Death Valley. The story of the death of the 18 Infantry Division during the Soviet-Finnish (Winter) War

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70 years ago, 30 November 1939, the Soviet-Finnish (winter), "not famous" war began. 105 days were fierce and stubborn battles that brought a lot of grief to the Soviet people and the Finns. Unfortunately, in Russia only a few media outlets briefly reported this sad date. And from our leadership there was no reaction at all. Probably, the indication of the May meeting of 1940 of the year at the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), at which the analysis of the hostilities took place, is not recommended to be remembered about this war, is still in effect. In Finland, the opposite is true. In Helsinki, mourning events were held at the monument to Marshal Karl Mannerheim and at the military cemetery in Hietaniemi. In addition, a memorial service was held in the Cathedral of the Finnish capital, in which President Tarja Halonen and her spouse took part.

We want to address our material to anyone interested. history fatherland, who cherish the concept of honor, valor, heroism of the Russian warrior. And we will tell about the little-known fact of the death of the 18 th rifle division in the infamous "Death Valley" near the Karelian town of Pitkäranta. These people had a terrible fate.

Death Valley. The story of the death of the 18 Infantry Division during the Soviet-Finnish (Winter) War


THE SMELL OF WAR

From the beginning of November, the division was already preparing for war. The mood of the fighters was elevated, and no one doubted a quick victory. The roads from Petrozavodsk and Lodeynoye Fields were blocked by troops. But 7 on November, when everyone was listening to the speech of the People's Commissar Voroshilov before the troops, not a word was said about relations with Finland. The commanders began to draw bold conclusions: the diplomats agreed, the Finns agreed with our sensible demands, seeing the power that was rushing to their borders. And on November 12 Voroshilov ordered to bring the troops of the Leningrad Military District to combat readiness and to be ready for anything by November 17. On November 20, the division was visited by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee Zhdanov and the Commander of the Leningrad Military District Meretskov. They were met by the commander of the Division Cherepanov and the regimental commissar Razumov. Guests were taken to the demonstrative 316-th regiment, commanded by Colonel Kondrashov. There they were shown excellent training of snipers, they were told that winters are not afraid and they train to sleep in huts without stoves and heating. The mood of the fighters in combat - to teach a damned Finnish pug-dog. Guests are satisfied. Zhdanov announced that the division was fully operational, and ordered the creation of an 15-day supply of food, ammunition and fodder. 28 on November, the whole division began to seethe: Minil fired at our guns, there are dead and wounded. It is broadcast on radio that rallies are going on all over the country and the Soviet people declare that the White Finnish adventurers will be punished for the blood of our comrades. In the evening, by secretary of the Military Council of the Leningrad Military District Zhdanov, the secretary of the regional committee of the Karelian party Kupriyanov and a representative of the 8 Army headquarters, which included a division, arrived from Petrozavodsk. An order was read out by the 8 Army for the appointment of Cherepanov as commander of the 56 Corps, and the commander of the 18 Division was Colonel Kondrashov with the assignment of an extraordinary military commander status.

TOMORROW WILL BE A WAR

In the evening of 29, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the division, at which an order was read to the troops of the Leningrad Military District.

"ORDER TO TROOPS OF THE LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT"

November 29 1939 city

The patience of the Soviet people and the Red Army came to an end. It is time to teach the overblown and impudent political gamblers, who have defied the Soviet people, and completely destroy the center of anti-Soviet provocations and threats to Leningrad!

Comrades, Red Army men, commanders, commissioners and political workers!

Fulfilling the sacred will of the Soviet Government and our Great Folk, I order:
The troops of the Leningrad Military District will cross the border, crush the Finnish troops and once and for all ensure the security of the north-western borders of the Soviet Union and the city of Lenin, the cradle of the proletarian revolution.

We are not going to Finland as conquerors, but as friends and liberators of the Finnish people from the oppression of landlords and capitalists.

We are not going against the Finnish people, but against the government of Cayander-Erkno, which oppresses the Finnish people and provoked a war with the USSR.

We respect the freedom and independence of Finland obtained by the Finnish people as a result of the October Revolution and the victory of the Soviet Power.

Together with the Finnish people, the Russian Bolsheviks, led by Lenin and Stalin, fought for this independence.

For the security of the north-western borders of the USSR and the glorious city of Lenin!

For our beloved homeland! For the Great Stalin!

Forward, the sons of the Soviet people, the soldiers of the Red Army, to the complete destruction of the enemy.

The commander of the LenVO troops Comrade. Meretskov K.A.
Member of the Military Council Comrade. Zhdanov A.A. ”


Then the division's task was set:

1. Take over the border village of Käsniaselka. Further, adhering to the main road leading south to Pitkäranta-Sortavala, the offensive line is up to 8 kilometers.

2. Master the villages of Wauma, Lavayarvi, Mitro, South Lemetti, Coyrinoya.

3. Go to the direction of Impilahti-Lässel-Sortavala and immediately seize the city of Sortavala.

4. At the final stage it goes to the rear of the Finnish troops and connects with our troops, leading the battles on the Karelian Isthmus.

After the meeting, it was reported that Molotov had spoken on the radio and reported the break in relations with Finland. So began the Soviet-Finnish war.

WAR

The war began on November 30 1939 of the year at 8 in the morning hours. First there was shelling, and then Soviet troops crossed the border. Border Käsniaselka was busy quickly, without a fight. The first casualties appeared - the T-26 tank was blown up by a mine and the entire crew was killed. A division rushed further to the west, because the birthday of Stalin had to perform a combat mission.

By December 19, the division advanced 40 kilometers to the west and captured South Lemetti. There were the first battles for the villages of Wom and Lavayarvi. And the fighters were faced with an unusual tactics of the Finns - the column rested on a blockage arranged on the road, and as soon as the sappers set about clearing, the shelling of snipers (cuckoos) began. Second, the method was rather psychological. Usually, in the morning, from the forest, a group of skiers would emerge from two, from three sides, shoot five to ten minutes from the trees and go back to the forest. The method is very effective. The goal is to intimidate the enemy and create panic.

Already there were losses, self-arrows and deserters.

Divisions in the reinforcement was attached 34-I light tank brigade under the command of the brigade Commander Kondratieff. And all this armada was moving westward along a narrow road, until it rested ...

ENVIRONMENT

December 28 - the day the division began. Finns, secretly passing through forest roads, came to Lavayarvi and, taking advantage of surprise, seized the garrison. The battle lasted almost the whole day, but our Finns were not able to knock back - the road to Petrozavodsk was cut.

Then the second group of Finns hit Wom. The telephone connection to the center was interrupted, apparently, the wires were cut, and not by radio. Wuma - this was the rear of the division: food depots, shells, ammunition, gasoline, horse feed, uniform.

The convoy carrying the winter uniform failed to pass through the Finns, and the rank and file of the division remained without short fur coats, felt boots, quilted jackets, and the frost was getting stronger.

The divisional commander Kondrashov did not want to go to the rescue of the rear garrisons (then it would be necessary to abandon the offensive, the schedule and order of the command would be violated).

And in early January, the Finns began to surround the southern and northern Lemetti. The sentries began to disappear from the posts, and only in the morning was found the ski run leaving the forest, saying that at night the Finnish scouts again visited the garrison.

On January 3, the Finns went to the garrison from three sides. They were eager for two headquarters dugouts, apparently already knew who was sitting where. The attack was amicably repelled. The Finns dragged their dead with them, ours remained lying still. Then the Finns secretly pulled up artillery and daily began to fire at the division’s positions, especially the tankers had to tighten, the Finnish artillery methodically shot the crowded motionless Tanks. Telephone communication with the shelves was broken and then restored; the Finns apparently restored, and now, probably, the entire telephone line is being tapped. The snipers intensified, especially they were interested in the commanders, who were not difficult to calculate by the white fur coats. Now moving around the garrison is no longer safe.

The divisional commander Kondrashov, in agreement with the tank commander Kondratiev, issued an order to organize the all-round defense of the Southern Lemetti. This means that it is necessary to distribute the remnants of artillery in the proposed areas of the offensive of the Finns, the device of the bunker, machine-gun nests, trenches and trenches. An order was also issued to move to a reduced nutritional rate. In order for the fighters not to relax, they arranged a demonstrative shooting of three people: two crossbowmen and a sentinel who fell asleep at the post. The scouts took prisoners and in the division they heard the name of the Finnish commander who led the South Lemetti entourage - Major Aarnio Matti Armas "Motti Matti" (master of the boilers Matti), commander of the 4 th Jäger battalion. Finnish planes threw leaflets at the garrison calling on ordinary soldiers to surrender, and brought with them weapon exchange for money. A particularly flattering offer was for tankers: 10000 rubles were offered for a tank. The fighters of course laughed at these "creations" of the Finns, and in their hearts there was anxiety, confusion and fear. But the worst was yet to come. A new misfortune was approaching - frosts, and ours were not ready for them.

The first alarming cryptogram flew to the headquarters of the 8 Army:

“The situation is critical. The command posts of the regiments are continuously attacked. A 30-40 man remained in the companies. The rear has not arrived. Urgent, effective assistance is required, otherwise it will be too late. ”


A map-diagram of the surrounded garrison in South Lemetti. Compiled at the headquarters of the 39 Infantry Regiment of the Finnish Army
1. Howitzer regiment cannons. 2. Dugouts political department. 3. The headquarters of the 18 th Infantry Division. 4. Sign for discharge of cargo from the air. 5. The positions of artillery, machine gun points. 6. Communications battalion. 7. Chemical platoon tanks (flame throwers). 8.The headquarters of the 34 st tank brigade. 9. Anti-tank artillery division. 10.Tanki protected by infantry (buried in the snow). Residential dugout. I / JR-39 - The First Battalion of the 39 Finnish Infantry Regiment. 1.K - First company. 2.K - The second company. 3.K. - The third company.




January 16 was one of the worst days. Frost 40 degrees. They say at night it was up to 50 degrees. Many sentries froze their arms and legs. The medical battalion is full. This is the first trouble, and the second is the endless shelling all day. For the first time, Finnish bombers arrived and bombarded the garrison. At dinner, the dining room was announced to be closing. Too great a risk of movement of people in the garrison, besides there is no meat, bread, and the remaining products are subject to careful accounting and will be issued by dry ration to the units. The horses had already been eaten by everyone — some were slaughtered, some were numb about by themselves, because there was no longer any oats or hay left. But nevertheless the garrison fiercely resisted, and was not going to surrender.

