiveJournal with a link to a Czech website.
The roguish author of these articles extracts data from a small number of intelligence reports known on the Internet, and based on it draws breathtaking conclusions that do not take into account the huge array of all intelligence information that was processed daily in the General Staff of the General Staff and brought to the top military leadership of the Red Army.
In general, the next series of false articles by this "researcher" continues, which should not be taken seriously.
For example, the author declares that

Some writers believe that it was easier for the semi-literate leadership of the spacecraft to consider enemy troops in divisions, and not in corps, in armies or army groups (in fact, these were fronts).

Firstly, both Halder and Shaposhnikov in their reporting documents operate on the number of divisions, rather than their association, because any military professional understands that the composition of the division is determined by the state and it does not change, but associations on the composition and number of divisions can differ. That's why professionals use the number of divisions to correctly assess their power and the strength of the enemy, but the author is an amateur in these matters, so he sculpts a hunchback for ignorant people.
Secondly, even when Stalin asked about the Vatican, he asked how many divisions he had, which best of all speaks of the "literacy" of the author of the article.

[Slavutich]

I agree with you:
to determine whether the GRU was working badly or not, it is necessary:
access to real documents and their analysis - this is not at all,
a comparison of similar operations by army reconnaissance: which were in the same position as the Red Army in 1941, i.e. Czechoslovakia, Poland, France and England,
the presence of a conditional "template" - how it is necessary for intelligence to operate in such conditions and whether Soviet intelligence has deviated from these canons: but there are no such templates, and in the late 30s and early 40s there could not be: all intelligence agencies learned to work in new conditions.
There were complaints to me: give sources and references, and they should be redirected to the author, indeed, he does not give any source data and work on the topic: everything is written from the head.

[ccsr]

Quote: Slavutich

to determine whether the GRU was working badly or not, it is necessary:
access to real documents and their analysis - this is not at all,
comparing similar actions of army intelligence

Quite right, access to all documents is not yet available, and to some it will not be at all. On the whole, studying intelligence reports of those years, one wonders how it was possible to open the Wehrmacht’s radio networks quite accurately with such antediluvian radio reconnaissance equipment, and how the agents transmitted the information was generally incomprehensible to the mind, because we didn’t even have good intelligence radio stations transmitters assembled the skills of radio operators from local funds.
In general, different cheaters, like the author of this article, came up with their own version, and now they hammer it like woodpeckers, in the hope that a hundred times repeated lies will become true.

Quote: Slavutich

There were complaints to me:

I understand your position, and I share it. And the fact that some wiseacres are trying to talk with intelligence about intelligence, without having the slightest idea about it, does not surprise me anymore.

[Olgovich]

In the German headquarters, the mess reigned the same as in the headquarters of the KA.

Judging by the crash of June 1941, g is much smaller.

The information in the article is certainly interesting, but it’s the details.

And the main thing was that on the border of the country there was a fully mobilized warring German army, which was opposed by an unmobilized, non-combatant army ....

Suffice it to say that ALL strategic border bridges were captured WHOLE in the first hours / days of the war, and the Hitlerites poured inland at a speed of 70 km / day along non-mined, free highways (much faster than in France and Poland).

[strannik1985]

And the main thing was

And then you get offended when you are called a biased commentator?
Passed after all already. When did this mobilized army appear on the border with the USSR?

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

And then you get offended when you are called a biased commentator?
Passed after all already. When did this mobilized army appear on the border with the USSR?

Who is offended that you?

Quote: strannik1985

When did this mobilized army appear on the border with the USSR?

Such things could be known: in 1939

[strannik1985]

Such things could be known: in 1939

In 1939, on our former border with Poland, our own group was no worse.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

In 1939, on our former border with Poland, we had our own group no worse stood

Yes? Well, and as a result?

[strannik1985]

Yes? Well, and as a result?

For the year 1939? An excellent result, Poland was annexed, the Wehrmacht fell off the border (by the beginning of October 1940 there were only 30 divisions on the Soviet-German border (25 infantry, 3 tank, 1 motorized, 1 cavalry, one division arrived within a month).
What do you think, troops from September 1939 to June 1941 need to engage in combat training?

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

For the year 1939?

And what happened in 1939 after September on our border? Nothing? There’s nothing to talk about.
In the 41st happened.

Let me remind you that in WWI Germany declared war on Russia only on the basis of the fact of the announcement of mobilization.
Here is on our border ALREADY mobilized army, and in response ..... silence .....

[Karen]

Quote: Olgovich

Let me remind you that in WWI Germany declared war on Russia only on the basis of the fact of the announcement of mobilization.
Here is on our border ALREADY mobilized army, and in response ..... silence .....

Olgovich, there was no silence in response ... Stalin wanted Finland and the coast of the Indian Ocean ... What generated / accelerated the German panic regarding him ...

[strannik1985]

In the 41st happened.

Those. from September 1939 to June 1941 should the army be on the Soviet-German border, not engage in combat training, not carry out organizational changes, just dig up trenches for 1412 km of the former border with Poland?

Here is already on the border ALREADY mobilized army, and in response ..... silence .....

At what point? By June 22, 1941? But didn’t that 77 out of 129 compounds on June 22 (plus another 23 connections in the OKH reserve) arrived in the concentration areas in May-June 1941?

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

Those. from September 1939 to June 1941 should the army be on the Soviet-German border, not engage in combat training, not carry out organizational changes, just dig up trenches for 1412 km of the former border with Poland?

I don’t understand WHAT is incomprehensible to you?
ALL measures have been known for hundreds of years: reciprocal mobilization and combat readiness.

Or is it ONCE AGAIN I draw your attention to a terrifying fact: ALL strategic border bridges have been captured WHOLE in the first hours / days of the war and UNMINED, the free highway hit the Nazis inland.

What besides the lack of goals prevented this?

Quote: strannik1985

But nothingthat 77 of 129 compounds on June 22 (plus another 23 connections in the OKH reserve) arrived in the concentration areas in May-June 1941?

It’s absolutely nothing: transferring huge masses of combat-ready troops over developed road networks over several days to hundreds of kilometers is a reality. Which is what happened.

And it was stupidity not to take this into account. Therefore, "suddenly" appeared ....

[strannik1985]

ALL measures have been known for hundreds of years: reciprocal mobilization and combat readiness.

So mobilized, brought into combat readiness, then what? The German, the bastard, did not attack, most of the troops withdrew from the Soviet-German border, what should I do?

Or is it ONCE AGAIN I draw your attention to a terrifying fact:

What do I care about infantry, for example, in the zone of the Western Front? Infantry marched along freshly captured bridges, and the mobile forces crossed the Bug on their own.

It’s absolutely nothing: transferring huge masses of combat-ready troops over developed road networks over several days to hundreds of kilometers is a reality.

So it was taken into account that the combat readiness of the army from the state of 1939 was raised at times.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

So mobilized, brought into combat readiness, thenwhat about?

1. Again, we look at history and see what: conduct NEGOTIATIONS, conclude UNIONS- BEFORE the situation is resolved.

Quote: strannik1985

The German, the bastard, did not attack, most of the troops withdrew from the Soviet-German border, what should I do?

see paragraph 1

Quote: strannik1985

Infantry marched along freshly captured bridges, and the mobile forces crossed the Bug on their own.

