Intelligence about German divisions in April-June 1941

In the previous part intelligence materials were reviewed (Goals Difference) NKVD for the 1940 year, which differed little from the information of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the KA. The review of the RM, which arrived at the beginning of the 41 year, was begun. It was shown that RM on license plate numbers included up to 80% misinformation.

The following abbreviations will be used in the article: ap - artillery regiment, IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, cd (kbr, kp) - cavalry division (brigade, regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Ro - headquarters intelligence department, RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, td (tbr, tp, tb) - tank division (brigade, regiment, battalion).

Concentration of German divisions near the border

Below is a graph of the concentration of German divisions at the Soviet-German and Soviet-Romanian borders.

It can be seen from the figure that according to 22.6.41, the dependencies of the actual number of divisions and similar information according to intelligence should have crossed. This is precisely the reason for the coincidence of data from the Republic of Moldova and actual data at the beginning of the war. This is evidenced by the nature of the indicated dependencies from May 40 to June 41. There are no coincidences in the nature of dependencies over the entire period. However, the intersection does not occur due to an increase in the number of divisions in the evening of June 22 in the RU report, in which the number of compounds is being increased in every way for safety reasons ...

In earlier reports of the Zapovo RO in Moscow, mention was made of two SS armored divisions that no one had seen, but two people allegedly heard about it. No one saw the servicemen from these divisions, nor the equipment from there. Even after a month-long attempt to find them, they were not found. But when compiling a report on the evening of 22 June, this unverified information came in handy. At the same time, the Republic of Uzbekistan is well aware that such SS divisions simply do not exist. 26.4.41 Summary of RU regarding the presence of SS divisions in the German Armed Forces 18 has a subscript "of which 10 motorized". Motorized, not tank.

The Synopsis issued on June 15 mentions the same number of SS divisions “18". There is no mention anywhere that some of these divisions are tank divisions. It is well known that the SS tank divisions did not exist before the war ... But, as they say, the salvation of drowning men is the work of the drowning men themselves. The management of the RU protected themselves using a method of increasing the number of connections. There are other examples of the above.

In the previous RU report, it was said that there were 9 German divisions in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine. In fact, they were not there, but something intelligence "saw." In the June 22 report in RU, this number was increased to 13-15 divisions. If there are no troops, then there is no transportation of troops and equipment, and retrospective intelligence “saw” an increase of almost 50% of the defunct German group ...

In Romania, according to the previous report, there were up to 27 German divisions (including up to 10 etc. and MD), and in the report from June 22 the number of divisions in the German group increased by 30%! At the same time, without trifling, the number of td and md increased exactly by half. No one was embarrassed that the fifteen TDs and MDs indicated in the Republic of Moldova in Romania make up almost half of the German mobile troops, which the German command allocated for the war with the Soviet Union. This is due to the fact that no one in intelligence knew how much, and so on, was allocated for the war with the USSR.

PM analysis from different intelligence

To verify the reliability of the data coming from our intelligence, we analyze some of the RM, which were prepared before the war. A detailed analysis of the presence or absence of motorized and tank troops at the border in this unit will not be carried out, since separate units will be dedicated to these troops in the future.

Special report of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR (9.4.41):
[quote] At the beginning of February, 1941 ... in Lublin arrived from Warsaw the 26-th up and the 64-th motor-mechanized regiment, from the city of Holm - the 23-th up. [/ quote]

23-th up was part of the 23-th PD, which in the indicated period was in East Prussia. Therefore, the artillery regiment could not be located more than 350 km from the southernmost point on the border of East Prussia. Since this regiment was seen in the cities of Holm and Lublin, this can only be a planned operation to misinform our intelligence.

26-th up from the 26-th front, which from July 1940 to May 1941 of the year was in Belgium. No one will send a divisional artillery regiment for 1,5 thousand km from the place of permanent deployment of the division.

64-th PP previously was part of the 16-th PD. During the formation of the 16th TD, the 64th pp was reorganized into the 64th Rifle Regiment, which became part of the division. The formation of the division was carried out on the territory of the 6-th HE (Germany). From December 40 to March 1941, the division will be in Romania, and in April it will have to fight in the Balkans. Intelligence correctly identified this regiment as motorized, but individual soldiers of this regiment or a group of soldiers with fake badges on shoulder straps could only arrive in Lublin from Warsaw. With any of these options, intelligence data is misinformation.

Special message of the NKVD of the USSR (14.4.41):
[quote] In the area of ​​Suwalki 5-6 April this year up to two motorized mechanized divisions arrived in the Sheplishki, Punsk, Krasnopol, Seyny, Giby and Kalety districts (30-40 km from the border) ...
Deputy People's Commissar of the Interior, Lieutenant General Maslennikov. [/ Quote]

The message contains a lot of other information that is difficult to double-check, but information about two MDs is easy to verify. The first German MD (20-I) 10.4.41 began to arrive from France to the territory of East Prussia and on April 16 went to Poland. Where exactly - information is missing. 20 MD arrived to East Prussia not completely. The anti-tank division, reconnaissance battalion, reserve battalion and some other units in mid-April were still in Germany. Two motorized and artillery regiments were not found at 14.4.41 locations. The next motorized division will arrive at the Eastern border only in the month of May. Therefore, we can say that the RM about the arrival of up to two MD are not true.

24.4.
On 41, a special message was received from our intelligence officer to the head of RU: [quote] Germany now has 265 divisions ... In Poland and East Prussia there are up to 85 divisions, of which up to 60 divisions, 8 divisions, 12 divisions, 1-2 divisions, 1-XNN ... "There are notes:" He has incorrect information about tank and mountain divisions and paratroopers. 2 motor div. deserves interest, but it needs to be backed up with other data. The distribution of theaters and reserves is not entirely correct. Golikov. 40 g. [/ Quote]

In accordance with the special message, in Poland and in East Prussia there are up to 85 German divisions, including 20 etc. and MD. The chief of RU was interested in information about 40 MD, but in fact there were fourteen such compounds in Germany and there was still a separate MP. And what information was provided in the Republic of Moldova during this period?

RU Summary (26.4.41):
[quote] As a result of accounting and comparing the received data, the general distribution of the German armed forces along borders and fronts at 25.4 is presented as follows: In the border zone with the USSR:
The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova) is 95-100 divisions (without cavalry units), of which:
a) in the East Prussian direction (against Pribovo) there are 21 – 22 divisions, of which: 17 – 18 fr, 3 md, one td….
b) In the Warsaw direction (against ZAPOVO) - 28 divisions, of which: 23 PD, 1 MD and 4 TD. In addition, one motocavalry.
c) In the Lublin-Krakow region (against KOVO) - 29 – 32 divisions, of which: 22 – 25 front, 3 MD, 4 etc ...
d) In the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 front ...
e) In the Uzhgorod direction (against KOVO) - the total number of German troops in the Carpathian region of Ukraine is 3, of which 2 is a combat unit and one traffic police.
f) In the Moldavian direction (against the OdVO) - 8 – 9 divisions, of which: 7 – 8 divisions and main-division ...
The total size of the German army at 25.4.41 is 286 – 296 divisions ... According to reports, from April 1 the German command began to form divisions before 40, which requires additional verification ... [/ quote]

The summary lists the German divisions that are included in the 286-296 number: 199-207 PD, 15 GSD, 20 MD, 22 TD, 4 Motorized Cavalry, 8-10 Parachute, 18 SS Division (including 10).

Information on the number of divisions is overstated: by the total number of connections - by 34-38%, by traffic - by 10%, by md (including md SS) - by 53%, by cd - by 4 times, by parachute divisions - by 4- 5 times

According to RU, at 25.4.41, the border (excluding German divisions in Romania) was 77-81 division, of which 16 and so on.

In fact, during this period there were 53 divisions near the border, including two TDs and one MD. Are intelligence data on TD and MD reliable when there is an error in determining their number more than 5 times? Are not. What parts did intelligence take for tank and motorized? We will figure it out later. Even worse is the situation in the Republic of Moldova with the number of cd and cp.

By coincidence the information is much higher. If we consider only the territory of East Prussia and Poland, the difference in intelligence data from the actual number of divisions is only 19-22%. For the German troops in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, everything is much worse - there is sheer disinformation ...

Special communications of the NKVD of the USSR and the RU General Staff

Consider now the information that came from the reconnaissance of the border troops.

Special message of the NKVD of the USSR (21.4.41 g.):
[quote] From 1 to 19 on April 1941, the border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border obtained the following data on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the Governor-General ...
In total, they arrived in these areas: ... 3 MD, 6 PD, up to 21 PP, 2 MP, 7 CP and 9-10 UP, up to 7 TB and 4 combat battalions, a motorcycle battalion, 2 scooter companies ...
People's Commissar of the Interior of the USSR Beria. [/ Quote]

The report refers to the border strip. Let's do the calculations. 3 MD and 6 PD arrived - a total of 9 divisions.

21pp / 3 + 1 up = 7 fr. Total 16 divisions. We accept that 7 tank battalions, 2 MP and two ap will make up two more divisions. It turns out that the Germans drove to the border to 18 divisions.

Let's look at the reports of the RU and determine: how many divisions arrived according to army intelligence. Special message RU (4.4.41): [quote] As a result of the analysis of all the received data, a general strengthening of the East German Front against the USSR from the Baltic Sea to Slovakia for February and March for 6 PD and 3 etc. is obtained ... Total: 72-73 divisions [/ quote]

On April 1, near the border (to Slovakia), according to the RU, there were 72-73 German divisions. Special message RU (26.4.41): [quote] The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova) [on 25.4.41, - Approx. auth.] - 95-100 divisions ..., of which:
... e) In the Uzhgorod direction ... three divisions ...;
f) In the Moldavian direction ... 8 – 9 divisions ... [/ quote]

Without Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania, the number of German troops will be 84-88 divisions. Taking away from the indicated number the number of divisions available on April 1, we get the arrival of 12-15 divisions. According to border guards, for a shorter period (six days) more troops arrived (three divisions). Therefore, it cannot be said that the reconnaissance of the border troops provided the RM with more accuracy compared to similar information of the RU.

It is not known how many divisions actually arrived from 1 to 19 in April. It is only known that for the whole of April 16 divisions arrived. Therefore, it is not possible to verify how reliable the RM RU is. We can only conclude that the information of the reconnaissance of the border troops is somewhat overestimated relative to the similar data of RU.

Special message of the NKVD of the USSR:
[quote] During the time from April 20 to May 19 this year an increase in the number of German troops near the border with the USSR was expressed:
In Klaipeda region: at 6, 2, and 2, ... one cbd ...
In the district of Suwalki: one pd, one cd and one ppm ...
In the region of Ostroleka: five pd, two mp, ... one mp ...
In the region of Biala Podlaska: on one AK, four front and one so on ...
In the area of ​​the Hill: one AK, one md ...
In the area of ​​Hrubieshov: two front and one so on ...
In the area of ​​Tomashov: two pd ...
In the area of ​​Yaroslav - Sanok: for one AK, six pd, one tp ... [/ quote]

35 divisions arrived (including 4 etc. and 4 MD), one KBR, three TP and one MP. Three TP and one MP count for one conditional etc. Then it turns out that from April 20 to May 19 1941 of the year there was an increase in the German grouping at the border by 36 divisions.

Adding the data from the previous NKVD report, we see that from April 1 to May 19 on November 1941, the German group in the border region increased by 18 + 36 = 54 division.

According to RU, the German group increased from April 1 to May 15 by 42-46 divisions.

In fact, from April 1 to May 31, 46 divisions arrived at the border. From the indicated number it is known that 10 divisions arrived after May 15. Then until May 15 (inclusive) no more than 36 divisions.

As a result of such complex calculations, it can be said that RU increased the number of arrived divisions by 17-28%. At the same time, it was shown that the reconnaissance of the border troops overestimated the number of arriving troops relative to similar information from RU.

Certificate of the NKVD of the USSR (after 24.5.41):
[quote] On the Soviet-German border: In April - May of this year The concentration of German troops continued near the Soviet-German border. During this period, concentration was established on the territory of East Prussia and the Polish governor general: ... 68-70 PD, 6-8 MD, 10 CD and 5 TD ...
On the Soviet-Romanian border: In April-May of this year in Romania concentrated to 12-18 divisions of the German troops, of which: 7 md and to 2 etc ...
The greatest concentration of German troops is noted in the areas of Dorohoi, Redeuci, Botosani. May 21-24 in this area was located up to 6 MD, 1 TD and 2 PD ...
Deputy People's Commissar of the Interior, Lieutenant General Maslennikov. [/ Quote]

In accordance with the above Information, the reconnaissance of border troops was found on the Soviet-German and Soviet-Romanian borders until 101-111 German divisions. This amount does not include the border territory of Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, as well as the German group in the Danzig - Poznan - Thorn region. The exact release date of the certificate is not indicated. The certificate contains the latest date “November 24.5.41, XNUMX»

According to RU, at 31.5.41, our border had 120-122 German divisions. If we subtract from the indicated number of formations the 14 divisions that the RU “saw” in territories that are not considered in the NKVD document, then we obtain the number 106-108. We can say that the intelligence information of the border troops and the RU is comparable.

In fact, on 31.5.41, the border was 83 German divisions. It can be seen that intelligence agencies from different departments do not provide the correct information. The myth that the reconnaissance of the NKVD border troops provided more accurate information than the SC General Staff’s RU does not stand up to criticism ...

It can be concluded that, according to the assessment of the intelligence of the border troops, the number of German divisions:
- in the summer - autumn of the 1940 of the year coincided with the number of troops according to the RU;
- in April 1941 of the year exceeded the same amount that was given in the RM RU;
- in April - May of the 1941 of the year, according to the top estimate (111 of divisions), the data also exceeded the number of divisions in the Republic of Moldova.

Let us return once more to the NKVD Help: “The greatest concentration of German troops is noted in the areas of Dorohoi, Redeuci, Botosani. May 21-24 in this area was located up to 6 MD, 1 TD and 2 PD". Nine German divisions are concentrated in the specified area according to border guards. These include a strong mobile grouping of 7 etc. and MD.

In fact, in this area there were only up to 1-2 German frontiers. Information on the presence of a powerful tank-motorized grouping also passes according to RU information. This can only be connected with the deliberate misinformation of our intelligence by the German command, at the direction of which it was necessary to overestimate the size of the group in the southern direction.

P.A. Sudoplatov:
[quote] We overestimated the grouping of German forces opposing us in the southwest, as a result of which the Southern Front was forced to withdraw in early July. Despite the very serious agent network that we had in Romania, was obtained mythical information on the significantly superior forces of the Germans and Romanians in the South, consisting of 40 PD and 13 TD and MD.

An incorrect assessment of the situation in Bessarabia by our intelligence, as the People’s Commissar of State Security of Moldova, later head of the special department of the Southern Front Sazykin, self-critically told me, at a critical moment in the outbreak of the war led to the low efficiency of the actions of the front forces, despite the fact that the enemy, as it turned out, did not have superior forces. No doubt this had an adverse effect on the development of events throughout the South-West... [/ quote]

Information on license plate numbers in the RM NKVD

Special message of the NKVD of the USSR (2.6.41): "25 of April arrived from Bulgaria in East Prussia 35-fr ..."

35 I was in Belgium before 25.3.41 and arrived in East Prussia 9.4.41. Reliability of information is acceptable: Belgium is confused with Bulgaria and the division was discovered after 16 days after its arrival.

Help NKVD USSR (9.6.41): “According to a survey of the border violator of the 93-th Leskovsky border detachment, the headquarters of the 257-th front, which is part of the 17-th AK, is deployed in Krosno ...”

257 I was not part of the 17 AK. From January to May of the 1941 year, it was part of the 34th AK, and then became part of the 49th mountain rifle corps.

Help NKVD USSR (10.6.41): “According to the operational data of the 91-th Rava-Russian border detachment ... to Narol - the 559-th p ...”

The 559-th sub-station in July of the 1940 of the year was disbanded and only 15.12.41 will be re-deployed. In the Republic of Moldova misinformation is reflected.

Special message of the NKGB BSSR (19.6.41):
[quote] “12 and 13 of June this year at art. Terespol [2 km to the border near the city of Brest - approx. auth.] a military train was unloaded, a group of German soldiers on shoulder straps had the numbers 411 and 643, four battalions in full combat gear, on shoulder straps the soldiers had the numbers 44 and 46 ... "[/ quote]

The numbers on the “411” epaulets could only correspond to the 411 PP, since 411-th front did not exist. The 411-th subdivision was part of the 122-th pd, which since April 1941 has been located in East Prussia. Therefore, the servicemen of the 411-th settlement could not unload several hundred kilometers from their place of deployment ...

The 643-th PP was disbanded as far back as 21.8.40, and the 643-th PD never existed.

The 44-th subdivision was part of the 11-th pd, which since 10.3.41 was located in East Prussia.

The 46-th subdivision was part of the 30-th pd, which until May 1941 was in France, and in June will be relocated to East Prussia.

In principle, the military personnel of separate units from the 44 and 46 infantry regiments could have appeared with the numbers on the shoulder straps of “44” and “46”. But 46-I PD during this period was in Romania and on the territory of Poland its parts were not. 44 I was stationed in early June in the city of Kielce, and 16.6.41 was already concentrated at the border opposite the city of Vladimir-Volynsky.

Why lead the 4 battalion to Brest and unload 2 km from it, then to lead these battalions along the border to a distance of about 150 km? Therefore, the unloading of infantry battalions far away from the concentration site is an unlikely event. It turns out that the servicemen of the four regiments could not be unloaded at art. Terespol in June 1941, and intelligence “saw” four battalions ...

Continuation of special messages: “The 241-th up, which arrived on 12 on May this year, was stationed in the Suvalka district in the region of Rachki-Stoki-Kuryanki. On 3 of June one unit of this regiment left Kuryanka to a new destination. We moved in the direction of Olshanka ...

18 May this year from the city of Graudenets to Tilsit arrived 501-th paragraph The headquarters of the 3th battalion of this regiment is stationed in Vilkisken, the 9th company - in Jagmanten, the 10th company - in Ausgiren, the 11-machine gun company located in the forester’s house ... (Information received during reconnaissance of border violator V. Schroder 6.6.41 g.)

... In April, two battalions of the 475 infantry regiment arrived from France in the city of Radom, which on June 3 moved to metro Rozhanka, the second battalion of the regiment, in addition to studying, carries border guards at night on the 4 km front. (Information was obtained during reconnaissance of the border violator of the soldier of this battalion R. Wichter) ... "

The 241-th up was part of the 161-th front, which since July 1940 was stationed in East Prussia. By the beginning of the war, 161-I will be on the Suvalka ledge.

The 501-th settlement from the 290-th front, which since March 1941 of the year has been located on the territory of East Prussia. The division was located near these settlements.

475-th PP from the 255-th PD, which has been in Poland since March 1941. The division will meet the outbreak of war at Brest.
Again we see about 50% misinformation and up to 50% reliable information.