On January 19, a small squad of tank crews from the 34 light tank brigade escaped from the Northern Lemetti and made their way to the Southern Lemetti garrison. Tankers told that they were surrounded too. Artillery first thing destroyed the tank trucks and immobilized tanks. The cars themselves tried not to destroy, but only to damage, the Finns needed the tanks themselves and they tried to capture them. When the situation became completely hopeless, it was decided to break through to their own, in South Lemetti. They began to destroy the remaining tanks, blew up and burned about 50 machines. The waste remained to be covered by Vladimir Tereshkov (father of the first woman cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova) and Vladimir Gryaznov, while the convoy was leaving, they all shot at the Finns. They stayed for about an hour, until the last shell, then they died.

And in South Lemetti, famine began. The code to the headquarters of the 8 Army from 28.01.40:

“Held on horses. Now they are not - ate. Aircraft shed little and irregularly. No products, depleted. They threw salt, but it crumbled. The people are exhausted. It is necessary to throw crackers, concentrate, salt. Take action.


The planes flew in and dumped cargo, but most of them either hit the Finns, or crashed when they fell. There was still not enough food, and some fighters had already begun to cook a stew of leather belts.

But the garrison stood, resisted and still hoped for help.

In early February, the Finns began to entangle the garrison with barbed wire. We nailed the thorn straight to the trees in several rows at different heights. Now the division was already in the trap. Snipers shoot all day all who appear in the affected area. The impression was that the Finns had turned the garrison into a shooting range and organized sports competitions. And only at dusk the garrison began to revive. Scouts' raids into the rear of the Finns almost ceased, and if they did, the scouts as a rule did not return back.

16 February, the morning began mortar shelling. Then the machine guns started talking. The Finns went on the attack, but having fallen under our machine-gun fire, they retreated. Frost reached 40 degrees. Then the psychic attack began: Finnish women sang in the forest, beat tambourines and danced. They were followed by former sailors, members of the Kronstadt insurrection who had settled in Finland. Gorlanili in Russian "Yablochko" under the accordion and swearing. Covered their cadets Vyborg military school. The garrison defenders decided they were crazy.

Meanwhile, in this hype, without any permission to leave the encirclement, at our own risk, a dozen of our tanks went to break through the ring. With the tank crews, the remnants of two battalions of the tank brigade of the 179 motorized rifle and 224 th reconnaissance, the remnants of the 208 th and 316 th rushed. But they failed to break out, ran into an ambush and almost all died - 1700 people.

The code from 19.02.40:

“Army headquarters. Kovalev. Why starve? Give foods. Help, help out, otherwise we will perish everything. Kondrashov.


“The situation is difficult. We are losing healthy 360, 750 patients. Weakened completely. Help urgently. Hold no strength.


The code from 22.02.40:

“Cherepanov, Seryukov. Aviation mistakenly bombed us. Help. Help out otherwise we will perish. ”


All those who remained alive after the encirclement recalled that they regarded this bombing as a unique gift from the command for the Day of the Red Army.

February 23 - Soviet Army Day began with shelling of Finnish artillery. The Finns rolled out the guns (which at one time captured the division) at direct fire and from about three hundred meters fired at the remnants of the division’s tanks at direct fire. After two hours, almost all the tanks were destroyed. That was the end. All the hope of the defense of the division, all its firepower - were tank guns.

The code from 23.02.40:

“We die. The disaster began. We require permission to exit. Waiting until 16 hours. Kondrashov. Kondratyev.


... Commands for the exit, for the breakthrough did not follow.

The code from 27.02.40:

“You persuade us all the time, like little children. It's a shame to die when there is such a large army nearby. We demand immediate permission to exit. If this permission is not given, we will accept it ourselves or Red Army men will accept it. Kondrashov. Kondratyev.


And finally, the long-awaited order came ...

BREAKTHROUGH

28.02.40 In 18.00, permission to exit the environment is obtained. A breakthrough will be made in 21.00. The remnants of the division and the 34 armored brigade will be divided into two columns. The stronger ones are in the first column - they are led by the division commander Kondrashov and the brigade commander Kondratiev. In the second column go weak. The whole operation is commanded by Colonel Alekseev, the Chief of Staff of the division, who will lead the second column. Military Commissar Razumov, instructed to carry and save the banner of the division. It was decided to leave the wounded, and there were more than three hundred people at the mercy of the winner. Collection in 20.30.

In 21.00, intelligence went ahead, followed by sappers with scissors. When the thorn was cut - the whole column rushed forward. Everyone shouted "Hurray!" And shot on the move to the horizon. The vanguard ran into the Finnish camp, the existence of which did not know. The fight there began a very brutal, and it saved the main column from inevitable death. In this battle, about two hundred people died, including Commissioner Alexei Razumov, the division’s banner was captured by the enemy (the Finns broadcasted it and wrote in leaflets). And the column went further ... There were still clashes with the Finnish guard posts, but they were bombarded with grenades and fled further. Alekseev encouraged: do not feel sorry for sweat - you will save blood! When it dawned, our planes appeared and began to show the path of advancement and soon the convoy went out to their own.

And the first column suffered a completely different fate - a tragic one. This train was to follow the second column, to close the line. There were relatively strong fighters in it, and in the event of persecution they had to repel the Finns and protect the second, weaker column. But this column, almost a 2000 man, moved along the road to Käsniaselka, which led them to Lemetti. The Finns provided for such an option and made blockages on the road, laid mines, and after blockages on both sides of the road they built bunkers. After letting the column down, driving it into mines, the Finns began to destroy the column and completely destroyed it. All column was killed and captured. All but the division commander Kondrashov and his adjutant. Kondrashov dressed in the uniform of an ordinary Red Army man, took off his overcoat and budenovka from a dead soldier, and along with his adjutant caught up with the second column and trudged around its very tail. Destroyed the first column 4 th Jäger battalion under the command of Major Matti Aarnio (Matti master of boilers).

The divisional commander Kondrashov was shot 29 in February 1940 of the year without trial in the courtyard of the hospital of the village of Salmi, the fate of the brigade commander Kondratieff is unknown.

Thus, the 18 Infantry Division, the Order of the Red Banner, and the division perished. 15000 people came out of the 1237 environment, half of them injured, frostbite. The death toll on this small patch made up 10 percent of the total death toll in the entire Soviet - Finnish war.

Alexey Nikolaevich Razumov - head of the division's political department, regimental commissar.


South Lemetti after the capture of the Finnish troops. Photos from the Finnish archives.


RESULTS

The fighting near the city of Pitkyaranta was extremely fierce in nature and units of the Red Army suffered heavy losses in this direction. 18-i sd was almost completely destroyed (out of 15, thousands survived about 1300 people). In the course of the winter war, this was the only compound of the Red Army that was completely destroyed. Since the inhabitants of Karelia were mainly called to this division, this meant that in 1940 thousands of children in the KASSR were left orphans.

The irretrievable losses of the Red Army (killed, dead from wounds and missing) on ​​the Pitkyaranta direction in general amounted to at least 30.11.1939 thousand people with 13.3.1940 through 35. These are the greatest losses suffered by the Armed Forces of the USSR for the entire period of the Second World War on the front from Svir to the Barents Sea.

Ow. top secret

ACT
17 March 1940. Lemetti Southern.


On the basis of the order of the 15 commander of the Army, the commander of the 2 rank of comrade. Kurdyumov, a commission chaired by the Military Commissioner 56 Rifle Corps - Brigadier Commissar Comrade. Seryukova composed of members: and. the commander of 18 SD - Colonel Alekseev, and. military commissar 18 CD - Art. political instructor Natsuna, deputy. beginning Special Section 56 SC - Art. Lieutenant Kozlov, Head of the 2 Division of the 56 SC, Captain Mochalov, examined the Lemetti South area and found the following:

Lemetti Yuzhnoye carries traces of fierce and stubborn fighting, representing a complete cemetery of corpses, broken fighting and transport vehicles. The entire defense area of ​​the control unit 18 SD is pitted with shells craters, the trees at 90% in the defense area are mowed down art. shells. 10 dugouts destroyed art. shells 152 m / m artillery, with the people there. The remaining dugouts were mostly blown up by the Finns as they occupied Lemetti. Found 18 corpses of the Red Army, with
burnt by the Finns in dugouts, one dead body was found in the mud hut, tied to the planks with wires and shot, and one dead body with a tight rope around its neck. Machines, trees, iron pipes of the dugout furnaces and all local objects are riddled with bullets and shell fragments. All military-economic property and personal demolished and piled Finns heaps along the road.

KP 18-th SD was surrounded by an adversary with a force over the regiment, as evidenced by the presence of trenches equipped with machine-gun fire points and artillery firing positions, and the presence of a Finnish camp and command point of the Finns in 2,5 km east of Lemetti Yuzhnoye (4022Г coordinates, 4024А coordinates XNX coordinates) . The enemy's trenches were located from the trenches of the defenders of Lemetti in some places in the distance of 100.000-50.

Finns in front of the trenches installed a wire fence in the 3 series (the wire is stretched over trees) and one row of spiral wire barbed wire. For the most part, the trenches of the Finns are dug out in full profile and connected by communications between themselves and with dugouts, located half a kilometer from the trenches. On the road in the direction of Lovayarvi, an anti-tank ditch was dug out by the Finns in 400 meters from the front edge of the defense and a blockage was made. The road in the direction of Lovayarvi has large debris, sometimes reaching up to a kilometer.

The firing positions of the artillery of the Finns, which fired on the 18 SD, were: 152 battery m / m in the Mitro region, 2 122 guns in the Lemetti Northern (3 AP 3 battery, captured by the Finns in late January 1940 g .), the 76 battery m / m near the Lovayarvi-Koivuselka road fork and the 76 battery m / m near the farm southwest of Lemetti South. The presence of 2-x last batteries is confirmed by the found equipped OP (firing positions) and cartridge cases in the OP region. Polukaponiry anti-tank guns, 2 in the area of ​​the antitank ditch, 2 at height against the southeastern defense sector and one against the southwestern defense sector were also found.

Inspection found 16 equipped trenches for heavy machine guns. The rest of the enemy grouping was located on high ground along the Lovayarvi road and at a height southeast of Lemetti.

On site in the area of ​​KP defense, 513 of our corpses was found, both in the trenches and outside the trenches.

In the area of ​​the enemy’s defense breakthrough, a column of Colonel Alekseev’s headquarters 18 SD was found to have a corpse, mainly in the area of ​​the enemy’s defense and at the wire barriers. In the area of ​​the enemy’s defense breakthrough, a column of the headquarters of 201 LTBR Colonel Smirnov discovered 34 corpses, 150 corpses of the remaining seriously wounded were found in hospital dugouts. Finnish corpses were not found, because those by the Finns were removed from 120 to 29.2.40.

