The far line of the sea missile defense system is almost bare. At stake is the survival of the ship groups of the Russian Navy.
Since mid-summer 2018, a completely serious situation has been played out before our eyes with an attempt by high-ranking officials in charge of the defense industry and related research and production units to fully justify the refusal to fully finance ambitious and vital projects to preserve the strategic initiative of the Russian Armed Forces promising multi-functional stealth fighter T-50 PAK FA (Su-57) and the main combat tank next generation T-14, designed on the basis of the unified heavy tracked platform "Armata". So, the statements of the head of the State Duma commission on legal support for the development of defense industry organizations Vladimir Gutenev, as well as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation for the defense industry, Yuri Borisov, about the allegedly beyond the common man's understanding of the high cost of large-scale production and "thin services" of these machines (for the media, everything was presented precisely in such a form) brought out of the peace of mind a rather impressive contingent of our and many other news and military analytical resources.
Later, in early September, harsh reality was slightly embellished by the news about the release and delivery to the Russian Army tank units of an experimental military party of 132 T-14, T-15 and T-16 ARVs until 2022, about which during the international military Army-2018 technical forum was announced by Deputy Head of the Russian Defense Ministry Aleksey Krivoruchko. Nevertheless, it could be noted that this was not a fresh contract between the Ministry of Defense and JSC Uralvagonzavod Scientific Industrial Corporation, but a re-announcement of a deal already concluded by the beginning of 2016, which provided for the delivery of 70 T to tank brigades -14 Armata by the beginning of 2020. Whether Uralvagonzavod will be allocated the necessary funds for the announced rate of release of the MBT T-14 and BMP T-15 is not entirely clear. If we talk about a promising aviation complex front-line aviation Su-57, then everything is generally written with a pitchfork on water. So, by 2020 only a couple of Su-57s will gain operational combat readiness, which will soon go into service with the 4th Red Banner Combat Use and Retraining Center of the Russian Air Force Chkalov in Lipetsk.
But if the situation with the critical rate of renewal of the Russian Aerospace Forces by tactical aviation of the 5th generation can at least partially be compensated by intensifying the production of multi-functional 4 ++ generation fighters (Su-30SM, Su-35S and MiG-35) with airplanes A-100 RLDN (as well as a small number of Armata T-14 tanks can be partially replenished with extremely armored T-90M equipped with Arena-M active defense systems), the absence of a full-fledged anti-ballistic missile defense for naval strike groups navy fleet Unfortunately, Russia has absolutely nothing to cover. Indeed, in order to cover the Russian Navy’s formations in remote areas of the World Ocean, it is necessary to have in the surface component either advanced naval anti-aircraft missile systems of short, medium and long range, or modern carrier-based tactical aviation capable of intercepting any (even ultra-small) enemy air attack means airborne radars with PFAR and AFAR and missiles RVV-SD.
The second option can be immediately excluded. Only a small 279-th separate ship-based fighter air regiment deployed aboard the Admiral Kuznetsov TAKR, which had been set up for dock repair, and represented by deck fighters Su-33 and MiG-29КК / KUB with outdated H001K and Zhuk-M fighters, is not running; the only carrier-based strike force of the Russian Navy from the 55 — 60 of the most modern carrier-based fighter jets F / A-18E / F “Super Hornet” even by one American AUG. On the successful interception of more than 100 AGM-158C LRASM and AGM-84G / N anti-ship missiles launched from the Super Hornet suspension units, Su-33 and MiG-29К / KUB also do not speak: the maximum - 15-30 intercepted " Garpunov "and" LRASM "with the help of P-27EP and RVV-SD. Why so little?