Special report of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR (2.6.41):
[quote] "Against the Belarusian Military District in the metro station Byala-Podlask ... 313 and 314 th ..." [/]

313-th PP from the 246-th PD, which has been in Germany since 1940, and in France since March. The division will be redeployed to the Eastern Front only in February 1942.

The 314-th settlement from the 162-th front, which since July 1940 has been located in East Prussia.

One fake regiment and one real regiment. 50% of the information was confirmed and 50% is misinformation ...

P.A. Sudoplatov:
[quote] To the distortion of the real picture of the leadership of Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, Tymoshenko, the activities of the Soviet intelligence voluntarily and involuntarily joined the KGB and GRU foreign intelligence leaders in the 1960-1980 years ... They actually initiated the thesis that on the eve of the war about the timing of the attack, the scouts "reported accurately", and the dictator Stalin ... criminally ignored the reliable RM about the German attack ... We did not reveal the disinformation actions of the enemy’s intelligence and its satellites on the eve of the outbreak of war ... [/ quote]

Enemy units against OdVO troops

In the first parts, we examined in detail the information on the three HEs (PribOVO, KOVO and ZAPOVO), which came from the ROs of the okrugs and RUs, and also compared these data with the information on the maps that are posted on the websites of the RF Ministry of Defense and “People's Memory”. The RM data does not contradict the information on the maps, which was shown. Then the RM about the enemy troops concentrated against the OdVO were not considered. The figure shows a graph of the increase in the number of troops on the Soviet-Romanian border according to RU.

The situation with the concentration of German troops against the OdVO is similar to the situation for the three previously considered military forces: since the beginning of June, an increase in the number of German troops at the border has not occurred. As if specifically, the German leadership shows that for the defense against the spacecraft, the troops were brought in at the proper volume and a further increase in the number of forces was not required. The change in the number of troops at the border has stabilized, but in fact during this period the most intensive movement of troops takes place, which our intelligence could not accurately identify. The figure below shows the layout of enemy troops on the eve of the war against the OdVO troops.

It’s just like in other districts: on 17.6.41, about 12 Romanian and German divisions are concentrated at the border and at a distance 13 ... 20 ... 35 km from it. Even before the 12 divisions are concentrated at a distance of 25 ... 38 ... 72 km from the border. According to the Republic of Moldova, up to 17 German divisions are deployed on the territory of Moldova and Northern Dobrudzhia. In the central part of Romania there are also 10 German divisions, which include 4 and so on.

From the presented scheme and the number of troops (according to intelligence) it cannot be concluded that the war will begin at the dawn of June 22. It can begin on 18 of June or, for example, 1 of July ...

Our intelligence reported on the enemy’s troops in such a detailed and accurate way that probably according to the leadership of the spacecraft the intelligence was obliged to detect the beginning of the advance of the invasion group to the border in the shortest possible time. For the full advance of such a group, it took up to two days, and during this time (according to the leadership of the spacecraft), it was possible to calmly bring the border troops into combat readiness, partially move the troops to the border and disperse Aviation... But everything went, unfortunately, according to the scenario conceived by the German command ...

Our planes over enemy territory

Currently white spot in stories reconnaissance is the issue of conducting reconnaissance flights by the air forces of the spacecraft in the 1941 year. It is known that border aviation aircraft flew along the border up to two times daily. Border guards collected information on troop movements on the German side and transmitted them to the border commanders responsible for reconnaissance at numerous field landing sites. Further, the RMs were generalized in the border districts and sent to the Main Directorate of the NKVD Border Troops.

And there is very little information about reconnaissance flights of the SC Air Force. This information is found only in memoirs. For example, F. Dolgushin (122 IAP, 11 Garden):
[quote] On Friday, 20 of June, we flew, scouted ... On Friday, Pavlov flew in, Kopets flew in, and the division commander, Colonel Ganichev, on his plane. They gathered us at the headquarters, I report that I saw a group of aircraft of about forty. It was we at dawn, we flew with Seryozha in the morning ... We shot from two thousand, we examined all this, and now we have reported - there were so many airplanes of this and that type. An increase of so much, the entire airfield of Suwalki is completely full.
And later we see a passenger car that is heading to our parking lot ... So Kopets, Lieutenant General, asks, “What is your name?” Will you let me fly the plane? Don’t worry, Sergey, I won’t break ... "Then flew: the commander, regiment commander, and our colonel Nikolaev ... They flew, they taxied. I come up, and Kopets comes out. “The plane is really good. Everything that you reported, everything is accurate. We could not count the planes with accuracy, but I didn’t feel like hanging out there ... [/ quote]

Consider German reports on the flight of Soviet aircraft along the border and abroad. The reports do not mention the regular flights of border aircraft along the border and the flights of passenger aircraft. Probably, regular (planned) flights by German observers were not recorded. The messages below sometimes do not record flights of our aircraft across the border or their return back. From this it can be assumed that some of the flights abroad could not be recorded by German observers.

Many flights over the border, as can be seen from the materials, could be associated with a loss of orientation by pilots in the air. However, quite a few border violations in May 1941, when Germany was expected to attack, may indicate that some of the flights could be reconnaissance. Below in the messages in parentheses is the distance from the border towards the enemy. The author could not find part of the settlements ...

15.1.41 in 11-37 in the area of ​​Wola-Ranizowska (65 km) a plane flew from East to West. With some delay he returned to the East. A little later, an airplane appeared again in the Ranizow area (36 km) with a flight direction to the West. Very high altitude did not allow to determine the nationality of the aircraft.

4.4.41 in the morning at a high altitude, an aircraft of unknown nationality flew northwest-west-west of 12 km Sokal. Further flight made to the southeast. Intelligence and air defense were notified.

11.4.41 message about the border crossing by plane. Near 12-00 at an altitude of 3000 m, another Russian aircraft flew along the border. No violation of the border.

15.4.41 an unknown plane at high altitude flew from south to north near Sokal.

19.4.41 two aircraft in 6-50 and in 7-10 (I-16 Rata) of Russian nationality were found over Malkinj (Poland). A large Soviet star is distinguishable on the underside of bearing planes. In 11-40, another plane of Russian origin flew from the East over Malkinia to the West. In 7-20, an aircraft of unknown nationality flew at an altitude of 200 m above Ostrowec.

17.4.41 in 10-45 4 Russian monoplane at an altitude of about 1000 m flew over the German-Russian border along the road Schwiddern (Poland) - Szczuczyn (USSR), as well as over the area Schwiddern and flew back to the east.

24.4.41 in 12-55 Russian airliner 15 km from Lotzen (58 km) passed at an altitude of 200 - 250 m above the marching column of the headquarters company.

9.5.41 in 23-00 from Russia crossed the border near the Rabedy plane and went deeper on 3-4 km to the German side. You could watch it before Szerwin. In Laski and Mahonow only the sound of motors was heard. Height 500 m. Navigation lights ...

10.5.41 in 7-30 saw 3 Russian aircraft over the border (22 km northeast of Sokolov. To the border in this direction, less than 22 km. Obtained over Soviet territory). Flight altitude about 1500 m.

In 11-45 from the east, a flight of an unknown aircraft at an altitude of 1200-1500 m near Wieska over the German region (9 km) in a north-south direction.

In 11-55, an aircraft of unknown origin from an eastern direction at an altitude of 1200 m flew over Starczewice (600 m) and Mogialnice (500 m),. Further flight over the German region in a southerly direction to Korczew (2,5 km). Further flight in a westerly direction.

13-50 flight of two aircraft of unknown nationality from the east over the German region at an altitude of 500 - 800 m with a duration of about 1 / 4 hours.

19.5.41 in 15-50 two single-engine aircraft at an altitude of 1000 m flew over the border. The signs were not distinguishable. The type of aircraft could only be Russian.

21.5.41 Russian planes crossed the border between Lipsk - Sopockinie.

22.5.41 in 8-30 an aircraft of unknown origin flew from north to south in the direction of the German border near Jablezna.
In 13-14, a twin-engine aircraft of unknown nationality flew over the German-Russian border near Okpсzyn and flew east.

24.5.41 unknown aircraft watched over the German border.

25.5.41 5 Russian aircraft were observed along the Rydavka road (3 km) - Macharce (23 km).

26.5.41 In the area of ​​the 4 Army in 8-30 in the morning, an aircraft of unknown nationality crossed the German border on a wide arc at Jablezna. In 13-40, a twin-engine aircraft of unknown nationality crossed the German-Russian border over Okpсzyn and turned east.

A Russian high-speed aircraft (type I-16) flew the border to 11-40 in the direction of Ostroleka at an altitude of 2000 m. At Ostroleka it dropped to about 200 m, and then flew over the railway station and headed east. At 11-50, at an altitude of about 1500 m, a single-engine short vehicle of a strange construction was observed, emerging from the clouds above Rozan (15 km). The 12-01 Russian fighter type I-16 was observed at low altitude near Lubiewo (9 km) flying towards the Komarovo camp (13 km). In 12-05, a Russian car flew east at Ugniewo (9 km). The Russian fighter returned to 12-10 Russian territory at an altitude of 50 m.

27.5.41 Russian bomber crossed the border.

30.5.41 flew a Russian plane at a distance of 200-300 m at the border.

2.6.41 from Russia near Kuzawka at an altitude of 6000 - 7000 m flew an unknown plane in the direction of German territory towards Byala Podlaska.

1.6.41 at 11-45 border the plane crossed from the east at an altitude of 1200 m. He returned back after about 5 minutes.

In 10-15, an airplane of unknown origin flew over the border at an altitude of 4000 m and flew at Wisenien Lomasy.

3.6.41 5 three-engine cars flew at the border at an altitude of 1000 m towards Augustow.

4.6.41 in 13-20 heard the sound of an airplane near Ostrov-Mazowiecki. The 13-47 once again heard the noise of a single aircraft. The sound disappeared towards the Russian territory.

5.6.41 in 11-58 flight of a Russian aircraft in the direction of Sarnaki (40 km).

In 12-37, a Russian single-engine aircraft crossed the border at an altitude of about 1500 m from the east. It was seen in 8 km south of Mikaszowka (12 km).

6.6.41 between 10-15 and 10-30 2 Russian aircraft type R5 or RZ at an altitude of 500 m flew to German territory through Komorowo - Ostrow Maz. - Ugniewo. Duration from 3 to 7 min.

In 10-30, 5 Russian planes flew along the border.

2 aircraft flown close to the border.

At the border (Szczebra) flew a Russian plane.

8.6.41 in 12-05 flight of the Russian monoplane Kolno - Wincenta - Turau. In 13-05, the plane flew in the opposite direction.

21.6.41 in the line Lipsk - Sopockinie (north of Grodno) in the morning a massive occupation of field positions in the border area was discovered. In 3-30, three Russian fighters flew near the border at Janowka (10 km north of Augustow).

To be continued ...

Comments

[Vadim T.]

I can’t understand one thing: infantry, motorized and tank divisions are not a needle in a haystack. How did the Germans conceal the transfer of their units to the border? Indeed, in the same Poland there were probably people who worked at railway stations and observed the transfer of troops. They could not notice tanks on the platforms or trucks, tractors, personnel. Yes, and pilots in reconnaissance flights should have noticed the movement of troops. Why did the General Staff of the Red Army find itself in ignorance?

[ccsr]

Quote: Vadim T.

They could not notice tanks on the platforms or trucks, tractors, personnel.

Firstly, not all of our agents could have been trained to distinguish a tracked Sd Kfz 251 (250) from a tank if it was covered with a cover or camouflage net during transportation.
Secondly, even if such an agent notices something, it is not a fact that he knows where it is moving and where the place of unloading is.
So do not succumb to the spells of the author of the articles that supposedly intelligence MUST reveal all the facts of the movements of any troops, because only foolish people can believe such stupidity.

Quote: Vadim T.

Yes, and pilots in reconnaissance flights should have noticed the movement of troops.

There was a ban for our aviation to cross the border, which is why if they flew in, it was more by mistake than with a special reconnaissance mission. Yes, and reconnaissance aircraft before the war were very primitive with us.

Quote: Vadim T.

Why did the General Staff of the Red Army find itself in ignorance?

This is the author of the article thinks so because of his ignorance. I will recommend to you summary No. 5 of June 15, where the placement of the parts for June 1 is given - here you should study it, and not what the deceitful author of this article writes, then you will find out what our general staff knew

[AsmyppoL]

Vadim T: "I can’t understand one thing: infantry, motorized and tank divisions are not a needle in a haystack. How did the Germans conceal the transfer of their units to the border? Indeed, in the same Poland there were probably people who worked at railway stations and observed the transfer of troops. They could not notice tanks on the platforms or trucks, tractors, personnel. Yes, and pilots in reconnaissance flights should have noticed the movement of troops. Why did the General Staff of the Red Army find itself in ignorance?»

Eugene. The situation is really not so clear and very complicated. Yes, most sources of intelligence were not qualified enough and could confuse equipment during transportation. The technique could be partially hidden by covers. Could be changed the form of technology under covers, etc. I have no information on this issue: such a question was currently not interesting to me.

Below, cccsr gave you advice: “So, because of the obsession, the author of the article made a big lie that our intelligence allegedly could not reveal the number of German divisions on the eve of the war, although report No. 5 gives a detailed picture on the theater". I would beware of following it, because the same user does not assume responsibility to confirm the presence of German troops on the specified summary. Either the truth is given there, or the untruth. Well, the user believes that the truth ... Someone believes in aliens, but this does not mean that everyone should believe in it ...

Running a little ahead, I will explain some points. In addition, I have some obligations to reduce the amount of material in the article (reducing the number of parts). Therefore, many documents will not be included in it. For example, below is a map of the areas of deployment of some Wehrmacht infantry divisions on 10 on May 1941 (black zones). The areas of concentration at the beginning of the war are marked in red. There are still initial areas of concentration before the attack, which are located near the border and are not marked on the map.

The figure shows that almost all divisional areas of concentration are located very far from the border. A significant part of them are located outside Warsaw - outside the area of ​​responsibility of ZapOVO intelligence and border reconnaissance intelligence. Although both intelligence services tried to record information about the enemy outside the Mlawa - Vrsava border, the reliability of this information was low (in my opinion).

There is a map with the area of ​​deployment of units and formations of the 2-th tank group. This zone is located west of Warsaw, but the city itself is not included in the zone. Guderian's headquarters moved from Berlin to Warsaw only on 31 of May.

If you look at the maps of the concentration of German troops on the 16 and 19 of June, then there are many tank and motorized troops still far from the border. A slightly different situation is with motorized and tank troops, which were deployed in East Prussia. They were located somewhat closer to the border, but our intelligence did not open them. Consequently, these areas were very well covered by German counterintelligence and field protection of the concentration areas.

[AsmyppoL]

In my opinion, the main reason for our intelligence not opening motorized (tank) units and divisions is that the main method of detecting units (divisions) for reconnaissance was epaulettes and rumors from German military personnel.

The German command so often changed and disguised the headquarters of army groups, armies and corps, that our intelligence simply could not detect a significant part of them. This will be discussed in the next part. Competent and skillful camouflage of the headquarters of associations and stupid disregard for determining the locations of divisions and regiments on shoulder straps somehow do not fit together. The German command should be either quite competent and prudent or very stupid ... According to the author, it was very competent and smart.

Now, according to the summary number 5. In the part "1941 year. German command against Soviet intelligence”Analyzed in detail the location from army headquarters to regiments (infantry, artillery, motorized and tank) on June 1 (term according to report No.5) and on June 17-21 on June 1941. A significant part of these troops was quite far from the border and could not start a full-scale war (with all its staff) at the dawn of June 22. Intelligence did not reveal the exit of German formations to the border. In previous parts, the same was shown for enemy troops concentrated against PribOVO and KOVO. This is already statistics - for three districts the enemy’s divisions to the border have not been revealed.

On mobile troops. The German command attributed cavalry, motorized and tank troops to mobile troops. In the Wehrmacht there was only one 1 I cavalry division, which included four cavalry regiments. There are twelve in summary number 5. According to different RM RU General Staff of the spacecraft, their number reached a larger number. By numbers, only two cases coincide, therefore, ten regiments for misinformation summary. On mobile troops I still have to understand in more detail (the move did not reach this part). There a lot of interesting things opened and still opens: it came to a new source of information from German archival materials. We can say that it seems that the false cavalry regiments were represented by cavalrymen from the reconnaissance units of the infantry divisions. For what? in my opinion, to show that a huge infantry grouping is concentrated near the border, in which there are small units and a few motorized tank units. Germany is not going to attack, but not a single tip will give up its land ... It’s ready to defend completely ...

On motorized troops. In the Republic of Moldova, regarding the number of motorized regiments, information is given on the presence of thirty-one regiments with known numbers, of which only three coincided! Of the numbers of confirmed eighteen motorized divisions, there is no coincidence in any case! Eighteen MD, information on which was simply not concentrated against the ZapOVO and PribOVO troops ... Paradoxically ... Who did the intelligence take for motorized troops? Perhaps the infantry ... For tank troops. Two out of nine tank regiments with numbers known to our intelligence. Out of five tank divisions, two were confirmed with confirmed numbers.

At the same time, the author considered the very fact of the presence of regiments and divisions against PribOVO with ZAPOVO and against KOVO coincidence. And there were a lot of them and the numbers could just coincide ...
It is difficult to restore exactly where these divisions and regiments were located from May 31 to June 1 1941 due to a lack of open information. It is possible that our sources saw precisely misinformation and coincidence is an accidental fact, as well as the coincidence of the number of divisions according to intelligence and their actual number before the war ... If you are interested in the question, then look again at the first parts about the locations of the infantry units

[Vadim T.]

Eugene, good morning. Thank you for the comment, he clarified a lot, but not all. Suppose that German divisions were outside the zone of responsibility of the ZapVO and it was unrealistic to penetrate their areas of residence (although this is a controversial issue). But after all, before the invasion began, the Germans still took their initial positions at the border, and entered this very zone of responsibility. Army and border intelligence was supposed to record the arrival of these enemy formations and its deployment. I read the memoirs of many participants in the war, who noted that a few days before the attack they heard an intense rumble of technology on the other side of the border, and border guards, for example, saw many times German groups who reconnoitered the area, determined places for crossings, etc. That is, even non-specialists in the field of intelligence KNEW about the presence of enemy units, as well as why they were there. Plus, constant German reconnaissance flights over our territory. I mean, even at the level of ordinary soldiers it was known that the Germans had large forces to strike. DID NOT KNOW about this, it seems, only the Scout and the General Staff.
As for the closed basing areas and the ideal counterintelligence of the Fritz ... There are many ways to collect information, including working with the local population. It probably knew where and what was located, besides, there were people on the other side of the border who were loyal to the USSR. Therefore, it was possible to find out that a shock fist was being created behind Warsaw. I will not say that it is easy, but for strategic intelligence it was a feasible task. And God himself ordered to find the enemy troops at the very border, under his nose. Indeed, regimental, division, corps, and army intelligence worked throughout the entire western border. I will never believe that no one saw anything. Then it is all the more strange why the General Staff and the leadership of the Red Army remained in ignorance?

