Military Review

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - the policy of pragmatism

The Munich Agreement, about which we wrote in the last article, untied Hitler's hands.
After Czechoslovakia, Romania became the next victim.

15 March 1939 German troops invaded Czechoslovakia and approached a cannon-shot near the Romanian borders. The next day, Hitler demanded that Romania immediately sign an economic agreement with the most favorable concessions in favor of Germany. Romanian envoy in London V. Thiel even stated in the English Foreign Office that Germany presented an ultimatum to Romania demanding to agree to the German monopoly in Romanian trade and economy, otherwise Romania was threatened with dismemberment by analogy with Czechoslovakia and becoming a protectorate [ 1].

On March 18, the USSR Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov informed the British ambassador to Russia, Shidsu, that the Soviet government was proposing to convene a meeting of representatives from the USSR, Britain, France, Poland and Romania. 19 March Halifax told the Soviet plenipotentiary in London that the convening of a conference proposed by the Soviet government would be “premature.” This Soviet proposal was also transmitted to the French government, but no response was received from France at all [2].

23 March 1939 was signed the German-Romanian Treaty in Bucharest. Romania pledged to develop its economy in accordance with the needs of Germany. The contract determined the amount of German trade credits and military supplies of Romania (250 million German marks). The creation of Romanian ports and other strategic points of "free zones" for the construction of German warehouses, oil storages and other objects was envisaged. Germany was granted the right to build railways and highways in Romania at its discretion [3].

The next victim was Lithuania. After the end of the First World War, Memel (the Lithuanian name Klaipeda) and the Memel region, which was part of East Prussia, were under the collective control of the Entente countries. In 1922, Memel received the status of a “free city”, as did Danzig (Gdańsk). In 1923, the Lithuanian government provoked a “popular uprising” in Memele. The “people”, consisting of disguised Lithuanian soldiers, demanded that the region be annexed to Lithuania, which was eventually realized. 12 December 1938 of the year in Klaipeda held elections to the city government, which resulted in the victory of the "German party", which declared the residents' desire to reunite with Germany.

Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - the policy of pragmatism

On March 20, 1939, the Lithuanian government adopted the ultimatum of Berlin on the annexation of Memel and the Memel region to Germany - in exchange for a “free zone” in the port and a “most favored nation treatment” in German-Lithuanian trade. German entered the city TanksHitler came and made a speech. Memel became a major German naval base [4].

Next was to be the turn of Poland.
After the First World War, Gdansk under the Versailles Peace Treaty (1919) received the status of a free city and was under the control of the League of Nations. The treaty also transferred territories to Poland, which gave it access to Danzig, the so-called The Danzig Corridor (or Polish Corridor), which separated East Prussia from Germany. Most of the city’s population (95%) were Germans, but the Poles were entitled to their own institutions, such as schools, libraries, etc. In addition, the Versailles Treaty gave Poland the management of Danzig’s foreign affairs and the management of the free city rail service.

During negotiations at the Versailles Conference of 1919, then British Prime Minister Lloyd George warned that the transfer of more than 2 million Germans under the power of the Poles "must sooner or later lead to a new war in Eastern Europe" [5]. English author M. Follik wrote in 1929 that “... of all the more German in Germany, Danzig is the most German ... Sooner or later the Polish corridor would be the cause of a future war. If Poland does not return the corridor, it must be ready for the most disastrous war with Germany, for anarchy and, possibly, for a return to the state of slavery, from which only recently it was liberated ”[5].

Joachim Fest in the third volume of Hitler’s biography “Adolf Hitler” writes that Hitler spoke with the commander-in-chief of the German ground forces Brauchitsch 25 in March talking about the undesirability of forcibly resolving the Danzig issue, but still considered a military action against Poland worthy of discussion, with “especially favorable political prerequisites "

On March 21, the English Ambassador in Moscow, Seeds, presented the draft declaration of the USSR, England, France and Poland to the USSR Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov, which read as follows [6]:

We, the undersigned, duly authorized, hereby declare that, since peace and security in Europe are a matter of common interests and concerns, and since European peace and security can be affected by any actions that threaten the political independence of any European state, our respective governments hereby undertake to immediately confer on the steps that must be taken to general resistance to such actions.

However, already 23 March 1939, Chamberlain in the House of Commons declared that “he does not want to create opposing blocs in Europe”. The declaration was never signed.
Chamberlain still treated the Soviet Union with deep hostility. The writer Feiling in his book “The Life of Neville Chamberlain” quotes the following statement of the English Prime Minister in a personal letter from March 26 of 1939: “I must confess my deepest distrust of Russia, I don’t believe in her ability to conduct successful offensive actions, even if she wanted to. And I do not trust her motives ”[7].

1 April 1939, the world press reported that Chamberlain’s cabinet, having abandoned the policy of appeasement, gave Poland a promise to protect it in the event of an attack.

April 13 similar guarantees were given by England to Greece and Romania [8].
The British government offered the USSR to give Poland and Romania the same one-sided guarantee that Great Britain gave Romania and Greece.
A little earlier, on April 11, Litvinov wrote to the Soviet ambassador to France, Y.Z. Suritsu [9]

It is now necessary to be especially precise and contentious with the words in the negotiations on our position in connection with modern problems ... After stories about the joint declaration in conversations with us, the British and French did not even contain hints of any specific proposal for any agreement with us ... It turns out the desire of England and France, without entering into any agreements with us and not undertaking any obligations towards us, to get some promises from us.
We are told that it is in our interests to defend Poland and Romania against Germany. But we will always be aware of our interests and will do what they dictate to us. Why should we pledge in advance, without taking any benefit for ourselves from these obligations?

Not without reason, previous events gave Hitler a reason to think that England would not fight for Poland. Moreover, in 1939, Great Britain practically had no land army. As we know, this is what happened - after the German attack on Poland, England declared war on the Third Reich, but did not render any real help to the Poles.

11 April 1939, Hitler approved the plan of attack on Poland (the Weiss plan) [10].
Here is the first point of the plan:

The position of Germany towards Poland still proceeds from the principle: to avoid complications. If Poland changes the policy towards Germany based so far on the same principle and takes a threatening position, then it will be necessary to settle the final scores, despite the current treaty.
The goal would then be the destruction of Poland’s military power and the creation of a situation in the East that would meet the country's defense needs. The free city of Danzig will be declared German territory immediately after the start of the conflict.
The political leadership considers it its task to isolate Poland as far as possible in this case, i.e., limit the war to military operations with Poland.
The intensification of the internal crisis in France and the consequent restraint of England in the near future could lead to the creation of such a situation.
The intervention of Russia, if it were capable of this, would in all likelihood not help Poland, since this would mean its destruction by Bolshevism.
The position of the Limits will be determined exclusively by the military requirements of Germany.
The German side cannot count on Hungary as an unconditional ally. The position of Italy is determined by the axis of Berlin - Rome.

27 April England introduced universal conscription. In his speech on April 28 1939, broadcast on almost the whole world, Hitler said that the Anglo-Polish treaty is evidence of the “environment policy” conducted by England against Germany, and setting Poland against it. As a result, according to Hitler, by concluding an anti-German treaty with England, Poland itself violated the terms of the German-Polish non-aggression pact 1934 of the year. Set up more decisively than Czechoslovakia, the Polish government did not succumb to the threat of Hitler, and began to mobilize. Hitler and this used to accuse Poland of aggressiveness, saying that the military preparations of Poland forced him to mobilize his troops.

On April 14, French Foreign Minister J. Bonnet proposed the USSR to exchange letters of the following content [11]:

In the event that France, as a result of the assistance it renders to Poland or Romania, is in a state of war with Germany, the USSR will render it immediate assistance and support. In the event that the USSR, as a result of the assistance it renders to Poland and Romania, is in a state of war with Germany, France will render the USSR immediate assistance and support.
Both states will immediately agree on this assistance and will take all measures to ensure its full effectiveness. ”

The feeling of an imminent war forced the French to change their arrogant policy towards the USSR. Here is what Suritz wrote when he handed the letter to Bonn to Moscow [9]:
The attacks in the press have disappeared, not a trace of the former arrogance in conversations with us. They speak with us rather in the language of the petitioners, ... as people, in us, and not we, those in need. It seems to me that these are not only “maneuvers”, ... but the consciousness ... that the war has begun. It seems to me that this view is held now by Daladier. Daladier (according to our friends) sincerely now seeks cooperation with the USSR

In response to the French and English initiatives of 17 on April 1939, Moscow proposed to conclude an English-French-Soviet agreement on mutual assistance of the following content [11]:

1. England, France, and the USSR enter into an agreement for the duration of 5 — 10 years for the mutual obligation to render each other immediately all possible assistance, including military, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states.
2. Britain, France, the USSR undertake to render all possible assistance, including military assistance, to the Eastern European states located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the USSR in the event of aggression against these states.
3. Britain, France and the USSR undertake to promptly discuss and establish the size and form of military assistance provided by each of these states in pursuance of §1 and §2.
4. The English government clarifies that the aid it promised Poland would mean aggression exclusively from Germany.
5. The existing treaty between Poland and Romania is declared to be in force for any aggression against Poland and Romania, or is canceled altogether as directed against the USSR.
6. After the opening of hostilities, Britain, France and the USSR undertake not to enter into any negotiations whatsoever and not to make peace with the aggressors separately from each other and without common agreement of all three powers.
7. The relevant agreement is signed simultaneously with the convention, which has to be worked out by virtue of §3.
8. Recognize the necessity for England, France and the USSR to enter into joint negotiations with Turkey on a special agreement on mutual assistance.

France 25 April agreed to these proposals. In this case, the French government made comments on the Soviet proposals. Note numbers correspond to paragraph numbers in a previous document [12].

1. The agreement, which the French government considers extremely urgent and which should give an immediate effect, is caused by the threats hanging now over the European world. The very fact of his rapid imprisonment would contribute to strengthening the solidarity of all the threatened peoples, would increase the chances of preserving peace. One may fear that it will take too much time to conclude a long pact of general mutual assistance, which could be interpreted by some countries as evidence of hesitation or disagreement between the three powers. At. In all circumstances, the conclusion of such a pact is a matter that requires a long time. And now we need to act as quickly as possible and reflect the possibilities of the next weeks or the next month.
2. In order to avoid any controversies {{* Disagreements (Fr.).}} It would be preferable that the intended agreement does not contain any references to one or another category of geographically refined states. The agreement should be limited to the obligation of assistance that the three states provide to each other in precisely defined circumstances. This kind of restriction would only strengthen the force. and the value of the obligation taken and at the same time would prevent any reaction from third parties who are constrained by preventive stiplyus {{** Conditions in the agreement (Fr.).}} for help.
3. The French government agrees that as soon as possible it will start to consider the issues covered by this paragraph.
4. This article applies exclusively to the British government.
5. Based on the reasons stated in connection with art. 2, it would be undesirable to include an article on behalf of third countries in the projected agreement. Taking into account, however, that the Polish-Romanian agreement was concluded ergomnomés {{*** Relative to all.}}, The French government is fully inclined to use all its influence in Warsaw and Bucharest to encourage both states to expand their practical application the conclusion of a convention that would provide for a case of aggression by Germany.
[Pp.] 6, 7 and 8 are not objected to by the French government. ”

The British were not ready for cooperation.
April 19 1939. At a meeting of the English government committee on foreign policy, a note was discussed by the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Cadogan, where he wrote [13]:

This Russian proposal puts us in an extremely difficult position.
What we must do is to weigh the advantage of Russia's written commitment to enter the war on our side and the disadvantages of an open alliance with Russia.
The advantage is at least problematic. From the messages of our embassy in Moscow, it is clear that, while Russia can successfully defend its territory, it cannot, if it even wished, provide useful and active assistance outside its borders.
However, it is very difficult to refuse the Soviet proposal. We have argued that the Soviets preach “collective security,” but do not make any practical suggestions. Now they have made such proposals and will criticize us if we reject them.
There is a risk - albeit a very remote one - that if we reject this proposal, the Soviets may enter into some kind of “non-interference agreement” with the German government [. . . ] "

26 April at a meeting of the English government, Foreign Minister Lord E. Halifax said that "the time is not ripe for such a comprehensive proposal."
England, according to her proposal from 8 in May and the statements of Halifax, was ready to cooperate to some extent with the USSR in the fight against aggression only if Germany committed aggression against Poland or Romania and the latter resisted the aggressor. However, the British government did not want to conclude an Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement on mutual assistance against aggression, according to which it would be obliged to assist the Soviet Union in the event of an attack on him.
Naturally, the USSR refused such a variant of the treaty. A note from the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the British Ambassador to the USSR 14 in May stated [20]:

The English proposals do not contain the principle of reciprocity in relation to the USSR and put it in an unequal position, since they do not provide for the obligation of Britain and France to guarantee the USSR in case of a direct attack on it by the aggressors, while England, France, as well as and Poland, have such a guarantee on the basis of the reciprocity existing between them.

