Is Russia's stake on strategic submarine missile carriers justified?
“Nevertheless, the OKM allowed Dönitz to build“ his ”submarine fleet and did not interfere (though did not render any assistance) in his affairs. By the 1938, Dönitz developed the tactics of group underwater attacks (wolf packs). He now needed 620-ton submarines (type VII) capable of operating in the Atlantic. But admirals, prone to gigantomania, plotted the construction of 2000-ton submarines, which, in their opinion, were more durable. Dönitz in a submarine was interested in other qualities: stealth, invulnerability to depth charges and low production costs. ” (tululu.org).
“I remind you: K-276 of Kostroma and Baton Rouge ... K-407 Novomoskovsk and Grayling ... All these nuclear submarine collisions took place in the Barents Sea in the 90s. May 23, 1981 at a polygon of the North fleet Not far from the Kola Bay, a collision of the Soviet strategic nuclear submarine of the Northern Fleet K-211 of project 667 BDR Kalmar and an American nuclear submarine of the Sturgeon class occurred.
First of all, I must say thank you to the distinguished Maxim Klimov for his article “Status” Deadlock ”, which, so to speak, initiated a long discussion on the subject of“ underwater weapons retaliation. " So, oddly enough, the most vulnerable component of the “system” seemed to the author not the Status devices themselves (around which the discussion was conducted), but their “media”.
No matter what anyone says, the task of “catching across the Atlantic / Pacific Ocean” these very “atomic high-speed deep-water torpedoes” does not seem so simple and easily solved. That's not the question. The devices themselves are quite dangerous and protected by depth and speed. They are not a weak link (at a reasonable price). The question is in the vulnerability of their carrier, which is not moving in the “fifth dimension”, but all in the same ocean, access to which from our bases is reliably “guarded” by the American ICTF (and not only ICFM).
That is, it is possible to look at this very problem purely from the point of view of these very pragmatic Yankees: why chase after insane Russian torpedoes across all seas and oceans, if you can simply and cheaply (for them now it is) to “eliminate” their carrier? Which is one. Well, let them be two or four. All one is not a problem. Here is the whole discussion around the "capture" of torpedoes at distant frontiers to me personally seemed somewhat contrived. What for?
This is about how an armored personnel carrier in modern conditions sometimes turns into a “burning tin can” for tightly packed infantrymen. That is, modern means of destruction are much more convenient and easier to burn the crew and troops of the BTR-a / BMP than to shoot them separately. And the carrier of these "supertorped"? Is he completely invisible? He will obviously be “fed”. American nuclear submarines firmly established in the vicinity of our bases, and even in Soviet times, much of our submarine missile carriers were “tracked”.
What is the point of catching individual torpedoes in the depths, if you can easily and simply destroy their carrier? And today things are exactly like this. At the moment of a “dramatic exacerbation of the situation”, simply release torpedoes into it (non-nuclear!). That is, here it the link seems to the author much weaker. Imagine, for simplicity, that the probability of intercepting the “Status” is 5 percent. Good. Just great. But the probability of destroying the “carrier” before reaching the launch line will clearly exceed 50 percent (in today's situation).
It’s just that the American Navy will inevitably turn a “personal guardian” or, rather, two. You do not consider them idiots? That is, it is necessary to analyze not how successfully the Poseidons will break through to the US coast and hit it, but how likely their launch is in a military-political crisis, turning into a purely military one.
And this is where the author begins to be plagued by vague doubts: after all, their carrier is fundamentally no different from other submarines. That is, its vulnerability will serve as the “weak link”, and not the vulnerability of “innovative torpedoes”. With all the desire such carriers can not be much (just expensive). And intelligence of the US Navy, of course, works.
A couple of years ago, when everyone was happy about the construction of the Crimean Bridge, the author just pessimistically noticed that our Western friends had probably already begun to work out options for “working with him”. And yes, yes - a provocation in the Kerch Strait. Quite expected, by the way.
In the end, his (carrier) is not necessary to drown, you can just cause him some damage. As if by chance. And he will not be able to complete the task. And to start a nuclear war because of an incomprehensible state of emergency with a submarine (albeit a secret one) no one in their right mind would be. Or will he swim on some separate, “secret” seas?
