Intelligence service. The first three months of 1941
In the previous part intelligence materials were reviewed (Goals Difference) about the German troops at the end of the 1940 year. These RM overestimated the total number of German troops, including those concentrated near our border. Based on the overestimated number of troops in the General Staff, they made the erroneous conclusion that Germany would allocate 173 divisions to attack the USSR.
The following abbreviations will be used in this article: AK - army corps, ap - artillery regiment, IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GU - Headquarters, cd (kbr, kn) - cavalry division (brigade, regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Ro - headquarters intelligence department, RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, td (tbr, mn, tb) - tank division (brigade, regiment, battalion).
Messages began to appear that the reconnaissance of the border troops had RM more accurate than RM RU. The materials of the series “Unexpected War ...” showed that the intelligence services of NPOs, NKVD and the NKGB (from March 1941) provided RM in the Republic of Uzbekistan (before 7.40 - the 5th Directorate of NPOs) on the armed forces of foreign countries. RU summarized the information provided by the Republic of Moldova, prepared reports, sent them to the leaders of the USSR, NPOs, NKVD and VO (in the part concerning them). In addition to the indicated cycle of the Republic of Moldova, there was an exchange of materials between the headquarters of the HE and the border districts, between the headquarters of the armies and border detachments, etc.
The reconnaissance of the border troops used the same basic methods of obtaining information as the RU: visual observation and collection of information during conversations. One of the sources of information for reconnaissance of border troops was the reconnaissance of border violators.
At the end of 1939, information appeared that under the guise of deserters from the German army, German agents could be sent to us (4.12.39):
Therefore, information from border violators should have been treated with suspicion, because she could be planted by the Germans.
Data on numbering units or on the number of divisions in the published NKVD RM for the 1940 year are not common. Check the reliability of the RM NKVD. 14.7.40 was prepared NKVD Memorandum:
39-th PP was part of the 26-th PD, which from May 1940 to May 1941 was in France and Belgium.
116-th up was part of the 5-th, which will arrive in Poland only in September 1940. Therefore, the 116-th AP could not be near our border until the 14.7.40 g. At this time, even in the General Staff of the ground forces could not know that after 6.9.40 a new group of divisions will be sent to the Soviet-German border.
129-th paragraph did not exist and information about it can only be thrown up by misinformation.
The 192-th point (56-th front) has been in Belgium since May 1940. After 6.9.40, he will arrive in the area of the city of Lodz.
The 44 th heavy up in May of the 1940 of the year was part of the 8 th AK. Further, until the spring of 1941, there is no information about him. Suppose that the 44-th up in July 1940 is located in Poland. In this case, the information in the RM is confirmed only by 20%, and 80% of the data on the numbering shelves is misinformation. The same amount of misinformation is contained in license plates in RM RU.
Help GUGB NKVD (6.11.40 g.):
According to RM RU - up to 52 PD, 2 MD, one TD, two TBR, 5 TP and 3 TB. In fact, so on, 2-xs and 5-xs were not. No TB information. Most likely, they did not exist either.
The Help contains information about the troops at the border, which is close to the data of RU. Therefore, the NKVD RM in the second half of the 1940 year did not coincide with the information that was included in the RU reports.
In the previously considered RM RU and RO ZAPOVO regarding license plate parts contained up to 80% misinformation. Maybe at the beginning of 1941, the amount of misinformation decreased? To answer this question, we analyze the information from the first RU report (in the West) in 1941.
Intelligence No. 1 RU:
The 192th Front never existed. In the wording there is no annotation that the information needs to be clarified or verified. Therefore, this is verified information or in other language - competent misinformation of the German command.
The 4-th with 15.8.40 is undergoing reorganization into the 14-th etc. in Germany. 14 I will be in Germany until March 1941, and will continue to be celebrated in Hungary. Could not be the 4-th front in Koenigsberg - this is again the misinformation of the German command.
Further, in the Republic of Moldova, the wording “the presence of ... a division (regiment) ... is not confirmed". The intelligence unit monitors the military unit for a certain time, but at some time its presence is not confirmed - it supposedly was relocated.
12-I before 10.3.41, is located in France. It is clear that its headquarters at this time cannot be located on the Soviet-German border far from its units.
Once upon a time there was 10 I in one area and suddenly moved to another area - a common thing ... Only 10 I with 23.9.40 will remain in Germany until April 1941. In Moldova, information on the presence of four divisions is not true.
“In the Goldap region, 7 TP is celebrated ...” 7-th TP is located since 10.40 in the city of Reims (France), and later in the city of Dijon (France). The 7th TP is part of the 10th TD, which is located in France until the end of the 1940. From January 41, it will be redeployed to Germany, from where it will arrive at the border in June 1941.
662-th PP disbanded 8.8.40 g. And therefore could not be in Poland. Only a group of military men with fake badges on shoulder straps could go somewhere.
The 110-th up was part of the AK gain, and it was not possible to find where it was in the indicated period. We will consider that RM on the regiment were confirmed.
In the Wehrmacht at that time, there were only four CPs that were part of the 1 cd. They were in their places of deployment. The presence of a multitude of knots in the Republic of Moldova is a deso. We will talk about cavalry in the part devoted to mobile troops.
68 th TP SS did not exist. There was no 68 SS regiment.
Of the four mentions of the shelves, only the 110 ap.
The 48th and 57th paragraphs were part of the 12th and 9th sections, respectively, which were in France until March 1941.
The 67th and 68th pp from the 23th pd, which is located in East Prussia. PM can be considered confirmed.
The 105-th settlement from the 72-th front, which is located in France before 1.1.41, and then will be relocated to Romania. Accordingly, the territory of Poland 105-th pp could not get.
The 135-th settlement from the 45-th front, which is located in Belgium until 1.2.41. RM did not confirm.
The 171th, 178th and 529th pp from the 56th, 76th and 299th respectively, which were located in Poland. RM confirmed.
The 225th and 600th pp did not exist.
1-th up was part of the 1-th front, which is located in East Prussia.
584 th up not found. It is only known that in April 1944 of the year there was a spare 584-th up. We believe that intelligence correctly tracked this up.
600-th up did not exist.
106-th PP was part of the 15-th PD, which from August 1940 to June 1941 was located in the city of Dijon (France).
The 458-th PP was part of the 258-th PD, which has been located in Poland since July 1940. RM confirmed.
Of the 16 references to numbering shelves, only eight can be reliable.
10-th CP did not exist.
208-I is located in the city of Calais (France) from August 1940 to January 1942 of the year.
40-I PD never existed, but it will be observed by our intelligence in June 1941.
62-th sub-structure of the 7-th front, which until 14.4.41 g. Will be deployed in Northern France.
