INF Treaty fell into a groundhog day
So, since February 2, the United States has suspended its participation in the INF Treaty (the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles), because "Russia is violating the Treaty." It is curious that this happened on Groundhog Day - there is a hidden symbolism in it.
So far this is not the end of the Treaty, but it is the beginning of its agony. We can say that the patient fell into a coma. And in six months he will be inevitable demise. At the same time, Trump's statements about the desire to conclude a new INF Treaty, but with the participation of China, are also generally untenable. For now, China will not agree to any INF agreements, if only because it is necessary to involve India, and there both Pakistan, and the DPRK, and, in an amicable way, and Israel. Are these countries ready for such an agreement? Not. Not ready, and China. Moreover, Chinese means of medium and shorter range are largely non-nuclear, and go to the elimination of this weapons under a nuclear agreement - why do it? Trump, perhaps, does not know and does not understand this, but his assistants, at least some of them, understand clearly, and this statement is only an attempt to play the ostentatious peacefulness. As well as our response peace statements. Everyone wants peace and is preparing to defend it at any cost, right down to a stone on a stone ...
The Americans give these half a year "for reflection" not because they are trying to show "goodwill" and give us time to "return to the execution of the Treaty", which we are not going to do in any case - whether we have violated it or not, no one has so far and not proven, nor is it proven otherwise. And we are not even going to because the USA is not going to correct its violations either (real ones and attributed to them, where without it). Just such a six-month pause is spelled out in the Treaty itself.
The Americans took advantage of the 2 clause by sending us a statement of exceptional circumstances. What will happen now? Well, to begin with, we can say that in these six months, neither side will take any real steps openly. The contract formally still acts, why openly violate it (if you can continue to do what you did, or do nothing if you did not violate anything).
But after that, when the termination of the INF Treaty becomes a fact, it will be possible to make some real open steps. For now, Russia can continue to deploy the Iskanders-M with both the old set of ballistic and cruise missiles, and with new launchers designed for 4 KR instead of 2 on the old one. The United States believes that about hundreds of such missiles are already in service with us in the "4 divisions." Obviously, we are talking about 16 SPU with 4 KR on each, well, and stock of missiles. You can notice the following about this launcher - it was already shown more than 10 years ago, and then it was issued for the Club PCR ground launch (export version of the sea-based CD 3М14, which the Iskander-M complex-level CD, like 9X728, shorter, which is longer (9М729). And there it came out as a result - it was useful in some capacity. Yes, for sure for this and was created.
By this very new launcher you can notice the following. If someone thinks that it is intended only for the CD, and the BR of the Iskander-M complex should not be placed on it, then there is reason to assume that he is mistaken. KR of this complex have transport and launch containers (TPK), and do not need a “barn” sheltering them from the miseries of the surrounding world and its sliding roof. Yes, to reduce radar visibility "barn" for missiles is useful, as well as for masking, but obviously it is intended not only for this - it would have been made less "capital." And it is intended to shelter in it missiles, TPK not having, that is, a complex of ballistic missiles. Probably also 4 pieces. At the same time, after the termination of the INF Treaty, nothing prevents the realization of the potential inherent in the complex, as in its “old” BR (such as realizing not only a quasi-ballistic, but also a ballistic trajectory, which allows a significant increase in the range, albeit to the detriment of invulnerability, but it can be improved ways), and the fact that the new launcher allows you to create a larger and longer-range BR under it. And the potential in the complex itself is in any case, the Americans were right there, accusing Russia of cunning or not, but it is. And the Defense Ministry’s 9М729 presentation, in general, did not prove to the Americans anything, including because no one was going to show the rocket itself, and all the more, its internal structure. But the Americans did not want to listen to anything, because it was all the more unnecessary. In general, the potential for increasing the range of both the park of the "old" launchers of the complex, and the "new" - is large. Even if the existing complex CDs do not violate the Treaty, nothing prevents them from placing their sea "sisters" on these launchers, which have a real range of up to 2600-3500 (according to various sources for non-nuclear and nuclear versions) kilometers. And it can be done very quickly.