Remember the "Kursk"? "She drowned?" Too many questions arise from the combat use of these very "strategic" submarines. And specifically for their combat stability. Especially in conditions of actual domination of the US Navy in the World Ocean. And here it is not so important what these submarines are going to beat on the adversary - “super torpedoes” or ballistic missiles. The question is not this, the question is, will they live to strike? Here is such an "unexpected question arises. Nuclear triad, speak?
Here, even with the air component, the situation seems more predictable and understandable. That is, its capabilities and survival just do not bear any special surprises. But with the marine (underwater!) Component, everything is just not completely clear. Can she even shoot off? If in good Soviet times, when they did not spare money for defense, our submarine missile carriers were forced to make certain maneuvers (not always completely safe!) In order to throw off the "tail".
In Soviet times, when there were no special problems with the support forces, serious resources were spent on the launch of the missile carrier on combat duty ... and even then, "everything was not completely unambiguous." There is a big gap (chasm!) In the possession of the situation by a wide range of citizens and the people themselves, all of whom are involved.
Somehow it suddenly turned out (for the general public) that the American MTSPL was literally “grazing” at our naval bases. That is, they are not "somewhere far away" cutting through the waves of the sea ... they Here and now on our shores on duty. Literally close. And this, you know, somehow "unnerving." And we must understand that this very “idyll” of joint navigation of combat submarines under various flags is possible only in peacetime. During a crisis, everything will be "somewhat different."
In general, a relatively “normal” situation would be their presence “somewhere nearby.” But at the moment of crisis, they come close. As it turned out in the course of numerous incidents, they are already here in “peacetime”. That is, the ocean is certainly large, but just our naval bases have an unhealthy "flea market". And it seems the death of Kursk is from this series (there is still a lot of incomprehensible things there). And as if no one in their headquarters is afraid of anything to “ignite and provoke.”
Noble devils - if you want to face US NAVY head to head, you do not need to be dragged to Florida, why? They will meet you off the coast of Russia. We are so fond of telling and showing our mighty missile carriers, dissecting the depths of the oceans, that they somehow forget to mention that these very depths are quite habitable, like the surface of those oceans, well, and the heavens above them all ... In general, the Anglo-Saxons of the 80 years serious money in submarine detection systems, and the PLO experience is not childish.
They (not being clinical idiots) are well aware of the danger posed by our strategic submarine rocket carriers, and are taking appropriate measures. Up to capital investments in systems for continuous monitoring of ocean depths. And the forces of the PLO are, to put it mildly, well developed.
What is the trouble? The so-called submarine missile-carriers do not at all strengthen the power of the fleet in terms of just the sea war, but on the contrary, they seriously weaken it. Because in terms of sea war - this is not a “predator”, but a “prey”. He does not attack anyone at sea, it is necessary to defend him. That is, when the “strategists” and all the other ships go on the lists of the fleet warships (SF or Pacific Fleet) in a row — this is slightly wrong. Introduces the reader, so to speak, astray.
The submarine missile cruiser is, of course, big and scary, but it does not matter much in a sea collision. His task is to beat through half-planets across America, and not enemy ships. This is somehow usually overlooked. And he should carry out this “strategic” task exclusively in “greenhouse” conditions - that is, no one should interfere with him, and for this, in the area of his deployment, domination in the sea, on the sea surface and in the sky should be ours. Can we provide this condition today, at least in the Barents or Okhotsk seas?
Their (SSBN) as if we have a little left. And they cost, as it were, very, very much (incredibly because of our financial capabilities). And they can not risk it. That is, in the event of war, everything should be arranged not in the style of a heroic torpedo attack, but in the style of a quiet unloading of a wagon. They should not whip from anyone and should not count seconds. Their “suddenness” should be “strategic” and not “tactical” in nature - they surfaced quickly to the launch depth and shot out before they were sunk ...
That is, SSBN is a classic case when one is not a warrior in the field. Sorry, but “overcoming” is a bit of a wrong case in terms of a key element of the nuclear triad. The task of the missile carrier is precisely to “competently shoot off,” and not to hide from the enemy PLO. Probabilistic approach is not applicable here. Yes, the USSR could build a lot of missile carriers, did it make sense even then? Is not a fact.
