Why the Americans did not dare to attack the USSR?
In discussing the issues of the strategy of nuclear weapons from time to time, the thesis that the United States did not dare to attack the USSR and unleash an unlimited nuclear war only because the USSR had its own nuclear weapons and could strike its blow, because nuclear weapons restrained the likely American aggression, skips. This thesis is often formulated as a kind of truth that does not require proof. Anyway, any work and publications where the topic of nuclear deterrence develops is simply not to be counted.
I believe that this thesis is not only erroneous, but also based on the "granite foundation" of a clearly insufficient knowledge of military stories after the end of the second world war. The advocates of this thesis on nuclear deterrence completely ignore the key circumstances that completely change the whole essence of the matter.
We need to start with the fact that the Soviet command, which at the beginning of the 1960s developed the theory of conducting war with the use of nuclear weapons, did not at all assign it to an absolutely decisive role and did not intend to revise the basic concepts of military affairs.
Nuclear weapons were supposed to be used in the framework of the actions of all the armed forces strictly coordinated with each other in the form of a strategic operation. Or more specifically:
Moreover, since nuclear strikes could not achieve complete destruction of the enemy, it was supposed to finish it off:
The complete defeat of the enemy was to be achieved by tactical nuclear strikes, followed by the actions of fully mechanized and highly mobile combined arms or units. The likelihood of an adversary’s tactical nuclear strike made it necessary to abandon concentration of forces, to disperse along the front and in depth. The actions of the dispersed forces were determined by the application of tactical nuclear strikes, which suppressed and partially destroyed the enemy defenses, and the combined-arms formations had to immediately direct their strikes to areas already hit by a nuclear strike, quickly pass the nuclear explosion zone and rush further into the depth of enemy construction.
Describing nuclear strikes, the Soviet command emphasized the possibility of maneuvering fire, that is, rapid concentration of nuclear strikes on important targets, transfer and dispersal if necessary. The use of terminology that came from artillery, as well as the general nature of the use of nuclear weapons in war, clearly indicate that the Soviet command perceived nuclear missile weapons as a kind of artillery, only very powerful and especially long-range. All types of nuclear missiles made it possible to carry out a very fast (Marshal of the Soviet Union VD Sokolovsky wrote about 30 minutes of a nuclear strike) and large-scale artillery preparation of a strategic offensive, from the defeat of the advanced forces of the enemy to the destruction of military facilities in its rear. there is the entire strategic depth. Nuclear artillery preparation shocked and weakened the enemy, opening up the possibility for mechanized formations of a rapid leap, maneuver and the rapid achievement of the complete defeat of the enemy forces.
These views were formulated in the early 1960s, and were not abandoned until the early 1990s, when the idea of "nuclear deterrence" appeared in the official military strategy. Soviet doctrine put a combination of nuclear artillery preparation with powerful tank offensive.
The proliferation of "nuclear deterrence" was greatly contributed by the fact that we still lack the post-war history of the Soviet army. What was the army, what was its structure, what were its strategic and operational plans, what were they preparing for and how were they going to crush the enemy. Military historians readily write the history of wars, and the Soviet army did not participate in a large-scale war after World War II, so there seems to be nothing to write about (all sorts of local conflicts and regional wars are, of course, investigated, although not all). Here from this inattention and erroneous conclusions follow.
The Soviet army had a tool that radically changed the strategic situation in its favor. It was the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG). At the beginning of the 1980-s there were 429 thousands of personnel, 3600 guns and mortars 7900 tanks, 831 aircraft and 261 helicopters. GSVG was the largest group of troops, fully mechanized and motorized, equipped with the latest technology and weapons, maintaining constant combat readiness.
Just a few days ago, my book "The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: 50 Years on the Verge of Nuclear War", which I prepared at the urgent request of the GSVG veterans, was published. In it, I set myself the task of finding out what role this group of troops played and why we should remember it. Even superficial research (due to the limited time available for work) showed its closest connection with plans for nuclear war and the conduct of strategic offensive operations. All what the Soviet marshals wrote about the strategy of nuclear war, first of all, it was the GSVG that had to perform.