Also, nothing will prevent the resumption of the program "Rubezh" suspended some time ago. Reorienting to the tasks of the BRSD this missile, declared and tested as an ICBM. But it did not show its maximum intercontinental range, confining itself to testing by launching the Kura to a range of the order of 6-6,5 thousand km, enough to qualify as an ICBM, but not enough for real intercontinental use. That, given the different name of the program "Rubezh-Avangard", probably did not need this system - there is a version that the system was developed for a similar planning winged combat unit, with which its range became sufficient to deliver free terawatts to the USA. But with a heavier warhead, equipped with a powerful set of means to overcome the missile defense system and, say, 4-6 combat non-maneuvering units, it may well be "declassified" to the class of BRSD. And all this can be done for a maximum of several years - that is, if not too rush.
The Americans have a completely different situation. Despite the existing target missiles, which can be formally attributed to the BRSD, they will not create war missiles based on them, they simply are not suitable for serious weapons of a serious nuclear power. So, the BRDS will have to be created almost from scratch, perhaps using the best practices of Israel, and you will have to remember something old. According to estimates, the creation of such systems with ranges up to 2200 km can take at least 7-8 years, or even more. And now, due to the lack of nuclear warheads for new missiles, the only thing the Americans can do so far is to deploy them first on stationary (those same land-mounted launchers of vertical naval launchers Mk.41 used in the US European missile defense program), and then on mobile launchers, non-nuclear marine missiles of the Tomahawk type. Which will not bring any real effect, because these CDs are more than enough on navy, where they have greater flexibility of application, and maneuverability, and incomparable survival than lonely standing insecure launch modules on land. Moreover, non-nuclear missiles, and their use against Russian air defense, in general, is unpromising, especially in those small quantities that can still be placed on land. And against the greatly improved, including through the efforts of Russia, Chinese air defense, in general, is also not very promising.
Despite the demonstrated condemnation of Russia and the support of the "peacemaking efforts" of the United States in the field of INF and NATO allies, no one is eager to host even non-nuclear items. Even such frostbitten russophobes, ready for almost everything, like the Poles, and in general, are not torn. It was reported that Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputovich allegedly told Spiegel in an interview about the desire to deploy nuclear missiles in Europe, but this was immediately disavowed by the Polish Foreign Ministry. Quote tass:
That is, Chaputovich had in mind precisely not some ground-based nuclear missiles that were extremely hypothetical in the next decade, but he was referring to the B-61 bombs stored in Europe. So far, nothing more will ever be able to be placed with all the desire — there are no missiles, much less warheads for them. And the recently launched "production", as it is portrayed in our often not very knowledgeable media, the low-power warhead W-76-2 (which is not production, but only the barbaric vivisection of the warhead W-76-1) is hardly likely to help - it is not intended for cruise missiles, and not for the BRSD, but it is intended for the Trident 2 D5 SLBMs.
It is possible that Russia, too, will not actively intimidate the Europeans with new medium-range missiles for now, but will continue to develop this topic on a sly, but, most likely, it will be a little different - the size of the grouping of such missiles will not yet inflate above the required minimum, but the potential for solving continental tasks without involving the triad of strategic nuclear forces will be more than sufficient. Especially considering aviation non-strategic and marine non-strategic nuclear weapons.