Yes, because in parallel with the interception of anti-ship missiles at the far approaches to Admiral Kuznetsov, Su-33 and MiG-29K / KUB will have to conduct an unequal air battle with F / A-18E / F, equipped with AFAR-radars AN / APG-79 and air combat missiles AIM-120D. And this is without taking into account the support of Super Hornets by EW EA-18G “Growler” aircraft, which will be able to purposefully suppress the “ancient” radars of our deck “Dryers” and MiGs with response imitation and noise interference by means of perspective suspension containers of electronic countermeasures AN / ALQ-249 “ Next Generation Jammer ”, high-energy antenna modules of which are represented by active phased arrays, transmission modules of which are made on the basis of gallium nitride (GaN). Our Su-33 and MiG-29K, the geometrical dimensions of the radio transparent fairings which allow to place AFAR-RLS Н011 Bars and Zhuk-AE, continue to be in combat duty with the old radar stations that are not absolutely technically relevant to the challenges of the XXI century.
Therefore, in our case, all tasks related to the formation of a layered air defense / missile defense system of Russian naval strike groups can be assigned exclusively to modern shipboard anti-aircraft missile systems. And today in this component of the naval air defense there was formed a sickly “breach”, which consists in the loss of the possibility of intercepting any enemy air attacks on the distant approaches to the CCF. Initially, such a conclusion is valid only as applied to a low-freeboard portions, which are outside the radio horizon radar target illumination 3R41 "Wave" and 30N6E included in the architecture of the ship S-300F "Fort" and C-300FM "Fort M", because 5B55PM and 48Н6Е2 anti-aircraft missiles are equipped with semi-active radar GPS that require regular illumination from the ship's on-load tap-changer (up to the target's defeat), which is impossible beyond the limits of the radio horizon.
Today, the majority of surface ships equipped with long-range "Forts" are either chained to slipways or delivered to the dry docks of ship-repair enterprises for carrying out scheduled repairs and deep modernization. In particular, the heavy nuclear missile cruiser of the 1144.2М pr. Is undergoing a comprehensive modernization with the upgrade of the armament and radar systems at the berths in Severodvinsk and will be handed over to the fleet no earlier than 2021 of the year, the missile cruiser of the VNYAR pr. 1164 will also be sent for modernization, and its sistership - missile cruiser 1164.5 Ave. “Moscow” is in Sevastopol in anticipation of the final decision of the Main Committee of the Navy regarding its future fate. Thus, in the near future, only the 2 of the ship (TARC Peter the Great and the Marshal Ustinov RRC) can remain in the Russian Navy, capable of forming for our CCG long-range anti-aircraft prohibitions and restrictions on access and maneuver A2 / AD. In other words, the crisis of the operational and tactical capabilities of the Russian Navy to close the airspace for the enemy over the areas of future naval operations.
For example, if earlier, when the number of carrier cruisers of the Fort / -M complexes was enough to head several KUG long-range campaigns at once, NATO naval antisubmarine aircraft were forced to keep a distance of about 90 — 150 km from our order (depending on “Fort”), against the background of the absence of these ships as part of our naval formations Orions, Poseidons and other cruise scum of naval aviation, NATO can safely approach our ships at a distance of only 50 — 55 km (just such a distance Stell-1 ship-based air defense systems mounted on frigates of the “Admiral Series” project of the 11356 “Petrel” project have a kind of action. If we are talking about the ship grouping on the base of the frigate of the 11540 “Fearless” Avenue and large anti-submarine ships of the 1155 / 1 “Take away / -II”, then enemy aircraft can approach the grouping only 15 km, since the radii complexes "Dagger" and two combat modules of the KZRAK "Dirk" are only 12 and 8 km, respectively. The low altitude of the target to be hit in 6 km, as well as the radio command command of the 9М330-2 anti-aircraft missiles, will not allow the Dagger to stop the penetration of an enemy rocket into the zone of his own “dead funnel” directly above the ship (during a vertical dive from 10 — 12).