V.M. Molotov

Since May 3, Vyacheslav Molotov has already been People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Litvinov was an active supporter of rapprochement with the West and the enemy of Germany. Historian W. Shearer believes that Litvinov’s fate was decided on 19 in March - after the British rejected the proposal of the USSR to hold a conference in connection with the German ultimatum of Romania [14]:

Obviously, the desire for further negotiations with Britain after such a refusal was diminished by the Russians. Maysky later said to Robert Boothby, a member of parliament from the Conservative Party, that the rejection of the Russian proposals was regarded as another crushing blow to the collective security policy and that this decided the fate of Litvinov.

Obviously, after this, Stalin began to think about concluding an agreement with Germany, for which he needed a tough and pragmatic politician who was not so irreconcilable about Germany as Litvinov did. Such a politician was Molotov.

One of the few voices of reason in the then British politics was the staunch anti-communist Winston Churchill.
This is what he said in the May 19 Commons [15]:

I just can not understand what are the objections to the conclusion of an agreement with Russia, which the Prime Minister himself seems to want, against his conclusion in the broad and simple form proposed by the Russian Soviet government?
.. What's wrong with this simple sentence? They say: “Can we trust the Russian Soviet government?” I think Moscow says: “Can we trust Chamberlain?” We can say, I hope, that both questions should be answered in the affirmative. I sincerely hope so ...
If you are ready to become allies of Russia during the war, during the greatest test, a great chance to prove yourself to everyone, if you are ready to unite with Russia in defense of Poland, which you guaranteed, and also in defense of Romania, then why do not you want to become allies of Russia now, when by this you can perhaps prevent a war? I do not understand all these subtleties of diplomacy and delays. If the worst happens, you will still find yourself with them in the crucible of events and you will have to get out with them as far as possible. If difficulties do not arise, you will be provided with security at the preliminary stage ...

After the resignation of Litvinov, Hitler, for the first time in six years of his rule, expressed a desire to listen to his experts on Russia. From their report, Hitler learned a lot for himself new, in particular - that the USSR now adheres not to the policy of world revolution, but to a more pragmatic course of power.
Hitler's interest in Russia increased. After watching a documentary about the Soviet military parades, the Führer exclaimed: "I didn’t know at all that Stalin was such a nice and strong personality." German diplomats were given a command to continue probing the possibility of rapprochement with the USSR. [16]
Information that Germany is going to intensify relations with the USSR reached England. Hearing of this, Halifax declared that “one should not have much confidence in such messages, which, quite possibly, are spread by people who want to push us towards a pact with Russia” [17]
Against this background, the British decided to begin negotiations with Germany. June 9 British Ambassador to Germany Henderson visited Goering and told him that if Germany wished to enter into negotiations with England, she would receive a “non-unfriendly response”. 13 June Henderson met with the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, Weizsäcker, who, in the recordings of this conversation, noted that the English ambassador "clearly having instructions, spoke of London’s readiness to negotiate with Berlin ... criticized English policy in Moscow" and " attaches no importance to the pact with Russia ”[17].

Summer negotiations of the USSR with England and France

The current situation forced 6 — 7 of June Great Britain and France to accept the Soviet draft treaty as a basis. However, the British themselves did not intend to conclude an agreement. Their true goal was to tighten the negotiations, and thus keep Hitler under the threat of creating a powerful coalition against him. 19 May Chamberlain said in parliament that he "would rather resign than form an alliance with the Soviets." At the same time, as already shown above, the alliance with Hitler was also not excluded.
In turn, "In Paris, it was then believed that the Soviet authorities would wait for the outcome of political negotiations with Paris and London before they began official, even purely economic contacts with Berlin," Z.S. Belous content of French diplomatic documents [16].
The British government for negotiations, who decided the fate of Europe, sent an ordinary official to Moscow - the head of the Central European bureau of Strang, while on the Soviet side the negotiations were headed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov. Churchill noted that "sending such a secondary figure meant an actual insult." According to V. G. Trukhanovsky and D. Fleming, the direction of a low-ranking official in the USSR was a “triple insult”, since Strang also defended British engineers who were accused of espionage by the USSR in 1933, and also included in the group accompanying Prime Minister on his trip to Munich [18].
France was not represented by the highest official in the negotiations either - the French ambassador in Moscow Nadzhiar.

As planned by the British government, the negotiations were delayed, and the British press also drew attention to it.
Thus, for example, the newspaper News Chronicle, in its July 8 issue, gave the following caricature in this regard: in a weaved web room surrounded by dozens of volumes of British “sentences” for 1939 – 1950. depicts a decrepit Chamberlain sitting in a chair, talking to Halifax using a tube that amplifies the sound. The head of the Foreign Office informs him that he has just sent the last sentence. In the role of couriers are two turtles, one of which has just returned from Moscow, and the other goes there with new proposals. “What are we going to do next?” Halifax asks. “Oh yes, the weather is beautiful,” Chamberlain replies to him [18].

However, by mid-July, during the negotiations, a list of obligations of the parties, a list of countries that were given joint guarantees and the text of the contract were agreed. Issues of military agreement and “indirect aggression” remained uncoordinated.
By indirect aggression was meant what happened to Czechoslovakia — when there was no military action itself, but under their threat the country was forced to fulfill Hitler’s demands. The USSR expanded the concept of "indirect aggression"
“... The expression“ indirect aggression, ”emphasized in the proposals of the Soviet government of July 9 1939, refers to an action to which any of the above states agrees under threat of force from another power or without such threat and which entails the use of the territory and forces of a given state for aggression against it or against one of the contracting parties, therefore, entails the loss by that state of its independence or the violation of its neutrality ”[19].
The Soviet government insisted on extending the concept of “indirect aggression” to the Baltic countries and Finland, although they did not ask for this, which was motivated in the already mentioned note from 14 in May:

The absence of guarantees by the USSR on the part of Britain and France in the event of a direct attack by the aggressors, on the one hand, and the openness of the north-western borders of the USSR, on the other hand, can serve as a provocative moment for directing aggression towards the Soviet Union.

The protest of the negotiating partners led to the words “with or without such a threat” in defining indirect aggression and its spread to the Baltic countries. The British Foreign Office was afraid that such an interpretation of “indirect aggression” could justify Soviet intervention in Finland and the Baltic states even without a serious threat from Germany.
In early July, the French ambassador Nadzhiar proposed to resolve the contradictions about the Baltic countries in a secret protocol so as not to push them into Hitler’s arms by the mere fact of a treaty that actually limits their sovereignty [16]. The British agreed with the idea of ​​the July secret protocol 17.
As we see, representatives of Western democracies were not alien to the idea of ​​signing secret protocols concerning the fate of third countries.

2 August reached another milestone - the general definition of “indirect aggression” was adopted, however, an amendment was made that if the threat to independence arises “without the threat of force”, the issue will be resolved through consultation [21]. However, this option did not suit the USSR - the example of Czechoslovakia showed that consultations could be too long.
In delaying the negotiations, the British and French governments accused the Soviet Union before the public of their countries, who, according to them, put forward more and more new demands. According to M. Carley, this was a blatant lie — it’s not true that “Molotov constantly put forward new demands on Seeds and Nadzhiar. The fundamentals of Soviet policy were clearly defined as early as 1935 ... There were no new problems or “unexpected” demands questions about “indirect” aggression, guarantees for the Baltic countries, rights of passage and military agreement. Daladier lied when he said that the Soviet demands ... came as a surprise to him. ”[17]

22 July was announced the resumption of the Soviet-German economic negotiations. This stimulated the British and French on July 23 to agree to the Soviet proposal at the same time as negotiations on a political agreement to discuss military issues. Initially, England and France first wanted to sign a political agreement, and then a military one. In the event that only a political one was signed, and Germany’s aggression against the USSR had occurred, then Britain and France would themselves determine the extent of military assistance to the USSR. Therefore, the USSR demanded the simultaneous signing of a political and military agreement, so that the size of military assistance was clearly spelled out.
As mentioned above, the British and French sought first of all to delay the negotiations, so their delegation to negotiate on military issues, which the British led Admiral Drax, and the French, General Dumenc, went to the USSR on a low-speed freight and passenger ship. City of Exeter, which sailed to Leningrad only on August 10. The delegation arrived in Moscow 11 August. For comparison, we recall that during the Munich Agreement, English Prime Minister Chamberlain found it possible for the first time in his life to board the plane in order to quickly fly to Hitler.

The composition of the British delegation said that Britain has no serious intentions to sign agreements. Here is what the German ambassador to the UK G. Dirksen wrote to 1 in August in a report to the state secretary of the German foreign ministry E. Weizsäcker [22]:

They continue to be skeptical of continuing negotiations on a pact with Russia, despite sending a military mission - or rather, thanks to this. This is evidenced by the composition of the British military mission: the admiral, until now the commandant of Portsmouth, is practically retired and has never been in the headquarters of the admiralty; general - just the same simple military officer; the general aviation - An outstanding pilot and teacher of flying art, but not a strategist. This suggests that the military mission is more likely to establish the combat effectiveness of the Soviet Army than to conclude operational agreements.

The head of the French mission, General Dumenc, said that “there was no clarity and certainty” in the instructions given to him. Moreover, the delegations did not have the authority to negotiate: “It simply did not fit into any framework,” Drax wrote later, “that the government and the Foreign Office sent us on this voyage without providing any credentials or any other documents, confirming our credentials. ” Dumenc spoke almost identically to [17].
However, negotiations began.

According to the Anglo-French plan, the USSR was supposed to adhere to the obligations of these countries towards Poland and Romania. The USSR quite logically demanded that these countries at least allow the passage of Soviet troops through its territory. Otherwise it would have been impossible to get in touch with the German troops if they attacked, for example, Poland from the western border. The Poles, however, by virtue of their long-standing hostility toward Russia, were opposed.
19 August, Polish Foreign Minister Beck, at the direction of Marshal Rydz-Smigly, gave the French Ambassador Noel a negative answer to the question of the possibility of Soviet troops passing through Polish territory, stating that the Poles "cannot in any form discuss the use of part of the national territory by foreign troops "[23]. Moreover, Daladier instructed Doumenka not to enter into any military agreement that would stipulate the right of the Red Army to enter Poland.

French ambassador Nadzhiar wrote: “Poland did not want to enter into such an agreement ... and the Anglo-French did not insist too much ... We want to look good, but the Russians want a very specific agreement that would include Poland and Romania [17].