[AsmyppoL]

You're right. We must and have partially fixed it. But the German command turned out to be smarter. They knew about the inertia in the transmission of information from the intelligence departments of the districts and border guards. This inertia ranged from one day to one and a half days. Victoria tried to show this in the series "Unexpected War ...". It seems like 14 or 15 parts.

When there was mass information about the withdrawal of German divisions to their original areas, it did not have time to reach the country's leadership.
An example of this are messages from the STORAGE. In the evening of 20, the removal of wire fences was opened, the approach of German formations. Pavlov had to report this to the narcotics defense by telephone. The chief of his staff sends an encryption at night parallel to the chief of the General Staff (apparently with permission from Pavlov). And in response to silence. They did not believe this upstairs. They probably checked the data of the Intelligence Directorate, found out the opinion of the head of the Intelligence Directorate and calmed down ...

Also, border guards. I don’t remember in which part of the cycle, it seems about the ZAPOVO (23 or 24 parts) when the head of the Brest border detachment reports on the German advance to the initial, and for several hours there are no instructions from Moscow ...

[AsmyppoL]

In the summary of the ZAPOVO on 20-00 on 21 of June it is written that the Germans took their starting position for the attack. It is clear to me that this was reported to Moscow and again silence.

GOOD. The commander on the eve of the war is in units. Decisions are made by the district chief of staff P.S. Maples. Near Klenov’s 23-00 there are instructions on the withdrawal of troops, on possible provocations, etc. These are echoes of retold memoirs about the shot the chief of staff. Now both Victoria and I have tried to recover about the calls of Tymoshenko in the okrug from around 22-30 to 23-00. The second district where the People's Commissar was supposed to call was Pribovo. From a conversation like a conversation between a people's commissar and the commander of the OdVO troops, it follows that there were instructions not to submit to provocations and other nonsense like to be more careful. But as soon as Directive No. 1 arrived, Klenov gave the command to immediately put up mine barriers, but they did not have time to do it already. Although there is no hint of this in the Directive ...

I think that at the border the danger was felt much stronger than at the top. An example in my opinion can serve as an example with the flight of General Zakharov along the border. The border guards should have strengthened their RM in the part of the observations of the general - commander from another department. Therefore, they let him go along part of their route and included his observations in the next intelligence report, which Moscow did not attach due importance to. As a result, nothing has changed.

An example of an attempt to understand the situation is Stalin’s call to General Pavlov, about which Golovanov wrote. Stalin, with his bestial instincts, understood that something was going extremely wrong and was trying to find out their lower opinions about reconnaissance and concentration of enemy forces. At that time, Pavlov was sure of his intelligence, which was confirmed by the RM Intelligence Agency and intelligence KOVO and PribOVO. Stalin probably called both the commander of PribOVO and KOVO, but information about this did not remain. I think that only by intuition did Stalin initiate the last peace meeting at which the draft Directive No. 1 was born. Tymoshenko and Zhukov were also at 100% sure of the information that came from the Intelligence Agency.

[AsmyppoL]

And one more clarification - infantry divisions entered the zone of responsibility at least by 16 of June, and their advanced units reached the border much earlier.

[AsmyppoL]

for example, 31st Infantry Division from 27.5.41 to 1.6.41, 255 Infantry Division - 27.5, 34th - May 31, ..., 286th Security Division - by 30.5, 29th MD - from 3 to June 6 (saddle), SS Reich Division by 15.6, etc.

[Vadim T.]

[i] [/ i] Quote: They did not believe this above. They probably checked the data of the Intelligence Directorate, found out the opinion of the head of the Intelligence Directorate and calmed down ...
If this was indeed so, then this indicates either the complete incompetence of the chief of the General Staff and intelligence, or criminal negligence.

[AsmyppoL]

My opinion is that they were confident that they were right

[AsmyppoL]

For example, the concentration zone of the 2-th tank group is indicated (it was mentioned above). We still need to work with documents in German to draw final conclusions. But we can tentatively say that all the tank regiments that the reconnaissance saw closer to the border across the width of this zone with a high degree of probability simply were not exactly tank units ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Vadim T.

And God himself ordered to find the enemy troops at the very border, under his nose. Indeed, regimental, division, corps, and army intelligence worked throughout the entire western border.

Do you even have any idea what the pre-war district intelligence kit is and what organs it consisted of?
What kind of intelligence could be discussed at the level of a division, corps, army, if they did not have undercover intelligence, and the OSN divisions were directly subordinate to the head of intelligence of the district. The maximum that could be done by the army commander was to order divisional reconnaissance battalions periodically, in agreement with the border guards, to organize observation posts in those areas where enemy territory was viewed. And that's all, because there was a ban on the withdrawal of our troops to the border zone in order to avoid provocations from the Germans.
So what kind of complaints can you talk about at all, if you already started listing what God ordered them to do - what exactly did they tell, tell us to understand what you're talking about.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

It was shown that RM on license plate numbers included up to 80% of misinformation.

It was shown that the author is shamelessly lying, without providing information documenting the pre-war intelligence reports of the Republic of Uzbekistan, which indicated the numbers of the compounds. At least he still has not given a single link to the material he uses, and I consider the link to LJ just a cover for his incompetence. For example, he repeatedly stated that, allegedly, a whole program existed in the Wehrmacht to misinform Soviet intelligence by replacing the numbers on the insignia of the Wehrmacht troops, and he never brought at least one order to carry out this event. Now he cites the words of Sudoplatov, who also refute his speculation:

We did not open the disinformation actions of the enemy’s intelligence and its satellites on the eve of the outbreak of war ...

, which indirectly proves that the author of the article is simply lying about it.
Those. the fact is clear that our intelligence did not reveal this event, although it is already obvious that for the radio intelligence data, which the author of the article ignores, the insignia of the military personnel does not matter at all, because they work according to other intelligence signs.
So, because of the obsession, the author of the article made a big lie that our intelligence allegedly could not reveal the number of German divisions on the eve of the war, although report No. 5 gives a detailed picture of the theater of operations.
The fact that the author does not disdain fraud, I have already paid attention more than once, and this is available in this article:

In the Summary of RU dated 26.4.41 regarding the presence of 18 SS divisions in the German armed forces, there is an entry “of which 10 are motorized”. Motorized, not tank.

The fraud is that the author dropped the preposition "to" because the summary says "of them BEFORE 10 motorized ones, ”which means that there may be 6,7,8 and 9, because military documents usually use multiple digits when making rough estimates.
And in conclusion, once again I want to inform inexperienced readers that all the author's dances around the numbers of German regiments and a damn are not worth a damn, because even in the district, it is important for the commander to know the number of enemy formations in the zone of responsibility, and not the numbers of the regiments that are part of this or other compound. That is why any military professional immediately understands that the author is an amateur not only in understanding intelligence documents, but also has wild ideas about military affairs in general, and therefore his "discoveries" should be treated as a manifestation of graphomania based on military history.

[antivirus]

more than 350 km from the southernmost point on the border of East Prussia. Since this regiment was seen in the cities of Holm and Lublin, this can only be a planned operation to misinform our intelligence.
--Yes, misinformation-- COULD THERE BE SHOWS BETWEEN SUPPORTERS OF THE OFFENSIVE WAR ON ALIEN'S EARTH AGAINST "DEFENSE"?
there was unity of command, but the unity of thoughts and ideas how to fight in a future war ??? -Maybe this is a post fact owl propaganda?
"defeated" Tukhachevsky and others by 41, but there is still no unity at the top

[icant007]

Quote: antivirus

more than 350 km from the southernmost point on the eastern border

Well, firstly, about 270 km. Measured from Nijitsa to Lublin. And secondly, what does this prove? The regiment could well have been transferred to reinforce a division in the area of ​​Lublin or Helm and reassigned to it.

[antivirus]

I'm talking about the disinformation of one clan of the Red Army against others, to confirm their doctrine
catch the fog ...

[icant007]

I tell you about Thomas, you tell me about Yerema)

[antivirus]

what do not like in mine?
FIRST ABZATTTTS (WITH KM) --From the TEXT of the ARTICLE

[icant007]

And I didn’t say anything about "clans, fogs") I was not trying to clarify this moment.

[icant007]

Continuation of the special message: “The 241st AP, which arrived on May 12 this year, was stationed in the Suvalka district in the region of Rachki - Stoki - Kuryanki. On June 3, one unit of this regiment left Kuryanka for a new destination. We moved in the direction of Olshanka ...

18 May this year from the city of Graudenets to Tilsit arrived 501-th paragraph The headquarters of the 3th battalion of this regiment is stationed in Vilkisken, the 9th company - in Jagmanten, the 10th company - in Ausgiren, the 11-machine gun company located in the forester’s house ... (Information received during reconnaissance of border violator V. Schroder 6.6.41 g.)

... In April, two battalions of the 475 infantry regiment arrived from France in the city of Radom, which on June 3 moved to metro Rozhanka, the second battalion of the regiment, in addition to studying, carries border guards at night on the 4 km front. (Information was obtained during reconnaissance of the border violator of the soldier of this battalion R. Wichter) ... "

The 241-th up was part of the 161-th front, which since July 1940 was stationed in East Prussia. By the beginning of the war, 161-I will be on the Suvalka ledge.

The 501-th settlement from the 290-th front, which since March 1941 of the year has been located on the territory of East Prussia. The division was located near these settlements.

475-th PP from the 255-th PD, which has been in Poland since March 1941. The division will meet the outbreak of war at Brest.
Again we see about 50% misinformation and up to 50% reliable information.

So it’s not clear where is the misinformation here? You seem to confirm the message of the NKGB three times

[AsmyppoL]

Icantxnumx : "Well, firstly, about 270 km. Measured from Nijitsa to Lublin. And secondly, what does this prove? The regiment could well have been transferred to reinforce a division in the area of ​​Lublin or Helm and reassigned to it.»

Eugene: For other readers who may be off topic, I’ll explain that we are talking about the 23 m artillery regiment from the 23 md. In the Republic of Moldova regarding the indicated regiment it is said: "...arrived in Lublin ... Hill - 23-th Ap.»

The city of Helm is not located on the border itself, but not so far from it. If the artillery regiment arrived from this city, then somewhere it was stationed, but did not arrive there by mistake, and then without unloading it departed for Lublin. The distance from Nijitsa to Helm is about 323 km. Icant007, you are right that the distance to Lublin is about 270 km. Obviously, I looked at the distance to some city, which is located north. In that my mistake. True, insignificant.

The artillery regiment could hardly be transferred to strengthen another division, because they are located in the zones of responsibility of different field armies and between them is also the third army. When viewing a huge number of documents, I did not encounter a similar fact. There is not enough information about the 23 infantry regiment and the 23 artillery regiment before the war. There is no data on the transfer of the regiment to gain somewhere.

Maybe your version has a right to exist. But then any example of such an event should be given. In the Wehrmacht troops on the transfer of the divisional artillery regiment to another army until 22.6.41, or a similar example from the events of the spacecraft. For example, the transfer of a divisional artillery regiment from any PribOVO rifle division to reinforce, for example, the 10 Army of ZapOVO ... It seems to me that assumptions should be based on something ...

Icantxnumx: "So it’s not clear where is the misinformation here? You seem to confirm the message of the NKGB three times»

Eugene: This is about the first part of the message (about license plate parts). The first part says: "12 and 13 of June this year at art. Terespol unloaded a military train, a group of German soldiers on shoulder straps had the numbers 411 and 643, four battalions in full combat gear, on shoulder straps the soldiers had the numbers 44 and 46 ...»

I could not explain the mass presence of servicemen with the numbers 411, 643, 44 and 46 at the Terespol station, except this is misinformation of the enemy. In total comes out in the license plate parts in Special messages there is up to 50% of confirmed information and 50% of explicit misinformation.

[icant007]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Eugene: It's about the first part of the message (about license plate parts). The first part says: "June 12 and 13 this year. at art. Terespol unloaded a military train, a group of German soldiers on shoulder straps had numbers 411 and 643, four battalions in full combat gear, on shoulder straps the soldiers had numbers 44 and 46 ... "

I did not succeed in explaining the mass presence of servicemen with the numbers 411, 643, 44 and 46 at the Terespol station, except this is misinformation of the enemy. In total, in the part of license plate numbers in the Special Message, there are up to 50% of confirmed information and 50% of obvious misinformation.

Not convinced.
You are comparing 4 battalions from the first part of the message, and an artillery regiment, an infantry regiment, and two battalions of an infantry regiment from the second part. How to count here correctly?
By a message randomly broken into 2 parts. Let's say it seemed to us that the first part is misinformation. And on this basis, we argue that half of all information is false.

There should be a clear methodology. If you are tracking part numbers with such an addiction, then the conclusions must be done more correctly.

[AsmyppoL]

I didn’t try to convince you, but simply explained my point of view, which I used when processing RM. In the first case, there are four references to license plate numbers, in the other three. And no matter how many battalions, artillery divisions or regiments arrived. By the numbers on the shoulder straps, it was possible to evaluate the places of concentration of the regiments. Accounting for battalions, divisions and regiments will only make the complete statistical impossibility of processing the RM.

For example, in accordance with the materials of the NKVD Certificate: "The greatest concentration of German troops is noted in the areas of Dorohoi, Redeuci, Botosani. May 21-24 in this area was located up to 6 MD, 1 TD and 2 PD". If there are no more than two divisions in this area, the error is 7 divisions or roughly up to the 21 shelf. And this error should outweigh twenty detected license plate numbers in other places? In my opinion, this group was discovered by rumors and shoulder straps.

Or if an error is found in the name of one headquarters of the army corps, then it should outweigh the exactly discovered six regiments in other places? ... I personally consider this approach to be erroneous. I explained how I understand the need to assess the PM and remain confident in the correctness of my point of view. And you remain confident in the correctness of your point of view ... This is natural, since how many people exist - so many points of view can exist ...

[AsmyppoL]

Thousands of readers (sometimes tens of thousands) view the article. Judging by their evasion from discussion, it can be concluded that they are not ready to express their point of view on the material presented. And that’s right ... For the first time in more than 70 years, the materials allowed to question the intelligence information that supposedly gave everything ... This is not a rebuke to people who did everything possible so that the consequences of the war were less bad for the country ... This is a statement of facts.

It’s good that now they are trying to double-check the materials. Discrepancies in the Republic of Moldova are so clearly visible that it will be immediately noticeable. Someone will want to do this in the future, trying to compose for themselves a picture of what is happening on the eve of the war. This is just great, as everything should be double-checked! Especially when the books cite material taken out of context or use material with superimposed post-war after-war ...

In the part devoted to General Pavlov, I will explain how to find material on German sites. It is so elementary that it’s just ridiculous to explain ... Some readers have already reached these materials themselves.

The easiest way for yourself is to conduct an initial check of the materials of Report No.5 (in the west) of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army from 15.6.41. There were a total of five such detailed reports since February 1941. There were several similar ones in the east (I saw one, because this question is not very interesting to me at this moment in time).

Not everyone can get to this bulletin. Therefore, I will post scans of the basic data on the deployment of German troops.

[AsmyppoL]

There are many Russian-language sites where you can find out by division numbers whether they existed, where they were on the eve of the war, which regiments were part of them. You can double-check the materials of the Summary by the numbers of divisions and regiments that are given in it. You can double-check the numbers that were given in the tables of the article in the earlier parts. Or, if you do not completely trust the author, then go this way yourself. You can compare the materials of the Summary with the materials of the RO reports of the PribOVO headquarters on 18 and 20 of June, with the summary of the ROs of the ZAPOVO headquarters from 21.6.41. With the maps that are available in the article. A map with the situation on 21.6.41 is given on the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
Who does not know how to get to her - I will explain. Type: "Department of Defense Electronic Exhibitions". Enter the site and open the "First day of war" section. There is a map in the section dedicated to the WECO. Open it. Then everything is simple: by changing the position of the mouse on the right, enlarged images of the map sections will be visible

[AsmyppoL]

In addition, there is a wonderful project "RUSSIAN-GERMAN PROJECT
ON THE DIGITIZATION OF GERMAN DOCUMENTS IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ".
Without knowledge of the German language it is difficult to understand ... But there is a lot of information there, though to a large extent outside the period under review on the eve of the war

The author will consider his work done if a lot of people will double-check, clarify, supplement the results of my work, and eventually there will be an understanding of what really happened on the eve of the war and why decisions were made exactly as we now know. Do not call the military commanders and Stalin, nor come up with fantastic versions, but understand why this is so ...

If you are told that decisions were made without intelligence, then you are lying in the eye. Since the decisions of the General Staff of the KA and the Government of the Soviet Union and intelligence information cannot exist without each other ...

[icant007]

And what was the meaning of German misinformation in general? To convince the Soviet command of a larger number of German forces than in reality?

[AsmyppoL]

I can only express my guess. Convince the Soviet command of the presence of a significant number of infantry units with artillery. A huge infantry group, which is united by just one command of an army group. Even this command turned out to be fictitious. Although the German command strenuously tried to slip the headquarters of Army Group B, this headquarters was not opened by our intelligence. The headquarters of other army groups, all the headquarters of tank groups, which were disguised as corps headquarters known to our intelligence, and in rare cases - of armies, were not opened. The disguised headquarters of the motorized corps turned out to be hidden, hidden under the guise of various construction sites and headquarters of fortresses (fortified areas). And without these headquarters, the German infantry army cannot advance and hold the defense on the 1000-km front.

In particular, a large motorized formation or the headquarters of a tank group was hiding under the guise of the 12th Army Corps in Insterburg. It is also necessary to see who was hiding under subordinate networks subordinate to this fictitious corps. There are at least two German archival documents on the headquarters of the 12th AK, which indicate its other actual location. Those. the Germans very competently and carefully masked what they wanted to hide from our intelligence. They were probably convinced that our sources of information were closer to secrets. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Our intelligence was not even able to open the headquarters that the German command had prepared for "detection." This is just an assumption and it will be announced in the next part ...

I am still expressing my assumption. It will be finalized or clarified when disassembling documents, which I have uploaded several hundred and some of them still need to be translated. Everything has its time. I tried to answer your question. Unfortunately, I can’t work at the computer so often and therefore I won’t be able to answer more questions ... Thanks for your question

[icant007]

Strange logic. To convince us that there are more troops on our border than in reality. We will naturally respond to this by increasing the grouping. And why would the Germans do this if they needed the exact opposite?
Unless, of course, we start from the fantastic assumption that the Soviet Union was about to be the first to attack Germany.