At the same time, however, there was information that the United States, on the other hand, is planning to deploy non-nuclear Tomahawks on Guam. Like, to create a threat to China. Honestly, I don’t even want to believe in such nonsense. Either the American sources who disseminated such information came up with it, or in high circles in Washington it became quite bad with adequacy. Guam is too far from China, so that even the pre-existing nuclear "Tomahawks" from there can fly to China. To the Chinese coast from there, on the shortest path, 3000 km, and the range of the nuclear variant was 2500km. But you need not only to fly to the coast. A non-nuclear "Tomahawks" significantly inferior in range. And why keep the KR there, if the ships of the US Pacific Fleet are already full of them? And they are quite capable of approaching a thousand or one and a half to the coast of China. Another question, if we are talking about Okinawa. From it to the Chinese coast - just 650 km, to the DPRK - 1300 km, to our Primorye - 1800 km. Or, say, about some other base in the territory of “independent” Japan, all of which is “independent” only for the expression of protests of Russia regarding activities in our Kuril Islands and for asking for these same islands, while making statements excluding the transfer of even the last stone from the ridge Habomai (for example, about the non-deployment of US bases). Of course, the non-nuclear-oriented KRs are not a particularly serious threat, especially against the background of the presence of the US Navy with them, but in this case it will have to take into account in its plans, first of all, the Chinese comrades. And bring something more ballistic on the old Japanese "friends." Safer to the Japanese from this, of course, will not, but it is unlikely they have the courage to blame their American patrons.
And in general, a world without the INF Treaty, despite a number of advantages that Russia will receive, will not become safer anyway.
So far this is not the end of the Treaty, but it is the beginning of its agony. We can say that the patient fell into a coma. And in six months he will be inevitable demise. At the same time, Trump's statements about the desire to conclude a new INF Treaty, but with the participation of China, are also generally untenable. For now, China will not agree to any INF agreements, if only because it is necessary to involve India, and there both Pakistan, and the DPRK, and, in an amicable way, and Israel. Are these countries ready for such an agreement? Not. Not ready, and China. Moreover, Chinese means of medium and shorter range are largely non-nuclear, and go to the elimination of this weapons under a nuclear agreement - why do it? Trump, perhaps, does not know and does not understand this, but his assistants, at least some of them, understand clearly, and this statement is only an attempt to play the ostentatious peacefulness. As well as our response peace statements. Everyone wants peace and is preparing to defend it at any cost, right down to a stone on a stone ...
The Americans give these half a year "for reflection" not because they are trying to show "goodwill" and give us time to "return to the execution of the Treaty", which we are not going to do in any case - whether we have violated it or not, no one has so far and not proven, nor is it proven otherwise. And we are not even going to because the USA is not going to correct its violations either (real ones and attributed to them, where without it). Just such a six-month pause is spelled out in the Treaty itself.
Article XV
1. This Agreement is perpetual.
2. Each Party, in the exercise of its state sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from this Agreement if it decides that the exceptional circumstances related to the content of this Agreement jeopardized its highest interests. It notifies the other Party of its decision to withdraw from this Agreement six months before withdrawal. Such a notification contains a statement of exceptional circumstances that the notifying Party regards as jeopardizing its highest interests.
1. This Agreement is perpetual.
2. Each Party, in the exercise of its state sovereignty, has the right to withdraw from this Agreement if it decides that the exceptional circumstances related to the content of this Agreement jeopardized its highest interests. It notifies the other Party of its decision to withdraw from this Agreement six months before withdrawal. Such a notification contains a statement of exceptional circumstances that the notifying Party regards as jeopardizing its highest interests.
The Americans took advantage of the 2 clause by sending us a statement of exceptional circumstances. What will happen now? Well, to begin with, we can say that in these six months, neither side will take any real steps openly. The contract formally still acts, why openly violate it (if you can continue to do what you did, or do nothing if you did not violate anything).
But after that, when the termination of the INF Treaty becomes a fact, it will be possible to make some real open steps. For now, Russia can continue to deploy the Iskanders-M with both the old set of ballistic and cruise missiles, and with new launchers designed for 4 KR instead of 2 on the old one. The United States believes that about hundreds of such missiles are already in service with us in the "4 divisions." Obviously, we are talking about 16 SPU with 4 KR on each, well, and stock of missiles. You can notice the following about this launcher - it was already shown more than 10 years ago, and then it was issued for the Club PCR ground launch (export version of the sea-based CD 3М14, which the Iskander-M complex-level CD, like 9X728, shorter, which is longer (9М729). And there it came out as a result - it was useful in some capacity. Yes, for sure for this and was created.