Tanks went, equipment.

Quote: strannik1985

So it was taken into account that the combat readiness of the army from the state of 1939 was raised at times.

Well, how is the RESULT ?!
Or that is your main concern?

[strannik1985]

1. Again, we look at history and see what: conduct NEGOTIATIONS, conclude UNIONS- BEFORE the situation is resolved.

See Moscow talks in 1939. Tried, do not want to negotiate.
Troops what to do?

Tanks went, equipment.

There are no tanks in the infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht, they were transported on pontoons, along with equipment.

Well, how is the RESULT ?!

Bad. So he did not come out of the readiness of the rifle divisions.
And why did you decide that your version would be better?

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

See Moscow talks in 1939. Tried, do not want to negotiate.

They did not trust the USSR. And they were afraid.

And what grounds were there to trust? Do you remember the goals of the Comintern?

The West has not changed with WWI, but then agreement was found.

Quote: strannik1985

Troops what to do?

see above

Quote: strannik1985

No As part of the Wehrmacht's infantry divisions of tanks, they were transported on pontoons, along with equipment.

Are you serious about transporting tanks over water, not over captured bridges?

From Halder's diary:

North of Bialystok, the Gotha tank group achieved the greatest success. With a swift throw, she overcame the wooded-lake region, went to the Neman River and captured Intact Critical Crossings via the Neman at Alytus and Merken.
At the front of Army Group North, the Göpner Tank Group {13}, waging successful battles, advanced to the Dubissa River and captured two unbroken ferries.
our patrols, having met no resistance, crossed the Prut between Galati and Husi and between Husi and Iasi. Bridges are in our hands.
Result: Border Bridges over the Bug and other rivers everywhere captured our troops without a fight and in complete safety.

Okay, right?
Hitler prevented them from undermining?

Quote: strannik1985

Bad. So he did not come out of the readiness of the rifle divisions.
And why did you decide that your version would be better?

The story tells so, not me: see, at least the WWII,

[strannik1985]

They did not trust the USSR. And they were afraid.

And?

Are you serious about transporting tanks over water, not over captured bridges?

Absolutely, 2 TGr tanks crossed over on pontoons, i.e. even with the timely destruction of bridges, rivers will not become an insurmountable barrier.

The story tells so, not me: see, at least the WWII,

What story? The Germans did not advance on the Eastern Front in 1914.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

And?

I-NO contracts

Quote: strannik1985

Absolutely, 2 TGr tanks crossed over on pontoons, i.e. even with timely destructionand river bridges will not become an insurmountable barrier.

Above it is written: Geppner and Goth TANKS captured the crossing. And .... sailed further on the pontoons ....
And all sorts of idiots tried to capture bridges ...

Quote: strannik1985

What story? The Germans did not advance on the Eastern Front in 1914.

AND? Front only East was?

[strannik1985]

I-NO contracts

Apparently Czechoslovakia and Poland, they also feared
Then what? Lie down and die?

ABOVE is written

It’s easier, yes. AND? In terms of importance, the seizure of bridges is far from the first place.

AND? Front only East was?

And in the West there was a mobilization race, they started from the position of peacetime armies.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

Apparently Czechoslovakia and Poland, they also feared

There WAS an agreement

Quote: strannik1985

In terms of importance, the capture of bridges is far not in first placee.

So I say: apparently, for this the Hero was given for nothing

Quote: strannik1985

And in the West there was a mobilization race, they started from the position of peacetime armies.

and rightly so. Do you like 41-1 more?

[strannik1985]

There WAS an agreement

Who are the "allies" of what? They violated. Did Czechoslovakia and Poland threaten France and England?
Conclusion? It's not the USSR or the above countries, the French and the British frivolously reacted to the German military threat in 1939-1940, in contrast to 1914.

So I say: apparently, for this the Hero was given for nothing

Not for nothing, just, for example, the defeat of the South Front in the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody is not near.

Do you like 41-1 more?

I do not like it, only the choice of allies from the USSR does not depend too much, and you still have not answered the question of what to do in this situation.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

Who are the "allies" of what? They violated. Did Czechoslovakia and Poland threaten France and England?
Conclusion? It's not the USSR or the above countries, the French and the British frivolously reacted to the German military threat in 1939-1940, in contrast to 1914.

Contracts are needed. Without them, disaster 41

Quote: strannik1985

Not for nothing, just, for example, the defeat of the South Front in the battle of Dubno-Lutsk-Brody is not near.

with what?

Quote: strannik1985

I do not like it, only the choice of allies from the USSR does not depend too much, and you still have not answered the question of what to do in this situation.

"you can't, don't torture!", go away! Let it be done by people who CAN and CAN! ... Here's what to do!

[strannik1985]

Contracts are needed. Without them, disaster 41

And with them the disaster of 1938 or 1939.

with what?

With the capture of bridges. The reasons were different.

"you can't, don't torture!", go away!

Which people in 1939-1940 could do better? Poles, British, French? Suppose the British were able to, but they don't shine to dig a 37 km wide "ditch" in the narrowest part of the USSR

[ccsr]

Quote: strannik1985

For the year 1939? An excellent result, Poland was annexed, the Wehrmacht fell off the border (by the beginning of October 1940 there were only 30 divisions on the Soviet-German border (25 infantry, 3 tank, 1 motorized, 1 cavalry, one division arrived within a month).

So the Wehrmacht fell not from being afraid of the might of the Red Army, but because Hitler wanted to defeat France and England in the first place.

Quote: strannik1985

What do you think, troops from September 1939 to June 1941 need to engage in combat training?

Do you have any idea how the arrangement of troops in a new place affects combat training? It’s badly affected, and any officer who confirms that he served in the army will confirm this to you, and the fact that the battalion from the regiment was allocated for the construction of SDs, starting from 1940 until the outbreak of the war, speaks for itself about the quality of regimental exercises. By the way, in 1941, they did not manage to carry out a single corps exercise because of the formation and new deployment - here you have the quality of the exercises.

[strannik1985]

So the Wehrmacht fell not from being afraid of the might of the Red Army, but because Hitler wanted to defeat France and England in the first place.

So no matter why, the result is important.

Do you have any idea how the arrangement of troops in a new place affects combat training?

Of course, I had to combine with harvesting and serving in Chechnya Anything has happened.
For example, cover armies deployed in RPMs to a depth of 60 (some units up to 100 km) from the border (for example, 5 A KOVO) could at least somehow conduct combat training, if they all bring to the border at the rate of 8-12 km to SD they and they won’t be able to do such preparation.

[Geo⁣]

Quote: Olgovich

(much faster than in France and Poland)

On September 3, the Germans attacked Poland, on the 28th they took Warsaw (26 days, about 500 km).
On May 10, 1940 the Germans attacked France, and Paris was surrendered on June 14 (36 days, about 500 km).

On June 22, the Germans attacked Russia, a similar distance to the capture of Kiev went more than 3 months, a similar distance to the capture of Smolensk - 2,5 months.
Etc. etc.

