What did the intelligence report? The wars at dawn 22 did not wait for June

Various publications on intelligence materials

In many publications devoted to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, intelligence materials (RM) are considered very superficially. With such a consideration of the RM, the wrong conclusion is made that intelligence reported everything accurately and in great detail. The conclusions are based on the fragments torn out from the Republic of Moldova and on the memories of war veterans. Such memories may overlap with post-war knowledge or there may be other reasons why the memories were distorted. For example, to avoid responsibility for mistakes and shift responsibility for their erroneous actions onto the shoulders of other bosses. Answers to the questions of Colonel-General Pokrovsky began to be collected during Stalin's lifetime. The consequences for the truthful answers in advance were difficult to predict.

If intelligence reports accurately, then, consequently, the unexpected attack of the Nazis on the troops of the border districts was guilty either by Stalin or the traitors-generals who dreamed of helping the fascists to enslave our country. You can stick to the third version, which was expressed by the author Wik in the materials of the “Unexpected War ...” series. She used the recheck of materials based on numerous memories and documents. This is where statistics come into their own: one memory cannot be considered true, if four others say otherwise. Rather, the opposite is true ... Memories can be considered reliable only if they are supported by documents or other memories of war veterans. In the cycle of the author Vick there is a lot of material to which it is necessary to refer or briefly repeat them. Hereinafter, these materials will be referred to as "cycle" and be accompanied by hyperlinks.

In an article devoted to the creation of the Southern Front (Part 1) were considered not a large number of the RM and the memories of veterans that the actual location of the German grouping at the border turned out to be completely different from what they knew in the headquarters of the districts and armies. The same, but discussed in more detail in the cycle (Part 14, Part 15, Part 16 и Part 17).

Misinformation and misinformation intelligence materials

Let me remind you that the German government, officials of the Foreign Ministry and other departments, intelligence services and the Wehrmacht, voluntarily or unwittingly spread mass disinformation. The leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft received such "intelligence" information through numerous sources available in various fields and states. Our leadership should have had the impression that the RMs repeatedly rechecked from various sources are reliable! On the basis of these misinforming materials, conclusions were drawn that led to the tragic events in the border military districts ...

Not a single intelligence service in other countries could have obtained reliable information with such a massive flow of misinformation, in which even Hitler, Goebbels, Goering and other high-ranking officials of the Reich took part! There was no betrayal of the generals, there was no inhibition of the military initiative by Stalin. There was only an incorrect assessment of the expected actions of Hitler and the enemy forces concentrated on the Soviet-German border. Of course, there were also attempts not to give the Germans a reason for a full-scale war, and for this purpose it was necessary to avoid provocations ...

There was an attempt to warn Germany against attack by gradually building up its troops. First, far from the border, and then gradually increasing their number in the troops of the 1 th echelon of the covering armies. The main thing is that the number of divisions on both sides is comparable. Our divisions were stationed in points of deployment or in camps also at a distance from the border, like the German troops.

P.A. Sudoplatov wrote: “... In the spring of 1941, the Germans more than once managed to replay Soviet residencies in Berlin, Sofia, Bucharest, Bratislava, Ankara ... The management of the NARKOMAT DEFENSE and the GENERAL STATE sought to prevent the enemy from creating a group on our borders that would have an overwhelming superiority over the spacecraft. Achieving at least a balance of power on the border was an IMPORTANT direction of the military policy of keeping Hitler from a throw on the USSR ...». In the loop it was checked conviction.

It should be noted that even in the evening of June 21, the German command did not rule out the possibility of refusing to attack the USSR, disguising preparations for a full-scale war under separate provocations at the border.

17 Army Battlebook: “... 21.6.41 20-00. The troops read the appeal of the Fuhrer to the Soldiers of the Eastern Front.

20-00 The 52 Army Corps is instructed. conduct distractions in the area of ​​Przemysl, even if the main offensive operation of the corps will be canceled... ".

Speaking of detailed RM, one should not think that the leadership of the country and the SC saw the grouping of German troops in the form shown in the figure.

Intelligence activity consists of obtaining reliable, verified information, its assessment, analysis of trends in specific situations, their prediction and assessment of likely consequences. The RMs that were received by the Spacecraft General Staff Intelligence Agency were processed, summarized and analyzed. Then the materials were sent to the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union. Since the initial RM included misinformation, the analysis of the situation was not reliable. An erroneous analysis of the materials was superimposed on an incorrect assessment of the necessary number of German divisions required for a full-scale war with the USSR.

Article It was shown that in the five documents from September 1940 to 22 June 1941, the number of troops that Germany should put up against the USSR was 173-200 divisions. There is not a single pre-war document that says that for an attack on the USSR, Germany will enough in the initial period to set 120-124 divisions! In the memoirs of veterans reflected only the actual number of troops involved in the attack.

Intelligence reports about the German grouping near the border

В Intelligence Report No. XXUMX West says: "...The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldavia and Dobrudja) on 1 Jun reaches 120-122 divisions... Germanic troops are distributed along the following lines:

a) in East Prussia 23-24 divisions, including: 18-19 infantry and 3 motorized divisions, five tank regiments (2 tank divisions) and 7 cavalry regiments;

b) in the Warsaw area (against ZOVOVO) 30 divisions, including: 24 infantry, motorized, tank [divisions] and 6 Tank Regiments (total 4 Tank Divisions), Cavalry Division and 8 Cavalry Regiments;

c) in the Lublin-Krakow district (against KOVO) 35-36 divisions, including: 24-25 infantry, 5 motorized, to 6 tank divisions [some of these divisions are derived from five separate tank regiments and two tank battalions] and 5 cavalry regiments;

d) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions, cavalry regiment;

e) in Slovakia (in the area of ​​Duplin, Presov, Michalovce) - 5 divisions ...;

f) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;

g) in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja - 17 divisions, including: 4 motorized, mountain and 2 tank ...

[Total 120-122 divisions. Some of the specified number of divisions are even located beyond 400 km from the border.]

The reserve of the main command is 44-48 divisions, of which: in the center of Germany - 16-17, in the area of ​​Breslau, Moravska-Ostrava, Katowice - 6-9, in the center of Romania - 11, in Bulgaria - 11 ... ".

Together with the reserve, the number of German divisions is 164-170.

No intelligence was found on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland no one headquarters of tank groups and motorized corps. Many tank divisions were formed from tank regiments and battalions in bulk. To eliminate this incident, the writers came up with the following explanations:

- the leaders of the spacecraft are accustomed to count all the enemy troops as divisions and therefore information about the corps and armies in the Republic of Moldova is not given. This is probably a hint that the former noncoms who fell into the leadership of the spacecraft were inferior;

- no matter how many battalions, regiments or divisions, and most importantly - the number of tanks that can reach, for example, to Minsk. (A logical question arises: why then our mechanized corps at the beginning of the war with many hundreds of tanks lost their technique ineptly, if the main thing is the number of tanks?);

- in the archives there is more accurate intelligence data that reflect all the fullness of the situation. True, no one saw them, but the authors know that they exist;

- the border guards knew everything better than army intelligence and the Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the spacecraft.

What the NKVD Border Guard intelligence reported in the spring of 1941, was discussed in detail in 14-th part of the cycle. I will give a brief assessment of the results of the cycle. AT A note People's Commissar of Internal Affairs I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and S.K. Tymoshenko was told that the intelligence of the NKVD border guards 1 to 19 April 1941 received data on the arrival of German troops in points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the Governor-General. For 19 days, border guard intelligence found arrival before By the age of 18 German divisions.

According to the Intelligence of the General Staff for a somewhat longer period, with 1 to 25 April, there was an increase in the grouping of German troops on 12-15 divisions. NKVD intelligence data for a shorter period indicate a greater number of arriving divisions as compared with the Intelligence Department.

Information about the actual arrival of the German divisions to the border as of 19 or 25 in April could not be found. It is only known that 4 April to 15 May 1941 of the year (per day 32) arrived 24 divisions. Therefore, we can say that the Republic of Moldova from the NKVD border guards also included misinformation thrown by the Germans.

Consider Intelligence Service No. 1 The General Staff Spacecraft Intelligence Directorate on 20-00 22.6.41 G .: "... The total number of enemy groupings is determined by:

a) On the north-western front - 29 divisions (of which ... 4-5 etc.) ...; [According to RM on 1.6.41 there were up to 24 divisions, two of which were two.]

b) On the western front in the Warsaw district of the 31 division (of which ... 4 etc.) ...; [According to the RM there were 30 divisions, of which 4's, etc. The German group has increased by only one division!]

c) On the south-western front (to Slovakia) - 48 divisions (of which ... 6 etc.) ... [According to the RM, there were up to 36 divisions, of which up to 6 were tank divisions. There has been an increase in grouping for the 12 divisions!]

In addition, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the number of German troops is 13-15 divisions. In Romania - 33-35 divisions ...

[According to the RM against the KOVO troops, the German group in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine (Hungary) made up the 9 divisions.

Against the troops of the OdVO (Moldavia and Northern Dobrudja) there were 17 divisions, of which 2 was tank. In the central part of Romania and Bulgaria were still on 11 divisions. The reconnaissance report from 22.6.41 indicates the presence of 33-35 German divisions in Romania. It turns out that reconnaissance revealed the "relocation" of 6-8 of new German divisions to the territory of Romania from Bulgaria. This information, like the presence of 33-36 German divisions in Romania, was misinformation.]

Front-line reserves in the area of ​​Czestochowa, Breslau, Mor.Ostravka - to 7 divisions; in the area of ​​Thorn, Bromberg, Poznan the number of divisions of the front reserve has not been established. The reserve of the main command to 20.6 consisted of 17-20 divisions located in the central regions of Germany.

Due to the fact that the June transfer of troops to the east was carried out from the western front, it is necessary to consider that the composition of this reserve has been preserved, especially since further withdrawal of troops is possible from the west for use against the USSR ... ”

22 June military operations on the border with Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine did not begin. Without German troops in these areas, the number of groups at the border was 125 divisions. Taking into account the troops in Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine, front reserves and the reserve of the main command, the total number of German divisions was more than 167.

The actual size of the German group at the border of the Soviet Union

In fact, on 22.6.41, the following forces were on the Soviet-German front (including army reserves and army group reserves):

- Army Group (GRA) "North" - 20 infantry, 3 motorized, 3 tank and 3 guard divisions -
total 29 connections;

- GRA "Center" - 31 infantry, 6 motorized, 9 tank, 1 cavalry, 3 security divisions and 1 motorized regiment. Without a motorized shelf - only about 50 divisions. The 900-i motorcycle team was not taken into account in the calculations, since it was still 11 km from the border on 00-22 203 June;

- GRA "South" (including the two divisions of the OKV) - 18 infantry divisions, 4 light infantry divisions, 9 armored and motorized, 2 mountain rifle divisions and 3 security divisions. In Moldova and Northern Dobrogea - 8 infantry divisions. Total - 44 connections.

In total, the Soviet-German border had 123 divisions excluding German troops in Slovakia and Hungary. 123 and 125 divisions are very close and may indicate the successful work of the Soviet intelligence services ... However, their distribution in the Republic of Moldova intelligence services did not correspond to the actual ... And most importantly, they were not located on the border!

It should be noted that by 4 July 1941 was planned to concentrate on the East 13 divisions and 1 brigade from the reserve of the High Command, and after 4 July 11 divisions.

In five parts, we will consider obscure documents about the deployment of German troops near the border, according to intelligence reports, on the basis of which decisions were made on preparing for war. In the title of the subsequent parts will be the word "Intelligence".

Was the German group known to headquarters PribOVO?

The most powerful grouping of German troops as of 22 June was concentrated against the PribOVO troops. How did the dislocation and the number of the German group opposing PribOVO at the district headquarters on the eve of the war be assessed?

The figures below will show fragments of the map. The map in the archive was scanned on a fairly large scale, and with an increase in some of the inscriptions are not very clearly visible. Therefore, the author on the map in blue font additionally marked all the inscriptions and symbols. As illustrations on the fragments, drawings with the actual presence of German troops on the eve of the war are additionally placed.

From the presented materials it is clear that on the northern flank of the German troops stationed in East Prussia and in the territory of the former Poland, the exit of German formations to the border by intelligence was not detected. The actual deployment of German troops does not coincide with the intelligence data.

What is visible from the map? It turns out the headquarters of the corps and the army, when they reported intelligence, still placed on the maps!

Against the PribOVO troops, there is a grouping of a total number: one Army headquarters, up to 4 army corps headquarters, up to 18 infantry divisions, 2 tank and 4 motorized divisions, up to one cavalry division (cavalry brigade, and two cavalry regimental registries and motorized divisions, and one-of-a-kind and three-in-one motorized divisions), and one section of the body, as well as a single-unit cavalry and two cavalry registries, and one-off-one-year-old cavalry divisions; Without artillery regiments, the number of groups is about 25,5 divisions. It should be noted that one of the tank divisions was derived from separate tank units. Very significant grouping! But something confuses ...

first. Against the troops of the district (in the zone of responsibility of his intelligence) are concentrated in the 1 and in the 2 echelon, in the reserves of the army and army group to the 40 divisions!

Second. There is not a single headquarters of tank groups and motorized corps - neither the district command, the command vehicle, nor the leadership of the Soviet Union is known about them! But the leadership of the army and the country know that the Nazis had 10 motorized corps and they used in the war with Poland and in France from 3 to 5 tank groups!

Tank divisions too little - only two with a stretch. Of these, there are only four infantry divisions near the border to the Suwalki bulge! On the Suwalki ledge in the area of ​​responsibility PribOVO even before the 4,5 divisions, including the 2 motorized regiments and not a single tank unit! Total at the border to 8,5 divisions (without tanks). At the same time, the concept “near the border” is rather arbitrary - more than half of them are located at a distance of 20-30 km from the border. For infantry units this is one - two day march! And the information on the map refers to 21 June - less than a day before the start of the war ... The deployment of German troops and the capacity of the roads may indicate that it takes from 1 to 2 days to bring troops to the border ...

If the intelligence is so well informed about the German grouping, then in a day or two, when the German units are relocated to the border, it will be possible to redeploy their units to field positions, withdraw construction battalions from the border, disperse Aviation...

To be continued ...

Comments

[Corn]

The monstrous negligence of the top political and military leadership / leader of the country, for which our people had to pay tens of millions of human lives.

[Proxima]

Quote: Corn

The monstrous negligence of the top political and military leadership / leader of the country, for which our people had to pay tens of millions of human lives.

What does the "negligence of the top political leadership" have to do with it? The USSR was then doomed to be defeated. Namely, our country was hopelessly losing the Wehrmacht in divisions simultaneously entering the battle. That is, the Germans stupidly smashed the Red Army in parts! Not to mention the fact that the Wehrmacht was mobilized and has been waging war for two years!

[Corn]

The USSR was then doomed to suffer defeat.

Having a strategic and tactical advantage, the USSR was doomed to stick the Reich on the very first day of the war where it belongs ... but the mustachioed executioner with his mediocre hangers-on had a different opinion.

How many dozens do you have there? - three, five, seven?

according to official data of the RF Armed Forces, the USSR lost more than 26,6 million people in the war. However, you probably have an alternative opinion on this score, which has been successfully built into the "we can repeat" ideology.

[svp67]

Quote: Corn

Having a strategic and tactical advantage, the USSR was doomed to stick the Reich on the very first day of the war where it belongs ... but the mustachioed executioner with his mediocre hangers-on had a different opinion.

And what "strategic and tactical advantages the USSR had" on the first day of the war, explain

[Corn]

what are the "strategic

the absence of war exhaustion, which inevitably made itself felt after nearly two years of the great war, the absence of a war on two fronts and the presence of a reliable rear, a huge mob reserve and the availability of any necessary resources in a sovereign country.

USSR had tactical advantages

if you have anything to do with military affairs, you should know about the plate of the ratio of losses in attack and defense, depending on the density of fire. For example, in the Soviet doctrine the offensive was considered feasible with a minimum advantage of 3: 1, in the USA they went even further and in general (without taking into account technical superiority and skill) only a four-fold advantage is considered minimally sufficient for large offensive operations. In June 1941, the Wehrmacht met an approximately equal in number and well-equipped army, which was also located on its territory at previously prepared lines.
I hope I understand my point of view clearly?

[bayard]

You, Karl, look at the map of the deployment of divisions at the border.
Have you looked?
Carefully ?
How many German divisions are opposed to one Soviet?
Look again!
Four !
Four Wehrmacht divisions against one Soviet.
And one or two in the near rear, capable of joining the battle and supporting the offensive within a few hours.
And the main forces of the spacecraft in the rear, dispersed in TWO echelons.
In all the main directions of the blow, the Germans, Karl, had 4-6 times superiority ONLY in DIVISIONS. And the German division had about 30% more staffing than the KA division.
Didn't hear that, Carl?
Therefore, the Red Army entered the fray. And even the total number of the 1st and 2nd echelons of the western grouping (from the Baltic to the Black Sea) of the spacecraft was significantly inferior to the Wehrmacht.
Plus - SUDDEN.
Plus - MOBILITY.
Plus - TAKE THE LORD IN THE AIR.

And despite this, Carl, we stopped you near Moscow, Stalingrad, in the Caucasus!
AND DONE in Berlin!
Together with all your allies.

And so it will ALWAYS be.
Furstein, Carl?

[antivirus]

Bandera and SS-Balts also shoved into these 27 million?
is it all killed or possible demographic losses during the Second World War and subsequent years, "unborn" ???

Poland does not recognize the borders of the USSR from 09.39 to 05.45g - NUMBER OF ALL DIETS IN EASTERN CRESES - Polish WWII losses

[Corn]

is it all killed or possible demographic losses during the Second World War and subsequent years, "unborn" ???

no, demographic losses exceed 40 million, and 27 million are precisely those who died in battle, in gas chambers and labor camps, millions of victims from a terrible famine that erupted in the rear. I am ashamed not to know this.

[antivirus]

and 27 million are precisely those who died in battle, in gas chambers and labor camps, millions of victims from a terrible famine that erupted in the rear. I am ashamed not to know this.


-K-A-A-A-DENT ...
1.I am ashamed to believe in all the whimsical estimates, different "academicians" give + - 5-7 million deaths, etc.
2. The question of the Bandera-balts of the SS is not open.
3. in the southern course of the GZD there is 324 km - dRodyakovo.
A friend lived there, he always knew that 28g.
It turned out to be 1927 - in 2017, he celebrated 90 years (died 11.2018), went in and found out this news. They reduced it by a year "so as not to get into the war." IT WAS NOT CHANGED IN 1932.
but before or in war.
--that's all about the accuracy of the statistical method and direct accounting then.
4. in the GULAG there are many "innocent" separatists (from all over the USSR) + colorationists died (citizens of the USSR) + to them the generation that was not born from them - they are all included in the political "Article 58", like Leninists and Trotskyists - in spite of the IVS and his iron commissars.
5. In Germany, 1 million "missing" and --- pedantic Germans have not found for 70 years. And there is no exact data on the total losses of the people.
6. If 330 km from the Kremlin "cheated" (27 or 28 g) - what about the Caucasus and other dense corners to say.
it is approximately clear that we have more dead and dead than Germany, BUT WHERE LOSS OF ALLIES OF GERMANY (HUNGARIANS-ITALY-ROMANIANS) ???

"TROIKA" FOR WILLING TO STUDY AND NO MORE ...
In the 21st century, how are things, taking into account the population and deaths in Afghanistan, Mexico or BiH?
there can be no answer accurate and fair.
27 million-took by the ears to refuse to pay for Lend-Lease, "paid in blood"

[bayard]

Quote: Corn

no, demographic losses exceed 40 million

Lying ! Unconfirmed by anything.

Quote: Corn

and 27 million is precisely those who died in battle

Not !
In battle, Karl died about 7 ml. fighters of the Red \ Soviet Army. From the payroll.
And the rest, it is CIVIL losses, because the war does not spare civilians either.
Those who died under the bombing, from starvation and disease, from the repression of Nazi occupiers, who were taken out for forced labor to Germany and who died there OR did not return to their homeland, but were taken out by the Anglo-American occupation administration from defeated Germany to the United States and other British colonies.
27 million people, Karl, are the LOTS of the USSR, taking into account ALL categories of victims. EVERYONE, including small children and deep old men who could not bear the hardships of wartime.

And you, Karl, must repent!
Repent and pay.

[Corn]

Quote: bayard

And you, Karl, must repent!
Repent and pay.

and why did you write a comment?
you probably know about my deepest contempt for similar characters who whitewash and justify the vile scum, artificially distort even the actual story that still has living witnesses, like to dance on the bones of even their long-forgotten ancestors, if only this would correspond to a new-fangled ideology.

[bayard]

Quote: Corn

you probably know about my deepest contempt for similar characters to you

Well, know about my DEEPEST contempt for you and your kind - the vile denigrants of the history of my Country.
I knew too many participants in the TOY war - from rank-and-file to generals, to seduce on heresies like yours. My contempt for you is deep, systematic and justified.
And it is the memory of my ancestors that attaches my DISCUSSION to you ... Karl.

[ccsr]

Quote: bayard

In battle, Karl died about 7 ml. fighters of the Red \ Soviet Army. From the payroll.

By the way, there is one more fact that affects the numerical losses of spacecraft and which is still difficult to comprehend, but it exists. When I was looking for information about the death of my grandfather, I was surprised to find that his surname was distorted in three different documents, and one of these "surnames" was placed on the memorial in Barnaul, which was built on the basis of documents from the regional military registration and enlistment office. So, in case of unfair work with the calculation of losses, they can be overestimated in our country, and it will take many years to bring all the data on the victims into a single database in order to exclude cases when the same victim was not registered as two or three dead.

[Sugar Honeyovich]

Quote: Corn

demographic losses exceed 40 million, and 27 million are precisely those who died in battle, in gas chambers and labor camps, millions of victims from a terrible famine that erupted in the rear.

What are the demographic losses for our enemies? Mainly with the Germans with their "total mobilization"?

The dead in battle, in gas chambers and labor camps, in Khatyn and Babi Yars are 19,9 million (those same 20 million). Plus, victims of increased wartime mortality (hunger, illness, etc.) - about 1,5 million. And the remaining 5-5,5 million are emigrants, mainly national minorities: Poles, Finns, Balts and defectors.
For the USSR, they are losses, but not dead.

[Sugar Honeyovich]

Quote: antivirus

Bandera and SS-Balts also shoved into these 27 million?

Of course, shoved. As well as Vlasov and other omakaitechikov. But they are not included in the German losses, because the registration is not the same!

[antivirus]

by registration - several times on the site they wrote about it and the majority came to such conclusions, but the "truth discoverers" were born again

[naidas]

Quote: Corn

The USSR was doomed to stick the Reich on the very first day of the war to where it belongs

Guderian into tanks ahead disagrees with you.

[svp67]

Quote: Proxima

Namely, our country was hopelessly losing the Wehrmacht in divisions simultaneously entering the battle.

Yes, this is a historical fact, but also the same fact that our army intelligence could not only reveal the concentration of this group in front of our border, but also could not do this for a rather long period, already during the war itself. And what was it - not competence or malice, we will know very soon, if at all

[Osya Bender]

And what has the army intelligence to do with it? Did the German intelligence service not "screw up" our KV and T-34 tanks, Ilyushin's attack aircraft, Katyushas and, most importantly, the patriotism of our people?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Osya Bender

And German intelligence did not "screw up" our KV and T-34 tanks

No. Intelligence data were already available from T-34 and KV in the spring of 1941. But they didn’t reach the units.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Proxima

What does the "negligence of the top political leadership" have to do with it? The USSR was then doomed to be defeated. Namely, our country was hopelessly losing to the Wehrmacht in divisions simultaneously entering the battle. That is, the Germans stupidly smashed the Red Army in parts! Not to mention the fact that the Wehrmacht was mobilized and fought a war for two years!

what doom?
WHO and what prevented the leadership of the USSR (except incompetence and absolute misunderstanding of what is happening) to produce любые actions to stop all of the above? Those. to make their -mobilization, concentration, regrouping, etc.?