Of all the combat vehicles, the weapons were withdrawn and the Finns removed; all transport vehicles removed the wheels and a large part of the motors. An insignificant part of combat and transport vehicles was taken out by the Finns, as evidenced by traces of the withdrawal of vehicles. All the material part in its condition is irretrievably lost.

With respect to the northern column, it has been established:

The path of movement passed from the defense area to the north-east direction later along the Finnish road, which goes one and a half kilometers parallel to the Lemetti-Lovayarvi road. 150 killed during the withdrawal of corpses along the Finnish road, 78 corpses along the Finnish road were found along the way of the column, including military commissar 34 LTBR regimental commissar Gaponyuk.

Around 400 killed were found in the Finnish camp area that 2,5 km east of Lemetti, among which are identified: The Head of the Political Department 18 SD - battalion commissar Comrade. Razumov, early. Artillery 56 SC - Colonel Bolotov, Commissar 97 OBS - Senior Politrub Tyurin, Commissar 56 ORB - Art. political officer Suvorov, pom. The political department chief of the Komsomol — political instructor Samoznaev, the instructor of the political department 18 SD - political instructor Smirnov and his wife, representative of the 8 BBC Army — Lieutenant Permyakov, Head. VHS 18 SD — Major Bulynin, Chief of the Division’s fleet - ml. military technician Kulpin, political instructor Ilinsky and doctor Balueva. The rest of the people of the North column are wanted.

In the area of ​​the death of the Northern Column, the following was established: the trees for the most part bear traces of a two-way firefight, which indicates armed resistance of the Northern Group. Upon examination, it was established that, despite the presence of fatal injuries, a significant part of the dead has traces of targeting in the head and finishing with rifle butts. One of the dead, shod in Finnish boots, pieksas, was attached to the tree upside down. The wife of the instructor of the political department 18 SD Smirnova (who worked at the school party in the political department) was naked and our hand grenade was inserted between the legs. With most of the commanders, buttonholes and sleeve insignia have been torn off. Orders that were held by the commanders, the Finns broke free with matter.

The way out of both columns is tactically correct, since leaving the defense zone in other directions, in particular to the south, would be disastrous for both columns due to the presence of enemy defenses in the area of ​​Koivuselka, Kuikka, as well as the presence of a large number of fire weapons and enemy activity lately from the south.

Careful preparation for the exit was not made. The presence of the Finnish camp did not know due to the lack of deep intelligence in recent times. The exit was made hastily, as evidenced by the receipt by the head of the 18 SD headquarters - Colonel Alekseev of the order to exit to 18.00 28.2.40, which indicated the beginning of the exit to 21.00. The remaining 3 hours before the release were clearly insufficient to organize the exit.

Chairman of the Commission, Military Commissioner 56 SC, Brigadier Commissioner Seryukov

Members:
I. D. Commander 18 SD Col. Alekseev
I.D. Military Commissioner 18 SDT. political instructor Natsun
Deputy beginning Special Department of the NKVD 56 SC Art. Lieutenant Kozlov
Early 2 Division 56 SC Captain Mochalov


Bitter Lessons

From the memoirs of the General of the Army, the former commander of the Leningrad Military District, Anatoly Ivanovich Gribkov

The “winter” war is well known to me, since I participated in it as a twenty-year-old lieutenant, commander of a tank platoon in the 100 th separate tank battalion of the 122 rifle division in the Kandalaksha direction.

Many documents and testimonies made public today give reason to believe that the village of Mineila did not have any shelling of our territory from the Finns. All this was fabricated by our respective services.

I survived the 105 day of this shameful war, for which our "valiant and legendary" Red Army was not ready. The sad fate of the 18 Division befell our other divisions and brigades.

The brutal and sad lessons of the Soviet-Finnish war were considered at the March (1940) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), and in April at a meeting of the Main Military Council. Commissar of Defense, Marshal K. Ye. Voroshilov, as it became known now, said that neither he, nor the General Staff, nor the command of the Leningrad Military District could even imagine all the difficulties that the Red Army would face.

And indeed it is. What was the powerful line of Mannerheim, we learned only when we came to the pillboxes. In this war, much was not in our favor. The Finnish soldier was warmly and comfortably dressed in white camouflage jackets and pants, skied well, skillfully owned the Suomi machinegun on 69 cartridges. And our fighter went to battle in a cold overcoat, budenovka, boots with windings, a 1891-1930 rifle with skis in hand. Although the border troops and the troops of the NKVD were already armed with automatic weapons. Marshal G. I. Kulik, Deputy Commissar of Defense, said: “The automatic is for the American gangsters, and our Red Army man needs a rifle with a long four-sided bayonet.”

I witnessed scenes - these are indicative courts, shootings of fighters and commanders before the ranks, and executions without trial or investigation.

In the seventies, being the commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District, I officially visited Finland several times and met with Finnish veterans of that war. They told me that the red commanders who were captured were most afraid of their senior commanders and KGB officers, rather than the enemy.

When I, as a participant in the Finnish war, are asked how we fought, I recall with bitterness how the Finns taught us to fight in practice. The rear of our regiments, divisions, corps were not ready for war. The interaction between the kinds of troops organized very badly. Discipline was built on fear of superiors. The cowardly Leo Mehlis was especially rampant. He was even afraid of the commanders of armies and fronts in both the Finnish and the Patriotic War. Historians must calculate how much he ruined the command and political staff, how much.

During the Tehran conference in 1943, as R. Sherwood mentions in his book “Roosevelt and Hopkins,” Stalin said at lunch that “the Soviet Army proved to be poorly organized and very bad at war with Finland.”

In May, 1940, the new People's Commissar of Defense, S. K. Tymoshenko, in his order No. 120, self-critically summed up the main results of the war, revealed all the unpreparedness of our troops, set tough, specific tasks of retraining the Red Army. I remember how our commander of the 39 Tank Brigade, D. D. Lelushenko, brought this order to the commanders. Unfortunately, there was little time to prepare for a big war. She was already standing on the threshold of our house.

Until recently, our true losses were hidden in the “winter” war. It is now accepted that 126 875 people died. Losses of Finns - five times less.

A few years ago, the government of Finland allowed Russia to erect a monument on its territory in the Suomussalmi region, a monument to the dead soldiers of the 163 and 44 divisions. Together with Patriarch Alexy II, I participated in the opening of this monument. I stood at the "Grieving Russia" and thought about what the soldiers and commanders of these divisions and other parts who were surrounded by survived?
32 comments
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  1. Lech e-mine
    +6
    25 June 2012 09: 30
    As always, the mediocrity of the command is paid for by the lives of ordinary soldiers and commanders.
  2. +3
    25 June 2012 09: 49
    Interesting article. No one can judge that time except the direct participants. For me, Gribova does not exist. Tolik worked out a political order, like most during the time of Khrushchev. My grandfather fought there. I have never heard from him about the meaninglessness of that war.
    1. Lech e-mine
      +1
      25 June 2012 10: 28
      To fight in the 40th frost in overcoats is suicide (no matter how brave a soldier is, without normal support, he is doomed to speedy death)
      1. 0
        25 June 2012 12: 18
        The Red Army completed the task. The result is important. Just like in 1945, and 1989 in Afghanistan. It's all about politics. Look at the betrayal of Khrushchev.
        1. Bagno
          +1
          26 June 2012 19: 41
          you can immediately see that you are stupid .... go die in Chechnya to whine .. well, wise guy ....
    2. Rikoshet
      +2
      25 June 2012 11: 34
      And from someone who’s heard, did anyone hear about the meaninglessness of their life? Your grandfather had something to say, yes, granddaughter, I can’t understand what the hell we got there, wanted to check how the Russian military art of the Russian General Manerheim? ! And he wasn’t general, he didn’t see beyond his nest, so it would be too much to expect from him an assessment of the meaning or meaninglessness of the war
  3. +1
    25 June 2012 10: 46
    The article is a fat plus, very informative.
  4. 8 company
    +3
    25 June 2012 11: 17
    A very robust and instructive article, the author is a huge plus. It really hurts, we don’t like to remember bitter lessons. Of course, writing about victories is much more pleasant, and you write about a bitter lesson, a crowd of cheers-patriots will immediately come running, throw the enemy in hats, and the author will be accused of defamation.
    1. Bagno
      0
      26 June 2012 19: 43
      I completely agree .. the site is a bunch of stupid cheers patriots like ...
  5. Rikoshet
    -2
    25 June 2012 11: 29
    All lies !! Here recently, visitors to the site were crucified that they say they were slandering our army, party and government, and only thanks to the heroism of comrade (their comrade) Stalin, Russia survived.
    "Patriots" (who voted for both Benya Eltsin and Vovan Pitersky) sprayed with foam at the mouth that such films as I Serve the Soviet Union, Penal Battalion, Burnt by the Sun (you can still cite Lenin's Testament - well, such films do not watch false patriots Give a knight's course or there is a Battle for Moscow), and so on and so on, a slander against the army and the Motherland.
    But such as Chapaev and some other dregs only do what they educate young people and develop American patriotism (sorry, apparently their patriotism).
    And the second part of the article did not coordinate its information with the site visitors, and thus neglected the foundations of modern Putin’s democracy — we demand, all as one, to remove this article as not developing the best traditions of the Soviet army, which are successfully developing in the present through Caucasian hazing and show trips (as always mediocre) to Georgia
    1. Indigo
      0
      25 June 2012 12: 21
      .. take the thermometer from the ass and look at the degrees, the so-called remnants brain already boil away ....
      would you go to the ear matzoh press the keys ...
      1. Rikoshet
        -1
        25 June 2012 13: 37
        And what do you already have in ...... they say instead of ,,,,,,,, - quickly you were taught the Russian language, you would have to sit and not pick-shameless-only Russians in Transnistria could for themselves stand. And you won’t be fed up with such a nickname like your matzo
    2. Lech e-mine
      +1
      25 June 2012 15: 00
      Rikoshet NON-BEHAVIOR NONSENSE. On the basis of the Arab revolutions, many Americans have a phase shift.
      1. Rikoshet
        -3
        25 June 2012 15: 05
        Yes, and they flag in one place, I'm talking about Thomas, and I'm talking about Yarёma
        1. Lech e-mine
          +1
          25 June 2012 16: 49
          moreover, do not bring down the flag all in one heap. UNDER STALIN The Yankees begin to have a nervous tick, they can’t do a serious analysis.
  6. +4
    25 June 2012 12: 11
    The article is good. And I have always respected the Finns. Unlike us, during a change of government, they do not destroy the monuments erected under other "regimes" and do not forget those who died in any conflicts and in any territory. I was in the Pitkäranta region and saw how the local authorities, with the help of the Finns, arranged the military graves of both the Finns and ours, and the roads to them are enviable.
    1. Grenz
      +5
      25 June 2012 17: 22
      Pula