Why are you lying, and even on such a topic?

[Olgovich]

Quote: Geo⁣

Why are you lying, and even on such a topic?

Why are you so ignorant?

On June 27, the Germans entered Minsk. 350 km in 5 (five!) Days- this is 70 km / day.

Quote: Geo⁣

On the 28th they took Warsaw (26 days, about 500 km).
On May 10, 1940 the Germans attacked France, and Paris was surrendered on June 14 (36 days, about 500 km).

July 9 - reached Mogilev - it's 550 km in 17 days

[Geo⁣]

Quote: Olgovich

Why are you so ignorant?

Do not flatter yourself. You with this aplomb file this date and distance, as if you pulled them from memory. Everything is in the public domain, there is no question of scholarship.
You choose the fastest promotions and give them as a rule. This is at least stupid. Why didn’t you like my routes? They reflect the average in the most objective way.
And I did not describe the approach to the point to you, but the capture of the defended large settlement. So the Germans traveled 700 km to Lviv in Poland in a few days.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Geo⁣

Do not flatter yourself. You with this aplomb file this date and distance, as if you pulled them from memory.

What I remember, I write, this glaring example is by ear. by the way. the same distance: Duisburg - Dunkirk, 340 km. 340 by 21 = 16 km to denb. Minsk-70 km/day

Quote: Geo⁣

You choose the fastest promotions and give them as a rule. It is at least stupidly. Why didn’t you like my routes? They reflect the average in the most objective way.

Do you talk about stupidity?

We read OFFICIAL lacquered sources

: German tank and motorized formations advancing on Daugavpils and Vilnius - Minsk ... by the end of June 25 they advanced deep into the territory of the USSR per 230 km in the Vilnius-Minsk direction.
World History, ISEL, Moscow, 1965, v. 10, p. 114

by 80 km/day

By the end of June 25, the advanced units of the enemy in the zone of operations of the North-Western Front had overcome in the direction of Baranovichi, Minsk - to 250 km...

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945, Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1984, p. 59

80 km / day

Quote: Geo⁣

And I didn’t describe the approach to the point,

Minsk taken on June 27.

Quote: Geo⁣

So 700 km to Lviv

which ... 700 ?! See map: they were stepping on Lviv from Slovakia-there is everything nearby ....

[Geo⁣]

Quote: Olgovich

this glaring example is rumored

Often mentioned in your training manuals?

Quote: Olgovich

Minsk

Quote: Olgovich

Minsk

What is incomprehensible to you in the promise about the stupidity of attempts to characterize the general through exceptions?

Quote: Olgovich

Do you talk about stupidity?

It depends on who. With you, as I see it, this topic is very relevant.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Geo⁣

Often mentioned in your training manuals?

The average person just KNOWS

Quote: Geo⁣

What is incomprehensible to you in the promise about the stupidity of attempts to characterize the general through exceptions?

You are given TWO GENERAL evidence, not exceptions.

Did you refute something? Unable? So what is your chatter?

By the way, figure out what would happen to the USSR if it occupied the territory of Poland? No?

Quote: Geo⁣

It is a depends with whom. With you, as I see it, this topic is very relevant.

In your, fool depending on the interlocutor, is it sometimes ... smart, then stupid?
Yeah.....

[Alex013]

German agents outplayed our agents. A huge stream of misinformation ... and got what they got. Plus Italy in Greece stalled, Hitler had to intervene, otherwise the war would not have started in June, but in April-May.

[ccsr]

Quote: Alex013

German agents outplayed our agents.

Actually, the agents replay the counterintelligence bodies, not the enemy’s intelligence, because the intelligence itself is an auxiliary structure, not a military one, and its actions are aimed primarily at revealing the enemy’s combat power, and not counteracting the intelligence structures.

Quote: Alex013

Plus Italy in Greece stalled, Hitler had to intervene, otherwise the war would not have started in June, but in April-May.

The issue is controversial because it does not take into account the fact that Germany had a catastrophic shortage of raw materials and foodstuffs, and already in 1939 the first cards were introduced for certain categories of goods. There are reports from our intelligence sources about the big problems with food in Germany in 1939-1941. That is why the main reason for the transfer of the attack from May to June is the desire not to disrupt the sowing in the USSR, so that subsequently it would be possible to seize the sown area especially in Ukraine and the Kuban, and harvest them.

[Alex013]

Maybe you are right. But under Germany was almost all of continental Europe. Really they had so badly with agriculture. In Poland, France, etc.

[ccsr]

Quote: Alex013

Maybe you are right. But under Germany was almost all of continental Europe. Really they had so badly with agriculture. In Poland, France, etc.

Here are the materials of intelligence No. 1, prepared in January 1939 by the RU of the Red Army, which explicitly states that the Germans consider Ukraine to be the main breadbasket:

[Alex013]

By the way, there is an interesting material on this topic - Hans-Joachim Riecke "The food problem and agriculture during the war"

[knn54]

By shoulder straps it was possible to determine the membership of servicemen in regiments and headquarters of divisions. Even to the headquarters of the corps and armies,
The Germans understood this perfectly and used it for "disinformation!" MAXIMUM.
For example, VLOT before the Second World War, our intelligence tracked the 8th tank regiment. Only this regiment was included (since April 1941) in the Rommel African corps. Etc,
For reliability, the German command revealed to reconnaissance no more than a third of the number of formations.
And when the GRU leadership realized that they were being led by the nose, it was too late to correct ...

[Slavutich]

And what to fix then?
Due to the fact that the 8th "tank regiment" was missed, they decided that the war would not start? and sent the troops home?
Modernization in views on the 70-year-old process does not bring clarity, what would you do instead of the GRU, so that they would not lead you by the nose? What templates are there, what the GRU should have done and did not?
First: second: third? is there a textbook "Intelligence for" Dummies "from the GRU"?
And finally, it was difficult for the GRU to "catch" the 8th Panzer Regiment, since it was the 8th Division: firstly, and secondly, there was no division in Africa, in April it was in Yugoslavia, otherwise the GRU everything looked

[knn54]

It could have been corrected, but the headquarters of the Red Army (including the General Staff) simply did not react to the "amendments".
Still a GENERAL misfortune - there were practically no radio stations and reports, they went mainly through liaison
The GRU (as well as the army as a whole) got it decently. But what to do: deserters, in the leadership "the chicks of Trotsky's nest" In this case, Sklyansky.
The GRU was led by the former commander of the combined arms army.
And finally, the 8th tank regiment was part of the 15th tank division of the African Corps.
33% of the fake divisions and 29% of the fake regiments - not a lot of "overlooked".
For two years of service in the GRU (albeit in uniform) he learned enough
And one more mistake - counterintelligence from the NKVD was transferred to the army. Which, too (they controlled themselves) brought considerable damage to the common cause.

[ccsr]

Quote: knn54

And one more mistake - counterintelligence from the NKVD was transferred to the army. Which, too (they controlled themselves) brought considerable damage to the common cause.

Here is one small clarification - it was only about six months before the war, and then they were returned back to the NKVD after June 22, i.e. the fallacy of the decision is obvious, and it was quickly eliminated.