In this sense, the disagreement that Germany is focusing its main efforts against Britain seems much more reasonable.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The easiest way for yourself is to conduct an initial check of the materials of Report No.5 (in the west) of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army from 15.6.41. There were a total of five such detailed reports since February 1941. There were several similar ones in the east (I saw one, because this question is not very interesting to me at this moment in time).

Another blatant lie of the author, because in the General Staff of the General Staff they prepare daily reports that reflect the operational situation and where the enemy’s forces are indicated by the starting hour. This information is signed by the head of the RU, and presents it to a strictly limited number of officials. I cited a scan of such an April report in a previous article of this liar. The reconnaissance report No. 5 dated 15 is for reference purposes only for a wider circle of military commanders, moreover, with a delay of 06.1941 days from the last moment of receipt of operational information (summarized on 15/01.06.1941/1941), and therefore assume that in XNUMX it was created only five bulletins can either be a complete layman or a professional liar. I think the author belongs to the first category of authors of such nonsense.

[cavl]

Milchakov, why again, ascribe your lie to Eugene ??
There were five detailed reports: the first in February 1941 and the last on June 15, 1941. There is nothing else in the text fragment you quoted. There are dozens of references to the rest of the reports in the article. A liar and a con

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

There were five detailed reports: the first in February 1941 of the year and the last 15 of June 1941 of the year.

Such reports are not operational information, but merely reference material - cut yourself on your nose. However, for you this is still a Chinese letter, because you are a complete ignoramus in intelligence matters, which is why you believe in the lie of the author of the article.

[cavl]

Where in the discussion is at least one word that five reports are operational information? Why do you betray your lies to someone else's words ??

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

Where in the discussion is at least one word that five reports are operational information?

So you and the author refer to it when you try to prove that intelligence did not know anything, and the Germans deceived her. But it turned out that you understand intelligence reports like a well-known animal in oranges, that's why you built all your lies on information materials, and not on operational ones. And so you are considered liars and amateurs.

[cavl]

Where is the mention of the words that the five reports indicated are operational ??
By refuting these words you began to insult people.
I ask: where did I or Eugene write about operational reports? And why did you lie by attributing these words to us ??

[icant007]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I explained how I understand the need to assess the PM and remain confident in the correctness of my point of view. And you remain confident in the correctness of your point of view ...

And I'm just not sure about anything. I don’t know what methodology should be here. But you draw conclusions about the poor performance of intelligence in general on your methodology.

[iouris]

In 1941 the aircraft belonged to "state", not "national". The term "nationality" is the "conquest" of globalism, and globalism won in 1991.

[icant007]

Long tried to figure out the meaning of this paragraph. I'm a slow-witted person, to be honest) so I made a translation for myself. I was confused by some phrases and terms like "addiction" that confuse the meaning. My translation after quote

It can be seen from the figure that according to 22.6.41, the dependencies of the actual number of divisions and similar information according to intelligence should have crossed. This is precisely the reason for the coincidence of data from the Republic of Moldova and actual data at the beginning of the war. This is evidenced by the nature of the indicated dependencies from May 40 to June 41. There are no coincidences in the nature of dependencies over the entire period. However, the intersection does not occur due to an increase in the number of divisions in the evening of June 22 in the RU report, in which the number of compounds is being increased in every way for safety reasons ...

The graph shows that the discrepancy between evidence and intelligence is narrowing as the war begins. And by June 22, the completeness of the picture with the intelligence almost coincides with the actual data. But this coincidence seems random (but not necessary), since on June 22 in the evening the number of divisions according to intelligence already exceeds their real number. And this is understandable. June 22 begins to receive information from military intelligence directly from the battlefield. In the confusion of the first days of the war, these data were very contradictory.

[AsmyppoL]

I agree with your text. I just want to clarify that beyond the evening of June 22 I do not consider the chain of events. And by 20-00 on 22 in June, information from the districts was not contradictory, but significantly distorted. there was practically no truthful information. In terms of KOVO (SWF), Bagramyan wrote about this. In the section PribOVO - there is a map with the situation on the 23 number. Regarding the ZAPOVO, there are more distortions there.
If the text is difficult to understand, then this is the author’s mistake. I apologize ... Readers have repeatedly said similar things to me, and they are also familiar from the administration ... I know a sin, I try not to write on many topics. But this topic was too interesting for me ...
For scientists, the word "addiction" is so obvious that I used phrases from my main work))))

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: icant007

Strange logic. To convince us that there are more troops on our border than in reality. We will naturally respond to this by increasing the grouping. And why would the Germans do this if they needed the exact opposite?
Unless, of course, we start from the fantastic assumption that the Soviet Union was about to be the first to attack Germany.

In this sense, the disagreement that Germany is focusing its main efforts against Britain seems much more reasonable.

I express only my version, and not justify that it is the only true one ...
The German command through our intelligence showed the leadership of the spacecraft that it was preparing to defend itself on the Eastern border. For defense, a large number of infantry formations were concentrated, which were combined into army corps (essentially infantry corps). Infantry corps are essentially merged into infantry armies that do not have mobile units. In other words, a huge infantry group is shown, which is not able to advance quickly, over long distances. This entire infantry group is controlled by only one headquarters of a strategic eastern direction. Such control is still possible on defense, but not possible on the offensive: in a rapidly changing environment. It seems to me that our army leadership could not understand: how to advance without front headquarters (command of army groups in directions) ...

It is not possible for infantry units to carry out the practice of blitzkrieg, which the Germans used in Poland and in France. In my opinion, the German leadership insists that there is no threat of attack. German troops are preparing to defend or advance with the consent of the Government of the Soviet Union into our territory to fulfill the requirements for the ultimatum that was expected before the start of the war from Hitler. Our ultimatum with different requirements was repeatedly reported by our different intelligence services in June 1941.

The intelligence leadership (apparently fulfilling the mission of the spacecraft leadership) in June sends out several requests about the Germans preparing defensive structures, the number of anti-tank guns installed at positions, etc. Check: are the Germans really preparing for the defense. I can’t say how much, but the Germans did this work. Perhaps RM on this part were confirmed ...

Now on the question that we will bring the troops to the border more. After all, this was one of the main goals of the German command: to surround and destroy as many troops as possible at the border. Not everything worked out as they conceived ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

how can one advance without front headquarters (command of army groups in directions) ...

Lies - intelligence report No. 5 dated June 15 indicates the headquarters of the eastern group in the settlement She slept, which, according to our ideas at that time, corresponded exactly to the headquarters of the front. The author, because of his illiteracy, simply does not know how to understand official documents.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Now on the question that we will bring the troops to the border more. After all, this was one of the main goals of the German command: to surround and destroy as many troops as possible at the border.

This amateurish nonsense can be easily refuted by the simplest example of the fact that, according to our cover plans, we did not have enough troops to organize defense, at least according to the norms of field manuals, and the Germans knew this very well. That is why they were in such a hurry to start the war as quickly as possible (initially, in the month of May), until we finished building the URs and transferred additional armies to the border from the inner districts. It was the danger of our strengthening on the border that forced the Germans to attack in June, when, according to their own confessions, they did not even carry out all their measures on "Barabross". So the conclusion that the Germans considered the concentration of our troops on the border to be the main task is clearly delusional - a well-built defense could simply disrupt all the plans of the Germans in the first week of fighting, and they could get bogged down like in the Brest Fortress.

[cavl]

And which of the army groups "North", "South" or "Center" corresponded to the headquarters of the eastern group? Lie to us something.
What kind of headquarters was the headquarters of the eastern group? And what do you think the author’s lie is Eugene?

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

And which of the army groups "North", "South" or "Center" corresponded to the headquarters of the eastern group? Lie to us something.

You are definitely an illiterate pensioner - we and the Germans do not have common names for front headquarters or army groups, which is why, in our understanding, based on the name of our Western OVO, this group was given the code name "Eastern Group".
And if you were even a little interested in history, and studied the map of Poland, then you would have added that in this case it was about the headquarters of the German group "South", although for us it did not care, because the main thing is to know the number and the deployment of the Wehrmacht formations.

Quote: cavl

And what do you think the author’s lie is Eugene?

The fact that he brazenly lied that army groups had not been opened, and I gave a concrete example that they knew exactly about at least one headquarters of the group.

[cavl]

I then per and know more than you. And here you are again deceiving.

1. The headquarters of the eastern group is not the headquarters of the army groups. None of the three focused ("A", "B" and "C"). Not revealing all three army groups is a reconnaissance mistake.

2. What kind of headquarters that intelligence mistakenly considered the headquarters of an army group? What does he have to do with commanding army corps or armies? Or does not have? You blaspheme the author with no understanding of the intelligence being discussed.

3. We do not have common designations between army groups and fronts? Why cheat again? What are the differences, name them.
Geographically, the fronts on the eve of the war, which before Romania are formed from three districts, are equal to the fronts of army groups (small border crossings do not count). What is the fundamental difference in this case between them? Or does it not exist?

Until now, I see on your part complete ignorance in all the issues discussed, rudeness, pretending to be my words for the words of other people and outright lies

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

1. The headquarters of the eastern group is not the headquarters of the army groups. None of the three focused ("A", "B" and "C"). Failure to autopsy all three army groups is a reconnaissance mistake.

Complete nonsense, because in the text of intelligence report No. 5 the affiliation of the headquarters is precisely indicated - the division, the corps, the army and the "Eastern Group", which was given a code name, because there were no military districts in the general-governorship of the Soviet type.

Quote: cavl

2. What is the headquarters that intelligence mistakenly considered the headquarters of the army group? What does he have to do with commanding army corps or armies? Or doesn’t it? You blaspheme the author with no understanding of the intelligence being discussed.

You generally lied with the author of the article that not a single headquarters of the army group was opened, and I just poked you in the text of the bulletin to refute your lies. Now you began to dodge, but it doesn’t bother me anymore, because you are a liar and a layman in military affairs.

Quote: cavl

Until now, I see on your part a complete ignorance

You look not at me, but in your mirror and see who you really are.

[cavl]

In my comment about all the three army groups that were not discovered by intelligence and radio reconnaissance, you cited the eastern headquarters found as evidence to the contrary. After that they began to insult me.

When asked what kind of headquarters it was? You answered that the headquarters of the South group. What amateurism! The headquarters of the South group appeared only on June 22, and before that it was the headquarters of Army Group A.

I repeat the question: What was the Eastern Group headquarters really called? What did he command? What did he have to do with managing corps and armies ??

You insulted a person by providing the answer of a typical amateur and sofa expert. Your answer is stupid and not true.
You also demonstrated complete ignorance of the question that you answered with confidence.

This headquarters has nothing to do with the command of any troops other than a small part of the security units and units, of which there were fewer corps. The adoption of this sign of the headquarters of an army group as a real headquarters is an intelligence mistake. Evgeny also wrote about this in another part of me. Your slow-thinking and lack of knowledge on this issue did not allow us to understand what was written.
They told you: read the syllables

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

What amateurism! The headquarters of the South group appeared only on June 22, and before that it was the headquarters of Army Group A.

You are definitely an amateur, because even in Soviet military terminology, with the beginning of hostilities, the word "district" is replaced by "front", separating these two concepts. The same was approximately the same in the Wehrmacht, we just did not have an exact match in the definitions, but you will never understand this, verbiage.

Quote: cavl

You insulted a person by providing the answer of a typical amateur and sofa expert. Your answer is stupid and not true.

I just pointed out who you really are, along with the author of a deceitful article.

Quote: cavl

This headquarters has nothing to do with the command of any troops other than a small part of the security units and units, of which there were fewer corps.

Based on what documents did you decide?

Quote: cavl

The adoption of this sign of the headquarters of an army group as a real headquarters is an intelligence mistake.

And how can you prove this verbiage if, apart from intelligence number 5, you haven’t seen anything in the eye?

[cavl]

When you try to explain elementary things that only you supposedly know, you begin to understand that a person is simply not healthy and discussing something with him is simply stupid.

[icant007]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: AsmyppoL
Now on the question that we will bring the troops to the border more. After all, this was one of the main goals of the German command: to surround and destroy as many troops as possible at the border.

In my opinion, this is something new in military science. Wait until the enemy builds up strength to attack him.

True, in the case of the Western Front, this was partly due to the thoughtlessness of our command, which deployed most of the forces in the Bialystok ledge. Moreover, in many cases in the range of fire of enemy artillery. The Germans do not be fools took advantage of this.

[VS]

An anonymous author writes nonsense: "" "From the presented scheme and the number of troops (according to intelligence data) it is impossible to conclude that the war will begin precisely at dawn on June 22. It may start on June 18 or, for example, on July 1 ...

Our reconnaissance so "detailed and accurately" reported on the enemy troops that, probably, in the opinion of the SC leadership, the reconnaissance was obliged to detect the beginning of the advance of the invasion group to the border in the shortest possible time. For the full advancement of such a grouping, it took up to two days, and during this time (according to the leadership of the spacecraft) it was possible to calmly bring the border troops to combat readiness, partially move the troops to the border and disperse the aviation ... But, unfortunately, everything went according to the scenario conceived by the German command ... "

SO, what numbers did the OdVO begin to withdraw their divisions in the BCP and bring them to the military base? SHOULD they wait until June 21 and did nothing?)))

[cavl]

A liar appeared here? In the previous part, I, Milchakov, repeatedly asked about your unsubstantiated attacks, and you ran away. Just like a shit in the corridor first grader ....

Where is the confirmation of Zhukov’s call from the Kremlin to the General Staff? About this even he did not dare to write!

Where is the confirmation of your statement about the participation in the May war games or KShU of only 120 German divisions along the entire border from the Baltic to the Black Sea?

I showed the Wai that there were more than 170 of them for individual losing options !!

[VS]

Quote: cavl

Where is the confirmation of Zhukov’s call from the Kremlin to the General Staff? About this even he did not dare to write!

Zhukov also did not write about the fact that he called up the okrug in the evenings about the attack)))

Quote: cavl

Where is the confirmation of your statement about the participation in the May war games or KShU of only 120 German divisions along the entire border from the Baltic to the Black Sea?

study May CABG in GSh))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

In my opinion, the main reason for our intelligence not opening motorized (tank) units and divisions is that the main method of detecting units (divisions) for reconnaissance was epaulettes and rumors from German military personnel.

uzhos - it turns out our intelligence on the Germans was working on the epaulettes and rumors that the Germans themselves gave them .. well, pi..nes ... You can put these opinions to hell - to the table and not show it to the public - so that they don’t .. embed full)))))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

for three districts, the enemy’s divisions to the border were not opened.

so with how many of our divisions began to withdraw in the districts by software then?)))

[VS]

Quote: Vadim T.

even non-intelligence experts KNEW about the presence of enemy units, as well as why they were there.

the author bears nonsense exclusively in his "opinion" and under this "OPINION" he adjusts everything that he sees and what he does not like and does not fit his ready-made "opinion" - then he discards the next one as it should be for an anonymous rezun)))

"" At 20 o'clock on June 18, the commander of the 125th rifle division of the 11th SK of the 8th army of the PribOVO P. Bogaychuk sent a report directly to the commander of PribOVO:
“According to intelligence and defector data, in recent days in the Tilsit district, the Germans concentrated up to seven divisions, not counting the troops located in the area of ​​Šilutė and north-west
Some troops are directly drawn to the border.
There are motorized (anized) divisions.
(C) our side (measures) of a defensive nature, guaranteeing against attacking motorized (anized) units, has not been taken, and it is enough for the Germans to launch one tank battalion, as a holding garrison may be taken by surprise.
... The strip of the foreland without garrisons of the German offensive will not delay the advance, and the border units may not be warned in time.
321
The division’s near-field strip is closer to the state border than to the division’s units, and without preliminary measures to calculate the time, the Germans will capture the withdrawal of our units there earlier.
Reporting on the situation at the border, I ask:
Give an indication of what measures I can carry out now, guaranteeing against the unexpected invasion of motorized (anized) parts of the Germans, or give me the right to develop an action plan myself, but the means of the division are not enough.
To reduce the combat readiness of the units, allow the soldier to have a equipped satchel, raincoat, helmet and 60 live ammunition in his hands. In this case, the combat readiness of the units can be brought (to full - K.O.) in 10-15 minutes.
To speed up the resolution of the issue of the families of the command personnel, since the latter can disorganize the work of the commanders.
Allow me to withdraw not two battalions, but four to work on the foreground.
Order ONS to expedite the construction of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles at the turn of the SD.
It would be desirable to have a tank unit, an anti-tank division and artillery besides the division in the Art. Yanishki and Strgnushki as one of the likely directions of the offensive of motorized (anisized) parts
Commander of the 125th rifle division, Major General BOGAYCHUK "(TsAMO, F. 344, op. 5564, d. 10, pp. 3-4. Original. VIZh No. 5 1989, p. 47). ... "")))

[AsmyppoL]

Kozinkin: “Horror - it turns out our intelligence on the Germans was working on the epaulettes and rumors that the Germans themselves were giving them .. well, pi..nes ... You can put those opinions far away - into the table and not show it to the public - so that they can .. don't embed full ...
The author bears nonsense exclusively according to his "opinion" and under this "OPINION" he adjusts everything that he sees and what he does not like and does not fit his ready-made "opinion" - then he discards the next one as it should be for an anonymous rezun)))
“At 20 on 18 of June, the commander of the 125th Infantry Division of the 11 SC of the 8th Army Pribovo P.P. Bogaychuk directly sent the commander of Pribovo a report: “According to the intelligence data and the data of the defectors, in the last days the Germans concentrated up to seven divisions in the Tilsit district, not counting the troops located in the region of Šilutė and the north-west. Some troops are directly drawn to the border. There are motorized (anized) divisions ... "

We see the usual commentary of Mr. Kozinkin, which places a certain text and gives it out as a kind of tabloid sensation. At the same time, he flirts like a young lady ... Since the text is used by the writer Kozinkin in his book, then, therefore, he completely believes in the cited message. He believes without checking and presents it to his gullible readers, as absolutely reliable intelligence...

But is it really? Or is this another Kozinkin falsification? A person never checks anything and uses only someone’s quotes - when it is beneficial to him, and when it is not beneficial for his version - then these quotes should not be used...

In the understanding of Mr. Kozinkin, the commander of the 125th Infantry Division has intelligence capabilities that are comparable to the intelligence of a whole district - PribOVO. Or maybe it implies a different version that the intelligence of the NKVD border troops had more accurate information and then, in his opinion, simply did not share this data with the district’s intelligence ... Only supposedly in secret the border guards told the commander of the 125 SD. And this is the opinion of the writer who wrote 11 books and 11 years engaged in supposedly studying events on the eve of the war ???

[AsmyppoL]

Once from Mr. Kozinkin, wait for the analysis is not possiblethen try to analyze this together with readers.

Let's start with the most basic question: how many German troops were at 31.5.41? We will use the information from the Summary of RU No. 5 (in the west). The report itself was published on 15.6.41, but includes information as of May 31.