[strannik1985]

Unavailability of the main tool of the offensive-mechanized corps, independently 9 MK or 30 (29) MK, combat coordination until September 1941.
Lack of accurate signs of preparation for the attack.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

Unavailability of the main tool of the offensive-mechanized corps, independently 9 MK or 30 (29) MK, combat coordination until September 1941

The Wehrmacht from scratch had enough time since 1935, but here it wasn’t enough, and, yes, it’s far from time ...

Quote: strannik1985

Lack of accurate evidence of an attack preparation

Op-pa: the transfer of a warring, mobilized army to Poland is no longer a sign of preparing an attack!

Why is this a sign?

[strannik1985]

The Wehrmacht from scratch had enough time since 1935, but here it wasn’t enough, and, yes, it’s far from time ...

Not from scratch, by the fall of 1934 the number of the Wehrmacht was 240 thousand people. And money-growth from 3300 million in 1934 to 15500 million marks in 1938.

Op-pa: the transfer of a warring, mobilized army to Poland is no longer a sign of preparing an attack! belay recourse

And you pay attention to the number of alleged divisions for attacking the USSR.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

Not from scratch, by fall 1934 Wehrmacht strength amounted to 240 thousand people.

Date of formation of the WehrmachtMarch 1935!

Quote: strannik1985

And you pay attention to the number of alleged divisions for attacking the USSR.

What for?

[strannik1985]

The Wehrmacht was not formed from scratch.

Then, that we also kept troops on the border, by June 1941 there were 66 SD in the first echelon (0-50 km from the border).

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

The Wehrmacht was not formed from scratch.

yeah: compare the Wehrmacht 1935 and the Red Army 1935

Quote: strannik1985

Then that we also held troops at the border, by June 1941 66 SD in the first echelon (0-50 km from the border).

Yeah, the result of this, right, so stunning ....

[strannik1985]

yeah: compare the Wehrmacht 1935 and the Red Army 1935

Different conditions, in the USSR for 1935 only the second five-year plan is coming.

Yeah, the result of this, right, so stunning ....

We are talking about something else. In fact, even in May 1941 there were more German divisions near the border than German (in May 1941 there were 52 divisions, including 46 infantry / guard, etc., 3 armored, 2 motorized, 1 cavalry. 29 more arrived within a month).

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

Different conditions, in the USSR for 1935 only the second five-year plan is coming.

Yes, even the tenth: the Wehrmacht, without tanks, the Air Force, artillery, and the fleet. What about the Red Army?

Quote: strannik1985

We are talking about something else. In fact, even in May 1941 there were more German divisions near the border than German (in May 1941 there were 52 divisions, including 46 infantry / guard, etc., 3 armored, 2 motorized, 1 cavalry. 29 more arrived within a month).

So what?
PS I-Different divisions, we and them.

[strannik1985]

Well, there was no war in 1935, but there were guarantor countries of Versailles who gave the Rhine region, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to the hands of the Reich.

Riflemen are generally comparable, tank and motorized in quality lose.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

Well, there was no war in 1935

But there was a rickets-infant Wehrmacht without weapons and a powerful Red Army

Quote: strannik1985

but there were guarantor countries of Versailles who gave the Rhine region, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland to the hands of the Reich.

What side is it by 1935? WHAT was the Wehrmacht and WHAT-RKKA-do not see the difference?

Quote: strannik1985

Riflemen are generally comparable, tank and motorized in quality lose.

incomparable.

[strannik1985]

Rakhit Wehrmacht was propped up by the German economy and the guarantors of Versailles transferred to the hands of the Reich a bunch of resources, including the gold reserves of Czechoslovakia. In the USSR, such a support was much thinner, plus the need to independently ensure border security (i.e. you can’t manage with a relatively small army).

Comparable, 04/400 in general, the German PD is not inferior.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

Rakhit Wehrmacht was propped up by the German economy and the guarantors of Versailles transferred to the hands of the Reich a bunch of resources, including the gold reserves of Czechoslovakia.

in 1935 no one handed over anything, but there was an army WITHOUT ANYTHING, without a single tank.

Red Army in 1935 4 mechanized corps, 6 separate mechanized brigades, 6 separate tank regiments, 15 mechanized regiments of cavalry divisions and a significant number of tank battalions and companies. .
The same for airplanes, artillery, etc.

Do not catch the differences?

[strannik1985]

In fact, the development of the Pz.I started in 1931, in 1934 337 chassis were released, with 54 hulls and towers each. The chassis is larger because they were used for training purposes. In 1935, the first two tank regiments were formed. In 1935, 811 chassis, 851 tower, 851 building were produced. On October 15, 1935, the first three tank divisions were formed.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

In fact, the development of the Pz.I started in 1931, in 1934 337 chassis were released, with 54 hulls and towers each. The chassis is larger because they were used for training purposes.

And got them Kraftfarlerkomando (motorized training toomanding) "Zossen" - for training goals in 1934 г

Quote: strannik1985

October 15 1935

It's a day birth Panzerwaffe, tank troops of the Red Army for many, many years

[strannik1985]

And before that, the Germans on the territory of the USSR taught their own and our military on their materiel the basics of using the BTT. Object "Kama" was closed in 1933, "Zossen" was opened in 1934. The absence of armored vehicles in the troops does not mean the Germans did not develop military science on the topic.

[bayard]

Quote: Olgovich

But there was a rickets-infant Wehrmacht without weapons and a powerful Red Army

In 1935?
Mighty?
With a population of 150 thousand? Recruited according to the territorial principle, when the soldiers often stayed at home?
Are you confident in the quality and "power" of such an army?

And on the contrary - the XNUMX-strong "Army of Commanders" of "Weimar" Germany, where every private was ready at any time to become a squad leader, and any non-commissioned officer - a platoon commander ...
Not to mention the quality of the training of officers.
The Wehrmacht was from what to be born and grow. Yes with such a mobile reserve. And unspent military personnel with PMV.

At the same time, in the USSR, with the training of command personnel, not everything was clear. And the spacecraft began to grow in numbers just since 1935. With a population of 150 thousand

Now imagine the state of the Army, which in the period from 1935 to the summer of 1941 increased its strength from 150 thousand to 5 million people.
Presented?
And How ?
What is the experience of the commanding staff, especially of the middle level — the commanders of battalions, regiments, brigades ... and perhaps divisions ...?
What about combat coordination?
And the development of new equipment and weapons?
They planned to re-equip the entire SC with automatic rifles ... By 1943, they had already delivered about 1,5 million units to the troops. ... and the former collective farmers-peasants could not even tolerate their exploitation, because city guys with at least some technical skills were sent to the fleet, aviation, tank and mechanized units ... by drivers and headquarters ...
The military equipment went to the troops in a jamb, in a continuous stream, the divisions were formed dozens a year ... It was just mobilization.
But the USSR did not have at least one or two more years of peace time for the formation of a FULL army. But we had no choice and therefore had to learn already during the war itself. And indeed, two years later it was already a completely different Army, which grind the Wehrmacht.
Now, think about what it would be if the USSR entered the war earlier? ... In the year 1938 - 40th?

That is why Stalin was playing for time, winning it to CREATE a real Army.
Even in 1941, it was still a semi-finished product - preparation of the future Army of Winners.

[chenia]

Quote: bayard

But the USSR did not have at least one or two more years of peace time for the formation of a FULL army. But we had no choice and therefore had to learn already during the war itself

In principle, true.
The assumption that Germany is not ready for war with the USSR in 1941 (which is absolutely true), created the illusion of the impossibility of a serious war in 1941 (provocations to obtain political preferences are possible).
They did not take Hitler's adventurism into account, and they caught us figuratively at the time of dressing.

I always draw attention to the troops from the 4-month BP (in military conditions, which is important) launched an offensive near Moscow. And in principle, we could have troops with relative BP by 1941 (primarily mechanized). Naturally, in peacetime, the intensity of the PSU is lower, but it is not possible to drive away the Mech Corps at landfills with an imperfect OSH for a year, and so replicate, full of the generality of the Red Army.

And MK bleeding and weakened (selected TBR.) SK. Happened. that the armored component of the SV practically did not work for us (especially at the beginning of the war) ..

[Olgovich]

Quote: bayard

With a population of 150 thousand?

March 1932 - 604 300 people -number of the Red Army. What further is it to talk about?

Quote: bayard

And on the contrary - the one hundred thousandth "Army of Commanders" of "Weimar" Germany,

On the contrary, there are a bunch of reservists with plywood tanks, without artillery, navy and aviation, without universal military duty (where are the soldiers from?), The General Staff, etc.

Quote: bayard

The Wehrmacht was from what to be born and grow. Yes with such a mobile reserve. And unspent military personnel with PMV.

The Red Army all this had many times more (in potential). How to handle this is a rhetorical question

Quote: bayard

And the spacecraft began to grow in numbers just since 1935. With a population of 150 thousand

Quote: bayard

Now imagine the state of the Army, which in the period from 1935 to the summer of 1941 increased its strength from 150 thousand to 5 million people.
Presented?
And How ?

Now imagine the state of the Army, which in the period from 1935 to the summer of 1941 increased its strength from 100 thousand to 7,5 million people (Germany)
Presented?
And How?

Quote: bayard

Military equipment went to the troops in a jamb, in a continuous stream, dozens of divisions were formed per year ... It was just a mobilization

Germany.

Quote: bayard

But we had no choice and therefore had to learn already during the war itself

nonsense was a choice and wonderful: without the unprecedented defeat in the history of the world 41-42gg-cm PMV

Quote: bayard

Now, think about what it would be if the USSR entered the war earlier? ... In the year 1938 - 40th?

See the history of WWII: the main front and losses in the West.

Quote: bayard

That is why Stalin was playing for time, winning it to CREATE a real Army.

He did not win a single day: when Hitler decided to attack, then he attacked, having previously decided almost all tasks, with the neutrality of the USSR. He won the time - Hitler: while the Red Army was strengthening by percentages, Germany, at times, capturing the whole of Europe, and the USSR was left in terrible loneliness - a "smart" policy of delay, yes ...

[bayard]

Quote: Olgovich

March 1932 - 604 people, the number of the Red Army. What further is it to talk about?

This is the total strength, along with reservists. The personnel were just those same 150 thousand, and the rest were conscripts for short-term training on a rotational basis (2 - 3 - 4 months). The emphasis was on military training of the masses on the job - shooting courses, shooting ranges and parachute towers in every city, DOSAAF, flying clubs ... This made it possible to give some kind of base and form a mob. reserve, but the quality and combat readiness of specific units and formations was extremely low - on the frame was about 20% hp
In 1935, the Politburo authorized the departure from the territorial principle and already in 1937 60% of infantry divisions were transferred to the cadre.
In 1934 the Revolutionary Military Council was disbanded and the General Staff was created.
In 1939, the draft age was reduced from 21 to 19 years, then the sharp increase in the number of the Red Army began, which by June had reached 5,4 million people.
It should be borne in mind that during the civil war, professional military personnel were lost. Some emigrated, some joined the White movement and died or also migrated after defeat, and even the part that joined the Red Army as "military experts" in the following years suffered to a large extent from the repressions and slander of the Trotskyist sect. And when the rapid growth in the number of the Army began, there was an extremely shortage of trained commanders. This is a com. platoon / company can be prepared relatively quickly, but starting with the battalion, com. regiment, brigades, divisions, corps, armies ... Sometimes even majors became commanders of brigades and even divisions ... Plus the purges of the army in 1938 greatly thinned its command staff of the link of interest to us.
These are realities.
At the same time, the one hundred thousandth army of Germany was originally built as the army of future commanders, it was like a huge military school / academy, where great attention was paid to the individual training of a soldier, initiative, creative approach to solving combat tasks, combat coordination, decision-making ability and independent conduct battlefield starting from squad and platoon. It was an army of professionals, an army of commanders, and therefore, when the sharp growth of the German armed forces began, they had no problem with the command staff, and all training methods were transferred to the Wehrmacht.
Of course, you can laugh about plywood tanks and guns, because the shameful Versailles Treaty forbade having heavy weapons, the navy and aviation of Germany, but in the territory of neighboring states the branches of German enterprises worked on creating new types of weapons, and their representatives (of the German army) participated in military maneuvers in including on the territory of the USSR, where training of their tankmen and artillery was carried out, staff officers were practicing, and the personnel of fighter aircraft were sports pilots ...

And in 1939 the second five-year plan was going on ... the industry that ensured us victory later only got on the wing ... She needed time, the Army needed time ... After all, just before the war, conscripts began to come to the army secondary (7 years) education, which could teach new complex military equipment ... And this also took time ...

And most importantly, the allies.
It was in 1939 that the USSR found itself in "terrible isolation" - there was a war with Japan in the east, Britain and France refused to create a united front against Hitler, encouraging him in every possible way to go to war with us, and the United States would side with the victim of aggression. Now, if then the USSR had taken the risk of taking the initiative in the war with Germany, we would have received a UNITED FRONT of all Western powers against us. And Japan certainly would not have remained on the sidelines.
It was really scary to be in such a situation.
And pushing your enemies with your foreheads, forcing them to destroy each other with excitement is the result of the political genius of Stalin and his diplomats.
First, Poland is the worst historical enemy.
Then France (which, together with England, was preparing to strike at the USSR in Transcaucasia - at Baku).
And the USSR, meanwhile, pushed back its western border and regained the territories lost during the civil war - Bessarabia, Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, Karelia and Finnish territories near Leningrad ... And all this with minimal costs and losses.
You measure the distance from Lviv and Brest to the old border ... and see how many kilometers Hitler did not reach Moscow. These new territories saved the USSR from the final defeat in the terrible 1941. And this happened only thanks to the timely adopted POLITICAL decisions.
But the General Staff and the army commanders lost the 1941 company ... Scary and with a crushing score. But at the same time they won time and did not surrender Moscow.
And if we had started the war ourselves, we would have received not Lend-Lease supplies, but several more fronts and complete isolation.

[Olgovich]

Quote: bayard

but the quality and combat readiness of specific units and formations was extremely low

composition of the Red Army602 thousand people, its quality (territorial principle, etc.) is the problem of rulers: NOBODY did not interfere, like Germany, to do better.

Quote: bayard

It should be borne in mind that during the civil war, professional military personnel were lost. Some emigrated, some joined the White movement and died or also migrated after defeat, and even the part that joined the Red Army as "military experts" in the following years suffered to a large extent from the repressions and slander of the Trotskyist sect.

what are the common words? On Soviet territory left 110 thousand officers, to the Second World War in the army .... a few HUNDREDS. This is a crime, who committed?

Quote: bayard

And in our 1939 the second five-year plan was going on ... the industry that ensured us then victory only got on the wing ...

which "wing" in 1939? Do you at least read the materials of the 18th Party Congress

Quote: bayard

The army needed time ...

Hitler didn’t have to, yes. And no one else

Quote: bayard

It was in 1939 that the USSR found itself in "terrible isolation" - there was a war with Japan in the east, Britain and France refused to create a united front against Hitler, encouraging him in every possible way to go to war with us, and the United States would side with the victim of aggression. Now, if the USSR had taken the risk of taking the initiative in the war with Germany, we would have received a UNITED FRONT of all Western powers against us. And Japan certainly would not have stayed away

what are "would" worth? nothing.
Find out that after Poland Hitler was ALL countries RECOGNIZED general evil and NONE of the greats in alliance with him began to fight. It is a fact. And there was no "united front" against the USSR at all.
What was not enough brains and the ability to negotiate with potential allies is also a fact. And you can understand them, believe the USSR there was not a single reason.

Quote: bayard

And pushing your enemies with your foreheads, forcing them to destroy each other with excitement is the result of the political genius of Stalin and his diplomats

Yeah. This genius pushed the USSR .... face to face with the most terrible military machine in the world and led to unprecedented casualties and defeats in the history of the world 41-42 g

Quote: bayard

And we start the war ourselves, got would not Lend-Lease supplies, but a few more fronts and complete isolation

would = 0
and the PMV is real and an unlearned lesson.

[bayard]

Quote: Olgovich

Find out

Young man, we are not familiar with you, and you should not throw your schoolboy "truth" to a stranger.

Quote: Olgovich

after Poland, Hitler was RECOGNIZED as a universal evil by ALL countries and NONE of the greats in alliance with him did not fight. It is a fact. And there was no "united front" against the USSR at all.

Do you understand what you wrote?
"Recognized as evil" and no one is at war with him. They declare war on him, but no one is at war with him! "Strange War"? Very . And in the USSR, no one had any illusions. Hitler was pushed against the USSR. And then they themselves would have grabbed our throats. England and France - in Transcaucasia, England - in Central Asia (from India) and Arkhangelsk, Japan and the USA - the Far East.
Nobody even thought of an alliance with us until they themselves grappled with each other. When France did not, and England de facto found itself in a war with Germany, their Napoleonic plans for the USSR somewhat diminished. But. At the very height of the war - in 1942, Churchill proposed to Stalin ... to transfer our troops from Iran and Transcaucasia to the German front, and the British - so be it - would send their troops into our Transcaucasia.
But the very course of the war forced our sworn, historical enemies to send us ships with weapons and supplies in order to prevent Hitler's victory and, consequently, his defeat.
Our enemies helped us in the fight against a common enemy. Against his will and out of a sense of self-preservation. But in 1939 they could still agree ... And it seems that they agreed on something - we recall the flight of Hess.

Quote: Olgovich

what are the common words? In Soviet territory, 110 thousand officers remained, to the Second World War in the army .... several hundred. This is a crime, who committed?

Young man, don't make yourself a prosecutor. It looks very frivolous.
Study the material, preferably in primary sources, it would be nice to go through memoirs ... Be serious, the world is not a booth and not a kindergarten, serious people create history and in their decisions are guided not by children's enthusiasm and outburst, but by a serious analysis of ALL the accompanying factors. Grow up.
And keep in mind at least the fact that many of the former simply changed their biography and were not included in your statistics.
As a child, I was friends with the grandson of General Borodin - the one who carried out a brilliant raid and destroyed the headquarters of the Chapaev division ... It was the youngest general of the Imperial Russian Army in WWI. And he peacefully ended his days in one of the Ural villages. And his sons and part of his grandchildren became Soviet officers ... And I graduated from the military school with the great-grandson of General Yudenich, one of the leaders of the white movement ... he lives in Kaliningrad now ...
If for you there was no Trotskyist conspiracy, I have nothing to talk about with you at all. My aunt's father was a red commander in the Chapaev division and in 1938 he was executed by the stipulation of the very Trotskyists.
The history of Russia is much more complicated than you think ... or want to show what it seems.

Quote: Olgovich

And in 1939 the second five-year plan was going on ... the industry that ensured us then victory only got on the wing ...

which "wing" in 1939? Do you at least read the materials of the 18th Party Congress

Materials of the congress are bravura reports and statement of tasks. You better read industry reports, statistics, plunge into the REAL world of that time.
On our site with an excess of material on this topic, everything is stated clearly and clearly, delve into at least the archives of the site. It will be very useful for you.

The blame for the defeats of 1941 was entirely on the military - self-confidence, arbitrariness, sloppiness and lack of competence. Zhukov in the deputy. beg. The General Staff jumped from the comcor, having been in that position (comcor) nothing at all. The scale of the tasks facing the com. corps and the General Staff is simply incommensurable. He was not ready for this, but nevertheless undertook to smack the gag. If, for example, his former commander, Rokosovsky, would have been in his post, such a game would not have happened ... But Rokosovsky was in prison at that time ... And Beria saved him, reviewing his case and the affairs of many other slandered commanders of the Red Army .

Work on your education and do not rush to throw out your unfounded opinion to the court of a prepared public.
Good luck.

[Olgovich]

[quote = bayard] Young man, we are not familiar with you, and you should not throw your schoolboy "truths" to a stranger [/ quote]
I think that older than you, young man [quote = bayard] You yourself understood what they wrote?
"Recognized as evil" and no one is at war with him. They declare war on him, but no one is at war with him! "Strange War"? Very . [/ quote]
He is fighting: in the air, at sea, on land, rattles are afraid, but the war continues, to school for knowledge. [quote = bayard] And in the USSR no one had any illusions. Hitler was pushed to the USSR. And after would and they themselves clung to our throats. England and France - in Transcaucasia, England - in Central Asia (from India) and Arkhangelsk, Japan and the USA - the Far East [/ quote]
Once again: your endless "would" = 0, as well as your THOUGHTS - tales about Wed Asia, etc.[quote = bayard] England de facto refused in the war with Germany [/ quote]
To school! [Quote = bayard] But the course of the war forced our sworn, historical enemies to send us ships with weapons and supplies in order to prevent Hitler from winning, and therefore his defeat. [/ Quote]
Certainly: they paid us with help for our blood. We lost people, they are nothing. Is it okay? [Quote = bayard] Our enemies helped us in the fight against a common enemy. [/ Quote]
They wanted to spit on us: they helped themselves: they saved millions of their lives. [Quote = bayard] Study the material, preferably in the source, it would be nice to go through memoirs .. [/ quote]
You yourself do not know him. You can argue what? No. [quote = bayard] If there was no Trotskyist conspiracy for you, I have nothing to talk about with you at all. My aunt's father was a red commander in the Chapaev division and in 1938 he was executed by the stipulation of the very Trotskyists. [/ Quote]
Yeah, and the rest are not agreed.
He was a Trotskyist: or do you not believe Stalin's justice?! [Quote = bayard] [quote = bayard] Congress materials are bravura reports. [/ Quote]
Are you an anti-Stalinist, if so about his words? [Quote = bayard] On our site with an excess of material on this topic, everything is stated clearly and clearly, delve into at least the archives of the site. It will be very useful for you [/ quote]
wonderful materials: completely refute your fabrications [quote = bayard] The blame for the 1941 defeats is entirely on the military - self-confidence, arbitrariness, sloppiness and lack of competence [/ quote]
Fault fully at the top leadership of the country, it also selected personnel, i.e. and here it is in response. [quote = bayard] Work on your education and do not rush to throw out your unfounded opinion to the court of a prepared public.
Good luck. [/ Quote]
Work on your education and do not rush to throw out your unfounded opinion to the court of a prepared public.

Though......

[bayard]

Quote: Olgovich

Are you an anti-Stalinist, if so about his words?

Do you blame the top political leadership, that is, Stalin, and write me this?
His actions and decisions are justified, verified and sometimes simply brilliant, worthy of study and use as a teaching tool.

Quote: Olgovich

He was a Trotskyist: or do you not believe Stalin's justice ?!

What kind of antics?

Quote: Olgovich

executed under the stipulation of those same Trotskyists

Like you and others like you.

Quote: Olgovich

The blame is completely on the top leadership of the country, it also selected personnel, i.e. and here it is in response.