The 552-th PP along with the 279-th PD will be disbanded in July 1940. Only in December 1941 of the year will it be formed again along with the 329-th front.
3-th is located on the territory of Germany from 15.8.40 to 7.4.41, and its parts cannot simply disappear from the territory of Poland somewhere.
12-th is formed in the city of Stettin (distance to the border of 467 km), which since October 1939 of the year has been the territory of Germany. The minimum distance from the cities of Kielce - Krakow to Stettin is 501 km. Parts of the 12 th cannot be located in the indicated area. 12-I will be in Stettin until 15.4.41
221 is on vacation until January 1941. Then it is deployed again in Germany (8-th VO) until March 1941 year.
The 2 md from 5.10.40 to 10.1.41 was reorganized into the 12 md and therefore could not decrease anywhere from Southern Poland.
The 8th and 29th MPs were part of the 3th MD, which was located in Germany from 23.9.40 to May 1941.
112-th CP did not exist.
9-th settlement from the 23-th front, which was located on the territory of East Prussia. 9-th pp could not be in southern Poland.
The 50-th point from November 1940 to April 1941 of the year together with the 111-th point will be located in the city of Fallingbostel (Germany).
The formation of the 146 th point will begin only on 11.7.42.
The personnel of the 239-th front since July 1940 year is on vacation. The deployment of the division will begin in January 1941 in the 8 md (Germany), and 4.4.41 it will appear in Romania. The division included the 327, 372 and 444 points.
239-th PP was part of the 106-th PD, which at that time was located in the city of Wahn (Germany).
237-th pp did not exist. It is possible that servicemen from the 327-th regiment depicted the 237-th regiment, reversing the signs on uniform. Only information on the 372 regiment matched.
55-th PP was part of the 17-th PD, which until May 1941 was in France.
72-th and 93-th CP did not exist.
Since the summer of the 23, 1940 is located in East Prussia.
11-I until March 1941 year will be in France.
39-th PP from the 26-th Front, which until May 1941 will be in Belgium.
342-th PP (231-th Front) disbanded 31.7.40
116-th up was part of the 5-th, which was in Poland until January 1941. PM are confirmed.
The 102-th PP as part of the 24-th PD will be located in the city of Elda (Germany) from August 1940 to 23.3.41.
48-th up from the 12-th front will be in France until 10.4.41
302-th PP from the 231-th Front, which 31.7.40 was disbanded.
The 315-th PP from the 167-th PD, which is located in France from September 1940 to January 1941. Next, she will be relocated to Bavaria, which will be in May 1941 year.
From October 4 to February 1940 of the 1941 of the year XNUMX is located in Germany. Further, she will be relocated to Bulgaria, in which she will meet the beginning of the war with Yugoslavia.
The 7 I-DSS will not be formed until December 1941.
132-th PP of the 44-th Front This division will remain in France until March 1941.
353-th PP from the 205-th Front, which will be in France until January 1942.
The 168-th front included the 417-th, 429-th and 442-th points, as well as the 248-th up. The division has been in Poland since the summer of 1940. It did not include the 571, 650, 652, and 529.
The 571-th subdivision was part of the 302-th pd, which will be formed in Germany (2-th VO) from 12.11.40, and then will go to France.
The 650th and 652th pp of the 372th pd, which was disbanded in July 1940 of the year. 529-th up never existed.
Also, there was no 175 Id. Information on the motorization of a non-existent division can only be misinformation of the German command.
567-th PP was part of the 270-th PD, which was disbanded in the summer of 1940. It will be newly formed 21.4.42 g.
590-th PP from the 321-th PD, which was formed in December 1940 of the year in the 9-m VO (Germany). Since January 1941, the division arrived in the city of Boulogne (France).
In total, the number of German divisions is 285-295.
In the Republic of Moldova there are 69 references to license plate parts and CP. RM can be considered confirmed only 14. 80% license plate information is German misinformation. The same ratio was found in the Republic of Moldova for July, August and September of 1940. When in four RMs, spaced in time, there is a comparable amount of desa in the license plate parts, then this looks like a pattern ...
Special message NKGB USSR (31.3.41 g.):
316-th PP is part of the 212-th PD, which will be located on the English Channel until June 1941. 525-th up did not exist.
The 584-th sub-unit (the formation of the regiment began on 15.11.40) was part of the 319-th sub-base, which in December 1940 completed its formation and headed to Normandy. Where it was before the Allied landing operation in the 1944 year.
The marks on the shoulder straps of the machine gun team may correspond to the 17 th point. 17-th PP was part of the 31-th PD, which arrived in Poland since September 1940. If the scouts subsequently concluded that there was an 17-th sub, then the RM in terms of numbering regiments were confirmed at 25%. In this case, the amount of misinformation was 75%.
The figure shows a graph of the concentration of German divisions at the Soviet-German border. The decrease in the number of German troops in the figure is due to the movement of divisions to the Balkans and to the territory of Romania.
It was previously shown that in the Republic of Moldova the total number of divisions in the German armed forces was constantly overstated. It was shown above that the NKVD information on German troops coincided with the RU data.
Based on intelligence estimates of availability 243 divisions, in the Note of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the chief of the General Staff of the SC (18.9.40 g.) it was determined that "to 173 divisions ... will be directed against our borders". In the options considered by the General Staff for the outbreak of war with Germany, the number of German divisions is estimated by the number 160 ... 180 ... 188. At the same time, the presence of a German group on the territory of Romania, which at that time did not exist, was not taken into account. The note was submitted by I.V. Stalin and 5.10.40 received instructions to clarify it. An updated Note was prepared in October 1940 of the year:
«
It is possible that on the basis of the updated Note by the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff at HE headquarters, documents were prepared on the deployment of districts in case of war. For example, a note on the deployment plan for the 1940 year is being prepared at KOVO. The exact date for preparing this document is unknown. Let's try to clarify the time of its compilation.
The Note by the Chief of Staff of the KOVO states: “group gene. Blaskovitsa (most of it is already in Romania); group gene. Reichenau (on the border with Yugoslavia)».
In RM RU from 30.10.40, it is said:
In the RU report (9.11.40 g.) It is noted:
It turns out that most of the group of General Blaskowitz was transferred to Romania in early November 1940. Consequently, the Note was prepared at the same time. In a note by General M.A. Purkayev the total number of German troops is estimated by the number over 250 divisionsof which against the USSR can be put up to 166. In the considered variants of the initial period of the war, the maximum number of German divisions put up against the USSR (including the territory of Romania) can be 178 ... 190.