      Posted by koment. and then read your message. All is correct. But only one thing - the local authorities, if they did, it is very formal.
      I would like to add my impressions to your message.
      Last summer I was in Sortavala, and went to Pitkaranta to the memorial in Death Valley. By the way, the war created them a lot: Musta-Tunturi near Pechenga, 108 km. in Minsk in the area of ​​the death of the commander Polosukhin, who defended the Borodino field. This is just where I was. And how many more.
      But the general conclusion is that now no one cares about the preservation of our military glory. Everything that was created on the battlefield memorial decayed and fell into decay. Asphalt on the road to the memorial crumbled into pits, memorial plates overgrown.
      And most importantly, the earth still squeezes the bones of unburied soldiers. Search engines find many, many locals. And people are waiting for the found fighters next to the memorial. And there, as it were, a spontaneous pantheon was formed. There are even graves with established surnames. Indeed, in the forests are found not only the fighters of 1940, but 1941 and 1944.
      If someone has been in the Karelian forests and swamps, he will confirm that they are almost impassable in the summer, and even more so in the winter. In addition, in the winter, swamps turn into deadly traps. The locals told us that some units reached the deployment line in front of the forest, and there was no one to leave the line of attack beyond the forest. Maybe a bike, but maybe not.
      All forests in the remnants of soldier's ammunition. Interestingly, there are a lot of gas masks.
      And nothing Finnish. But regarding the Finnish graves, dear colleagues I’ll say - I am ashamed of our grandfathers and Finns. Finnish memorials are protected (rather than protection, but rather savings). The Russians are reluctantly allowed there. Like - well, look how we honor the memory. The roads to the memorials are perfect, always flowers and always groups of Finns. They travel by bus 2-3 times a day. Especially in the days of remembrance there is a full house.
      In Sortavala, in a travel agency, we don’t even mention the Death Valley. But the truth is, every taxi driver knows the way there and is sure to bring flowers and tell various stories. That is, the history has remained in the memory of the people, it is not in the memory of officials !!!!!
      1. Grenz
        0
        26 June 2012 17: 11
        Surnames are read only by touch. Many photos of individual monuments with established surnames.
    2. Grenz
      0
      25 June 2012 17: 43
      Pula

      Posted by koment. and then read your message. All is correct. But only one thing - the local authorities, if they did, it is very formal.
      I would like to add my impressions to your message.
      Last summer I was in Sortavala, and went to Pitkaranta to the memorial in Death Valley. By the way, the war created them a lot: Musta-Tunturi near Pechenga, 108 km. in Minsk in the area of ​​the death of the commander Polosukhin, who defended the Borodino field. This is just where I was. And how many more.
      But the general conclusion is that now no one cares about the preservation of our military glory. Everything that was created on the battlefield memorial decayed and fell into decay. Asphalt on the road to the memorial crumbled into pits, memorial plates overgrown.
      And most importantly, the earth still squeezes the bones of unburied soldiers. Search engines find many, many locals. And people are waiting for the found fighters next to the memorial. And there, as it were, a spontaneous pantheon was formed. There are even graves with established surnames. Indeed, in the forests are found not only the fighters of 1940, but 1941 and 1944.
      If someone has been in the Karelian forests and swamps, he will confirm that they are almost impassable in the summer, and even more so in the winter. In addition, in the winter, swamps turn into deadly traps. The locals told us that some units reached the deployment line in front of the forest, and there was no one to leave the line of attack beyond the forest. Maybe a bike, but maybe not.
      All forests in the remnants of soldier's ammunition. Interestingly, there are a lot of gas masks.
      And nothing Finnish. But regarding the Finnish graves, dear colleagues I’ll say - I am ashamed of our grandfathers and Finns. Finnish memorials are protected (rather than protection, but rather savings). The Russians are reluctantly allowed there. Like - well, look how we honor the memory. The roads to the memorials are perfect, always flowers and always groups of Finns. They travel by bus 2-3 times a day. Especially in the days of remembrance there is a full house.
      In Sortavala, in a travel agency, we don’t even mention the Death Valley. But the truth is, every taxi driver knows the way there and is sure to bring flowers and tell various stories. That is, the history has remained in the memory of the people, it is not in the memory of officials !!!!!
  7. +1
    25 June 2012 12: 58
    Without these shameful cases, there would have been no victory at 41.
    But the Winter War provided a lot of food for thought and pushed the development of the Red Army
    1. loc.bejenari
      +2
      25 June 2012 15: 41
      and what a victory in 41 was on whose mill you pour water
      1. +2
        25 June 2012 16: 17
        I'm talking about the fact that without going through the problems of 39-40
        The Red Army could not defeat the Wehrmacht near Moscow in 41-42
        1. loc.bejenari
          +1
          25 June 2012 20: 48
          don't take it seriously wink
          it's me in the style of local potreots wink
          You are completely right
          it’s true that near Moscow there was a Pyrrhic victory as a result - a stupid offensive on the forehead on fortifications of the type as in the 39-40 years, which led to wild losses
          Ours learned anything by the year 43 at the cost of millions of lives
  8. Roman 3671
    +3
    25 June 2012 13: 23
    The 18th infantry division was personnel and was stationed in Karelia for a long time, while the 168th was formed in August during the “large training camps” and was transferred to the border in early September. The 34th light tank brigade was transferred to the Petrozavodsk region in October, and one of its battalions, the 86th, was temporarily withdrawn from the brigade and sent northward to the Murmansk region, where he took part in the war. Already by September 14, the front units of both divisions were on the border of Vidlitsa.
    In the early days of the fighting, both the 168th and 18th divisions, along with the tank brigade supporting them, advanced slowly, but without any particular problems, especially since only two rangers of the Jäger acted against them (8th and 9th). Despite significant superiority only on December 10, the city of Pitkäranta occupied a week later than the deadline provided for in the 402 plan by the infantry regiment of the 168th division. By this time, units of the 18th and 168th divisions and the tank brigade supporting them had advanced 45-50 km and reached the Lemetti area. Over the next two days, the advance in the western and north-western direction continued, but with more stubborn battles, since parts of the 13th infantry division and units of the 36th and 35th infantry regiments of 12th pd. By December 15, at the front were 2 battalions of the 37th Infantry Regiment, 8 Jaegers Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, the battalion of 36th Infantry Regiment and the battalion of 39th Infantry Regiment. In addition, in the immediate rear there were two battalions of 37 and 39 regiments and a battalion of 36 regiments.
    Finnish units and formations did not counterattack in the forehead. Commander of the 4th Army Corps of the Finnish Army Major General Yu.-V. Heglund was well aware that such actions were unlikely to succeed, because despite significant losses (168 infantry division, for example, lost about 3000 people killed and wounded) and fatigue, Soviet divisions retained superiority in manpower and especially in equipment and weapons. Therefore, with the accumulation of forces, the Finns, taking advantage of their superiority in ski training and breaks in the battle line, began to penetrate the rear of Soviet divisions, interrupting their communications and mining roads. The Soviet troops, who did not have skis or did not know how to use them, were extremely dependent on the latter. By December 22, parts of the 56th Rifle Corps finally switched to defense. Already the first attacks of Finnish detachments on a few roads forced the command of the 56th corps to withdraw from the front for their protection the 83rd tank battalion of the 34th tank brigade, and then the company of the 82nd battalion.
    Nevertheless, by December 26, the Finns managed to create two mined blockages on the Lavajärvi-Lemetti road in the Uoma area and by December 28 completely interrupted the communication on this highway. At this point, the following Finnish forces were at the front against the left-flank formations of the 56th Corps: the second battalion of 35 infantry. regiment, 8 special battalion, two battalions of 38 and 37 infantry regiments and a battalion of 36 infantry regiment. In addition, the third battalions of the 37th and 38th regiments, the battalion of the 36th regiment and the entire 39th regiment were in reserve in the immediate rear. It should be noted that the Finnish command from the very first days of intense fighting in the Ladoga region repeatedly sent to the second echelon and reserve units that were longer on the front lines and suffered the greatest losses, which at first did not want and then could not do the headquarters of the 56th corps .
    On December 28, the Finns were able to completely cut the road in the Uoma region and although the attacks on the 316th rifle regiment did not lead to success, the position of units and formations that advanced deeply into Finland was sharply complicated. The command of the 56th Corps immediately tried to eliminate the dangerous situation. In the period from January 1 to 5, 1940, a group of corps troops consisting of 82 tank battalions, two companies of 179 motorized rifle battalions, a battalion of 97 rifle regiments and some rear units repeatedly attacked Finnish positions in the Uoma area. However, despite the persistence shown by Soviet soldiers and commanders, he was unable to break through the enemy’s defenses and lead a convoy of 168 vehicles with food, ammunition, and fuel into Lemetti.
    At the same time, the Finns managed to cut the Lemetti garrison into two parts, which in the Soviet reports were called southern and northern, and in Finnish - eastern and western. In North Lemetti there were 76 tank battalions of 34 brigades, some rear units of 18 rifle divisions with a total of about 750 people, two guns and about 30 tanks, in the southern part of the garrison were the headquarters of the 18th division and 34th brigade, 83 tank battalion, units 201 a separate flamethrower tank battalion, two companies of 97 rifle regiments, a battery of 3 artillery regiments, an anti-aircraft machine-gun company, separate guns from a corps and howitzer artillery regiments, a total of about 4000 people, 226 vehicles, about 10 guns and more than 80 tanks. The command of the two formations was left with a choice between a passive expectation of their approach, an attempt to join the rest of the garrisons and an independent breakthrough to the east, to the main forces of the 8th army ...
  9. Roman 3671
    +2
    25 June 2012 13: 42
    The command of the encircled formations preferred the first option, without even trying to connect with the closest neighbors in northern Lemetti. In addition, a defense system was not established in the area of ​​southern Lemetti. And according to the Finnish schemes of the captured area, and according to the conclusion of the commission of the headquarters of the 15th army, the advantageous lines of defense were not occupied, the tanks were in complete disarray, they were not even tried to be arranged so that they strengthened the battle formations with guns and machine guns, moreover, some of they remained as targets on the road. As indicated in the report of the headquarters of the 15th army: "... The southern defense of Lemetti was organized spontaneously, units and units that arrived in Lemetti, built the defense where they stopped, to directly protect themselves. This led to the fact that the defense area was stretched along the road for 2 km, and had a width of only 400-800 m.This width of the defense put the garrison in an extremely difficult position, since the enemy shot it with real fire from all types of weapons. The mistake made in the organization of the defense led to the fact that the height “A”, which was of great tactical value, was not occupied, and the command height above the southern Lemetti area was occupied by insufficient forces (60 people with one machine gun and therefore, during the first enemy attack The enemy, having occupied the heights, had every opportunity at point-blank range to shoot people, military and transport vehicles, to observe the behavior and actions of the garrison ... Most of the tanks 34 Ltbbr and 201 Khtb were not placed as firing points, but directly on the road ... It’s not possible to determine the exact number of ammunition supplies, but I must say that there were enough of them, by the time they got out of the encirclement ... there were up to 12 thousand shells and 40-45 thousand rounds of ammunition. two gas stations. This allowed them to be put in more convenient positions for defense, which was not done ... "
    The command of the 18th infantry division and 34th tank brigade failed to restore the situation even after the 168th infantry division sent two battalions of 462 regiments and a battalion of 402 regiments to help. As a result of the inept leadership from the headquarters of the 56th Infantry Corps, the attacks of the 168th Infantry Division units were not fully successful and the deported battalions managed to reach only the Mitro, Ruokojärvi area, where there were units of the 208th and 316th Infantry Regiments, 3 artillery and 12 howitzer artillery regiments, 381 tank and 56 reconnaissance battalions of the 18th division, as well as 82 armored, 224 reconnaissance and 179 motorized rifle battalions of the 34th brigade.
    The arrived border guards failed to break through the Finnish defense in the area of ​​Uoma, although even the Finns noted that their actions were more meaningful and it was much more difficult to fight them with good ski skills than with army units.
    Already on January 8, the Finns scattered leaflets from the airplanes of the following content: “Fighters of the 18th and 168th divisions! You know that you are surrounded and all your ties with the Motherland are broken. Why are you continuing this unreliable (apparently wanted to say hopeless) struggle against our advantage, frost and hunger. The convoy of the 8th army, which you expect, the Finns exterminated near Salmi. We suggest you give up immediately. ”