Moreover, let us voice another tangible problem of the presence in the armament of the naval personnel of the grouping of only self-defense systems. The AGM-15E AARGM anti-radar missiles (or even the old HARMs) launched by the deck aviation of the enemy from the 88 km distance will reach the near borders of the Udalyi and the Fearless anti-aircraft missiles with a still undeveloped solid propellant charge. So, the flying speed will be maximum (of the order of 2300 km / h), and this will at times complicate the process of interception and "Daggers", and "Dirks", and, of course, AK-630M. In the case of “Moscow” or “Marshal Ustinov”, those launched from the 90 — 100 km AGM-88E distance will burn out a solid propellant charge and, due to aerodynamic braking, slow down to 1600 — 1400 km / h directly in the ZAKi zone. Here is another important advantage of the presence of ships equipped with long-range air defense systems as part of the TUG.
It would seem that the situation can be rectified by the newest URO frigates of project 22350 "Admiral Gorshkov", equipped with promising anti-aircraft missile systems "Redut" and unique anti-aircraft guided missiles 9M96DM, capable of destroying targets by the method of kinetic destruction "hit-to-kill" at a distance of 2 up to 130-150 km. Moreover, on October 1, during his interview with the authoritative news and military-analytical agency Janes's, Igor Ponomarev, General Director of PJSC Severnaya Verf Shipyard, added optimism with information about 99% readiness of the second frigate Admiral Kasatonov, which Should be handed over to the fleet at the end of 2019; he also spoke about the stable construction process of the 3rd and 4th ships of project 22350 "Admiral Golovko" and "Admiral Isakov", the first of which is being prepared for launching, and the second has entered the stage of docking of the hull blocks. Thus, it turns out that by the beginning of the 20s the Russian fleet will have at its disposal already 2 frigates of project 22350, capable of complementing Marshal Ustinov and Peter the Great in the task of creating a long-range ABM line of the Russian Navy in the sea and ocean theaters of military action.
But the positive background of what is happening completely overshadows the absence of any intelligible information about the successful tests of the 9М96Д / ДМ family of anti-aircraft missiles both as part of the ship's Redut air defense system and as part of the Vityaz and C-350 “Triumph” anti-aircraft missile systems ", While the information presented by the mass media about the successful tests of the" Reduce "on the" Dan-M "target is none other than the full-scale tests of the" near asset "of the complex - the 400М9 anti-aircraft guided missile; .100 "Savvy" blue waiting on the internet with 20380 year. Judging by the photo from the fields of the International Aviation and Space Salon MAKS-2014, 2017М9 is slightly modified for the sea-based anti-aircraft family 100М9-330 "Dagger".
It is not equipped with either a gas jet or interceptor thrust vector deflection system, or transverse control gas-dynamic engines to increase maneuverability, or an active radar homing system, and therefore it is not worth expecting opportunities from the CAMM British Sea Ceptor complex from it. The very impressive effective reflective surface and moderate maneuverability of the Tank-M target (9G) makes its interception noticeably simpler than, for example, the destruction of the promising French-British supersonic RPC CVS401 "Perseus"; and therefore we draw the appropriate conclusions. The only data that official military-analytical resources currently possess is serious problems with the target capture mode through ARGSN of one of the 9М96 modifications during the Triumph fire tests in the 2011 year.
And therefore, the anti-aircraft capabilities of the Poliment-Redut complex still do not provide confidence that long-distance air approaches to our KUG will be reliably protected from the penetration of high-precision elements. weapons the adversary. Without the 9M96DM, all the 22350 Avenue frigates will be only carriers of the Caliber-NK family of anti-ship, strategic and anti-submarine missiles, as well as floating 16-channel multipurpose radars Polimer, for the realization of unique capabilities that simply will not 9М100 self-defense missiles. One should not expect the enemy strike grouping from them during the “star raid” of the enemy anti-ship missiles, especially if warrant ships are scattered over a large area of the marine theater due to the peculiarities of the tactical situation. We can only judge the receiving path of the active radar 9М96Е2 / DM radar only by such a litmus test, as the start of deliveries of the first divisions of the Vityaz C-350 air defense system, which had already been repeatedly broken.