August 21 Marshal K. Voroshilov made the following statement [24]:

The Soviet mission believes that the USSR, which does not have a common border with Germany, can assist France, England, Poland and Romania only if its troops pass through Polish and Romanian territory, because there are no other ways to get in touch with the troops. the aggressor.
The Soviet military mission cannot imagine how the governments and the general staffs of Britain and France, sending their missions to negotiate a military convention to the USSR, did not give precise and positive instructions on such an elementary issue as the passage and actions of the Soviet armed forces against the troops of the aggressor. on the territory of Poland and Romania, with which England and France have corresponding political and military relations.
If, however, this axiomatic question turns the French and the British into a big problem that requires a long study, it means that there is every reason to doubt their desire for real and serious military cooperation with the USSR.

With regard to determining the extent of military assistance that the parties had to provide to each other, the British and French here also avoided specifics that the USSR demanded. When Admiral Drax informed the British government about the requests of the Soviet delegation, Halifax, at a cabinet meeting, said that he “does not consider it right to send any response to them” [17]. Negotiations on a military agreement were actually thwarted.

What lay behind the reluctance of the British and French to sign an agreement with the USSR? Here is what L. Kollier, head of the northern department of the English Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1935 — 1942, wrote about this. years [17]:

It is difficult to get rid of the feeling that the real motive of the cabinet’s behavior is the desire to enlist the support of the Russians and at the same time leave their hands free, in case of an opportunity to show Germany the path of expansion to the east, at the expense of Russia ... Soviet support had to be on its side, and. .. give the Russians, in exchange for the promise of their help, the confidence that we will not abandon them alone in the face of German expansion.

Back in the spring of 1939, Chamberlain, reflecting on the position of his country in the current situation, believed that Russia, and not Germany, was the main threat to Western civilization [25].
As a result, the short-sighted policy of France and England led to the breakdown of negotiations.
Louis Fisher, a prominent American journalist and historian, in September 1939, asked the British for exclusive information for an article condemning Soviet politics. Halifax refused him, saying "... it’s not so incredible that these materials will make us blush."

Negotiations with Germany

Joachim von Ribbentrop

Germany, after the Munich Agreement, was the first to show an initiative to get closer to the USSR. German industry needed Soviet raw materials. Goering, who headed the German Hering Werke concern since 1937, which took over numerous factories confiscated from Jews, and later plants in occupied territories, demanded from the German Foreign Ministry "at least try to reactivate ... trade with Russia, especially parts where it comes to Russian raw materials ”[14]. When extending the Soviet-German trade agreement 16 in December 1938, the chairman of the German economic delegation K. Schnurre told the deputy Soviet trade representative Skosyrev that Germany was ready to provide a loan in exchange for expanding Soviet exports of raw materials. The German credit initiative was economically profitable and evoked a response. The 30 January trip 1939 of the German delegation to Moscow was scheduled. However, when reports of the Schnurre trip were leaked to the world press, Ribbentrop forbade the visit, negotiations broke down, which for some time convinced Stalin of the frivolity of the Germans' economic intentions (the “political basis” wasn’t yet) [16].
The next active phase of negotiations began in the summer.

28 June 1939, the German ambassador to the USSR, Schulenburg, in an interview with Molotov, stated that "... the German government wants not only normalization, but also improvement of its relations with the USSR." Here is how Molotov describes his conversation with Schulenburg below [26]:

Schulenburg, developing his thought at my request, said that the German government wants not only normalization, but also improvement of its relations with the USSR. He added further that this statement, made on the instructions of Ribbentrop, was approved by Hitler. According to Schulenburg, Germany has already given evidence of her desire to normalize relations with us. As an example, he pointed to the restraint of the tone of the German press in relation to the USSR, as well as non-aggression pacts concluded by Germany with the Baltic countries (Latvia and Estonia), which he sees as a gratuitous contribution to the cause of peace and which show that Germany has no evil intentions against the USSR. Also in the field of economic relations, according to Schulenburg, Germany tried to go with us. towards To my remark that the ambassadors mentioned by the ambassador were not concluded with the USSR, but with other countries and do not have a direct relationship to the USSR, the ambassador said that, despite the fact that these pacts were not concluded with the USSR, the question of Baltstranakh is sensitive and interesting. for the USSR. We thought, Schulenburg added, that the conclusion of these pacts by Germany makes a step not unpleasant for the USSR. Refraining from confirming the thought of Schulenburg, I reminded him of the recently existing non-aggression pact between Germany and Poland, which had so unexpectedly lost its force. At the mention of this fact, Schulenburg set about explaining that Poland itself was to blame for this, while Germany has no evil intentions towards Poland. The rupture of this pact, Schulenburg added, is supposedly a defensive event on the part of Germany.

18 July E. Babarin, a Soviet trade representative in Berlin, gave K. Schnurre a detailed memorandum on the trade agreement, which featured an increased list of goods for exchange between the two countries, and said that if minor differences between the parties are settled, he is authorized to sign the agreement in Berlin. From the report on the meeting, which was presented by Dr. Schnurre, it appears that the Germans were satisfied.
"Such an agreement," wrote Schnurre, "will inevitably have an impact, at least on Poland and England." Four days later, on July 22, the Soviet press reported that the Soviet-German trade talks [14] were resumed in Berlin.

3 August Ribbentrop sent Schulenburg to Moscow a telegram marked "urgent, top secret":

Yesterday I had a long conversation with Astakhov [USSR Charge d'Affaires in Germany], the content of which I will set out in a separate telegram.
Expressing the desire of the Germans to improve German-Russian relations, I said that all along the length from the Baltic to the Black Sea there are no such problems that we could not solve to mutual satisfaction. In response to Astakhov’s wish to proceed to negotiations on specific issues ... I stated that I was ready for such negotiations if the Soviet government informs me through Astakhov that it also seeks to establish German-Russian relations on a new basis.

15 August Schulenburg read out to Molotov a message from Ribbentrop insisting on the urgent rapprochement of the two countries, and said that the German Foreign Minister was ready to immediately arrive in Moscow to settle Soviet-German relations. 17 August followed the official response of Molotov:

Until recently, the Soviet government, taking into account the official statements of individual representatives of the German government, who were often unfriendly and even hostile towards the USSR, assumed that the German government was looking for reasons to clash with the USSR, was preparing for these clashes and often justifies the need to increase its weapons the inevitability of such collisions.
If, however, the German government is now turning from the old policy towards a serious improvement in political relations with the USSR, the Soviet Government can only welcome such a turn and is ready, for its part, to restructure its policy in the spirit of its serious improvement with respect to Germany.
The USSR government believes that the first step towards such an improvement in relations between the USSR and Germany could be the conclusion of a trade and credit agreement.
The USSR government considers that the second step in a short time could be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact or the confirmation of the neutrality pact of 1926 with the simultaneous adoption of a special protocol on the interest of contracting parties in various foreign policy issues so that the latter represents the organic part of the pact. .

By August 17, the Soviet leadership had already understood that the British and French did not intend to conclude an agreement with the USSR, and decided to conclude a pact with Germany in order to gain certainty in the military-political plan for the near future.

21 August were signed the Soviet-German trade agreements.
23 August Ribbentrop flew to Moscow. Interestingly, under the Great Onions, Soviet anti-aircraft gunners mistakenly fired Ribbentrop’s plane heading for Moscow. They were not warned about the flight route, they were taken by surprise and shot even without sights [27].

On the same day a non-aggression pact was signed, which went down in history as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The pact was accompanied by a secret protocol describing the division of spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR in Europe.

According to the protocol, the sphere of interests of the USSR in the Baltic states was Latvia, Estonia and Finland, and in Germany, Lithuania; in Poland, the section took place along the line Narew-Vistula-San, Vilnius passed from Poland to Lithuania. At the same time, the very question of whether the preservation of the Polish state was desirable from the point of view of the interests of the contracting parties was given to the “course of further political development”, but in any case had to be decided “by way of friendly mutual consent”. In addition, the USSR stressed its interest in Bessarabia, and Germany did not object to the interests of the USSR in this region of Romania.

Molotov signs an agreement, followed by Ribbentrop, on the right is Stalin

Implications of the Covenant and its value

1. Attaching territories.


Poland section in 1939 year

The pact allowed the reunification of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples when the corresponding territories of Poland received in 1921 after signing the Riga Peace Treaty that ended the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1921 entered the USSR after the division of Poland between Germany and the USSR in September of 1939.

Is it necessary to condemn the USSR for the fact that he sent troops to the territory of Poland when the Polish government fled, and the Polish army was defeated? As already mentioned, Poland received these territories only in 1921. The overwhelming majority of the population in these territories were Belarusians and Ukrainians, who in Poland at that time endured discrimination based on nationality.
Hardly the reunification of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples can be called a historically unjust act.
We illustrate the thesis that Ukrainians and Belarusians in Poland were not in the best position. Here is what PG writes. Chigirinov in the book "History of Belarus from antiquity to the present day":

The crises of the 1924-1926 and 1929-1933 years were deep and protracted. At this time, the number of enterprises in Western Belorussia decreased by 17,4%, workers - by 39%. Workers here received a salary in 1,5-2 times less than in the central regions of Poland. At the same time, it decreased by 1933 in comparison with 1928 by 31,2%. In Western Belarus, poor peasants made up 70% of the population, however, the authorities settled the so-called "osadnik" on state lands and on the lands of Russian owners forced to leave Poland. Sieges are the “racially clean” Poles who participated in the 1919-1921 wars.

In 1938, in Eastern Poland, around 100 Orthodox churches were either destroyed or transferred to the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Church. By the beginning of World War II, not a single Belarusian school remained in Western Belarus, and only 44 schools with partial teaching of the Belarusian language remained.
But what the Canadian historian of Ukrainian origin Orest Subtelny, a supporter of Ukraine’s independence and critical of the Soviet regime, writes [29]:

A serious deterioration in Ukrainian-Polish relations came during the Great Depression, which hit the agrarian regions inhabited by Ukrainians with particular force. The peasants suffered not so much from unemployment as from the catastrophic fall in their incomes caused by a sharp decline in demand for agricultural products. During the crisis years, net profit per acre (0,4 ha) in small farms decreased by 70 — 80%. Under these conditions, the hatred of Ukrainian peasants toward well-funded Polish colonists and wealthy Polish landowners sharply escalated. There was growing discontent among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, especially among young people who did not have a job, since Poles inevitably occupied a small number of places provided by the state. Therefore, when the radical Ukrainian nationalists called for active resistance to Polish domination, the Ukrainian youth responded to this appeal readily.


Firstly, it should be noted that in the 1930 the Baltic states were not democratic at all, but quite the opposite.
In Lithuania, in 1927, the head of the ruling pro-fascist party “Tautininkai Sayunga” Antanas Smetona declared himself “leader of the nation” and dissolved parliament. Up to 1 in November 1938, martial law was in force in the country (canceled at the request of Nazi Germany in connection with the events in Klaipeda). In Estonia, in March, the dictatorship of the Agrarian Party leader Konstantin Päts was established as a result of the coup in March. Parliament was dissolved, and all political parties are banned. In Latvia, in the same year 1934, the leader of the Peasant Union, Karl Ulmanis, became the dictator.
A significant part of the Baltic population sympathized with the USSR. Here is what K. Ord, the envoy in Latvia, informed the British Foreign Office:

From cipher telegram No. 286 from 18 June 1940 g .:

Last night there was a serious riot in Riga, when the population, much of which met Soviet troops with cheers and flowers, clashed with the police. This morning everything is calm ...

