Is preparing a long-range strike on Iran. Will the battle give hypersonic "Phoenix" and "Bavara"?
Quite a wide resonance in the circles of political scientists, military experts and advanced readers news and analytical Internet resources caused the news about the possible preparation of the defense departments of the United States, Great Britain, Australia, as well as New Zealand to form an expanded coalition to deliver a massive missile strike on the most important strategic targets of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which may include a nuclear center in Tehran, scientifically and research centers in Yazd and Karaj, a uranium enrichment center in Natanz, as well as a research and production rocket group SHIG ("Shahid Hemat Industrial Group"). Similar information was released by the American ABC television channel, allegedly referring to high-ranking military officials in the Australian Cabinet last week. We have been listening to the incessant "fairy tales" of Tel Aviv and Washington about "planned" strikes on Iranian nuclear research facilities since 2003, when the United States accused Tehran of secretly developing nuclear weapons.
Indeed, in the Central Command of the US Armed Forces (CENTCOM) and the Hel Haavir Command, over a 15-year period, a number of strategic aerospace offensive operations in the IRI have been worked out using both tactical and strategic aviation (including deck), and underwater and surface components fleetthat are carriers of the Tomahawk strategic cruise missiles in the UGM / RGM-109E versions of the Tomahawk Block IV and TLAM-C / D. That's just before the successful implementation of a real theater of military operations, most of these concepts are still very far away even with the participation of the powerful air force backbone of the “Arabian coalition”, which finally joined the anti-Iranian camp of pro-American henchmen in 2015, after the conclusion of the unwritten Israeli-Saudi agreement against Tehran (we recall that in accordance with this document, Riyadh even ratified the document on the provision of the Israeli Air Force with Arabian airspace to strike Iran But it happened against the background of the commitment of the then President of the Obama Administration "nuclear deal" that is extremely controversial and the opinion of Israel, and the opinion of Saudi Arabia). Now, Washington, with its aggressive anti-Iranian rhetoric, once again fully and completely satisfies all the anti-Shiite demands of Tel Aviv and Riyadh. But why, then, are there still delays in the implementation of the strike plan against Iran involving the “Arabian coalition”? The answer here is simple.
The thing is that by the beginning of the 20-ies, the ground component of Iran’s air defense had evolved beyond recognition. The 4 anti-aircraft missile systems of the long-range C-XNUMPPMU-300 “Favorit” (using 2-fly-wing interceptors 6,6H48EXXUMNXX), 6, Tor-M2, Tor-X29, and the X-NUMX troop-rocket self-propelled self-propelled systems, Tor-M1, and the 10th-10th-10th-10th-10-byp Bavar-373 ", in the PFAR-radar of illumination and targeting with a 99% probability there is a modern Chinese radio electronic element base, as well as an impressive amount of radar systems for radar detection of the Russian, whale national as well as national development. In the list of the latter, it is necessary to note such products as high-potential radar early warning and targeting "Najm-802" (has 5120 transceiver modules, operates in the decimeter S-band and is designed to detect ballistic targets and small-sized high-precision elements weapons), the Russian meter radar ARLO "Sky-SVU" with AFAR, as well as radar SPRN type "Ghadir" meter range.
These radars are integrated into Iran’s network-centric missile defense system, which for several years already has its own headquarters near Tehran, covered by the above types of anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as other systems. Ghadir radars are capable of detecting not only tactical fighters of the USAF, Saudi Arabia and Israel, but also DF-3A and DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles of the royal Saudi strategic missile forces immediately after launch (at a distance of about 1100 km). As a result, the presence of Iranian radio engineering units of multi-band radar detection equipment in the western air direction (Persian Gulf) will allow to prepare in advance a flexible echeloned air defense system to repel high-intensity massive missile strikes from the United States Air Force and Navy, Hel Haavir and the Arabian Coalition.
Radar illumination and targeting of the "Bavar-373"
The effectiveness of repelling such attacks with the help of a network-centered air defense system can be judged by the events that took place on the Syrian theater of war 14 on April 2018, when the Buk-MXNUME, Pantyr-C2, S- systems in service with Syrian air defense forces 1 Pechora-125M, Kvadrat-M, Osa-AKM, and Strela-2 were able to intercept, according to official 10 data, the enemy’s cruise missile (among which were strategic underwater and surface-based Torahawk missiles, as well as tactical missiles are great th range «Shtorm Shadow»). The destruction of such a large percentage of enemy low-altitude missiles during the first strike may indicate only one thing: in the Syrian air defense, automated control systems of the Baikal-71МE, Polyana-D1М4, etc., are being actively used. Naturally, there are similar systems in Iran, and therefore the forces of the air defense of this state are capable of intercepting a much larger number of enemy anti-radar and cruise missiles during the first strike. Noticeably complicate the issue relevant, given the complex mountainous terrain of Iran.