In response to whom?
Before you?
Stalin did not relieve himself of responsibility and said this at a banquet in honor of the Victory. And he saw his guilt precisely in personnel matters. The same Zhukov, after analyzing the causes of the disaster in 41 (sorted out after the war) was sent first to Odessa, and then to the Ural Military District. Stalin was not a military man. He was a business executive and saw as his task to provide the army with everything necessary, giving questions of military planning to professionals. In a situation where such commanders as Rokosovsky are sitting, and such as Zhukov make a dizzying career, it is not surprising to make a mistake. Moreover, before that, in general, military construction was headed by Tukhachevsky ...
I repeat - the history of Russia is much more complicated than it seems. And its Soviet period is a period of dazzling take-off. Take off in those difficult, inhuman conditions.
So it makes you (with your kind) on the Soviet leadership.
Goodbye
And without respect.

[Olgovich]

Quote: bayard

Do you blame the top political leadership, that is, Stalin, and write me this?

YOU write that Stalin told a lie in a report at the 18th congress. AND?.

Quote: bayard

His actions and decisions are justified, verified and sometimes simply brilliant, worthy of study and use as a teaching aid.

Of course, to study: in order to never repeat the terrible defeats, unprecedented in the history of mankind, losses of 41-42gg, unprecedented in the history of famines of 33 and 47 years and terrible demographic losses of the people

Quote: bayard

Such as you and others like you

Executed by Stalin's justice, remember?

Quote: bayard

What kind of antics?

Quote: bayard

What kind of antics?

.

Quote: bayard

Stalin did not relieve himself of responsibility and said this at a banquet in honor of Victory

Responsibility is tell the truth and ask for an assessment their actions. The truth about the losses of 41-42 years was not for the people at all, as well as the opportunity to give an assessment to those who allowed it. Would he leave in power in 1942 those who allowed it?

Quote: bayard

The same Zhukov, after analyzing the causes of the disaster in 41 (sorted out after the war) was sent first to Odessa, and then to the Ural Military District.

Tell me: where are these estimates recorded and indicated in the orders of reductions. Can you No, you tell tales.

Quote: bayard

talin was not military. He was a business executive and saw as his task to provide the army with everything necessary, giving questions of military planning to professionals. In a situation where such commanders as Rokosovsky are sitting, and such as Zhukov make a dizzying career, it is not surprising to make a mistake

he is the leader of the country. A business executive is a supply manager.

Quote: bayard

I repeat - the history of Russia is much more complicated than it seems. And its Soviet period is a period of blinding take-off

The Russian cross and the borders of the 17th century is the result.

Atom, space, science, everything was created Russian scientists and engineersgrown in Russian imperial universities. And it would be (in Russia), even better.

Quote: bayard

So it makes you (with your kind) on the Soviet leadership

Does it make you bankrupt? No? Well, see ...

Quote: bayard

Goodbye
And without respect

Why?
However, your business

[bayard]

Quote: Olgovich

Atom, space, science, everything was created by Russian scientists and engineers grown in Russian imperial universities. And it would be (in Russia), even better.

You tell Academicians Utkin. And their leader and mentor from a neighboring village - Academician Yangel.
And RI would have trailed in the tail of civilization without universal free education, including higher education, without social elevators, high goals and general enthusiasm. And she would suffocate in the swamp of her estate.
Just don’t make yourself a supporter of historical Russia; the Trotskyists have always succeeded badly.

Quote: Olgovich

Executed by Stalin's justice, remember?

Not Stalinist, but during the reign of Trotskyist terror and the alcoholic Yezhov - executed for this ... like Yagoda - his predecessor.
So grimace further, it's your nature.
Sim does not know how otherwise ...

[Olgovich]

Quote: bayard

You tell Academicians Utkin. And their leader and mentor from a neighboring village - Academician Yangel.

They know this without you. And here you are, no

Quote: bayard

And RI would have trailed in the tail of civilization without universal free education, including higher education, without social elevators, high goals and general enthusiasm.

Universal free education, in fact, since 1908. Or is it the Bolsheviks 140 thousand schools configured? By 1927, the pre-revolutionary amount was only restored, i.e. 10 years, down the drain.
Higher education-leading in the world, female higher-first in the world, the brilliant peasant Lavr Proskuryakov-, scientist, builder of world bridges, would laugh at you about the elevator.

Enthusiasm is necessary when catching fleas, in a normal economy, MONEY is paid for work,

Quote: bayard

Not Stalinist, but during the reign of Trotskyist terror and the alcoholic Yezhov - executed for this ... like Yagoda - his predecessor.

Learn: In 1937-1938 Yezhov visited Stalin almost 290 times, and the duration of his visits was 850 hoursOn January 27, 1937, he received the title of General Commissioner of State Security, in the summer of the same year - the Order of Lenin. The city of Sulimov was renamed in his honor, which became known as Yezhovo-Cherkessk.

Or did Yezhov spin around his finger as he wanted? But what about ... genius ?! You answer directly. Hard? Yeah ....

Quote: bayard

So grimace further, it's your nature.
Sim does not know how otherwise ...

What annoys you like that?
Just answer, essentially, without going personal

[bayard]

Quote: Olgovich

But what about ... genius ?!

Quote: Olgovich

Or hedgehogs spit around his finger

Quote: Olgovich

What annoys you like that?

Quote: Olgovich

Sim does not know how otherwise ...

Quote: Olgovich

So grimace further, it's your nature.

[Olgovich]

Quote: bayard

Quote: Olgovich
Sim does not know how otherwise ...

Quote: Olgovich
So grimace further, it's your nature.

Do not attribute to me your ravings

[16329]

Of course, without a revolution it would have been much better and Russia would have avoided the colossal victims of the first half of the 20th century, but unfortunately, the revolution has happened and we have what we have.
Stalin came to power in a country with a broken social structure and having a huge amount of internal problems and contradictions
At the same time, Hitler was not an adventurer, all Western experts gave the USSR 2-3 weeks of active resistance.
By the way, why do you think that in the Red Army, which Trotsky created, for the world revolution, its supreme command staff was not its supporters.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

the composition of the Red Army is 602 thousand people, its quality (territorial principle, etc.) is the problem of the rulers: NOBODY did not interfere, like Germany, to do better.

No money. The USSR does not have money to simultaneously maintain an army capable of scaring away Poland, Finland, China and Japan, and to provide this army with a level of training at the Reichswehr level (sergeants - according to the officer program, officers - one or two higher).
Paradoxically, the Germans were helped by Versailles and the League of Nations, which secured the borders of the Reich and ensured the possibility of long-term training of the "army of commanders". The Germans could calmly hone the structure and tactics of using mech troops in the classrooms and on the training grounds, select the optimal composition of the Kampfgroups (the combined group of motorized infantry, armored vehicles and artillery operated in their exercises already in the late 20s). And not try to fill at least some kind of troops in two theaters, spaced 6000 kilometers and connected to each other by a single railway.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

No money. The USSR does not have money to simultaneously maintain an army capable of scaring away Poland, Finland, China and Japan, and to provide this army with a level of training at the Reichswehr level (sergeants - according to the officer program, officers - one or two higher).

Germany had, yes.

Quote: Alexey RA

The Germans could calmly hone the structure in classes and polygons

The absence of an army, conscription, trained soldiers, tanks, artillery, aviation is very useful for the army.
Only, for some reason, no one follows this.

Quote: Alexey RA

a group of motorized infantry, armored vehicles and artillery operated in their exercises in the late 20s

with plywood tanks on ..cars ...

Quote: Alexey RA

And do not try to fill at least with some kind of troops two theater of operations, spaced 6000 kilometers and connected to each other by a single railway.

there was no need to shoulder on such fragile shoulders and weak heads — such overwhelming tasks ....

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

Germany had, yes.

To train an army of 100 people with limited armaments - no tanks, no planes, with artillery limited by Versailles? Yes, the Germans had money for such a "training army".

Quote: Olgovich

with plywood tanks on ..cars ...

For tactical and operational training, this is more than enough - having the performance characteristics of all the models of simulated equipment, you can safely work out the tactics of use and the optimal composition of tank groups with air support on cars and motorcycles. And already having well-coordinated connections with trained military personnel, you can safely equip them with military equipment.

Quote: Olgovich

The absence of an army, conscription, trained soldiers, tanks, artillery, aviation is very useful for the army.

The opportunity to engage in combat training for almost 15 years, without being distracted by conflicts and border protection, is priceless. As for the draft ... von Seeckt scored against Versailles in the mid-20s, dividing the rank and file of the Reichswehr into "long-term" and "short-term". "Long-term" privates served for 12 years and were trained for non-commissioned personnel, while "short-term" ones underwent primary training and quit, replenishing the trained reserve of rank and file.

After inspecting a number of units, Colonel Morgan discovered that German soldiers served six months or a year, and then secretly retired to the reserve. In addition, he established that a significant number of privates actually received a salary due to non-commissioned officers.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Alexey RA

To train an army of 100 people with limited armaments - no tanks, no planes, with artillery limited by Versailles? Yes, the Germans had money for such a "training army".

What in the USA itiots spend so much money ..... And what's interesting. the more they spend (all), the stronger the army.
Only with you, on the contrary: the weaker and less cash-the more she ... stronger and more capable

Quote: Alexey RA

For tactical and operational training, this is more than enough - having the performance characteristics of all the models of simulated equipment, you can safely work out the tactics of use and the optimal composition of tank groups with air support on cars and motorcycles.

We remember, we remember the "most fruitful" training of owls. tankerswalking on the tank and shooting .. a rifle cartridge. Having SUCH "knowledge and experience" and

TTX of all models of simulated equipment, you can safely work out the tactics of application and the optimal composition of the tank groups with air support. And already having well-coordinated connections with trained military personnel, you can safely equip them with military equipment.

came to the natural defeat of these "trained and well-coordinated" parts

Quote: Alexey RA

The opportunity to engage in combat training for almost 15 years, without being distracted by conflicts and border protection, is invaluable.

The border was defending: you are confusing something. And what conflicts was distracted by Germany before the WWII? Nothing changed.

Quote: Alexey RA

As for the draft ... von Seeckt scored against Versailles in the mid-20s, dividing the rank and file of the Reichswehr into "long-term" and "short-term". "Long-term" privates served for 12 years and were trained for non-commissioned personnel, while "short-term" ones underwent primary training and quit, replenishing the trained reserve of rank and file.

All this is a trifle: without a call, there is no mass training of ordinary personnel. He was not there.

[ccsr]

Quote: Alexey RA

"Long-term" privates served 12 years and they were trained for non-commissioned personnel,

They became the backbone of the junior officers in the Wehrmacht, and such a sergeant major was a ready-made company commander in the troops with the outbreak of war.

[16329]

In 1935 there was no mighty Red Army, there was a semi-militia structure with a low level of technical, command and staff culture, with high command personnel of revolutionary origin, adhering to various political orientations and armed with poor domestic copies of outdated models of military equipment of Western states
And in general, the state of the USSR was only somewhat stabilized by the end of the 30s after the revolution and the catastrophic Civil War
And the Wehrmacht was deployed from the Reichswehr, a highly professional structure that worked out and generalized the experience and advanced achievements of the military thought of the First World War in the country, which had serious national scientific and technical schools, highly developed metallurgy and mechanical engineering, chemical and instrument-making industries.
In addition, the German nation was united by a thirst for revenge after the "dishonest", as they considered defeat in the first world

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

The Wehrmacht from scratch had enough time since 1935, but here it wasn’t enough, and, yes, it’s far from time ...

In fact, an ordinary Reichswehr for two or three years of service underwent such training, which not all the lieutenants of the Red Army had after graduating from a military school, and this is described in detail in the book "Soldier of Three Armies". That is why the Wehrmacht received 100 thousand (and in fact more, taking into account the previously dismissed) well-trained officers who, in fact, being sergeant major of the Reichswehr, in fact could command the companies of the Wehrmacht during the war and without any retraining rose to major positions. Unfortunately, we did not have such a reserve at that time - due to the growth of the army in 1939-1941. many command positions were held by officers who were not yet ready for them due to lack of experience and appropriate training. So the statement that "the Wehrmacht from scratch" is essentially incorrect, and does not reflect the real state of affairs in the German army.

[Jurkovs]

Quote: Proxima

divisions simultaneously entering battle

So answer yourself why this happened, and who is to blame for this specifically.

[strannik1985]

To do this, you need to hit first, in the realities of spring 1941, start mobilization no earlier than May.

[bayard]

Quote: strannik1985

To do this, hit first

And to make Hitler an innocent victim and throw him into the US allies?
History does not tolerate the subjunctive mood.
If the General Staff fulfilled the doctrine proposed by Stalin about the defensive war in the first phase with the subsequent transition to the offensive, it would have been possible to avoid such large encirclements ... and it would simply have been easier ... But this is also a subjunctive mood ...

[strannik1985]

How, if they had already agreed with the British on a common strategy and time for entering the war? Because of the USSR, the Americans will throw the British?
There is no such strategy, in principle, no, especially for a peacetime army.

[bayard]

WWII's goal for the USA was to DESTROY THE BRITISH EMPIRE. That is why the United States financed the German economy after Hitler came to power, and also recognizing the existence of the USSR, they ensured accelerated industrialization in our country.
Yes, yes, it was in the United States that the plan of the first five-year plan was being drawn up; it was there that not just entire plants were designed and delivered turnkey, but entire industries. At least 100 engineers and about 000 specialists from the USA managed to work hard in the field of our industrialization in the pre-war years. And this does not detract from the labor feat of the Soviet people.
Both Germany and the USSR in the USA were considered as future fighters for the British Empire. The goal was precisely England and the destruction of its empire - for access to American corporations, for opening markets for its colonies. And not even having managed to achieve a military alliance between Germany and the USSR, they did what they did by pulling it into a war with Germany, disrupting military supplies along Lend-Lease and finishing off Br. The empire was already in the post-war period, at the same time imposing the Bretonwood Agreements on almost the whole world.
But on the question of who to help in the war between the USSR and Germany, they decided that they would help the weaker side so that the war lasts as long as possible and as many people die as possible. Stalin knew about this decision and therefore insisted on the defensive nature of the first phase of the war, so as not to get the United States as an ally of Germany.
But Zhukov, together with Tymoshenko, prepared an alternative plan, and without informing Stalin about it, it was he who implemented it ... for which our state paid off with a long war on its territory and millions of lives of its citizens.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: strannik1985

To do this, you need to hit first, in the realities of spring 1941, start mobilization no earlier than May.

But there’s nothing to beat. The mechanized corps - co-ordination until September. And only in September 1941 should the exercises of the first fully equipped mechanized corps be tested to test its capabilities in defense, offensive and on the march - with subsequent adjustment of the OSh. That is, even a staffed and coordinated MK with an OSh arr. 1940 may be sky-ready.
Aviators have the same problem. Until mid-1942 they had planned retraining and rearmament. The result is a double set of equipment in the same air regiments (the same border smad in June 1941) and at the same time - air regiments without airplanes.

[strannik1985]

And this is not important anymore, the actions of the USSR are retaliatory regarding the actions of the Reich (for some reason, no matter for what, Stalin decided that the 3rd Reich was about to attack), the main point of a preemptive strike is not even to defeat the enemy, but in order to gain time for the general mobilization and deployment of troops, try to fight for a strategic initiative, and not wait for an attack by having units and formations of covering armies in the RPM at a distance of 0-60 (some up to 100 km) from the border.

[Proxima]

Quote: Corn

to pay for which our people had tens of millions of human lives

Take it steeper, like Solzhenitsyn, with hundreds of millions of lives. How many dozens do you have there? - three, five, seven?

[strannik1985]

Well, yes, yes, it was necessary to attack first not earlier than the beginning of May 1941.

[To be or not to be]

light. short. everything is clear
.... there is a journal of visiting JV Stalin in his Kremlin office. A careful researcher will find a lot of interesting information in it ...
https://history.wikireading.ru/52654

[alubushka]

And Fedorov
The author of the article, for some unknown reason, does not have a link to the directive "On bringing troops to combat readiness" of June 18, 1941.

[2 Level Advisor]

because if you studied the question, its existence is still 100% not proven ..

[swan49]

Father said that in June of the 41st, he, art. lieutenant, was on vacation and somewhere between June 18-19 received a telegram calling for service in Minsk. On the basis of which directive the telegram was sent, it remained a mystery, covered in darkness.

[Corn]

Some literate commanders of subunits who miraculously survived the "purges" began to distribute and intensively prepare their lines from the middle of June. But this was precisely a personal initiative, not a combined arms order from above.

[Nagaibak]

Kukuruza "Some competent commanders of subunits who miraculously survived the" purges "have begun to distribute and intensively prepare their lines from mid-June on alarm."
It is sad when a person does not understand what he is writing about.))) From the word at all.)))

[svp67]

Quote: alubushka

The author of the article, for some unknown reason, does not have a link to the directive "On bringing troops to combat readiness" of June 18, 1941.

There is not much else. Who, that is, which intelligence agency reported this information to the RU of the Red Army or the intelligence agencies of the NKVD and the MGB? I mean that the Germans are ready to attack or provoke during this period. Operational maps of the headquarters of our border districts clearly show that military intelligence could not accurately reveal the German forces

[Olgovich]

Quote: alubushka

The author of the article, for some unknown reason, does not have a link to the directive "On bringing troops to combat readiness" of June 18, 1941.

how can one refer to what ....does not exist in nature?

[Sergey Averchenkov]

Traveling topic. What was it was. And if yes, if not interesting.

[Baloo]

Not a historian, not a politician, not a military man. In a distant school childhood in a pioneer camp from the Moscow region in the suburbs, at a meeting with a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, one clever boy asked the question: is it true that our intelligence got the Messerschmitt drawings before the war. This is true in Spain, where Messer 109 made its debut. He also seriously asserted that Kaplan did not shoot Stalin, and this is also true. She was detained when the raid ended three hours after the assassination attempt with an umbrella in one hand and a briefcase in the other several blocks away at a tram stop. And the pistol appeared not on the day of the assassination attempt, but when Kaplan had already been burned. He also claimed that Stalin knew when Hitler would attack. Indeed, illegal immigrants have named the exact date 47 times. The date was postponed several times due to problems with the delivery of equipment-weapons to the border, the rear could not cope. One professor distantly reminds me of the boy. which we often see on talk shows. This is my impression of everything that I accidentally read somewhere. Perhaps Stalin deliberately gave Hitler the opportunity to start a war, being confident of victory, fearing that Hitler was sniffing out the Naglo-Saxons. It is no coincidence that he did not allow the removal of Hitler to those of our patriots who had direct access to him, according to Sudoplatov. We can only guess now. There may be many fake "documents" in the archives. It is our duty to honor the memory of famous and unknown heroes and ordinary people, thanks to whom we live. I am more concerned about the present and the future.

[Proxima]

Your extensive post from the first and last letter - some nonsense! The only thing you are right is that ..

Quote: Balu

Kaplan did not shoot at Stalin, and this is also so.

I'll tell you even more, Kaplan didn’t even kill Kennedy. It seems like she tried on Lenin ..

[Far B]

It seems like she tried on Lenin ..

- Lennon! Lennon!
- He's with you. Yesuday ...

[not main]

Quote: Balu

He also seriously claimed that Kaplan did not shoot at Stalin, and this is also true.

Absolutely right! Since M. Kaplan shot at Lenin! This is how one should not be interested (at least) in their history! I wanted a lot more rude ...

[Ross xnumx]

Quote: non-primary

Since M. Kaplan shot at Lenin!

You heard about the ringing, yes ... She shot at Lenin:

Fanny Efimovna Kaplan (at birth. Feiga Haimovna Roytblat; February 10, 1890, Volyn province - September 3, 1918, Moscow)

and therefore she could only be F. Kaplan ...

[Baloo]

Quote: ROSS 42

and therefore she could only be F. Kaplan

Sverdlov’s cousin’s friend. she was exposed as a scapegoat, a false target. Her former lover from the Odessa bandits, the Chekist-esser called on a date at this place. And detained for prevention: what are you doing here? And why do you pay off. With her eyesight, she wouldn’t fall into a cow from five steps, all the more so into a moving target.

[not main]

Quote: ROSS 42

Quote: non-primary

Since M. Kaplan shot at Lenin!

You heard about the ringing, yes ... She shot at Lenin:

Fanny Efimovna Kaplan (at birth. Feiga Haimovna Roytblat; February 10, 1890, Volyn province - September 3, 1918, Moscow)

and therefore she could only be F. Kaplan ...

Thanks for the clarification! The memory was to blame, I have not addressed this topic for a long time.

[Viknt]

Quote: Sergey Averchenkov

Traveling topic. What was it was. And if yes, if not interesting.

What is characteristic is that the top management, including the people themselves in the shoulder-belts, is of the same opinion. To get into the subject and thoroughly understand them zapadlo. And this is a direct indication that once again we will go on the same rake. History again teaches that it does not teach anything, but it was, is and will always be!

[Avior]

The mistake, in my opinion, consisted in defense tactics.
Given the fact that the Red Army was not mobilized, and the border shifted 300 kilometers, there should have been two plans for covering the deployment.
1. If it was possible to carry out mobilization before the attack, a tough defense.
2. If failed, a flexible defense with the retreat of our cover groups after short skirmishes and sudden oncoming counterattacks with armored vehicles.
The second would allow exchanging distance for time. The German infantry division passed 25-30 km per day through a march. Constant skirmishes would require the Germans to deploy in battle formations and reduce the pace of the offensive. If it were possible to reduce by three times, the organization of defense would be a month on the old border.
But in practice, both our command and the Germans sought one thing - so that our troops would remain steadfast in holding the defenses.
What contributed to their environment.

[Jurkovs]

We always have it, we want the best, but we get it as always. The tasks of building a new defensive line and dismantling the old line were in the same document. As a result, they did not even manage to build a new line and managed to partially dismantle the old one. The combat-ready fortified areas were only on the Southern Front, and played their role there. And in the West, many forts were disarmed, and the retreating units simply could not defend themselves in them.

[sailor roman]

To Avior. "The mistake, in my opinion, was tactics defense ".
It would be right to say STRATEGY defense, but generally agree with you.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Avior

2. If failed, a flexible defense with the retreat of our cover groups after short skirmishes and sudden oncoming counterattacks with armored vehicles.

If it was not possible to carry out early mobilization, then flexible defense plans can be safely burned. Because the mobility of the Red Army compounds was achieved only after receiving mobilization techniques.
And yet, NPOs do not have mobile units - the coordination of battalions in mechanized corps is planned for July 1941. Oh yes, do not forget that NPOs do not have rubber for cars for 1941 either.

Quote: Avior

The second would allow exchanging distance for time. The German infantry division passed 25-30 km per day through a march. Constant skirmishes would require the Germans to deploy in battle formations and reduce the pace of the offensive. If it were possible to reduce by three times, the organization of defense would be a month on the old border.

All this was done in 1942 - already mobilized and having the combat experience of the Red Army. Then, advanced detachments were created in the south, with which they tried to slow down the Germans' approach to the hastily built defense line of the Stalingrad Front. The results were ... deplorable.