Information sources:
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/fort_m/fort_m.shtml
http://forum.militaryparitet.com/viewtopic.php?id=22265
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-611.html
http://bastion-karpenko.ru/9m96/
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-13.html
http://airwar.ru/enc/fighter/su33.html
http://airwar.ru/enc/fighter/mig29kub.html
https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/fa18/
https://vpk.name/news/153851_persei__konkurent_bramosa.html
Later, in early September, harsh reality was slightly embellished by the news about the release and delivery to the Russian Army tank units of an experimental military party of 132 T-14, T-15 and T-16 ARVs until 2022, about which during the international military Army-2018 technical forum was announced by Deputy Head of the Russian Defense Ministry Aleksey Krivoruchko. Nevertheless, it could be noted that this was not a fresh contract between the Ministry of Defense and JSC Uralvagonzavod Scientific Industrial Corporation, but a re-announcement of a deal already concluded by the beginning of 2016, which provided for the delivery of 70 T to tank brigades -14 Armata by the beginning of 2020. Whether Uralvagonzavod will be allocated the necessary funds for the announced rate of release of the MBT T-14 and BMP T-15 is not entirely clear. If we talk about a promising aviation complex front-line aviation Su-57, then everything is generally written with a pitchfork on water. So, by 2020 only a couple of Su-57s will gain operational combat readiness, which will soon go into service with the 4th Red Banner Combat Use and Retraining Center of the Russian Air Force Chkalov in Lipetsk.
But if the situation with the critical rate of renewal of the Russian Aerospace Forces by tactical aviation of the 5th generation can at least partially be compensated by intensifying the production of multi-functional 4 ++ generation fighters (Su-30SM, Su-35S and MiG-35) with airplanes A-100 RLDN (as well as a small number of Armata T-14 tanks can be partially replenished with extremely armored T-90M equipped with Arena-M active defense systems), the absence of a full-fledged anti-ballistic missile defense for naval strike groups navy fleet Unfortunately, Russia has absolutely nothing to cover. Indeed, in order to cover the Russian Navy’s formations in remote areas of the World Ocean, it is necessary to have in the surface component either advanced naval anti-aircraft missile systems of short, medium and long range, or modern carrier-based tactical aviation capable of intercepting any (even ultra-small) enemy air attack means airborne radars with PFAR and AFAR and missiles RVV-SD.
The second option can be immediately excluded. Only a small 279-th separate ship-based fighter air regiment deployed aboard the Admiral Kuznetsov TAKR, which had been set up for dock repair, and represented by deck fighters Su-33 and MiG-29КК / KUB with outdated H001K and Zhuk-M fighters, is not running; the only carrier-based strike force of the Russian Navy from the 55 — 60 of the most modern carrier-based fighter jets F / A-18E / F “Super Hornet” even by one American AUG. On the successful interception of more than 100 AGM-158C LRASM and AGM-84G / N anti-ship missiles launched from the Super Hornet suspension units, Su-33 and MiG-29К / KUB also do not speak: the maximum - 15-30 intercepted " Garpunov "and" LRASM "with the help of P-27EP and RVV-SD. Why so little?
Yes, because in parallel with the interception of anti-ship missiles at the far approaches to Admiral Kuznetsov, Su-33 and MiG-29K / KUB will have to conduct an unequal air battle with F / A-18E / F, equipped with AFAR-radars AN / APG-79 and air combat missiles AIM-120D. And this is without taking into account the support of Super Hornets by EW EA-18G “Growler” aircraft, which will be able to purposefully suppress the “ancient” radars of our deck “Dryers” and MiGs with response imitation and noise interference by means of perspective suspension containers of electronic countermeasures AN / ALQ-249 “ Next Generation Jammer ”, high-energy antenna modules of which are represented by active phased arrays, transmission modules of which are made on the basis of gallium nitride (GaN). Our Su-33 and MiG-29K, the geometrical dimensions of the radio transparent fairings which allow to place AFAR-RLS Н011 Bars and Zhuk-AE, continue to be in combat duty with the old radar stations that are not absolutely technically relevant to the challenges of the XXI century.
