Americans will stay in Afghanistan
During the recent swift voyage to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, President Barack Obama of the United States signed with his local counterpart Hamid Karzai a strategic partnership agreement that will regulate the relationship between Washington and Kabul after the withdrawal of US and NATO troops from the IRA in 2014.
Simple explanation
According to the document, the United States undertakes to support the social and economic development of Afghanistan, as well as to ensure security in the country up to 2024, for which 20 thousands of overseas superpower will be here. They will have to train Afghan security forces and take part in operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban militants.
The Americans are refusing not only permanent military bases in Afghanistan, but they are already stopping sudden raids on human settlements. In exchange, the Kabul regime pledges to provide the United States with the opportunity to use military facilities in the country. The agreement states: the United States recognizes the IRA as its main ally in the world from among non-NATO countries.
It is quite natural that in this treaty many in Russia have discovered the disclosure of the “true designs of Washington”, which will necessarily retain its military presence in the “heart of Asia”, from where it will carry the deadly threat to the Russian Federation, China, Iran and all progressive humanity.
Unfortunately, anti-American paranoia, mixed with total incompetence, has become simply dangerous in our country. Attributing to Washington literally devilish designs and similar supernatural opportunities seriously affects Russian politicians and the general mental health of Russians.
Meanwhile, the Kabul agreement has a much simpler explanation: the United States and its allies lost the war in Afghanistan (as we know, they are not the first). However, they want the defeat not to be complete and absolute, the situation has not returned, because of which in 2001, the campaign had to be started. By the way, if we recall the relatively recent past, we will have to state that the United States itself created the situation, but now there is no special point in talking about this. What is today is what it is.
Accordingly, the Americans hope to have at least some control over the situation in Afghanistan (and, apparently, in neighboring countries) with the help of “special forces-unmanned” operations that have been well developed in recent years. This is such a kind of high-tech version of the rebel war. It is best to fight partisans using partisan methods, which military experts have long known about. However, modern technological sophistication (Drones, satellite navigation, night vision devices, etc.) can significantly increase the effectiveness of counterguerrilla operations.
Apparently, Washington hopes to break the trend when the ruling regime of a developing country after the withdrawal of foreign “patron” troops collapses under the pressure of armed formations of local opponents in about two years . Moreover, the deployment of at least small groups of American special forces in Afghanistan should be no less important psychologically than in the military: even if the Afghan authorities and security forces retain the feeling that they were not left to fend for themselves and have someone to rely on in the event of a sharp deterioration .
However, the latter may be just an illusion. Special forces units are able to smash small militant units, and drones can destroy the leaders of the kaidists and the Taliban. But neither the special forces nor the UAVs will be able to contain the large-scale offensive of Karzai’s opponents, especially if Pakistan is behind them (and he will almost certainly support the massive onslaught of the Taliban, since it is Islamabad’s most important geopolitical tool). And then the remaining Americans in Afghanistan will have to flee. Naturally, the smaller, more compact and more mobile their forces will be, the easier and faster evacuation will take place. Apparently, this was the most important consideration (except, of course, the financial side) when the United States refused from the permanent bases in Afghanistan.
Extremely difficult task
In Russia, for some reason, the sacred significance of the concept of “military base” is attached. As if this is such a special option in a computer game, the receipt of which immediately provides the player with an automatic victory. Meanwhile, nothing in this case is automatically provided, on the contrary, the likelihood of the occurrence of enormous problems is great.
The value of a foreign military base is determined by how it allows you to deploy active hostilities in the event of an armed conflict. And this primarily depends on whether its supply with consumable materials (ammunition, fuel, food, medicines, spare parts), which in modern war "fly away" with great speed, is ensured. For example, the Russian bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia very significantly reinforce the grouping of Russian troops opposing Georgia, since they are pushed into the depths of Georgian territory, and the delivery of everything needed from Russia is reliably and guaranteed.
But our group in Transnistria does not create anything for Moscow except problems: if an armed conflict suddenly breaks out between the Russian Federation and NATO, it will not be possible to ensure its supply (it is blocked by Ukraine) and it will be lost immediately and completely.