    Another leaflet contained no less than grammatical errors: “It’s not your fault in the attack on Finland, it was up to your commanders and commissars, the instigators of the war. We know this and do not want to shed your blood. We advise you the following:

    GO!

    To do this, you must choose from your environment negotiators who should arrive tomorrow morning at 9 o’clock in the following places:

    1. At the railroad track in Kitela

    2. At the intersection at Ruokojärvi

    3. At Rukhtinamyaki

    4. In the village of Lavajärvi

    5. On the bridge 5 kilometers south of Uksu.

    Negotiators should be unarmed and have a stake with a white handkerchief. Thousands of your comrades in the north have already done so, be reasonable and follow their example.

    The commander and soldiers of the 4th Finnish Army "[
    In addition to naive grammatical and lexical errors, the leaflets contain the naive fallacy of the Finns that Russian soldiers will so easily surrender to the enemy, and neither vigilant political officers, nor even more vigilant special officers will prevent the surrender.

    The intelligence department of the headquarters of the 4th Army Corps assessed the situation as of January 10 as follows: Soviet troops are trying to stay in this important area by any means. At the same time, the morale of most of the troops was significantly shaken, both divisions and the tank brigade suffered significant losses, while in the 168th division, despite receiving about a thousand personnel, the staffing of infantry regiments does not exceed half. The Finns also knew about sending three battalions from the 18 and 402 rifle regiments to the aid of the 462th division. According to them, two battalions of 462 regiments were poured into the 208 rifle regiment of the 18th division, after which it numbered about 500 people, 316 rifle regiment from the beginning of the war did not receive replenishment and are extremely small, the Finns did not quite correctly calculate the strength of the 34th tank brigades in Lemetti: according to their data there were only about 500 people and only 15-20 serviceable tanks.

    They also knew the approach to Uoma of the units of the 620th Infantry Regiment, which according to their data had good equipment, including skiing and armament, but the quality of the command staff was fairly assessed by them as low ...
  10. Roman 3671
    +2
    25 June 2012 14: 01
    ... On January 12, 1940, the commanders of some parts of the 18th infantry division gave orders to restore order in the rear and the movement of soldiers and commanders on the front line and in the second echelon, but soon it was unnecessary: ​​the front was already on all sides.

    On January 16-19, the enemy launched a new offensive, in which 38 full infantry regiments participated, two battalions of the 37th and 39th regiments, as well as the 2nd battalion of the 35th regiment, 22 special and 4 huntsman battalions, three battalions ( The 1st and 3rd 36th Infantry Regiment and the 1st 34th Regiment) formed the outer ring of encirclement, in addition five more battalions (one of the 36th, 37th and 39th regiments and the 8th and 18th special ones) were entered into battle during the operation, which led to significant success of the Finnish army in this direction: the Finns managed to reach the approaches to Pitkäranta, the heads they even tried to take the city on the move, but the assault was repelled by the units of the 11th Infantry Division (219 Infantry Regiment) and the 60th Division (194 Infantry Regiment). This significantly reduced the ability to assist the surrounded troops by breaking into the blockade area. In addition, the Finns captured a number of islands, which the command of the 8th Army completely in vain released from its control. Having left small garrisons on the islands of Petya-saari, Tooth, Maximan-saari and Lunkulan-saari, the enemy was able to threaten the left flank of the 8th army with sabotage on the roads and fire at ice communications, which supplied the 168th infantry division, whose defense flanks relied on Lake Ladoga.
    In addition, from January 16 to 20, the Finns managed to encircle and firmly block the garrison of Uoma (units of the 97th and 620th Rifle Regiments, 82th Tank Battalion, some other parts of the 18th Division, numbering about 1100 people in total, about half of which comprised wounded and frostbite, 8 tanks, 6 guns, 34 machine guns, more than 50 vehicles), at a fork in the road (units of the same rifle regiments, as well as 3 artillery, 467 corps artillery regiments, 82 tank battalions and 64 anti-tank divisions, all in all - more 1200 people, 8 tanks, 8 guns, 20 machine guns, about 40% of the personnel were wounded and frostbite), a garrison near Lake Sari-järvi (third battalion, anti-tank and 76-mm regiment battery of 97 infantry regiment, tank platoon of 83 tank battalion , a total of 476 people, 3 tanks, 8 guns and 36 machine guns), the Lavajärvi garrison (first and second battalions (without three companies) and a reconnaissance company of the 97th infantry regiment, a ski battalion of the 18th infantry division, a battery of 467 corps artillery regiments, more than 1100 people in total, 8 guns, 45 machine guns).
    The encirclement of the 18th and 168th divisions, together with the 34th light tank brigade, was the result of poor command and control by the headquarters of the 56th Rifle Corps and 8th Army, poor reconnaissance, and a low level of ski training, which completely deprived our units of the ability to maneuver off the road. Colonel N.P. Raevsky sent to the headquarters of the 8th Army, soon appointed chief of staff of the 164th rifle division, wrote to K.E. Voroshilov: "It is surprising that our troops are suffering huge losses ... because know how to ski, despite the mass of previously issued orders for ski training ... ”. To eliminate this situation, he proposed to draft ski masters for military service in order to create special units similar to those in Finland.

    However, the remaining proposals of Colonel Raevsky were mildly difficult to implement. In particular, he proposed switching to the tactics of thoroughly combing the forests, for which the maximum possible number of NKVD troops and even the police should be concentrated, and in addition, to complicate the actions of enemy sabotage groups, send all combat engineer and road units from the internal districts, as well as the whole lumbering machinery for deforestation and road construction. If the Raevsky project were to be implemented on a full scale, with the organization of a large number of camps, then Enso would have nothing to do in Karelia today.

    For the Bolsheviks, as Comrade Stalin said, there are no insurmountable difficulties. “We need to go to the tactics of continuous combing, which requires a lot of troops. But do we have few of them? ” In his opinion, apparently, the reason was precisely in the small number of troops, half of which could be laid in front of the enemy’s trenches, and the second would crush him. A typical example of Soviet military art. However, such tactics are probably not the fault, but the trouble of Colonel Raevsky, as well as many other commanders at a time when the whole army was led by a man whose mental capabilities allowed him to command a brigade or division at best. But he led the multimillion-dollar Red Army and did not really want to listen to the chief of the General Staff.

    Meanwhile, the Finns, having reliably blocked the garrisons, began their phased elimination, precisely choosing the moment when hunger and cold would undermine the forces of the Red Army and commanders. Marshal Mannerheim and General Heglund knew well the history of wars, including the war of 1812, only in the winter of 1939/40. General Moroz was not on the Russian side.

    Already on January 25, information about the depletion of food supplies began to arrive from individual garrisons. Further it gets worse. On January 29, from the headquarters of the 18th rifle division: “Food has not been dropped, why is not clear. Hungry, the situation is difficult.” On the same day, another message came from the garrison at the fork in the road: “Surrounded for 16 days, 500 wounded. Ammunition, no food. We finish the last horse. ”...
  11. Roman 3671
    +2
    25 June 2012 14: 47
    ... On February 2, the Finns managed to destroy the northern Lemetti garrison. In battle, more than 700 people were killed and captured. Only 20 managed to get into Lemetti South to continue the struggle in the same inhuman conditions.
    According to Finnish historians, 4 tanks (mostly out of order), 32 guns and mortars, a large number of small arms and 7 trucks became trophies for parts of the 30th Army Corps.
    On February 5, another radiogram was received from the “Road fork” garrison: “The situation is difficult, the horses were eaten, there was no discharge. Sick of 600 people. Hunger. Scurvy. Death."
    Surprisingly, even in an environment where there was not enough food and ammunition, under crossfire of the enemy from all types of weapons, our soldiers and commanders continued to stay on snowy patches of land, which in a few months would become part of the territory of Soviet Karelia. It is unclear for what, but they held on, fighting to the last.