She had to fight in conditions of abundant use of nuclear weapons, which in Europe was concentrated unimaginably many. NATO had about 6 thousands of operational-tactical nuclear warheads (along with nuclear projectiles) and 4,5 thousands of warheads on strategic carriers deployed in Europe and the adjacent seas. The Soviet nuclear arsenal in Europe is not exactly known, but there is evidence that there were 1,3 thousands of tactical missile nuclear warheads and about 2 thousands of other types of nuclear weapons (including nuclear projectiles). According to my estimations, both sides could have made about 4 thousands of nuclear explosions during the war on the territory of Germany (11% of the country’s territory would fall into the zone of severe destruction). More than half of the forces on both sides would probably be destroyed during the first wave of nuclear exchanges.
But then this factor came into play. The Soviet troops, as is known, were equipped with armored vehicles with anti-nuclear protection (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery systems), very resistant to a nuclear explosion. The tank can withstand an 30 CT blast at a distance of approximately 800 meters without loss of combat capability, the BMP is about 1500 meters. What was the need for anti-nuclear protection of armored vehicles? Not only and not so much in order to survive the enemy's nuclear strike, especially since the probability of hitting a tank battalion deployed in dispersed order is very small. Even a successful hit of a tactical charge against an upcoming tank battalion will result in the failure of about half of its tanks.
The main thing was different: the anti-nuclear defense allowed the mechanized units and formations to advance behind the nuclear firing shaft. That is, a nuclear projectile or tactical missile strikes at the enemy, while the advanced tank units are located about a kilometer from the point of impact. After passing the shock wave, they tear forward, under the "nuclear fungus", where the enemy is destroyed, demoralized and shocked. The tanks pass through the zone of a nuclear explosion, behind them are infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled guns, finishing off everything that caught my eye, and developing an offensive further, deep into enemy territory. All this is done very quickly, within literally 30-40 minutes or less.
The most interesting thing is that this method of conducting the offensive was recognized even in the open press:
Given the fact that self-propelled guns could shoot nuclear shells, this gave the tank formations tremendous power. Say, in the 10th Guards Tank Division there were 36 self-propelled guns 2S3 "Acacia". If in each of them there was one 3BV3 projectile with a capacity of 2,5 kt, then the division would have 36 shells with a total capacity of 90 kt. Hence the conclusion that even without the support of missile and aviation, in this spirit of the offensive under the "nuclear fungus", the 10th Guards Tank Division was quite able to break its way and reach the English Channel.
That is why they did not decide that they did not have adequate means of counteracting the GSVG tank forces in conditions of an unimaginably cruel nuclear massacre. What did it lead to?
The American strategy of warfare also provided for support for the advance of ground troops with nuclear strikes, and for this purpose in Western Europe, the United States and NATO held their large force grouping. But it took a disadvantageous position, since the Atlantic Ocean was behind it, and the strategic depth of the theater was small, about 400-500 km, depending on the direction. Soviet tank break pressed them to the sea.
Delivery of reinforcements from the United States required time for sea transportation and the restoration of European ports after nuclear strikes to unload troops, equipment and cargo. The USSR had the advantage in transporting reinforcements, since it was easier and less time-consuming to restore temporary crossings instead of destroyed bridges, to restore the railways to a minimum. The Soviet army could quickly replenish battered parts and increase the force of strikes than NATO.
The American command carefully analyzed all this and came to the conclusion that in the event of war, Soviet troops could capture all of Western Europe, right up to Gibraltar. In this case, the nuclear war ended in a stalemate. The communists could not finally dump the capitalists because they could not transfer their troops across the Atlantic, but the capitalists were also deprived of the opportunity to finish off and dump the communists weakened by a massive nuclear strike, because their European group was defeated and NATO was deprived of the most important strategic bridgehead on the continent.
That's all. Starting a global nuclear war, which in the prevailing conditions almost inevitably ended in a stalemate, was obviously meaningless for the American command and political leadership. Huge sacrifices, destruction and damage ... so what? Because the option of war was rejected, the Americans began to look for a solution to the problem in the sphere of psychological war and found it.
Hence the conclusion: the thesis of “nuclear deterrence” and its miraculous nature is based essentially on a strong underestimation, even ignoring the real military history of the Cold War, that is, this thesis is incorrect from the actual point of view.
American scheme to judge the planned scope of a nuclear war in Europe. This is an early version, when tactical nuclear weapons were still a bit
I believe that this thesis is not only erroneous, but also based on the "granite foundation" of a clearly insufficient knowledge of military stories after the end of the second world war. The advocates of this thesis on nuclear deterrence completely ignore the key circumstances that completely change the whole essence of the matter.