By the way, the “NATO base in Ulyanovsk”, even if someone really planned to create such in Brussels or Washington, being inside Russia at a considerable distance from the borders of any of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, would not have lasted even two days if tried use the facility in the Volga region for aggression against Russia. NATO would not only lose one hundred percent of the forces and assets deployed in Lenin’s homeland, but would also suffer huge losses in aviation, trying to transfer the "air bridge" to a doomed base.
A similar situation would have been for the USA in Afghanistan if they had permanent bases there. This country, I remind you, has no access to the sea, and in dealing with the issues of supplying objects on its territory, Americans are dependent on the surrounding Iranian states (at least until the invention of teleportation, which is clearly not foreseen). Russia, China, the former Soviet Central Asian republics, Pakistan and Iran must provide their land routes and / or open their airspace for the transport of goods destined for the American group. However, Tehran is a fierce enemy of Washington, and in the capitals of other countries bordering Afghanistan with great pleasure will be engaged in blackmailing the United States, knocking out the most favorable conditions for providing American troops.
The task is doubly complicated by the fact that Afghanistan is in the Eastern, and the United States is in the Western Hemisphere. It is difficult to solve it even in the absence of any opposition.
Moreover, Pakistan may well become a second Iran, only worse, since Islamabad already has a nuclear weapon, and enough quality means of delivery. As mentioned above, if the Taliban move to Kabul, Pakistan will certainly support them (it is possible that parts of the Pakistani army will take part in the offensive). Naturally, Islamabad and Washington will be in a state of direct military confrontation. And then the supply of US bases will depend entirely on the countries of Central Asia, and also (at least indirectly) on Russia and China, which have a very large influence on the authorities of these states.
However, Beijing has recently finally established itself as the main geopolitical ally and patron of Islamabad, and also has very serious views of the natural resources of Afghanistan. Accordingly, the Celestial Empire will do everything to create maximum problems for the Americans. The position of Moscow in such a situation is more difficult to predict, but it is clear that complete dependence on Russia in such a critical situation is completely unacceptable for Washington.
Due to the circumstances described, it is completely absurd to fear that Americans from bases in Afghanistan will strike at Russia and China. More precisely, these objects can be used against the Russian Federation, if Beijing and Islamabad agree to this. Or against China and Pakistan, if such an operation is approved by the countries of Central Asia and Moscow. There is no third. Theoretically, none of these options is possible, but it is difficult to present their practical implementation in the foreseeable future. Even attacking Iranian territory from Afghanistan will be extremely difficult.
Thus, for reasons of geographic nature, full-fledged military bases in Afghanistan would become for the United States not an option, but a grave problem, requiring very large expenditures, in addition to being useless. That is why Washington refused to create these bases.
Rearguard battles
The special forces and UAV units left in Afghanistan will apparently be incorporated into the army and security forces of the Kabul regime. The Americans will be engaged in the implementation of the most difficult combat missions and will act as instructors for the Afghan wards, and also, of course, as overseers over them. Even now, desertion from the army and the police of the IRA is widespread. If the foreign contingent leaves, they can simply “evaporate” or fall into tribal formations. Moreover, such a development is quite likely even without tangible pressure from the Taliban, and if they launch a massive attack, the collapse of the security forces of the Karzai government is almost guaranteed. The presence of American special forces in the Afghan units will play a significant stimulating role to increase their stability in battle.
However, as mentioned above, all this will be effective only up to a certain limit. Of course, the presence of Americans will increase the combat capability of the Afghan units. But if the onslaught of the enemy formations in combination with religious and nationalist propaganda turns out to be powerful, then for every American soldier there will be a very real prospect of getting a bullet in the back. As if from their own. However, a good level of US special forces training should help reduce losses. But not to win the war.