By this very new launcher you can notice the following. If someone thinks that it is intended only for the CD, and the BR of the Iskander-M complex should not be placed on it, then there is reason to assume that he is mistaken. KR of this complex have transport and launch containers (TPK), and do not need a “barn” sheltering them from the miseries of the surrounding world and its sliding roof. Yes, to reduce radar visibility "barn" for missiles is useful, as well as for masking, but obviously it is intended not only for this - it would have been made less "capital." And it is intended to shelter in it missiles, TPK not having, that is, a complex of ballistic missiles. Probably also 4 pieces. At the same time, after the termination of the INF Treaty, nothing prevents the realization of the potential inherent in the complex, as in its “old” BR (such as realizing not only a quasi-ballistic, but also a ballistic trajectory, which allows a significant increase in the range, albeit to the detriment of invulnerability, but it can be improved ways), and the fact that the new launcher allows you to create a larger and longer-range BR under it. And the potential in the complex itself is in any case, the Americans were right there, accusing Russia of cunning or not, but it is. And the Defense Ministry’s 9М729 presentation, in general, did not prove to the Americans anything, including because no one was going to show the rocket itself, and all the more, its internal structure. But the Americans did not want to listen to anything, because it was all the more unnecessary. In general, the potential for increasing the range of both the park of the "old" launchers of the complex, and the "new" - is large. Even if the existing complex CDs do not violate the Treaty, nothing prevents them from placing their sea "sisters" on these launchers, which have a real range of up to 2600-3500 (according to various sources for non-nuclear and nuclear versions) kilometers. And it can be done very quickly.
Also, nothing will prevent the resumption of the program "Rubezh" suspended some time ago. Reorienting to the tasks of the BRSD this missile, declared and tested as an ICBM. But it did not show its maximum intercontinental range, confining itself to testing by launching the Kura to a range of the order of 6-6,5 thousand km, enough to qualify as an ICBM, but not enough for real intercontinental use. That, given the different name of the program "Rubezh-Avangard", probably did not need this system - there is a version that the system was developed for a similar planning winged combat unit, with which its range became sufficient to deliver free terawatts to the USA. But with a heavier warhead, equipped with a powerful set of means to overcome the missile defense system and, say, 4-6 combat non-maneuvering units, it may well be "declassified" to the class of BRSD. And all this can be done for a maximum of several years - that is, if not too rush.
The Americans have a completely different situation. Despite the existing target missiles, which can be formally attributed to the BRSD, they will not create war missiles based on them, they simply are not suitable for serious weapons of a serious nuclear power. So, the BRDS will have to be created almost from scratch, perhaps using the best practices of Israel, and you will have to remember something old. According to estimates, the creation of such systems with ranges up to 2200 km can take at least 7-8 years, or even more. And now, due to the lack of nuclear warheads for new missiles, the only thing the Americans can do so far is to deploy them first on stationary (those same land-mounted launchers of vertical naval launchers Mk.41 used in the US European missile defense program), and then on mobile launchers, non-nuclear marine missiles of the Tomahawk type. Which will not bring any real effect, because these CDs are more than enough on navy, where they have greater flexibility of application, and maneuverability, and incomparable survival than lonely standing insecure launch modules on land. Moreover, non-nuclear missiles, and their use against Russian air defense, in general, is unpromising, especially in those small quantities that can still be placed on land. And against the greatly improved, including through the efforts of Russia, Chinese air defense, in general, is also not very promising.