It's not entirely clear that we are winning. Now, if we were hitting America with medium-range missiles, approaching its shores, then ... Then it's interesting! Saving. And the boat would be smaller (simpler, cheaper, less noticeable). But, as we proudly say, SSBNs can "shoot in America at least from the pier." Perfectly. But then why are they even needed? What is the profit? Say, they have incredible secrecy and combat stability? (So often said). Well, just here and begin to torment vague doubts. Our SSBNs are forced to swim in “one broth” with American (and not only) ships and submarines, which will hunt them in every way.
Here, of course, everything is “secret” and “strictly secret”, but, repeating, the heroic surprise attacks - the lot of the “ordinary” submarines, to demand this from the strategists is a bit wrong. Throw our small fleet to support the activities of submarine missile carriers? Well, I do not know. All one strength is not enough for this task. And on the other they just will not. Constantly to solve the problem, how can the missile carrier get away from the pursuit of the American MTSPL? Also not a gift. Especially considering the number of those and others.
Once again: the version about all sorts of "secret technologies and devices" rests on the fact that Americans will be very close. And they are very active (SSBN) to search. And the carrier of nuclear weapons directly (megaorpeda or missiles) is a secondary issue, and they are much less vulnerable (after launch!). In any case, the successful destruction (before launch) of any such missile carrier is a huge plus for the US Navy. Here we have too many eggs (rockets) in the “one basket”. And we can lose them all at once.
The situation when enemy acoustics hear the sound of “opening hatches of missile shafts” is called “sailed”. For fun, to deepen the Caspian Sea and launch a similar missile carrier (“Shark”!) Or “isolate” the Sea of Okhotsk. But, seriously, it is quite difficult to understand the enormous interest of the Russian leadership specifically to submarine rocket carriers: they do not go into space, and not into the “fifth dimension”. And quite a vulnerable.
And the carriers of the missiles themselves are extremely few and cost incredible money (and they are built for a very long time). Therefore, the idea of replacing the “Bulava” with “Status” is not immediately clear and not fully understood. the problem is not so much in the vulnerability of the missile / torpedo, as in the vulnerability of the carrier of torpedoes / missiles. With this, what to do? It seems to me that the absence of a “scared reaction” on the part of our sworn friends on “Poseidon” is explained precisely by this. Is not one damn, what will be on board the Russian strategic submarine, if it is still "overwhelmed"? Yes, even the hyperboloid of engineer Garin ...
Many thanks to Andrei from Chelyabinsk - he spoke in detail and in detail about the state of our fleet and its prospects (their absence). And he managed to please the venerable public with information that, they say, at least with the missile carriers, things are not bad with us ... And for what kind of woods are they needed, one asks? In this alignment of forces? On their own, without a support fleet (and without a marine aviation)? Engage in unbridled heroism and play Russian roulette? For such billions? I do not believe in the heroic lone SSBN. I do not believe.
At one time, it seemed that even the Soviet admirals wanted full-fledged aircraft carriers to cover the underwater "strategists" in the Barents Sea (somehow difficult and expensive even for the USSR, isn’t it?). That is not completely clear: why do we even need to climb into the salty ocean water with ballistic intercontinental rockets? Do we have enough land? Moreover, the rockets are all one “intercontinental”. And we leave the pier in search of invulnerability in the depths of the sea, which in fact is unattainable for us (with the existing ratio of sea forces).
I don’t need to explain why our dear overseas partners are doing this. For them, just the depths of the ocean can be a good shelter. Just as they can almost guaranteed to ensure the safety of their submarine missile. No problem. And does not require additional costs: the fleet is all the same.
In our case, the question can be formulated as follows: why do we need “Poseidon”, if there is a “Barguzin”? Again, from the point of view of the author, the ideal system. Reliable, stable and unobtrusive. Well, it can not be monstrously expensive. And it is much easier and cheaper to protect it. Still, for intercontinental rockets, the railway track is even better than wheels. Stable. And how will you “carry out” the “Barguzins”? Before the start of the conflict? Tell that. Sand in bucks bulk?
And the launch of a rocket from a steady land platform is much easier than sea firing. And the binding on the ground ... And the storms on the Russian Railways does not happen. None And difficult ice conditions on the surface. Well, the "classic centipedes" "MZKT" with the replacement of "Platform-O". Simple and tasteful. And also no serious risks “at a distance of a pistol shot”: neither “Abrams” nor “Leopard” will jump out of the bushes. And to repair and maintain multi-wheeled tractors on land is much easier. And imagine that just at the moment of the crisis on the SSBN there is a serious accident (one that is on duty). And what to do? He can not fight, go back meaningless.