Thus, the United States will be able to avoid a complete and final collapse in Afghanistan only by reconciling with the Taliban and Islamabad, which would have isolated Al Qaeda’s remnants (this was done in Iraq). It is extremely difficult to determine how realistic this is. The Taliban and their Pakistani patrons are well aware: time is playing against the Americans, so you just have to wait for the departure of the main forces of the enemy. They do not intend to go on a compromise in the form of admission to some power structures, because they want to get power entirely. It is extremely difficult to assume that in the remaining two years, the US troops, together with the contingents of their allies, will inflict such a heavy defeat on the Taliban that he will agree to concessions or they will not be needed by the Americans. If the anti-Taliban coalition did not achieve this in 12 years, will it really work out in just two years? Especially when the Europeans are quite frankly striving "to the exit", having lost the remnants of the already very insignificant desire to fight.
It is not possible to create Afghan armed forces capable of seriously opposing not only the Taliban, but also Pakistan. Attempting to solve this problem will require huge material costs from Washington without any guarantee of success. The gap in military capabilities between the Armed Forces of Kabul and Islamabad, as well as in the levels of military and moral-psychological training of military personnel is too large to be made up even with the help of the United States. Moreover, China stands behind Pakistan, which is also able to render assistance to its allies, and the possibilities of the PRC in this respect are now almost equal with the American ones.
In general, after the withdrawal of the Western coalition, the fate of Afghanistan will be decided in Islamabad and Beijing, it is absolutely inevitable. It is not excluded that Washington hopes to contain external expansion due to even the symbolic presence of American troops in the IRA. For a time, this factor will probably act, but not for long. First, the Taliban are like an internal Afghan force, which masks the fact of external interference. Secondly, in Islamabad and Beijing they will understand (or have already understood) that, for Western countries, leaving does not mean returning. At least so far there have been no precedents. Especially with the supply problems described above.
Fully leaving Iraq, the Americans will not return to it. And if in two years they keep some “limited contingent” in Afghanistan, it will never become the core of the new grouping. The question will be only when and how he leaves the IRA. The era of American hegemony is over, now the United States is fighting rearguard battles. Just for the time being, very few have realized this fact. But gradually awareness will come to all. And the struggle will begin for the “American inheritance”, in which there will be a mass of unexpected and extremely unpleasant (including for Russia) subjects.
Simple explanation
According to the document, the United States undertakes to support the social and economic development of Afghanistan, as well as to ensure security in the country up to 2024, for which 20 thousands of overseas superpower will be here. They will have to train Afghan security forces and take part in operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban militants.
The Americans are refusing not only permanent military bases in Afghanistan, but they are already stopping sudden raids on human settlements. In exchange, the Kabul regime pledges to provide the United States with the opportunity to use military facilities in the country. The agreement states: the United States recognizes the IRA as its main ally in the world from among non-NATO countries.
It is quite natural that in this treaty many in Russia have discovered the disclosure of the “true designs of Washington”, which will necessarily retain its military presence in the “heart of Asia”, from where it will carry the deadly threat to the Russian Federation, China, Iran and all progressive humanity.
Unfortunately, anti-American paranoia, mixed with total incompetence, has become simply dangerous in our country. Attributing to Washington literally devilish designs and similar supernatural opportunities seriously affects Russian politicians and the general mental health of Russians.
Meanwhile, the Kabul agreement has a much simpler explanation: the United States and its allies lost the war in Afghanistan (as we know, they are not the first). However, they want the defeat not to be complete and absolute, the situation has not returned, because of which in 2001, the campaign had to be started. By the way, if we recall the relatively recent past, we will have to state that the United States itself created the situation, but now there is no special point in talking about this. What is today is what it is.
Accordingly, the Americans hope to have at least some control over the situation in Afghanistan (and, apparently, in neighboring countries) with the help of “special forces-unmanned” operations that have been well developed in recent years. This is such a kind of high-tech version of the rebel war. It is best to fight partisans using partisan methods, which military experts have long known about. However, modern technological sophistication (Drones, satellite navigation, night vision devices, etc.) can significantly increase the effectiveness of counterguerrilla operations.