From cipher telegram No. 301 from 21 June 1940 g .:
"The fraternization between the population and the Soviet troops has reached a considerable size."
26 July, the 1940 of the London Times noted:

The unanimous decision to join Soviet Russia reflects ... not pressure from Moscow, but a sincere admission that such a solution is a better alternative than inclusion in a new Nazi Europe. ”

Initially, the USSR did not intend to fight with Finland and tried to achieve a concession by Finland to part of the Karelian Isthmus in exchange for twice as big areas but less suitable for agricultural use in North Karelia, as well as transferring the USSR to rent several islands and parts of the Hanko peninsula (Gangut) under military bases. The Karelian Isthmus was strategically important for the USSR - after all, in 1939, the Soviet-Finnish border ran just 32 km. from Leningrad - the largest industrial center, the second largest city in the country and an important transportation hub. Moreover, the territory of Western Karelia was not originally Finnish, but was obtained by Finland in the 1920 year in the Tartu peace after the Soviet-Finnish war of 1918-1920.
The territory of the Vyborg gubernia was conquered by Peter the Great from Sweden during the Northern War (there was no talk of any independent Finland at that time), and at the end of 1811, according to the manifesto of Emperor Alexander the First, the Vyborg gubernia (which included Pitkäranta) entered the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland . Over 90's years of being a part of the Russian Empire, it became much more Russified, and many of its inhabitants “knew nothing but the Russian language”. And even more so, the originally Finnish territory was not a large center of Orthodoxy, Valaam Island on Lake Ladoga, although formally before the 1917 revolution it was part of the Finnish principality of the Russian Empire, and after 1917, it departed independent Finland.

territorial changes after the Soviet-Finnish war

Accession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR

Bessarabia was the former Russian province, therefore, in the opinion of the government of the newly formed USSR, it was supposed to be part of it. In 1918, Romania announced to Western European states that it does not exclude the annexation of Bucovina and Bessarabia. At that time, the Moldovan Democratic Republic was in the region, led by Sfatul Tarii, loyal to Romania.
This violated the agreement with the RSFSR, signed at the beginning of the year. Taking advantage of the civil war in Russia and anarchy, Romanian troops crossed the Danube and Prut rivers in January of the same year and reached the Dniester. With Sfatul Tarii, an agreement was signed on the unification of Bessarabia with Romania. The new border with the OCP and the UPR, then with the Ukrainian SSR and the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the USSR, passed through the Dniester until 1940. She was not recognized by the Soviet government. The RSFSR also categorically refused to recognize these territories as Romania [31].

Thus, if in the case of Poland and Finland it was at least about those territories that the USSR legally recognized for these countries, then in the case of Bessarabia everything was not so and the territory was obviously more than controversial.

Local people suffered from Romanization [31]:

The Romanian administration considered it extremely important to oust Russian and Russian-speaking from state bodies, education systems, culture, trying to minimize the role of the “Russian factor” in the life of the province ... One of the means of ousting Russian from state institutions was the adoption of the Law on Nationalization in 1918, according to which all the inhabitants of Bessarabia had to take Romanian citizenship, speak and write in Romanian ... The expulsion of the Russian language from the official sphere zilos primarily on multi-thousand detachment of officials and employees. According to some estimates, tens of thousands of families of officials, who were dismissed due to ignorance of the language or for political reasons, were left without any means of livelihood.

The annexation of this territory did without hostilities. 27 June 1940 King Carol II of Romania accepted the ultimatum note of the Soviet side and passed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR.

Military value - pushing the boundaries

The annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia pushed the borders to the west, and therefore increased the time for the German forces to advance to the Soviet industrial centers, and gave more time to evacuate the factories.
Opponents of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact indicate that it would have been better for the USSR to have buffer states between itself and Germany, and therefore it would not be worthwhile to annex the Baltic states. However, this does not hold water. Due to the fact that Soviet troops were stationed in Estonia, Estonia was able to resist the fascist invaders from July 7 to August 28 1941, almost the month 2. Obviously, if at that time Estonia were an independent state, its armed forces would not have been able to restrain the Wehrmacht for so long. If in big Poland the resistance lasted only 17 days, then in small Estonia it would last maximum 3-4 days.
Meanwhile, these 2 months, which Soviet Estonia resisted, were crucial for the organization of the defense of Leningrad - as already mentioned above, the largest industrial and second largest city in the country. The siege of Leningrad diverted the almost million Wehrmacht group of troops to the North. Obviously, if Leningrad were quickly taken at the very beginning of the war, then this million German soldiers could take part in other battles, as a result of which the history of World War II could be completely different and much more pitiable for the USSR. Well, in the end, we must not forget that 19 June 1939, the Estonian ambassador in Moscow, told his British counterpart that in the event of war Estonia would side with Germany. That is, there would be no resistance to Estonia at all.
From this point of view, it was critically important to move the Soviet-Finnish border away from Leningrad. Of course, it is believed that if it were not for the 1939-1940 winter war, Finland would not then become an ally of the Third Reich, and from the north Leningrad would not be in danger, but no one could guarantee such a development of events.

Getting time to prepare for war

Stalin understood that the Red Army in 1939 was far from being perfect, and the Soviet-Finnish war showed it. It took time to re-equip and reorganize. And Germany helped it. By contract from February 11 1940
the list of military materials provided for delivery by the German side by the end of the current year was 42 typewritten pages printed in one and a half intervals, and included, for example, drawings and samples of the newest German combat aircraft "Messerschmitt-109" and "-110", "Junkers- 88 ”, etc., artillery guns, tanks, tractors and even the whole heavy cruiser“ Lutz ”. The Soviet list consisted almost entirely of military materials and included not only those used, but also those that were in development: dozens of maritime and antiaircraft artillery systems, mortars of caliber 50 — 240 mm with ammunition, the best tank Pz-III, torpedo weapons, dozens of radio stations, etc. [17]. In exchange, the USSR supplied raw materials - oil, grain, cotton, timber, etc.

Neutralization of Japan

In August, the USSR 1939 fought with Germany’s ally Japan in the Khalkhin Gol river. For Tokyo, the conclusion of the Soviet-German agreement was a real shock. Soviet intelligence officer R. Sorge reported [32]:

The negotiations on the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with Germany caused a huge sensation and opposition against Germany. The resignation of the government is possible after the details of the conclusion of the agreement have been established ... Most of the members of the government are thinking of terminating the anti-Comintern treaty with Germany. Trading and financial groups almost agreed with England and America. Other groups adjoining Colonel Hashimoto and General Ugaki stand for concluding a non-aggression treaty with the USSR and forcing England out of China. Internal political crisis is growing ”

And so it happened - the Japanese government resigned. It is quite possible that if the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had not been signed, then military operations against Japan in the Far East would continue after the 1939 year. In May 1941, the Soviet Union and Japan signed a non-aggression pact. Of course, the USSR still had to keep large forces in the Far East in case Japan suddenly did attack, but, fortunately, Japan never invaded the territory of the USSR.

What were the alternatives?

1. Conclusion of a military and political treaty with the allies without strict conditions (corridors, obligations) and detailed planning.

This option is considered a well-known military historian Alexey Isaev. We quote an excerpt from his article “The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Military aspect "[33]:

To prevent the defeat of Poland in this case would be hardly possible. Even the strikes of Soviet aircraft could hardly have stopped Guderian on the way to Brest. The Baltic states would be occupied with the tacit consent of the Allies, again in order to avoid the appearance of Germans near Narva. The Red Army is mobilizing, workers' hands are being withdrawn from industry, the troops are suffering losses. The next round would follow in the summer of 1940. Wehrmacht strikes at France. True to allied commitments, the Red Army is going on the offensive. At the disposal of the Germans for the exchange of time on the territory - all of Poland. The maximum that could be achieved by the Red Army model 1940 year, i.e. having neither KV, nor T-34, nor the lessons of the Finnish war - a breakthrough to Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. Large masses of BT and T-26 would have waited for the merciless beating of German anti-tank guns. Examples abound gives 1941 year. Even the achievement of the Vistula line seems too optimistic. The defeat of France is almost predetermined, followed by the castling of troops to the east. Instead of the “Battle of Britain”, the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe attack the Red Army in Poland weakened by battles. As a result, neither gain time, nor favorable strategic position of the border.

Of course, we can say that this option is better than the 1941 disaster of the year. However, the fact that in 1941, the events will occur exactly this way, the Soviet leadership, of course, did not know, but considering the possible options, it could come to the same conclusions as Alexey Isaev. Naturally, such a development of Stalin's events could not be arranged at all.

2. Do not enter into a contract. Rearm and wait for developments

The worst case scenario. Western Ukraine and Western Belarus are retreating to Germany, the Baltic countries, obviously, are engaged in German troops. If the USSR wants to occupy the Baltic States earlier, then most likely the beginning of the war with Germany is precisely because of the Baltic states. If Germany occupies these territories, in the event of the inevitable war of the USSR with the Third Reich, Leningrad is under threat of taking with all the ensuing consequences, which we wrote about above. Also, obviously, the Soviet-German trade agreement, under which the USSR received German military technology, would not have been signed.
It is possible that in the Far East, the fighting with Japan would continue after the 1939 year.
Some historians say that because of the signing of the pact and the transfer of borders to the west, the fortified areas — the “Stalin Line” and the “Molotov Line” were abandoned, and it would be better for the USSR to continue to strengthen these lines. The Soviet army would have dug in there, and no enemy would have passed. Firstly, these lines are not so powerful at all, as Suvorov-Rezun, for example, writes about this. Secondly, practice has shown that such lines are not a panacea, no matter how well they were strengthened. They break through by concentrating forces in one sector, so passive defense in fortified pillboxes without counterstrikes is the way to defeat.

3. Do not enter into a treaty, attack Hitler himself

In Russia, there are quite a few supporters of the theory that the USSR itself planned to attack Germany, but Hitler was ahead of it. How could events have developed if the USSR would indeed be the first to attack Germany in 1939-1940?
Recall that when, during the Munich Agreement, Western envoys set an ultimatum to Benes, demanding to accept the plan of dividing Czechoslovakia, they said to him:
“If the Czechs unite with the Russians,” the war can take on the character of a crusade against the Bolsheviks. Then the governments of England and France will be very difficult to stay away. " That is, England and France did not rule out the possibility of uniting with Germany for the purpose of war against the USSR.
What is most interesting, these plans did not disappear even in 1940, when World War II was already under way.
During the Soviet-Finnish war, the British government began to prepare expeditionary troops to be sent to Finland. On the basis of the emerging anti-Soviet imperialist front, a commonality of interests and intentions of Britain and France with fascist Germany and Italy was outlined. Hitler and his staffs, interested not only in weakening the Soviet Union, but also in making the border of Finland as close as possible to Leningrad and Murmansk, made it clear about their solidarity with Finland and, like the French leaders, did not hide their satisfaction with the difficulties who met the Red Army at the breakthrough line Mannerheim.
Through the Swedish correspondents in Berlin, Hitler announced that Germany would not object to the transportation of military materials and volunteers through Sweden. Fascist Italy openly supplied Finland weapon and bombers, with the latter having the right to fly through France. The newspaper "Evr" wrote 3 January 1940 g .: "Foreign aid provided to Finland, organized. The ambassadors of England and Italy left Moscow for an indefinite period of time." So on a common anti-Soviet basis, the contact of Western democracies and fascist states, which were formally in a state of either war or alienation with each other, was now almost openly established [34].

The English historian E. Hughes later wrote [35]:

The motives of the proposed expedition to Finland cannot be reasonably analyzed. The provocation by England and France of war with Soviet Russia at a time when they were already in a war with Germany is a product of an insane asylum. It gives grounds for proposing a more ominous interpretation: switching the war to anti-Bolshevik rails so that the war against Germany can be ended and even forgotten ... At present, the only useful conclusion may be that the British and French governments in that time lost the mind.

A. Taylor was of the same opinion: “The only reasonable explanation for all this is to assume that the British and French governments just went crazy” [35].