The loss of one or two rocket trucks (at least ten!) On land (for technical reasons) does not affect the situation in any way. In the case of a mega-carrier, we put too many eggs in one large and very expensive basket, and Americans with “hammers” are actively running around in the vicinity of this basket. Good it may not end. For some reason, they like to photograph them. Submarine missile carriers. And starts with them like to take pictures. Because it "inspires". Much more for some reason, than launches from a mobile soil rocket complex or, especially, from a mine.
But here the combat value of these “strategists” is rather doubtful: all “launches” in peacetime, for obvious reasons, take place in the absence of opposition from the enemy. And then - there were certain problems ... Remember at least the epic with the "Bulava". That is, in peacetime, you can just test the ability of the complex to “shoot out” across America in “greenhouse conditions”. But the ability to perform it all in combat conditions is absolutely impossible to verify. Once again: the USSR had many “strategists” (as well as ships in general) and somehow they were “purely mathematically” more likely to survive. But there was also a fleet, besides strategists (large), there was naval aviation, there were PLO weapons ... And nevertheless, the USSR’s stakes on the naval component of the SNF raise questions.
What for? The American fleet is all one stronger. The Americans have a rather messy army, but the fleet there (historically) is very good! And rich naval traditions. And even in the two Soviet "bastions" (the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea), they actively sought to get through. Back in the Soviet era. And the American Navy was not an easy opponent even for the Soviet Navy during its heyday. Once again: the Americans need to distinguish between the fleet and the army, that is, the army from them is one thing, but the fleet is quite another.
That is, a power with maritime superiority may well rely on sea-based ballistic missiles. And the logic here is iron, that is, the Americans get all the advantages attributed to the naval component of the SNF in full. Then you and stealth, and freedom of maneuver, and a blow from an unexpected angle. Everything is present. For a country with a weak fleet (like today's Russia), the stakes on SSBNs are quite controversial (to put it mildly).
We will not be able to freely maneuver them over the oceans. We will not be given. Their secrecy in modern conditions is also very, very doubtful. If the Americans, if necessary, can “close” a very large part of the World Ocean from outsiders, then Russia today has problems with ensuring the security of its own naval bases. Well, why do you need underwater "strategists" in this situation? What do you intend to do with them? Where are they going to shoot you? From space?
It is quite understandable: at one time we were “conservative”: the Americans are making such ballistic-missile submarines — and we too will be! And by the way, they could. Made. Magnificent missile carriers. But with the question of their combat use everything is somewhat more complicated ... No, if Russia were a small, densely populated country (like Japan), then yes. Then all these submarine missile carriers would make sense. And a lot of sense! But Russia slightly more than Japan.
In our case, this component of the strategic triad raises more questions than it answers. If we had at hand a lifeless ocean without traces of human activity (as the ocean on the “backdrop” of a photo with a rocket carrier sometimes looks like, and they are based in rather wild places), then all this would make sense. In the current situation, its saturation with hostile fleets, just stationary means of detection and the decline of the Russian fleet ... well, I do not even know.
Present theoretically that the Russian military budget has doubled, and the cost of the fleet - three times. Imagine that we (as in computer strategy) have no problems with the workload of shipyards and their performance. Imagine that everything is fine (ideal). In the next ten years, could we ensure the safety of deploying SSBNs? In the coming 15 years? Even taking into account the fact that the financial capabilities of the United States are really declining and a mess is growing in their state.
The answer is likely to be negative. Simply, the fleet usually has a large strategic mobility (as opposed to ground forces). And our "friends" will simply concentrate their forces near the Russian naval base. Such cases, no one is to blame. Yes, you can "try" and you can "overcome", but what's the point? Why get involved in a pre-disadvantageous confrontation? All our efforts to protect the SSBN and combat their detection by the enemy will respond with a concentration of forces, which he clearly has more.
In the case of ground-based, the main problem is removed - the safety of the carrier until the launch. That is, they can be “carried out”, but strictly within the framework of a global sudden strike. And strictly remotely. Mobile ground-based missile systems must also be "spotted and caught," the mine ones need to be properly disfigured. That is, the task, of course, has a solution ... but not at all a trivial, or quite trivial, but obviously not quite effective. And that's typical: in spite of the presence of the monstrous “Sharks”, the United States for some reason, at one time, extremely painfully reacted to the appearance of the “Good fellow” BZhRK. That is, it seems to be - what is the significance for the USSR that this “supplement” could have? With his arsenal?