In fact, even the advanced detachments sent out were an attempt by the Soviet command to find a solution to the problem of forecasting enemy actions. What was needed was some kind of “creative”, “Kunstshtuk,” and such advanced units became. Theoretically, they could, firstly, delay the enemy, force them to move in battle and pre-battle orders, and not in marching columns. Secondly, they could feel for a really strong enemy grouping and reveal the direction of its movement. This idea cannot be called successful. The depth of the task of the advanced detachments (PO) from the front line of the defense line in the area of ​​the 192nd Infantry Division was 88 km, the 33rd Guards. Infantry Division - 66 km, 147th Infantry Division - 82 km. For small arms this was a very long distance. The maneuverability due to the lack of vehicles in the units was low. At the same time, up to 25% of the divisional forces with reinforcements were allocated to the advance detachments. Having come into contact with the troops, the Germans fettered them from the front with small forces and walked around from the flanks. As a result, the advance detachments were individually defeated by the Germans moving east. Their remnants randomly departed in small groups to the front line of defense.
Major Kordovsky, an officer of the General Staff of the spacecraft in the 62nd Army, wrote the following about the actions of the advance detachments in his report to AM Vasilevsky: “As a result of sending the software to a great distance, the army lost a large amount of manpower and mate. parts before the start of the battle at the forefront. Very few have completed their main task. ”

© Isaev

[serg v stock]

All the articles I read explain the failure of the defense for various reasons. However, there were more tanks, and less trained mechanized drivers. Airplanes are a breakthrough, but some of them are not combat ready; on the other, there are not enough trained pilots. About the fleet is a separate song. Before the attack on the USSR, the Germans fought for only three months and a little - 3 weeks for psheks, about a month at the paddling pools. Airplanes over shaved. A little Africa and learned! Did the Soviet military train their troops properly? Judging by the first days of the war, they didn’t really bother with studying. Grandfather told me that a platoon came to him, even in Stalingrad, they didn’t know how to shoot, they closed their eyes when fired, the mortality rate among such fighters was prohibitive. Only when the fighters began to be taught normally, then the victories were not long in coming. Whenever training was established, then intelligence reports were not so fatal.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: serg v zapase

Before the attack on the USSR, the Germans fought for only three months and a little - 3 weeks for psheks, about a month at the paddling pools. Airplanes over shaved. A little Africa and learned!

Do not forget about more than 10 years of training for the officer and non-commissioned officer corps in the Reichswehr - the "army of commanders". Germany could afford to maintain a small army and train its rank and file as non-commissioned officers, and non-commissioned officers - as officers - because its borders were established by the guarantors of Versailles.
But the USSR could not afford a hundred thousandth army from Kamchatka to Leningrad - because the armed force was the only guarantor of its borders. So the NGO dodged, balancing on the fine line of the budget between the size of the army and the level of training. Hence the territorial divisions, and the attempt to make a rifle division with a staffing of less than 10000 people, and the "tankization" of the army.

[Vladimir61]

Many historians and authors of memoirs write based on only one of the intelligence structures. Only analysis of intelligence from the entire intelligence community of the Red Army, the Navy, the NKVD-NKGB, the border troops and the Foreign Ministry can give truth.
Most likely, such an analysis has been done long ago, but it is not for wide publicity, since many materials will have a corresponding signature stamp for a long time.

[Ross xnumx]

Mistakes, miscalculations, mistakes ... You tell Zhukov this ...
Lack of strategy and strategists themselves. Are you familiar with this table?

The top leadership of the Red Army was preparing (or was it ready?) To wage a past war. What experience did the newly appointed commanders and chiefs have? Perhaps you will recall that it was thanks to some strategists that we had to counter tank cavalry wedges.
The absence of a deeply echeloned defense and (MOST IMPORTANT !!!) command and control of the troops, coupled with the effect of surprise (this is when the attacker hit you with a club on the head from behind) gave exactly such results.
You write that the grandfathers told that the replenishment did not know how to shoot? Didn't your grandfathers tell you that the replenishment did not know how to write or read? It is one thing to teach a child, another - an adult who does not even have the basics of education. In the first grade, I read 40-50 words per minute fluently, and my grandfather (not my own - my grandmother's second husband) read a story in the "Roman-Gazeta" in a week, and my grandmother, born in 1916, could only sign a statement and could read the names of products on labels and price tags.
The defeat in the first months of the Second World War was strategic miscalculations and self-confidence of the country's leadership, the absence of experienced commanders of various levels in the army. There were facts of the presence in parts of equipment (tanks, aircraft) without fuel and ammunition. But you should not dump everything in one heap. From the height of today, we will not see a complete analysis of the mistakes of the past.
It should be noted that the losses of Soviet prisoners of war and civilians of the USSR were higher than in Germany and its allies, which itself speaks for what purpose and against whom Hitler fought.

[svp67]

Quote: ROSS 42

Errors, miscalculations, misses ...

Sorry, but they are in your comment.

Quote: ROSS 42

What experience did the newly appointed commanders and chiefs have?

All of them were participants in some kind of pre-war armed conflict and distinguished themselves there. And what better experience could be gained at this time?

Quote: ROSS 42

Perhaps you will recall that it was thanks to some strategists that we had to oppose cavalry with tank wedges.

Can you name the names of these "some" and what did they suggest?

Quote: ROSS 42

Lack of defense in depth

Sorry, but this is your personal nonsense.

Quote: ROSS 42

And grandfathers did not tell you that the replenishment could not write or read?

??????? All polls? Well, what kind of nonsense are you saying here? according to the census of the 1939 year in the USSR for 1000 residents, people with higher education - 6,4, people with secondary general education - 77,8, literate, 9 years and older - 812 ... Where did you get your data from?

Quote: ROSS 42

There were facts of the presence in parts of equipment (tanks, aircraft) without fuel and ammunition.

Can I have examples? Well, to understand what this is about

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: svp67

All of them were participants in some kind of pre-war armed conflict and distinguished themselves there.

Yes, you’re right, but participating in the conflict they held positions, for example, brigade commander, and before the war, having jumped through several posts, they became a com.district or higher (Pavlov, Rychagov) Well, this is not done either.

Quote: svp67

All polls? Well, what kind of nonsense are you saying here? according to the 1939 census in the USSR

I will not say about literacy (read, write), although the censuses of those years are definitely not worth believing (the ability to distinguish the letter "a" from the letter "b" is, after all, not literacy in the volume that is necessary to comprehend the text), yes it is and does not affect the ability to shoot a rifle, but technical illiteracy was rampant, if most of the SVT could not be mastered.

[strannik1985]

How is it done? The army from 1932 to 1941 grew in number 7. Is it better to leave a vacant place?

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: strannik1985

Is it better to leave a vacant place?

I think it is better to plan more graduates of military schools and academies and shoot them less. And why such a hasty increase in the army, an unprepared army, I will note. IN AND. How did Lenin teach? "Less is better!" So they beat us with a smaller number of trained, a larger number of untrained.

Quote: strannik1985

The army from 1932 to 1941 grew in number 7.

and how many times has the German army grown since 1933?

[strannik1985]

Because until 1937-1938 the main adversary was a qualitatively different coalition of the countries of the so-called Little Entente with financial and military-technical assistance from France and England. The Red Army was exactly what the budget allowed, for example, for January 1935 personnel rifle divisions (in the state of peacetime 5600 ~ 6300 people) there were only 14 pieces, the rest were mixed, territorial, and collective-farm.
When comparing the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, they somehow forget that the budget and the quality of the economies were not comparable.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: strannik1985

Because until 1937-1938 the main adversary was a qualitatively different coalition of the countries of the so-called Little Entente with financial and military-technical assistance from France and England.

Wehrmacht development is a mirror image of the development of the Red Army, only in an accelerated format. The enemy was the same for Germany

Quote: strannik1985

coalition of countries of the so-called Little Entente

because it was they who were bound by mutual assistance agreements between themselves and the land. claimed by Germany, were appropriated by this coalition.

[strannik1985]

No, the main adversary was France and Poland. The Germans budget grew from 3300 million in 1934 to 15500 million marks in 1938. Moreover, in 1939-1941, the times of greatest success, they always started b / d first.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: strannik1985

No, the main adversary was France and Poland.

Is France not included in the so-called Little Entente, wasn’t it bound by treaties with Great Britain and Poland, as well as those among themselves?

[strannik1985]

Not included, but was bound by military treaties. More precisely, to speak as about the countries of the so-called "cordon sanitaire". With the difference that the USSR did not have a common border with France, but Germany had such a border.

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "So they beat us with a smaller number of trained, a larger number of untrained."
At 41 in the summer, we were a minority.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

At 41 in the summer, we were a minority.

??

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "??? [/ quote]"
Yes .. yes, just Rezun need to read less.)))

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

Yes, just Rezun need to read less.

Rezun is the editor of the Russian newspaper ???
Data from there: tanks and self-propelled guns: we have 15678, they have 6292 + 409 among the stellites; aircraft: 24488 vs 6852 + 496; artillery: 117587 vs 88251 + 6673; l / s 5774211 vs 7239000 + 869900

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "Data from there: tanks and self-propelled guns:"
On the western border of our infantry was 3 million 200 thousand, the enemy had 4 million 300 thousand. That is what I was talking about. I took it there in the Russian newspaper.))) We were in the minority.))) And if you take the whole army, that is, the numbers that you represented the enemy’s superiority in manpower will be even greater. It makes sense to compare not the amount of equipment, but the units themselves. The German divisions were twice as large as ours. In addition to 76 mm guns, they even had 152 mm howitzers in the infantry regiments. And we only have regimental 76 mm and 45 mm guns. Etc.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

On the western border of our infantry was 3 million 200 thousand, the enemy had 4 million 300 thousand.

so the infantry, the British, for example in Africa and Asia, the name machine guns and cannons, defeated the natives, armed with small arms at a ratio of forces 1:10. A. Suvorov said, I remember, "they fight not by numbers, but by skill." With a skilful leadership, with such an advantage in tanks, aircraft and artillery, the Germans could, if not roll out, then inflict incomparable losses on them.

Quote: Nagaibak

The German divisions were twice as large as ours.

but what prevents two from being put up against one enemy division?

Quote: Nagaibak

In addition to 76 mm guns, they even had 152 mm howitzers in the infantry regiments.

Super! As many as two !!! With air supremacy, these two whole howitzers are rolled into scrap metal.

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "so it is infantry"
Tank units, artillery without infantry zero complete. It is strange that you have to explain it to you.
Pedrodepakes "Super! As many as two !!!"
Yes ...))) two 152 mm.))) This only means that their infantry regiment had a numerical superiority over ours. Under all equal conditions, their regiment was rolling against our regiment, our regiment was damn. They also have more machine guns ... Two 152 mm howitzers allowed the German commander of the regiment to solve their problems without asking for support from the division artillery. What kind of domination in the air are you talking about? I don’t know.)))

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

Tank units, artillery without infantry zero complete. It is strange that you have to explain it to you.

and who is talking about "throwing tanks without infantry into battle"? But this is exactly what the commanders of the Red Army did, from the inability to control the troops, that's exactly what I'm talking about

Quote: Nagaibak

All things being equal, their regiment was rolling against our regiment, our regiment was damn.

This is if a regiment to a regiment in an airless space, but they don't fight like that (but, unfortunately, in 41st and 42nd, we fought like that), the regiment is always covered by both art and aviation, of which we had at the beginning of the war more than the Germans. Another thing is that our commanders could not coordinate this. I read about the war in France, well-equipped defensive fortifications, artillery support, tanks at the starting point (powerful Somua, the Germans could not oppose anything against them), but birds called "shtukas" and kirdyk french fighters fly in, the German infantry only has to run to the destroyed fortifications and take the demoralized French prisoners. They also fought with us in 41st.

Quote: Nagaibak

What kind of domination in the air are you talking about? I don’t know.

It is acquired over the site of the alleged battle, the Germans did it well, with fewer planes, which I’m talking about.

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "But this is exactly what the commanders of the Red Army did, from the inability to control the troops, I am just talking about this"
This was due to the fact that the mechanized corps created on the eve of the war had, so to say, the crude design of the infantry formations trained to act together with tank units was scarce. All corrected during the war as you said in blood. The French also had enough tanks, but they also had mistakes in military planning, they also could not correctly use the tank units. Note that they did not have repressions at all. You take the German tank divisions, corps, etc. and compare with ours, the French ... you know, an amusing business. Just compare everything down to the number of tractors, infantry regiments, artillery trucks and everything will be clear.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

Just compare everything down to the number of tractors, infantry regiments, artillery trucks and everything will be clear.

and what will we come to? The Germans in the minority beat the majority as a result of their well-functioning military machine.

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "and where are we going? Germans in the minority beat the majority as a result of their well-oiled war machine."
They were not in the minority.))) (The number of troops was greater and this allowed them to create an advantage in the direction of the main strikes. They had a surprise plus an army mobilized. They beat us in parts. Ours were in the minority. Even the defense in the fortified areas raised by alarm our troops did not save our combat-ready divisions.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

The number of troops was greater and this allowed them to create an advantage in the direction of the main strikes.

here is the second part of your proposal right to the point, the art of command and control and the talent of a military leader is precisely what

Quote: Nagaibak

create an advantage in the direction of the main blows.

Our defenses were smeared along the entire front line, tanks and aviation as well, while the Fritzes created a shock fist with a concentration of tanks and artillery, and beforehand some kind of geshwader of the "green ..." type, "flying circus" or "funny guys" flew in. and swept away rare "red falcons" from the sky, well, then a rout or a cauldron.

[Nagaibak]

"Pedrodepakes" here is the second part of your proposal right to the point. "
If you have 3 million and I have 4 million soldiers, I’ll create an advantage anywhere ..))) (Given the German organizational structures.) And you won’t stop me even having seven spans in your forehead. Do you remember the strategic games in the Red Army before the war. Zhukov played for the Germans. Remember the result?)))

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

If you have 3 million and I have 4 million soldiers, I’ll create an edge anywhere ..

given the logistics in the USSR, it was problematic for them, but it’s much easier for us. And I will repeat once again that a bunch of infantry under shelling or an air raid (continuous) is a crowd of demoralized people. This is what the Germans achieved by concentrating equipment on the points of strikes, not being afraid to expose other sectors of the front, in contrast to the Red Army commanders, who spread tanks and aircraft around the front.

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "considering the logistics on the territory of the USSR, it was problematic for them, but it was much easier for us."
With the transfer of technology, the Germans were fine. Where they wanted to go there and transferred. Especially in the early days of the war in Poland, everything was normal with logistics. Nobody fought a bunch of infantry. The Germans in the tank division had two regiments each with panzergrenadiers. Conventional divisions were also full of anti-tank weapons. Attacks of Soviet tanks on German infantry ended badly. In that situation, the repressed military leaders would also be unable to do anything. I’m talking about this.

[svp67]

Quote: Pedrodepackes

Well, just not done.

Of course, there is little good, but do not forget that the Red Army greatly increased both its numerical and qualitative composition at that time, so there were a lot of commanders, and everyone understood the proximity of the outbreak of war, so wait until we see the commanders gradually growing up to these posts and having relevant experience simply did not exist. They appointed those whom they considered worthy from among those who had already shown themselves positively on the battlefield. There was simply no other place to take

Quote: Pedrodepackes

but technical illiteracy was rampant, if SVT in the majority could not be mastered.

And what did you want from the PEASANT country, which was just becoming INDUSTRIAL. Technical literacy has been developed over the years.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: svp67

The Red Army greatly increased both its numerical and qualitative composition at this time, so that many commanders were required,

so I repeat my question: how many times did the German army increase over the same period? Where did the commanders come from?

Quote: svp67

And what did you want from the PEASANT country,

Yes, I don’t want anything, I just give a fact, although the same peasants in Germany or US farmers knew the technique, and after all, many of them have never even been to a large city.

[svp67]

Quote: Pedrodepackes

so I repeat my question: how many times did the German army increase over the same period? Where did the commanders come from?

It remains to clarify the period

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: svp67

It remains to clarify the period

it remains to carefully read the entire correspondence, but, as I understand it, you do not have time for this nonsense. We take the corresponding period from 1933 to 1939

[svp67]

Quote: Pedrodepackes

The period we take the corresponding from 1933 to 1939 years

And what do you want to say that if in 1939, on the territory of the same Poland, there were a direct clash between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, then it would be horror-horror for us ... No, something tells me that at that time and on on such a narrow front, everything was not so sad for us and rosy for the Germans. Take, for example, the qualitative composition of the troops. That there, that there they had almost the same level of training and equipment, for one thing. During the company in Poland, the Wehrmacht used up almost all available stocks of bombs and heavy shells, as the "German geniuses" did not calculate this issue.
So in 1939, we had a chance to compete on an equal footing with the Wehrmacht.
But by the 1941 year there was a strong qualitative gap between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht, which has rich combat experience, with proven modern tactics and strategy, is a force equipped with enough weapons and material means, and the Red Army, alas, having good equipment, didn’t have such experience, and besides, in terms of strategy and training, it lost a lot to the Wehrmacht .
Why did it happen? Now it’s easy for us to talk about it, looking from the height of the past tense, but is it worth it to blame our ancestors so much? I do not think so. After all, not only they, but also the soldiers of France and England living in more comfortable conditions, could not see the qualitative changes that the Germans made in military affairs. How are they the victors in the WWI, the ancestors of tank breakthroughs and the skilled aces of air battles, missed these changes?

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: svp67

And what do you want to say that if in 1939

you are somewhere in the wrong place, firstly, "if only, if only" I do not consider; secondly, we are talking about very specific periods of time and facts.

Quote: svp67

in terms of strategy and training, the Wehrmacht was greatly lost.

this is precisely what this is all about, although the Red Army has always fought since the civil war: the CER, Spain, Hassan, Khalkhin-Gol, China, Finland ... it’s another matter that experience did not accumulate, but left with the repressed commanders. And then, fools learn from their mistakes, and smart ones learn from strangers. Who prevented our generals from generalizing the Wehrmacht’s experience, after all, there was a dress rehearsal in Finnish, which showed a complete inability to control the troops.

[svp67]

Quote: Pedrodepackes

we are talking about very specific times and facts

Well, if so, then the number of Wehrmacht for this period increased from 100 000 (Reichsweer number) to 3 737 000 people and this is without the Luftwaffe
RKKA from 880 000 to 2 000 000 people, including the Air Force

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: svp67

the number of the Wehrmacht during this period increased from 100 (the number of Reichswehr) to 000 people

this I know, the essence of the question, where did they get so many sensible and trained commanders?

[svp67]

Quote: Pedrodepackes

this I know, the essence of the question, where did they get so many sensible and trained commanders?

Well, they don’t hide it now .. This is from the book of B. MULLER-HILLEBRAND
GERMANY LAND ARMY 1933 — 1945

“The training of the required number of officers was especially difficult. As a result of the sharp increase in the number of military units of the ground army, a large shortage of officers was formed. About 200 highly qualified officers were transferred to the air force.
The creation of new military schools and courses, the staffing of numerous new command agencies, the bodies in charge of recruiting and staffing, the organs of the military economy, the engineer-sapper units of fortified areas, and, finally, the increasing need of the OKH - all this absorbed a large number of officers.
A small contingent consisting of 3600 officers of the Reichswehr Army (without taking into account about 400 officers of the sanitary, veterinary and
artillery and technical services), could not satisfy the increased demand for
officer cadres. Therefore, the following activities were carried out:
1. The maximum possible number of candidates for officers was selected. Everything
the young soldiers who seemed fit were enlisted as officers, even though they did not have the required matriculation certificate. If before 1933, young people were annually enlisted as candidates for 180-200 officers, then this number soon increased to 500, and in 1938. - up to 2 thousand
2. About 300 legal service candidates who, due to their large
overproduction had few prospects for use in the specialty, in
after a short course of training in a special program, the candidates for officers were enlisted by the Minister of Justice.
3. The non-commissioned officers of the Reichswehr army, who met the requirements, were admitted to officer posts, and due to the high level of training in the Reichswehr units, they turned out to be particularly valuable officers. About 1500 officers were obtained in this way. This measure, however, exacerbated the lack of non-commissioned officers.
4. About 2500 officers were taken from the police.
5. Former officers of the old Imperial Army and the Reichswehr were again called up for service. They were used either in military service, or if their physical condition did not allow them to serve in the ranks, in staffing agencies, in the military-economic service, and in certain positions of the Ministry of War.
In the same way, a large number of reserve officers were used. This event gave an extra about 1800 officers.
6. The inclusion of the Austrian army in 1938 yielded about 1600 officers.
7. Requirements when deciding on the dismissal of an officer in connection with the service
mismatch were reduced.
The above measures led to a very significant change in the composition of the entire officer corps, which must be borne in mind when considering further developments. A certain part of the officers obtained as a result of the above measures was at first a significant burden, since it was necessary to organize numerous new courses or expand existing ones in order to give the newly hired officers the necessary level of training. Despite all these measures, soon thousands of officer posts were again unsubstituted, as a result of which the available number of officers very often turned out to be heavily overloaded, which affected their further training.
Similar difficulties were with staffing services.
sanitary, veterinary and artillery supplies.
The need for non-commissioned officers was to be covered by professional soldiers from the Reichswehr army. In addition, with the inclusion in the 1935 of the land police in the army, the non-commissioned officers were replenished with new personnel that corresponded to their appointment.
Finally, a brisk influx of volunteers helped cover shortfalls in non-commissioned officers. However, the staffing appropriate for their appointment and experienced non-commissioned officers remained far from complete.
The shortage of rank and file was replenished by volunteers and conscripts. "

[Pedrodepackes]

you see, they solved the problem, without repression and purges, and by the beginning of the 40’s they had an efficient army

[svp67]

Quote: Pedrodepackes

you see, they solved the problem, without repression and purges, and by the beginning of the 40’s they had an efficient army

Well, no, here you are wrong, people with pro-communist views were "cleaned up" and "repressed"

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: svp67

people with pro-communist views and "cleaned up" and "repressed"

here you are right, I do not argue with this, but the question is in the quantity and in the validity of the repressions. For the three pre-war years in the Red Army, four Air Force commanders were replaced, all turned out to be spies.

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "Who prevented our military leaders from generalizing."
As a result of the Finnish war, experience was generalized. Conclusions have been made. The leadership of the USSR was well aware of the state of the Red Army. Read materials on the results of the Finnish war with the participation of Stalin.

[Vladimir61]

Quote: Nagaibak

As a result of the Finnish war, experience was generalized. Conclusions have been made. The leadership of the USSR perfectly understood the state of the Red Army

But we didn’t have time to fully cure all that the lessons of the Finnish war had given us!

[Nagaibak]

Vladimir61 "Only we did not have time to fully heal all that we were given by the lessons of the Finnish war!"
Reading some dumb-headed comments, one would think that if the Red Army didn’t be repressed, the Germans would immediately drive the Germans with a filthy broom.))) Repressions were not the main reason for the Red Army’s defeat in the summer of 1941. They were one of many reasons and far from the most important. I can imagine how the geniuses of military affairs Tukhachevsky, Blucher, and some sort of Uborevich led.

[Vladimir61]

Quote: Nagaibak

Reading some dumb-headed comments, one would think that if the Red Army had not been repressed, they would immediately drive the Germans out with a filthy broom.

Did you see this in my comment?
According to the Finnish results, programs were developed for the regular reorganization of the Red Army, combat readiness and training systems. But, by the beginning of the Second World War it was not possible to complete it fully. Which was one of the reasons for the heavy defeats and huge casualties at the beginning of the war.
It was after the Finnish that the organizational and staffing levels of the units were revised, new posts were introduced, and the need to increase automatic weapons, mortars, and communications equipment was recognized. We drew attention to weak military intelligence, the interaction of headquarters, rifle units with aviation, and so on.
But, no time ... What's wrong?

[Nagaibak]

Vladimir61 "Did you see it in my commentary?"
I didn’t mean you. What you wrote about was mentioned by Stalin at the meeting. All right. The main thing we were foreshadowed in the deployment and surprise. Everything else is attached: repression and other. By the way, there were ski-skiers near Moscow, right from the experience of the Finnish campaign. What did not have time? They didn’t have time to create new officer cadres and couldn’t make it. (Meaning new ... new generation: competent, trained, dedicated and so on) Stalin spoke about this at the meeting as well.

[Vladimir61]

Quote: Nagaibak

The main thing we were foreshadowed in the deployment and surprise.