The peace made by the Soviet Union with Finland, thwarted the designs of England and France. But in London and Paris they did not want to give up their intentions to strike at the Soviet Union. Now, as in Berlin, the Soviet Union began to be considered militarily extremely weak militarily. Eyes turned to the south. The objects of the strike are elected by the Soviet oil regions.
19 January 1940 French Prime Minister Daladier sent Commander-in-Chief General Gamelin, Commander Aviation Vuilmen, General Coelz and Admiral Darlan to read: "I ask General Gamelin and Admiral Darlan to develop a memorandum on a possible invasion in order to destroy Russian oil fields." Further, the three most likely ways of intervening in the Soviet Union from the south were considered. The second of these options was the "direct invasion of the Caucasus." And it was written on the day when the German side was actively preparing for the defeat of France.
In February, 1940, the French General Staff, completed the development of an intervention plan against the Soviet Union. 4 April plan was sent to Chairman of the Council of Ministers Reyio. "Allied operations against the Russian oil region in the Caucasus," the plan said, "can have the goal ... to take away from Russia the raw materials that it needs for its economic needs, and thus undermine the power of Soviet Russia."
Soon the deadline for the attack on the USSR was also set: the end of June - the beginning of July 1941.
In addition to air attacks against the Caucasus, which, according to the Anglo-French leadership, could undermine the basis of the economy of the Soviet Union, an attack from the sea was envisaged. Further successful development of the offensive was to draw Turkey and other southern neighbors of the USSR into the war on the side of the Allies. The English General Wavell for this purpose came into contact with the Turkish military leadership.
So on the eve of the invasion of Hitler’s armies, in an environment fraught with mortal danger to France, its ruling circles continued to think about an alliance with Hitler and a perfidious attack on a country whose people later made a decisive contribution to the salvation of France.
The development of the anti-Soviet plan "Operation Baku" ended in Paris 22 February 1940. And two days later, 24 February, in Berlin, Hitler signed the final version of the Gelb directive, which called for the defeat of France [34].
So, as we see, nothing was impossible in the unification of Germany, Britain and France against the USSR even after 1 September 1939, when England and France declared war on Germany. This option was not realized only because Hitler himself was the first to neutralize France. However, if the USSR had managed to attack Germany up to this point, then the option of uniting Germany, Britain and France against the USSR under the auspices of the “crusade against Bolshevism” was quite real. However, even if the USSR had concluded a mutual assistance agreement with England and France in August 1939, there are no guarantees that these countries would not plan military operations against the USSR.

Is it Bolshevism?

Someone may say that England and France did not enter into a full-fledged military alliance with the USSR, because hostile to Bolshevism. However, even a superficial knowledge of history is enough to know that Russia and the countries of the West have always been geopolitical opponents, starting from the time of the opposition of Alexander Nevsky and the Teutonic Order. At the same time, which is typical, Russia itself was not the first to invade England, France or Germany (except for the Seven Years War, when in the summer of 1757, Russian troops invaded East Prussia). While the reverse cases can easily be recalled.
Hostility towards Russia in Western countries did not depend on what kind of political system it had. It was hostile even when there were no Bolsheviks in Russia, but there was the same monarchy as it was throughout Europe.
Vasily Galin in his book “The Political Economy of War. The European Conspiracy ”provides a good selection of statements by the Western press of the first half of the 19 century about Russia, which I will quote here [34]:

Russia had a reputation in Europe as “a power that is conquering by its very nature,” Metternich noted in 1827. “What can the sovereign conqueror do, standing at the head of these brave people who are not afraid of any danger? ... Who can resist their pressure? ”, Wrote Ancelot in 1838.“ In the 1830-ies in the republican and - partly - government press, the idea that the Russian emperor was preparing a “crusade” against Western civilization and intends to bring to the West "civilization of a saber and club" (as defined by the newspaper National), that Russia's only vocation is war and that "a rude, militant backward North, driven by instinctive need, will bring its power to the civilized world and impose its own laws on it »- Revue du No rd, 1838 g. "Russia was portrayed as a" Damocles sword suspended above the heads of all European sovereigns, a nation of barbarians ready to subdue and devour half the globe "- Wiegel. The call "not to allow wild hordes from the North to Europe ... To protect the rights of European nations" was sounded in 1830 in the manifesto of the Polish Sejm

As we see, these fears are absolutely irrational. Naturally, in 1830, Nicholas I did not prepare any crusade against Western Europe - Russia had no strategic need for this and this possibility was not even theoretically discussed.
But this is the 19 century. But what General Denikin wrote about the perception in the Western world of the role of Russia in the First World War [37]:

... I have met such a lack of understanding of the role of Russia almost everywhere in wide public circles, even long after the conclusion of peace, wandering through Europe. A small episode serves as a caricature, but a very characteristic indicator of it: on the banner - a banner, presented to Marshal Foch "from American friends", depicts flags of all states, small lands and colonies, one way or another included in the orbit of the Entente in the great war; the flag of Russia is put on ... 46-th place, after Haiti, Uruguay and directly behind San Marino ...

Such were the sentiments in Europe. Similarly, in the 1930s, it was believed that Stalin planned to seize the whole of Europe, although at that time the USSR had long ago abandoned the idea of ​​a “world revolution” and built socialism in a single country. Such statements can be quoted for a long time. Therefore, most likely, if in 1930 in Russia there were capitalism with democracy, England and France would behave in the same way in the negotiations, and, therefore, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact would still be inevitable.

Sources of

1. Eastern Europe between Hitler and Stalin. 1939-1941 Chapter 7.
2. V.Ya. Sipols. Diplomatic struggle on the eve of the Second World War. Chapter 4.
3. German-Romanian economic treaties and agreements 1939
4. Keys to Memel
5. D. Fuller. World War II 1939-1945's. Strategic and tactical review. Chapter 1
6. Draft Declaration of Great Britain, USSR, France and Poland, presented by the British Ambassador to the USSR W. Seeds to the USSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs MM Litvinov
7. From Munich to Tokyo Bay: Looking from the West to the tragic pages of the history of the Second World War
8. Moscow talks 1939
9. E. O. Obichkina. French diplomacy 1938 – 1939: from “appeasement” to “containment”, or a guarantee policy
10. Germany's attack plan on Poland
11. S.N. Kovalev. Inventions and falsifications in assessments of the role of the USSR on the eve and with the beginning of the Second World War // "Military History Journal" - №7 - 2008 g
12. Year of crisis 1938-1939. Documents and materials in two volumes. NN201-300 Compiled by the USSR Foreign Ministry. Xnumx
13. Proposal presented by the USSR People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov to the Ambassador of Great Britain to the USSR W. Sids
14. William Shearer. The rise and fall of the Third Reich (Volume 1)
15. W. Churchill. The Second World War. Chapter 20.
16. Alexander Shubin. On the way to the 1939 Pact: the difficulties and contradictions of the Soviet-German rapprochement
17. Vasily Galin. Stalin's retaliatory strike
18. UK policy from Munich to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact: from appeasement to a guarantee policy?
19. History of the Second World War 1939 – 1945 Tom 2. Chapter 4
20. Memorandum presented by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the British Ambassador to the USSR
21. The draft definition of the concept of "indirect aggression", presented by the ambassadors of Great Britain and France in the USSR to the people's commissar of foreign affairs of the USSR
22. Report of the Ambassador of Germany to the UK G. Dirksen to the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany E. Weizsäcker
23. Record of the conversation of the head of the USSR military mission K. Ye. Voroshilov with the head of the French military mission J. Dumenck
24. Year of the crisis. 1938-1939. Documents and materials in two volumes. NN501-600
25. A.I. Utkin. The Second World War. Chapter 2.
26. Year of the crisis. 1938-1939. Documents and materials in two volumes. Documents N401-500 Compiled by the USSR Foreign Ministry. Xnumx
27. V. Dashichev. Between Molotov and Ribbentrop.
28. Chigirinov P.G. The history of Belarus from antiquity to the present day. Minsk: Book House, 2004. C. 517-518.
29. O. Subtelny. History of Ukraine. Western Ukraine Between the World Wars
30. Igor Pykhalov. How to “enslave” the Baltics
31. Accession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR
32. Dyukov A.R. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in Questions and Answers / Historical Memory Foundation. - M., 2009.
33. A. Isaev. Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact. Military aspect.
34. D. Projector. German-Polish War
35. I. Pankratenko. Winter War. Part one. The first geopolitical ... Continuation
36. Vasily Galin. Political economy of war. The plot of Europe. M .: Algorithm, 2007.
37. A. I. Denikin. Sketches of Russian distemper. Volume I, Ch. XXI-XXX
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  1. 8 company
    8 company 28 July 2012 10: 30
    "Bessarabia was the former Russian province, therefore, in the opinion of the government of the newly formed USSR, it should have been a part of it."

    It is understandable, in general, greatbrits have grabbed a third of the world. Hapali everyone who could. It’s just a cool logic: the Bolsheviks recognized the tsar’s debts as strangers, and the tsar’s territories were an unexpected turn! - recognized by their own. winked
    1. you tested the restore function of your back
      Gentlemen, I still don’t understand why Stalin needed the ONE BORDER with Hitler, for what?
      1. Dobrokhod Sergey
        Dobrokhod Sergey 28 July 2012 13: 57
        Quote: back
        Gentlemen, I still don’t understand why Stalin needed the ONE BORDER with Hitler, for what?

        And why did you get this that he needed her?
    2. Vadim
      Vadim 28 July 2012 13: 46
      This is just a normal policy, in it the usual logic does not work.
  2. Dobrokhod Sergey
    Dobrokhod Sergey 28 July 2012 10: 45
    Everything seems to be fine, until the moment when Poland and other limitrophs began to be dragged to the Nonaggression Treaty.
  3. Brother Sarych
    Brother Sarych 28 July 2012 10: 49
    Normal material, there would be more of them!
    You can repeat more and more - you look at one of the stubborn accusers of their country, at least a little start to think!
    Though. Of course, there is not much hope ...
  4. Alx1miK
    Alx1miK 28 July 2012 11: 11
    Someone blames Stalin for signing Mr. I wonder what could have been done in a situation when one country wants war, the second does not want it, and the third does not want cooperation? To repulse the Germans in the event of an attack on Poland? Without any agreements with the "allies" (and the Poles did not want to let our troops pass, because they believed that we were occupying the country, go ahead)? Silly and shortsighted. I think the Mr Pact is a very wise move.
  5. mox
    mox 28 July 2012 12: 46
    Another excuse.
    Slammed, made conclusions.
    What to procrastinate.
    1. Dobrokhod Sergey
      Dobrokhod Sergey 28 July 2012 14: 54
      The one who is guilty is acquitted.
      By signing the Treaty with Germany, the USSR made these snobs, England and France, think.
  6. smile
    smile 28 July 2012 13: 08
    Perhaps the most complete and comprehensive analysis of those appearing on the site. It amazes me why such materials rarely appear in our press. From the Moscow treaty, which is no different from the analogous ones concluded by the Germans with all the major countries of Europe earlier, we were just the last, made a bugbear who knows whose propagandists have been waving God forbid for how many years .... it’s even called although all similar agreements are called not pacts, but agreements not by the name of the signatories, but by the city in which the signing took place ....
    Well, how - man, damn it, we have been sleeping for the last thousand years and see how to capture the whole world .....
    Mr. Mox, which is taller - we didn’t get involved, the Treaty is a very important achievement and an outstanding diplomatic victory. I repeat, all the European powers had such an agreement with Germany. including Poland, which concluded it with Germany back in the year 34 and Derbanov together with Nazi Germany Czechoslovakia ....
    By the way - a more detailed coverage of this treaty is one of the most important tasks, since all the propaganda of the Baltic states, and of other countries of eastern Europe, is based on the myths surrounding this treaty.
    1. Dobrokhod Sergey
      Dobrokhod Sergey 28 July 2012 14: 03
      Quote: smile
      By the way - a more detailed coverage of this treaty is one of the most important tasks, since all the propaganda of the Baltic states, and of other countries of eastern Europe, is based on the myths surrounding this treaty.