Therefore, in our case, all tasks related to the formation of a layered air defense / missile defense system of Russian naval strike groups can be assigned exclusively to modern shipboard anti-aircraft missile systems. And today in this component of the naval air defense there was formed a sickly “breach”, which consists in the loss of the possibility of intercepting any enemy air attacks on the distant approaches to the CCF. Initially, such a conclusion is valid only as applied to a low-freeboard portions, which are outside the radio horizon radar target illumination 3R41 "Wave" and 30N6E included in the architecture of the ship S-300F "Fort" and C-300FM "Fort M", because 5B55PM and 48Н6Е2 anti-aircraft missiles are equipped with semi-active radar GPS that require regular illumination from the ship's on-load tap-changer (up to the target's defeat), which is impossible beyond the limits of the radio horizon.
Today, the majority of surface ships equipped with long-range "Forts" are either chained to slipways or delivered to the dry docks of ship-repair enterprises for carrying out scheduled repairs and deep modernization. In particular, the heavy nuclear missile cruiser of the 1144.2М pr. Is undergoing a comprehensive modernization with the upgrade of the armament and radar systems at the berths in Severodvinsk and will be handed over to the fleet no earlier than 2021 of the year, the missile cruiser of the VNYAR pr. 1164 will also be sent for modernization, and its sistership - missile cruiser 1164.5 Ave. “Moscow” is in Sevastopol in anticipation of the final decision of the Main Committee of the Navy regarding its future fate. Thus, in the near future, only the 2 of the ship (TARC Peter the Great and the Marshal Ustinov RRC) can remain in the Russian Navy, capable of forming for our CCG long-range anti-aircraft prohibitions and restrictions on access and maneuver A2 / AD. In other words, the crisis of the operational and tactical capabilities of the Russian Navy to close the airspace for the enemy over the areas of future naval operations.
For example, if earlier, when the number of carrier cruisers of the Fort / -M complexes was enough to head several KUG long-range campaigns at once, NATO naval antisubmarine aircraft were forced to keep a distance of about 90 — 150 km from our order (depending on “Fort”), against the background of the absence of these ships as part of our naval formations Orions, Poseidons and other cruise scum of naval aviation, NATO can safely approach our ships at a distance of only 50 — 55 km (just such a distance Stell-1 ship-based air defense systems mounted on frigates of the “Admiral Series” project of the 11356 “Petrel” project have a kind of action. If we are talking about the ship grouping on the base of the frigate of the 11540 “Fearless” Avenue and large anti-submarine ships of the 1155 / 1 “Take away / -II”, then enemy aircraft can approach the grouping only 15 km, since the radii complexes "Dagger" and two combat modules of the KZRAK "Dirk" are only 12 and 8 km, respectively. The low altitude of the target to be hit in 6 km, as well as the radio command command of the 9М330-2 anti-aircraft missiles, will not allow the Dagger to stop the penetration of an enemy rocket into the zone of his own “dead funnel” directly above the ship (during a vertical dive from 10 — 12).
Moreover, let us voice another tangible problem of the presence in the armament of the naval personnel of the grouping of only self-defense systems. The AGM-15E AARGM anti-radar missiles (or even the old HARMs) launched by the deck aviation of the enemy from the 88 km distance will reach the near borders of the Udalyi and the Fearless anti-aircraft missiles with a still undeveloped solid propellant charge. So, the flying speed will be maximum (of the order of 2300 km / h), and this will at times complicate the process of interception and "Daggers", and "Dirks", and, of course, AK-630M. In the case of “Moscow” or “Marshal Ustinov”, those launched from the 90 — 100 km AGM-88E distance will burn out a solid propellant charge and, due to aerodynamic braking, slow down to 1600 — 1400 km / h directly in the ZAKi zone. Here is another important advantage of the presence of ships equipped with long-range air defense systems as part of the TUG.