The discrepancy between the maximum number of German divisions and divisions concentrated for war with the USSR, in the Notes of the General Staff and the headquarters of the KOVO can be explained:
- or clarification of the German group when discussing the document with Stalin;
- or the development of the Notes was carried out independently of each other (the most likely option).
It can be seen from the documents presented that the leadership of the KA and the KOVO Military Council are trying to estimate the number of German troops deployed against the USSR and the KOVO, and they are also trying to predict the options for starting military operations. The number of German divisions put up in the initial period of the war against the USSR is estimated by a number of at least 166 ... 173.
At the end of December 1940, in Moscow, a meeting of the highest command staff of the spacecraft is held. Many different reports explaining how German generals fought. The speakers explain many points in sufficient detail. The people reading these materials should have a question: why did all the senior commandos forget everything that was said at the meeting before 22.6.41? Or is it easier to use the version voiced by many top-ranking military officers that Stalin alone is to blame? And how many German troops were in the scenarios of the war games that took place in early January 1941 after the end of the meeting?
There were almost as many of them as were considered in the Note from 18.9.40 to 173 German divisions, and about 120 were concentrated near our border by June 22. In a variant of one of the games, the number was also used. 180 German divisions:
14.2.41, in RM RU it is said about an increase in the number of German divisions: “[By] according to the Yugoslav General Staff, Germany now has 250 divisions ... "
11.3.41, the number of divisions is again increasing in RM RU “1.3.41 Germany has 263 divisions”. According to intelligence, compared with September 1940, the size of the German army increased by 20 divisions.
The Plan of the General Staff of the Spacecraft on the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East (11.03.41) refers to the close number of divisions in Germany "to 260". The Plan further states that “to 200 divisions ... will be directed against our borders... »
Everything is logical: the Germans have increased the number of divisions and, therefore, Germany can send more divisions to war with a strong spacecraft. It only bothers that the plans of the General Staff are somewhat behind the data of the RU. In the latest RMs, it is called "263 divisions", and in the General Staff they operate with older information about 260 divisions.
Don't you find that the number of 200 is significantly different from the number of 120 divisions concentrated at the border by 22.6.41? Do you think that by June 1941, the General Staffists had suddenly seen their light and realized that the Germans would attack, having only about 120 divisions?
In the fall of 1940, the general staff assesses the number of German divisions for the war with the USSR 173. In January 1941, games are held with the 173-180 spacecraft opposed to German divisions. In the same period, intelligence reports on the increase in the size of the German army, and, consequently, the number of troops allocated for the war with the Soviet Union should increase. In the document of the General Staff from 11.3.41 this number is increased to 200 divisions. The next step should be to take this mass of troops into account when developing Cover Plans ...
The Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft to the commander of the Western Command, Colonel-General D.G. Pavlov. There is no exact date for this Directive, but the approximate time for its preparation is indicated - April 1941 of the year. April is later than 11 of March ... What does the Directive say?
Even a month later, the material stated in the General Staff Plan of the 11.3.41 is quoted verbatim. When developing the Plans, one should be guided by the direction against the USSR to the 200 divisions! And why do literary men tell us that all our military men know that 120 German divisions are enough? Perhaps later in the General Staff the number of 120 German divisions treasured for a number of writers will be enlightened and called?
We look at a well-known document - a draft Note by the USSR people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft, which was compiled after May 15.
And after 65 days, when developing a new document on the deployment of troops in the General Staff, the number of German divisions allocated for an attack on the USSR is used: significantly more than 120! The number of divisions was reduced to 180, but in the original version it was 189 divisions. And now question: what group of German troops in the initial period of the war should the forces of PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO and OdVO have to resist? Of course, 180 to German divisions, which are considered at the General Staff after 15 on May 1941 of the year! And regarding this number of German troops, plans must be developed for covering these VOs!
Directives from the General Staff on the development of new “Cover Plans ...” KOVO and OdVO were obliged to take into account this vision of the General Staff, as These Directives were prepared in early May. Both Directives have the same mark: "Done in 2 copies. No. 1 - KOVO [or OdVO. - Note ed.], No. 2 - into the case of the Oper of the General Staff. Performed and printed by Major General Anisov. " Copy certified by deputy. "Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the SC Major General Anisov 7 May 1941 g.". Most likely, both Directives left in the first ten days of May.
A similar Directive went to ZAPOV until May 15. This follows from the fact that an extract from the indicated Directive of the General Staff was sent to the commander of the 3 Army from the headquarters of the ZNUMX ZAPOV.
There are recollections of war veterans that with them at the General Staff before sending the Directives to develop cover plans for a long time all issues were worked out. In other words, the representatives of the districts in the General Staff worked out the deployment of their troops and their actions in the initial period of the war, based on the number of German troops at the border up to 180 divisions.
The draft Cover Plans for PribOVO included information on the maximum number of German troops:
Thus, according to the assessment of the headquarters of PribOV it is possible to concentrate German troops up to 48-49 against the troops of the district. By June 22, in the area of responsibility of the PribOVO intelligence, there will actually be 40. Only according to intelligence of the RU and RO headquarters of the district at the border there were only 24. A significant part of this amount is dispersed far enough from the border. About 50% of divisions are not enough up to the maximum number of troops ...
On the entire Soviet-German border November 21.6.41, XNUMX before 180 German divisions 31% connections were still missing. Therefore, the German generals should not have started the war on June 22. But the Soviet command did not assume that the German command required a significantly smaller number of troops to defeat the border group of spacecraft ...
Error in reassessing the capabilities of the spacecraft and the required number of German divisions to attack the USSR was one of the two biggest mistakes that led to the unexpected attack for the leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft.
Second by mistake, which led to the same consequences, were incorrect PM, which came from our intelligence. We will continue to consider this issue further.
Many advanced VO members could be puzzled by the forcing through June 22 of Directive No.3 of Stalin by the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov's urgent departure to KOVO to organize an attack on Lublin. During this period, the chief of the General Staff is fully confident in the Republic of Moldova, which was represented by the General Staff of the Spacecraft until June 22. According to RU, by 21.6.41 the number of German divisions in the Lublin-Krakow region was 35-36. True, in a day the RU will significantly overestimate this grouping, referring to some new RM. According to the author - fictional. The same fictitious information as added to the summary about the SS on the Suvalka ledge. Information that is obtained from rumors and not confirmed within a month. The same information taken from the air about the availability of up to 14 divisions on the border of Slovakia and Hungary ...
So where did the Chief of the General Staff rush off on 22 on June? And the answer is in the famous Note of General M.A. Purkaeva:
The total number of German divisions in the Lublin-Krakow region, according to the Note, before the start of concentration is up to 38. And according to RU at 21.6.41, there were before 36.