      The main myth of this treaty is "secret protocols", and it is not disclosed, but is confirmed in this article. Therefore, the article did not fulfill its task, but on the contrary, once again confirmed the point of view of the anti-Soviet.
      1. Evgan
        Evgan 28 July 2012 14: 30
        Sergey, why are secret protocols a myth? Can you give evidence?
        1. Dobrokhod Sergey
          Dobrokhod Sergey 28 July 2012 14: 52
          There are a lot of them, so it is better to read separately: Kungurov A. A. "Secret Protocols, or Who Forged the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" (Moscow: Algorithm: Eksmo, 2009).
        2. Nuar
          Nuar 28 July 2012 15: 01
          Quote: EvgAn
          why are secret protocols a myth? Can you give evidence?
          hmm ... but the fact that no one has ever seen these "protocols" will pass for proof? Presented only some piece of paper, like which was dug up in German archives. (In addition, there are a lot of questions to her. For example, why is this the signature of Molotov's romanizations, although this was not the first time he was in negotiations and had not forgotten his native alphabet before)

          To confirm the existence of protocols directly, you need to demonstrate them. To confirm indirectly - show some thread pieces of paper referring "on secret protocols". but not even them.

          For example, if there was a partition of Poland, then why did both German and Soviet troops climb to non-territory? Is it not in combat orders that the boundaries of demarcation between units and the lines to be reached are indicated, it is necessary to try to get out and which to cross nizya in no case? Or were the protocols so secret that the Germans did not even report their command to them?

          Summary. Direct evidence for the existence of protocols - nobut there is indirect evidence that the protocols and did not have never.

          is that enough? repeat
          1. Evgan
            Evgan 31 July 2012 10: 54
            There is no direct and irrefutable evidence either in favor of the existence of protocols, or in favor of the fact that they never existed. Indeed, there are only indirect ones - and in favor of both versions.
            Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that the signing of the protocols took place, because I can not explain in any other way that the Red Army's entry into the Baltic states, Western Ukraine and Belarus and Bessarabia and the change of government there took place without any opposition from Germany. Consequently, there were some agreements between our countries on this subject - whether in the form of secret protocols or even oral agreements.
            Some incidents that took place (crossing the dividing line of the troops, shelling of a German tank, etc.) are more likely simply misunderstandings due to their scarcity and insignificance.
            Another thing - well, there were these protocols, so what? The USSR really tried to ensure their security, even at the expense of small states. Noble, of course, but it’s geopolitics. The Munich agreement is no better in this respect.
  7. Kars
    Kars 28 July 2012 14: 50
    It’s not a frequent case when Russia did not drag chestnuts from the fire for impudent Saxons, and gave them a try of their own medicine.

    As for the common border, it was like the USSR pushed the future line of contact far west. And rightly so. It is a pity that Adik the possessed decided to recall Napoleon and defeat England with a normal landing or campaign in Egypt and repeat the mistake of 1812.
  8. rexby63
    rexby63 28 July 2012 15: 28
    Stalin did what every sensible politician would have done in his place.
    "If their policy was coldly calculating, then it was also at that moment highly realistic" - Churchill's words
  9. bistrov.
    bistrov. 28 July 2012 19: 29
    Very detailed and objective analysis. I read it with pleasure. Recently, some publications have condemned the signing of a non-aggression pact. On the Soviet side, it was a very far-sighted and timely move, which made it possible to move the border several hundred kilometers to the west, and this is the main thing, and secondly, it made it possible to attract huge human, industrial and natural resources, which is also important, in addition, it made it possible to return the enslaved Slavic peoples to the USSR. It is bad that Stalin took the path of creating "union republics", this gave rise to nationalism, which allowed the USSR to collapse in the end. Now you are convinced how far-sighted the policy of tsarist Russia, which stood on the position of a unitary state, was.
    1. igordok
      igordok 31 July 2012 20: 31
      I totally agree.
  10. TAGIR
    TAGIR 28 July 2012 21: 10
    All political decisions were made in a state of time trouble. And this party consisted of "tsung-tswang". The USSR regained a part of the former territory, otherwise Germany would have been already in 1939 50 km from Minsk. By pushing back the borders, we did not give the Germans the opportunity to take Moscow before winter. But in general, the will of God and history cannot be changed for everything.
  11. skullcap
    skullcap 28 July 2012 21: 51
    To give an objective assessment of the contract, it is necessary to predict the development of events if this contract had not been concluded.
    Then from the border (Narva) to Leningrad there would be about 150 km - three days of offensive for German tanks. To organize a reliable defense of the city simply would not have time.
    After the capture of Leningrad, the liberated troops of the North group would be used to capture Moscow, after which Japan and Turkey would enter the war with all the consequences.
    In this case, it would be extremely difficult not only for Russians. For example, if we had to survive beyond the Urals, the problem of the same Poles by the Germans would have been solved completely. So, on the basis of common sense, the Poles are simply obliged to erect monuments to Comrade Stalin at every corner for his ingenious decision in preserving the prospects for the very existence of the Polish people.
    Hence the indisputable conclusion: the Moscow Treaty is a brilliant course of Soviet policy, which laid the material basis for the Victory of mankind in a mortal battle with fascism fostered by Western civilization.
    1. motors
      motors 29 July 2012 16: 20

      Let me disagree with the opinions that the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact was the only option for the defense of the western borders of the USSR.

      1. It was possible to conclude agreements with the Baltic countries on mutual assistance (which was done in the autumn of 1939).

      2. If even Germany attacked the Baltic countries with the least agreement on mutual assistance with the USSR, then they would have succeeded in getting to Narva in 5-6 days at best.
      Yes, and Leningrad was very serious fortified and attacking the Germans seriously would have substituted their flanks stretched.

      Quote: kosopuz
      For example, if we had to survive beyond the Urals, then the problem of the same Poles by the Germans would be finally solved. So the Poles, based on common sense, are simply obliged to erect monuments to Comrade Stalin on every corner for his ingenious decision in preserving the prospects for the very existence of the Polish people.

      Well, again, if the USSR didn’t sign such a treaty, Germany would have failed to attack Polsha.

      1. The German army was still rather weak and the political leadership would hardly risk oozatsa in a state of war with the USSR and

      2.After the attack on Polsha, Germany found herself in isolation most of the time, and it was the USSR that provided such important resources for the Nazis to wage war.

      sorry for the mistakes. Russian is not my happy language
      1. Kars
        Kars 29 July 2012 17: 02
        Quote: motors
        1. The German army was still rather weak and the political leadership would hardly risk oozatsa in a state of war with the USSR and

        Why? The USSR did not have any treaties with Poland
        Quote: motors
        2.After the attack on Polsha, Germany found herself in isolation most of the time, and it was the USSR that provided such important resources for the Nazis to wage war.

        Also, there were plenty of neutral countries.
        1. motors
          motors 29 July 2012 19: 27
          Quote: Kars
          Why? The USSR did not have any treaties with Poland

          Well, I don’t know such a case when a country is about to carry out an expansion without thinking about the reaction of other countries and the large tembolism! If the USSR had overturned the German proposal, the Germans would have risked a lot - where is the guarantee that the USSR will not be helped by Polshe? and who knows what France / UK will do ...
          And in this case, the Soviet Union untied the hands of the national ....

          Quote: Kars
          Also, there were plenty of neutral countries.

          Yes, of course there were non-neutral countries. But if the USSR did not send German resources in large quantities, then the Nazi military machine would have been significantly less. Yes, and where is the logic in helping resources to the country with which they were preparing to fight in the near future?

          The argument that the newest models of equipment were received in return so that later they would not be used against the Germans themselves was accepted. If they wouldn’t have been able to send the resources and realized their own guarantees (a guarantee to help Czechoslovakia in the event of the 1935 war), then the Germans would not receive anything.

          I'm sorry for the mistakes
          1. skullcap
            skullcap 29 July 2012 21: 53
            .motors Today, 19: 27
            And in this case, the Soviet Union untied the hands of the national ....
            The Nazis' hands were untied from the very beginning, when Western banks began to finance Hitler's rise to power and then his expansion to the east in order to annihilate the Russian and German forces in a mutual war.
            The role of Poland could be different. The Polish authorities dreamed of a future joint war with the fascists: after Czechoslovakia with the USSR and its subsequent division.
            But their hopes turned out to be deceived, because Hitler of the Slavs, including the Poles, did not consider people, especially allies.
            In Munich, the British and the French gave Hitler the go-ahead for further aggression eastward. The Polish government abandoned the treaty with the USSR, hoping to remain an ally of fascist Germany.
            Therefore, the fate of Poland has already been predetermined. If Stalin had remained a mere observer, as the Anglo-French vassal Hitler occupied the whole of Poland, then all the resources that the USSR accused of supplying would have been inherited by Hitler in Poland with interest. And the borders of Germany would have been hundreds of kilometers closer to Moscow. And how it would end - I wrote above.
            After the actual refusal of Western elites to negotiate with the USSR, Stalin had no choice but to take care of pushing as far as possible. Even Churchill recognized this in his time.
            1. motors
              motors 29 July 2012 22: 41
              Quote: kosopuz
              The Nazis' hands were untied from the very beginning, when Western banks began to finance Hitler's rise to power and then his expansion to the east in order to annihilate the Russian and German forces in a mutual war.

              According to the westerners, the bankers and the significant degrees of the government of McGgo were unprincipled. But why did the USSR do the same?

              Quote: kosopuz
              The Polish authorities dreamed of a further conquering war with the Nazis: after Czechoslovakia with the USSR and its subsequent division.

              Can you provide any facts about this, please?

              Quote: kosopuz
              In Munich, the British and French gave Hitler the go-ahead for further aggression to the east.

              I disagree. In Munich, it was only about the Sudetenland, and the annexation later occurred without any agreement from France and England.

              And about "gave the go-ahead for further aggression to the east" also disagree. If this would be so, why did France and Great Britain declare war on Germany after the aggression in Poland?

              Quote: kosopuz
              like the English-French vassal Hitler

              Sorry, to call Hitler vassals of England / France is frivolous. If he were Vasalam, why did he capture the whole of France + was content not far from the victory over England? If Hitler really were vassals of these countries, then he would not have concluded an agreement with the USSR and after the capture of Polsha by the premier of the attack on the USSR

              Quote: kosopuz
              then all the resources that the USSR is accused of supplying would go to Hitler in Poland with interest.

              Yes? And why then did the USSR attack Polsha in order to declare war on Germany (and Polsh, in view of the catastrophic situation on all fronts, didn’t refuse to help the USSR) and set off to supply weapons and other help to the Poles, he invaded Polsha and defeated their forces and even held a joint parade ( !)
              1. skullcap
                skullcap 29 July 2012 22: 59
                motors Today, 22: 41

                According to the westerners, the bankers and the significant degrees of the government of McGgo were unprincipled. But why did the USSR do the same?
                1. I do not understand why Owls. The Union is charged with unpardonable blame for those actions that are considered quite acceptable for Western European countries - diplomatic and trade relations with Germany.
                2. The USSR was forced to do so in order to survive on its own and save the world from fascism. But he was forced because the European countries refused to conclude an agreement on collective security, and the Polish government also refused a defensive agreement with the USSR.
                In this situation, there was no alternative.

                In order to answer the remaining questions with specific links (as you ask), I will have to write an article and not one. It simply does not allow the comment format.
                1. motors
                  motors 29 July 2012 23: 21
                  Quote: kosopuz
                  1. I do not understand why Owls. The Union is charged with unpardonable blame for those actions that are considered quite acceptable for Western European countries - diplomatic and trade relations with Germany.