Yes, and a powerful "otvetka" from the side of the missile units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which have Ghadr-110, Sajil-2, Shihab-3 and Khorramshahr medium-range ballistic missiles (with the ability to equip multiple-unit weapons with several combat units ) literally in the first hours of the escalation of hostilities, the US Air Force will deprive the airfields of Al-Dafra (UAE), Al-Udeid (Qatar), Isa (Bahrain), Al-Salem (Kuwait), Ahmed Al-Jaber (Kuwait) airfields. The last two runway canvases can be easily damaged even with ordinary long-range rocket artillery used by Iranian missile units deployed south of Abadan, because the distance from these lines to Kuwait is about 85 km.
That is why, based on the above risks, the Pentagon relies on the use of Australia as the main link for the massive missile attack on Iran that is being worked out today. The most interesting point in the statement of ABC journalists referring to Australian officials is to focus on using the intelligence services of the UK and Australia (part of the Five Eyes Alliance, along with Canada, the United States and New Zealand) as the main tool for providing the United States Central Command information on targets in Iran to be subjected to missile strikes. It is even theoretically difficult to imagine that the defense department and the commanders of various branches of the US military (with a huge range of radio, electronic, optical and infrared intelligence deployed on aerial and orbital carriers, not to mention intelligence intelligence) needed support from London and Canberra for this kind of information. Conclusion: In this anti-Iranian “game”, the States can assign a fundamentally different role to Australia, which has nothing to do with providing additional intelligence information (it has long been noted on digital strategic maps ready to be loaded into SKN-2440 inertial navigation systems of strategic rocket carriers B -1B "Lancer").
The only scenario considered here could be the use of Tindal and Amberley airbases as the main aerodromes of a jump to reach the US strategic bombers B-1B "Lancer" on the frontiers of the low-profile tactical cruise missiles AGM-158B JASSM-ER on Iranian nuclear and military-industrial infrastructure from the southern and southeastern airways (the Arabian Sea and Pakistan). The training of personnel and equipment of various Australian airfields for the deployment and maintenance of Lancers has been known for a long time, as indicated by the numerous joint RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Australian Air Forces) and United States Air Forces, during which several air bases regularly Not only the B-1B rocket carriers appear, but also the KC-10A “Extender” strategic air tankers (the regularity of such exercises can be easily found through Google). In March, 2016, a representative of the US Air Force in the Pacific, Lt. Col. Damien Pikart, announced the negotiations between the Pentagon and the Australian government on the deployment of these missile carriers in this country. According to him, the deployment of the B-1B squadrons of the 8 Air Force of the Global Shock Command of the United States Air Force in Australia will establish parity between the operational and strategic strike capabilities of the United States (and its allies) and the annually increasing military-technical threats in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Also, the machines should have a deterrent effect on the likely opponent
US Air Force B-1B strategic bomber missile arrives at the Amberley air base of the Royal Australian Air Force for a joint military-air exercise
Obviously, in this statement, the main threat implied a rapid strengthening of the combat capabilities of the PLA, as well as the expansion of the influence of the Naval Forces of the Middle Kingdom from the former boundaries of the waters of the South China and East China seas, up to the islands of the Second Chain, which includes the island The Republic of Palau, the island transshipment base of the Navy and the US Air Force Guam, as well as the island chain Bonin (Ogasawara). In the B-1B missile-carrying strategic bombers, the US Air Force command sees the only operational and most effective anti-ship "fist" capable of unleashing several tens or hundreds of modern AGM-158C LRASM anti-ship missiles on Chinese naval attack groups without the need to substitute a shock of the case. medium-range DF-21D carrier strike groups of the US Navy 7 operational fleet. But more recently, the deployment of “Lancers” on Australian air bases (especially on the northern Aving Tyndal) can be viewed from the perspective of a long-range raid to destroy Iran’s most important strategic sites. What are the advantages of such a basing?
First, unlike the closest air bases on the Arabian Peninsula that fall within the range of the Shihab, Sajil and Ghadr-110 missiles, Tyndal Air Base, which is more than 8800 km from Iran, is inaccessible to any type Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles. Secondly, we repeat, such a deployment provides for the B-1B squadrons to reach the launch lines of AGM-158B cruise missiles from the south and southeast operational directions, in which the density of the Iranian air defense divisions is far from the best, which means there is a mass of “gaps” (non-covered zones) in the missile defense of the southern sectors of the country's airspace. Moreover, due to the complex mountainous terrain in the areas of the Makran mountains and the Kukhrud ridge, many blind spots are formed for ground-based surveillance radar systems (Sky-SVU, YLC-8A, Fath-14, YL-11B, etc.) radio armed units of the Iranian Armed Forces, which is why the warning of the approach of hundreds of low-altitude cruise missiles will be minimal, which will create an extremely serious headache for the Iranian air defense system operators.
In this case, one can only hope for the effectiveness of the automated control system (ACS) of JY-10E anti-aircraft missile units, a certain amount of which was purchased by Tehran from the People's Republic of China. If a strategic object is covered by a layered air defense system based on several anti-aircraft missile systems (Bavar-373, Cube and Tor-M1), the proper operation of a highly productive automated control system can allow these complexes to distribute all the enemy’s air attacks as accurately as possible. according to the degree of threat, and then intercept them, even if they are found to be literally 4 — 7 minutes before approaching the battlefield. But even this is currently being written with forks on the water, as there is currently no information on hardware-software adaptation of Iranian Tor-M1 and other air defense systems to the JY-10E automated control system; It is most likely that such a link is only available for the “Bavar-373” air defense system, which was developed with the participation of specialists from CASIC in general and the Academy of Defense Technologies of China in particular. The effectiveness of the Iranian air defense system in terms of increasing the warning time of approaching enemy missiles from mountain ranges can be improved thanks to synchronization with the JY-10E ACS of the radar patrol and guidance aircraft “Baghdad-1” and “Adnan-2” capable of detecting a JASSM target -ER at a distance of 50 and 80 km, respectively, but there is no information about this linkage either.