Nuclear strike - a type of artillery preparation
We need to start with the fact that the Soviet command, which at the beginning of the 1960s developed the theory of conducting war with the use of nuclear weapons, did not at all assign it to an absolutely decisive role and did not intend to revise the basic concepts of military affairs.
Nuclear weapons were supposed to be used in the framework of the actions of all the armed forces strictly coordinated with each other in the form of a strategic operation. Or more specifically:
"The strategic operation of a nuclear war included actions by the types of the Armed Forces conducted according to a single plan, plan and under one strategic leadership. The nuclear operations of the Strategic Missile Forces were the main content of the operation." (Military strategy, 1963, p. 95).
Moreover, since nuclear strikes could not achieve complete destruction of the enemy, it was supposed to finish it off:
"For the final defeat of the surviving enemy groups, it was planned to conduct offensive operations of the fronts, airborne operations, and in some areas - operations of the country's fleets and frontline formations of the country's air defense forces" (Military, strategy, 1963, p. 95).
The complete defeat of the enemy was to be achieved by tactical nuclear strikes, followed by the actions of fully mechanized and highly mobile combined arms or units. The likelihood of an adversary’s tactical nuclear strike made it necessary to abandon concentration of forces, to disperse along the front and in depth. The actions of the dispersed forces were determined by the application of tactical nuclear strikes, which suppressed and partially destroyed the enemy defenses, and the combined-arms formations had to immediately direct their strikes to areas already hit by a nuclear strike, quickly pass the nuclear explosion zone and rush further into the depth of enemy construction.
Describing nuclear strikes, the Soviet command emphasized the possibility of maneuvering fire, that is, rapid concentration of nuclear strikes on important targets, transfer and dispersal if necessary. The use of terminology that came from artillery, as well as the general nature of the use of nuclear weapons in war, clearly indicate that the Soviet command perceived nuclear missile weapons as a kind of artillery, only very powerful and especially long-range. All types of nuclear missiles made it possible to carry out a very fast (Marshal of the Soviet Union VD Sokolovsky wrote about 30 minutes of a nuclear strike) and large-scale artillery preparation of a strategic offensive, from the defeat of the advanced forces of the enemy to the destruction of military facilities in its rear. there is the entire strategic depth. Nuclear artillery preparation shocked and weakened the enemy, opening up the possibility for mechanized formations of a rapid leap, maneuver and the rapid achievement of the complete defeat of the enemy forces.
These views were formulated in the early 1960s, and were not abandoned until the early 1990s, when the idea of "nuclear deterrence" appeared in the official military strategy. Soviet doctrine put a combination of nuclear artillery preparation with powerful tank offensive.
Offensive under the "nuclear fungus"
The proliferation of "nuclear deterrence" was greatly contributed by the fact that we still lack the post-war history of the Soviet army. What was the army, what was its structure, what were its strategic and operational plans, what were they preparing for and how were they going to crush the enemy. Military historians readily write the history of wars, and the Soviet army did not participate in a large-scale war after World War II, so there seems to be nothing to write about (all sorts of local conflicts and regional wars are, of course, investigated, although not all). Here from this inattention and erroneous conclusions follow.
The Soviet army had a tool that radically changed the strategic situation in its favor. It was the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG). At the beginning of the 1980-s there were 429 thousands of personnel, 3600 guns and mortars 7900 tanks, 831 aircraft and 261 helicopters. GSVG was the largest group of troops, fully mechanized and motorized, equipped with the latest technology and weapons, maintaining constant combat readiness.
Just a few days ago, my book "The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: 50 Years on the Verge of Nuclear War", which I prepared at the urgent request of the GSVG veterans, was published. In it, I set myself the task of finding out what role this group of troops played and why we should remember it. Even superficial research (due to the limited time available for work) showed its closest connection with plans for nuclear war and the conduct of strategic offensive operations. All what the Soviet marshals wrote about the strategy of nuclear war, first of all, it was the GSVG that had to perform.
She had to fight in conditions of abundant use of nuclear weapons, which in Europe was concentrated unimaginably many. NATO had about 6 thousands of operational-tactical nuclear warheads (along with nuclear projectiles) and 4,5 thousands of warheads on strategic carriers deployed in Europe and the adjacent seas. The Soviet nuclear arsenal in Europe is not exactly known, but there is evidence that there were 1,3 thousands of tactical missile nuclear warheads and about 2 thousands of other types of nuclear weapons (including nuclear projectiles). According to my estimations, both sides could have made about 4 thousands of nuclear explosions during the war on the territory of Germany (11% of the country’s territory would fall into the zone of severe destruction). More than half of the forces on both sides would probably be destroyed during the first wave of nuclear exchanges.