Yes, all sources said that there would be an attack! They knew about the deployment of the Wehrmacht's forces and equipment, they knew about reconnaissance flights over our territory, about provocations on the borders, about the activation of undercover reconnaissance in the border zone, about the deployment of sabotage groups. Everyone knew! But is it really possible, within three hours, after the well-known directive, to bring the troops into full combat readiness - to get ammunition, move forward, take up defenses, disperse aviation, take out warehouses, etc., this is described quite fully in the memoirs of those who exactly and should have shouted "It's time". But, everyone thought about their ass, because the top didn’t want to, and the bottom didn’t.
In some part, indeed, the repressions that took place in the Red Army gave their fruits.

[Nagaibak]

Vladimir61 "In some part, the repressions that took place in the Red Army really gave their fruits."
They added and worsened, exacerbated our bad situation in 41, but I agree with that. I think Tukhachevsky, Uborevich and others would not be able to do anything in that situation.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

Conclusions have been made. The leadership of the USSR was well aware of the state of the Red Army.

and??? We stepped on the same rake, again the lack of control in the troops, again the boilers and the inability to unlock them. The Germans did not sit anywhere in the boilers before the attack on the USSR, but the troops encircled by the Red Army both supplied and unblocked them once or twice. In Stalingrad, just did not work.

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "The Germans did not sit in boilers anywhere before the attack on the USSR."
And where was they sitting there?))) In Poland?))) Do you think in all seriousness that leave Stalin those commanders who were repressed and that’s all. The war would have gone differently?)))

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

And where did they sit there?))) In Poland?)))

Do you think that Poland was easy for them? Kösselring or someone of his level wrote something like this: "after the end of the war in Poland, we were left with 30% of ammunition and the military spirit in the units fell by 50%" The ability to manage troops is the main strong point of the Wehrmacht

Quote: Nagaibak

Do you think in all seriousness that leave Stalin those commanders who were repressed and all. Would war go differently?

I don’t know, we didn’t have any sensible commanders at the beginning of the war, all of them subsequently studied on soldier’s blood in the 41-42th years, which they write about in their memoirs. We are not seers talking about what was not. But destroying the commanders who had experienced wars in Spain, Khalkhin Gol, Finland, China, they certainly did not strengthen the Red Army. At least the captains, commanders of the regiments and majors in the posts of divisional forces obviously did not bring us closer to victory.

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "But having destroyed the commanders who had experience of wars in Spain, Khalkhin-gol, Finland, China, they definitely did not strengthen the Red Army."
And how many of those commanders with such experience were repressed? They would have learned from blood in the same way, because the hostilities you mentioned cannot be compared with the German invasion. Well. and Poland ... From wiki ... "According to modern estimates, during the hostilities in September 1939, the Polish army lost 66 thousand soldiers killed, 133 wounded and about 700 thousand prisoners [400]. The losses of the German army amounted to about 3 thousand killed and missing, 14 tanks and armored vehicles, 319 guns and mortars, 195 11 cars and motorcycles "Is this a scale?))) The Poles did not have a single tank division.)))

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

Is it really a scale?

and nevertheless, the Germans fiddled there and, most importantly, learned and there was a march in France, but after Finland we did not learn lessons after Khalkhin Gol either. And got the 41st year

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "and nevertheless, the Germans fiddled there and, most importantly, learned their lessons and there was a march across France."
The Germans in Poland had some rough edges, but they overcame them. This is true.))) If we had not Khalkhin Gola and Finland, our situation would have been much worse. According to the results of the war with the Finns, measures were taken aimed at increasing the combat readiness of the troops.
Stalin's findings were as follows:
1. In modern warfare, artillery is God, judging by artillery. Anyone who wants to reorganize in a new modern way must understand - artillery decides the fate of the war, mass artillery ....... As the Finnish soldiers write, they could not sleep enough for 4 months, only slept well on the day of the armistice. That's what artillery means. Artillery is the first thing.
2. The second - aviation, mass aviation, not hundreds, but thousands of planes. More shells, more ammunition to give, less people will be lost. If you spare the ammo and shells, there will be more losses. You have to choose. Give more shells and ammunition, or spare your army, save strength, give a minimum of killed, or spare no bombs, shells.
3. Next - tanks, the third, also decisive, mass tanks are needed, not hundreds, but thousands.
4. Mortars - fourth, there is no modern war without mortars, mass mortars. All corps, all companies, battalions, regiments must have 6-inch mortars necessarily, 8-inch mortars. This is a terrible need for modern warfare. These are very effective mortars and very cheap artillery.
5. Next is the automation of hand weapons. There is still debate: do we need self-loading rifles with a ten-shot magazine? People who live the traditions of the civil war are fools, although they are good people when they say: why do we need a self-loading rifle? So - infantry, hand weapons with a semi-automatic rifle and automatic pistol - are required.
6. Further. Creation of a cultural, qualified and educated command staff. We do not have such command staff or there are units. We are talking about a combined arms commander. He must give assignments, that is, lead the aviation, artillery, tanks, tank brigade, mortar men; but if he does not have at least a general idea of ​​this kind of weapon, what instructions can he give? The current combined arms commander is not the commander of the old era of the Civil War.
7. Further. Well-knit and skillfully working headquarters are required. Until recently, they said that such and such a commander failed, a hat, it was necessary to headquarters.
I cited excerpts. I think at the top everyone understood. And they did a lot for defense. But not everyone was in time. Or could not have time at all. (This is me about the frames)

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

According to the results of the war with the Finns, measures were taken aimed at increasing the combat readiness of the troops.

up to the fourth point, again, emphasis on mass, well, we riveted tanks and planes twice as many as the Germans, did this help? Without troop control, this is all scrap, and in the worst case, trophies for the enemy. This whole plan is good in itself, but it all remained on paper. For example, mortars, weapons are cheaper than SVD, and they were sorely lacking in the war. AND

Quote: Nagaibak

Creation of a cultural, qualified and educated command staff.

Quote: Nagaibak

well-knit and skillfully working headquarters

who prevented them from creating since the formation of the Red Army? Or were they not needed?

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "who prevented their creation from the very moment of the formation of the Red Army? Or were they not needed?"
You read the speech of Stalin on the results of the Finnish war. it says a lot. In the internet it is. And about the headquarters.
2. Regarding the mass, it certainly helped. There were so many riveted 76 mm guns that they were enough for secondary divisions, which formed and entered into battle. Rifles might be missing somewhere, but there were enough divisional guns.
3 ". What prevented our army from quickly rebuilding and adapting to conditions on the move, not preparing for a walk, but for a serious war? What prevented our command staff from rebuilding to wage war not in the old way, but in a new way? After all, keep in mind that during the entire existence of Soviet power we have not yet fought a real modern war. Small episodes in Manchuria, near Lake Khasan or in Mongolia are nonsense, this is not a war - these are isolated episodes on a strictly limited patch. Japan was afraid to start a war, we too They did not want this, and some test of strength on the patch showed that Japan had failed. They had 2-3 divisions and we have 2-3 divisions in Mongolia, the same number on Hasan. Our army has not yet waged a real, serious war. Civil war - this is not a real war, because it was a war without artillery, without aviation, without tanks, without mortars. Without all this, what kind of serious war is it? It was a special war, not modern.
4. About headquarters. To whom is this question?)))
In 1923, it was transformed into the PBC of the USSR. The chiefs of staff of the Red Army were:
P.P. Lebedev (February 1921 - April 1924),
M.V. Frunze (April 1924 - January 1925),
S. S. Kamenev (February - November 1925),
M.N. Tukhachevsky (November 1925 - May 1928),
B. M. Shaposhnikov (May 1928 - June 1931),
A.I. Egorov (June 1931 - September 1935).
September 22, 1935 The headquarters of the Red Army was renamed the General Staff of the Red Army. The chiefs of the General Staff were:
A. I. Egorov (September 1935 - May 1937),
B. M. Shaposhnikov (May 1937 - August 1940),
K. A. Meretskov (August 1940 - January 1941),
G.K. Zhukov (January - July 1941).
During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45, the General Staff was the main body of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command for strategic planning and leadership of the armed forces on the fronts.
The chiefs of the General Staff of the Union Armed Forces were:
B. M. Shaposhnikov (July 1941 - May 1942),
A.M. Vasilevsky (May 1942 - February 1945),
A.I. Antonov (since February 1945).
By the way, Stalin was not omnipotent and he had to prove and explain something. "Where did all these conversations come from? Conversations were conducted not only there, conversations were conducted here as well. Civilians - me, Molotov - found something on military issues. Non-military people specially argued with the heads of the military departments, argued them over and forced them to admit that we were waging a modern war with the Finns, who are taught modern warfare by three states: taught by Germany, taught by France, taught by England. To take a modern war in the presence of fortified areas and at the same time raise the question of whether that only at targets it is necessary to shoot - it means utter wisdom. "

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

You read the speech of Stalin on the results of the Finnish war. it says a lot.

Yes, everyone is strong in hindsight, only no one thinks about the future.

Quote: Nagaibak

There were so many riveted 76 mm guns that they were enough for second-priority divisions

where were they in the 42nd, according to the memoirs of veterans, they fought all year without artillery support, I’m silent about aviation

Quote: Nagaibak

Our army has not waged a real, serious war

and the Germans were?

Quote: Nagaibak

About headquarters. To whom is this question?

no one else, the war has passed and its results are not very comforting

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "Yes, everyone is strong in hindsight, but nobody thinks about the future."
Well, you also argue after the fact.))) Everyone imagines himself ....
"Pedrodepakes" where were they in 42, according to the recollections of the veterans, they fought all year without artillery support, I am already silent about aviation. "
Memories of veterans are a peculiar thing. Among them is one rifle for five and so on. You’ll start to figure it out, it turns out that the man in the wagon train fought the whole war.))) We need to look, now there is a lot of data where there was how much equipment. There is nothing worth summarizing here.
Pedrodepakes "Did the Germans lead?"
1. The Germans in the first world run-in tactics of assault groups. The Germans battle squad was built around a machine gun. This is also from the first world. Our tsarist officers (junior and middle) were also inferior to German officers in tactical training and literacy even then.)))
2. The Germans had experience of major offensive operations. Poland, France. We had nothing of the kind even close.
3. About headquarters your question. My opinion is as follows. If Stalin had not worked on mistakes after the Finnish war, the result would have been much worse. The emphasis on mass, the accumulation of reserves have done their job. As I understand it, before the Finnish war, there were really no mortars in our troops. And the commanders .... well, the screenings take place during the war. It has always been so and it will be so.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

You begin to understand it turns out the man in the wagon train fought the whole war.

it also happens, but there are other cases, now, for example, I am reading "Vanka of the company" by A. Shumilin. Here are some more indirect ones, through all our films about the Second World War until 43, the theme of the unpunished bombing of our troops runs through the canvas. Where are our "red falcons" there? And the Soviet Union had much more aviation.

Quote: Nagaibak

The Germans in the first world run-in tactics

In World War I we had experience, there were whole shock armies, in Spain there was a full-fledged war, for some reason the Germans generalized and saved the experience, and ours were all shot.

Quote: Nagaibak

Our tsarist officers (junior and middle) were also inferior to German in tactical training and literacy

nonsense, right there in VO a whole series of articles about the First World War, were not our fools

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "Where are our" red falcons "there? And the USSR had much more aviation."
1.Our aircraft, by the way, in the early days of the war fought well. At 41 near Moscow, aviation superiority was on our side. The Germans did not really shine.
2. In addition to the Brusilovsky breakthrough, there is nothing to note. Well, they called the army shock. Did they have major successes?
3. "During the entire war, 1811 specialists were sent to Spain, including 772 aviators, 351 tank crews, 222 general military advisers and instructors, 77 naval sailors, more than 150 various other military specialists, 130 workers and engineers of aircraft factories, 156 signalmen , 204 translators. At the same time, more than 600-800 Soviet advisers and specialists have never been in Spain. 127 Soviet advisers and specialists died in battles, 11 died of wounds, 32 were missing, 19 people died in accidents. "
Why are you writing to all shot?))) Which of them was shot? Of the Heroes of the Soviet Union of Tankers 17, only Pavlov was shot and then in 41. Of the Heroes of the Soviet Union of pilots, about 60 people were shot 3-Smushkevich, Levers and Blacks also in 41 years .. Kopets shot himself. The rest either died in a disaster or in battle (Spain or the Second World War), and many of the pilots survived to victory. Tankers have Heroes mostly posthumously. Maybe someone forgot, but that does not change the overall picture. ALL NO ONE SHOT.))))
4. I did not call fools of tsarist officers. But staffing quickly knocked out. And wartime officers studied everything at the front with blood as you like to say.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

Our aircraft, by the way, in the early days of the war fought well

Ok, how's that? They flew, shot down, yes, but the Germans dominated the air

Quote: Nagaibak

At 41 near Moscow, aviation superiority was on our side.

A well-known fact, but here weather conditions played a role. they couldn’t take off simply because of the thickening of synthetic lubricants, they were not ready for the chances of war in such conditions

Quote: Nagaibak

Well, they called the army shock. Did they have major successes?

and the German attack aircraft were major successes? The war was a positional one, local battles. But we are not about success, but about tactics of using troops, are we?

Quote: Nagaibak

For the entire time of the war, 1811 specialists were sent to Spain

Nope

2065 citizens of the USSR took part

Quote: Nagaibak

Which of them was shot?

in your presentation you did not write Stern, but this is one of the major leaders, but if you look at the lists of repressed commanders of the rank of regiment-division-brigade, then many and not only "Spaniards"

Quote: Nagaibak

write to all shot?

I wrote

all under execution

, figuratively speaking, I meant repression in general.

Quote: Nagaibak

And wartime officers studied everything at the front with blood

no matter how they studied, the main thing that they were taught, the Germans also did not learn from books.
On this I want to finish chewing on this chewing gum, we each have our own vision of the past history, on this I say goodbye.

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "How good is that? We flew, shot down, yes, but the Germans had air supremacy."
1.A few days, our Air Force fought for air supremacy, and quite actively, but the general background, retreat, and so on did their job.
Pedrodepakes "is a well-known fact, but weather conditions played a role here."
2. Not only weather conditions. In Moscow there was a powerful air defense. A lot of aviation was concentrated, there are figures on this matter, they are published.
3.Pedrodepakes "Did the German attack aircraft have major successes?"
Of course, the German attack aircraft were major successes then. For example, at the Battle of Cambrai they recaptured the territory captured by tanks.))) Much has been written about it and there is no need to talk about it.
4. Yes, I missed Stern.))) But of course I would have won in June 1941.))) You do not give your numbers for Spain but it doesn’t matter. The fact is that you most likely do not have numbers, so we have a discussion in general terms)))). If there were no repressions, those commanders as you write with experience would also study on soldier's blood and be good students ... is a very big question. Because our defeat in the summer of 41 years has a lot of reasons. Of which the repression was concomitant. The value of repression is exaggerated very much, as well as the number of repressed.

[Nagaibak]

Nagaybak "where were they in 42, according to the recollections of veterans, they fought all year without artillery support, I am already silent about aviation."
We talk in general and about nothing.)))
G.F.Krivosheev (edited). Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XNUMXth century: Losses of the armed forces.
There are tables on the losses of everything and everything. From pistols to ships. There is data on artillery by caliber divided. How much came, how much was, how much was lost. How much lost in percentage. Table No. 186. And there it is painted over the years. The largest losses from anti-tank artillery. In general, this book is with factual material. If you haven’t read it, I recommend it.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

There is data on artillery by caliber divided. How much has arrived

you know, it was smooth on paper, but forgot about the ravines. Could do as much as desired, and then be stored in warehouses or rolled by rail, and on the way get under the bombing and not reach, but they were not on the front end. Here is on paper, but where necessary - no. In our tanks, planes and artillery, what was the advantage in the 41st, and why did they retreat to Moscow and Stalingrad? Well, in general, our you

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "It could have been received as much as necessary, and then stored in warehouses or rolled by rail." It also indicates the number of retired vehicles, destroyed, lost)))) in battles))) do you understand?))))

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

It also indicates the number of retired equipment, destroyed, lost)))) in battles

the fact that we lost a lot is known, and we’re talking about the delivered

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "what we have lost is known, but we are about the delivered"
What does delivered mean?))) It says this: The presence, receipt and loss of weapons and equipment (according to the years of the war). The arrival of equipment does not mean delivered equipment?))) For example, field artillery consisted of 01.01.42 thousand barrels on 18,9/30,1/49,0. Received during the year 12,3. Total resource 42. Losses for the year XNUMX. And so on, in the same way, field artillery is broken down according to the calibers that were in it. On the same points. There are tables. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that talk about the complete absence of artillery is complete nonsense. Moreover, after all, there are documents on the warring units and you can see there how much was enough or not. I admit the loss of guns in conditions of encirclement, retreat, and so on. But talking about the absence of artillery throughout the entire XNUMX years is not true.

[Nagaibak]

1. The data presented in the table are based on the analysis of archival materials of the period of the Great Patriotic War and calculations on them.
2. In the columns: "Consisted of ..." weapons and military equipment are taken into account, including those that were under repair, used up or had a small service life (power reserve, warranty periods of operation of engines of combat vehicles, the level of wear of the channels of the barrels of guns and others ).
3. In the columns: "Received" weapons and military equipment received from industry (production), under lend-lease and after restoration (overhaul) are taken into account. The admission does not include: approx. 43 thousand units small arms, 17,1 thousand guns and mortars, 1,3 thousand tanks, 1,6 thousand aircraft transferred by the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War to equip military formations and parts of Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
4. In the "Losses" columns, combat and non-combat losses are taken into account together. the proportion of non-combat losses is insignificant, except for aviation. Its losses are given: general in the numerator, and combat losses in the denominator.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

The receipt of equipment does not mean delivered equipment?

delivered to? To the rear of the army, to the warehouses of support units, to the front line ???

Quote: Nagaibak

loss of weapons and equipment

again, lost where? When delivered to the front line, on the front line or left during a retreat ??

Quote: Nagaibak

talking about the complete absence of artillery is complete rubbish.

of course nonsense, artillery could not all sink into oblivion, this is precisely the effect of the spreading of forces and units along the entire offensive line. Where all this artillery and aviation was during the retreat from Kharkov to Stalingrad, such a receipt, practically flight (whether someone likes this definition or not) but the 227 order from the 42nd year was not born from scratch, although the 270th order from 41 year was not canceled by anyone. Remember Vasily Terkin:

Can’t tell, can’t describe
What kind of life when in battle
Behind someone else's fire
His artillery.

If things with artillery would develop as we are telling you about the tables here, it would be a routine that we would not recall.
And let's end this

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "delivered where? To the near rear of the army, to the warehouses of support units, to the front line ???"
1. Delivered to the forefront of course. How do you imagine the situation in those days if at least one gun would not fight at the front? Will they be somewhere in warehouses, and not at the front? Or guns in time not delivered to the army? This is a fantasy.)))
Pedrodepakes "again, lost where? On delivery to the front lines, on the front lines, or abandoned on retreat ??"
2. Delivered to the front, where else?)))) If they deliver to the wrong place, the delivery person will be sent to places not so remote.
3. Terkin is certainly good. But, this is not an argument. I know let's say the lack of artillery in the winter of 41-42. During the counterattack near Moscow. Then there was not enough for all sections. guns with a caliber over 100 mm. since a large number of large-caliber artillery was lost in the boilers of the summer of 41. And guns with a caliber of less than 100 mm were available. Therefore, when the German fortifications were stormed, the 45 mm and 76 mm guns could not penetrate the brickwork of the old Russian churches and buildings in which the Germans took refuge. Therefore, there were bloody assaults of the city of Ostrov, the station of Pogost, Yukhnov and so on. But where the command acted decisively and skillfully the assaults were also successful with the artillery that was available. About the spreading of something I will not say something))) this is not a conversation. What was spread where.))) Pay attention to the breakthrough of the German defense on the Lama River. How much and what was transferred to Vlasov. There is an order Zhukov read it. Nobody smeared anything.))) You can parse each operation if desired. And in each case there will be specific mistakes that we and the Germans made. And smearing is a common smeared term and no more. I agree with you. We conclude the conversation. All the best.

[Avior]

In fact, the 1939 and the Finns then hardly defeated ....

[svp67]

Quote: Avior

In fact, the 1939 and the Finns then hardly defeated ....

Actually, they were defeated in 40, and this was largely not the army that entered the war in 1939. Gained experience and was able to change a lot.

[Avior]

So I’m saying, how would the Germans be defeated in 1939 in September if the Finns could not 1939 in winter?

[svp67]

Quote: Avior

So I’m saying, how would the Germans be defeated in 1939 in September if the Finns could not 1939 in winter?

They may not have been able to overcome completely, but they would have been "nailed" for sure. On day 20, the Germans used up almost all of their stock of heavy shells and aerial bombs and what would they have fought with then, but they would have no place to resist, like the Finns, for a defensive line and impassable forests. So, each situation must be approached specifically.

[Avior]

A moot point. In this version, the Poles would have fought on two sides, so that the Red Army would have been a weakening, like the Germans

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: svp67

it was already in many ways the wrong army

the army remained the same, increased the number of military vehicles and equipment (they started the war with the composition of one LenVO), Mannerheim’s line was also stormed in the forehead, they simply increased the amount of artillery. The army does not change in two months, in the Second World War we were not enough for two years to change the army.

[svp67]

Quote: Pedrodepackes

The army does not change in two months, in the Second World War we were not enough for two years to change the army.

Is changing. Tactics has changed, people have gained experience, the system of material and technical support, the supply of the army has changed. The experience was hard but necessary

[Jurkovs]

Quote: Pedrodepackes

how many times did the German army increase over the same period? Where did the commanders come from?

The law on the creation of the Wehrmacht from 1934. Everything is detailed there. Apparently we did not find readers.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Pedrodepackes

so I repeat my question: how many times did the German army increase over the same period? Where did the commanders come from?

Everything is very simple. Firstly, all of their officers who completed the First World War school remained in Germany. They just did not have to run away from the country.
And secondly, the German army after Versailles was limited - only 100 thousand people, but it was precisely those who later would command in different ranks and positions that served in it. There were ordinary commanders of the future. And it was this small army that was taught and prepared as it should. It was small and not very financially expensive, so they could train it as it should.

[Olgovich]

Quote: svp67

literate, 9 years and older - 812.

aha, and the criterion of "literacy" was the ability ... to sign.

from the Russian Pedagogical Encyclopedia (article "Literacy"):

"The elimination of mass illiteracy in the USSR is completed after World War II. The process of becoming fully literate has ended in the late 60s and 70s: the proportion of people with education below the completed primary (including those without education) was among the population of the USSR at the age of 10 years and older in 1959—32,9%,"

[BAI]

??????? All polls? Well, what kind of nonsense are you saying here? according to the census of the 1939 year in the USSR for 1000 residents, people with higher education - 6,4, people with secondary general education - 77,8, literate, 9 years and older - 812 ... Where did you get your data from?

But this is Colonel Katukov - the commander of the 20th TD of the 9th MK why did he write ?:

"The report on the staffing of the 20 division with personnel on 10 March 1941 g .:

2. Secondment from the division rank and file unsuitable for service in tank units and which is the ballast, namely: 499 people unfit for military service, illiterate and illiterate 833 people who were on trial and repressed 478 people. 236 people who do not speak the Russian language, 36 people who are not to be sent to the border troops. Only 2082 people, instead of which to dress people for quality suitable for service in tank units. " [fifteen]

15. TsAMO RF f.131, op. 12980, d. 3, ll.200-205

This despite the fact that, as follows from the report, the illiterate should not be called up to tank units. It is easy to imagine what was happening in the infantry units. I will tell you more - the personnel of the divisions formed in Central Asia hardly spoke Russian, not only that they could read and write.
From the same report:

Natives nat. Republics of non-Russian nationality - 1914 people or 23,2%. Of them do not speak Russian at all - 236 people.