According to the intelligence, by the first of June, in the indicated zone, which the commander of the 125th regiment speaks of: up to 15 infantry and motorized regiments, 6 artillery regiments, 6 infantry battalions (we take them for two infantry regiments). Total up to 6 divisions (including one artillery regiment in each of them). There is also a cavalry regiment and two tank battalions that can pull another regiment. In other words, in the indicated zone on May 31 of 1941 of the year there is over 6 divisions the adversary.

Let's check the numbering shown in the highlighted portion of% 5 Summary (West). 1-I and 206-Id; 43-th, 45-th, 216-th, 469-th, 501-th, 502-th and 503-th pp - PM confirmed.

7-th AK - in May 1941 arrived in Poland. In East Prussia was not deployed.
216-I PD - the division was in the West. 212-th PP - from the 79-th PD, which was located in Austria. 1-I cavalry brigade - did not exist. 2-th cavalry regiment - was in Poland. 52-th, 250-th pp - by 31.6.41 g. The 44, 206, 291, 350 and 510 motorized shelves - just as motorized ones did not exist. 8-md - this motorized division did not exist. Given the exact numbers of these parts, which were confirmed by intelligence, PM are misinformation.

[AsmyppoL]

The commander of the 125 SD (18.6.41) says that the German troops became up to seven divisions. Consequently, in 18 days, the group increased by less than one division. The commander of this division could use the information from the previous intelligence report of the headquarters of PribOVO. Why from the previous one?

In the intelligence report of the PribOVO headquarters from 18.6.41 (as of June 17) there are even more German troops in the area: over 20 infantry and motorized regiments, up to 4 tank regiments, 7 artillery regiments and 2 cavalry regiment. This number included three tank regiments, two motorized regiments, and three artillery regiments, which, according to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft, departed for Neukirch (west of Tilsit). In total, up to seven infantry and motorized divisions, and in total up to one tank division. That is, after using RM in the message of the commander of the 125 division, another enemy division appeared. The intelligence information is shown in the figure below.

How reliable is this data? After the outbreak of the war, when they probably began to look for the culprit that led to an unexpected attack at the headquarters of PribOVO, a map was prepared with the situation on June 21 on 1941.

[AsmyppoL]

Against the 125-th SD, up to 6 divisions are concentrated (including two motorized and one panzer divisions - both mythical - the 8-th did not exist, and the 16-th 20 arrived in Poland in Sandomierz, and not in East Prussia) and one cavalry brigade. Total up to 6,5 division. The information is close to the information in the June 18 Summary.

The information on the map does not contradict the information in the Summary of the intelligence department of the headquarters of PribOVO on 22-00 on June 21 (less than six hours before the start of the war!) Some of the German troops disappeared from the locations located on the Summary from 18.6.41, but the intelligence was instructed to check the location of these parts in the old places of deployment ...

And what else is interesting in the figure with the situation on the reporting card on June 21 ?? To the left of the group in the Tilsit area there are only three infantry divisions. But this information is not true? Yes, just as the number of German troops to the right is not true (towards the Suvalka ledge). The intelligence information of PribOV headquarters is extremely unsatisfactory ...

Something there is no German group on our border, even on 22-00 21 June! And this, according to Mr. Kozinkin, is a good intelligence job ?? He or, as a first grader, believes any quote and intelligence. Or he knows about his mistake, but still continues to roll it over to his readers, and this is fraud ...

[AsmyppoL]

And how was it really? Let's look at the situation of German troops in this zone using two German reporting cards with the situation on the evening of 16 and on the evening of 19 on June 1941.

On the map on the evening of the 16 of June we see up to two infantry divisions and partly two more deployment zones in the indicated zone. Maximum in the indicated regiment area for three divisions. Intelligence overstated the data more than twice! Such information that existed since May 31 cannot be called reliable! We look further.

In the evening of June 19, up to four infantry divisions and the approaching 8-I Panzer Division are deployed in the indicated zone. Only a tank division is not marked at all in the zone of its deployment by our intelligence. And as Mr. Kozinkin hints at us, repeatedly insulting the author, the information of the commander of the 125 SD should be trusted ... Well, of course, since this text was inserted into his "work" by the science fiction writer Kozinkin ... Or did he deceive the readers? ... Judge for yourself ...

[AsmyppoL]

Eugene: “... Our reconnaissance reported on the enemy’s troops in such a detailed and accurate manner that, according to the leadership of the spacecraft, the reconnaissance was likely to detect the beginning of the advance of the invasion force to the border in the shortest possible time. For the full advance of such a group, it took up to two days, and during this time (according to the leadership of the spacecraft), it was possible to quietly put the border troops on alert, partially move the troops to the border and disperse the aircraft ... But everything went, unfortunately, according to the scenario conceived by the German command ... "

Vasily Kozinkin: "SO, what numbers did the OdVO begin to withdraw their divisions in the BCP and bring them to the military base? "SHOULD they wait until 21 of June and did nothing?"

Eugene: Again, Mr. Kozinkin’s comment, designed for people who do not know documents and memories well enough ...

After several similar reports, the leadership of the OdVO on the urgent appeal of the chief of staff of the OdVO through the chief of the General Staff to the narcotic defense received permission to redeploy some of the troops. One of them: "2.6.41 g. According to the intelligence data of the border troops of the NKVD of the Moldavian SSR, the commander of the 5 m of Romania 15.5.41 g. Received the order of General Antonescu to immediately clear all bridges, roads and sections near the border of the USSR, mined in 1940-1941 gg ...

Among a narrow circle of officers of the Romanian border guard, there are allegations that the alleged Romanian command and the German command 8 June this year intend
to begin military operations against the USSR, for which the pulling up of large parts of the German and Romanian armies to the border line. The data on pulling up to the border of the troops are confirmed by two sources. Goglidze ".

Immediately before the war in the district, the redeployment of a small part of the troops, which were not supposed to reach the defensive lines by June 22, continued. For his urgent demands for the withdrawal of troops through the chief of the General Staff to the narcotic defense (almost ignoring the personal opinion of the chief of the General Staff), the chief of the OdVO staff on 19 was supposed to vacate his post and go to Moscow on June. The beginning of the war confused these plans and the district worthily met the attack, and General Zakharov arrived in Moscow as a worthy military commander ...
Е
If you look at the materials of the cycle dedicated to the OdVO, then you can see that parts of the 1 th echelon of the June 21 were in the RPM. On the border were a few units that did not find anything unusual. The head of the artillery also noted that there was nothing unusual on June 21 at the border.

The direction of advanced detachments of formations to the border occurred only after a conversation between Zakharov and the commander of the OdVO troops. The district chief of staff made an initiative decision to withdraw advanced divisions to the border. As Zakharov writes in his memoirs, this its designation was contrary to that of Directive No. 1. Therefore, it never occurred to anyone on the eve of the war on the eve of the war to withdraw the troops of the 1 echelon to the border according to cover plans ...
And again, Mr. Kozinkin is trying to trick his readers ...

[cavl]

Eugene is glad to read your comments.! And then this liar, Kozinkin, will throw a few comments, lie in three boxes, bring fog, naham and run away! And on the demand to provide evidence, he is again rude, he refers to his books or to the answers of the divisional commanders. And he lies and lies, and does not provide one fact. Bad, insignificant little man!

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

Eugene is glad to read your comments.! And then this liar, Kozinkin, will throw a few comments, lie in three boxes, bring fog, naham and run away! And on the demand to provide evidence, he is again rude, he refers to his books or to the answers of the divisional commanders. And he lies and lies, and does not provide one fact. Bad, insignificant little man!

Your Eugene is lying like a gray gelding, counting on such amateurs as you who do not understand intelligence, even if you have spent the whole service in the cipher agency, although it is not clear at what level, and certainly not in intelligence, that's for sure.
Enlighten, pitiful verbiage that Golikov writes in his memoirs, and not some talker "Eugene":

It is not out of place, at least in three examples, to show how thorough and qualified the control of both our friends and our employees over German troops in Poland, East Prussia and Slovakia was during the preparation of the Nazis for the invasion of our country. The first example. Of the total number of 105–107 divisions that were already here by June 1, the locations of the headquarters of seven armies, twenty-two corps and seventy-five divisions were precisely recorded. The numbers of divisions and armies were installed in the vast majority, and the numbers of corps administrations were half. An example of the second. By the end of 1940, facts and routes of operational-strategic reconnaissance of representatives of the supreme German command in Poland according to the plans of military operations against the USSR came into our view. From our document - intelligence report No. 1 for 1941 - you can find out that Field Marshals Brauchitsch and List during this trip visited the cities of Warsaw, Radom, Lublin, Suvalki, Ostroleka, Holm, Tomashev and Sanok (this is not far from Lviv!), and Colonel-General Küchler, with the same Field Marshal Liszt, visited the town of Giba in the Suvalk district. An example of the third. April 1941 was characterized by an increased supply of material and technical support to the German troops, which concentrated against the USSR. And our April 3 report summarizes how cargo flowed from the depths of Germany with ammunition, fuel and lubricants. I would like to emphasize that our capabilities in reconnaissance of the German armed forces were not only on the periphery of the Hitler Reich, say in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, etc. No! First of all, in Germany itself, starting from the border zone and right up to Berlin.

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Examples of this are messages from the ZAPOV. On the evening of the 20th, the removal of wire fences was opened, the approach of German formations. Pavlov had to report this to the narcotics defense by telephone. The chief of his staff sends an encryption at night parallel to the chief of the General Staff (apparently with permission from Pavlov). And in response to silence. They did not believe this upstairs. Probably checked the data of the Intelligence Agency, found out the opinion of the head of the Intelligence Agency and calmed down ..

Well, enough SPRING is so brazenly ..

This message about the removed wire was reported to STALIN and Molotov !!! ..

On June 21 in the morning a message arrived from Moscow from Minsk - and most likely along the entire border, where it had a place to be, and the border guards, including this, were reporting unambiguously - the Germans began to remove the thorn on the border. And these reports are urgently submitted to SNK, Stalin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Molotov’s assistant Vyshinsky. Researcher S. Chekunov shows that on this report from Minsk there is Vatutin’s resolution: “To urgently prepare a report to the Government and separately to Vyshinsky” ... (In the same KOVO, according to the memoirs of I.Kh. Baghramyan, the Germans “began to remove all the engineering barriers installed at the border” (Thus began the war. M., 1971. p. 77) almost on June 12-13!)
And now such reports became the basis for Stalin - to begin the process of transferring the army, air force, air defense and fleets - from high to full combat readiness!

According to Chekunov, Stalin wanted to convene a meeting of the Government and the Politburo in the Kremlin by lunchtime, but it was rescheduled for the evening.
At 13.00 Berlin time, i.e. at 2 pm Moscow time in the Wehrmacht, the Dortmund signal went off, which meant that the offensive, as planned, would begin on June 22 and that it was possible to proceed with the open execution of orders. And this radio signal was uniquely intercepted by our intelligence and radio interception services, which identified it as a combat signal. And through the RU, this was unequivocally reported first to Zhukov, and then to Stalin within 2-3 hours maximum! Those. up to 16-17 hours.
And here is what the historian O.V. Karimov in the “introduction” to the memoirs of Marshal F.I. Golikova "Philip Golikov. Notes of the head of the Intelligence. " (M. 2018, p. 58), about how the General Staff of the General Staff is real, and about which it provided data to Stalin and Molotov and Tymoshenko and Zhukov on the last day before June 22:
“In June 1941 alone, nine meetings were held with G. Kegel. On the basis of the information transmitted to him on June 19, 1941, a special message was prepared at the Center “On Signs of a Probable German Attack on the USSR in the near future” 146. (146 The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: In 12 t. M., 2013. T. 6. S. 108.)
On June 20, 1941, the General Staff of the General Aviation Administration sent a report to the USSR leadership “On the Signs of the Inevitability of a German Attack on the USSR in the Coming Days” (147 Ibid., P. 147.)
On the morning of June 21, 1941 G. Kegel (an employee of the German embassy and our agent, K.O.) called the Soviet intelligence officer to a meeting and said that the German ambassador “received a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin [that the] German war against the USSR will begin in the next 48 hours. ” The second meeting took place on the same day at 19:00. The source said that in the morning the German ambassador F.V. von der Schulenburg was instructed to “destroy all secret documents” and ordered “all embassy staff to pack all their belongings and hand them over to the embassy, ​​who live outside the embassy, ​​should move to the mission territory” until the morning of June 22. At the end of the conversation, the German anti-fascist said: “Everyone believes that war will begin on the coming night” 148 (148Id. P. 108).
After this meeting, an urgent report was prepared “On the Signs of a German Attack on the USSR on the Night of June 21.06 to June 22.06”. At the direction of Lieutenant General F.I. Golikova, special communications officer at 20:00 on June 21, 1941 urgently delivered an envelope with the inscription "Only to the addressee. Do not open the staff of the apparatus ”I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and S.K. Tymoshenko 149. (149Id., P. 108) ... "

Those. - The General Staff Administration under the leadership of Golikov on June 19, 20 and by 20.00:21 on June 19 sent three reports to Stalin and the military: about the “probable” 20th, “inevitable” 22th — the German attack, and the German attack on the night of June 21 — in the evening XNUMXst of June!

(Note: Karimov further writes: “By June 22, 1941, the General Staff of the General Aviation Administration, headed by Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, was able to provide the leadership of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff with the following documents:
a diagram of possible areas where German troops are concentrated in Finland and the use of a group in Norway in the event of a war against the USSR;
information on general mobilization opportunities and the likely distribution of German forces in theaters of operations;
a diagram of probable operational directions and possible concentration and deployment of Wehrmacht troops on the Eastern Front;
the scheme of the grouping of German troops on June 20, 1941;
a map of the grouping and deployment of the German and Romanian armies on June 22, 1941, 152 (152 Kondrashov V.V. Know all about the enemy. M., 2010. P. 98–99.)

Stalin in the afternoon of June 21 informs the party leadership of Moscow - there will be an attack. It gives instructions to bring Moscow air defense to high alert. More precisely - gives instructions to lead in BG “75%,” but in fact it is limited so far only to certain general proposals, because it was not serious to wait for a serious raid on Moscow from German aviation in those days. Moscow's air defense was formally given in bg only at 0.10 on June 22 ...
On June 21, Zhukov calls around the okrugs around 18-19 pm and warns them of the attack. About which it was the intelligence that reported to him and when he told the commander of the Moscow Military District Tyulenev in the evening, at about 18.00 p.m. he reports that an attack is expected in the coming hours, days, and this he knows from the Intelligence (and not the “defectors”), he means namely, the reports of the General Staff of the General Staff of Golikov dated June 20 and 21 already ...
According to Meretskov's memoirs on the evening of the 21st, the People's Commissar Timoshenko, sending Meretskov to the Leningrad Military District, informs him: “Perhaps the war will start tomorrow! You need to be the representative of the High Command in the LVO. <…> Be on alert. In the event of an attack, you yourself know what to do ... "(Meretskov K.A. In the service of the people. - Moscow: Politizdat, 1968, p. 209) Why Meretskov writes in his memoirs that he left for Leningrad Military District on the evening of the 21st, but not pointed out that he went to the districts on the 19th? So he could not write anything else in another way - at the end of the 60s ...
...........

So the author has his OPINION on whoever there believed or thought - you can put it where you were indicated)))

[AsmyppoL]

Kozinkin: "This message about the removed wire was reported to STALIN and Molotov !!! "

And nothing was done before Stalin received the package from Golikov after 20-00 21 on June 1941 and calling Tymoshenko and Zhukov on the carpet. Since Zhukov should not be trusted about the conversation with Stalin, since he had deceived in his memoirs about this fact and about the Directive No. 3, I would suggest trusting S.M. memoirs Budyonny, who showed that the military came completely unprepared ...
S.L. Chekunov wrote in the comments that General Pavlov complied with all instructions from Moscow.

Kozinkin: “And now such reports became the basis for Stalin - to begin the process of transferring the army, air force, air defense and fleets - from high alert to full combat readiness!”

Lies again. Victoria showed in parts of the air defense that the air defense units were not on high alert. As well as aviation in all five districts. As well as most of the mechanized corps, which is also shown in great detail in the cycle in parts devoted to all districts. There is no confirmation of the words of Mr. Kozinkin ... Well, maybe he can cite the facts, and not his own fabrications?

The deep corps were advanced because they were expected to replace parts of the internal districts, but their arrival time at the border was not expected on June 22!

Kozinkin: “According to Chekunov, Stalin wanted to convene a meeting of the Government and the Politburo in the Kremlin by lunchtime, but it was rescheduled for the evening.”

Since S.L. Chekunov spoke repeatedly about a lie Kozinkina, I would also like to read S.L. Chekunov with reference to this text.

Kozinkin: “In 13.00 Berlin time, i.e. at 2 o'clock in the afternoon in Moscow in the Wehrmacht a signal “Dortmund” went off, which meant that the offensive, as planned, would begin on June 22 and that it was possible to proceed with the open execution of orders. And this radio signal was uniquely intercepted by our intelligence and radio interception services, which identified it as a combat signal. And on the RU line this was unequivocally reported first to Zhukov, and then to Stalin during 2-3 hours maximum! Those. up to 16-17 hours. ”

Lies. These are Milchakov’s fabrications. Give the documents.
Radio intelligence lied a lot. For example, the PribOVO report says that according to radio intelligence and undercover, the locations of the headquarters of the 7 and 12 army corps were in East Prussia. According to German documents on schedules for the nomination of the headquarters of these corps and their units, they have never been to East Prussia (This will be in the next part with the German archival materials). And their radio reconnaissance until June 22 was seen in a completely different place. Also, as I have not seen a single command of army groups. As well as not seen a single headquarters of the motorized corps. Also, as I did not see under the headquarters of the construction sites of the headquarters of the German mobile troops. And I repeat again - without submitting documents - all said by Kozinkin and Milchakov is a complete lie!

[AsmyppoL]

Kozinkin: “The General Staff University under the leadership of Golikov 19, 20 and 20.00 21 in June gave three reports to Stalin and the military: about the“ probable ”19, the“ inevitable ”20 — the German attack, and the German attack on the night of June 22 - in the evening of June 21! ”

Present the documents, Mr. falsifier of the story Kozinkin!

Kozinkin: ““ There is no doubt that the General Staff of the Red Army knew Razvedupr's data on the German army, studied them and took them into account in their operational developments. In confirmation, I will refer to some sources. Here is what the book “Strategic Outline of the Great Patriotic War 1941 – 1945” says: “The General Staff of the Soviet Army had quite complete information about the buildup of enemy forces along our western borders. According to intelligence reports, on February 1, 1941, Germany had 66 divisions at our western borders, on April 20 there were already 84-89, and on June 1 120-122... »

The intelligence article has analyzed numerous intelligence reports and it is clear that the intelligence was very, very misinformation.