But then this factor came into play. The Soviet troops, as is known, were equipped with armored vehicles with anti-nuclear protection (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery systems), very resistant to a nuclear explosion. The tank can withstand an 30 CT blast at a distance of approximately 800 meters without loss of combat capability, the BMP is about 1500 meters. What was the need for anti-nuclear protection of armored vehicles? Not only and not so much in order to survive the enemy's nuclear strike, especially since the probability of hitting a tank battalion deployed in dispersed order is very small. Even a successful hit of a tactical charge against an upcoming tank battalion will result in the failure of about half of its tanks.
It is difficult to find a good photograph of a tank unit deployed for the offensive. This photo from the exercises in the DPR gives some idea of what a tank attack is in dispersed orders.
The main thing was different: the anti-nuclear defense allowed the mechanized units and formations to advance behind the nuclear firing shaft. That is, a nuclear projectile or tactical missile strikes at the enemy, while the advanced tank units are located about a kilometer from the point of impact. After passing the shock wave, they tear forward, under the "nuclear fungus", where the enemy is destroyed, demoralized and shocked. The tanks pass through the zone of a nuclear explosion, behind them are infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled guns, finishing off everything that caught my eye, and developing an offensive further, deep into enemy territory. All this is done very quickly, within literally 30-40 minutes or less.
Nuclear blitzkrieg - a sight not for the faint of heart
The most interesting thing is that this method of conducting the offensive was recognized even in the open press:
"Only tanks, following nuclear strikes, can rapidly attack the enemy, destroy its remaining forces and means, overcome radioactive contamination zones and the resulting debris and quickly reach the opposite side of the area of nuclear explosions. ("Tanks and Tank Forces", 1980, p. 225)
Given the fact that self-propelled guns could shoot nuclear shells, this gave the tank formations tremendous power. Say, in the 10th Guards Tank Division there were 36 self-propelled guns 2S3 "Acacia". If in each of them there was one 3BV3 projectile with a capacity of 2,5 kt, then the division would have 36 shells with a total capacity of 90 kt. Hence the conclusion that even without the support of missile and aviation, in this spirit of the offensive under the "nuclear fungus", the 10th Guards Tank Division was quite able to break its way and reach the English Channel.
Why the Americans did not dare to fight?
That is why they did not decide that they did not have adequate means of counteracting the GSVG tank forces in conditions of an unimaginably cruel nuclear massacre. What did it lead to?
The American strategy of warfare also provided for support for the advance of ground troops with nuclear strikes, and for this purpose in Western Europe, the United States and NATO held their large force grouping. But it took a disadvantageous position, since the Atlantic Ocean was behind it, and the strategic depth of the theater was small, about 400-500 km, depending on the direction. Soviet tank break pressed them to the sea.
Delivery of reinforcements from the United States required time for sea transportation and the restoration of European ports after nuclear strikes to unload troops, equipment and cargo. The USSR had the advantage in transporting reinforcements, since it was easier and less time-consuming to restore temporary crossings instead of destroyed bridges, to restore the railways to a minimum. The Soviet army could quickly replenish battered parts and increase the force of strikes than NATO.
The American command carefully analyzed all this and came to the conclusion that in the event of war, Soviet troops could capture all of Western Europe, right up to Gibraltar. In this case, the nuclear war ended in a stalemate. The communists could not finally dump the capitalists because they could not transfer their troops across the Atlantic, but the capitalists were also deprived of the opportunity to finish off and dump the communists weakened by a massive nuclear strike, because their European group was defeated and NATO was deprived of the most important strategic bridgehead on the continent.
That's all. Starting a global nuclear war, which in the prevailing conditions almost inevitably ended in a stalemate, was obviously meaningless for the American command and political leadership. Huge sacrifices, destruction and damage ... so what? Because the option of war was rejected, the Americans began to look for a solution to the problem in the sphere of psychological war and found it.
Hence the conclusion: the thesis of “nuclear deterrence” and its miraculous nature is based essentially on a strong underestimation, even ignoring the real military history of the Cold War, that is, this thesis is incorrect from the actual point of view.
Information