You want to say - Katukov is lying, but statistics are telling the truth?

[Ross xnumx]

Quote: svp67

Can I have examples? Well, to understand what this is about

Full of examples, you just have to look.

Quote: svp67

Sorry, but they are in your comment.

My comments are only general conclusions. Do you, dear sir, know the fate of General Pavlov, the Commander of the Western Front? He even Zhukov (in the film, so that it reached the general public) explained on his fingers (on the map) his past mistakes ...

Quote: svp67

Can you name the names of these "some" and what did they suggest?

Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny ...

Quote: svp67

Sorry, but this is your personal nonsense.

First you look, read, learn thoroughly about backup communication channels, about army depots, about airfields near the border ...

Quote: svp67

??????? All polls? Well, what kind of nonsense are you saying here?

And I wrote somewhere that EVERYTHING PERFECTLY? Are you such a literalist, or did you decide to reason with me? Then - in the archives and study the data of the draft commissions. Don't beat yourself in the chest ... In the mid-sixties, the education of conscripts was far from secondary. Or was it not? Or were you not yet living? It was then that the most "brutal troops" existed - the construction battalion, which (anecdote) was not even given a weapon ...
Don't try to humiliate anyone with your empty comments. Your words do not even hurt me - I know and have seen more than you. As for the census, recording, nitrous oxide and other paper heaps, I will tell you a secret: "In order not to be considered an" enemy of the people "with subsequent organizational conclusions, people wrote exactly the kind of papers that were needed. Today this practice is very it is well applied, because all the "top" managers are former members and circles of the CPSU, whose party card is "lying around somewhere" ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: svp67

??????? All polls? Well, what kind of nonsense are you saying here? according to the census of the 1939 year in the USSR for 1000 residents, people with higher education - 6,4, people with secondary general education - 77,8, literate, 9 years and older - 812 ... Where did you get your data from?

In fact, the problem of low education of draftees in the Red Army was. For example, in 1941 in BTV KOVO 2/3 of privates had only primary education. And what about the most filthy - and 1/3 of the junior command personnel too. That is, a third of those who were supposed to drive military wisdom into the heads of the new draft did not have basic knowledge for this.

[strannik1985]

There is a nuance to the decision to form 30 (29) MKs in the winter of 1941, i.e. the mass deployment vehicle of the BTV fell on one call of the young replenishment and those seconded from other parts (normal commanders will not give good fighters to the side) with all the consequences. Stop GSh on 9 MK the situation with education would be better.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: strannik1985

Stop GSh on 9 MK the situation with education would be better.

Figures.
6 MK Khatskilevich:

In the 7th Panzer Division of 1180 people. 1 people had education from 6 to 484 classes, from 6 to 9 - 528, secondary - 148 and higher - only 20 people. Of the 19809 junior commanders and privates from 1 to 6 classes, 11942 people graduated, from 7 to 9 - 5652, 1979 had a secondary education and 236 higher education.

4 MK Vlasova:

Education:
Higher - 592
Average - 3521
Grades 9-7 - 5609
Grades 6-3 - 16662
Uneducated - 1586
Illiterate - 127

Moreover, the low level of education was in all divisions, right down to communication. Here are 15 TDs of the same 8 MK:

The staffing of units by radio operators at the general educational level is low - the 2nd battalion of the 29th tank regiment - 15 people. radio operators have an education from 1 to 3 classes.

In general, with the formation of personnel in armored vehicles, even if there were only "autumn" mechanized corps, everything would not be very good.

And in order for you to become completely fun, we recall that in the forty-first year, elementary school did not last three years, as you usually do, but four years. That is, people with education in 4 classes are the usual third-graders who know four arithmetic operations and more or less confidently count within a hundred. So far, they have not studied physics, chemistry, or equations in mathematics. The radio for them is a big black talking “plate” on the wall, a car or a tractor, of course, they have seen several times in their lives ... if they lived in cities. But whether cars and tractors “natives of national republics of non-Russian nationality” have seen is a separate big question. And of these people who do not always understand the Russian language, for the three months remaining before the war, they will have to make driver mechanics, radio operators, gunners. To make by hands those who themselves at the former duty station were considered worthless "ballast." Why not a feat worthy of Hercules?

© Ulanov / Shein

[strannik1985]

What prevents those literate who went to staff the 21st mechanized corps to distribute to the "old" MK? The personnel strength of the BTV as of January 1, 1941 was 659 (payroll 088) people, the number of the BTV, according to Timoshenko's note to Stalin dated May 498, 266, was 27 people.

[Nagaibak]

ROSS 42 "Perhaps you will remember that it was thanks to some strategists that we had to oppose the cavalry to the tank wedges."
If you carefully study the initial period of the war, you will suddenly find the Soviet counterattacks carried out by the mechanized corps.))) But when they were knocked out, the cavalry showed itself perfectly. But, it was already a battle for Moscow.

[Pedrodepackes]

Quote: Nagaibak

But when they were knocked out, the cavalry showed itself perfectly.

quite right, but in raids on the rear, and not in frontal attacks on tanks

[Nagaibak]

Pedrodepakes "is quite true, but in rear raids, not in frontal attacks on tanks."
Of course. Sheep write about frontal attacks.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: ROSS 42

Perhaps you will recall that it was thanks to some strategists that we had to oppose cavalry with tank wedges.

Under Stalingrad, this partially succeeded - the cavalrymen detained Manstein’s tanks, gaining time to deploy mechanized corps and infantry.

[Ross xnumx]

Quote: Alexey RA

This partially succeeded near Stalingrad - the cavalrymen detained Manstein’s tanks ...

This is true, ka and the fact that:

An important role was played by the Soviet cavalrymen in the battles for Stalingrad. 81 cavalry division was completely destroyed by the tank corps of General Routh in the city of Kotelnikovo, behind enemy lines. The cavalrymen sacrificed themselves in order to slow down the German attack on Stalingrad and prevent them from occupying important railway junctions that would enable them to advance on Stalingrad in a more mobile way.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: ROSS 42

This is true, ka and the fact that:

Cavalry division against the tank corps. If any other division had been in its place, the result would have been the same. Although ... and what other division could cover such a distance along the winter steppe without roads?
The Red Army cavalry is a motorized infantry for the poor. Just instead of a coffin for ten to fifteen fighters with one and a half hundred horses under the hood (well, the USSR did not have a car engine for one and a half hundred mares) each cavalry fighter had two individual horsepower intended for marches and delivery of the fighter to the battlefield (rather, even this not ersatz-motorized infantry, but ersatz-motorcyclists). Moreover, as the states of cavalry division and cavalry corps changed, they were saturated with armor and artillery, approaching mechanized formations.

[Nagaibak]

Alexey RA "cavalrymen detained Manstein's tanks"
By the way, the cavalry corps had up to 100 guns. Approximately in half, 45 mm and 76 mm. Some all believe that their ancestors jumped from tanks with a naked s ... Well, this is their attitude to their history, to their ancestors and to themselves.)))

[serg v stock]

My grandfather was the only one I know, went 41-45, all the other friends started at 43 and above.
One artilleryman told how the commander taught them to dig out 3-4 positions for the 76th gun, after 3 shots a change of position and so on for 5-8 hours a day. There were almost no losses at the division for 1.5 years. Then the commander died, he came to replace him with a sucker of study, and the big problem himself.

[Baloo]

Quote: Proxima

Your extensive post from the first and last letter - some nonsense! The only thing you are right is that ..

Quote: Balu

Kaplan did not shoot at Stalin, and this is also so.

I'll tell you even more, Kaplan didn’t even kill Kennedy. It seems like she tried on Lenin ..

She will not kill you either, she was shot in the courtyard of the Kremlin, where Sverdlov’s assistant had brought her from the Cheka, then they burned her. And the rest I wrote as is. Your alternative

[Ros 56]

Now on this subject you can write anything and as much as you like, but they won’t attract what you don’t. What's the point. Road spoon for dinner.

[evgen1221]

If the intelligence correctly reported (and in general terms it’s true, we don’t forget that not all the parts at the border were opened), then there is a problem with the transfer of information above and its analysis and the presentation of it to Zhukov and Stalin. Plus, different doctrines and, accordingly training and the equipment itself is being produced. As a result, I had to study, adapt to the prevailing conditions and improvise (only winter offensives are from a series of improvisations in the place I think). Later, politicians and military leaders in every possible way began to dust their history of the initial period of the Second World War, as well as custom-made memoirs under Khrushchev, which only Rokosovsky did not seem to write for a ready-made answer.

[Operator]

There was only an incorrect assessment of the expected actions of Hitler and the enemy forces concentrated near the Soviet-German border (C)

The author contradicts himself: either the Soviet leadership was mistaken in assessing the intentions of the enemy or Soviet intelligence in assessing the size of its troops.

Since the article states that the General Staff of the Red Army calculated the minimum required number of enemy divisions for an attack on the USSR, and intelligence reported (no matter, right or wrong) that this number was reached, then according to the author’s logic, the Soviet leadership made a mistake in evaluating the enemy’s intentions.

Another thing is that the General Staff of the Red Army also made its own glaring mistake (without reference to the work of intelligence) by placing a cover army directly at the border, thereby substituting the most combat-ready Soviet troops and their rear services under enemy attacks, the headquarters of which did not know the number and directions.

And it was the last purely staffist mistake that became fatal for the 1941 military campaign of the year.

[BAI]

No intelligence in other countries would be able to obtain reliable information with such a massive stream of misinformation, in which even Hitler, Goebbels, Goering and other dignitaries of the Reich took part!

Not like our intelligence, Hitler himself did not know the exact start of the war! How many times did he postpone the date of the attack. And then the effect of a boy shouting "Wolf!"

[Jurkovs]

I see the same conceptual error in this and other similar articles. The German troops, after the French company, are ALREADY in Poland, they are mobilized and are located in the areas of Lublino and Warsaw, from where the mechanized units can walk three hours to the border. Jump airfields are located along the border and fuel has been delivered to them, artillery positions have also been dug and prepared. What difference does it make WHEN the war starts, Monday or Friday. In such a situation, one must be prepared every day, and the intelligence data is already secondary here. Stalin was aware of the fact that the war could start at any moment, otherwise there would not have been this hysteria "not to succumb to provocations." Our generals, both those who were shot and those who survived, had their brains differently arranged than required. They were not even preparing for a war in the image and likeness of World War I, but most likely even the Crimean one. The terrible unpreparedness of the army was revealed by the Finnish war, but the conclusions drawn were limited, and where Voroshilov and other Stalinist associates were concerned, they were not made at all. In fact, no combat training was conducted at all. One and a half million prisoners after the summer battles, after all, says the same thing. Stalin can only be blamed for his work with personnel. After all, he was not a military man.

[Avior]

The story of a good king and bad boyars is spring.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Jurkovs

What is the difference WHEN the war begins, on monday or in friday. AT in such a situation you have to be ready every day, and intelligence is already secondary here.

quite right!

Quote: Jurkovs

The Finnish war revealed the horrific unpreparedness of the army, but the conclusions reached were limited, and, where Voroshilov and other Stalin's associates were concerned, were not made at all

exactly.
.

Quote: Jurkovs

Stalin can be blamed only with work with personnel. In the end, he was not a military man.

here it is no longer: who did not mobilize, did not bring troops into combat readiness and

Quote: Jurkovs

hysterical "not to give in to provocations."

?
Who wrote the TASS statement of June 13?

[Jurkovs]

Quote: Olgovich

here it is no longer: who did not mobilize, did not bring troops into combat readiness

First, covert mobilization was carried out from May 1, 1940. A clear mobilization would trigger an immediate attack by mobilized German troops.
Secondly, in fact, the mobilization had to be announced the day after the German attack on France.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Jurkovs

First, covert mobilization was carried out from May 1, 1940.

there was no mobilization

Quote: Jurkovs

A clear mobilization would trigger an immediate attack by mobilized German troops.

1. They attacked only when they were able to free themselves from other affairs: from Yugoslavia and Greece.
2. Who prevented mobilizing TOGETHER with Germany?
3. Non-mobilization and triggered an attack

Quote: Jurkovs

Secondly, in fact, the mobilization had to be announced the next day after the attack of Germany to France.

Germany did not attack France ... it was the other way around, in 1939

[Jurkovs]

Quote: Olgovich

Who prevented mobilizing TOGETHER with Germany?

The Germans defeated Poland and France without mobilization. Hitler declared universal mobilization in the spring of 1943 after the defeat at Stalingrad.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Jurkovs

The Germans defeated Poland and France without mobilization. Hitler declared universal mobilization in the spring of 1943 after the defeat at Stalingrad.

you wrote it

: Quote: Jurkovs
Explicit mobilization would trigger an immediate attack mobilized German troops.

and they were right: if the actual mobilization of Germany in 1939 was called an appeal, it does not cease to be it.
numbered. Wehrmacht 41 g 7 million, his own mobilized March 1945 - the same 7 million

[nathanael]

Hehe .. Archive of the magazine light .. The presentation style is painfully familiar. To see the author not only borrowed photographs, but also whole articles with the cooling of JV Stalin was not too lazy to shovel .. But the pearl about the mustached executioner is something new .. See from late .. Korotich’s light would be afraid to squeeze

[Operator]

Quote: Jurkovs

The Finnish War revealed the terrible unpreparedness of the army

"I have no other writers for you" (C)

In view of the low combat effectiveness of the Red Army as of June 22 and 1941 of the year, the General Staff was obliged to push the line of deployment of the cover army from the border to protect it from a surprise attack, to reveal the directions of enemy attacks and obtain a reserve of time for their units to go to field positions.

[IGOR GORDEEV]

Well, I do not believe that Hitler attacked the USSR without at least informal agreements with England and the United States or one of these countries that they would be largely aloof. Or - we remove the logic, leaving behind England England, which was supported by the United States and attacks the largest country in the world.

[Snoop]

I think so too. Indeed, recently in England materials about Hess were to be declassified - his interrogations, transcripts of meetings with English officials, etc. due to the expiration of the secrecy. In my opinion, all the military historians of the world rubbed their hands. Like, maybe then we will find out what is there and how it is. Yeah ... schazz ... Finally, they announced that there would be no declassification of these documents! ))) What are the British so afraid of making these materials public? It is especially interesting that Hess died right before his release from prison.
By the way, it was amusing - Molotov’s memoirs: “When we read about it, we were completely stunned. This is necessary! Not only he sat down to control the aircraft, but also jumped with a parachute when gas ran out. Hess called himself a stranger. What is not a feat of a scout? Stalin asked me which of our members of the Politburo would be able to decide on this? I recommended Malenkov, as he was sponsoring the aircraft in the Central Committee ... Stalin proposed parachuting Malenkov to Hitler, let them tell him not to attack the USSR ... ” Introduced the descending Malenkov by parachute))).

[Lieutenant Colonel of the USSR Air Force in stock]

It is enough to read the Act on the admission of the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Timoshenko S.K. from comrade Voroshilova K. E. May 7, 1940 Moscow, to understand the depth of the problems in the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR
https://litra.pro/povsednevnaya-zhiznj-vermahta-i-rkka-nakanune-vojni/veremeev-yurij-georgievich/read/3

[Jurkovs]

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

It is enough to read the Act on the admission of the People’s Commissariat of Defense of the USSR Timoshenko S.K. from comrade Voroshilova K. E. May 7, 1940 Moscow

And I still read the Report of the People's Commissar of Defense (Voroshilov) on the situation in the Red Army from 1939.
Well, no difference. Many rightly point out that it was necessary for Stalin to quit Voroshilov, and Tymoshenko simply stated to everyone the long-known facts. It is noteworthy that apparently everyone adopted this Act as a bureaucratic lead against Voroshilov, so practically nothing was done based on its results.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Jurkovs

It is noteworthy that apparently everyone adopted this Act as a bureaucratic lead against Voroshilov, so practically nothing was done based on its results.

And here you are mistaken. If nothing had been done, then Barbarossa could have gone for a ride.

Read the memoirs of those who served about the times after Tymoshenko came to the post of people's commissar - the people howled like a wolf. No cancellation of exits due to weather conditions, no replacements of field training for classes, no conditional training. If they work out the march, then everything goes out and the credit goes according to the latter, and not as before, when the best battalion depicted the regiment on the march, and all the rest were in the RPM. At DalVas, for example, in 1940, for the first time, in a practical exercise, the ferry of a division worked through the Amur — the entire division, with the guidance of a real ferry.

[Jurkovs]

And yet, it was done a miserable of the necessary.

[Force multiplier]

The military-political leadership of the USSR was aware of the impending German attack and was ready for it. The reason for the 1941 defeats was not the surprise of the attack or the inaccuracy of intelligence.
Suddenness! This is the biggest surprise in the German documents on June 22nd. The intelligence departments of German formations and associations, month after month, week after week, noted the concentration of Soviet troops in the west of the country, overflights of Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, covert mobilization and the beginning of measures to evacuate industry. The suddenness achieved really surprised the Germans. But it was the illusion of surprise, created thanks to the very directive number 1, the meaning of which, judging by the literature, has not been understood. It was thanks to this "contradictory" directive that a very favorable foreign policy situation for the USSR was created, when Germany undoubtedly and irrefutably began the hostilities, which meant that the USSR was a victim of the attack and this was not a "conflict between two predators who did not divide Europe."
Since there was no surprise attack, intelligence could not be its cause. Even the material cited by the author of the article shows that Soviet intelligence accurately revealed the composition of the group of German troops. The fact that tank divisions were not found near the border happened because they were not there. Tank divisions were redeployed to the border at the very last moment. In the band Gr. The Army of the South, for example, 1Tgr did not plan to take part in breaking through the defensive lines at the new border and was introduced into the breakthrough after it was carried out by the 6A infantry. And not all German infantry divisions were brought into battle on the very first day, some of them continued to advance east to the border

[Operator]

A favorable foreign policy situation for the USSR was created by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and an unfavorable military situation was created by the General Staff of the Red Army, which did not withdraw troops from the border (which, incidentally, would further strengthen the favorable foreign policy situation).

[Force multiplier]

The General Staff carried out the orders of the country's political leadership. Leaving the army at the border was absolutely correct from both a military and political point of view. For example, one of the factors. Here the general staff withdraws the bulk of the troops from the border, and then self-proclaimed governments will appear in Vilnius and Lviv. And this is not a hypothetical scenario, so in reality it happened in the conditions of the Red Army retreat. But the appearance of these governments before the outbreak of war with Germany would be a foreign policy disaster for the USSR.
After June 22, the bulk of these troops were already withdrawn, holding back the German motorized mechanized units with counterstrikes by mechanized corps and German infantry by defending the fortified areas. The fact that no organized withdrawal occurred at the Polar Division was not the fault of the General Staff and the perpetrators were punished. And from the "Lviv ledge", for example, they left in a completely organized manner and without catastrophic consequences

[Operator]

Quote: Force Multiplier

The General Staff carried out the orders of the country's political leadership
the main headquarters withdraws the bulk of the troops from the border, and self-proclaimed governments will appear in Vilnius and Lviv
from the "Lviv ledge", for example, they left in a completely organized manner and without catastrophic consequences

From the General Staff of the Red Army there were no initiative proposals for the pre-war withdrawal of the army of cover from the border, so to say that he only complied with the order of the political leadership, is not necessary.

In case of self-declaration, there were NKVD troops.

If parts of the Red Army left the Lviv ledge before the war, then after it began they would be able to engage not in their relocation, but in striking the flank of an enemy advancing in the central direction.

[Jurkovs]

The surprise was. But she was akin to the one when you were invited to play chess with a master of sports, and someone who did not even have a rank sat down against you.

[Sandro]

The Second World War clearly follows from the outcome of the First World War, and the First, as everyone knows, was provoked by the actions of the Serbian oligophrenic terrorist! (look at his photo, he is outwardly real!) More than 60.000.000 people died in Russian and then Soviet people in those two wars, taking into account the civilian population! But not a single Serbian public or political figure, for all subsequent years, apologized to the World, for the HORROR, which was started by his fellow countryman! In 1995, in Moscow, before the start of the Victory Parade, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl apologized on behalf of the German nation. Why are the Serbs silent? Do not feel guilty?

[Alexey Gorshkov]

It is customary to believe that it is exclusively the central leadership and "Comrade Stalin personally" who are to blame. In the end - he, as the head of state, of course, bears part of the responsibility - but "to hang all the dogs on him", as has been the custom since Khrushchev's times, is, in my opinion, WRONG!
It was the central leadership that made the MAXIMUM POSSIBLE that the attack was not unexpected. Studying at the university’s historical faculty, I wrote a thesis on the topic of preparing and starting a war, so that, in principle, I own a subject and stumbled upon facts that ROOT contradict the theory of the Center’s unconditional guilt! I will bring PART of them:
- in the spring of 1941, under the guise of training camps, "storerooms" were called up - what is this, if not hidden mobilization ?;
- troops were drawn from the rear and generally non-western military districts to the western border. BEFORE THE WAR. to the western borders - the most famous example is 19 A
Koneva, transferred from the Caucasus to Ukraine;
- something (I didn’t get to the bottom - what exactly) was on June 18, 1941 - when the troops of the western districts were put on alert, though - it was already canceled by the beginning of the war;
- ON THE EVE OF June 22, even before the attack, ALL Western Special Military Districts were renamed to the fronts ...
And many other things, which even gave some reason to believe that we were preparing to attack Germany - I personally don't think so - the army would have been ready for war no earlier than 1942, but even then it would hardly have attacked - the position of the "third rejoicing" - very profitable ...
So it seems to me that responsibility cannot be removed from the local military leadership - not without reason that many of the veterans I interviewed claimed that at the beginning of the war there was some kind of anti-state "conspiracy of the military"! It should be noted that the Soviet military participants in the conspiracy, having seen how the Germans were in charge, stopped engaging in conspiracies and fought with dignity, but after Stalin's death they shifted their "shoals" onto him - they are "Victory commanders"!

[bubalik]

- in the spring of 1941, under the guise of training camps, "storerooms" were called up - what is this, if not hidden mobilization ?;

were renamed to the fronts ...

[Snoop]

Where does this order come from? It became interesting. I have not met before.

[bubalik]

Snoop (Vyacheslav) Today, 13: 51

,, with "Memory of the People", the time will look with a footnote

[bubalik]

Here is another interesting:
A crucial moment is happening - the concentration of troops of the parties

[Snoop]

Looks like a reaction after the outbreak of hostilities, as scolded for not providing clear reports for June 21, 1941.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Alexey Gorshkov

- in the spring of 1941, under the guise of training camps, "storerooms" were called up - what is this, if not hidden mobilization ?;

In the USSR, storerooms were called up almost every year. Does this mean that every year the USSR prepared for war?
In 1941, the usual gatherings were held - for the retraining of ordinary and sergeant personnel. From Big Training Camps, regular camps differ in that:
1. The call of the storerooms is "smeared" for a long time: in 1941 it lasted for 4 months.
2. The call of the storekeepers is carried out in coordination with the national economy: in 1941 part of the draft was received a reservation, and the call of the rest was to be agreed upon by the military commissars already with the chairmen of collective farms and directors of enterprises. .
3. Those called up for retraining go to the formations as a "second set", as a result of which divisions are obtained with a remanufacturing of privates in combat subunits, while the commanders and the rear remain in peacetime states (those same "divisions of 12000 men").
4. There is no mobilization of equipment and horses.
Here is what real Big Training Camps look like (they are also hidden mobilization) in practice:

2 people were called up who, on September 610, 136, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 22 of September 1939, were declared mobilized "until further notice." The troops also received 177 thousand horses, 23 vehicles and 634 tractors.