    February 8: "Food was thrown to the east, some were picked up." After that, the radiograms became somewhat calmer, since those surrounded clearly heard the sounds of artillery cannon and battle. On February 9, the troops of the 8th Infantry, which became part of the southern group of the 8th Army, launched an offensive with the aim of unblocking the 18th and 168th divisions. However, it did not receive development: having advanced a distance from several hundred meters to one and a half kilometers, parts of the corps stopped and began to gain a foothold in the positions won with a lot of blood. After this, the blockade intensified again, the position of our units worsened again. February 13th from the “Fork Road” garrison: "We are dying of hunger, intensify the dumping of food, do not let us die a shameful death."
    However, the Finns did not give these victories bloodless either. As of December 26, Finnish units had the following strengths: 1st battalion 36 of the infantry regiment - 704 people, 2nd - 759, 3rd - 895, 1st battalion of the 37th regiment - 730, 1st battalion of the 38th regiment - 660, the number of battalions of the 39th regiment was 718, 710 and 731 people. respectively. By February 1, all battalions, including those that appeared at the front later, had thinned significantly. So the 2nd battalion of the 36th regiment remaining at the front numbered only 459 soldiers and officers, the battalions of the 37th regiment - 567, 578 and 381, the 38th regiment - 502, 489 and 813, in the 39th - 526, 476 and 426, finally Two battalions of the 64th regiment suffered significant losses, arriving at the front by the beginning of the Finnish counterattack in January, having only 418 and 403 people, the 8 Jaeger battalion was more or less full-blooded - 717 people, the remaining two Jaeger battalions - the 4th and the 18th were only 472 and 511 people - not much more than the cavalry squadron of 13 divisions. Note that the staff number of the battalion of the Finnish infantry regiment was about 800, and the ranger - about 850.

    On February 15, the enemy stepped up the onslaught on the Mitro garrison — the Ruskaset stop, or “KP of four regiments” (in documents of the 4th army corps, it means “rykmentti motissa” - surrounded regiments), where there were battalions of the 208th and 316th rifle and batteries of 3 artillery and 12 howitzer artillery regiments of the 18th division. On the night of February 18, his remains with a total number of about 1700 people began a breakthrough from the encirclement. According to some reports, the convoy, half of which was wounded and frostbitten, tried to break into Lemetti South, but a more realistic version seems to be that the goal of the garrison was the defense area of ​​the 168th division. The withdrawal was covered by fighters and commanders of 83 tank and 224 reconnaissance battalions of 34 brigades. They fought to the last so that their comrades could break through to their own. Not a single tanker and scout returned from this battle. However, the shooters and gunners also failed to break out of the encirclement: on the afternoon of February 18, this group was destroyed at an altitude of 79,0. Only 168 people broke into the defense area of ​​the 30th Rifle Division. [34] According to Finnish data, the trophies were 20 tanks, 32 field and 2 anti-tank guns, 6 four-barreled anti-aircraft guns, 63 machine guns and light machine guns, 17 tractors, 25 cars, and more than 200 carts. More than 250 people were captured in Finland.

    The only success in this situation can be considered the exit from the encirclement of the Lovarvi garrison, which on the night of February 15 destroyed the Finnish barrier and joined the main forces of the newly created 16 army on the 15th. 810 people came out with 34 machine guns. 280 people died and went missing; heavy weapons were destroyed upon exit. The position of the remaining surrounded garrisons gradually worsened.

    February 18 from Lemetti Southerly: "Why starve, give food"

    February 19 from the “Road Forks”: “There is no discharge”. On the same day, from the commander of the 34th light tank brigade of the brigade brigade commander S.I. Kondratyev (Lemetti): “The R-5s all dropped to the enemy today.”

    On the night of February 19, the Finns, taking advantage of the poor organization of defense in Lemetti, took control of several heights, which allowed them to completely take control of all the movements of those surrounded, the area of ​​their defense was reduced to one kilometer in length and about 400 meters in width.

    February 21 from the brigade commander S.I. Kondratiev: “Help, we are starving to death.”

    February 22, on the eve of the Day of the Red Army from there: "Aviation mistakenly bombed us. Help, help out, otherwise we will all perish. ” On the same day from the “Forks of the Road”: “The situation is difficult, we bear losses, urgently help, there is no strength to hold on.” However, they suddenly appeared from somewhere, it seems that the besieged ones held on to "one hardened will."

    February 23rd, red calendar day. From the garrison “Road fork”: “They’ve been surrounded for 40 days, I can’t believe that the enemy is strong. Free from vain doom. People, materiel are actually a sick camp, healthy are exhausted. We don’t know the fate of Kozhekin (we are talking about the garrison of Sari-yarvi-P.A.), there is no strength, the situation is difficult. ”
    On February 23, the garrison near Lake Sari-järvi was destroyed. There were no survivors. After the war, 3 corpses and two mass graves erected by the Finns were discovered at the location of the 97rd battalion of the 131th infantry regiment. According to Finnish sources, the trophies of the 4th Army Corps were 6 regimental and 6 anti-tank guns, 4 mortars, 4 tanks, about 60 machine guns, some of which were out of order.

    However, for the Finns, the capture of every gun, even every machine gun and rifle, was very important: in February 1940, i.e. in the midst of the fighting, the headquarters of the 4th Army Corps issued an order stating the need for careful treatment of outdated weapons, and the careful collection of captured small arms and artillery weapons. Moreover, troops were ordered to make weapons in workshops. [42]

    On February 25-27, the ski squadron tried to break through to the Garrison “Road fork”, but only three frostbitten soldiers came out to those surrounded, the squadron was defeated ...
    1. 0
      1 October 2017 12: 22
      Bukaf a lot. But the main thing - the tanks were in a mess, they did not even try to use them to reinforce the defense. Secondly, important defensive lines were not occupied. Third - Kurdyumov did not even try to clear his Finns from their rear. In the aggregate, he received his highest measure quite reasonably. A typical example of how a commander ruined his unit by almost 100%. Despite the fact that the enemy forces were less than his own. I am not surprised that they tried to help him so late. Around knowing the strength of the Finns and 18 SD and 34 TB, they simply could not believe that the division commander could not seriously cope with the problem.
  12. +1
    25 June 2012 15: 01
    Tryndet is enough for the Finns to lose 5 times less then they raised their paws to the top eh? War is a cruel thing for slackness punishes hard and IVS Stalin did not forgive our heads for the loss of our fighters. The main reason for our failure was interrupted succession in the military estate World War I experience lost in the civil war and in the undercover wars of the interwar period. Whatever the USSR won, the Vyborg province returned to Russia and established a base on Hanko.
  13. Roman 3671
    +1
    25 June 2012 15: 16
    .... On February 26, the command of the Lemetti South garrison sent another radiogram to headquarters 56 of the corps: “Help, storm the enemy, dump food and smoke. Yesterday, three TBs turned around and flew away, did not drop anything. Why starve? Help, otherwise we will all perish. ” The commander of the 15th Army, Commander of the 2nd rank, V.N. Kurdyumov, in a return telegram, advised those around him to calm down and asked the command of the surrounded garrisons about the possibility of landing aircraft on the occupied territory. Those answered in the negative. Then Kurdyumov asked to hold out a couple more days and promised help. However, the command of the encircled garrison required permission to exit the encirclement. The Military Council of the 15th Army, having received Stavka’s permission on the night of February 28, ordered the departure of Lemetti at nightfall, indicating the need for the removal of the wounded and the decommissioning of material equipment.

    For some unknown reason, the garrison was divided into two columns - the northern one under the command of the commander of the 34th tank brigade, brigade brigade Kondratyev, and the southern one, commanded by the chief of staff of the 18th division, Colonel Alekseev (brigade commander G.F. Kondrashev was wounded on February 25) with a total strength of 3261 people. According to the report of the 15th Army headquarters commission, “Kondrashev organized the exit very badly. Even a part of the command structure did not know which subunits were part of which columns ... The exit plan was developed with the expectation of an easier exit of the northern column, in which the command, headquarters and the healthiest people followed according to the plan ...

    Kondrashev’s column from Lemetti South came out for about 22 hours and moved from the command post of the 34 light tank brigade along the Finnish road along the path to the southwestern shore of Lake Wuortana-järvi. The convoy personnel was armed with rifles and revolvers, in addition, the convoy had 3 integrated anti-aircraft mounts and 2-3 BT-7 tanks, which were supposed to be used to support the exit, but due to poor organization they were not used and they even forgot to warn the crews about the exit .. The order of the Military Council on the deterioration of technology and equipment was not fully implemented.

    Despite the order of the Army’s Military Council, it is imperative to take all the sick and wounded with them, the seriously ill and wounded were left, and the garrison’s exit was deliberately hidden from them ... ”

    However, what the Finns did with the wounded left, also, judging by the documents of the headquarters of the 15th army, it is far from not only the norms of the Hague Convention, but also ordinary humanity: some of the dugouts were thrown with grenades (some wounded might have tried to resist), and some of the dugouts after the conclusion of a peace treaty, it was found burnt, and some charred skeletons preserved traces of barbed wire, which defenseless people were screwed to the bunks.
    At the exit, the northern column stretched out, lost control, which was used by the Finns, who destroyed it almost completely. Fearing whether captivity or special forces, the commander of the tank brigade, brigade brigade commander S.I. Kondratyev, chief of staff colonel N.I. Smirnov, chiefs of the political departments of the division and brigade I.A. Gapanyuk and I.E. Izraetskiy, as well as the head of the special Tank Brigade Division Captain Doronin. The Finns, in addition to other trophies, also got the combat banner of the 18th Yaroslavl Red Banner Rifle Division. The division was disbanded shortly after the end of the war, and in June 1940, its number was adopted by the 111 rifle division.

    The southern column was withdrawn by Colonel Alekseev. 1237 people made their way, 900 of whom were injured or frostbite, 48 people died during the breakthrough.

    Thus, of the 18 thousand people who were in divisions of 18 rifle divisions and 34 tank brigades, by the beginning of the war, about 2,5 thousand were out of the ring, and a little more than a thousand left the encirclement. The rest were killed or captured.

    These were not the last victims of the war in this direction: on March 4, the wounded brigade brigade commander Kondrashev was taken into custody, who was subsequently shot, and on March 8, apparently fearing responsibility for the defeat of corps formations, divisional commander I.N. Cherepanov shot himself.

    According to documents of the formation of the 56th Corps, they suffered the following losses: 168 rifle division - 6742 people killed, wounded and missing, 18 rifle division without taking into account the losses of 97 rifle regiment, some of which were outside the ring - 8754 people, the aforementioned regiment itself - 3097 people . Finally, 34 tank brigade - more than 1800 people, 143 tanks and 14 armored vehicles.

