"Sleeping" C-300 and "Buk-M2E" - only the visible part of the problems of air defense of Syria. To be continued?
There is absolutely no doubt that the E-1C “JSTARS” strategic radar reconnaissance aircraft made a significant contribution to the provision of tactical information to the IDF with the coordinates of the Artillery-С8, which (through the AFAR-RNL side-end radar) received radar images of target areas in the southern provinces of the SAR at the beginning of last week, during the transfer to one of the US air force bases in Western Asia. This fact alone is irrefutable evidence that the air defense systems of the SAR under Damascus are still not covered by modern ground-based electronic countermeasures of DPR-7 / 2 and Krasuha-4, operating in the centimeter X and Ku-wave bands, and noticeably reducing the effective range of the radar AN / APY-4. And therefore, the appearance of any (large and small-sized) facilities of the Syrian army in Damascus and its surroundings is instantly fixed by the operators of the RLC of the aircraft JSTARS.
As for the means of electronic warfare, about the effectiveness of which the Russian media have repeatedly stated in the SAR, they cover only military facilities of the Russian Navy and the Air Force of the Russian Federation in the vicinity of the military logistics post of the Russian Navy in Tartus and Avb Hamimim, and partly in the city of Masyyafa, where all three anti-missile divisions C-300PMU-2 "Favorite".
As a result, all the strategically important facilities of the Syrian government forces in the south of the republic are extremely vulnerable to both enemy radar reconnaissance equipment and to his motley nomenclature of air attack weapons, which was perfectly demonstrated during the last Israeli Air Force MRAU. Naturally, there can be no question whatsoever about the combat work regimes of the destroyed Syrian “Carapace”, as well as the actions of its calculation (such can be found in the comments on almost all reports about the last attack of the IDF and Hel Haavir on ATS) Considering the fact that only single batteries of these unique anti-aircraft missile-cannon systems were involved in repelling the impact (without support from the Buk-М6E XNUM-channel SAMs and advance targeting from modern XNUM radar detectors XL2 or “Gamma-C96”, which are not on the most missile-dangerous areas in Syria), interception of more than 6 elements of high-precision weapons the enemy can already be considered a kind of achievement. Why?
Yes, because the process of detecting, "tying up trails", as well as "capturing" dozens of inconspicuous Israeli drones-kamikaze "SkyStriker", guided bombs and long-range tactical missiles "Delila" was assigned exclusively to the shoulders of its own radar and optoelectronic means "Shells" - radar detectors 1RS1-1E, guidance radars 1RS2-1E "Helm" (capable of detecting " SkyStrikers "with an RCS of 0,005 - 0,01 sq. m at a distance of 5-7 km and capturing far from with a 100% probability), as well as 10ES1-E optoelectronic sights that have problems with detecting and capturing "cold targets" in the infrared range, especially at night, when it is not possible to correct the pointing process using the TV channel. The SkyStriker drone, represented by a glider made of composite materials and an electric motor with a pusher propeller, is just that inconspicuous element of the WTO with ultra-low radar and infrared signatures, which is much more difficult to detect than a 122-mm steel rocket projectile of the 9M22U MLRS "Grad" type, The experience of combating which the Pantsir-S1 has had for a long time.
Far more questions in all this stories it is caused by the fact that throughout the entire flight route (from the ejection trigger to the Pantsirey-С1 positions) SkyStrikers not only received control commands from Israeli operators from ground control stations near the Golan Heights, but also transmitted a fairly high-quality video image targets on the telemetric communication channel in the decimeter range.
Such an alignment speaks only about one thing: the Syrian armed forces are still deprived of modern tools of electronic intelligence and suppression of radio communication channels, as well as UAV controls, to which the Resident, Diabazol, etc. complexes can be partially attributed. It is not surprising that under similar conditions, when modern air defense and EW components more or less protect only the north-western part of Syria, the IDF will continue to implement its aggressive actions against the low-level missile defense system of the southern provinces of Syria.
Information sources:
http://www.russianarms.ru/forum/index.php?topic=8522.0
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/c300pmu2/c300pmu2.shtml
https://lenta.ru/news/2019/01/22/skystriker/
https://www.interfax.ru/world/646998
Information