Nevertheless, the Iranian Air Force also has a serious trump card - the Fakour-90 long-range air-to-air missiles, the serial production of which was announced on July 23, 2018 by the head of the Iranian defense department, Amir Khatami. Based on the photographs provided by the military news and analytical publication "Jane's 360", we have before us a natural copy of the American interceptor missile AIM-54A "Phoenix", the first production samples of which began to enter service with combat units of the Iranian Air Force, which have F-14A interceptors -90 / 95-GR back in January 1976. Then, against the backdrop of the Shah's period, military-technical cooperation between Washington and Tehran was at a height, and the head of the White House, Richard Nixon, decided to transfer to the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi an advanced interceptor capable of effectively resisting modern tactical aircraft of the Soviet design, which entered service in Iraq and other Middle Eastern states-strategic partners of the USSR.
The Fakour-90 missile, which, in parallel with the aviation version of the MIM-23B Hawk, is supposed to maintain the ammunition load of the Tomcat interceptors in service, has a normal aerodynamic configuration with a cruciform tail of a large sweep and elongation. Control is carried out by four rectangular tail aerodynamic rudders of a large area, which makes it possible to provide a more or less acceptable angular rate of turn for intercepting targets maneuvering with overloads of 6-8G (these include Israeli and Arabian F-15I "Ra'am" and F-15SA , which in the strike on Iran will still be assigned a secondary role: anti-radar strikes using AGM-88AARGM missiles, limiting tactical fighters by their maximum overload). Judging by the announced range of 150 km, a similar 2-mode engine will be used, comparable in thrust and duration of operation with the standard Mk.60 Mod.0 / 1. It is possible that Iranian specialists independently made a prototype, and then organized the serial production of this type of engine, or perhaps purchased similar single-chamber dual-mode solid propellants for R-33 missiles with similar geometric parameters (the R-33 rocket has a diameter of 380 mm, " Phoenix / Fakour-90 "- 381 mm) and adapted them to the" Phoenix "body. Nevertheless, the speed of "Fakour-90" remained at the same (almost hypersonic) mark of ≤5M (4800-5311 km / h), which means that any Israeli and Arabian fighters will be intercepted at a distance of up to 100 km, even on catch-up courses.
Fakour-90 long-range air combat missile
The only technological moment on which the effectiveness of the Fakour-90 air combat missile depends is the type of guidance system, as well as the presence or absence of the receiver of the radio correction channel and target designation from third-party radar tools. If Chinese heads were still “conjuring” over the renewed Iranian “Phoenix”, the rocket could get not only the standard active semi-active radar homing head, sharpened only for work with the onboard F-9A interceptor radar ANC, but also modern inertial a navigation system capable of targeting from third-party guidance tools through a two-way information exchange module of the European Meteor URVB type. In this case, Iranian F-14A can launch “Fakour-14” on the aggressor’s aircraft, and, without waiting for the transition to active homing, escape from dangerous contact with the AIM-90C-120 or Derby missiles.
But on this subject of data, unfortunately, not yet. Conclusion: despite the possibility of complete destruction of the US military infrastructure and the "Arab coalition" with a powerful rocket strike, the Iranian air defense system does not have the full radar coverage of its high-altitude airspace in the highlands, which could completely arrest the US and Allied missile from the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. Here we need an integrated approach to updating the fighter fleet of the national Iranian Air Force with such vehicles as Su-30MKI and Su-35С, as well as more "heavy" contracts for such air defense systems as Pantsir-С1 and С-300ВМ "Antey-2500" . Of course, the Bavars-373 should also make a significant contribution, but there are not so many of them in service.
If we evaluate the news of the planned strike on Iran from such a position as complete liberation in the Syrian Arab Republic of most of the enclaves of the opposition group “Free Syrian Army”, where the White Helmets cannot add their spoon to the geostrategic alignment, an attempt loosen the situation in the whole of Front Asia through the use of power tools against Tehran - the only reliable method for the United States that allows you to pull the blanket over to your side in the shortest time and then from the position and the forces to try to dictate their terms in the new round of negotiations with Vladimir Putin. After all, it was not by chance that Trump was advised to take a lingering time out at these meetings, which certainly cannot be explained by the hackneyed topic of the “witch hunt”.
Information sources:
http://forum.militaryparitet.com/viewtopic.php?id=21324
http://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/70308
http://www.airwar.ru/weapon/avv/aim54.html
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/27/07/2018/5b5a8dd19a794774a29c0896
https://lenta.ru/news/2015/05/15/b1austral/
http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/5403364
Information