In one of the first parts considered a map with the situation on the eve of the war. The map is posted on the site “Memory of the People” and has a note that the date of its creation is 23.6.41. The figures show fragments of the map that correspond to the German group concentrated in the Lublin-Krakow region. In the figures you can see the areas of deployment up to 30 (one of the divisions was obtained by adding up three tank regiments). Infantry divisions in the cities of Radom and Deblin were not taken into account, because these cities belong to the ZAPOVO responsibility zone. Missing 5-6 divisions (up to the number of divisions indicated in the RM) are deployed in depth beyond the borders of the figures. The chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft was to see a similar map with the deployment of German troops on 21 and 22 on June 1941.
The numbers 38 and 36 are close to each other. But the German command should have been brought up before the 33 divisions ... The chief of the General Staff had to decide for himself that the German group had not yet concentrated for a full-scale war, and the speed of the strike by mechanized corps would allow the German divisions to be march to the border one by one!
Did not know at that time G.K. Zhukov, that the German army had already concentrated completely at the border.
Did not know Chief of the General Staff, that the German generals were going to beat parts of the spacecraft with less force than the General Staff thought about it ...
And the last one. An echo of the expected number of German divisions at the beginning of the war, much larger than 120, can be seen in the first RU intelligence report, which began to be prepared after the 20-00 on June 22: “The enemy for 22.6 introduced significant forces into the battle ... of the entire 50-52 division. However, this amounts to only approximately 30% of the enemy’s forces concentrated towards the front ... "
It turns out that the German command concentrated considerable forces towards the border and only about 30% of them were thrown into battle on June 22. And the maximum number of divisions at the border can reach 173 (100% of 52 divisions). It is strange that the number of 173 divisions coincided with the number of divisions indicated in the Note of 18.9.40.
The author will try to dream further, and fantasies do not require proof. How should the 180 German divisions be distributed along our border?
The enemy could concentrate up to 80 divisions (48-49 against PribOVO) against the forces of PribOVO and ZAPOVO.
The 100 of the remaining German divisions focused on KOVO and OdVO. Of these, on the borders with Slovakia and Hungary - up to 10 divisions. In Romania, up to 20-25 divisions, of which on the southern flank of KOVO 15-18. Then in the Lublin-Krakow region there could be 65-70 of the remaining German divisions.
In addition, according to 1940 estimates, non-German divisions (Italian and Hungarian) could be located in Romania before 20-25. Plus Slovak, Hungarian and Romanian troops. That is why the main blow was expected against the KOVO troops. The version that the southern version of the enemy’s main strike was forced through by the people from KOVO or Stalin has nothing to do with this ...
To be continued ...
The following abbreviations will be used in this article: AK - army corps, ap - artillery regiment, IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GU - Headquarters, cd (kbr, kn) - cavalry division (brigade, regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Ro - headquarters intelligence department, RU - Reconnaissance of the General Staff of the spacecraft, td (tbr, mn, tb) - tank division (brigade, regiment, battalion).
Intelligence information of the NKVD of the USSR in the 1940 year
Messages began to appear that the reconnaissance of the border troops had RM more accurate than RM RU. The materials of the series “Unexpected War ...” showed that the intelligence services of NPOs, NKVD and the NKGB (from March 1941) provided RM in the Republic of Uzbekistan (before 7.40 - the 5th Directorate of NPOs) on the armed forces of foreign countries. RU summarized the information provided by the Republic of Moldova, prepared reports, sent them to the leaders of the USSR, NPOs, NKVD and VO (in the part concerning them). In addition to the indicated cycle of the Republic of Moldova, there was an exchange of materials between the headquarters of the HE and the border districts, between the headquarters of the armies and border detachments, etc.
The reconnaissance of the border troops used the same basic methods of obtaining information as the RU: visual observation and collection of information during conversations. One of the sources of information for reconnaissance of border troops was the reconnaissance of border violators.
At the end of 1939, information appeared that under the guise of deserters from the German army, German agents could be sent to us (4.12.39):
According to our data, the Gestapo is preparing the transfer to the territory of the USSR of a group of its agents who graduated from a special intelligence school in Linz ... It is possible that these persons will be abandoned in the USSR under the guise of deserters from the German army who fled due to persecution for revolutionary activity.
Therefore, information from border violators should have been treated with suspicion, because she could be planted by the Germans.
Data on numbering units or on the number of divisions in the published NKVD RM for the 1940 year are not common. Check the reliability of the RM NKVD. 14.7.40 was prepared NKVD Memorandum:
Recently, newly arrived units of the German army are marked:
in the city of Yaroslav (20 km to the north of Przemysl) - the 39-th settlement and the 116-th up;
in the city of Rzeszow (60 km northwest of Peremyshl) - 129 th ...
in the city of Przhevorsk (40 km northwest of Peremyshl) - the 192 th point, the 44 th heavy unit ...
Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Lt. Gen. Maslennikov.
in the city of Yaroslav (20 km to the north of Przemysl) - the 39-th settlement and the 116-th up;
in the city of Rzeszow (60 km northwest of Peremyshl) - 129 th ...
in the city of Przhevorsk (40 km northwest of Peremyshl) - the 192 th point, the 44 th heavy unit ...
Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Lt. Gen. Maslennikov.
39-th PP was part of the 26-th PD, which from May 1940 to May 1941 was in France and Belgium.
116-th up was part of the 5-th, which will arrive in Poland only in September 1940. Therefore, the 116-th AP could not be near our border until the 14.7.40 g. At this time, even in the General Staff of the ground forces could not know that after 6.9.40 a new group of divisions will be sent to the Soviet-German border.
129-th paragraph did not exist and information about it can only be thrown up by misinformation.
The 192-th point (56-th front) has been in Belgium since May 1940. After 6.9.40, he will arrive in the area of the city of Lodz.
The 44 th heavy up in May of the 1940 of the year was part of the 8 th AK. Further, until the spring of 1941, there is no information about him. Suppose that the 44-th up in July 1940 is located in Poland. In this case, the information in the RM is confirmed only by 20%, and 80% of the data on the numbering shelves is misinformation. The same amount of misinformation is contained in license plates in RM RU.
Help GUGB NKVD (6.11.40 g.):
During operations in France, the German command held in East Prussia and former Poland up to 27 front ... [according to RM RU also 27 divisions. - Note auth.]
After the surrender of France, the German command began in early July 1940, the mass transfer of troops from west to east and south-east, with the result that concentrated in East Prussia and former Poland:
until July 16 - until 40 pd and above 2 pt [according to RM RU - 40 pp, to 2 pd, brd, tp and 6 tb. - Note auth.];
on July 23 - up to 50 pd and above 4 pd [according to RM RU - up to 50 pp, two tbp, two tp and 6 tb. - Note auth.];
on August 8 - until 54, and until 6, etc.