                  Because neither England, nor France, nor one other country does not deny that they acted unprincipledly and directly say it is our shame. But the USSR, which did not act better, is presented as a defender for justice.

                  Quote: kosopuz
                  The USSR was forced to do so in order to survive on its own and save the world from fascism.

                  Sorry - I will repeat

                  To avoid fascism, as you say, it could have been otherwise.

                  According to your line of thought, it turns out like this - the USSR sees that the enemy (Germany) is gaining strength and the Western countries are for some reason not obstructing. And the place to somehow pretend to themselves is beginning to supply them with raw materials and other important resources. And even concludes an agreement with the Nazis on the division of several countries (descending to the level of the Nazis) and continue to keep them in every possible way in the war with the English and France.

                  And this is glad to save their territory from the Nazis ???

                  Quote: kosopuz
                  And I was forced to because European countries refused to conclude a collective security treaty.

                  And what requirements did the USSR see in relation to these European countries?

                  Among other things, the Baltic states agreed to all the demands of the Soviet Union to understandly avoid war. So what ?
              2. Aleksys2
                Aleksys2 30 July 2012 00: 20
                Quote: motors
                Can you provide any facts about this, please?

                from the SVR 1935 archive year:
                Our agent categorically states (as he read it) that
                the well-known and officially published non-aggression pact for
                ten years between Poland and Germany, concluded on January 26
                1934 of the year, there is a secret add signed on the same 26 on January
                Varya 1934 d. By virtue of this addendum in exchange for a sacred obligation
                In no case should Germany oppose Poland as an independent
                In fact, in a coalition with other states, Poland took over
                a commitment to Germany, which has the following
                dacion (the text of this secret addition is written in German and
                HONOR AND SECURITY. ”
                Our agent considers this addition to be a liquidation by Germany.
                the Rapall Treaty in exchange for the obligation of Germany not to raise
                mother of the issue of revising its eastern borders at the expense of Poland, i.e. per
                account of the Corridor, Danzig and Upper Silesia, otherwise, as soon as peaceful
                by - through a voluntary bilateral agreement.
                Our agent found out about the existence of this secret addition.
                to the contract just the other day. He gives him an extremely important
                Considering that Poland, according to the meaning of this addition, has been a year
                ago broke the Franco-Polish Union, as this paragraph in
                Sko-German protocol is not only a gentlemen's agreement
                Hitler - Pilsudski - is already an obligation between states.
                In this regard, our agent must change his previous personal
                the opinion that without France, with only one Germany, Pilsudski
                supposedly never decides to war against the USSR. As things go
                so far, our agent has generally become more serious about well-known
                Hitler's plans - Pilsudski. According to the agent, in the presence of the above-
                The proposed addition to the contract should be reckoned with the possibility of
                We are against the USSR without France, i.e. forces of Germany and Poland in Europe
                with the participation of Japan in the East.
                Our agent considers the threat of war all the more probable given
                the well-known position of England, which in any case will provide her
                the trait of France. According to Gonsiorovsky, the agent conveys that when
                By signing the official non-aggression pact Germany put-29
                la acceptance of the foregoing secret addition then Pilsudski
                uttered the following phrase:
                GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT. "
                Our agent is now not as skeptical as before, regarding
                According to plans Hitler - Pilsudski and says that the situation is very
                serious and that from the extravagant adventurer Pilsudski you can just
                expect, and therefore, one must be alert.
          2. Kars
            Kars 30 July 2012 00: 48
            Quote: motors
            where is the guarantee that the USSR will not be helped by Polsha

            Oh yes USSR in 1941 German guarantees greatly helped.
            Quote: motors
            and who knows what France / UK will do ...

            How does anyone know? They have a clear agreement --- and they complied with it --- declared war on Germany, though they did nothing.
            Quote: motors
            But if the USSR did not send in large quantities German resources
            The Germans would buy in other places, since even the United States traded with them before entering the war.
            Quote: motors
            Yes, and where is the logic in helping resources to the country with which they were preparing to fight in the near future?

            Logic? Do you know what the USSR received in exchange for raw materials?
            Quote: motors
            The argument that in exchange received the latest models of equipment so that later they are not used against the Germans themselves

            These are your personal problems --- nobody else supplied or planned for us.
            Quote: motors
            realized their guarantees (guarantee for Czechoslovakia’s assistance in the event of the 1935 war)

            Yes, of course --- the same Poland did not give corridors, and the persons involved in the Munich agreement would gladly enter the war on the side of Germany with the USSR.
            Quote: motors
            If you couldn’t post resources

            I repeat once again ---- that Germany had resources to get from.
            Quote: motors
            the Germans would not receive anything.

            If England and France did not give the Germans armaments then nothing would have worked.
            1. Aleksys2
              Aleksys2 30 July 2012 01: 13
              The Versailles system, whose guarantors on the continent were France and the small countries of Eastern Europe, could not be effective, because its direct and indirect victims were the two largest powers of the continent - Germany and Russia. However, on April 16 of the 1922 of the year, Germany and Soviet Russia signed the Rapallo Agreement, thanks to this it was possible to maintain and mutually develop the military-technical potential accumulated during the First World War. While the Red Army used the technical achievements of the German military industry and modern organizational methods of the German General Staff, the Reichswehr was able to train groups of pilots, tankmen and chemical weapons (gas) specialists in three own schools, as well as with the help of subsidiaries of the German military industry in Russia to train its officers in handling new weapons, the manufacture and possession of which was banned by Germany.
              For their part, Britain and the United States were not interested in a sharp weakening of Germany, seeing it as a counterweight to French dominance in Western Europe. The crisis of 1923 convinced them of the danger of revanchist forces coming to power in Germany. Therefore, in 1924, Britain and the United States are pushing for the adoption of the Dawes Plan, which allows Germany to receive US loans to repay reparations. This enabled Germany to restore its military-industrial potential by 1927. In 1930, an even milder “Jung plan” was adopted, which provided Germany with a delay in repaying reparations for the period of crisis.
              The Saarland was returned to Germany as a result of a plebiscite, but the demilitarization of the Rhine region adjacent to France was preserved, and the Lesser Entente, a system of French guarantees for new buffer states, was formed in Eastern Europe.
              France and Great Britain tried to blur the special character of Soviet-German relations. This course was actively promoted by German Foreign Minister G. Stresemann, who argued that Germany has more in common with Western countries than with the USSR. To this end, Germany, France and Britain signed the Locarno Accords at 1925. In accordance with its conditions, Paris and London guaranteed the inviolability of the western border of Germany, but did not give similar guarantees with respect to its eastern borders. This posed an immediate danger to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Lithuania, which in France were seen as a counterbalance to Germany and the USSR ("Little Entente"). After Locarno, capital, mainly American, rushed to Germany, accelerating the modernization of its industry. The Locarno agreement gave rise to a deep distrust of French politics in Eastern Europe, which in many ways disrupted negotiations on the creation of a collective security system in Europe in the 1930 years.
      2. Dobrokhod Sergey
        Dobrokhod Sergey 30 July 2012 09: 12
        motors, who told you such tales? Maybe this is their school curriculum?
    2. Alex
      Alex 21 February 2014 23: 13
      Quote: kosopuz
      So the Poles, based on common sense, are simply obliged to erect monuments to Comrade Stalin on every corner for his ingenious decision in preserving the prospects for the very existence of the Polish people.
      But they prefer to express more preferences. This, as I understand it, because of the burning resentment that no one wanted to fight for them then. What can you whitewash: the political syphilis, which England suffered so much and for centuries for, turned out to be contagious for the Poles, too, I wanted to, you see, influence geopolitics.
  12. wulf66
    wulf66 28 July 2012 23: 21
    The article is definitely PLUS. There was a desire to find a history textbook and see how these events are presented there ...
  13. Midshipman
    Midshipman 29 July 2012 00: 02
    Interestingly, Molotov and Ribbentrop studied at the same gymnasium and both idolized Anna Akhmatova
  14. gfreid
    gfreid 29 July 2012 14: 05
    The author is well done! The Molotov-Ribentpop Pact, but in reality, the agreement on the outbreak of World War II, which claimed 50-60 million lives, is called pragmatism !!! I wonder how many years of a real term would an aviator get an article in modern Germany if he would call the great pragmatist the impudent Fuehrer for signing this document that led to the Second World War?
    1. skullcap
      skullcap 29 July 2012 14: 40
      Do not distort!
      "... the treaty on unleashing the Second World War, which claimed 50-60 million human lives" ... is called the Munich Agreement.
      Stalin was simply pushed to the wall by the policies of Western countries, which concluded similar agreements with Hitler much earlier and set an example of how to protect their interests.
      Stalin-just a good student of the British and French (and Poles, by the way).
      1. gfreid
        gfreid 29 July 2012 15: 24
        Am I distorting? Apparently, according to the secret protocol to the Munich agreement, England and France chopped off 51% of Poland? And / Or 20% of Finland? And / or 100% of Latvia? And / Or 100% of Lithuania? And / or 100% of Estonia? Provided the Nazis with everything necessary? And did Nazi ships navigate through their territory to the Arctic waters to drown Soviet vessels? And then, half a century ago, they lied about the whole world, that there were no secret protocols in Munich when they were born?
        1. Kars
          Kars 29 July 2012 15: 28
          Quote: gfreid
          England and France chopped off to the Munich agreement

          According to the secret protocol, they hoped that Hitler would start a war against the USSR together with Poland, for this they gave Poland guarantees that it would be like naming Hitler that it was better to be friends with her.
          But it did not work out, the Poles were too arrogant.
          1. gfreid
            gfreid 29 July 2012 15: 51
            In psychology, this is called substitutional resentment, when the sense of resentment is transferred from one’s object to another. So learn that the poles are shitty, s, the Anglo-Saxons - sorry, the imagination refuses, pick up the epithet yourself. Although, if you thoroughly rummage through the forum, then you will not find such a thing.
            1. Kars
              Kars 29 July 2012 16: 05
              Quote: gfreid
              In psychology

              But are there no psychological reasons for surrendering Czechoslovakia to Hitler? Or an Anglo-German naval treaty? Militarization of the Rhine region in violation of the Versailles conditions? Anschlum's assumptions with Austria?

              Or the fact that Poland also participated in the seizure of Czechoslovakia and appropriated a part of its territories?
              1. gfreid
                gfreid 29 July 2012 16: 52
                Apparently again one of us is cringing, but the examples that you gave show the West, which is not far-sightedly trying to appease the Nazis. Demilitarizes Reinslaja, admits the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Austria, Abolishes sea treaties. And which countries were captured by the Western allies in Evaop? 51% of Poland, 20 of Finland, 100% of Liwa, Latvia and Estonia? As between the Nazis, they share Europe. Whom did you "eat"?
                By the way, World War II began precisely on September 1, 1939, ACCORDING to secret bells, namely the attack on Honor Poland. Now read these secret protocols !!! And why did the USSR lie for half a century that there were not any secret protocols.
                In the West, a cowardly and compromising policy with the Nazis and their pacification is considered the GREATEST SHAME !!! It is SHAME and DISAPPOINTMENT! just read their textbooks. And at the same time, I emphasize that ALL materials on Munich were declassified a long time ago. And no one a normal person would never think VIDEO called pragmatism.
        2. skullcap
          skullcap 29 July 2012 22: 35
          gfreid Today, 15: 24 ↑
          Am I twisting?
          Of course you twist. The USSR did not chop off anything, but only regained a part of the Russian lands that were lost after the revolution in Russia organized by the "allies".

          Nazystov supplied with everything you need?
          Before the war with Germany, the USSR simply traded with it. As one high-ranking Englishman said: "You can trade with cannibals." But at that time the Germans were not yet cannibals. And as soon as they began, they stopped immediately.
          The greatest humanists of all times and peoples — the Americans — for example, traded with the fascists throughout the Second World War, which sometimes pops up during the local presidential elections there.