Golikov’s memoirs contain a lot of lies. For example, from the above quantity 120-122 divisions according to intelligence (from the same reports) to 25 located in Romania, Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia. In fact, on May 31, at the border there were no more than 83 German divisions ...

The materials of the article present maps officially posted on the websites of the RF Ministry of Defense and "Memory of the People", on which there are quite a few German troops against the PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO troops as of June 21, 1941, and a significant part of them are located in the depths of enemy territory ... And this is the data of the Intelligence Directorate, which was led by General Golikov. Complete disinformation is also carried out in the first intelligence report of the Intelligence Directorate on June 22, which was signed by the same Golikov. Without documents, you can write any lie in your memoirs ... It is much worse when the writer Kozinkin uses this lie for his own purposes to "reinforce" his version of events ...

Kozinkin: "Stalin in the afternoon of June 21 notifies the party leadership of Moscow - there will be an attack."

This is not a confirmed claim.. According to the recollections of one of the leaders of the City Committee, one of the highest ranks of this committee called for him only in 4-00 22 in June. Let the facts, Mr. falsifier of history!

Kozinkin: “He gives instructions to bring Moscow air defense to high alert. More precisely - gives instructions to lead in BG "At 75%"

Lies! And even furnished with Kozinkin’s reservations. I discussed this issue with him in 2018, and now he has added water to flow around his lies. For example, he no longer claims that Stalin’s call was at noon on the 21 of June, because this is refuted by Victoria in the cycle (part of 18 is about air defense).
The only mention of bringing the air defense of Moscow as directed by Stalin is in the memoirs of the commander of the Moscow Military District Tyulenev. Kozinkin used to write that Admiral Kuznetsov confirms this. But he was poked with a nose that Admiral Kuznetsov did not confirm Tyulenev’s words, but wrote that I heard about it from Tyulenev! And what is this confirmation? According to the memoirs of General Zhuravlev (commander of the 1 Air Defense Corps), there was no such indication.

D.A. Zhuravlev: "Comrade General, you are ordered to immediately appear at the Communist Party. ” I looked at my watch: 18-35 ... Gromadin appeared on the command post: “The district commander just called. It is ordered to call out from the camps and to put in positions 20% of all the troops there ... "

The lie is very visible. 75% and 20% are not at all comparable numbers! And it's half past six, not noon! Why was it necessary to deceive General Tyulenev? He is an adherent of the ardent Zhukov and for some reason lied about it in order to help the marshal with something ... At the same time, no one seeks to bring anti-aircraft units to firing positions. The corps command only finds out who shot and who can be brought to the position.

It turns out that the instructions of Stalin Tyulenev rephrased and was in no hurry to comply. In addition, by ten in the evening he had gone home to sleep soundly. Does anyone believe that some general could calmly ignore Stalin’s instructions? Of course not! It's about cheating! An alarm in the corps was announced only after the outbreak of war. Kozinkin gives a false argument and he knows perfectly well that he is lying!

[AsmyppoL]

Kozinkin: “On June 21, Zhukov, at 18-19 o'clock in the evening, phoned the districts and warned them of the attack. About which it was the intelligence who reported to him and when he told the commander of the Moscow Military District Tyulenev in the evening, at the same time, around 18.00 reports that an attack is expected in the coming hours, days, and this he knows from the Intelligence (and not the "defectors"), he means it was the reports of the General Staff of the General Staff Golikov from 20 and 21 of June already ... "

Another lie General Tyulenev. In the border districts, there is no confirmation of this. For example, the commander of the OdVO troops went to rest and was called to a telephone to speak with Marshal Tymoshenko shortly before 23-00. If Moscow is talking about the expectation of an attack, then how can the troop commander leave the headquarters? Kozinkin knows about this fraud, but again, without presenting any evidence, he counts on the not quite knowledgeable circle of readers of the Military Review website.

A similar circumstance exists in the headquarters of the LenVO, when General Novikov left the headquarters, and soon (at about one in the morning) he was called up by the only head of the LenVO — the chief of staff, and before that no one in the LenVO had fussed and did not expect anything from Moscow. In particular, near 24-00, the head of one of the departments calls the SC Air Force and is interested in whether there is anything new? And there is silence ...

Kozinkin: “According to Meretskov's memoirs on the evening of the 21st, People's Commissar Timoshenko, sending Meretskov to the Leningrad Military District, informs him:“ Perhaps, tomorrow the war will start! You need to be the representative of the High Command in the LVO. <…> Be on alert. In the event of an attack, you know what to do ... ”Why does Meretskov write in his memoirs that he left for Leningrad Military District on the evening of the 21st, but did not indicate that he had gone to the districts on the 19th? So he could not write anything else in another way - at the end of the 60s ... "

Mr. Kozinkin is bashfully silent that Meretskov traveled to three districts in June. Sent by the People's Commissar of Defense Meretskov to the LVO after Stalin had discussed the text of Directive No. 1. And the words of Tymoshenko, just testify that they do not expect the inevitable attack of Germany at dawn 22 on June in the NPO and the General Staff! Meretskov can’t come to LenVO on the eve of the war. And the LenVO already transferred Estonia and there in the event of war they were expecting a landing, as well as in the Crimea ...

Tymoshenko’s words to Meretskov are identical to the words of the People’s Commissar of Defense quoted in the memoirs of the commander of the OdVO. The commander of the OdVO Cherednichenko indicates the time of the call of the People's Commissar - 23-00. Until that time, there were no calls from Moscow to the OdVO about the expectation of a certain Directive or about the expected attack! Cherednichenko’s words are confirmed by Sandalov’s recollections about the call of the headquarters of ZAPOVO, which practically says the words of the people's commissar of defense about 23-00.

And again, a coincidence in time. After the ZAPOVO, the People's Commissar should make a call to the KOVO on the list, and the ZAPOVO chief of staff should call his first 3 army. Further, the People's Commissar will call the OdVO, and the headquarters of ZAPOVO to the 4 Army and this conversation is mentioned by General Sandalov. In addition, Cherednichenko cites the words of the People's Commissar that OdVO is the last district that Tymoshenko calls. Absolutely right! After all, OdVO is the fifth (last) account in the Directive No. 1. The following is the text of the address: “Copy to the Navy Drug Officer.” And Admiral Kuznetsov confirms Tymoshenko’s call after 23-00. It follows that they did not call the districts before these calls about the expected attack by Germany. And the very nature of the calls does not indicate an expected attack, but a warning about a possible provocation ...

[cavl]

I remember we discussed this with Vicki. Since then, I have been everywhere Vaska and Milchakova minus where I see

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

“On June 21 of Zhukov, around the 18-19 hours of the evening, he calls the districts and warns them of the attack. About which it was the intelligence who reported to him and when he told the commander of the Moscow Military District Tyulenev in the evening, at the same time, around 18.00 reports that an attack is expected in the coming hours, days, and this he knows from the Intelligence (and not the "defectors"), he means it was the reports of the General Staff of the General Staff Golikov from 20 and 21 of June already ... "

Another lie is General Tyulenev. In the border districts, there is no confirmation of this. For example, the commander of the OdVO troops went to rest and was called to a telephone to speak with Marshal Tymoshenko shortly before 23-00.

and HOW did the oddvo divisions know about this ??))) and HOW did the divisional commanders know in KOVO - in the evening WHO was frightening them with an attack then? Read Markush corned beef - there in 21.30 they already did alarm sometimes)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

If Moscow is talking about the expectation of an attack, then how can the troop commander leave the headquarters?

one such wax was put to the wall - for this including))) And Klenova in Pribovo for manifesting INACTIVITY in managing the affairs of the DISTRICT)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

near 24-00, the head of one of the departments calls the SC Air Force and is wondering if there is anything new? And there is silence ...

and Cho, he finally could call you in 24.00 ?? ))) And what could they say to him in the Air Force GU then at MIDNIGHT if the directive is full bg. Is ALL current encrypted?))) Wait ...

Quote: AsmyppoL

Ospodin Kozinkin is bashfully silent that Meretskov traveled around three districts in June.

and what? The deputy on tour went around THREE districts and cho - what claims to me?) They didn’t wait for the ATTACK - he traveled around THESE days - but from nothing to do and went to THESE pre-war days)) for a laugh))) And the current NCO came back and sends him to Riga)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Sent by the People's Commissar of Defense Meretskov to the LVO after Stalin had discussed the text of Directive No. 1.

but you don’t have to lie - NCO NOT AFTER 22 hours sent him to Riga))

Meretskov: "" I did not forget this evening either.

I was called to my immediate superior, the people's commissar of defense, who was in a particularly tense state over the past few days. And although I understood the reason for his nervous state, although I saw with my own eyes what was happening on the western border, the words of the People's Commissar unusually abruptly and anxiously entered my mind. S.K. Timoshenko then said:

- Perhaps tomorrow the war will begin! You need to be a representative of the High Command in the Leningrad Military District. You know his troops well and will be able to help the district leadership if necessary. The main thing is not to succumb to provocations.

- What are my powers in case of an armed attack? - I asked.

- Excerpt above all. To be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into war. But be on alert. In the event of an attack, you yourself know what to do. ""

WELL AND WHERE YOU HERE saw that this conversation was AFTER 22 .00 ???
customize for YOUR Wishlist? Maybe Zhukov described that he saw Meretskov at Tymoshenko during THESE hours - after 22.20 in NCO ??)) Or did Kuznetsov 23.00 see Meretskov at Tymoshenko in his office?)))

Meretskov: "" Arriving in Leningrad, I immediately went to the district headquarters. ""

So AT WHAT time did Meretskov arrive in LenVO? )) HOW did you determine that Tymoshenko communicated with him AFTER 22.00 ??)) \

Quote: AsmyppoL

Cherednichenko’s words are confirmed by Sandalov’s recollections about the call of the headquarters of ZAPOVO, which practically says the words of the people's commissar of defense about 23-00.

and Zakharov gives time - about 22.00)) And Zhukov set tasks to Kirpanos at midnight)))

and HOW does this all give you reason to assert that Meretskov communicated with Tymoshenko AFTER 22.20?)))
if you read Popov, then he arrived at 10 hours of the morning at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District and THERE WERE ALREADY Meretskov))
At 4 hours Popov was in Petrozavodsk. He had about 300 km to Leningrad, and it was about 6 hours to go))) there and there - at 7 hours he was halfway to LenVO)) he drove another hour and he was at 10.00 near LenVO headquarters - Meretskov is already here))

Popov: "" At the headquarters of the district was General of the Army K. A. Meretskov, who arrived in the morning as a representative of the People's Commissar. ""))

Well, he arrived at 9 in the morning - how long did he have to go from Moscow THEN it was - at least 10 hours or more?))) Or maybe he arrived BEFORE - at 7 hours, for example?)) Meretskov cho - immediately after a conversation with NGOs, he rushed to St. Petersburg or something - without going home for things ??)))

So AT WHAT TIME Meretskov chatted with NGOs?)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Kuznetsov confirms Tymoshenko's call after 23-00. It follows that they did not call the districts before these calls about the expected attack by Germany.

the logic is Madame and Batan - business))

You can WARN about important encryption is common and natural))) And you did NOT refute Zakharov’s words in the end)))

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: V.S.

Quote: AsmyppoL

“On June 21 of Zhukov, around the 18-19 hours of the evening, he calls the districts and warns them of the attack. About which it was the intelligence who reported to him and when he told the commander of the Moscow Military District Tyulenev in the evening, at the same time, around 18.00 reports that an attack is expected in the coming hours, days, and this he knows from the Intelligence (and not the "defectors"), he means it was the reports of the General Staff of the General Staff Golikov from 20 and 21 of June already ... "

Another lie is General Tyulenev. In the border districts, there is no confirmation of this. For example, the commander of the OdVO troops went to rest and was called to a telephone to speak with Marshal Tymoshenko shortly before 23-00.

and HOW did the oddvo divisions know about this ??))) and HOW did the divisional commanders know in KOVO - in the evening WHO was frightening them with an attack then? Read Markush corned beef - there in 21.30 they already did alarm sometimes)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

If Moscow is talking about the expectation of an attack, then how can the troop commander leave the headquarters?

one such wax was put to the wall - for this including))) And Klenova in Pribovo for manifesting INACTIVITY in managing the affairs of the DISTRICT)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

near 24-00, the head of one of the departments calls the SC Air Force and is wondering if there is anything new? And there is silence ...

and Cho, he finally could call you in 24.00 ?? ))) And what could they say to him in the Air Force GU then at MIDNIGHT if the directive is full bg. Is ALL current encrypted?))) Wait ...

Quote: AsmyppoL

Ospodin Kozinkin is bashfully silent that Meretskov traveled around three districts in June.

and what? The deputy on tour went around THREE districts and cho - what claims to me?) They didn’t wait for the ATTACK - he traveled around THESE days - but from nothing to do and went to THESE pre-war days)) for a laugh))) And the current NCO came back and sends him to Riga)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Sent by the People's Commissar of Defense Meretskov to the LVO after Stalin had discussed the text of Directive No. 1.

but you don’t have to lie - NCO NOT AFTER 22 hours sent him to Riga))

Meretskov: "" I did not forget this evening either.

I was called to my immediate superior, the people's commissar of defense, who was in a particularly tense state over the past few days. And although I understood the reason for his nervous state, although I saw with my own eyes what was happening on the western border, the words of the People's Commissar unusually abruptly and anxiously entered my mind. S.K. Timoshenko then said:

- Perhaps tomorrow the war will begin! You need to be a representative of the High Command in the Leningrad Military District. You know his troops well and will be able to help the district leadership if necessary. The main thing is not to succumb to provocations.

- What are my powers in case of an armed attack? - I asked.

- Excerpt above all. To be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into war. But be on alert. In the event of an attack, you yourself know what to do. ""

WELL AND WHERE YOU HERE saw that this conversation was AFTER 22 .00 ???
customize for YOUR Wishlist? Maybe Zhukov described that he saw Meretskov at Tymoshenko during THESE hours - after 22.20 in NCO ??)) Or did Kuznetsov 23.00 see Meretskov at Tymoshenko in his office?)))

Meretskov: "" Arriving in Leningrad, I immediately went to the district headquarters. ""

So AT WHAT time did Meretskov arrive in LenVO? )) HOW did you determine that Tymoshenko communicated with him AFTER 22.00 ??)) \

Quote: AsmyppoL

Cherednichenko’s words are confirmed by Sandalov’s recollections about the call of the headquarters of ZAPOVO, which practically says the words of the people's commissar of defense about 23-00.

and Zakharov gives time - about 22.00)) And Zhukov set tasks to Kirpanos at midnight)))

and HOW does this all give you reason to assert that Meretskov communicated with Tymoshenko AFTER 22.20?)))
if you read Popov, then he arrived at 10 hours of the morning at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District and THERE WERE ALREADY Meretskov))
At 4 hours Popov was in Petrozavodsk. He had about 300 km to Leningrad, and it was about 6 hours to go))) there and there - at 7 hours he was halfway to LenVO)) he drove another hour and he was at 10.00 near LenVO headquarters - Meretskov is already here))

Popov: "" At the headquarters of the district was General of the Army K. A. Meretskov, who arrived in the morning as a representative of the People's Commissar. ""))

Well, he arrived at 9 in the morning - how long did he have to go from Moscow THEN it was - at least 10 hours or more?))) Or maybe he arrived BEFORE - at 7 hours, for example?)) Meretskov cho - immediately after a conversation with NGOs, he rushed to St. Petersburg or something - without going home for things ??)))

So AT WHAT TIME Meretskov chatted with NGOs?)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

Kuznetsov confirms Tymoshenko's call after 23-00. It follows that they did not call the districts before these calls about the expected attack by Germany.

the logic is Madame and Batan - business))

You can WARN about important encryption is common and natural))) And you did NOT refute Zakharov’s words in the end)))

I am amazed, to be honest ... How can I write 11 books about events on the eve of the war, if you do not know when Army General Meretskov left Moscow?

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

“The General Staff Administration under the leadership of Golikov on June 19, 20 and by 20.00:21 on June 19 sent three reports to Stalin and the military: about the“ probable ”20th,“ inevitable ”22th — the German attack, and the German attack on the night of June 21 — in the evening XNUMXst of June!"

Present the documents, Mr. falsifier of the story Kozinkin!

are you sure not? Themselves already said - at 20.00 on the 21st there was a certain report about Golikov to Stalin and Zhukov))) I gave links to THESE reports - calm down already (((read Golikov’s memoirs)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

According to intelligence reports, on February 1, 1941 Germany had 66 divisions at our western borders, on April 20 there were already 84-89, and on June 1 - 120-122 ... "

The intelligence article has analyzed numerous intelligence reports and it is clear that the intelligence was very, very misinformation.

)))) judging by how you can carry nonsense - you are still that analyzer)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

In fact, on May 31, at the border there were no more than 83 German divisions ...

why are you doing that forgery? Golikov on June 1 shows NOT at the BORDERS themselves - but at a LARGE distance from the border so far, right up to Danzig, but - as oriented to the USSR)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

as of June 21, 1941, the German troops near the border were quite small, and a significant part of them were deployed deep in enemy territory. And this is the data of the Intelligence Directorate, which was led by General Golikov. Full misinformation also takes place in the first intelligence report of the Intelligence Directorate on June 22, which was signed by the same Golikov. Without documents, you can write any lie in your memoirs ... It is much worse when the writer Kozinkin uses this lie for his own purposes to "reinforce" his version of events ...

and where does it - At the very border if reconnaissance showed up to 400 km of enemy territory depth ??)) you on the MAP at what distance from the border you measure the location of German divisions - under YOUR Wishlist and reconnaissance fantasies that you didn’t find out there?)) km so on type 10 or something ??))) and all that is FURTHER 10 kim from the border - it doesn’t count as German divisions - like in Tilsit?)))

"Lessons and conclusions" look - from the officers of the VNU GSh - there are applications - about the deployment of German troops by June 22 - according to the RKU GSh))) and tell me that you are definitely smarter than these officers who wrote the DSP work on the topic where you foolishly climbed)) )

Quote: AsmyppoL

"Stalin in the afternoon of June 21 informs the party leadership of Moscow - there will be an attack."

This is not a confirmed statement. According to the recollections of one of the leaders of the City Committee, one of the highest ranks of this committee stopped at him only at 4-00 on June 22. Let the facts, Mr. falsifier of history!

Ie THESE memories you like and wrap in other ruba?))) Fufufu)))
Admiral Kuznetsov and Chadayev - from SNK, by the way - you don’t like it - do not fit YOUR tales and ravings?)))
THESE eyewitnesses - NARCOM of the Navy and the SNK MANAGER - GOVERNMENT - are not as cool as some clerk from the City Committee?)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

he no longer claims that Stalin’s call was at noon on June 21, as this is refuted by Victoria in the cycle (part 18 on air defense).