Apparently, Washington hopes to break the trend when the ruling regime of a developing country after the withdrawal of foreign “patron” troops collapses under the pressure of armed formations of local opponents in about two years . Moreover, the deployment of at least small groups of American special forces in Afghanistan should be no less important psychologically than in the military: even if the Afghan authorities and security forces retain the feeling that they were not left to fend for themselves and have someone to rely on in the event of a sharp deterioration .
However, the latter may be just an illusion. Special forces units are able to smash small militant units, and drones can destroy the leaders of the kaidists and the Taliban. But neither the special forces nor the UAVs will be able to contain the large-scale offensive of Karzai’s opponents, especially if Pakistan is behind them (and he will almost certainly support the massive onslaught of the Taliban, since it is Islamabad’s most important geopolitical tool). And then the remaining Americans in Afghanistan will have to flee. Naturally, the smaller, more compact and more mobile their forces will be, the easier and faster evacuation will take place. Apparently, this was the most important consideration (except, of course, the financial side) when the United States refused from the permanent bases in Afghanistan.
Extremely difficult task
In Russia, for some reason, the sacred significance of the concept of “military base” is attached. As if this is such a special option in a computer game, the receipt of which immediately provides the player with an automatic victory. Meanwhile, nothing in this case is automatically provided, on the contrary, the likelihood of the occurrence of enormous problems is great.
The value of a foreign military base is determined by how it allows you to deploy active hostilities in the event of an armed conflict. And this primarily depends on whether its supply with consumable materials (ammunition, fuel, food, medicines, spare parts), which in modern war "fly away" with great speed, is ensured. For example, the Russian bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia very significantly reinforce the grouping of Russian troops opposing Georgia, since they are pushed into the depths of Georgian territory, and the delivery of everything needed from Russia is reliably and guaranteed.
But our group in Transnistria does not create anything for Moscow except problems: if an armed conflict suddenly breaks out between the Russian Federation and NATO, it will not be possible to ensure its supply (it is blocked by Ukraine) and it will be lost immediately and completely.
By the way, the “NATO base in Ulyanovsk”, even if someone really planned to create such in Brussels or Washington, being inside Russia at a considerable distance from the borders of any of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, would not have lasted even two days if tried use the facility in the Volga region for aggression against Russia. NATO would not only lose one hundred percent of the forces and assets deployed in Lenin’s homeland, but would also suffer huge losses in aviation, trying to transfer the "air bridge" to a doomed base.
A similar situation would have been for the USA in Afghanistan if they had permanent bases there. This country, I remind you, has no access to the sea, and in dealing with the issues of supplying objects on its territory, Americans are dependent on the surrounding Iranian states (at least until the invention of teleportation, which is clearly not foreseen). Russia, China, the former Soviet Central Asian republics, Pakistan and Iran must provide their land routes and / or open their airspace for the transport of goods destined for the American group. However, Tehran is a fierce enemy of Washington, and in the capitals of other countries bordering Afghanistan with great pleasure will be engaged in blackmailing the United States, knocking out the most favorable conditions for providing American troops.
The task is doubly complicated by the fact that Afghanistan is in the Eastern, and the United States is in the Western Hemisphere. It is difficult to solve it even in the absence of any opposition.
Moreover, Pakistan may well become a second Iran, only worse, since Islamabad already has a nuclear weapon, and enough quality means of delivery. As mentioned above, if the Taliban move to Kabul, Pakistan will certainly support them (it is possible that parts of the Pakistani army will take part in the offensive). Naturally, Islamabad and Washington will be in a state of direct military confrontation. And then the supply of US bases will depend entirely on the countries of Central Asia, and also (at least indirectly) on Russia and China, which have a very large influence on the authorities of these states.
However, Beijing has recently finally established itself as the main geopolitical ally and patron of Islamabad, and also has very serious views of the natural resources of Afghanistan. Accordingly, the Celestial Empire will do everything to create maximum problems for the Americans. The position of Moscow in such a situation is more difficult to predict, but it is clear that complete dependence on Russia in such a critical situation is completely unacceptable for Washington.