    However, the data on personnel losses require verification for the following reason: personnel losses were given in documents as the difference between the number of personnel on December 9 and March 13, while some units remaining with the main army forces were replenished and again suffered losses, in addition Apparently, the headquarters of 18 and 168 divisions did not take into account the loss of three battalions of 402 and 462 rifle regiments transferred in January to the 18 division. The headquarters of the latter, as before, considered them to be “strangers,” and the headquarters of the 168th considered them to be “retired from the division.” It is only known that more than 1600 corpses were found in the southern Lemetti garrison area alone, and according to inconclusive data from the headquarters of the 15th army, the surrounded garrisons lost about 3,5 people killed.

    We note, however, that the victories to these Finns were by no means bloodless either: during the period of hostilities, units of the 13th infantry division, bearing the brunt of the fighting in the Ladoga Karelia, lost 1171 people killed, 3155 wounded and 158 missing; units (64 infantry regiment, rangers, guerrilla and special battalions, combat engineer companies) were missing 924 more, 2460 wounded and 102 missing. Finally, you can’t call small the losses of units of the 12th infantry division, which also participated in battles against the left-flank group of the 56th Corps: 36th infantry regiment lost 253 people killed, 763 wounded and 67 missing, and 35th infantry regiment - 261, 470 and 27 person accordingly.

    Altogether, 12 infantry divisions, which fought mainly in the Loymolovsky direction, together with dowry units and subunits, lost 1458 people killed, 3860 wounded and 220 missing.
  14. Volkhov
    +6
    25 June 2012 15: 36
    It could not have been otherwise - he served in that locality and saw the remains of Finnish farms - everything was rational, thoroughly, accurately. I saw the methods of collective farm economy - the opposite is true.
    In the event of war, their commanders seemed to be the main danger - the brain had only protein value:
    - atomic era, flight time 8 min. but there are no shelters, no trenches, the column is going to 35 minutes, and still go
    - all warehouses (gasoline, ATV, NZ, reserve of transport) on 1 hectare, in 400 m a hill covered with forest, i.e. 2 fighters with Barrett make the whole part fire victims and pedestrians without risking themselves, and they will need no more than 2 clips, and we have an explosion of an anti-tank mine carriage, not counting the little things for a couple of cars
    - All tactics came down to attacking the heights on the forehead in deep snow and there have never been any rounds or suppression.
    Our command would be suitable for the Chinese militia or the Indian homeless, so that there remain real wizards whom nothing takes. There are not so many people in Russia anymore.
  15. +1
    25 June 2012 15: 52
    As Stalin said: "In the war with Finland, the Soviet Army showed itself to be poorly organized and fought very badly." And this is the truth from which the corresponding conclusions were drawn. But I didn't really like the article itself. Something is wrong. Wash smacks of anti-Sovietism.
    But for those who always respected Finns there is a good passage:
    During the inspection it was found that, despite the presence of mortal wounds, a significant part of the dead bears traces of shooting in the head and finishing off with butts. One of the victims, dressed in Finnish boots peeks, is placed upside down to the tree. The wife of the instructor of the 18 political department, SD Smirnov (who worked on the school desk in the political department), was naked and our hand grenade was inserted between the legs

    As they say, cultural Europeans are there.
    By the way, who does not know, but many do not know, the war of 39-40 was already the third Soviet-Finnish war. Moreover, the first two, taking advantage of the then weakness of Soviet Russia, were unleashed by the "peace-loving" Finns.
  16. tariff
    0
    25 June 2012 16: 10
    Not all military leaders teach history, but an ordinary soldier pays for it. Somehow after the article, a parallel arose from 1994-1996.
  17. controller
    +1
    25 June 2012 18: 00
    I really would not like this "winter war" to be repeated. But all the prerequisites are there. Yes, and our army today is trained and organized, alas, as in 39. Figuratively speaking also in "greatcoats", "budenovka" and with three-line.

    I know a couple of places called the Death Valley. According to the density of the dead per 1 square meter, I think much higher. This is the fortified area of ​​Summakul, and a couple of kilometers from it is 65.5 (DOT [Sj5] at the height of the Tongue).
    And about the attitude of our authorities to the Finnish war, I can give an example - the entire place of the main breakthrough of the summul was given 20 years ago to the military for summer house construction, and some sections directly with the pillboxes were sk5, sk-15. About the excavated mines, pots and fragments, in this place, I think, and so it is clear.
    Here are quite detailed links to them with photos, maps and diagrams: http://www.glebychevo.narod.ru/sk.html
    http://www.glebychevo.narod.ru/sj.html
  18. 8 company
    +7
    25 June 2012 18: 04
    In April 1940 Under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (B), with the participation of Stalin, a meeting of commanding officers was held to gather experience in fighting against Finland. In the speeches of the meeting participants, a truly depressing picture of the state of combat capability of the Red Army was opened. Below are excerpts from speeches that do not require further explanation.

    Brigadier Commissioner Semenov:
    "I think it is absolutely abnormal that when untrained fighters were sent to the front, their composition was high, reaching 20-30% ..."

    Commander Pshennikov:
    "... Up to 47% of the Red Army personnel did not know the material part of the weapons put to them ... The command personnel did not know each other and the fighters ..."
    "Of the commanding staff of the division, only 17% were familiar with the compass, map and able to walk in azimuth ..."

    Comdiv Kirponos:
    '... The questions of covert control were poorly worked out ... All control was carried out in clear text by telephone. Divisional Commander Kurochkin calls me: 'Tell me, where is your command post?'

    Major Mukhin:
    "It was said here that the battalions were commanded by junior lieutenants, and we were commanded by captains, but they could not set artillery tasks correctly."
    "With regard to intelligence, we must reproach the command that we did not have any intelligence."

    Major Bychevsky:
    “We did not have extensive camouflage work. All warehouses, stations, airfields, OP, firing positions were poorly camouflaged ... There was no organizer of camouflage work. '

    Brigade Commander Nedvigin:
    "The newly arrived commanders who graduated from military schools have absolutely no hand weapons, are not familiar with topography, the exactingness of such a commander is extremely low, he has almost no knowledge of the regulations."

    Brigadier Commissioner Muravyov:
    “The headquarters did not have a well-thought-out plan with the calculation of forces and means of communication ... The 18th Infantry Division abandoned the radio station on its territory and crossed the state border without radio equipment ... The weak link in the work of communications should be attributed to the command and control of the military units: battalion-company-platoon. The simplest means: missiles, tracer bullets, conventional bursts of machine guns, small walkie-talkies, light-signaling means were ignored. Our troops and command personnel are not trained in this. '

    Comcor Chuykov:
    "There was essentially no interaction between the departments of the army headquarters ... The operations department is only interested in its own troops, and as for the enemy, it is not at all interested in them."

    During the Finnish war, Comcor Grendal made the following conclusions for himself:
    '... It is impossible to throw tanks on an unsuppressed anti-tank defense system, just as you cannot throw infantry on an unsuppressed system of small arms and machine gun fire.'
    "The individual training of our fighter is weak ... The training of the Finnish fighter in terms of technical and tactical skills was higher."

    Army Commissar Zaporozhets drew attention to the fact that lies and exaggeration flourish in the reports of lower instances, the professional level of the commanders is low, they do not know how to use radio stations in the troops, and often just leave them right on the road. "During the day, the regiment fought, and by evening this regiment had 105 crossbows."

    Colonel Mamsurov said that the number of inspectors and supervisors from higher levels at headquarters was such that '90% of the command staff of the 9th Army still do not know who their army commander was.'

    Raven Command:
    “I have to say it bluntly ... no interaction with tanks was taught. More than 7 thousand tanks were scattered among the divisions and they did not play any role. They were helpless ... More often than not, they were sent to guard the headquarters. '
  19. +2
    25 June 2012 19: 37
    Grandfather fought in the Finnish as part of the ski battalion ... they fought the Finns. The same raids on their rear ... the Finns did not seem enough. To be honest, if there hadn’t been a Finnish winter company, it is not known how the winter of 41 would end. It is not known how the defense of Leningrad ended. We will not be modest on the side of the Finns, all of Europe fought, the same Germans and British, they were united here despite what they were enemies, amerikosy and all all helped the Finns.
    1. Ilyukha
      +1
      26 June 2012 23: 30
      My grandfather fought there. By the order of Dzhugashvili, as I recently learned, the soldier didn’t mention this war. The grandfather took the grandfather, there really is no record, unlike Khalkhin-Gol and Patriotic. And why? Yes .... we fell unexpectedly! The Finns have always been such a quiet forest people, living on the outskirts of Europe, and never participated in European pogroms. We thought it would be easy.
      You don’t know the story at all, unfortunately. All of Europe at that time was under Hitler, who was an ally of our leader of peoples. With Hitler’s full consent, Stalin took half of Poland and the Baltic states (without any problems) Finland left us according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Yes, she didn’t leave. There was no military help from the Germans (we are friends!), the British then saved their country, amers sold some weapons (but for them, as always, this is business-nothing personal, especially since they haven’t entered the war) )
      The Finns, in fact, defeated the army of a huge country that surpassed them in all numbers and weights. They beat us off due to excellent management (we would have organizers like Mannerheim), and due to the latest military technology then the use of snipers, the massive use of machine guns (for the first time in the world, by the way!), min-extensions, etc.
      After Hitler's surprise (he gave this to Stalin like this? Finland!), The decision to attack the USSR became final (fascist generals point out in his memoirs).
      The price of defeat in the Finnish war is 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
  20. loc.bejenari
    +1
    25 June 2012 20: 55
    my grandfather also passed Finnish
    he served in a border school in Karelia and they were thrown into battle near Sortavala
    got a shell shock from an explosion
    then awarded him a medal for courage
    about the article - very good
    liked the diagrams and illustrations
    In the photo, by the way, the commissioner with Finnish Suomi
    1. Roman 3671
      +2
      25 June 2012 23: 15
      No, this is a PPD-34 with a 25-round sector magazine, pay attention to the barrel casing, in addition, it is clearly visible in the photo that the magazine is slightly bent ("horn") and the Suomi had either drum or rectangular magazines.
      PPD-34 is an automatic weapon, a fairly simple design. Its action is based on the use of the recoil energy of the free shutter when the barrel is stationary. The barrel bore is locked by the mass of a spring-loaded shutter return spring. USM - shock type, allows the conduct of single and automatic fire. Flag type fire mode translator, located near the trigger guard on the right side of the weapon. A fuse in the form of an engine is located on the shutter handle. When placed on the fuse, its tooth engages, with the cutout of the receiver blocking the bolt. Food PPD-34 is carried out from sector stores for 25 rounds. Sights, consisting of an aiming strip with a collar and a front sight, are designed for firing range from 50 to 500 m. The barrel of the PP is closed by a casing with holes for air cooling. The stock and butt are made of one piece of wood.
      In 1938, according to the results of military tests in 1936-37, the PPD was modernized. The drummer and the method of fastening the store have undergone changes. In addition, a new 71-round drum magazine was developed. The store was a copy of the Finnish PP Suomi store, but had a special neck inserted into the store receiver. This made it possible to use both types of stores, sector and drum. The new model received the designation "7,62-mm submachine gun of the Degtyarev system arr. 1934/38 (PPD-1934/38)".