          And then, for half a century, there was breach on the whole world, that there were no secret protocols in Munich?
          Breaking is the functional responsibility of the "free press" and "independent media", as some honest journalists have repeatedly testified to.
          Well and others picking up materially interested persons.
          1. The comment was deleted.
    2. Dobrokhod Sergey
      Dobrokhod Sergey 30 July 2012 11: 06
      gfreid, real Germans know who and what really served to unleash the Second World War.
      1. gfreid
        gfreid 30 July 2012 14: 40
        And why did you get the idea that I am German, though real? IP address? Oh well. In Germany, I work, I have two citizenships, but I live in Israel.
      2. gfreid
        gfreid 30 July 2012 15: 27
        “But I just regained a part of Russian lands” - I've already heard that somewhere.
        Yes, I remembered!
        And the Nazis said that he had only regained part of the German lands — Danzing, the Sudetenland, and the Rhine region. And the Japanese only regained part of the Japanese lands: Manjuria, the Philippines, etc. Great three !!!
        The greatest humanists of all times and peoples - the Americans - for example, traded with the Nazis throughout the second m.v., which sometimes pops up during the presidential elections there - honest journalists told you that
        Breaking is the functional responsibility of the "free press". - No comment.
  15. Kars
    Kars 29 July 2012 17: 00
    Quote: gfreid
    And what are the sirans captured by the Western allies in Evaope

    Oh, yes, half the world they’ve already taken is not enough.

    And from a psychological point of view, you forget that the PLAN did not work out. But in the end, the United States seized half of Europe under its economic control --- having received bases and debtors.
    Quote: gfreid
    By the way, the Second World War began precisely on September 1, 1939, ACCORDING to secret portals, namely the attack on Honor Poland

    Really? Why not a division of Czechoslovakia? What is the difference between Czechoslovakia and Poland?
    She and many do not share the First and Second World War, but consider the peace gap a long truce.
    But the most important thing is that from a psychological point of view you think that Ang-Franz can sign agreements with Germany, but the USSR does not. So go learn psychology and don’t make people laugh.
    Quote: gfreid
    just read their textbooks

    Do not quote?
    Quote: gfreid
    ALL materials on Munich declassified a long time ago.

    Really? Scanner of the final document you will not bring?
    Quote: gfreid
    And no one a normal person would never think VIDEO called pragmatism

    Naturally, they did not achieve their goal, and if Hitler had gone east, there would have been another assessment.
    1. gfreid
      gfreid 29 July 2012 17: 39
      If you really think that the United States had any relation to the Munich Treaty, then I pass !!! If this is taught in the countries of the former USSR, then comrade. Suslov is resting.
      If I decide what to teach me, I’ll figure it out without your highly qualified advice.
      What about quotes? Yes, at least Cherchel's memoirs vol. 1. They have a carriage with a cart there.
      Come to any acre and read, copy.
      And do you know their goals? Is this about US goals in the Muchen agreements?
      1. Kars
        Kars 29 July 2012 17: 44
        Quote: gfreid
        If you really think that the United States had anything to do with the Munich Treaty, then I pass

        You still can’t read?
        Quote: Kars
        what's the plan their didn’t work. And in result of the USA з

        Quote: gfreid
        If I decide what to teach, I’ll figure it out without your highly qualified advice

        Well, I wanted to help.
        Quote: gfreid
        Yes, at least Cherchel's memoirs Vol. 1

        In textbooks
        Quote: gfreid
        just read their textbooks

        whoever reads that cherchel, especially considering that he came after Chamberlain and naturally blamed everything on his predecessors.
        Quote: gfreid
        Come to any acre and read, copy

        So you yourself have not seen? Are you so sure and straightforward?
        Quote: gfreid
        they did not achieve their goal

        Quote: gfreid
        And do you know their goals?

        Well, figure out what the goal was for Britain, allowing Germany to have a fleet of 20% of its own and build submarines.
        1. gfreid
          gfreid 29 July 2012 18: 34
          I can read that. To the cheat question, the West claimed in Europe, signing the Munich agreements, did you answer as a result, the USA captured something there? The USA has nothing to do with Munich !!!! So what are we talking about? In the city of elderberry and in Kiev uncle.
          At the expense of textbooks, buy and read. And Ser Unston Churchill is recklessly reveling there. I graduated from high school and university a long time ago, and did not save any history books, but I read them and had 98 history books. And which Western textbooks did you read?
          At the expense of archives. I am not a historian, but my cousin - writes a doctorate in history and visits the archives. By the way, in which western archive did you or your friends try to get information and were refused to you / acquaintances? Or some other one, not even your friend, has been punished. Names, passwords, appearances !!!!
          At the expense of the goal: I thought and ... came up with. Well, for example, to conquer Poland + Finland + Latvia + Estonia.
          By the way, you ignored the question, why did the USSR lie for half a century that there were no secret protocols?
          1. Kars
            Kars 29 July 2012 18: 42
            Quote: gfreid
            Munich agreement you answered as a result of the United States something captured there? The USA has nothing to do with Munich !!!!


            Quote: Kars
            You still can not read? Quote: Kars
            that the PLAN didn’t work. And as a result, the USA

            I’ll also clarify for special history connoisseurs. THE PLAN OF ANGLO-French did not work out the USSR and Germany, Germany attacked France and knocked out the British from the continent, so they had to turn to the USA for help, which was not originally planned.
            Quote: gfreid
            So what are we talking about?

            On the results of the Second World War unleashed thanks to the Munich Pact, which brought Britain and France to the rank of secondary powers and the USA and the USSR to the rank of Super Powers.
            Quote: gfreid
            At the expense of archives. I am not a historian, but my cousin - writes a doctorate in history and visits the archives.

            it's you
            Quote: gfreid
            In the city of elderberry and in Kiev uncle

            Quote: gfreid
            At the expense of the goal: I thought and ... came up with

            Yes, this is expected, it means that Britain did not pursue submarines that caused huge damage to Germany in the first war, and didn’t just pursue the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles?
            1. gfreid
              gfreid 29 July 2012 21: 04
              I answered all your questions and learned the teal - go on, go and study, while you did not answer any of my questions. And if you answer uncomfortable questions with insults or teachings, then Gd will judge you !!! You have the right.
              1. Kars
                Kars 30 July 2012 00: 41
                Quote: gfreid
                I answered all your questions and learned teal

                No, they didn’t answer. For example, this one.
                Quote: Kars
                Well, figure out what the goal was for Britain, allowing Germany to have a fleet of 20% of its own and build submarines

                So dumb bananas dumb, think of a reason come up.
                1. gfreid
                  gfreid 30 July 2012 12: 05
                  No answered. You asked: "Well, think of what goal Great Britain was pursuing by allowing Germany to have a 20% fleet and build submarines." And I came up with. And my answer: "At the expense of the goal: I thought and ... came up with. Well, for example, to capture Poland + Finland + Latvia + Estonia." If my answer does not suit you, then write what exactly. And if you have a different opinion - share it.

                  And so one of the questions that did not get an answer: why did the USSR lie for half a century that there were not any secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact?
                  1. Kars
                    Kars 30 July 2012 15: 35
                    Quote: gfreid
                    "Well, think of what goal Great Britain was pursuing by allowing Germany to have a 20% fleet and build submarines." And I came up with. And my answer: "At the expense of the goal: I thought and ... came up with. Well, for example, to capture Poland + Finland + Latvia + Estonia."

                    You wrote real nonsense, and are you proud of it?
                    Quote: gfreid
                    The USSR lied for half a century that there were no secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribentrop Pact?

                    Have you brought them?
                    1. gfreid
                      gfreid 30 July 2012 16: 37
                      "You wrote real nonsense and are you proud of it?"
                      I wrote nonsense no more than this article.
                      "Did you bring them?" Is this your answer?
                      1. Kars
                        Kars 30 July 2012 16: 42
                        Quote: gfreid
                        I wrote nonsense no more than this article.

                        An article is a separate conversation.
                        But you could not answer a specific question.
                        Quote: gfreid
                        "Did you bring them?" Is this your answer?

                        Yes, the answer is, at least give me the text - I haven’t read it, so I can’t answer.
                        Also, I did not see how the USSR denied something about secret protocols. And about the MP Pact itself, I saw in all textbooks when I was at school, and in the literature I read.
                      2. gfreid
                        gfreid 31 July 2012 17: 52
                        Haven't you read it? You have not read textbooks, except Soviet ones (for a couple of tens of bucks you can buy, for example, in amazon.) In google, find the text "secret additional protocol
                        to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact "takes a couple of seconds. Sorry, but you remind me of Mr. Bean from the James Bond movie. The main character's motto was: Mister Bean knows no fear, Mister Bean knows no reproach, Mister Bean knows nothing at all!
                      3. Kars
                        Kars 31 July 2012 17: 56
                        Quote: gfreid
                        except Soviet you did not read

                        I'm not so old
                        Quote: gfreid
                        "takes a couple of seconds

                        And what prevented you from bringing them here instead of writing nonsense?
                        Quote: gfreid
                        Mr. Bean knows nothing at all!

                        And this is said by a person who cannot answer the question about the Naval Treaty between Great Britain and Hitler Germany allowing the latter, in contradiction with the Treaty of Versailles, to build a fleet of 20% of the tonnage of English? So why should Britain have national socialist submarines and battleships? And Mr. Bean?
                      4. gfreid
                        gfreid 31 July 2012 19: 06
                        For the gifted, those who for several days of correspondence could not find the text:
                        Secret Additional Protocol to the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union

                        When signing the non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned ombudsmen of both sides discussed in a strictly confidential manner the question of delimiting areas of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. This discussion led to the following result:

                        1. In the event of a territorial-political reorganization of the regions belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania is at the same time the border of the spheres of interests of Germany and the USSR. At the same time, the interests of Lithuania in relation to the Vilnius region are recognized by both parties.

                        2. In the event of a territorial-political reorganization of the regions belonging to the Polish State, the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR will be approximately along the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and San.

                        The question of whether it is desirable in the mutual interests to preserve the independent Polish State and what the borders of this state will be can only be finally clarified in the course of further political development.

                        In any case, both Governments will resolve this issue by way of friendly mutual agreement.

                        3. Concerning the southeast of Europe from the Soviet side, the USSR’s interest in Bessarabia is underlined. On the German side, it declares its complete political disinterest in these areas.

                        4. This protocol will be kept by both parties in strict confidence.

                        Moscow, 23 August 1939 of the year
                      5. Kars
                        Kars 31 July 2012 19: 51
                        And where are the signatures? Can I even compose this myself? Seals?

                        and if honestly I don’t see anything reprehensible here. Where is the start date of the war? Where is the date of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland?
                        England, for example, even before World War I stressed that the Black Sea Straits
                        Quote: gfreid
                        is the boundary of the spheres

                        so what?
                        Mr. Bean needs you to heal, there is nothing compared to the Militarization of the Rhine region and the construction of the fleet by Germany --- what are you stubbornly silent about as partisans - Shame on you or what?
  • skullcap
    skullcap 29 July 2012 22: 43
    gfreid Today, 17: 39
    Come to any acre and read
    What are you, from the moon fell. What kind of archives are you talking about? The British have not yet removed the neck of the secret from the archives, which ensures free flight of any assumptions, for example, about the Hess mission to them.
    And in general there everything is safely hidden from prying eyes.
    Only the archives of the USSR who lost the cold war have been fully disclosed so far. Moreover, even more were opened than they were in reality, a vivid example of which is the gamble with the execution of Poles by the Hitlerites at Katyn.
    1. gfreid
      gfreid 30 July 2012 12: 20
      Fell directly to our sinners, unlike some, continuing to fly in the clouds, like cherubs.