As it turns out - serious. And, apparently, the United States seriously considered a nuclear strike on the USSR, even in 80-s! And BZHRK they seriously interfered with something. What, strictly speaking, leads to sad thoughts.
That is, if the adversary builds aircraft carriers and submarine missile cruisers - this does not mean at all that we had to copy it “one to one”. In general, from the point of view of the author of the USSR, he paid extremely insufficient attention to the fleet. The standoff was global and it was unrealistic to win it only with a land army. Somehow I remember jokes about the Soviet "hypertrophied coastal defense fleet". That is just the fleet then it was necessary to pay much more attention. Heavy-duty GSVG is the most obvious inappropriate expenditure of forces and means. Well, she would have reached the Atlantic, then what? Play shell at the ocean?
That is, the fleet, then just need to build, and even today's Russia. But to begin with heavy aircraft carriers or giant submarine cruisers is not entirely correct. After all, just for our opponents, and this also applies to NATO countries and Japan, maritime communications are vital (unlike Russia). Therefore, it is absolutely critical to increase the offensive power of the fleet with the superiority of the enemy in tonnage. And since the days of Grand Admiral Dönitz, no one has invented anything better than submarines. That is, in our case, diesel-electric submarines and ICPEL. And there is no contradiction with what was written before, firstly, unlike the SSBNs, they can actually fight at sea, and secondly, their loss does not lead to failure in the sphere of “nuclear deterrence”.
For some reason, I immediately recall the renaming of “Deutschland”. Even the Germans understood that in war nothing can be guaranteed and any ship (even the largest, and especially the largest!) Can be drowned.
I am also “pessiming” on the SSBN: World Ocean, it’s like «common’ (international waters!), And South Koreans or Australians are different there, too, have something underwater and also cooperate with the United States. And there are different Canadians with Indians. And with China, everything is not completely clear. That is, it is still not clear from whom the “friendly torpedo will come aboard” (or who will “friendly” merge the information of the US Navy). And there are precedents for the destruction of the "drying" by the Turks and the "silt" by the Israelis (as if in "peacetime"). So, easily. By the way, the last one is frank stupidity, just from the sphere of "drawing into unnecessary confrontation." In this case, Israel with Russian air defense. That is, "you can do" does not mean at all that "you need to do."
And even if we had 3-4 times more resources for a naval war, it’s not a fact that it was the SSBN that should have been a priority. They are very bad at “fighting at sea”, they are not meant for that. And what they are intended for is much easier, cheaper and more reliable to decide from the mine / wheel / railway base (of course, the personal opinion of the author). And it is clear that launching a rocket from the depths of the sea is technically much more complicated, more expensive and more risky than starting a multi-centipede. And if the latter runs across the boundless Russian territory, then the missile cruiser floats just in international waters and in peacetime it can be pursued, hunted down and aimed at. And coming to him "right next" American ICPL no international law does not violate.
That is, of course, the modern Russian fleet should be modern, shock, but its targets should be ships, or enemy ships, or the most important objects of enemy infrastructure (cruise missiles are designed for this). To hang on him also the task of delivering a global strike is not entirely correct. We just theoretically do not have and will not have the resources so that he could solve this problem qualitatively.
But the construction of multi-purpose nuclear submarines (representing a serious threat to the enemy and possessing global mobility) just such a priority could be. As the construction of "classic" diesel-electric submarines, which need a lot. And do not forget about naval aviation. Well, we must understand that the fleet does not begin with the construction of mega-ships, but with ensuring the security of the naval bases.
No, just like the "heavy aircraft carriers" for propaganda of the SSBN are very good. “In brief,” but very solemnly, to tell about its unprecedented possibilities ... and to meaningfully shut up (about the rest of the support fleet and the rest of the fleet structure), as if giving the listener the opportunity to “think out”. But propaganda is one thing, but building a fleet is something completely different. And yes, the author doesn’t like the legendary “Sharks” at all. Incomprehensible some ship. Why we like to brag so much to us is not quite clear: it’s rather not the “Death Star”, but a fantastically interesting target for any submariner, a sort of underwater “Shinano”.
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