After the surrender of France, the German command began in early July 1940, the mass transfer of troops from west to east and south-east, with the result that concentrated in East Prussia and former Poland:
until July 16 - until 40 pd and above 2 pt [according to RM RU - 40 pp, to 2 pd, brd, tp and 6 tb. - Note auth.];
on July 23 - up to 50 pd and above 4 pd [according to RM RU - up to 50 pp, two tbp, two tp and 6 tb. - Note auth.];
on August 8 - until 54, and until 6, etc.
According to RM RU - up to 52 PD, 2 MD, one TD, two TBR, 5 TP and 3 TB. In fact, so on, 2-xs and 5-xs were not. No TB information. Most likely, they did not exist either.
The Help contains information about the troops at the border, which is close to the data of RU. Therefore, the NKVD RM in the second half of the 1940 year did not coincide with the information that was included in the RU reports.
RM about German troops at the beginning of the 1941 year
In the previously considered RM RU and RO ZAPOVO regarding license plate parts contained up to 80% misinformation. Maybe at the beginning of 1941, the amount of misinformation decreased? To answer this question, we analyze the information from the first RU report (in the West) in 1941.
Intelligence No. 1 RU:
“... Changes in the grouping of German troops in East Prussia and in the territory of the former Poland for the period from 15.11.40 to 1.2.41 ... In Velau, the headquarters of 192 front was marked; in Koenigsberg - the headquarters of 4 front; in Suwalki - the headquarters of 12 front ... "
The 192th Front never existed. In the wording there is no annotation that the information needs to be clarified or verified. Therefore, this is verified information or in other language - competent misinformation of the German command.
The 4-th with 15.8.40 is undergoing reorganization into the 14-th etc. in Germany. 14 I will be in Germany until March 1941, and will continue to be celebrated in Hungary. Could not be the 4-th front in Koenigsberg - this is again the misinformation of the German command.
Further, in the Republic of Moldova, the wording “the presence of ... a division (regiment) ... is not confirmed". The intelligence unit monitors the military unit for a certain time, but at some time its presence is not confirmed - it supposedly was relocated.
12-I before 10.3.41, is located in France. It is clear that its headquarters at this time cannot be located on the Soviet-German border far from its units.
“According to the data of the ZapOVO headquarters RO, 10 frontier was relocated to the areas of Ostrow, Rozhan, Govorova ...”
Once upon a time there was 10 I in one area and suddenly moved to another area - a common thing ... Only 10 I with 23.9.40 will remain in Germany until April 1941. In Moldova, information on the presence of four divisions is not true.
“In the Goldap region, 7 TP is celebrated ...” 7-th TP is located since 10.40 in the city of Reims (France), and later in the city of Dijon (France). The 7th TP is part of the 10th TD, which is located in France until the end of the 1940. From January 41, it will be redeployed to Germany, from where it will arrive at the border in June 1941.
“According to RO Zapovo, in December they left southward from the Ostroleka region ... 662 pp, 110 up, kp, 68 SS…”
662-th PP disbanded 8.8.40 g. And therefore could not be in Poland. Only a group of military men with fake badges on shoulder straps could go somewhere.
The 110-th up was part of the AK gain, and it was not possible to find where it was in the indicated period. We will consider that RM on the regiment were confirmed.
In the Wehrmacht at that time, there were only four CPs that were part of the 1 cd. They were in their places of deployment. The presence of a multitude of knots in the Republic of Moldova is a deso. We will talk about cavalry in the part devoted to mobile troops.
68 th TP SS did not exist. There was no 68 SS regiment.
Of the four mentions of the shelves, only the 110 ap.
“From the Warsaw, Rembert region in the south and south-east direction, 48, 57, 67, 68, l 05, 135, 171, 178, 225, 529 and 600 pp, 1, 584 and 660 up; from Pruszkow - 106 pp and from Rozhan 458 pp ... "
The 48th and 57th paragraphs were part of the 12th and 9th sections, respectively, which were in France until March 1941.
The 67th and 68th pp from the 23th pd, which is located in East Prussia. PM can be considered confirmed.
The 105-th settlement from the 72-th front, which is located in France before 1.1.41, and then will be relocated to Romania. Accordingly, the territory of Poland 105-th pp could not get.
The 135-th settlement from the 45-th front, which is located in Belgium until 1.2.41. RM did not confirm.
The 171th, 178th and 529th pp from the 56th, 76th and 299th respectively, which were located in Poland. RM confirmed.
The 225th and 600th pp did not exist.
1-th up was part of the 1-th front, which is located in East Prussia.
584 th up not found. It is only known that in April 1944 of the year there was a spare 584-th up. We believe that intelligence correctly tracked this up.
600-th up did not exist.
106-th PP was part of the 15-th PD, which from August 1940 to June 1941 was located in the city of Dijon (France).
The 458-th PP was part of the 258-th PD, which has been located in Poland since July 1940. RM confirmed.
Of the 16 references to numbering shelves, only eight can be reliable.
“At the end of December, 10 CP arrived in Deblin. In the Sokolow district marked 208 front and in the Radzyn district headquarters 40 front ... "
10-th CP did not exist.
208-I is located in the city of Calais (France) from August 1940 to January 1942 of the year.
40-I PD never existed, but it will be observed by our intelligence in June 1941.
“62 and 552 pp arrived in the Biala Podlaska region ...”
62-th sub-structure of the 7-th front, which until 14.4.41 g. Will be deployed in Northern France.
The 552-th PP along with the 279-th PD will be disbanded in July 1940. Only in December 1941 of the year will it be formed again along with the 329-th front.
“According to the RO of the KOVO headquarters, from Kielce, Krakow went to an unknown destination 3 and 12 etc., ... 221 PD ...”
3-th is located on the territory of Germany from 15.8.40 to 7.4.41, and its parts cannot simply disappear from the territory of Poland somewhere.
12-th is formed in the city of Stettin (distance to the border of 467 km), which since October 1939 of the year has been the territory of Germany. The minimum distance from the cities of Kielce - Krakow to Stettin is 501 km. Parts of the 12 th cannot be located in the indicated area. 12-I will be in Stettin until 15.4.41
221 is on vacation until January 1941. Then it is deployed again in Germany (8-th VO) until March 1941 year.
“From the region of Yaroslav, Przemysl, Przhevorsk, departed: headquarters 2 MD, 8, 29 MP, ... 112 CP, 9 PP, units of 50 and 146 PP ...”
The 2 md from 5.10.40 to 10.1.41 was reorganized into the 12 md and therefore could not decrease anywhere from Southern Poland.