What has been refuted by this lady anonymous like you - ITS ladies' stupidities?)) By the way, it seems to me that this guy mowed down a pervert for a woman and then mowing nonsense under a woman-fool gave an entire year))) if he will have a beautiful excuse - this I didn’t give a stupid woman)))

And here you are - maybe not a man, but a lady of Balzakov’s age obviously carries a blizzard))) you never know how many anonymous perverts run and crap Comrade Stalin over the network (((

Quote: AsmyppoL

18-35 ... Gromadin appeared at the command post: “The district commander just called. "It is ordered to call from the camps and put in position 20% of all the troops there ..."

The lie is very visible. 75% and 20% are not at all comparable numbers! And it's half past six, not noon! Why was it necessary to deceive General Tyulenev? He is an adherent of the ardent Zhukov and for some reason lied about it in order to help the marshal with something ...

Tyulenev adherent of ZhUKOV)) ??)) gygygy))))

Quote: AsmyppoL

no one seeks to bring anti-aircraft units to firing positions. The corps command only finds out who shot and who can be brought to the position.

it’s Perm’s mother)) SO IT IS UNDER MOSCOW))) THERE HERE THE GERMANS CANNOT fly in June of the 41st)))
therefore did not twitch much did not fight in hysterics as you want .....

Quote: AsmyppoL

Kuznetsov did not confirm Tyulenev’s words, but wrote that he had heard about this from Tyulenev!

and Chadayev from whom did you hear this?))) from Kuznetsov apparently (((

Quote: AsmyppoL

by ten in the evening he went home to sleep soundly. Does anyone believe that some general could calmly ignore Stalin’s instructions? Of course not!

Already on boiling water, the generals were written every time from the instructions of the tyrant (((

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

“This message about the removed wire was reported to STALIN and Molotov !!!”

And nothing was done before Stalin received the package from Golikov after 20-00 21 on June 1941 and calling Tymoshenko and Zhukov on the carpet. Since Zhukov should not be trusted about the conversation with Stalin, since he had deceived in his memoirs about this fact and about the Directive No. 3, I would suggest trusting S.M. memoirs Budyonny, who showed that the military came completely unprepared ...

And WHAT TO DO - PP there, type of MOBILIZATION type or what?)))
you really be kind-tell CHO DO THAT SHOULD be Stalin DAY 21st ?? To get hysterical and type ... - what to do then ??)))

Zhukov brought with him at 20.45 (!!!) a directive for the introduction of software and Stalin again slowed it down - HOW DO YOU THINK - WHY?))))

Quote: AsmyppoL

S.L. Chekunov wrote in the comments that General Pavlov complied with all instructions from Moscow.

IIIii?))) And then at the FIRST interrogation he demanded Tymoshenko and Zhukov confront)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

to begin the process of transferring the army, air force, air defense and fleets - from high to full combat readiness! ”

Lies again. Victoria showed in parts of the air defense that the air defense units were not on high alert.

but you never know the women who are bad in the world of unmarried unmarried friends wandering around (((I am sure your same anonymous madame is not one of those)))

YOU NOSE to Poke into the directive on prigovo - on the introduction of increased b .. g for air defense in these days ??))) Read Markush corned beef - he dug up a bunch of docks on the Air Force and showed - the Air Force was brought to the increased bg. from June 18-19 and I, too, bring the same docks in books))) But this thing was done contrary to both Stalin and Zhukov (((d ... b ... (((

Quote: AsmyppoL

as well as the majority of mechanized corps, which is also shown in great detail in the cycle in parts devoted to all districts. There is no confirmation of the words of Mr. Kozinkin ... Well, maybe he can cite the facts, and not his own fabrications?

not all MKs were brought in bg, but currents - THE MOST combat-ready combat ready in the districts - since June 16)) YOU NOSE to poke an order for the 3rd MK or what? ((Markusha solonina n brought those MKs on his ZhBZh site))) what did they start to conduct from June 16 approximately))) Or do you bring the railway headquarters from Pribovo from June 19 or from KOVO from June 11 ???)) Do you know WHEN THE BEGINS OF MILITARY ACTIONS IN DIVISIONS BEGIN?))) yap anonymous)) )

Quote: AsmyppoL

“According to Chekunov, Stalin wanted to convene a meeting of the Government and the Politburo in the Kremlin by lunchtime, but it was rescheduled for the evening.”

Since S.L. Chekunov repeatedly spoke about Kozinkin’s lies, then I would also like to read S.L. Chekunov with reference to this text.

and you'd better go DIRECTLY to CHEKUNOV and contact)) suddenly I will cheat and concoct a quote of "his words" for you))))

he showed this on a milliter))) He promised to make a book on pre-war docks and events))) And - this Chekunov - the same batan first rushed to scatter me and then CONFIRMED my words or docks ALWAYS))))
Do you know why? BECAUSE I do not compose hypotheses like stupid people rezuns or Isaevites or YOU are an anonymous disrespectful here - adjusting the texture to fantasies and speculation)) And I just show what was there in REALITY - I'm SIE interesting)) and - I DON'T GUESS what is there who "THOUGHT "or" wanted "or" believed ")))
I do not give a damn about these things)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

I did not see a single command of army groups. As well as not seen a single headquarters of the motorized corps.

you have already been told SIE AND ON x..n it was not necessary for our GSh)) IT IS IMPORTANT HOW MANY DIVISIONS in PIECES are identified and WHAT and in what kind of "groups" they will gather - the THIRD thing in principle)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

without submitting documents - everything said by Kozinkin and Milchakov is a complete lie!

you managed to mess with the documents and be dishonored - with your drovers)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

this was reported to Moscow and again silence.

GOOD. The commander on the eve of the war is in units. Decisions are made by the district chief of staff P.S. Maples. Around 23-00 Klenov there are instructions on the withdrawal of troops, on possible provocations, etc. These are echoes of retold memoirs about the shot the chief of staff. Now both Victoria and I tried to recover about Tymoshenko’s calls to the districts from around 22 p.m. to 30 p.m. The second district where the People's Commissar was supposed to call was Pribovo. From a conversation like a conversation between a people's commissar and the commander of the OdVO troops, it follows that there were instructions not to submit to provocations and other nonsense like to be more careful.

STOP LYING! READ the anonymous unfinished Marshal Zakharov - that he was indicated at THIS time .. READ ANSWERS ON THAT ONE EVERYTHING indicated in the divisions = what on KOVO EVENING indicated in the divisions ..

And where did such anonymous BREAKERS climb - the lying bastards ?? ((

[AsmyppoL]

S.L. Chekunov, to which Mr. Kozinkin twice refers. Here is an excerpt from the dialogue Victoria has already brought up:

Let's take a look at how Kozinkin S.C.Chekunov comments on certain statements currently possessing the most information about the period being described.

S.L.Cekunov (answers from the forum site http://militera.borda.ru ):

“Kozinkin, did you publish a“ study ”? That from afar behind your signature is called nonsense of a sick imagination ... Why are they "bad"? On the contrary, "good." Make a business. Nothing personal. Publish "fool's notes"...

Kozinkin writes: “If the divisional commander receives an order from the okrug and those from NPOs and the General Staff about that - it is required to withdraw the divisions (s) to the area stipulated by the Cover Plan (in UR), then the additional order of the General Staff to be brought to bg. these divisions are NOT REQUIRED in principle "

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

Kozinkin writes: “Slavin claims - there was still an order - to bring him to B.G. - not only for the Air Force, Air Defense and Fleets in those days of June 18, but also for the troops - from the General Staff - as an addition to the withdrawal orders ”

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

Kozinkin writes: “And on June 20 of the okrug, they reported to the General Staff - the troops are given in g. [combat readiness] and are being withdrawn or have already been withdrawn by software [Cover Plans] are located in areas by software ... "

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

Kozinkin writes: “When withdrawing from the military unit, the divisional commander is MANDATORY to bring his division to the military base. stopping all studies and work

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

Kozinkin writes: “He [Zhukov] at 22 hours of 21 June gives the command to the districts - WAIT for an important encryption - about the TRANSFER OF ALL troops, air forces, air defense and fleets to FULL Bg.”

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

Kozinkin writes: “At 23-24 hours, he and the NPO are calling in the okrugs and indicating - faster follow the order for full bg.”

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

Kozinkin writes: “Who did you think puzzled the OPERATOR on duty on the General Staff who can carry out orders ONLY directly to the General Staff - to notify the district as Zakharov described it?”

[AsmyppoL]

S.L.Cekunov: "In 1941, there was no “operational duty on the General Staff”. There was a simple “attendant” and his assistant ... Colonel Vasilchenko was on duty at the General Staff of 22.06.41. ”

Kozinkin writes: “At 2 hours there is an alert-verification and clarification - - report on the readiness to accept this encryption”

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

Kozinkin writes: “At 24 hours go and instructions - to quickly fulfill the order - to alarm and complete BG And in 2.30 there is an order - to open the package. ”

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

Kozinkin writes: “PP was entered into 2.30 - in an hour, and BEFORE this, it was necessary to raise it stupidly by ALARM, which the deer required. b.n. - in 2 hours and THIS was at that moment. ”

S.L.Cekunov: Yeah, tell this to Major General Kokorev, who in 7 in the morning tried to find out what happened with the PP in the districts ....

Kozinkin writes: “BEFORE the deer. b.n. there were directives on INCREASED bg - for the Air Defense Forces and fleets to the heap .. and it was just 18 of June. And the army received orders - on bg without specifying a "degree" ... "

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

Kozinkin writes: “Two options published” [This is Directive No. XXUMX]

S.L.Cekunov: I read unpublished.

Kozinkin writes: “So is it my fault that the PP as well as the full BG maple bricks through ... introduced? What claims do you have for me? ”

S.L.Cekunov: You're lying that in 2.30 there was a command to enter the PP.

Kozinkin writes: “Or will you assure that no one in the NPO in 2.30 gave a command to the PP?”

S.L. Chekunov: No one in the NPO gave such a team either in 2.30 or later.

Kozinkin writes: “A type of SAMI was invented for themselves in these districts and brought by orders of the Air Defense Forces, etc. - in bg alert #2. ”

S.L. Chekunov: It was only in Pribovo. There is all correspondence on this issue. There is no directive from 18.06 there. NOT.

You can see that S.L. Chekunov repeatedly wrote that the writer Kozinkin was lying. Therefore, all of his outpourings below with a high degree of probability are fraud. And most importantly: he knows that this is a lie, but he writes it all the same hoping that not all readers are well-versed in this matter ...

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Kozinkin writes: “If the division commander receives an order from the okrug and those from NGOs and the General Staff about that - it is required to withdraw the divisions (s) to the area provided for by the Cover Plan (in the UR), then the additional order of the General Staff to be brought to the base station is these divisions are NOT REQUIRED in principle "

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

We are sure that Chekunov is a plump batan, but at least not referring his name - is it better to know ZhUKOV?))))

Zhukov : "" The commanders of the border military districts were ordered to withdraw the troops of the districts - designated as part of the covering forces, closer to the state border and the lines that they had to occupy in an emergency, by special order. Wherein advanced units were ordered to advance to the border units. Other equally important events were held. All this obliged the commanders of the districts and armies to increase their combat readiness. "")))

Quote: AsmyppoL

On June 20, the districts reported to the General Staff - troops are given in g. [combat readiness] and are being withdrawn or have already been withdrawn by software [Cover Plans] are located in areas by software ... "

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

until Chekunov about finds docks my words confirming he yells a lie !!! ()))

Quote: AsmyppoL

“Slavin claims - there was still an order - to bring him to B.G. - not only for the Air Force, Air Defense and Fleets in those days of June 18, but also for the troops - from the General Staff - as an addition to the withdrawal orders ”

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

if cho - "Slavin" this is a colonel, Kvashnin had an assistant, and he gets his data there where the Chekunovs and all the more anonymous babs will not be allowed to ever - in the archive of the General Staff))

I gave his exact last name in my last books completely)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

“When withdrawing from the military unit, the divisional commander is MANDATORY to bring his division to the military base. stopping all studies and work

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

and who is it - YOU OR Chekunov that cried out in hysterics nonsense in this matter?)))

Alas, when withdrawing from the ACCOUNTING PLAN, the division commander is obliged to stop all work and CHEKUNOV brought the docks in his two-volume book to the same Abramidze indicated on June 19-20 - to STOP work on the border and return the EMPLOYMENT-free l / s to units)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

“At 23-24 hours, he and the NPO are calling in the okrugs and indicating - faster follow the order for full bg.”

S.L. Chekunov: A lie.

wow .. Chekunov boldly drove into Zhukov - convicted him of a lie ((

Quote: AsmyppoL

“Who did you think puzzled the OPERATOR on duty on the General Staff who can carry out orders ONLY directly to the General Staff - to notify the district as Zakharov described it?”

uaps .. but why didn’t you give Chekunov’s answer ??))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

only by intuition did Stalin initiate the last peace meeting at which draft Directive No. 1 was born. Tymoshenko and Zhukov were also 100% sure of the information that came from the Intelligence Agency.

what are you talking about BREAKHUN anonymous (((

At least you should read Zhukov — how they fussed in those days — asking Stalin to take big measures — officially to cut MOBILIZATION — in connection with the EXPECTED ATTACK OF Germany in the near future !!

Why are you lying here preaching like an attack DID NOT WAIT for measures to take because the Germans changed epaulettes on their soldiers? ((Well ... from)))) I would even say - as Lavrov said the moat about such - d. . .... b))

[AsmyppoL]

I can read Zhukov as soon as you present the document that Purkaev called Zhukov about the deserter in 21-00.

[VS]

Quote: Vadim T.

They did not believe this upstairs. Probably checked the data of the Intelligence Agency, found out the opinion of the head of the Intelligence Agency and calmed down ...
If this was indeed so, then this indicates either the complete incompetence of the chief of the General Staff and intelligence, or criminal negligence.

this one says that the anonymous author BRESHET and customizes the texture according to his opinions))) completely ignoring what was actually done in THE DAYS in the army - in the General Staff and districts))

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

any military professional immediately understands that the author is an amateur

nnea ... the author is a CONSCIOUS LIAR and a FALSIFIER!))) Trying with fake "shoulder straps" to prove that the German attack was not WAITING for and did not TAKE any measures against it by June 22)))

[cavl]

Look who's Talking! Such a liar as Kozinkin himself still needs to be searched !!

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

It seems to me that our army leadership could not understand:

"it seems" - cross yourself first)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Thousands of readers (sometimes tens of thousands) view the article.

and how these things are known - a forger on drovers ??))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

we will bring troops to the border more. After all, this was one of the main goals of the German command: to surround and destroy as many troops as possible at the border. Not everything worked out as they conceived ...

stop lying and bring nonsense absurdly)) MORE THAN PROVISION OF THE DISTRICTS OF THE DISTRICTS TO THE BORDER OF FORCES NOBODY CAN'T WITHDRAW, and there were such - only 42 divisions for ALL DISTRICTS in the settlement)))
AND REALLY, by June 22, they had withdrawn through the BCP — BORDER divisions — ALL in PribOVO, at least 10 of their 17 in KOVO — those that were stationed BEFORE that — BEFORE June 11 — were far from their main defense zones, and ALL of their frontier divisions were in the OdVO )))

But in the ZAPOVO, their border divisions were not taken out on the PP, but they already stuck out on the BORDER EVERYTHING))) because there were their "winter apartments"))) And the rest of the divisions of the districts and even more the ARMY of the RGK that began to withdraw according to the deployment plans according to the directive from MAY 13 - IN ANY WAY TO THE BORDER WILL NOT BE IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWAL - so that the intelligence would not report on the German epaulettes there)))

[AsmyppoL]

I will not answer anything ... The numerous comments of Sergei Leonidovich about the lies of Mr. Vasily Kozinkin were many above

[VS]

Quote: icant007

this was one of the main goals of the German command: to surround and destroy as many troops as possible at the border.


In my opinion, this is something new in military science. Wait until the enemy builds up strength to attack him.

neighing))))
it is always nice to see a person THINKING and not a stupid believer - ravings of ANONYMOUS scribblers))
Sincerely, Oleg Kozinkin)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

the commander of the 125th Infantry Division has intelligence capabilities that are comparable to the intelligence of a whole district - PribOVO. Or maybe it implies another version that the intelligence of the NKVD border troops had more accurate information and then, in his opinion, simply did not share this data with the district’s intelligence ... Only supposedly in secret the border guards told the commander of the 125th regiment about this. And this is the opinion of the writer who wrote 11 books and 11 years of allegedly studying events on the eve of the war ???

so what problems then - do not like this dock? details - is there a TsAMO? THERE IS here and calm down dear anonymous)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

this motorized division did not exist. Given the exact numbers of these parts, which were confirmed by intelligence, RM are misinformation.

alas, you are not an analyzer but - and .. from))) In the hospital sense of the word)))

The commander knows about SEVEN German divisions, including the fact that in TILSIT and this is about a dozen km from the border - there are motorized ones)))

You dear anonymist already pointed out - YES DO NOT FUCK ALL WANTED to numbers of those divisions. The main thing is that they are a network and there is a lope of TANKOV found there)))) and this is a division commander and shows - HIM BY FIG what are the numbers of these SEVEN German divisions ready for the offensive)))

so stick your chases to hell))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

there is no German group on our border, even at 22-00 on June 21! And this, according to Mr. Kozinkin, is a good intelligence job ?? He or, as a first grader, believes any quote and intelligence. Or he knows about his mistake, but still continues to roll it over to his readers, and this is fraud ...

you in forgery and stupidity, an un respectable anonymist, no one will beat t)) YOU TAKED an attractive face into the DOCUMENT and you snooped and stubbornly trying to prove that there were no German divisions against the 125th on June 19th or no one saw them ??))))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

And how was it really? Let's look at the situation of German troops in this zone using two German reporting cards with the situation on the evening of 16 and on the evening of 19 on June 1941.




On the map on the evening of June 16 we see in total in the indicated zone up to two infantry divisions and partly two more deployment zones. Maximum in the indicated zone of regiments for three divisions. Intelligence overstated the data more than twice! Such information that existed since May 31 cannot be called reliable!

Well, just like trastupupka zululil our anonymist))
Having divorced his report to Riga, he sent not 16 but 19 igrins)) This is ONCE)) and TWO - AND REALLY flooded him - the 4th German TG - to SEVEN divisions on June 22)))

SO "GUESSED" the Divisional Commander or how - didn’t send him these up to seven divisions of the Germans, including the motorized ones as a result in REALITY ??)))

but you cannesha Moget and further against reality compose any crap - about the German carters))))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

as Mr. Kozinkin hints at us, repeatedly insulting the author, the information of the commander of the 125th SD should be believed ... Well, of course, since this text was inserted into his "work" by the science fiction writer Kozinkin ... Or did he deceive the readers? ... Judge for yourself

Well, how can you insult the ignoramus and the ANONYM-FALCIFIER then ??))