Due to the circumstances described, it is completely absurd to fear that Americans from bases in Afghanistan will strike at Russia and China. More precisely, these objects can be used against the Russian Federation, if Beijing and Islamabad agree to this. Or against China and Pakistan, if such an operation is approved by the countries of Central Asia and Moscow. There is no third. Theoretically, none of these options is possible, but it is difficult to present their practical implementation in the foreseeable future. Even attacking Iranian territory from Afghanistan will be extremely difficult.
Thus, for reasons of geographic nature, full-fledged military bases in Afghanistan would become for the United States not an option, but a grave problem, requiring very large expenditures, in addition to being useless. That is why Washington refused to create these bases.
Rearguard battles
The special forces and UAV units left in Afghanistan will apparently be incorporated into the army and security forces of the Kabul regime. The Americans will be engaged in the implementation of the most difficult combat missions and will act as instructors for the Afghan wards, and also, of course, as overseers over them. Even now, desertion from the army and the police of the IRA is widespread. If the foreign contingent leaves, they can simply “evaporate” or fall into tribal formations. Moreover, such a development is quite likely even without tangible pressure from the Taliban, and if they launch a massive attack, the collapse of the security forces of the Karzai government is almost guaranteed. The presence of American special forces in the Afghan units will play a significant stimulating role to increase their stability in battle.
However, as mentioned above, all this will be effective only up to a certain limit. Of course, the presence of Americans will increase the combat capability of the Afghan units. But if the onslaught of the enemy formations in combination with religious and nationalist propaganda turns out to be powerful, then for every American soldier there will be a very real prospect of getting a bullet in the back. As if from their own. However, a good level of US special forces training should help reduce losses. But not to win the war.
Thus, the United States will be able to avoid a complete and final collapse in Afghanistan only by reconciling with the Taliban and Islamabad, which would have isolated Al Qaeda’s remnants (this was done in Iraq). It is extremely difficult to determine how realistic this is. The Taliban and their Pakistani patrons are well aware: time is playing against the Americans, so you just have to wait for the departure of the main forces of the enemy. They do not intend to go on a compromise in the form of admission to some power structures, because they want to get power entirely. It is extremely difficult to assume that in the remaining two years, the US troops, together with the contingents of their allies, will inflict such a heavy defeat on the Taliban that he will agree to concessions or they will not be needed by the Americans. If the anti-Taliban coalition did not achieve this in 12 years, will it really work out in just two years? Especially when the Europeans are quite frankly striving "to the exit", having lost the remnants of the already very insignificant desire to fight.
It is not possible to create Afghan armed forces capable of seriously opposing not only the Taliban, but also Pakistan. Attempting to solve this problem will require huge material costs from Washington without any guarantee of success. The gap in military capabilities between the Armed Forces of Kabul and Islamabad, as well as in the levels of military and moral-psychological training of military personnel is too large to be made up even with the help of the United States. Moreover, China stands behind Pakistan, which is also able to render assistance to its allies, and the possibilities of the PRC in this respect are now almost equal with the American ones.
In general, after the withdrawal of the Western coalition, the fate of Afghanistan will be decided in Islamabad and Beijing, it is absolutely inevitable. It is not excluded that Washington hopes to contain external expansion due to even the symbolic presence of American troops in the IRA. For a time, this factor will probably act, but not for long. First, the Taliban are like an internal Afghan force, which masks the fact of external interference. Secondly, in Islamabad and Beijing they will understand (or have already understood) that, for Western countries, leaving does not mean returning. At least so far there have been no precedents. Especially with the supply problems described above.
Fully leaving Iraq, the Americans will not return to it. And if in two years they keep some “limited contingent” in Afghanistan, it will never become the core of the new grouping. The question will be only when and how he leaves the IRA. The era of American hegemony is over, now the United States is fighting rearguard battles. Just for the time being, very few have realized this fact. But gradually awareness will come to all. And the struggle will begin for the “American inheritance”, in which there will be a mass of unexpected and extremely unpleasant (including for Russia) subjects.
Information