Quote: knn54

The GRU was led by the former commander of the combined arms army.

Indeed, in the several prewar years after Berzin, there were four GRU chiefs who headed military intelligence before Golikov’s appointment, and I must say that Golikov was higher in military status than his predecessors, although of course he was not a professional intelligence officer when he was appointed to this position. That is why one is surprised that with such personnel leapfrog, military intelligence itself provided the Red Army command with a huge array of reliable information about the enemy.

[ccsr]

Quote: knn54

For example, FLIGHT before the start of the Second World War, our intelligence tracked the 8th Tank Regiment.

The GSh is not involved in tank regiments, and the district intelligence was not so strong as to track the composition of all Wehrmacht divisions in real time. Moreover, the regiment only in April, as you deigned to notice, reassigned the corps of Rommel. It is possible that in the archives of the intelligence structures of the districts information on this regiment is available, just historians have not yet been allowed to it.

Quote: knn54

And when the GRU leadership realized that they were being led by the nose, it was too late to correct ...

This is nonsense, because there was no strategic surprise and the upcoming start of the war - read at least the Directive b / n.
Tactical surprise was allowed for many parts of the cover of the state border, but this is largely the fault of the district leadership, because they are responsible for this. You would wonder why Zakharov was not afraid to raise troops, not seeing the Directive, and Pavlov, having it in his hands, even after the start of the German shelling, could not really understand what happened, and this best shows his commanding "skill".

[ccsr]

Quote: knn54

By shoulder straps it was possible to determine the membership of servicemen in regiments and headquarters of divisions. Even to the headquarters of the corps and armies,
The Germans understood this perfectly and used it for "disinformation!" MAXIMUM.

Do you even know that in the Wehrmacht there was a frequency distribution for radio stations of various types and branches of the army, and each of them had its own callsigns that do not change in peacetime? What is the use of dressing the entire division in a different uniform if there is no strict order to observe radio silence, and test sessions are an essential element of training radio operators, like communication training, not to mention that there are warning signals, the passage of which must be confirmed. Yes, at least every month change the shape, the radio intelligence officers will still reveal to which connection this or that radio station belongs, and when direction finding, even with errors, they will nevertheless indicate approximately where the headquarters of the association are and where the connections and subordinate units are located.

[icant007]

Quote: knn54

By shoulder straps it was possible to determine the membership of servicemen in regiments and headquarters of divisions. Even to the headquarters of the corps and armies,

When it comes to uniforms of the German army, I start to have a hysterical laugh.
The author and his fans apparently believe that we had an agent or observer in the bushes at every station or settlement where some German unit was located, who clearly recorded numbers on uniform and immediately transferred them to the Center.

No intelligence service in the world can afford such a density of agents, and naturally we did not send reconnaissance groups before the war.
Therefore, reference to shoulder straps cannot be the main argument in intelligence.

This game of knowledge of the insignia of the Wehrmacht is like a kindergarten. We divorced a lot of specialists who know every badge, every badge, the color of their uniform or band, and other nonsense.
To build an evidence base on these external signs is not correct.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

Therefore, reference to shoulder straps cannot be the main argument in intelligence.
This game of knowledge of the insignia of the Wehrmacht is like a kindergarten. We divorced a lot of specialists who know every badge, every badge, the color of their uniform or band, and other nonsense.
To build an evidence base on these external signs is not correct.

You absolutely rightly noticed the essence of the heresy that the author of the statues bears - he still firmly believes that it was thanks to the change of shoulder straps that the Germans misled military intelligence on the eve of the war, which is just wildness from the point of view of any normal person who has an idea of ​​intelligence. You can fool some agent who is poorly versed in military insignia, but if information is received from a resident in Germany, who conditionally saw photographs of policy documents on the redeployment of some compounds, then it’s enough radio intelligence to intercept several communication sessions to understand that the residency information reliable, even if all parts of the compound are changed into another form.
In general, the author of the statues clearly did not play enough in the sandbox and builds his castles there, completely not understanding how all this is organized in real life.

[BAI]

It’s just that our intelligence had only information at the time the war in Poland ended. The change in the designations of the large headquarters of the associations, their movement from the territory of Poland to Germany, to France, back to Germany and the appearance of intelligence at our borders simply could not be tracked.

And why is this conclusion made?
It reads:

№ 129
MESSAGE "METEOR" FROM BERLIN FROM SEPTEMBER 29, 1940
To the Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army
1. According to a number of colleagues and Germans, the Germans over the past 2-3 years, 10-12 infantry were not transferred from west to east. divisions and moved a number of divisions from depth to borders. Directly at the eastern border with
concentrated to 60 infantry. divisions. All troops previously stationed in East Prussia were returned entirely to East Prussia. The movement of military trains to the east continues to take place.

The Germans feared and fear that the treaty of Germany, Italy and Japan would cause countermeasures on the part of the USSR.
2. The units stationed in Belgium, Holland and northern France are instructed to prepare winter quarters and are given winter clothing. It can be assumed that the offensive is postponed to next year.
3. The Germans are moving the first corps to Spain.
4. Alta is very tired, nervous breakdown and the like. She was allowed treatment and financial assistance.
Established a connection with Heer.
TSA MO RF. Op. 22424. E.4. LL 403-404.

On the Internet, and more precisely on Militer, there is such a thing:

1941: In 2 book. / Comp. L.E. Reshin et al .; Ed. V.P. Naumova; Entry Art. Acad. A.N. Yakovleva. - M .: International Fund "Democracy", 1998. - 832 p. - (“Russia. XX Century. Documents” / Ed. By Academician A.N. Yakovlev)

Publisher's abstract: The terrible catastrophe that befell our country in 1941 still raises many unanswered questions about its causes and perpetrators. Not least because under the stamp of secrecy for many years, both under Stalin and after him, there were documents of the Soviet political and military leadership. Of the ten thousand documents identified, this publication includes over 600 of the most important and interesting. Book one - documents from June 1940 to March 1941, book two - April 1941 - June 22, 1941. The second book also included documents for June - December 1941, as well as (in the appendix) a number of materials for 1933-40, important for assessing the events of the initial period of World War II. The collection contains documents from the secret archives of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, higher military departments and intelligence services, various people's commissariats (ministries) of the USSR, a significant part of which is made public for the first time. They provide an opportunity for studying and understanding the tragic events of 1941, overcoming legends and erroneous ideas about that period of our history created over the years.

And there are useful things on the Internet.

[cavl]

So 60 German divisions, concentrated near the Soviet-German border, in the above quote is true or not ??

[BAI]

1. From the beginning we will go over the author again a bit:

Our intelligence was allowed to find out about the presence in the East of Army Group B, the headquarters of the 2nd, 4th, 11th, 18th field armies and the 4th TGr. Of the four army headquarters, two were not deployed in Poland and in East Prussia: the 2nd A was in the Balkans, and the 11th A, although it was called the “High Command of the German Forces in Romania”, was stationed in Germany until 21.6.41 .