The 8th and 29th MPs were part of the 3th MD, which was located in Germany from 23.9.40 to May 1941.
112-th CP did not exist.
9-th settlement from the 23-th front, which was located on the territory of East Prussia. 9-th pp could not be in southern Poland.
The 50-th point from November 1940 to April 1941 of the year together with the 111-th point will be located in the city of Fallingbostel (Germany).
The formation of the 146 th point will begin only on 11.7.42.
“From the region of Jaslo, Sanok, Krosno, 239 lost with 239, 237 and 372 pp ...”
The personnel of the 239-th front since July 1940 year is on vacation. The deployment of the division will begin in January 1941 in the 8 md (Germany), and 4.4.41 it will appear in Romania. The division included the 327, 372 and 444 points.
239-th PP was part of the 106-th PD, which at that time was located in the city of Wahn (Germany).
237-th pp did not exist. It is possible that servicemen from the 327-th regiment depicted the 237-th regiment, reversing the signs on uniform. Only information on the 372 regiment matched.
“From the Hrubieszów region, Zamoеć, 55 items, 72 and 93 items went down ...”
55-th PP was part of the 17-th PD, which until May 1941 was in France.
72-th and 93-th CP did not exist.
“The availability data did not confirm: 23 PD in the Kholm region; 11 front headquarters in the Jaslo area; 39, 342 PP and 116 up in Yaroslav; 102 pp and 48 up in the Przhevorsk region. ”
Since the summer of the 23, 1940 is located in East Prussia.
11-I until March 1941 year will be in France.
39-th PP from the 26-th Front, which until May 1941 will be in Belgium.
342-th PP (231-th Front) disbanded 31.7.40
116-th up was part of the 5-th, which was in Poland until January 1941. PM are confirmed.
The 102-th PP as part of the 24-th PD will be located in the city of Elda (Germany) from August 1940 to 23.3.41.
48-th up from the 12-th front will be in France until 10.4.41
“Not marked: in Lansut - 302 and 315 pp; in Krakow - the headquarters of the 4 and 7 traffic police; in Lublin - 132 and 353 pp ... "
302-th PP from the 231-th Front, which 31.7.40 was disbanded.
The 315-th PP from the 167-th PD, which is located in France from September 1940 to January 1941. Next, she will be relocated to Bavaria, which will be in May 1941 year.
From October 4 to February 1940 of the 1941 of the year XNUMX is located in Germany. Further, she will be relocated to Bulgaria, in which she will meet the beginning of the war with Yugoslavia.
The 7 I-DSS will not be formed until December 1941.
132-th PP of the 44-th Front This division will remain in France until March 1941.
353-th PP from the 205-th Front, which will be in France until January 1942.
“The arrival of 168 frontier in the Kielce region was recorded as part of 571, 650 and 652 points and, presumably, 529 up. 175 front, deployed in Zamosc, is motorized ... "
The 168-th front included the 417-th, 429-th and 442-th points, as well as the 248-th up. The division has been in Poland since the summer of 1940. It did not include the 571, 650, 652, and 529.
The 571-th subdivision was part of the 302-th pd, which will be formed in Germany (2-th VO) from 12.11.40, and then will go to France.
The 650th and 652th pp of the 372th pd, which was disbanded in July 1940 of the year. 529-th up never existed.
Also, there was no 175 Id. Information on the motorization of a non-existent division can only be misinformation of the German command.
“567 and 590 pp were marked in Tomaszow ...”
567-th PP was part of the 270-th PD, which was disbanded in the summer of 1940. It will be newly formed 21.4.42 g.
590-th PP from the 321-th PD, which was formed in December 1940 of the year in the 9-m VO (Germany). Since January 1941, the division arrived in the city of Boulogne (France).
“Additional mobilization and the formation of new formations ... As a result of this event, the number of divisions of the German army by the spring of 1941 could be brought up to 250-260, 20, and 15 MD ...”
In total, the number of German divisions is 285-295.
In the Republic of Moldova there are 69 references to license plate parts and CP. RM can be considered confirmed only 14. 80% license plate information is German misinformation. The same ratio was found in the Republic of Moldova for July, August and September of 1940. When in four RMs, spaced in time, there is a comparable amount of desa in the license plate parts, then this looks like a pattern ...
Special message NKGB USSR (31.3.41 g.):
The 316th regiment arrived and was stationed in Komarovo ... In the last days of December 1940, the 525th regiment moved from the city of Sandomierz through Ostrovets. 9.3.41, to the village of Koroshchin, Byala-Podlaska Uyezd, the settlement arrived at No. 584. The horse-machine gun team is located in the same village. On the shoulder straps of officers and soldiers of the team there is No. 17
316-th PP is part of the 212-th PD, which will be located on the English Channel until June 1941. 525-th up did not exist.
The 584-th sub-unit (the formation of the regiment began on 15.11.40) was part of the 319-th sub-base, which in December 1940 completed its formation and headed to Normandy. Where it was before the Allied landing operation in the 1944 year.
The marks on the shoulder straps of the machine gun team may correspond to the 17 th point. 17-th PP was part of the 31-th PD, which arrived in Poland since September 1940. If the scouts subsequently concluded that there was an 17-th sub, then the RM in terms of numbering regiments were confirmed at 25%. In this case, the amount of misinformation was 75%.
The figure shows a graph of the concentration of German divisions at the Soviet-German border. The decrease in the number of German troops in the figure is due to the movement of divisions to the Balkans and to the territory of Romania.
The main mistake of the General Staff of the spacecraft?
It was previously shown that in the Republic of Moldova the total number of divisions in the German armed forces was constantly overstated. It was shown above that the NKVD information on German troops coincided with the RU data.
Based on intelligence estimates of availability 243 divisions, in the Note of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the chief of the General Staff of the SC (18.9.40 g.) it was determined that "to 173 divisions ... will be directed against our borders". In the options considered by the General Staff for the outbreak of war with Germany, the number of German divisions is estimated by the number 160 ... 180 ... 188. At the same time, the presence of a German group on the territory of Romania, which at that time did not exist, was not taken into account. The note was submitted by I.V. Stalin and 5.10.40 received instructions to clarify it. An updated Note was prepared in October 1940 of the year:
«
I am reporting for your approval the main conclusions from your instructions given on October 5 of 1940 when considering plans for the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces for the 1941 year ... "
It is possible that on the basis of the updated Note by the People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff at HE headquarters, documents were prepared on the deployment of districts in case of war. For example, a note on the deployment plan for the 1940 year is being prepared at KOVO. The exact date for preparing this document is unknown. Let's try to clarify the time of its compilation.