Despite the demonstrated condemnation of Russia and the support of the "peacemaking efforts" of the United States in the field of INF and NATO allies, no one is eager to host even non-nuclear items. Even such frostbitten russophobes, ready for almost everything, like the Poles, and in general, are not torn. It was reported that Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputovich allegedly told Spiegel in an interview about the desire to deploy nuclear missiles in Europe, but this was immediately disavowed by the Polish Foreign Ministry. Quote tass:
"In a conversation with a German weekly journalist on the subject of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (DIS), the head of Polish diplomacy noted that Europe is currently based on nuclear deterrence guaranteed by the North Atlantic Alliance. American forces, including nuclear ones, "informs the agency.
“When asked about the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons in Poland, Minister Chaputovich clearly emphasized that“ we don’t want this at all. ”The head of Polish diplomacy did not rule out that in the future, as now, nuclear weapons will ensure peace in our part of the world. regarding the location of this type of weapon, however, are left to the discretion of NATO, "said the Polish Foreign Ministry, recalling that" nuclear weapons are currently in several European countries. "
“When asked about the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons in Poland, Minister Chaputovich clearly emphasized that“ we don’t want this at all. ”The head of Polish diplomacy did not rule out that in the future, as now, nuclear weapons will ensure peace in our part of the world. regarding the location of this type of weapon, however, are left to the discretion of NATO, "said the Polish Foreign Ministry, recalling that" nuclear weapons are currently in several European countries. "
That is, Chaputovich had in mind precisely not some ground-based nuclear missiles that were extremely hypothetical in the next decade, but he was referring to the B-61 bombs stored in Europe. So far, nothing more will ever be able to be placed with all the desire — there are no missiles, much less warheads for them. And the recently launched "production", as it is portrayed in our often not very knowledgeable media, the low-power warhead W-76-2 (which is not production, but only the barbaric vivisection of the warhead W-76-1) is hardly likely to help - it is not intended for cruise missiles, and not for the BRSD, but it is intended for the Trident 2 D5 SLBMs.
It is possible that Russia, too, will not actively intimidate the Europeans with new medium-range missiles for now, but will continue to develop this topic on a sly, but, most likely, it will be a little different - the size of the grouping of such missiles will not yet inflate above the required minimum, but the potential for solving continental tasks without involving the triad of strategic nuclear forces will be more than sufficient. Especially considering aviation non-strategic and marine non-strategic nuclear weapons.
At the same time, however, there was information that the United States, on the other hand, is planning to deploy non-nuclear Tomahawks on Guam. Like, to create a threat to China. Honestly, I don’t even want to believe in such nonsense. Either the American sources who disseminated such information came up with it, or in high circles in Washington it became quite bad with adequacy. Guam is too far from China, so that even the pre-existing nuclear "Tomahawks" from there can fly to China. To the Chinese coast from there, on the shortest path, 3000 km, and the range of the nuclear variant was 2500km. But you need not only to fly to the coast. A non-nuclear "Tomahawks" significantly inferior in range. And why keep the KR there, if the ships of the US Pacific Fleet are already full of them? And they are quite capable of approaching a thousand or one and a half to the coast of China. Another question, if we are talking about Okinawa. From it to the Chinese coast - just 650 km, to the DPRK - 1300 km, to our Primorye - 1800 km. Or, say, about some other base in the territory of “independent” Japan, all of which is “independent” only for the expression of protests of Russia regarding activities in our Kuril Islands and for asking for these same islands, while making statements excluding the transfer of even the last stone from the ridge Habomai (for example, about the non-deployment of US bases). Of course, the non-nuclear-oriented KRs are not a particularly serious threat, especially against the background of the presence of the US Navy with them, but in this case it will have to take into account in its plans, first of all, the Chinese comrades. And bring something more ballistic on the old Japanese "friends." Safer to the Japanese from this, of course, will not, but it is unlikely they have the courage to blame their American patrons.
And in general, a world without the INF Treaty, despite a number of advantages that Russia will receive, will not become safer anyway.
Information