It would seem that the situation can be rectified by the newest URO frigates of project 22350 "Admiral Gorshkov", equipped with promising anti-aircraft missile systems "Redut" and unique anti-aircraft guided missiles 9M96DM, capable of destroying targets by the method of kinetic destruction "hit-to-kill" at a distance of 2 up to 130-150 km. Moreover, on October 1, during his interview with the authoritative news and military-analytical agency Janes's, Igor Ponomarev, General Director of PJSC Severnaya Verf Shipyard, added optimism with information about 99% readiness of the second frigate Admiral Kasatonov, which Should be handed over to the fleet at the end of 2019; he also spoke about the stable construction process of the 3rd and 4th ships of project 22350 "Admiral Golovko" and "Admiral Isakov", the first of which is being prepared for launching, and the second has entered the stage of docking of the hull blocks. Thus, it turns out that by the beginning of the 20s the Russian fleet will have at its disposal already 2 frigates of project 22350, capable of complementing Marshal Ustinov and Peter the Great in the task of creating a long-range ABM line of the Russian Navy in the sea and ocean theaters of military action.
But the positive background of what is happening completely overshadows the absence of any intelligible information about the successful tests of the 9М96Д / ДМ family of anti-aircraft missiles both as part of the ship's Redut air defense system and as part of the Vityaz and C-350 “Triumph” anti-aircraft missile systems ", While the information presented by the mass media about the successful tests of the" Reduce "on the" Dan-M "target is none other than the full-scale tests of the" near asset "of the complex - the 400М9 anti-aircraft guided missile; .100 "Savvy" blue waiting on the internet with 20380 year. Judging by the photo from the fields of the International Aviation and Space Salon MAKS-2014, 2017М9 is slightly modified for the sea-based anti-aircraft family 100М9-330 "Dagger".
It is not equipped with either a gas jet or interceptor thrust vector deflection system, or transverse control gas-dynamic engines to increase maneuverability, or an active radar homing system, and therefore it is not worth expecting opportunities from the CAMM British Sea Ceptor complex from it. The very impressive effective reflective surface and moderate maneuverability of the Tank-M target (9G) makes its interception noticeably simpler than, for example, the destruction of the promising French-British supersonic RPC CVS401 "Perseus"; and therefore we draw the appropriate conclusions. The only data that official military-analytical resources currently possess is serious problems with the target capture mode through ARGSN of one of the 9М96 modifications during the Triumph fire tests in the 2011 year.
Perspective 2-swing anti-ship missile CVS401 "Perseus" (designed by British and French units of MBDA) should be intercepted at the distant approaches to the friendly order CUG, as the device will use its main "trump card" - the release of two 50 -kilogram small-sized adjustable ammunition, for the destruction of which the computational facilities of the CRAFT "Dirk" and "Pantsir-M" just do not have enough reaction time
And therefore, the anti-aircraft capabilities of the Poliment-Redut complex still do not provide confidence that long-distance air approaches to our KUG will be reliably protected from the penetration of high-precision elements. weapons the adversary. Without the 9M96DM, all the 22350 Avenue frigates will be only carriers of the Caliber-NK family of anti-ship, strategic and anti-submarine missiles, as well as floating 16-channel multipurpose radars Polimer, for the realization of unique capabilities that simply will not 9М100 self-defense missiles. One should not expect the enemy strike grouping from them during the “star raid” of the enemy anti-ship missiles, especially if warrant ships are scattered over a large area of the marine theater due to the peculiarities of the tactical situation. We can only judge the receiving path of the active radar 9М96Е2 / DM radar only by such a litmus test, as the start of deliveries of the first divisions of the Vityaz C-350 air defense system, which had already been repeatedly broken.
Information sources:
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/fort_m/fort_m.shtml
http://forum.militaryparitet.com/viewtopic.php?id=22265
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-611.html
http://bastion-karpenko.ru/9m96/
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-13.html
http://airwar.ru/enc/fighter/su33.html
http://airwar.ru/enc/fighter/mig29kub.html
https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/fa18/
https://vpk.name/news/153851_persei__konkurent_bramosa.html
Information