      The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 showed that the PPD was not sufficiently reliable. As a result, in 1940, the PP was modified again. The new model "7,62 mm submachine gun of the Degtyarev system arr. 1940 (PPD-40)" differed from the previous samples by a deeper fit of the magazine, which was now located directly under the bolt chamber, this increased the reliability of the power unit. The stock is cut to ensure the abutment of the magazine. PPD-40 was equipped with drum magazines for 71 rounds, without a neck.

      PPD-34 is the first submachine gun adopted in the Soviet Union. The negative attitude to this type of weapon among the command could not but affect its introduction into the troops. The PP was produced in small batches and was intended mainly for infantry commanders and border troops of the NKVD. In 1939, the PPD was completely removed (!) From armament and sent to warehouses, but the Soviet-Finnish War put everything in its place. PPD-40 was used during the Second World War as a weapon of the commanders of rifle units and in the NKVD troops. It was mass-produced at the factory in the city of Kovrov until the end of 1941, when it was replaced by PPSh-41, a simpler in production and more reliable PP, which largely repeats V.A. Degtyareva.
      1. Morani
        -1
        26 June 2012 00: 00
        This is a Suomi-KP Model 1931 submachine gun. Adopted in 1931. Who licked someone?
    2. infantry
      0
      6 June 2013 01: 55
      This is not Suomi but PPD-34
  21. khoma nickson
    -2
    25 June 2012 20: 57
    There is something to be proud of. after Kuusinen’s provocation, the Soviet Union piled on, at first only with the forces of LenVO (we’ll throw his caps) at tiny Finland and pushed the border from Leningrad at a great price, plus bought something in other places and got Hanko for rent. It is believed that there were thoughts over time to take over the whole of Finland, but ... And why all this. Confronting the whole world against oneself, incurring huge material and human losses, in order to cut a small scrap to one sixth of the land. It is clear that after accession and sovietization, everything would gradually go down there to a general level: not for you Viola cheese and Valio butter, no clothes, no shoes - like the Baltic: Speedola, Rafiki and a little cleaner and more satisfying. Then - like the Baltic states: they would have gone into the wild with everything invested there and built there.
  22. IGR
    IGR
    +1
    25 June 2012 21: 34
    The results of the Finnish war 17.04.1940/XNUMX/XNUMX I.V. Stalin, Speech at a meeting of commanding officers to summarize the experience of hostilities against Finland
    General conclusion. What did our victory boil down to, whom did we defeat, in fact? So we fought for 3 months and 12 days, then the Finns knelt down, we lost, the war ended. The question is, who did we defeat? They say Finns. Well, of course, the Finns won. But this is not the most important thing in this war. Finns win - not God knows what the challenge. Of course, we had to defeat the Finns. We defeated not only the Finns, we defeated their European teachers as well - defeated the German defensive equipment, defeated the English defensive technique, defeated the French defensive technique. Not only the Finns won, but also the technology of the advanced states of Europe. Not only the technology of the advanced states of Europe, we defeated their tactics, their strategy. The whole defense of Finland and the war were conducted at the direction, at the instigation, on the advice of England and France, and even earlier the Germans helped them great, and a half-defense line in Finland was built on their advice. The result speaks of this.
    We defeated not only the Finns - this task is not so big. The main thing in our victory is that we defeated the technique, tactics and strategy of the advanced states of Europe, whose representatives were Finnish teachers. This is our main victory.

    Целиком на http://airsoftgame.ru/forum/index.php?PHPSESSID=71caab3593383a270a14456eacf67956
    & topic = 3649.msg20677 # msg20677
  23. Morani
    -5
    25 June 2012 23: 25
    If Finland had taken advice, they would have been without Nokia mobile phones and first-class Nokian wheels and would have called the Finns - a naughty man and a circle of collective farms, collective farms.
  24. Bagno
    -2
    26 June 2012 19: 48
    well done Finns ... and ours as always crap .... and by the way the Mannerheim line was complete garbage .. a couple of bunkers and everyone .. we read it .. and the whole story that they wrote red-assed is a complete lie .. not a word of truth ... it's a shame ... and the Finns are great ... respect ... the colossus with feet of clay was blown away ... that's a disgrace ... however, it was the same with us in Chechnya ... so everything is natural here ...
  25. 0
    22 January 2014 20: 43
    One clarification: recently, a statement from the Central Operational Archive of the FSB of Russia was published: “The following information is available in the archival criminal case file stored in the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia. Kondrashev Grigory Fedorovich, a native of the village of Elshanki, Lopatinsky district, Saratov region, Russian, with secondary education, brigade commander. At the time of his arrest, he was the commander of the 18th Infantry Division. He was arrested on 15 on March 1940 on charges of “criminal inaction in the war with the White Finns,” and was convicted on August 12 of 1940 by the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR under Art. 193-17 n. "B" and 193-22 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR in the VMN and was sentenced to be shot with the deprivation of the military rank of "brigade commander" and confiscation of all property belonging to him personally. By the decision of the minutes of the meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 24.08.1940, the verdict on the application of capital punishment to G. Kondrashev upheld. The verdict was executed on August 29 1940 in Moscow. Buried Kondrashev G.F. at the Don cemetery in Moscow.
    The definition of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR of December 30 1968 G. Kondrashev posthumously rehabilitated. "

    Once in 10 years, the Finns exhibit captured banners of the Soviet units, including the luxurious, gold and silver embroidered banner of the 18th Infantry Division (photo from the Finnish archives).
  26. kvs45
    0
    7 May 2015 19: 58
    Quote: AK-74-1
    No one can judge that time except the direct participants.

    and what can ordinary infantry Vanya judge? The fact that there were no warm footcloths was not given, and that our own aviation had bombed, no more! A historian with archival materials can draw honest conclusions, unless of course he has a conscience
    Quote: AK-74-1
    For me, Gribova does not exist.

    And for someone, the earth is flat, so what?
    Quote: AK-74-1
    My grandfather fought there. I have never heard from him about the meaninglessness of that war.

    Your grandfather gave your subscription about non-disclosure, he would say a lot what he thinks, he would finish very badly and this would affect your whole family
  27. 0
    1 October 2017 12: 40
    Well, the fact of the war is that in it not only victories happen, but also defeats. The main thing is that they learned a lesson from that war and approached the next one much stronger than they could.
    Raises many questions the moment of loss. The Finns themselves say that it’s 25 lsh, or 26 thousand irrevocable. However, vague doubts torment me. After all, it wasn’t just a war. This question was, to be, or not to be, because the new government of Finland was already available. It could easily be that the IVS would advise the Finns, and then completely include it in the Union. The second point - the French expeditionary force was ready to go to the aid of the Finns. There was little to wait. The Finns quite successfully resisted, and not only on the Mannerheim line, as we see. And what, having lost only 25 thousand, the Finns surrendered? This is a maxim, 10% of their strength. Of course, there are also wounded, and those, according to Finnish data, are only 48 thousand. Total losses - only 73 thousand, despite the fact that most of the wounded will return to duty. Losses are not catastrophic. So what dates so briskly ran to give up? But everything will fall into place if you take the Soviet version of the Finnish losses for truth - 95 thousand killed. Then everything falls into place. With the wounded (we leave the ratio 1: 2) 285 thousand, that is, more than 50% of the personnel. This figure is already such that it’s true, it makes no sense to wait for the help of the Allies, nothing else and can only go to bow, agreeing to almost everything. What the Finns did. There was no one to fight, no one to wait for help, another week, and Soviet tanks would enter Helsinki. And then, miraculously avoiding Sovietization and the loss of sovereignty, the dates were comforted, like all losers, by the fact that their losses were less. And so that fewer questions were asked on the topic "why was it all, if you still gave the Russians what they originally demanded", we cut the number of losses to a miserable 25 thousand. I could be wrong, but my opinion is this.
  28. 0
    23 May 2022 10: 37
    The article is a mixture of facts about the "winter war" but summarizing the subjective opinion of the author, frankly anti-Soviet conclusions.
    The Finnish war is a disaster for the USSR, the losses of the USSR are not comparable with Finland, but nevertheless, the tasks that the USSR set before the start of this war were completed. The result of this war for the Finns is the loss of 10% of the territory of their country, for the USSR, the move away from their borders, the border of a potentially dangerous state, the security of Leningrad and the Baltic fleet.
    Prehistory of the Finnish war and negotiations. Finland on the eve of the Finnish war was practically a reconnaissance base for third countries, the Finnish government refused the proposals of the Soviet government to move the border and in return receive compensation for the same amount of land in Karelia. The Soviet Union to the last tried to persuade the Finns, they refused. Well, on the eve of a big war, only liberoids cannot realize the danger of the Finnish army (and God knows who else) on the border of the union, 30 km from Leningrad, as Stalin said: "We cannot move Leningrad away from the border, so we will move the border away from Leningrad."
    Now about the essence and the "shame" of the Soviet troops, yes, the losses are huge, not comparable to the Finnish ones, BUT the tasks were completed, the Soviet Union moved the border, taking another 10% of the Finnish lands, taking the second city of Finland, Vyborg, and repelling the Finns' desire to participate in any aggressive alliances against the USSR. Now knowing about the Mannerheim line, that it is a natural and man-made fortification strip that is insurmountable for any army in the world, about what weather conditions were at the time of this war (frosts down to -50 degrees), now we can say that the Mannerheim line was impossible to overcome, BUT the Soviet soldier and the commander overcame it and forced the Finns to submit and agree to the conditions of the USSR! Yes! The losses of the USSR in this war are terrible and cannot be compared with the losses of the Finns, but after we passed the line of the Mannerheim, this ratio, if the Finns continued to resist, would begin to take shape not in their favor, now their losses would amount to hundreds of thousands of dead. So this war is not popular, tragic, but it was inevitable on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, and had Stalin not started this war then, it is not yet known how things would have turned out in the region of Leningrad and the entire north after 1941.