В

№ 367
SPECIAL MESSAGES OF THE RED ARMENIAN GENERAL STAFF DEPARTMENT ON STRENGTHENING THE GROUPING OF GERMAN TROOPS AT THE BORDER OF THE USSR
№ 660370
4 April 1941 city

it is said:

In addition, two new army headquarters were identified: one (number not set) to Allenstein (East Prussia); another having number 12, in Zakopane (85 km south of Krakow).

Those. The above statement by the author about the capabilities of Soviet intelligence is not true.

2. About 60 divisions.
Information was constantly updated. If above is the message of one agent from September 40, then in the special message under consideration from April 41 it says:

total number of German divisions of all types in the border zone with the USSR reaches 83 - 84 divisions, not counting the troops concentrated in the Czech Republic, Moravia and in the center of Romania.

Which, in principle, is also not true.
On the whole, one must understand that against the background of the special plan of the disinformation cover of "Barbarossa" (it is in "1941") there were many cross messages from different agents. Somewhere they confirmed each other, somewhere they contradicted. Therefore, choosing the right option was extremely difficult. A striking confirmation is:

№ 327
REPORT OF THE HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL GOLIKOV IN THE NKO USSR, SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b)
non-cash
20 March 1941 city
3. Option No. 3 according to our intelligence report for February 1941 (Appendix No. 3) *:
"... To attack the USSR, three army groups are created: the 1st group under the command of General Field Marshal Bock strikes in the direction of Petrograd **, the 2nd group under the command of General Field Marshal Runstudt * * - in the direction of Moscow, and 3 -th group under the command of Field Marshal Leeb - in the direction of Kiev.


Conclusion:
1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible date for the commencement of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable world for Germany.
2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR in the spring of this year must be regarded as disinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence.
Head of Intelligence
General Staff of the Red Army
Lieutenant General (Golikov)

That is, having the right scenario, the General Staff chose the wrong one - the attack on Leningrad and the attack on Kiev, the attack on Moscow was not considered.

[BAI]

There is an appendix to the Golikov report:

Help
April 27, 1964
On February 4, 1964, Marshal Golikov wrote a letter to the head of the] GRU General Staff, in which he asked for permission to read "... a written report of RU, signed by me to the Institution and the military leadership about the forces that Nazi Germany at that time could throw against the USSR in the coming war and on the main operational and strategic directions of the offensive of the Hitlerite army against the Red Army. "
Upon consideration by the head of the GRU, Comrade Golikov was acquainted with this document in April 1U63. He recognized him. I read it carefully, noticed that everything was correctly stated. Regarding the findings, he said that they did not matter.

Head of TsAMORF (signature)

TSA MO RF. Op. 14750. D. 1. L.21 (with about.). Manuscript, original, autograph.

[ccsr]

Quote: BAI

Of the ten thousand documents identified, this publication includes over 600 of the most important and interesting.

This is only 6% of YAKOVLEV'S IDENTIFIED, and how many more documents are in the archives of law enforcement agencies, and to which no one is allowed, is still a mystery. And it’s not a fact that what Yakovlev was allowed to do was decisive in making the decision by Stalin and the country's top military leadership.
And this is understood by professionals, to whom the author of the series of articles clearly does not apply, to put it mildly, and to put it bluntly, he frankly lies on many issues, and this is noticeable.

[32363]

in the museum on Poklonnaya Gora I photographed a document, "Military topographic maps of the European part of Russia and Moscow" surprised by the date of submission to print, June 20, 1941.

[Doliva63]

Looks like intelligence was not given due importance, alas.

[antivirus]

It can be seen that the actual data differ significantly from the verified and confirmed PM. Between May 15 and July 20, 1940, there are no army headquarters in these territories, and intelligence “sees”, double-checks and confirms information about the presence of two headquarters of the 1st and 4th armies.

who should the IVS trust? their "mugs" or Hitler and Churchill? "west" knew better where the Abwehr stood and where he was going to go

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

On 16.7.40 reconnaissance confirmed the presence of these headquarters and noted the appearance of the headquarters of the 20th AK in the city of Danzig. The 20th AK will be recorded by our intelligence in the city of Danzig before the outbreak of war. It was possible to establish that the indicated corps was never stationed in Danzig. Since November 1940, the building was located in the city of Schneidemuhl (currently the city of Pyla, 182 km from Danzig), on 12.12.40 - in the city of Stettin (Szczecin, 288 km from Danzig), and from the beginning of 1941 until June - Thorne (149 km from Danzig). For the headquarters of the 20th AK, the headquarters of the 20th VO was adopted, which was stationed in Danzig, which is an intelligence mistake.

Since the author is constantly lying, even in this case, under the words "It was possible to establish," the source of information is not indicated so that they could refute the intelligence report not of 1940, but the one he cited, because it was dated June 15, 1941.
The statement that "For the headquarters of the 20th AK, the headquarters of the 20th VO was deployed, which was stationed in Danzig,"also not supported by anything, although any military professional understands that the corps consists of several divisions and corps units that can be deployed in different places, but the corps headquarters itself can be located tens and hundreds of kilometers from their quartering places. As an example from the Soviet experience, when at the headquarters of the Western Group of Forces in Wünsdorf, where there was no airfield, there was the headquarters of the 16th air army, but the air divisions were tens or hundreds of kilometers from the headquarters of the air army. So I won’t be surprised if any "expert" in military history seventy years later will claim that the headquarters of the 16th VA could not be located in Wünsdorf, but was in Sperenberg, where the nearest airfield and aviation units subordinate to the commander of the air army were located.

[icant007]

Read our wikipedia about the military districts of the Wehrmacht. Somewhere I left a detailed comment on the example of 21 AK.
The author apparently invented a reading method in which he sees only what he wants to see.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

The author apparently invented a reading method in which he sees only what he wants to see.

I noticed this from his first publications, so I agree with you. And his "revelations" of the Soviet military intelligence seem to be generally amateurish nonsense, especially in the eyes of those who have an idea of ​​how all this was carried out at that time.

[cavl]

I don’t know how the author Eugene reads, but you personally do not know how to read!
Where on Wikipedia is it written that in the corps district remains after the departure of the army corps corps headquarters ??
You carefully read and see other sources of information!
When the army corps departs with headquarters in the corps military district, there remains the rear corps headquarters corps, which manages this corps district! You should read more, and not just look at Wiki as Milchakov ...
This is understandable to any military man who does not even need to look at other sources. To do this, just look at the departments remaining at the district headquarters by your own link!
Well, how annoying are these experts from the couch ....
And there was still about hysterical laughter ... Laughter for no reason is an occasion to consult a doctor for help, and even hysterical is to run to a doctor immediately ....

[icant007]

Yes, but the author is silent about this nuance. The fact that AK corresponds to VO, rally accusing intelligence of incompetence. Like the entire series of articles, he was silent about his sources.
Why he pulled to the last, do you have an answer?
I have only one. Deliberately throw mud on intelligence in order to impose its idea on readers and distort history. And then already, when the majority of this nonsense is grabbed, it gives a reference to the source, the reliability of which is about the same as the average on Wikipedia.

But the matter has already been done. Opinion formed.
Well done boys. Who better than disinfectors to write about disinformation.