SO CHO Bogaychuk guessed that there were SEVEN divisions trampling on him TWO DAYS?))) For the anonymous and anonymous, I will tell you - EXPLORATION The border area tracks up to 400 (!!!) km on the other side)))

[AsmyppoL]

I repeat for those who do not get it. It’s evident that something is missing ...

The commander of the 125 SD cited part of the summary of the intelligence department of the PribOVO headquarters, which, in the part concerning it, came from the headquarters of the corps. The main idea in this document is what to do if the Germans attack unexpectedly. He does not cite some sacrificial intelligence data. He asks for an indication of an attack ...

In terms of intelligence data (including the Reconnaissance Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft), the data are unsatisfactory. On the 20 of May There are no German divisions in the area at all. They are located west. Only separate units could be there. I do not know yet when the divisions arrived at the border, but even by the evening of 16 on June 1941, there were about two infantry divisions in the indicated area. And according to intelligence as early as 31 in May, there were up to the 6,25 division, including motorized infantry regiments and tanks. Overstating intelligence data by 3 times is a fact of its unsatisfactory performance. The exact names of regiments and divisions (on 31 of May 1941 of the year) indicate the slipping of fake military personnel (or their groups) with false signs on uniform.

Even by the evening of June 19, there is no mass of troops that the intelligence allegedly sees since the end of May 1941. This also indicates that intelligence worked extremely poorly. The loss of intelligence by a significant part of the German troops shows that on the eve of the war (6 hours before its start) it worked disgustingly ...
As I understand it, what I wrote is beyond your comprehension ...

[AsmyppoL]

What pleased me in your posts. You cannot dispute a single concrete fact. As I suspected before: looking for something and analyzing is beyond your abilities. I’m even glad that you exposed yourself to potential readers of your fictitious garbage in books as a complete amateur and falsifier of history. There are many such counterfeiters both in Russia and in the West. You even surpassed the traitor Rezun, who never called our generals stupid Unter!
I will not refute your stupidities and lies. I think that everything is clear to readers ...

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Immediately before the war in the district, the redeployment of a small part of the troops, which were not supposed to reach the defense lines by June 22, continued. For his urgent demands for the withdrawal of troops through the chief of the General Staff to the drug of defense (almost ignoring the personal opinion of the chief of the General Staff), the chief of staff of the ODVO on June 19 was to vacate his post and go to Moscow.

are you ?? Read Zakharov’s book — it completely shows by the day — HOW all this happened and how Zhukov resisted the supposedly requests of the NSO ODVO .. from June 6)))

For even the same Chekunov showed HOW it was - on the docks at TsAMO)))

Do you want to prove that ZhUKOV did not wait for the attack in June 41st - on the 20th of June ?? )))

The laurels of Rezun and Isaev are not allowed to sleep peacefully - you dream with your delirium that no one was waiting for the attack and that they didn’t take measures to go down in the history of HISTORY?) It won’t work out))) to anonymists and clinical liars (and d .. m b ..b) there is no place)))

So why are you hiding your name from the few here? Are you afraid - on a subconscious level - what lies can they attract?))

if you are addressing us with Milchakov by the last name, please call YOURSELF - if you consider yourself a decent person)) Or they will "insult" you for your stupid nonsense)))

[AsmyppoL]

a lot of honor to you

[ccsr]

Quote: V.S.

if you are contacting us with Milchakov by name, please call YOURSELF - if you consider yourself a decent person)

They are pathetic cowards because they understand that if someone finds out their names, they will be easy to identify, and then many people will spit on their faces in social networks or on the street for their lies. Chekunov turned out to be much more decent in this respect - although he sometimes carries nonsense, he did not hide his data. Waiting for decency from these types is a waste of time.

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The district chief of staff made an initiative decision to withdraw advanced divisions to the border. As Zakharov writes in his memoirs, his instruction contradicted the instructions of Directive No. 1.

you are definitely - or dumb my friend - or - a conscious LIAR!

Zakharov received the so-called deer 1 - SO CALLED her mother deer. No. 1 and not - deer. No. 1 - he was afraid that he had already CANCELED the order for the OPENING of packages in the army district! WORT that bothered him.)) He expected that the directive about which he had warned Cherevichenko at 22.00 would be for OPENING the package and - entering the software !! Unable to stand it, he began at midnight to try to give commandos on this and received a directive on FULL bg. only - at 1.30 after reading it - he tensed))
His team didn’t pass the package at midnight - it wasn’t compiled by the commanders of the OdVO))) BUT they executed another command - like a TRAINING alarm from Zakharov and - and raised their parts by alarm))) WITHOUT opening the package ...
And then he gave the order again - to open the packages! And at 2 o’clock the packages were opened in OdVO .. And in other districts they began to open the packages immediately after 2.30)) according to the NCO TEAM !!)) In addition to profit))) and at about 4 o’clock a letter of directive came from the NCO and GS - Directive No. 1 - Introduce PP)))

my advice to you - well, do not meddle in this matter - with your anti-Stalinist shit - you screw it up after all))) Take a look at how Isaev managed to contact me on this topic)))

https://liewar.ru/tragediya-22-iyunya/347-antiisaev.html – АнтиИсаев
On the channel https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4OZa3NVl8I Isaev still answers my questions - according to what plans the General Staff of the RGK should have been transported directly to the border ..
and my answer is https://liewar.ru/tragediya-22-iyunya/349-antiisaev-2.html - AntiIsaev-2 ..)))

[AsmyppoL]

I do not read your nonsense in articles. If it were interesting, then people would queue at the fools: just to listen to nonsense ...

Facts about opening red packets. No them, no need to lie. Give the facts and we can discuss something. I know events, documents and memories better than you

[VS]

Quote: cavl

Since then, I have been everywhere Vaska and Milchakova minus where I see

do this more often and you will be happy)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Chekunov repeatedly wrote that the writer Kozinkin was lying.

))) neighing in due time)))

[AsmyppoL]

Yes you are right. many at Sat Military literature laughed at the amateur Kozinkin)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I can read Zhukov as soon as you present the document that Purkaev called Zhukov about the deserter in 21-00.

are you I write that THIS was not - Zhukov from Purkayev and especially at 21.00)))

[AsmyppoL]

If it didn’t get the first time, then I will repeat it.
Zhukov’s memoirs about the events of 21 and 22 of June contain a lot of lies (almost all). If you personally think that his text about calling Stalin, where they got an appointment with the leader and brought the draft Directive, is true.
Then prove to me that the previous text about Purkayev’s call to 21-00 about the deserter is also true! And then it turns out weird: a sea of ​​lies, but the science fiction writer Kozinkin found a couple of sentences of truth, but he can’t confirm this with anything. And he lied about Zhukov’s call to the General Staff from the Kremlin ...

Let’s the facts, are you our falsifier ... or not ours, but their rezunist? ...

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL
we will bring troops to the border more. After all, this was one of the main goals of the German command: to surround and destroy as many troops as possible at the border. Not everything worked out as they conceived ...

stop lying and carry nonsense absurd)) MORE THAN THERE IS PROVIDED BY PP of districts to the border of the troops, NO ONE COULD WITHDRAW and those were - only 42 divisions in ALL DISTRICTS for PP)))
AND REALLY, by June 22, they had withdrawn through the BCP — BORDER divisions — ALL in PribOVO, at least 10 of their 17 in KOVO — those that were stationed BEFORE that — BEFORE June 11 — were far from their main defense zones, and ALL of their frontier divisions were in the OdVO )))

But in the ZAPOVO, their frontier ones in terms of PP did not deduce, but they already stuck out AT THE BORDER OF ALL))) because there were their "winter quarters"))) And the rest of the divisions of the districts and even more so the ARMY of the RGK that began to withdraw according to the deployment plans according to the directive of the General Staff of MAY 13 - IN ANY WAY TO THE BORDER WILL NOT BE IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAWAL - whatever intelligence would not report there epaulettes of the Germans)))

Quote: AsmyppoL

I will not answer anything ... The numerous comments of Sergei Leonidovich about the lies of Mr. Vasily Kozinkin were many above

oh well - you are madly stupidly blown away and they have nothing to say in my words - which are confirmed by DOCUMENTS)))

[AsmyppoL]

Where are these documents? present to us. You bring only all stupidity.
Why can I give facts and relate different events to each other, and you only carry out political information as a political officer for a tick ... How amateurs got it

According to the cover plans, I cited many statements by S.L. Chekunov which says that you are a liar!

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I will not answer anything ..

specially dyal-Roezunov, etc., and counterfeiters - from officers of the VNU General Staff))

"Lessons and conclusions" show that: "The political and military leadership of the Soviet Union 11 days after Hitler’s approval of the Barbarossa plan on December 18, 1940, there were data from intelligence agencies about Germany’s direct preparations for war against the USSR. Since February 1941, the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff had information about the formation of three army groups with the aim of striking at Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, and the beginning of the transfer of forces (up to 66 divisions) to the Soviet border.
According to intelligence reports, by April 20, the group of forces had increased to 90 divisions. The reports also reported on the forces and means of the allies of Germany, concentrated along the western border of the USSR {119 - TsAMO, f. 7, op. 179415, d. 126, l. 7-26}.
Under these conditions, the General Staff, having received permission from the Soviet government, had planned and implemented a complex of measures since February 1941, aimed at preparing the army and navy for successfully solving the tasks of the upcoming war.
In the immediate preparation and implementation of the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces, three stages can be seen.
At the first stage (February - March) additional decisions were taken and further development of measures for the reorganization, technical re-equipment and organizational strengthening of the Armed Forces, accelerated theater equipment, which continued until the outbreak of war.
The second stage (April - early June) is the planning and implementation by the General Staff with the permission of the government of secretive mobilization of troops and the nomination of the army of the reserve of the High Command (second strategic echelon) in the areas of operational mission.
At the third stage (early June - June 22, 1941), decisions were made and the advancement of second echelons (reserves) of the western border military districts began, as well as specific measures were taken to increase the combat readiness of the covering army (annex 18)". (p. 80-82)
The “lessons” also show: “In March 1941, Soviet intelligence managed to uncover the basis of the plan of the Barbarossa plan. In addition, it was indicated that Germany refused to attack England until the complete defeat of the USSR. ” (p. 82)
)) if cho - I laid out the lessons with ALL applications - for cutters, etc. dams anonymous)))

[AsmyppoL]

You do not quote. If you have something to say, let's documents or analyze events based on indirect facts. If not, I can only discuss issues with smart people.

[AsmyppoL]

I am amazed at how low Kozinkin's level of awareness of events on the eve of the war ... 11 years to spend quoting quotes and not understand the events. Write 11 books about events in which he does not understand at all .. Poor readers of this writer ...

Kozinkin: "and who did Chadayev hear this from?))) from Kuznetsov, apparently (((" .... And I hear this about a man who supposedly knows something about the events on the eve of the war ??? What stupidity and amateurism ...

I write more for readers, and not for the person with whom this issue has been discussed twice ... To begin with, General Tyulenev is very grateful to Marshal Zhukov and was his ardent supporter. In his memoirs General Tyulenev wrote: "At noon Poskrebyshev called me from the Kremlin: “Comrade Stalin will talk to you ...”
I heard a dull voice in the receiver: “Comrade Tyulenev, what is the situation with Moscow’s air defense?” I briefly reported to the head of the government about the air defense measures taken today, June 21. In response, he heard: “Keep in mind, the situation is turbulent, and you should bring the combat readiness of the Moscow Air Defense Forces up to 75%... I got the impression that Stalin received new alarming information about the plans of Nazi Germany. I immediately gave the relevant orders to my Air Defense Assistant, Major General M.S. The whopper... "

Phoned I.V. Stalin at noon (this is 12-00), we are talking about 75% of the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons to firing positions. Order sent right there.

Admiral Kuznetsov: "Not so long ago I had the opportunity to hear from General of the Army IV Tyulenev - at that time he was in command of the Moscow Military District - that on June 21, about 2 hours of the day IV called him Stalin demanded increase air defense alert ... "

Already there are no connections. In his memoirs, Tyulenev writes about 12-00, and to Admiral Kuznetsov he talks about two in the afternoon. Further, Admiral Kuznetsov writes that the leaders of the Moscow City Group visited Stalin during the day and also received instructions on location and on air defense alertness. From whom he heard this lie Kuznetsov in his memoirs is not indicated ...

Now let's see what writes Chadayev"Around 7 pm A.N. Poskrebyshev called and asked to go to him to take one document for execution ... Today, the "owner" was worried: summoned Tymoshenko and Zhukov and just talked with Tyulenev. I asked him what was done to put the air defense into combat alert ... "

If there was a call from Stalin to Tyulenev, then he was in the interval after 18-00 and up to 18-30. And Stalin did not demand that 75% anti-aircraft weapons be put on alert. On bringing combat readiness of the air defense missile defense to combat readiness is Tyulenev’s lie. This assumption is confirmed by the memoirs of the commander of the 1 Air Defense Corps General Zhuravlev: “Comrade General, you have been ordered to report to the command post immediately.” I looked at my watch: 18-35... Gromadin appeared at the command post: “The district commander just called. It is ordered to call out from the camps and to put in positions 20% of all the troops there ... " In this case, the period is not indicated!

[AsmyppoL]

Since Stalin and Molotov were going to discuss the issue of German politics and the insistent meeting of the employees of the USSR Embassy in Berlin with the German Foreign Minister. No one suspects the war at dawn 22 of June. But for some reason, the version that Tymoshenko and Zhukov were with Stalin near 17-00 is strongly pushing by the party functionaries. This is a conscious distortion of events or an attempt to falsify, to hide something. And what did the military try to hide? Just the fact of an unexpected attack.

Chadayev’s memoirs also contain another lie - this is allegedly Stalin’s presence before the 19-00 leader of the Moscow City Party Committee. Before Stalin, 18-27 did not have any of the visitors. In addition, one of the party leaders from Moscow left memories that they were sitting with Stalin as they arrived until the 3-00 22 on June. Also a lie that is easily refuted.

There are recollections of the second secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, G. Popov, that he learned about the beginning of the war in 4 in the morning at the cottage in Usovo, he was woken by a knock on the window. When he got dressed and ran out of the house, he saw a Lincoln car at the gate: “It was the secretary of the Central Committee, MK and MGK VKP (b) A.S. Shcherbakov. He told me: "The war. The war has begun. The Germans crossed our borders half an hour ago.". Upon learning of the war, the first secretary called in for the second secretary. Everything is natural ...

General D.A. Zhuravlev: “While I was negotiating by telephone with Lavrynovych on the procedure for selecting units for dispatch to positions, and he was checking which of the batteries had already fired, a new order was received: to call not 20%, but half of all the troops from the camp ...

Somewhere after midnight, another order was received: to withdraw all anti-aircraft artillery to positions ... In this business hectic, no one immediately paid attention to the call of one of the phones ... And the phone, after a little silence, rang again, long and demanding ... The distant excited voice repeated several times: “Moscow, Moscow, Minsk says. Bombing the airfields of Grodno and Lida. Do you hear Moscow? .. "

Near 22-00, General Tyulenev went to rest home, which shows that he does not expect a war ... Further instructions on the air defense forces come from anywhere, but not from the Kremlin and not from the commander of the Moscow Military District. Only after 3-00 on the streets of Moscow were the first anti-aircraft guns seen (on Lubyanka Square).

Battle log of the 1 Air Defense Corps: "22 June 1941 year. 0-10. The corps commander, Major General of Artillery, was called to the commander of the Moscow Air Defense Zone, Major General Gromadin.

1-40. Based on the instructions received in the Military Council, the corps commander, Major-General of Artillery Comrade Zhuravlev, ordered 80% of all units to be put on combat alert.

4-30. An alarm has been raised on the receipt of data on the violation of the border by German aircraft and the bombing of Brest-Litovsk in parts of the 1 air defense corps.

5-00. The corps commander ordered to deploy 100% of the units to full combat readiness and occupy the ZA [anti-aircraft artillery], ZPL and ZPR OP according to plans.

5-20. The commander of the 24 air division reported that the units of the division were ready to carry out the reflection of the enemy raid.

8-20. Units of the corps, by order of the corps commander, set out from the Kosterovo camp from 251 and 329, three batteries each on their own ... "

It is strange that you, Mr. Kozinkin, do not know such elementary things ...

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

How can you write 11 books about events on the eve of the war if you do not know when Army General Meretskov left Moscow?

show and prove)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I think that readers and so everything is clear ...

daragaya anonymous madame - and YOU have no reader))) God forbid fifty saw your nonsense and ONE low-chilling anti-adviser supports you like))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

many at Sat Military literature laughed at the amateur Kozinkin)))

if people like you - NO FUCK who do not know the topic but are climbing clever then there m there were a couple of idiots in total - from cutters just)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

If you personally think that his text about calling Stalin, where they got an appointment with the leader and brought the draft Directive, is true.
Then prove to me that the previous text about Purkayev’s call to 21-00 about the deserter is also true! And then it turns out weird: a sea of ​​lies, but the science fiction writer Kozinkin found a couple of sentences of truth, but he can’t confirm this with anything. And he lied about Zhukov’s call to the General Staff from the Kremlin ...

Let’s the facts, are you our falsifier ... or not ours, but their rezunist? ...

so you are a patriot (((I mean something about some kind of calls from Zhukov to STALIN, he said something? are you talking about yours?))

Zhukov’s call to the OPERATIVE dezh on GSH follows from the understanding of HOW and to whom does the operative fix what loaded Cherevichenko about this directive and he informed ZAKHAROV about it at 22.00)) You don’t understand such things - not my problems))))))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

You do not quote. If you have something to say, let's documents or analyze events based on indirect facts. If not, I can only discuss issues with smart people.

I am glad that you know better than officers of the General Staff of the General Staff about intelligence))) but how do you UNDERSTAND the docks = we have already seen)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

"About 7 pm A. N. Poskrebyshev phoned and asked to come to him to take one document for registration ... Today the" owner "was worried about something: he called Timoshenko and Zhukov and just talked to Tyulenev. what has been done to bring the air defense into combat readiness ... "

If there was a call from Stalin to Tyulenev, then he was in the interval after 18-00 and until 18-30.

but why did you get that it’s not about Stalin’s instructions given back AFTERNOON — which he decided to check with Tymoshenko?

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

8-20. Units of the corps, by order of the corps commander, set out from the Kosterovo camp from 251 and 329, three batteries each on their own ... "

It is strange that you, Mr. Kozinkin, do not know such elementary things.

only cretins on THIS can build global conclusions about whether or not the Germans were waiting for the attack in the Kremlin on the morning of June 21)) It was only time - the Germans CANNOT fly and nobody seriously waited for the Germans from the first days to Moscow with their Air Force raids))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Facts about opening red packets. No them, no need to lie. Give the facts and we can discuss something. I know events, documents and memories better than you

wow .. I'm sure - you've heard about "Malandin's questions" go - from August 41 - just about HOW and why the red packages were opened in the same ZAPOVO?))) oops - opened until 4 o'clock in the morning)))