Quote: Alexey Gorshkov

- troops were drawn from the rear and generally non-western military districts to the western border. BEFORE THE WAR. to the western borders

True - this transfer was a reaction to the growing tension in Soviet-German relations. The reason for it is simple: just in case, it was necessary to strengthen the Red Army in the western direction without mobilization and try to solve the problem of the Red Army losing the terms of mobilization and concentration. The transfer to the west of the divisions of the internal districts made it possible to partially carry out the concentration in peacetime, shortening its time, and to unload the railway in the initial period of the war: at the beginning of mobilization, the divisions would already be in the planned concentration areas, and only replenishment forces had to be delivered to them: mob-contingent and mob-transport (and not to first transport all this to the place of deployment of the division, and then carry the division "assembled" to the West).
Nevertheless, it was precisely a transfer "just in case" - that is why the "internalists" were transferred not to the borders, but to the rear areas of the border districts.

[Parvis rasulov]

Did the USSR intelligence report to the leadership of the country? I think it reported why they were not ready for war, this was another matter. And why did Stalin pull all the time, well, as many claim, citing this fact as his version. But here I will give one example, this relationship between Turkey and Russia, they are somewhat similar to the relationship between Germany and the USSR in the early forties.
After all, Turkey, on the one hand, is friends and supports Russia in some matters, and in some, on the contrary, acts as a hostile country, but for some other reasons, Putin maintains relations with Erdogan, and now think maybe Stalin had some reasons to believe Hitler

[Bator]

Let me tell you why they "overslept" on June 22, 1941. So, Stalin knew that the war with the West (Hitler) was inevitable and in every possible way won time to arm the Army and the power of the country. If Stalin, before June 22, 1941, built on the border with Germany troops then the West World would blame the Leader that he wanted to attack Germany and poor Hitler was forced to defend himself

[Lieutenant Colonel of the USSR Air Force in stock]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: Jurkovs

It is noteworthy that apparently everyone adopted this Act as a bureaucratic lead against Voroshilov, so practically nothing was done based on its results.

And here you are mistaken. If nothing had been done, then Barbarossa could have gone for a ride.

Read the memoirs of those who served about the times after Tymoshenko came to the post of people's commissar - the people howled like a wolf. No cancellation of exits due to weather conditions, no replacements of field training for classes, no conditional training. If they work out the march, then everything goes out and the credit goes according to the latter, and not as before, when the best battalion depicted the regiment on the march, and all the rest were in the RPM. At DalVas, for example, in 1940, for the first time, in a practical exercise, the ferry of a division worked through the Amur — the entire division, with the guidance of a real ferry.

***
Something was corrected ... yes, there was little time, and also, all these STAY THERE - GO HERE! with the knocking out of command in previous years against the backdrop of fast-moving ...
Yes, and the traditional mess otherwise ...
The tactics teachers at my VVUZ, the officers-participants of the Great Patriotic War, talked so much about the mess, about shakozakidatelstvo "on foreign territory with little blood" to the drumbeat, shortcomings in the BUSV, etc. etc.

[Lieutenant Colonel of the USSR Air Force in stock]

Quote: Jurkovs

Report of the People's Commissar of Defense (Voroshilov) on the situation in the Red Army from 1939

*** I agree, https://military.wikireading.ru/9471

[Lieutenant Colonel of the USSR Air Force in stock]

Quote: Bator

Let me tell you why they "overslept" on June 22, 1941. So, Stalin knew that the war with the West (Hitler) was inevitable and in every possible way won time to arm the Army and the power of the country. If Stalin, before June 22, 1941, built on the border with Germany troops then the West World would blame the Leader that he wanted to attack Germany and poor Hitler was forced to defend himself

***
They didn’t need to be built ... it was necessary on the contrary to be taken away from under strikes at a distance where neither the aircraft nor the enemy’s artillery could reach the main forces, airfields, depots, namely, along the old line of defense, and further into the depth of defense because there was no new yet.
Initially, it was necessary to detain border troops, fortified areas and mobile groups with the support of the allotted air and art units ...
In addition, the troops did not prepare much for mobile defense, but prepared for a positional war.

We open a curious document http://podvignaroda.ru/?#id=60440615&tab=navDetailDocument strangely declassified and under a different name MAP Map From: __. 05.1941 Published: Operational Department of the Western Front; General of the Army G. Zhukov, who got into the public domain "Scheme of fortified areas of the third line along the line: Ostashkov, Rzhev, Vyazma, Spas-Demensk" (RGVA, fund 208, inventory 2511, file 309.
It is about building a third line, probably in 1941-42.
I don’t know how fortified areas would have played a role, because the Maginot Line was bypassed, but they would have created big problems for the enemy using the old and new, and the third fortified defense lines ....

[chenia]

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

In addition, the troops did not prepare much for mobile defense, but prepared for a positional war.

BP was completely foiled (especially by mechanized troops) by constant reform. Moreover, the idea of ​​MK is beautiful and correct. But their quantity (complete blurring of professionals) and quality (the structure could have been removed in a year).
And the selected tank brigades from the SK returned them (and there was at least some kind of PSU there) by capabilities almost to the level of PMV.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

They didn’t need to be built ... it was necessary on the contrary to be taken away from under strikes at a distance where neither the aircraft nor the enemy’s artillery could reach the main forces, airfields, depots, namely, along the old line of defense, and further into the depth of defense because there was no new yet.
Initially, it was necessary to detain border troops, fortified areas and mobile groups with the support of the allotted air and art units ...

These two paragraphs are mutually exclusive. If we take aviation beyond the old border, then we give the sky over the new SD backlash. Because the new SDs are built in the border strip. A battle radius the main fighter of the Red Army - I-16 - only 110-130 km. That is, air support of mobile and stationary defense in the foreground can be forgotten.
The real radius of the Red Army fighters can be estimated by Cover Plans:

the second departure of bomber aircraft, inflict a ular on the enemy airfields and bases located in the second zone to the line of Koenigsberg, Marienburg, Thorn, Lodz. For this purpose, airplanes of the SB, PE-2, and AR-2 type can be used, of which we have 122 links; to solve this problem, 132 links are required, 10 links are missing. Fighter aircraft cannot accompany bombers when performing this task, their range of action does not allow;

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

In addition, the troops did not prepare much for mobile defense, but prepared for a positional war.

But how can you prepare for mobile defense units in which artillery is slower than infantry? The artillery towing speed of the rifle division is 3-5 km / h. But the basis of the SD firepower is precisely its two artillery regiments.
And I don’t remember her about the extremely bad situation with vehicles - both in terms of the lack of trucks in general (especially the ZIS-5 and 6), and in terms of the lack of serviceable cars and spare parts for repairs.

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

It is about building a third line, probably in 1941-42.

On the diagram there are terms of construction:

In the lower right corner is a plate with a layout according to how many and what structures should be built and how much it will cost. Judging by the table, the first phase of construction was to be completed by June 1, 1942, an intermediate stage by January 1, 1942.

[Lieutenant Colonel of the USSR Air Force in stock]

Quote: Pedrodepackes

Quote: svp67

the number of the Wehrmacht during this period increased from 100 (the number of Reichswehr) to 000 people

this I know, the essence of the question, where did they get so many sensible and trained commanders?

Comparative table of the growth rate of the Red Army and the Reichswehr, and then the Wehrmacht for the period from 1923 to June 22, 1941. (person)

RKKA 1923–550 000 1927–586 000 1928–617 000 1932–562 000 1933–880 000 1935–930 000 1937 - 1 200 000 1938 - 1 513 400 19.08.39 - 2 000 000 09.05.40 - 3 200 000 01.01.41 .4 - 207 000 21.06.41 5/500/000 - XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX

Until 16.03.35 - Reichswehr, after - the Wehrmacht until 30.01.33 - 100 000 31.12.33 - 300 000 1935-500 000 1936-600 000 01.10.38 - 2 200 000 19.08.39 - 4 233 000 23.11.39 - 5 000/000/21.06.41 - 7 e-reading.club

[Lieutenant Colonel of the USSR Air Force in stock]

Quote: Operator

Quote: Force Multiplier

The General Staff carried out the orders of the country's political leadership
the main headquarters withdraws the bulk of the troops from the border, and self-proclaimed governments will appear in Vilnius and Lviv
from the "Lviv ledge", for example, they left in a completely organized manner and without catastrophic consequences

From the General Staff of the Red Army there were no initiative proposals for the pre-war withdrawal of the army of cover from the border, so to say that he only complied with the order of the political leadership, is not necessary.

In case of self-declaration, there were NKVD troops.

If parts of the Red Army left the Lviv ledge before the war, then after it began they would be able to engage not in their relocation, but in striking the flank of an enemy advancing in the central direction.

***
No Commissariat of Defense and General Staff could initiate anything against the main lines of the CPSU.
The country was on the "manual leadership" of the Leader.

[Alexander Greene]

In the defeats of the beginning of World War II, there is no fault of the highest political leadership of the USSR. It did everything to prepare the country and the Red Army to repel German aggression. Including timely directives on putting the troops of the border military districts on alert.

The war was not sudden, everyone knew about it, but the start of hostilities for many military units was unexpected. They simply slept through their beginning, the Germans in the barracks at night simply slaughtered the sleeping Red Army soldiers. But who is to blame for this - think for yourself. Stalin has nothing to do with it.

[svp67]

Quote: Alexander Green

In the defeats of the beginning of World War II, there is no fault of the highest political leadership of the USSR. It did everything to prepare the country and the Red Army to repel German aggression.

No, you are not quite right. Yes, the leadership put a lot of effort into this preparation, but unfortunately it made a lot of miscalculations that painfully affected both the first and subsequent stages of the Second World War.

Quote: Alexander Green

Including timely directives on putting the troops of the border military districts on alert.

No, and here you are not quite right. Yes, the directive was:

“Directive of the General Staff No. 1 of 21. 06.41. "
“Military Councils of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdOVO.
1. During 22 -23 June 1941 years, a sudden German attack on the fronts of the LVO, Arr. OVO, Zap. OVO, KOVO, Od. OVO. An attack can begin with provocative actions.
2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.
At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev and Odessa districts to be in full combat readiness, to meet a possible sudden attack by the Germans or their allies.
I order:
a) during the night of June 22 of 1941 of the year secretly occupy the firing points of fortified areas on the state border;
b) before the dawn of June 22 of June 1941 of the year, disperse all aviation, including military, across field airfields, carefully mask it;
c) bring all units into combat readiness. Troops keep dispersed and disguised;
d) to bring the air defense to combat readiness without additional lifting the subscription. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects;
e) do not carry out any other events without special order.
Tymoshenko, Zhukov.
21 June 1941 years. "

But taking into account the passage and execution, this directive was given late, it simply did not reach many low-level executives, by the time the war began, so much more, it did not announce the mobilization, that is, it was necessary to manage the personnel and equipment that was in the units, formations and associations at the moment, in the states of peacetime

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: svp67

But given the passage and enforcement, this directive was given late,

The first directive to alert troops was issued on June 18, 1941, which the command of the Western Special Military District did not comply with, while other districts, including the fleets, complied with.

[svp67]

Quote: Alexander Green

The first directive to alert troops was given on 18 on June 1941,

And she did not announce the mobilization.

Quote: Alexander Green

which the command of the Western Special Military District did not fulfill, while other regions, including fleets, did so.

Excuse me, but this only confirms the evidence given by the front command against itself, the facts speak the opposite, the troops carried out the order given. Yes, they were not fully implemented, but I assure you that in other districts there was a similar picture, they just were lucky enough not to fall under the main blow of the Germans

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: svp67

And she did not announce the mobilization.

And mobilization in the country began in the month of May.

Quote: svp67

other districts had a similar picture, they just were lucky not to fall under the main blow of the Germans

But for some reason, no one writes about other districts that before the start of the war, the airplanes were removed from the planes, gasoline was leaked, the planes did not disperse and mask the airfields, and the tanks didn’t have shells,.

[svp67]

Quote: Alexander Green

And mobilization in the country began in the month of May.

No, what was carried out under the guise of "large gatherings" was only a small part of the mobilization measures, the equipment did not go from the national economy to the troops, the reserve personnel were not staffed until the full wartime staff, the missing property, weapons and ammunition from arsenals and warehouses central subordination were not issued

Quote: Alexander Green

But for some reason, no one writes about other districts that before the start of the war, the airplanes were removed from the planes, gasoline was leaked, the planes did not disperse and mask the airfields, and the tanks didn’t have shells,.

Well, yes, of course, but the fact that there was no connection, since the wired one was violated by saboteurs, and it was forbidden to use radio communications in full and the Air Force units were simply not even notified in time, and the state of affairs with the air defense of the airfields was completely disastrous, the shortage of the artillery, often replaced by quad mounts of Maxim machine guns, was supplemented by a lack of prepared calculations, as a result, and the existing ones could not be used in full. Yes, and the fighters suffered minimal losses in the first raid, having managed to fight back. The rout came in the afternoon.
At the expense of tanks. My grandfather served in the 22-th Panzer Division, it was located in the Brest area on the 22-th June. So, not only did they have fully equipped tanks, but every day in May-June they were raised at least once by alarm. On the 22 of June, their positions were covered first by artillery corrected from the balloon at the time of the alarm, and then bombers bombed. Grandfather recalled that anti-aircraft guns were destroyed first ...

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: svp67

and it was completely forbidden to use radio communications in full and the Air Force units were simply not even notified on time,

Well write? What means "fully ... prohibited"? Of course, you can’t tell jokes, but you could even sound an alarm and raise airplanes "incompletely".

[svp67]

Quote: Alexander Green

Well, write? What does "fully ... prohibited" mean?

Yes, the fact is that with each announcement of the alarm restrictions are announced, like, do not give out live ammunition and shells, use radio equipment according to the scheme of such ...

Quote: Alexander Green

but it was even possible "to an incomplete extent" to announce the alarm and raise the planes into the air.

Everything is possible, but it remains to recall this point from "Directive No. 1":

"2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications."

They were simply reinsured, because for any action that could be recognized as "succumbing to provocative actions" one could immediately "fall under the rink of investigation and repression"

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: svp67

since for any action that could be recognized as "succumbing to provocative actions" one could immediately "fall under the roller of investigation and reprisals"

This has now been suggested to us through the media since 1956, in fact, no one forbade keeping the troops ready,

Quote: svp67

Yes, the fact is that with each announcement of the alarm restrictions are announced, like, do not give out live ammunition and shells, use radio equipment according to the scheme of such ...

This is during training anxiety, not combat.

[svp67]

Quote: Alexander Green

This is during training anxiety, not combat.

Yes. But it seems not in this case. Again, I am returning you to item No. 2, there is already a certain limitation. The text of the Directive from 18 on June 1941 would explain a lot, but it has not been declassified ...

[M. Michelson]

I think this is nonsense. The war in the area of ​​June 22 is definitelywaited.
But ... only at the very top. A grandiose game was conducted, where it was necessary to show with all his might that the Red Army was sleeping in a childhood sleep. Hence all these repressions against alarmists (signaling growing tension at the border) and now seemingly idiotic demonstrative (!) Complacency.
Everything says that some kind of invader was prepared dirty trick; the wolf was lured into the "sheepfold", which in fact was to become a kennel for him.
But ... the enemy did not attack at all as expected. Not by the rules. The billet burst, and they tried never to remember about it. It was even better to accept the accusations of unpreparedness than to talk about the shame of the failed counter-operation.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: M. Michelson

It was even better to accept the accusations of unpreparedness than to talk about the shame of the failed counter-operation.

This is really nonsense. After the war, Stalin tried to get to the bottom of the truth - why it happened, wanted to identify the possible, and perhaps even obvious, betrayal, a questionnaire was sent to the highest command staff .... But SMtalin did not have time, and then Khrushchev cared and turned off responsibility for Stalin, but they say that the answers of some generals have been preserved ...

[Snoop]

This is you about the research of Pokrovsky. They were partially declassified and published in the military-historical journal for 89 No. 3 - 5. The author of the article mentioned them briefly. During the study, the generals were asked 5 questions:
1. Whether the plan of defense of the state border was communicated to the troops in the part concerning them; when and what was done by the command and staffs to ensure the implementation of this plan?
2. Since when and on what basis did the covering troops begin to enter the state border and how many of them were deployed before the outbreak of hostilities?
3. When the order was received to put the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack of Nazi Germany in the morning of June 22; what instructions were given and when to implement this order, and what was done by the troops?
4. Why was most artillery located in training centers?
5. How prepared were the staffs for command and control and to what extent did this affect the conduct of operations during the first days of the war?

Find on the internet. By the way, when they reached the 3rd question, the VIZ without the explanation of reasons stopped publishing this study.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: Snoop

They were partially declassified and published in the military-historical journal for 89 No. 3 - 5.

Thank you comrade.

[AsmyppoL]

Sorry to interfere with your discussion.
In 2017-2018, our website published a huge cycle "An Unexpected War ..." by the author of Victoria. 26 parts, acquaintance with each of them took about half an hour.
While reading materials, I became interested in the topic of 22 June.
The cycle contains excerpts from the answers to General Pokrovsky of all the commanders, if they concerned the June 22.

The 17 part contains all the answers regarding intelligence data. Therefore, in my materials I do not cite excerpts from the answers. I try to consider issues outside the cycle.

I looked through all materials from the site "Memory of the People", which are available for 1941. Everything related to June 22 has already been given in the cycle. Only maps were not considered. I am considering this question in a new article.
I looked through the memoirs of military leaders - and they are practically all reflected in the cycle ... It is difficult to write if everything was described and compiled by a girl ... If you are interested, then it is better to get acquainted with the cycle from 1 to 3 parts and then from 11 to 26. You may not be interested in my answer. In this case, I apologize for the verbose advertising))))

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: AsmyppoL

You may not be interested in my answer. In this case, I apologize for the verbose advertising))))

No, why, I’m very interested, I will definitely use your advice. Thank you very much.

[AsmyppoL]

I give permission to use any materials published on this site, S.L.Ch. (Sergey St) without restrictions and I will not have any claims against him.

[NF68]

I would have known the purchase, I would have lived in Sochi. So it is here. Stalin, unlike Adolf Aloizovich, was a much more cautious person. Adolf Aloizovich, on the other hand, acted according to the principle "Let's get into a fight, and then we'll see." Therefore, Stalin made a number of the most serious mistakes on the eve of the Second World War.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: NF68

Therefore, Stalin made a number of the most serious mistakes on the eve of the Second World War.

What mistakes are you talking about? *

[NF68]

Quote: Alexander Green

Quote: NF68

Therefore, Stalin made a number of the most serious mistakes on the eve of the Second World War.

What mistakes are you talking about? *

For example, about the lack of cars, radio stations, aviation gasoline of the B-74 and B-78 brands in the Red Army. The fact that the troops of the Red Army located in the western part of the USSR in the border military districts on 22 on June 1941 of the year were located in the form of 3-echelons that could not help each other and create a solid front line. The fact that a large number of warehouses of the Red Army was located very close to the border.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: NF68

For example, the lack of red army cars, radio stations, aviation gasoline brands B-74 and B-78 ....
The fact that a large number of warehouses of the Red Army was located very close to the border.

This should be the task of the People’s Commissar of Defense for armaments and rear services, and not Stalin.

[NF68]

Quote: Alexander Green

Quote: NF68

For example, the lack of red army cars, radio stations, aviation gasoline brands B-74 and B-78 ....
The fact that a large number of warehouses of the Red Army was located very close to the border.

This should be the task of the People’s Commissar of Defense for armaments and rear services, and not Stalin.

The People's Commissars and, not only the People's Commissars, dealt with these, but the country's leadership controlled and coordinated their activities and provided all the necessary programs and the USSR government, including Stalin, is also responsible for the shortcomings that took place. The government also controlled the activities of the Red Army and is also responsible for the shortcomings.

The captain of the ship, and Stalin, by convention, was somehow similar to the captain of a huge ship called the USSR, is responsible for his entire crew. At least this applies to the activities of all USSR people's commissariats.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: NF68

... the leadership of the country controlled and coordinated their activities and provided all the necessary programs and the USSR government, including Stalin, is also responsible for the shortcomings that took place. The government also controlled the activities of the Red Army and is also responsible for the shortcomings.

So you can blame the Almighty, because he is responsible for every person. But military programs were handled based on their capabilities, Tukhachevsky, for example, demanded 100 thousand tanks at the beginning of 30, but for some reason he did not develop radio communications. Is this also Stalin's fault?

[NF68]

Quote: Alexander Green

Quote: NF68

... the leadership of the country controlled and coordinated their activities and provided all the necessary programs and the USSR government, including Stalin, is also responsible for the shortcomings that took place. The government also controlled the activities of the Red Army and is also responsible for the shortcomings.

So you can blame the Almighty, because he is responsible for every person. But military programs were handled based on their capabilities, Tukhachevsky, for example, demanded 100 thousand tanks at the beginning of 30, but for some reason he did not develop radio communications. Is this also Stalin's fault?

Are only leaders like Tukhachevsky to blame for all the shortcomings? And did these figures act on their own? The Almighty, if he really exists, is engaged in his own "heavenly" affairs. The country's government was engaged in the selection of personnel, including the leaders of the same People's Commissariat, and control over their work.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: NF68

The government of the country was engaged in the selection of cadres, including the leaders of the same people's commissariat, and in monitoring their work.

Yes, in one of the films they said beautifully: "The seller got drunk, the store did not open on time, but they criticize the Soviet government"

[Alexey RA]

Quote: NF68

For example, about the lack of cars, radio stations, aviation gasoline of the B-74 and B-78 brands in the Red Army.

Tell us what could be done to solve these problems. Who will produce and operate these radio stations, even if they have to prepare radio operators from draftees with 1-3 education classes?
15 TD 8 MK (formation of the autumn of 1940):

The staffing of units by radio operators at the general educational level is low - the 2nd battalion of the 29th tank regiment - 15 people. radio operators have an education from 1 to 3 classes

Quote: NF68

The fact that a large number of warehouses of the Red Army was located very close to the border.

Oh ho ho ...

The artillery depots of the border districts were dispersed along the front and layered in depth. The first line of warehouses located 50-75 km from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). On the second line, 300-400 km away from the state border, warehouses of 3-nd and partially of the 2nd category were located, and on the third (rear) line were the most powerful warehouses (of the 1st and 2nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 500-600 km.

It was not the warehouses that were close to the border, but the Germans traveled these 500-600 km too quickly. But it is impossible to take the warehouses even further - the number of cars and tractors required for transportation on an increased shoulder is growing, plus daily rates of mileage must be taken into account.

[NF68]

Tell us what could be done to solve these problems. Who will produce and operate these radio stations, even if they have to prepare radio operators from draftees with 1-3 education classes?

Before the Second World War, the USSR produced more than 20 thousand tanks of several types. Approximately the same number of combat aircraft. And other, quite difficult to manufacture, military equipment produced quite a few. For this, the USSR also had to train a large number of specialists. As for the shortage of automobiles, aviation gasoline, a radio station and other things in the Red Army, in this case there were serious errors / omissions on the part of the heads of the respective people's commissariats and representatives of the highest political leadership of the USSR who supervised these commissariats.