And I won't say anything about the sofa expert. If you hastily draw conclusions about me without knowing me. Unlike you, I do not fall to this level.

[cavl]

Once again I will voice my opinion. After the outbreak of war in Poland, there is no equal sign between AK and the headquarters of the military district. You are wrong in this. The military district in Germany is also called the corps district or corps military district.

As soon as AK left the district together with the headquarters before the war, the equal sign between the concepts of AK and the corps area disappeared. Only the rear headquarters remained. It is clear that the rear headquarters is not the AK headquarters. Probably it was a fairly small rear headquarters, since for all the time from the resources of both corps districts, only one division was formed before the war (196 and 197 infantry divisions).

You do not confirm your statement in any way and speak in an incorrect form about the author .... It's one thing if he were caught lying ... But I read the comets and saw that you alone were noted in the incorrect presentation of answers. It seems to me that you should not rush, but you should double-check the information in your answers.
I apologize for the couch expert

[icant007]

I also do not put a sign of strict equality between the corps and the district. But I admit that in the place of the departed headquarters, a new emerging structure may well appear. And if intelligence, for some reason, determined the presence of AK headquarters in this place, then there were reasons.
Although I admit that there could be mistakes.

The author does not make assumptions, but paints the world in black and white.
For the sake of demonstrating his idea, he drives the facts.

For example, let's go back to AK. He claims that there are no 7 army corps in Krakow. That's right, but there are 17 AKs. Should this intelligence be considered false?

The author believes that yes, take it. And I think not, intelligence has established the presence of AK headquarters in the city, and the fact that he has a different number is not so significant.

Further, about the headquarters of the 18th infantry division, the author claims that the division itself is in Lignnice (Legnica) at the end of May 1940, while it was in France until September, and then yes, it was reorganized into a motorized one, apparently in Legnica. Could the headquarters separately from the division be transferred to Danzig. Could become the governing body of some new compound.

Further, the author writes that in Krakow there were no headquarters above the AK level. Moreover, earlier in the text he mentions the headquarters of a certain army in Krakow.

Etc. etc.

And then he collects the facts in a heap, one puts a minus, the other a plus. And in the end, it concludes that 80 percent of the intelligence was false.

I admit that I am also mistaken when I check, but I do not write articles on these topics. And I don’t have time to shovel this whole amount of information. But it’s a shame for my power.

The responsibility of the author, especially on such topics, should be many times higher than that of us modest readers.

I am bitterly aware that alas, most readers accept this approach of the author when everything is decided to be blamed on intelligence.

[cavl]

I understood what you are writing about and unsubscribed to the author. Maybe he clarify this issue.
The table showing the parts in the city of Danzig was taken from the June 1941 report.

[AsmyppoL]

Indeed, in the first part of the article there is a misunderstanding of its content, which relates to the 20th Army Corps (AK).

The article contains the text: “On 16.7.40 reconnaissance confirmed the presence of the above headquarters and noted the appearance of the headquarters of the 20th AK in the city of Danzig. The 20th AK will be recorded by our intelligence in Danzig before the outbreak of war. The author was able to establish that the indicated corps was never stationed in Danzig. From November 1940, the corps was deployed in the city of Schneidemuhl (currently the city of Pyla, 182 km from Danzig), on 12.12.40 - in the city of Stettin (Szczecin, 288 km from Danzig) and from the beginning of 1941 until June in the city of Thorn ( 149 km from Danzig). For the headquarters of the 20th AK was taken the headquarters of the 20th VO, which was stationed in Danzig ".
And the drawing is placed.

It is correctly indicated to the author that the article does not directly indicate the information in the figure, which should refer to the end of May 1941.

The author did not specify this episode, because The last date before the drawing concerned 1941: «from the beginning of 1941 to June in Thorne (149 km from Danzig) ». It seemed to me that this is enough.

icant007 (Andrei) writes (excuse me, Andrei, I understood your point exactly) that having confused the headquarters of the 20th Military District (VO) with the headquarters of the 20th AK, intelligence did not make a mistake, because VO headquarters was AK headquarters.

In other words, I rephrase this text: “the fact that intelligence confused the two headquarters is not a mistake of the General Staff of the CA. This is a common thing in intelligence ... "

[AsmyppoL]

I applaud when a person is jarred by considering the facts of erroneous information of our intelligence ...

But, I am not pleased when the military from the spacecraft command named IV the main culprit of the tragedy on June 22. Stalin. A man who was the only one of the same military who received two copies of intelligence reports and read all messages from intelligence officers. He analyzed it, wrote something on the second copies of intelligence reports, it is possible that he calculated and analyzed ...

However, G.K. Zhukov called in his memoirs his only culprit. This point of view remained the only one in Soviet times. I suggested that readers analyze RM and decide for themselves whether Stalin was guilty of an unexpected attack or not!

Later, a version appeared about the betrayal in the leadership of the spacecraft and individual HE. I do not like this version at all, because those who insist on it cannot conduct a simple analysis of the reliability of information in intelligence reports. The biggest mistakes in command and control were, but they were later in 1941 and in 1942 ...

As some of my acquaintances told me about the incompetence of our intelligence before the start of the Great Patriotic War and about the betrayal in the leadership of the spacecraft, they were adopted by the intelligence service of the overseas partner. Before the beginning of the threatened period, this version (among other dirt and fiction) should be used in network attacks on Russians in order to create disbelief in the ability of our intelligence services to timely assess the threat of a surprise attack and cause, among other “revelations,” panic and mass protests.

As well as the betrayal of the generals who “have” abroad: either relatives, or property and money, or direct interest, etc. In other words, to win without a war, which will also be very unpleasant for them ... Therefore, I, like Victoria, tried to figure out the information of our intelligence services and at the same time very interesting details were revealed ...

Let's look at the information on VO and the 20th AK. The 20th AK was formed on 17.10.40/1940/11. The headquarters was formed by the military inspection of Berlin. Since November 20, the corps is subordinate to the 20th Army. The corps commander was the infantry general Materna, who was not associated with the XNUMXth VO at the indicated time. The German name is AK “Das Generalkommando XX. Armeekorps ”- the general command of XNUMX AK.

In the city of Danzig was the headquarters of the 20th HE - "Wehrkreis XX", i.e. Germans themselves did not call the headquarters of the military district the headquarters of the AK. The district began forming on 23.10.39/196/XNUMX. Before the war with the USSR, only one division was formed on the territory of the district - the XNUMXth front. Other military units formed many divisions, regiments, and special units. Perhaps this is due to a lack of reliable mobilization stock. Before the war with Poland, Danzig was a free city ...

The German command also used the term “corps districts” instead of the term “VO”. In peacetime, at least one AK was located in each corps area.

[AsmyppoL]

With the outbreak of war, or before its outbreak, AK from the corps area could be redeployed, and then only the rear control of the AK remained in VO, because AK left without hull rear.

German sources say something similar: “The commander of the XX VO was immediately appointed deputy commander of the XX AK and at the same time remained the commander of the XX VO ”. I don’t believe this, because the headquarters of the 20th AK is in the 3rd Military District, and the headquarters of the 20th District is in the 20th Military District ...