The Note by the Chief of Staff of the KOVO states: “group gene. Blaskovitsa (most of it is already in Romania); group gene. Reichenau (on the border with Yugoslavia)».
In RM RU from 30.10.40, it is said:
As of 29.10, it has been transferred: to Romania - except for the training division - 3 pd, td, md ... Arrival of troops continues ...
The previously established army groups of Colonel General Blaskowitz ... and Field Marshal Reichenau ... carry out the advancement in the south-east direction and, as you can judge, are focusing: the army group Blaskowitz - in Romania ... and the army group Reichenau - on the Yugoslav border ...
The previously established army groups of Colonel General Blaskowitz ... and Field Marshal Reichenau ... carry out the advancement in the south-east direction and, as you can judge, are focusing: the army group Blaskowitz - in Romania ... and the army group Reichenau - on the Yugoslav border ...
In the RU report (9.11.40 g.) It is noted:
According to new reports ... the army of Colonel General Blaskowitz ... finished my concentration in Romania ... in the latter by now 15-17 divisions ... "
It turns out that most of the group of General Blaskowitz was transferred to Romania in early November 1940. Consequently, the Note was prepared at the same time. In a note by General M.A. Purkayev the total number of German troops is estimated by the number over 250 divisionsof which against the USSR can be put up to 166. In the considered variants of the initial period of the war, the maximum number of German divisions put up against the USSR (including the territory of Romania) can be 178 ... 190.
The discrepancy between the maximum number of German divisions and divisions concentrated for war with the USSR, in the Notes of the General Staff and the headquarters of the KOVO can be explained:
- or clarification of the German group when discussing the document with Stalin;
- or the development of the Notes was carried out independently of each other (the most likely option).
It can be seen from the documents presented that the leadership of the KA and the KOVO Military Council are trying to estimate the number of German troops deployed against the USSR and the KOVO, and they are also trying to predict the options for starting military operations. The number of German divisions put up in the initial period of the war against the USSR is estimated by a number of at least 166 ... 173.
At the end of December 1940, in Moscow, a meeting of the highest command staff of the spacecraft is held. Many different reports explaining how German generals fought. The speakers explain many points in sufficient detail. The people reading these materials should have a question: why did all the senior commandos forget everything that was said at the meeting before 22.6.41? Or is it easier to use the version voiced by many top-ranking military officers that Stalin alone is to blame? And how many German troops were in the scenarios of the war games that took place in early January 1941 after the end of the meeting?
There were almost as many of them as were considered in the Note from 18.9.40 to 173 German divisions, and about 120 were concentrated near our border by June 22. In a variant of one of the games, the number was also used. 180 German divisions:
The documents of the first game indicated that the North-Eastern and Eastern fronts of the "Western" (up to 60 front), operating north of Deblin to the Baltic Sea, launched an offensive "in the interests of the main operation", carried out south of Brest, where they are deployed the main forces of the "West" - up to 120 front, and together with their allies - up to 160 infantry divisions ...
14.2.41, in RM RU it is said about an increase in the number of German divisions: “[By] according to the Yugoslav General Staff, Germany now has 250 divisions ... "
11.3.41, the number of divisions is again increasing in RM RU “1.3.41 Germany has 263 divisions”. According to intelligence, compared with September 1940, the size of the German army increased by 20 divisions.
The Plan of the General Staff of the Spacecraft on the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East (11.03.41) refers to the close number of divisions in Germany "to 260". The Plan further states that “to 200 divisions ... will be directed against our borders... »
Everything is logical: the Germans have increased the number of divisions and, therefore, Germany can send more divisions to war with a strong spacecraft. It only bothers that the plans of the General Staff are somewhat behind the data of the RU. In the latest RMs, it is called "263 divisions", and in the General Staff they operate with older information about 260 divisions.
Don't you find that the number of 200 is significantly different from the number of 120 divisions concentrated at the border by 22.6.41? Do you think that by June 1941, the General Staffists had suddenly seen their light and realized that the Germans would attack, having only about 120 divisions?
In the fall of 1940, the general staff assesses the number of German divisions for the war with the USSR 173. In January 1941, games are held with the 173-180 spacecraft opposed to German divisions. In the same period, intelligence reports on the increase in the size of the German army, and, consequently, the number of troops allocated for the war with the Soviet Union should increase. In the document of the General Staff from 11.3.41 this number is increased to 200 divisions. The next step should be to take this mass of troops into account when developing Cover Plans ...
The Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft to the commander of the Western Command, Colonel-General D.G. Pavlov. There is no exact date for this Directive, but the approximate time for its preparation is indicated - April 1941 of the year. April is later than 11 of March ... What does the Directive say?
Order to proceed to develop a plan operational deployment of ZAPOVO armies, guided by the following guidelines ... In the event of a war with us, Germany, of its 225 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, will be able to direct against our borders to 200 divisions...
Even a month later, the material stated in the General Staff Plan of the 11.3.41 is quoted verbatim. When developing the Plans, one should be guided by the direction against the USSR to the 200 divisions! And why do literary men tell us that all our military men know that 120 German divisions are enough? Perhaps later in the General Staff the number of 120 German divisions treasured for a number of writers will be enlightened and called?
We look at a well-known document - a draft Note by the USSR people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft, which was compiled after May 15.
And after 65 days, when developing a new document on the deployment of troops in the General Staff, the number of German divisions allocated for an attack on the USSR is used: significantly more than 120! The number of divisions was reduced to 180, but in the original version it was 189 divisions. And now question: what group of German troops in the initial period of the war should the forces of PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO and OdVO have to resist? Of course, 180 to German divisions, which are considered at the General Staff after 15 on May 1941 of the year! And regarding this number of German troops, plans must be developed for covering these VOs!
Directives from the General Staff on the development of new “Cover Plans ...” KOVO and OdVO were obliged to take into account this vision of the General Staff, as These Directives were prepared in early May. Both Directives have the same mark: "Done in 2 copies. No. 1 - KOVO [or OdVO. - Note ed.], No. 2 - into the case of the Oper of the General Staff. Performed and printed by Major General Anisov. " Copy certified by deputy. "Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the SC Major General Anisov 7 May 1941 g.". Most likely, both Directives left in the first ten days of May.
A similar Directive went to ZAPOV until May 15. This follows from the fact that an extract from the indicated Directive of the General Staff was sent to the commander of the 3 Army from the headquarters of the ZNUMX ZAPOV.
There are recollections of war veterans that with them at the General Staff before sending the Directives to develop cover plans for a long time all issues were worked out. In other words, the representatives of the districts in the General Staff worked out the deployment of their troops and their actions in the initial period of the war, based on the number of German troops at the border up to 180 divisions.