It was not the warehouses that were close to the border, but the Germans traveled these 500-600 km too quickly. But it is impossible to take the warehouses even further - the number of cars and tractors required for transportation on an increased shoulder is growing, plus daily rates of mileage must be taken into account.

The Red Army troops located in the western military districts of the USSR were divided into 3 groups. As a result, the Germans were able to destroy these 3 groups separately. Apparently, not long before the German attack on the USSR, the top leadership of the USSR considered the probability of such an attack too low. Otherwise, the bulk of those located in the western military districts would be located somewhere near the old border of the USSR, and closer to the border would be visible not large mobile units whose responsibilities would include supporting border guards with withdrawal to the main forces of the Red Army, constant transmission of information about the upcoming the enemy, the destruction of bridges in order to delay the advance of the Germans.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: NF68

Before the Second World War, the USSR produced more than 20 thousand tanks of several types. Approximately the same number of combat aircraft. And other, quite difficult to manufacture, military equipment produced quite a few. For this, the USSR also had to train a large number of specialists.

You see what gave, the Soviet Union at least had frames for working with iron and wood. And then, as a result of their work, the Red Army received tanks that had to be started with a fire extinguisher in hand, and aircraft with falling wings and engines that failed through 8-12 hours of operation.
Moreover, tanks could make these shots. But the high-speed tractor, which GAU and GABTU in 30 constantly asked for, could neither design, manufacture, nor copy.
But with electronics in the USSR, everything was extremely bad. No, the industry could produce large piece and small-scale radio stations. But as soon as it came to small large-scale r / s - that's all, either we can’t, or at the output we get such that the crews simply can’t use it.

during the movement of the BT tank, the reception quality deteriorates significantly until the complete loss of communication ...

the communication range of the radio stations was up to 50 km in the telegraphic mode at a standstill, while the communication range fell to 30 km in the telegraphic mode and 15 km in the telephone mode

© Ulanov / Shein

[NF68]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: NF68

Before the Second World War, the USSR produced more than 20 thousand tanks of several types. Approximately the same number of combat aircraft. And other, quite difficult to manufacture, military equipment produced quite a few. For this, the USSR also had to train a large number of specialists.

You see what gave, the Soviet Union at least had frames for working with iron and wood. And then, as a result of their work, the Red Army received tanks that had to be started with a fire extinguisher in hand, and aircraft with falling wings and engines that failed through 8-12 hours of operation.
Moreover, tanks could make these shots. But the high-speed tractor, which GAU and GABTU in 30 constantly asked for, could neither design, manufacture, nor copy.
But with electronics in the USSR, everything was extremely bad. No, the industry could produce large piece and small-scale radio stations. But as soon as it came to small large-scale r / s - that's all, either we can’t, or at the output we get such that the crews simply can’t use it.

during the movement of the BT tank, the reception quality deteriorates significantly until the complete loss of communication ...

the communication range of the radio stations was up to 50 km in the telegraphic mode at a standstill, while the communication range fell to 30 km in the telegraphic mode and 15 km in the telephone mode

© Ulanov / Shein

I do not argue. But in this case, there were errors in the planning of the work of the people's commissariats and in the training of the necessary specialists. The same applies to oil refining, but in the end it turned out what happened.

[Shurale]

Puchkov - the goblin has a video revealing this topic.

[Lieutenant Colonel of the USSR Air Force in stock]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

They didn’t need to be built ... it was necessary on the contrary to be taken away from under strikes at a distance where neither the aircraft nor the enemy’s artillery could reach the main forces, airfields, depots, namely, along the old line of defense, and further into the depth of defense because there was no new yet.
Initially, it was necessary to detain border troops, fortified areas and mobile groups with the support of the allotted air and art units ...

These two paragraphs are mutually exclusive. If we take aviation beyond the old border, then we give the sky over the new SD backlash. Because the new SDs are built in the border strip. A battle radius the main fighter of the Red Army - I-16 - only 110-130 km. That is, air support of mobile and stationary defense in the foreground can be forgotten.
The real radius of the Red Army fighters can be estimated by Cover Plans:

the second departure of bomber aircraft, inflict a ular on the enemy airfields and bases located in the second zone to the line of Koenigsberg, Marienburg, Thorn, Lodz. For this purpose, airplanes of the SB, PE-2, and AR-2 type can be used, of which we have 122 links; to solve this problem, 132 links are required, 10 links are missing. Fighter aircraft cannot accompany bombers when performing this task, their range of action does not allow;

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

In addition, the troops did not prepare much for mobile defense, but prepared for a positional war.

But how can you prepare for mobile defense units in which artillery is slower than infantry? The artillery towing speed of the rifle division is 3-5 km / h. But the basis of the SD firepower is precisely its two artillery regiments.
And I don’t remember her about the extremely bad situation with vehicles - both in terms of the lack of trucks in general (especially the ZIS-5 and 6), and in terms of the lack of serviceable cars and spare parts for repairs.

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

It is about building a third line, probably in 1941-42.

On the diagram there are terms of construction:

In the lower right corner is a plate with a layout according to how many and what structures should be built and how much it will cost. Judging by the table, the first phase of construction was to be completed by June 1, 1942, an intermediate stage by January 1, 1942.

***
1. The Germans did not have strategic aviation. They could not bomb far away from the front line.
2. The withdrawal of aviation would allow it to be maintained for support, and not substitute it for destruction in the very first hours of the war at airfields.
3. The withdrawal of the main forces would allow them to be maintained for support, and not substitute them for destruction in the very first hours of the war in the barracks and military towns in the zones of destruction by artillery and aircraft ..
4. Your "That is, you can forget about air support for mobile and stationary defense in the foreground."
And so it was at the beginning of the war.
"In total, by June 23, 1941, the Germans declared 322 aircraft destroyed in the air and 1489 - on the ground, as a result of air strikes. Ours declared about 22 enemy aircraft destroyed on June 300. And yet the number of our aircraft destroyed by the Germans is much less losses of our aviation, which, only in the western districts and fleets, had about 16000 aircraft. Of these, about 11000 were in the covering forces. But on July 10, the air force of the active army totaled only about 2200 aircraft. And the Germans, by this number, announced the destruction about 3200 of our planes. Paradoxically, but the main losses, about 9000 cars, our aviation suffered not in the air, but on the ground. It turned out that these planes were simply abandoned at the airfields. No, most of the machines were impossible to use. Which does honor to our grandfathers And the Germans sent them to be melted down. But the fact remains the fact. And in the report to Goering, according to the results of the first day of the war, it is indicated about the wreckage of 2000 Soviet aircraft captured by the Wehrmacht.territory. "http://back-in-ussr.com/2016/08/kuda-delas-nasha-aviaciya-220641.html
If the advanced units of army aviation were based too close to the border - 10-30 km., Then the units of front-line and long-range aviation were too far away - from 500 to 900 km. https://russian7.ru/post/5-oshibok-sovetskogo-komandovaniya-v-nach/
There are still a lot of miscalculations in the MTO, fuels and lubricants and other, and other ...
It’s a pity we didn’t command you, otherwise it would be with our knowledge of military art, and taking into account what we learned on the internet ....

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

1. The Germans did not have strategic aviation. They could not bomb far away from the front line.

Surely Kiev, Gorky, Yaroslavl and Poltava were front-line cities?

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

The withdrawal of aviation would allow it to be maintained for support, and not substitute it for destruction in the very first hours of the war at airfields.

The withdrawal of aviation deprives of air cover and support of the forces deployed in the foreground. And it makes it possible for the Germans to calmly open the positions and movement of the "mobile" detachments, adjust the artillery fire and deliver air strikes.
In addition, the withdrawal of aviation only postpones its destruction - just a "meat grinder" will move from the border to the line of the old border. There was no mass destruction of our air force in the first hours at the airfields - the Germans methodically and systematically, for several days, knocked out our aircraft in the air and at airfields.

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

Which, only in the western districts and fleets, had about 16000 aircraft. Of these, about 11000 are in the cover forces.

It is not iron that counts, but the crews. And here the USSR is pretty bad.
Number of crews capable of simultaneously flying into the air, by districts:
LVO: 830
Surf: 711
CALL: 973
KOVO: 1227
Air defense: 482
Total: 4223 crews
Why so few? And because part of the air regiments had a double set of equipment with one set of pilots. The other part did not have equipment at all, waiting for it from the factories, but was already equipped with personnel. That is, formally, the pilots seem to be only a little short on the available planes, but in reality - there are either planes on which there is no one to fly, or there are pilots who have nothing to fly on.
In addition, in the USSR, despite the norm of "two crews per car", in fact the number of pilots and crews trained for specific types of aircraft was less than the number of these aircraft. And this was the case not only with new cars, but also with old ones. So there is technology, but there is no one to fly.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

If intelligence is so well informed about the German grouping, then within a day or two, with the redeployment of German connections to the border, it will be possible to redeploy our units to field positions, withdraw construction battalions from the border, disperse aviation ...

Any military professional will laugh at this enchanting stupidity, because such throwing of our troops will only lead to confusion, and the consequences will be even worse than those that may arise when performing the actions prescribed by him with a cover plan, for which a special cover plan is created.

[Alexander Greene]

Quote: svp67

Again, I return you to point 2, there is already a certain limitation.

Clause # 2 prescribed: Everyone should be on alert and not sleep "without hind legs" in the barracks. The surviving eyewitnesses told how the Germans cut and strangled the sleeping Red Army soldiers. The whole country was preparing for the war, and the fact that the Western District slept through the beginning of the war was a criminal negligence and maybe a betrayal of the command of the Western District, not Stalin.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene writes:

It should be noted that even in the evening of June 21, the German command did not rule out the possibility of refusing to attack the USSR, disguising preparations for a full-scale war under separate provocations at the border.

This fantasy of the author is completely refuted by the signal "Dortmund", which was delivered to the troops at 13 o'clock Berlin time, and after that no one could postpone the attack, since the entire war machine of Germany was in motion. Cancellation of the attack would lead to the disclosure of Germany's plans at the initial stage of the war, and would allow our leadership to take adequate countermeasures.

Since the initial PM included disinformation, the analysis of the situation was not reliable.

It is easy to refute this stupidity by the fact that on June 21 the date of the attack was precisely determined - June 22-23, about which all border districts and the NKVMF were notified by directive b / n. What else prevented the districts from quickly raising troops of at least border divisions, and having time to withdraw combat units from the RPM?

An erroneous analysis of the materials was superimposed on an incorrect assessment of the required number of German divisions required for a full-scale war with the USSR.

And intelligence, and what if the operational management is engaged in such analysis, which has complete information about the state of its own troops and their combat readiness? The author seems to have vague ideas about the tasks that are solved by different general staff administrations.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene writes

The article showed that in five documents from September 1940 to June 22, 1941, the number of troops that Germany should put up against the USSR was 173-200 divisions. There is not a single pre-war document that says that to attack Germany, it would be enough to set up 120-124 divisions in the initial period!

This is a dubious statement by the author, which can be refuted at least by the "Review of the" War in the West "(10.5-25.5.40), prepared by the 5th Directorate of the Red Army (later RU GSh KA), which states that Germany mobilized an army in 8 million people, deployed 200 divisions, of which 125-130 divisions were concentrated on the Western Front.Based on this ratio of Germany's mobilization capabilities in 1940, having assessed the situation in our General Staff, we could assume quite accurately that such forces, and possibly more , will be deployed against the USSR after the defeat of France.
So the author misleads readers that we did not know about what troops Germany could attract against the USSR at the end of 1940, based on the experience of conducting military operations on the Western Front.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene writes

Information on the actual arrival of German divisions to the border as of April 19 or 25 could not be found. It is only known that from April 4 to May 15, 1941 (in 32 days) 24 divisions arrived. Therefore, we can say that the Republic of Moldova from the NKVD border troops also included disinformation planted by the Germans.

They searched poorly, since they could not find anything:

Special communication RU №660448ss 26.04.41/XNUMX/XNUMX

“... As of April 25.04, the total number of German troops on the western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova) is 95-100 divisions ..., of which:

a) ... against Pribovo 21 – 22 divisions, of which: ... 3 md, 1 etc ...

b) ... against SECOVO - 28 divisions, of which: ... 1 md and 4 etc ...

... Against KOVO - 29 – 32 divisions, of which: ... 3 md, 4 etc ... In the region of Carpathian Ukraine 3 division ... Against OdVO - 8 – 9 divisions ...

https://topwar.ru/120030-neozhidannaya-voyna-gitlerovskoy-germanii-s-sssr-chast-2.html

[Lieutenant Colonel of the USSR Air Force in stock]

Quote: Alexey RA

Surely Kiev, Gorky, Yaroslavl and Poltava were front-line cities?

Bombers on 22.06.1941/935/732 Eastern Front– 528/88 (281Ju-111 * + 126He-17 * + XNUMXDo-XNUMX *) within the reach of which these cities could be, but point targets could be exposed to attacks inside and outside the cities, due to the radius of combat use, the ratio of fuel and bomb load at such a distance:
Ju-88 * radius of 759-800 km no more than 1500-1200 kg
He-111 * radius of 575 km no more than 1500-2000 kg
Do-17 * radius of 650 km no more than 1000 kg
but these bombers are medium-sized bombers, not strategic ones. They were able to quickly destroy the entire infrastructure at such distances.
Therefore, on June 22.06.1941, 66, XNUMX airfields in the reach zone and other important objects were exposed.
The withdrawal from the blow of the Soviet troops and, in particular, aviation was necessary. What would you suggest?
Despite the fact that on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX Soviet aviation on the Eastern Front was
- 4720 fighters, including 1030 MiG-3 and Yak-1;
- 3583 bomber, incl. 205 Pe-2 and 9 TB-7;
- a total of 8303 combat aircraft, with a CTG - a total of 0,85, 7057,
and German on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX aviation on the Eastern Front was
- fighters - 848/683 (633 Bf-109 F + 215 Bf-109 E).
- bombers - 935/732 (528Ju-88 + 281He-111 + 126Do-17).
- dive bombers (Ju-87) - 309/220.
- multi-purpose (Me-110) - 183
Total 2275.
3,1: 1 ratio

[Lieutenant Colonel of the USSR Air Force in stock]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

1. The Germans did not have strategic aviation. They could not bomb far away from the front line.

Surely Kiev, Gorky, Yaroslavl and Poltava were front-line cities?

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

The withdrawal of aviation would allow it to be maintained for support, and not substitute it for destruction in the very first hours of the war at airfields.

The withdrawal of aviation deprives of air cover and support of the forces deployed in the foreground. And it makes it possible for the Germans to calmly open the positions and movement of the "mobile" detachments, adjust the artillery fire and deliver air strikes.
In addition, the withdrawal of aviation only postpones its destruction - just a "meat grinder" will move from the border to the line of the old border. There was no mass destruction of our air force in the first hours at the airfields - the Germans methodically and systematically, for several days, knocked out our aircraft in the air and at airfields.

Quote: Lieutenant Colonel of the USSRF Air Force in reserve

Which, only in the western districts and fleets, had about 16000 aircraft. Of these, about 11000 are in the cover forces.

It is not iron that counts, but the crews. And here the USSR is pretty bad.
Number of crews capable of simultaneously flying into the air, by districts:
LVO: 830
Surf: 711
CALL: 973
KOVO: 1227
Air defense: 482
Total: 4223 crews
Why so few? And because part of the air regiments had a double set of equipment with one set of pilots. The other part did not have equipment at all, waiting for it from the factories, but was already equipped with personnel. That is, formally, the pilots seem to be only a little short on the available planes, but in reality - there are either planes on which there is no one to fly, or there are pilots who have nothing to fly on.
In addition, in the USSR, despite the norm of "two crews per car", in fact the number of pilots and crews trained for specific types of aircraft was less than the number of these aircraft. And this was the case not only with new cars, but also with old ones. So there is technology, but there is no one to fly.

Certainly, the one you cited took place. And here is the look of the enemy:
https://mihalchuk-1974.livejournal.com/438217.html
When you try to summarize the general impression of the German aviation, army and navy officers about the Soviet air force in 1941, the following picture emerges:
1. The Soviet Air Force was used exclusively to support the actions of the ground forces, and the air units in carrying out these missions sometimes showed commendable aggressiveness and a certain vigor. Their failure was due primarily to the fact that the Luftwaffe achieved air supremacy.
2. The Soviet Air Forces during this phase of the company were inferior to the German and were forced to confine themselves to defensive operations. Nevertheless, in certain parts of the front, at certain periods, the Russians had superiority in the air, which more influenced the emotions of the German army commanders than the overall picture.
3. The weakness of the Soviet Air Force was mainly due to the following factors:
a) the loss of a large number of aircraft on the ground and in the air during the first unexpected German attack;
b) insufficient tactical, flight and general training of the Soviet flight personnel and the lack of combat experience;
c) the backwardness of the aircraft fleet, weapons and other equipment at the beginning of the campaign;
d) the destruction of the Soviet ground service as a result of the fighting, the loss of airfields during the rapid advance of the German ground forces.
4. The fact that the Soviet Air Force was several times superior to the Luftwaffe was a complete and unpleasant surprise for the German commanders. In this regard, the Luftwaffe High Command fatally miscalculated. Their numerical superiority did not lead at the considered stage of the war to negative results for German aviation for the reasons described above.
5. Towards the end of 1941, signs of a gradual recovery of the Russian Air Force after summer losses began to intensify. The early advance of harsh land greatly helped this process.
6. Soviet anti-aircraft artillery, as well as other air defense units, often acted extremely efficiently and quickly came to their senses after the first shock. They were significantly more combat-ready than the High Command of the Luftwaffe

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

In the figures below, fragments of the map will be presented. Archive map scanned on a fairly large scale and with magnification, some inscriptions are not particularly clearly visible. Therefore, the author on the map in blue font additionally marks all the inscriptions and symbols. As illustrations on fragments, drawings with the actual presence of German troops on the eve of the war are additionally placed.

The author apparently did not pay attention to the fact that it says "Position of the sides by the beginning of hostilities on 21.6.1941/21.6.1941/21", and the date of creation is 22/22/XNUMX. This immediately suggests that the author is inexperienced in assessing such documents, because on June XNUMX, no one knew that on June XNUMX, BATTLE ACTIONS would take place, which means that the map, by definition, could not have been created in the intelligence department of PribOVO on the eve of the war and had such a name. I can only assume that this map was created much later on June XNUMX, and it was created in order to somehow justify the defeat of the troops and not in the intelligence department, but most likely in the operational department of the district headquarters. It is from such nuances that one can conclude how unprofessional the author is in assessing military documents, and in his false interpretation of the events of those days, he can mislead readers. That is why it is necessary to be skeptical about his "conclusions" - he makes them too unprofessionally.

[pafegosoff]

"By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Admiral Kuznetsov made a significant contribution to strengthening the combat power, to increasing the combat readiness of the forces and means of the Navy. On the eve of the German attack on the USSR, he took effective measures to increase the combat readiness of the fleets, and on the night of June 22, he gave the order to bring them to full combat readiness, which made it possible to avoid losses of ships and naval aviation. "
But Zhukov ignored Stalin’s order to bring troops into full combat readiness and profiled millions of soldiers and half of the USSR.
It is precisely for this that Zhukov absolutely hated both Kuznetsov and Alexander Golovanov, on whom he recouped after the war ...

[Nagaibak]

pafegosoff "And Zhukov ignored Stalin's order to bring the troops to full combat readiness and wasted millions of soldiers and half of the USSR."
Full game.)))

[ccsr]

Quote: Nagaibak

Full game.)))

I completely agree with the assessment. This should be considered at the level of psychiatrists, not people who know history.

[ccsr]

Quote: pafegosoff

But Zhukov ignored Stalin’s order to bring troops into full combat readiness and profiled millions of soldiers and half of the USSR.

Was Zhukov the Commissar of Defense? Or did the one-man management in the Red Army not exist in 1941? Or wasn’t he appointed to the post of the NSS 5 months before the start of the war?
It may be enough to replicate stories about his personal fault for all the defeats in the initial period of the war, or at least to understand correctly the role of each commander in what happened in 1941. Maybe then it will be possible to more objectively assess the role of Zhukov himself as a historical person.

[phair]

One of the reasons that the war began on June 22, and not earlier, is the resistance of the Yugoslav army (not Poles and not Czechs with the French and Limes). They fought until 1945. And not symbolically, the Wehrmacht lieutenant general (Russian Jew) died on May 9, 1945, in Yugoslavia, yes:

https://news.rambler.ru/other/40468499-kak-russkiy-evrey-boris-shteyfon-stal-nemetskim-generalom-vermahta/

[Nagaibak]

phair "Lieutenant General of the Wehrmacht (Russian Jew) died on May 9, 1945."
in the GSVG, one driver of a garbage truck leaving the unit on a German street accidentally hooked a German grandfather who was riding a velisiped ..... grandfather died ...... building in the parade ground ... the poor guy drove his head down in the middle of the parade ground .. Kompolka yelling from the rostrum pointing at him ........ Old German ... senior citizen !!!!!!!! during the war he was a tanker in the SS !!!!!!! several times it was hit and burned in the Tiger !! captured !!!!! went through all the horrors of the Soviet camps !!!! miraculously half-dead returned home !!!!!! and so!!!!!!!! 40 years later, at the threshold of his own house in his hometown, he perishes under the wheels of a Soviet shit carrier !!!!
HOW IT'S CALLED????
* silence, the polkan wipes his forehead and softly whispers bass:
I call it - RETURN!

[Sergei Novozhilov]

General Pavlov did not comply with Directive No. 1. Actually, the true story with this directive on bringing troops into full combat readiness is still hidden. For example, only now has the information been declassified that US President Roosevelt knew about the impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This helped him rekindle the fury of Americans who wanted to sit out on their island.

[Jurkovs]

I think the effect of misinformation is still secondary. Intentions must match capabilities. This is an axiom of geopolitics. The intentions of Germany were completely revealed by foreign intelligence, right up to the date of the attack. This should not be a complaint to the NKVD. And Stalin himself was sure of the inevitability of war. But the real capabilities of Germany had to reveal the military intelligence of the General Staff. And there was a complete failure. From their data it did not follow that Germany could attack at any moment. And in this I see the complete blame of the General Staff and its leaders from Yegorov to Zhukov. Talk about the mobility of mechanized formations remained hanging in the air, in practice no one looked in that direction. The Polish and French Wehrmacht companies from this side were not analyzed. Apparently the General Staff did not orient the GRU, but through it and their agents, about what to look for. As a result, areas in the depths of Poland were practically not considered, and the agents did not see the development of the attack infrastructure at point blank range, she was only interested in the movement of troops in the border zone, and she simply did not notice the jump airfields, fuel depots, dug and empty gun courtyards. As a result, they completely missed the opportunity to quickly transport mechanized units along a developed network of roads to the border and enter the battle the very next day. In the post-war period, and in fact still the causes of the disaster of 41 years, are concealed from the people. Corporate solidarity, the military really does not want to blame themselves, even if in the future they became the Marshals of Victory. This partly explains why the army supported Khrushchev in seizing power and shifting all the blame to Stalin. Cadres decide everything. This was said by Stalin, but apparently he did not follow too much. The selection and placement of personnel is Stalin's fault in the disaster for 41 years. The rest is on the conscience of the generals.

[icant007]

Here statistics come into their own: one memory cannot be considered true, if four others speak otherwise. Rather, it is the other way around ... Memories can be considered authentic only if they are confirmed by documents or other memories of war veterans.

And didn’t you think that the memories of one participant could be more accurate for the reason that he was closer to the events described?

For example, who could better describe the events in the 4th Army band in June 1941, if not Sandalov, the chief of staff.