In the Republic of Moldova (16.7.40), the information came specifically about the headquarters of the 20th VO, because the headquarters of the 20th AK will begin its formation only on 17.10.40/XNUMX/XNUMX. In my opinion, this is a mistake of our intelligence.

The stationary headquarters VO (essentially one rear control) was identified as the headquarters of the AK. The headquarters of this corps, our intelligence enlisted in the force group, designed to attack the Soviet Union.

Consequently, the observation of the indicated headquarters could determine the preparation for war with the USSR with the advance of the troops of this corps to the border. Therefore, the stationary location of the headquarters of the 20th VO could not indicate the transfer of German groups to the border.

In the figure below we can consider the deployment of German troops on 2.11.40. On the territory of the 20th Military District there is neither the headquarters of the 20th AK, nor divisions subordinate to the corps. Only the headquarters of the 1st AK is deployed on the territory of the Military District, but in a completely different city.

The 122nd Front (20th AK) began forming on 7.10.40/XNUMX/XNUMX in the city of Gross-Born (it seems that we are talking about a military training camp, which occupies an area highlighted in green). In the figure, it is there that the location of the division headquarters is indicated and the area where the divisions are concentrated is circled.

The 123rd Front (20th AK) began its formation on October 5.10.40, 3, at a military training camp in the 3rd Military District. The figure shows its location in the XNUMXrd district.

On the reporting map in the city of Danzig, the headquarters of the 20th Military District is not even indicated. The map simply displays the boundaries of the county.

Reconnaissance report of the headquarters of ZapOVO No. 44229 (19.9.40): "...Confirmed location data Headquarters 20 AK in Danzig, there is also the 6th reserve infantry regiment. The data is reliable... »

[AsmyppoL]

Consider the deployment of enemy troops at the end of May 1941.

There is no AK headquarters or division headquarters in the city of Danzig. However, within the 20th VO there is the headquarters of Army Group North, which was not opened by our intelligence. The commander of the army group was known, but the headquarters was not discovered by our intelligence until June 21, 1941. Although, perhaps, the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR were confident in the reliability of the information received from the intelligence services ... The headquarters of the 20th AK was stationed for a long time on the territory of the 20th military district in the city of Thorn, but the headquarters of this corps were registered in the Republic of Moldova on 15.6.41 in the city of Danzig. If someone believes that the confusion with the headquarters in the city of Danzig is not a mistake of our intelligence, this is his right. In my opinion, this is one of the errors in the chain of errors that led to the tragic consequences of June 22, 1941 ...

The article also states that in the RM five AKs with known numbers are mentioned. One of them is the 7th located in Krakow. The article verified the reliability of the data of the indicated RM. The 7th AK at the indicated time is in the West and will be there until January 1941. Andrew notes that the 7th AK could be confused with the arrival of the 17th AK.

Consider Intelligence No. 86 / 252104ss (20.7.40): “In Danzig was the headquarters of the twentieth ak. [without any presumably or data require verification - Approx.]

... Large headquarters were established at the following points: - headquarters of the eastern group in Lodz; - Army Headquarters: 1st in Warsaw and 4th in Krakow; - the headquarters of the army corps: XXI in Poznan, III in Lodz, XXXII in Lublin, VII in Krakow and unidentified numbering in Warsaw ... "

There was never a fourth army headquarters in Krakow. And intelligence knows exactly the army number and at least double-checked this information from 1-2 sources, because again there are no words “presumably or the data require verification”. And when can you find out the exact number of the army, which is confirmed by several independent sources? In my opinion, only when this information is consciously palm off on our intelligence ...

The same for the 7th AK: the case number in the summary is not in doubt. Therefore, it is also confirmed by several sources of information. 2-3 independent sources cannot accidentally distort the number from the 7th AK to the 17th AK!

Interestingly, this headquarters of the 7th AK will be recorded by our intelligence (again without words presumably or the data needs verification) with confirmation of the data by radio intelligence in a completely different place until the outbreak of the war. But more about that in the part devoted to the buildings ...

[AsmyppoL]

A month and a half later, a new reconnaissance report No. 103 / 252361ss (11.9.40) is released: “Grouping of the German Army on 1.9.40 [Again there should be at least one message confirming the previously available information - Approx.]

... This grouping is combined into two armies, whose headquarters are in Krakow (headquarters of the 4th army) and in Lublin (presumably 3 armies) ... [The presence in Krakow of the headquarters of the 4th Army is not questioned, but it is not there - Note. auth.]».

The summary shows a huge number of German divisions: up to 62 TD, up to 7 TD and 2 MD. Total - up to 71 divisions. At the same time, there is not a single word in the summary of doubts about its information on the number of German divisions. About 80% of the division numbers (in August 1940) were installed and double-checked! At the same time, there wasn’t even a hint of an order to redeploy the formations at the headquarters of the Wehrmacht ground forces, and they hadn’t sent any teams of tenants to the East, but the intelligence “saw” all this mass of troops and knew the numbers of the overwhelming number of divisions and regiments ... How can this be ? And how, then, to look for evidence that intelligence is not to blame and that all the information has given the correct ...

It was actually 17-18 infantry divisions. Tank and motorized divisions were completely absent.

I can’t believe that four times the number of divisions was mistaken, our intelligence “accidentally” confused the AK number from “seventeenth” to “seventh” ... If the AK name confirmed in the Republic of Moldova is not reliable, then this, in my opinion, is a reconnaissance error. Indeed, intelligence confidently declares: “12 headquarters of army corps, of which nine are with established numbering” ...

[AsmyppoL]

Now about the 18th MD, which was also shown in the figure when it was said about the 20th AK.

On June 15, 1941, it was indicated in the RM RU GSh KA that the headquarters of the 18th detachment was stationed in the city of Danzig. This is not true.

This can be seen from the figure. Why did our intelligence "know" about the presence of a motorized division in Danzig? It's simple. The headquarters of the 60th MD was stationed in the city of Danzig from the fall of 1940 to the beginning of January 1941, when the division was redeployed to Romania. And our intelligence is confident for more than five months that the motorized division of the Wehrmacht still remains in Danzig ... And what reliability of information can we talk about in this case? On the lowest ... Next year, an article on mobile troops (cavalry, motorized and tank troops) is expected. It turns out that the reliability of the intelligence information was at the level of the plinth, unfortunately ...

[aKtoR]

Hello Eugene!
I read your posts and yet another article only. Good.
Thank you for not forgetting!

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

As some of my acquaintances told me about the incompetence of our intelligence before the start of the Great Patriotic War and the betrayal in the leadership of the spacecraft, they were adopted by the overseas partner intelligence service.

Those. you deliberately disseminate the version of the incompetence of military intelligence on the eve of the war solely for the purpose of the intelligence services of the overseas partner. Well, at least they admitted where the legs grow from your lies.
By the way, I’m not surprised at your activity - like you, on the eve of the 75th anniversary of the Victory, specially intensified to prove what we were stupid and fools on the eve of the war that even the Germans could deceive our intelligence by changing their buttonholes. Burn on, the paid agitator, you will not be lost ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

In other words, I rephrase this text: “the fact that intelligence confused the two headquarters is not a mistake of the General Staff of the CA. This is a common thing in intelligence ... "

In other words, the fact that military professionals understand it clearly is a Chinese letter for you, that’s why you think that headquarters of the 20 corps is not the headquarters of 20 VO in peacetime, and you could not be located in Danzig. Fantasy further, you are fun to read ...