The draft Cover Plans for PribOVO included information on the maximum number of German troops:
The railway network ... already on the 12 day of mobilization provides concentration to 40 reinforced detachments, and the developed network of dirt roads and the presence of a motorway allow the transfer of motorized and mechanized troops, the number of which against Pribovo can be determined up to 6 TD and 2-3 MD ...
Thus, according to the assessment of the headquarters of PribOV it is possible to concentrate German troops up to 48-49 against the troops of the district. By June 22, in the area of responsibility of the PribOVO intelligence, there will actually be 40. Only according to intelligence of the RU and RO headquarters of the district at the border there were only 24. A significant part of this amount is dispersed far enough from the border. About 50% of divisions are not enough up to the maximum number of troops ...
On the entire Soviet-German border November 21.6.41, XNUMX before 180 German divisions 31% connections were still missing. Therefore, the German generals should not have started the war on June 22. But the Soviet command did not assume that the German command required a significantly smaller number of troops to defeat the border group of spacecraft ...
Error in reassessing the capabilities of the spacecraft and the required number of German divisions to attack the USSR was one of the two biggest mistakes that led to the unexpected attack for the leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft.
Second by mistake, which led to the same consequences, were incorrect PM, which came from our intelligence. We will continue to consider this issue further.
Many advanced VO members could be puzzled by the forcing through June 22 of Directive No.3 of Stalin by the people's commissar of defense and the chief of the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov's urgent departure to KOVO to organize an attack on Lublin. During this period, the chief of the General Staff is fully confident in the Republic of Moldova, which was represented by the General Staff of the Spacecraft until June 22. According to RU, by 21.6.41 the number of German divisions in the Lublin-Krakow region was 35-36. True, in a day the RU will significantly overestimate this grouping, referring to some new RM. According to the author - fictional. The same fictitious information as added to the summary about the SS on the Suvalka ledge. Information that is obtained from rumors and not confirmed within a month. The same information taken from the air about the availability of up to 14 divisions on the border of Slovakia and Hungary ...
So where did the Chief of the General Staff rush off on 22 on June? And the answer is in the famous Note of General M.A. Purkaeva:
Deployment Dates.
1. Lublin grouping: a) in the border strip at a distance of up to 250 km are deployed - 10 pd, 2 td, 2 md ...; b) the capacity of the trains leading to the Vistula River - 72 pairs, taking into account the optional 48 – 60 pairs, i.e. One division can be transported per day. You need to give 15 – 18 divisions a ride. Conclusion: the grouping in the Lublin district can be completed by 15-18 day from its beginning ...
2. The Krakow group: a) in the border strip at a distance of 250 km, the following are deployed: infantry and mountain divisions up to 20, tank 2, motorized 2; b) the throughput of the railway to the line of the Vistula river is 126 pairs, taking into account the optional rate up to 100 pairs, i.e. makes it possible to drive up to 2 divisions daily. Tank and motor divisions from the Katowice meridian can follow along the ground. It is necessary to give a ride 10 – 15 front. Conclusion: focusing grouping is required 5 – 7 days.
1. Lublin grouping: a) in the border strip at a distance of up to 250 km are deployed - 10 pd, 2 td, 2 md ...; b) the capacity of the trains leading to the Vistula River - 72 pairs, taking into account the optional 48 – 60 pairs, i.e. One division can be transported per day. You need to give 15 – 18 divisions a ride. Conclusion: the grouping in the Lublin district can be completed by 15-18 day from its beginning ...
2. The Krakow group: a) in the border strip at a distance of 250 km, the following are deployed: infantry and mountain divisions up to 20, tank 2, motorized 2; b) the throughput of the railway to the line of the Vistula river is 126 pairs, taking into account the optional rate up to 100 pairs, i.e. makes it possible to drive up to 2 divisions daily. Tank and motor divisions from the Katowice meridian can follow along the ground. It is necessary to give a ride 10 – 15 front. Conclusion: focusing grouping is required 5 – 7 days.
The total number of German divisions in the Lublin-Krakow region, according to the Note, before the start of concentration is up to 38. And according to RU at 21.6.41, there were before 36.
In one of the first parts considered a map with the situation on the eve of the war. The map is posted on the site “Memory of the People” and has a note that the date of its creation is 23.6.41. The figures show fragments of the map that correspond to the German group concentrated in the Lublin-Krakow region. In the figures you can see the areas of deployment up to 30 (one of the divisions was obtained by adding up three tank regiments). Infantry divisions in the cities of Radom and Deblin were not taken into account, because these cities belong to the ZAPOVO responsibility zone. Missing 5-6 divisions (up to the number of divisions indicated in the RM) are deployed in depth beyond the borders of the figures. The chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft was to see a similar map with the deployment of German troops on 21 and 22 on June 1941.
The numbers 38 and 36 are close to each other. But the German command should have been brought up before the 33 divisions ... The chief of the General Staff had to decide for himself that the German group had not yet concentrated for a full-scale war, and the speed of the strike by mechanized corps would allow the German divisions to be march to the border one by one!
Did not know at that time G.K. Zhukov, that the German army had already concentrated completely at the border.
Did not know Chief of the General Staff, that the German generals were going to beat parts of the spacecraft with less force than the General Staff thought about it ...
And the last one. An echo of the expected number of German divisions at the beginning of the war, much larger than 120, can be seen in the first RU intelligence report, which began to be prepared after the 20-00 on June 22: “The enemy for 22.6 introduced significant forces into the battle ... of the entire 50-52 division. However, this amounts to only approximately 30% of the enemy’s forces concentrated towards the front ... "
It turns out that the German command concentrated considerable forces towards the border and only about 30% of them were thrown into battle on June 22. And the maximum number of divisions at the border can reach 173 (100% of 52 divisions). It is strange that the number of 173 divisions coincided with the number of divisions indicated in the Note of 18.9.40.
The author will try to dream further, and fantasies do not require proof. How should the 180 German divisions be distributed along our border?
The enemy could concentrate up to 80 divisions (48-49 against PribOVO) against the forces of PribOVO and ZAPOVO.
The 100 of the remaining German divisions focused on KOVO and OdVO. Of these, on the borders with Slovakia and Hungary - up to 10 divisions. In Romania, up to 20-25 divisions, of which on the southern flank of KOVO 15-18. Then in the Lublin-Krakow region there could be 65-70 of the remaining German divisions.
In addition, according to 1940 estimates, non-German divisions (Italian and Hungarian) could be located in Romania before 20-25. Plus Slovak, Hungarian and Romanian troops. That is why the main blow was expected against the KOVO troops. The version that the southern version of the enemy’s main strike was forced through by the people from KOVO or Stalin has nothing to do with this ...
To be continued ...
Information