[Operator]

Quote: ccsr

returned back to the NKVD after June 22, i.e. erroneous decision is evident

Quite the opposite:
- On April 19, 1943, by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 415-138ss, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence “Smersh” of the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (head - Commissar of the 2nd rank V.S.Abakumov) and the Counterintelligence Directorate of Smersh of the People’s Commissariat of the USSR Navy were created (the chief - the commissioner of GB P.A. Gladkov);
- On May 15, 1943, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00856, the Smersh Counterintelligence Division of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (head - Commissar of the State Security Service S.P. Yukhimovich) was created, which oversaw the border, internal and escort troops.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

- On April 19, 1943, by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 415-138ss, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR was created (chief - commissar of the GB 2 rank V.S. Abakumov)

This is a completely different structure that appeared during the war. And the author of the text had in mind the reassignment of special departments to the Red Army command, which occurred in early 1941:

In February 1941, special departments were transferred to the People’s Commissariat of Defense, becoming 3 departments in NPO structures
.... February 3, 1941 the NKVD was suddenly divided into three parts. On its basis, there are two whole people's commissariats: the NKVD and the NKGB itself, and special departments (military counterintelligence) are completely transferred to the people's commissariat of defense.
.... A month after the start of the war, on July 20, 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were again, instantly and painlessly, united into one People’s Commissariat.
This association was planned even earlier, since the Special Departments, transferred on February 8 from the newly formed NKGB to the People’s Commissariat of Defense, were returned on July 17 to the NKVD.

[Operator]

Special departments of NPO = Smersh NPO.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

Special departments of NPO = Smersh NPO.

You didn’t seem to understand that special departments existed long before the Second World War, and they were not an NGO structure until February 1941, because initially

Special departments were created on December 19, 1918 by a resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), according to which the front-line and army Cheka were merged with the military control bodies, and on their basis a new body was formed - A special department of the Cheka at the SNK of the RSFSR.

And only in 1941 they were temporarily reassigned to NPOs, but already in July they were removed from NPO subordination:

Decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR No. 187 / ss of July 17, 1941, signed by Joseph Stalin, bodies of the 3rd Directorate of the NPO of the USSR were reorganized into Special Departments, and the Directorate of NPO itself received the name "Management of the Special Departments with the transfer to the NKVD of the USSR"

As for SMERSH, it was just that it was created for NGOs on the basis of special departments, because it was believed that it would be easier for them to solve the issues of eliminating spies in the front line, since the NKVD bodies in battlefields did not have their own structures capable of organizing the search and destruction of enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups:

On April 21, 1943, Joseph Stalin signed the Decree of the GKO No. 3222 cc / s on the approval of the regulations on the Smersh State Administration of Civil Defense of the Soviet Union. The text of the document consisted of only one laconic phrase: “To approve the provision on the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence“ Smersh ”- (Death to Spies) and its local organs (see the appendix).” But in the appendix to the document it was written in detail what the new unit of the USSR People’s Commissariat of Defense and the Navy’s People’s Commissariat should do, and the status of its employees was determined.
According to the Regulation, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of Non-Profit Organizations (Smersh - Death to Spies), established on the basis of the former Office of the Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, is part of the People’s Commissariat of Defense.
The head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO (Smersh) is the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense, reports directly to the People’s Commissar of Defense and carries out only his orders. ” Let us explain that Joseph Stalin himself was the People's Commissar of Defense.

So your statement is that

Special departments of NPO = Smersh NPO

fundamentally wrong, because special divisions remained to exist in the troops, for example, in the internal districts, and they were subordinate to the NKVD bodies. But in the front line, the created SMERSH bodies were removed from the submission of the NKVD and transferred to the subordination of the command of the People’s Commissariat of Defense - the commanders of the fronts. There were no SMERSH bodies in the internal districts, so this structure was intended only for operations in the front line, which was advisable given the mass abandonment of spies and the lack of forces and means at the NKVD to carry out liquidation of agents in the combat zone.

[ccsr]

Quote: icant007

At the same time, military districts were headquarters of the corps and territorial commands.

And the casket just opened ...

[Operator]

Quote: ccsr

special departments existed long before the Second World War, and they were not an NGO structure

Thanks, Cap

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

Thanks, Cap

You're welcome.
Have you even figured out what kind of subordination of counterintelligence bodies of the NKVD existed before the war, in 1941, and in 1943, when you created SMERSH? And then you carried such nonsense, completely not understanding when the military counterintelligence was subordinate to the narcotics of defense, and when to the NKVD narcotics, and even how you famously attributed the entire military counterintelligence to the SMERSH bodies, it's enchanting.

[VS]

"O. Kozinkin (who wrote the review)" "- actually I did not write ANY reviews to THIS book))) I made additions to the book on some points, but I did not write any" reviews "and was not going to write)))

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

ALL strategic border bridges were captured WHOLE in the first hours / days of the war, and the Nazis poured inland along the unmarked, free highway.

What besides the lack of goals prevented this?

PLANS NCO and GSH on these bridges)))

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

As some of my acquaintances told me about the incompetence of our intelligence before the start of the Great Patriotic War and the betrayal in the leadership of the spacecraft, they were adopted by the overseas partner intelligence service.

Those. you deliberately disseminate the version of the incompetence of military intelligence on the eve of the war solely for the purpose of the intelligence services of the overseas partner. Well, at least they admitted where the legs grow from your lies.
By the way, I’m not surprised at your activity - like you, on the eve of the 75th anniversary of the Victory, specially intensified to prove what we were stupid and fools on the eve of the war that even the Germans could deceive our intelligence by changing their buttonholes. Burn on, the paid agitator, you will not be lost ...

Yes, what are you - the author we have is STALIN ZAHISTNIK !!!)))

[AsmyppoL]

Once again, I was pleased that O. Kozinkin couldn’t imagine anything clever and could not refute a single fact ... Even the most insignificant ... You can see the difference in the level of ownership of historical material ...

I was also pleased with the screams of O. Kozinkin on the site "galloped to this forum ... and that anonymous fool)) do not want to drive - for boredom - there?" By this O. Kozinkin once again showed his helplessness. But the main thing is that no one responded to the requests of the unlucky writer))))

[VS]

What fact of YOUR anonymous delirium should be refuted? What did the Germans, such as epaulets, change HUNDREDS of thousands to deceive our intelligence?)) But you just lied to your dear - that I was like writing a review of some kind of Martirosyan's book)) And even more, you lied that Martirosyan in a NEW book which YOU DIDN'T READ your own exactly - shows supposedly "well-known facts" and nothing new !, Here you guessed dear - YOU are NOTHING from what he shows as FACTS and gives MORE than 900 LINKS to sources - I had no idea)) And HIS information is exactly what is documented! And you and your epaulettes can go to the same place))) CRASH you piled full)))